Online Study Materials on
GLOBAL PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

48

"...beat their Swords into Plowshares"

Just like the United Nations all religions throughout their history have called for and worked towards a more peaceful world.

"Though one man conquer a thousand times in battle, he who conquers himself is the greatest warrior."

Dhammapuda

"Violence is the way of barbarians, non-violence is the way of men."

Mahatma Gandhi

"Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God."

Matthew 5:9 (New Testament)

"...let there be no hostility except to those who practise oppression."

Qur'an 2:193

"They shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks. Nation shall not lift up sword against nation. Neither shall they learn war any more."

Isaiah 2.4

Activities

1. Read the 'swords into plowshares' quote carefully. Put it into your own words to show that you understand its meaning. Think about why people and countries fight. List some of the reasons.

2. What does the word 'peace' mean to you? Draw a picture or write a poem about peace.

3. There are many quotations about peace from a variety of religions on this sheet. Choose one that you like or find another one. Sketch a sculpture that you would like made which would have your quote inscribed on it.

4. Play the game overleaf. Cut out the squares and make a game board. Use a dice or cards with a different number (1-6) on each one. They can be turned upside down and shuffled after each go. Now write about what you learned from the game.

5. There have been many steps towards peace and many steps backwards into war. How do you feel about the future? What sort of world would you like? How can the United Nations help? Why are countries reluctant to "beat their swords into plowshares"?

UN Fact-file: The United Nations working for Peace

Many countries donate gifts to the United Nations. The sculpture showing the man beating his sword into a plowshare was given by the Soviet Union and it stands in the park outside the UN building in New York. The words on the base of the statue read: "We shall beat our swords into plowshares."

The opening words of the United Nation Charter state *"We the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind...."* These are powerful words, and the UN's work is an attempt to turn that into reality. The Security Council is a place where problems can be discussed before wars start. Much of the work of the UN is aimed at eliminating the roots of conflict and building the foundations of lasting peace through economic and social development and the promotion of justice.

This is a game that requires you to use your imagination. You can try and win by getting to the end first, but the main purpose is to be creative and convincing. Design a board with at least 20 squares. Cut out the cards in this unit and place them face down. Take turns picking up a card. It will ask you to draw, write or act the meaning of a word or event. Some cards will require you to act or draw a word so that others can 'guess' what it is. Other cards will say 'Vote'—this means that the class must vote on whether you can move on or not, based on whether you have been convincing or creative enough. If successful, you move the number of squares indicated on the card. If not, you must try again when your turn comes. If the card does not have 'Vote' written on it, do not show it to the rest of the players. If you pull the same card as another person before you, you cannot repeat what he or she did. If needed you can put a time limit on each card. You can also make your own cards to add to the stack.

49

United Nations Member States as on January 2001

Following is the list of 189 Members States of the United Nations with dates on which they joined the Organisation:

Member	Date of Admission
Afghanistan	19 Nov. 1946
Albania	14 Dec. 1955
Algeria	8 Oct. 1962
Andorra	28 July 1993
Angola	1 Dec. 1976
Antigua and Barbuda	11 Nov. 1981
Argentina	24 Oct. 1945
Armenia	2 Mar. 1992
Australia	1 Nov. 1945
Austria	14 Dec. 1955
Azerbaijan	2 Mar. 1992
Bahamas	18 Sep. 1973
Bahrain	21 Sep. 1971
Bangladesh	17 Sep. 1974
Barbados	9 Dec. 1966
Belarus	24 Oct. 1945
Belgium	27 Dec. 1945
Belize	25 Sep. 1981
Benin	20 Sep. 1960
Bhutan	21 Sep. 1971
Bolivia	14 Nov. 1945
Bosnia and Herzegovina	22 May 1992

Botswana	17 Oct. 1966
Brazil	24 Oct. 1945
Brunei Darussalam	21 Sep. 1984
Bulgaria	14 Dec. 1955
Burkina Faso	20 Sep. 1960
Burundi	18 Sep. 1962
Cambodia	14 Dec. 1955
Cameroon	20 Sep. 1960
Canada	9 Nov. 1945
Cape Verde	16 Sep. 1975
Central African Republic	20 Sep. 1960
Chad	20 Sep. 1960
Chile	24 Oct. 1945
China	24 Oct. 1945
Colombia	5 Nov. 1945
Comoros	12 Nov. 1975
Congo (Republic of the)	20 Sep. 1960
Costa Rica	2 Nov. 1945
Cote d'Ivoire	20 Sep. 1960
Croatia	22 May 1992
Cuba	24 Oct. 1945
Cyprus	20 Sep. 1960
Czech Republic	19 Jan. 1993
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	17 Sep. 1991
Democratic Republic of the Congo	20 Sep. 1960
Denmark	24 Oct. 1945
Djibouti	20 Sep. 1977
Dominica	18 Dec. 1978
Dominican Republic	24 Oct. 1945
Ecuador	21 Dec. 1945
Egypt	24 Oct. 1945
El Salvador	24 Oct. 1945
Equatorial Guinea	12 Nov. 1968
Eritrea	28 May 1993
Estonia	17 Sep. 1991
Ethiopia	13 Nov. 1945
Fiji	13 Oct. 1970
Finland	14 Dec. 1955

France	24 Oct. 1945
Gabon	20 Sep. 1960
Gambia	21 Sep. 1965
Georgia	31 July 1992
Germany	18 Sep. 1973
Ghana	8 Mar. 1957
Greece	25 Oct. 1945
Grenada	17 Sep. 1974
Guatemala	21 Nov. 1945
Guinea	12 Dec. 1958
Guinea-Bissau	17 Sep. 1974
Guyana	20 Sep. 1966
Haiti	24 Oct. 1945
Honduras	17 Dec. 1945
Hungary	14 Dec. 1955
Iceland	19 Nov. 1946
India	30 Oct. 1945
Indonesia	28 Sep. 1950
Iran	24 Oct. 1945
Iraq	21 Dec. 1945
Ireland	14 Dec. 1955
Israel	11 May 1949
Italy	14 Dec. 1955
Jamaica	18 Sep. 1962
Japan	18 Dec. 1956
Jordan	14 Dec. 1955
Kazakhstan	2 Mar. 1992
Kenya	16 Dec. 1963
Kiribati	14 Sep. 1999
Kuwait	14 May 1963
Kyrgyzstan	2 Mar. 1992
Lao People's Democratic Republic	14 Dec. 1955
Latvia	17 Sep. 1991
Lebanon	24 Oct. 1945
Lesotho	17 Oct. 1966
Liberia	2 Nov. 1945
Libya	14 Dec. 1955
Liechtenstein	18 Sep. 1990

Lithuania	17 Sep. 1991
Luxembourg	24 Oct. 1945
Madagascar	20 Sep. 1960
Malawi	1 Dec. 1964
Malaysia	17 Sep. 1957
Maldives	21 Sep. 1965
Mali	28 Sep l960
Malta	1 Dec. 1964
Marshall Islands	17 Sep. 1991
Mauritania	27 Oct. 1961
Mauritius	24 Apr. 1968
Mexico	7 Nov. 1945
Micronesia (Federated States of)	17 Sep. 1991
Monaco	28 May 1993
Mongolia	27 Oct. 1961
Morocco	12 Nov. 1956
Mozambique	16 Sep. 1975
Myanmar	19 Apr. 1948
Namibia	23 Apr. 1990
Nauru	14 Sep. 1999
Nepal	14 Dec. 1955
Netherlands	10 Dec. 1945
New Zealand	24 Oct. 1945
Nicaragua	24 Oct. 1945
Niger	20 Sep. 1960
Nigeria	7 Oct. 1960
Norway	27 Nov. 1945
Oman	7 Oct. 1971
Pakistan	30 Sep. 1947
Palau	15 Dec. 1994
Panama	13 Nov. 1945
Papua New Guinea	10 Oct. 1975
Paraguay	24 Oct. 1945
Peru	31 Oct. 1945
Philippines	24 Oct. 1945
Poland	24 Oct. 1945
Portugal	14 Dec. 1955
Qatar	21 Sep. 1971

Republic of Korea	17 Sep. 1991
Republic of Moldova	2 Mar. 1992
Romania	14 Dec. 1955
Russian Federation	24 Oct. 1945
Rwanda	18 Sep. 1962
Saint Kitts and Nevis	23 Sep. 1983
Saint Lucia	18 Sep. 1979
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	16 Sep. 1980
Samoa	15 Dec. 1976
San Marino	2 Mar. 1992
Sao Tome and Principe	16 Sep. 1975
Saudi Arabia	24 Oct. 1945
Senegal	28 Sep. 1960
Seychelles	21 Sep. 1976
Sierra Leone	27 Sep. 1961
Singapore	21 Sep. 1965
Slovakia	19 Jan. 1993
Slovenia	22 May 1992
Solomon Islands	19 Sep. 1978
Somalia	20 Sep. 1960
South Africa	7 Nov. 1945
Spain	14 Dec. 1955
Sri Lanka	14 Dec. 1955
Sudan	12 Nov. 1956
Suriname	4 Dec. 1975
Swaziland	24 Sep. 1968
Sweden	19 Nov. 1946
Syria	24 Oct. 1945
Tajikistan	2 Mar. 1992
Thailand	16 Dec. 1946
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	8 Apr. 1993
Togo	20 Sep. 1960
Tonga	14 Sep. 1999
Trinidad and Tobago	18 Sep. 1962
Tunisia	12 Nov. 1956
Turkey	24 Oct. 1945
Turkmenistan	2 Mar. 1992
Tuvalu	5 Sep. 2000

Uganda	25 Oct. 1962
Ukraine	24 Oct. 1945
United Arab Emirates	9 Dec. 1971
United of Republic of Tanzania	14 Dec. 1961
United States	24 Oct. 1945
Uruguay	18 Dec. 1945
Uzbekistan	2 Mar. 1992
Vanuatu	15 Sep. 1981
Venezuela	15 Nov. 1945
Vietnam	20 Sep. 1977
Yemen	30 Sep. 1947
Yugoslavia	1 Nov. 2000
Zambia	1 Dec. 1964
Zimbabwe	25 Aug. 1980

50

Multifaceted Co-operation: A Post-Confrontational Perspective for the United Nations

At the beginning of a new year—indeed a new decade—it is of benefit to review the results of the one that has just ended. Looking back as interested parties over the mosaic of the United Nations' recent achievements, we single out the, day 15 November 1989. It was on that day that the General Assembly, on an initiative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, adopted by consensus resolution 44/21 entitled "Enhancing international peace, security and international co-operation in all its aspects in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations".

Wherein lies the significance of the Soviet-American initiative? For the first time in the history of the United Nations, the Soviet Union and the United States acted in concert to support this unique Organisation. Drawn up on the basis of the efforts of two great Powers, the resolution became their joint contribution to the strengthening of the United Nations, and thus a joint success. The manner in which the resolution was adopted is also important. Although the draft resolution was originally proposed by the Soviet Union and the United States, participation in it was, from the outset, open to other countries. Another 41 Member States joined in sponsoring it, and it was supported by the entire world community. In substance, the draft resolution affirms the cardinal Charter concept of collective action by Members of the Organisation in the interest of maintaining and enhancing international peace and security.

Let us emphasize right away that it would be utterly wrong to regard this resolution as some "covert" understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States in which only their interests are

represented. The very fact that the proposal was made—and it may have been something of a surprise to many—illustrates, indeed, that the USSR and the United States have renounced such an approach. Accordingly, the significance of the joint action lies in the fact that it symbolizes the beginning of a new and different phase in the activities of the USSR and the United States at the United Nations, a phase in which they work together in parallel: now, instead of maintaining a separate Soviet-American dialogue, they are incorporating it into the international debate.

No less important is the content of the resolution adopted. Action of this type puts an end to the cold war and confrontation at the United Nations. The habitual tendency to make proclamatory statements in United Nations proceedings, with propaganda battles and the cultivation of political intolerance, is becoming a thing of the past. The stereotyped behaviour whereby one side automatically, so to speak, rejected the other side's proposals is ceasing. The United Nations is entering the post-confrontational era, in which a new international order will be established, based on mutual understanding and active co-operation. It is no accident that at the most recent session of the General Assembly a number of other resolutions were also adopted by consensus, including two important international conventions of a humanitarian character: on the rights of the child and against the use of mercenaries.

The changes in the material and spiritual life of civilisation which are taking place before the eyes of the present generation are of an unprecedented character. The rapid scientific and technological progress of recent years, the takeoff of computer technology and the transformation of the world into a single information space, the trend towards interacting economic mechanisms and integration on a regional and global scale, and the growing gap between the levels of development of individual countries: all of these developments turn upside down the conventional wisdom about the present and the future. Transformations of a political character are also accelerating. Ideas of freedom and democracy, the supremacy of law, freedom of choice, and responsible behaviour on the part of States are uppermost in people's minds. Peoples, nations and countries are becoming politically more active, and an international community in the full meaning of that term is taking shape. Not finding convincing answers to the contemporary challenges which affect the very foundations of human existence, in the economic, political, humanitarian or any other sphere, means being left on the sidelines of world civilisation.

Thus, what is at issue is not simply security, but security in all its aspects and forms. Resolution 44/21 properly reflects this requirement. It is apparent from its text that peace, security and co-operation are inseparable. The combining of these three concepts is no accident; it embodies the essential characteristic of the kind of international relations now taking shape.

The maintenance of international peace and security is the central aim of the United Nations Charter. Today it is particularly important to understand the two-in-one, complex nature of authentic security. Such security is characterized not simply by the absence of war, but also by the presence of reliable and positive guarantees of the non-use of force and the establishment of comprehensive conditions for peaceful development. With the recognition of this complex and diverse character of security it can be seen that a multifaceted, comprehensive approach to the achievement of security is called for.

It also follows from resolution 44/21 that, in the new conditions, co-operation is the only possible course of action for States. Co-operation affords, for the first time, an opportunity—at the current level of world civilisation and with the United Nations Charter as a basis—to set the development of international relations on an evolving course that would allow the turbulent natural changes occurring in the world to be set within a framework of stability, so as not to break up existing structures or endanger peace and security. Cooperation, previously a sporadic phenomenon, is becoming the central principle of active joint creation and co-development. It is the proper response to the needs of an emerging peaceful era in international relations. It is characterized by positive, rather than negative, interaction by States in their efforts to ensure optimal external conditions for their development.

Precisely for this reason, the aim of the joint resolution is to mobilize Member States for the expansion of practical efforts to guarantee peace and security. The search for lasting security through power rivalry is unthinkable today. The States Members of the United Nations have spoken up unequivocally in favour of ensuring security in tomorrow's world through political means alone, that is to say, through consultations and co-operation within the framework of the United Nations, in all its bodies without exception.

Lastly, it follows from the resolution that peace, security and co-operation are regarded as a *single system,* based on the United Nations Charter. This constitutes a recognition of observable trends in today's world, which for all its diversity is increasingly becoming an indivisible

and interdependent whole. Our civilisation is a functioning system the component parts of which cannot be disturbed without causing harm to the working of the entire mechanism. In other words, peace cannot be maintained on a selective basis, in a particular region, without regard to peace in other parts of the world. The organic bond between national and international security is becoming increasingly apparent: when the diminished security of any country becomes unfavourable for other countries, this leads to a destabilisation of the overall situation, and hence it is only within the framework of global security that the security of an individual State can be reliably ensured. It is becoming obvious that, in an interdependent system, progress in a given society which is separated from other societies by artificial boundaries and ideological limits is in fact impossible.

It follows from resolution 44/21 that the system of peace, security and co-operation, must be backed by the authority and capabilities of the United Nations. In the past, when the work of the United Nations was greatly distorted, the Organisation served first and foremost as a forum for States to express their own—uncompromising—viewpoints. Today, however, the United Nations is becoming a forum of a different kind. In it, the representatives of the Member States speak, not to engage in polemics or make accusatory statements, but to promote co-operation among all States and ensure that decisions have a practical orientation. As the Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, observed in his most recent annual report on the work of the Organisation, "the assistance of the world Organisation is being sought as never before in its history". It is impossible not to share the Secretary-General's gratification at the "renewal of confidence in multilateralism and its agents".

Pacta sunt servanda. As far as the United Nations is concerned, the full and universal implementation of the United Nations Charter is today a doubly important goal. These are not simply words, but a deeply meaningful and significant statement. In the past, States not infrequently singled out some provisions of the Charter and ignored its other constituent parts. In the new, post-confrontational world, all the provisions of the United Nations Charter must be observed in letter and in spirit, and the Charter must be the corner-stone of all international action by States.

Such a corner-stone is now more necessary than ever. In a world that is changing so fast and at times so unpredictably, it cannot be dispensed with. (Some politicians say, not without foundation, that at

the time of the cold war they felt more at ease because, however paradoxical it may seem, peace, although tottering on the brink of a "hot" war, appeared more reliable and more stable.) Today changes may occur in any region. Resolution 44/21 is therefore aimed at promoting, through the United Nations, the stability of an international system undergoing change.

The Soviet Union and the United States, together with all the States Members of the United Nations, chose to act at a critically important and decisive moment. They reached the unanimous view that the basis of action should be unconditional respect for the Charter of the United Nations and the purposes and principles enshrined in it. This means closely following the course set as a result of carefully weighing the interests of all the countries which worked on framing the Charter at a time when there was real co-operation as the war against fascism ended. In addition, the United Nations itself must be developed, and relations must be renewed between the participants in its proceedings.

The direct joint search for solutions to quite specific and tangible issues on the agenda, at all levels of international interaction, is now becoming a decisive factor.

In the military-political sphere, a real breakthrough was achieved with the Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. This was the first agreement to affirm the organic nature of comprehensive security through the elimination of two classes of nuclear weapons.

The new security order can and must be established, not by the build-up of arms, but by their elimination. The results of the meeting in Malta between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States justify the hope that, by the next stage of their dialogue—in the second half of June 1990—the basic elements of a treaty on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive arms will be agreed on. Following that, in the course of the next few months, the treaty could be prepared for signature. In the course of this year, 1990, understandings are likely to be reached at the Vienna talks on the reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces. Work on a convention for the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons is nearing completion at Geneva.

New basic categories are emerging in the concept of disarmament. Accompanying conditions such as verification and openness are

assuming particular significance. The strictest and most reliable verification is needed in order to ensure the full confidence of all parties to the agreements. With the progressive introduction and refinement of multilateral procedures and the necessary extension of inspections to foreign military bases in the territories of third countries, the role of international verification, particularly under the auspices of the United Nations, will be enhanced.

Meanwhile, openness and *glasnost* will serve as the "philosopher's stone" of disarmament, facilitating an ordered transformation of military confrontation into arrangements to end such confrontation. Publication of the military doctrines and military budgets of States, their comparison and the establishment of agreed standards for the greatest possible transparency in military activity are becoming particularly topical issues. The Soviet Union is to take an active part in the work on this subject that is to be started by the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1990. We believe that the new world order should be based, not on military—including nuclear—restraint, but on restraint grounded in policy, law, transparency and verification, supported by the authority and facilities of the United Nations.

The winding down of military capabilities lends substance to the economic dimension of disarmament, and gives real content to the principle of disarmament for development. On the international level, we must ensure that resources are indeed released as a result of the reduction of military programmes and that a share of them is used to assist the poorest countries and to solve global problems. This process will certainly be facilitated now that the United Nations has begun to examine the problem of converting military production, covering both international scientific research and the exchange of relevant experience.

We are convinced that development is a decisive factor in shaping the construction of a new kind of world. From the political, moral and economic points of view, the general transition to reasonable sufficiency for defence purposes is capable of giving an enormous boost to positive processes in all other spheres of human existence. However, every aspect of security is increasingly being affected by non-military factors, such as the creation of a healthy environment, stable economic development, the defence of human rights, and freedom of information. The list could be continued: more and more new transnational problems are appearing on the agenda of the United Nations.

Just as important as the banning of war will be the prevention of an ecological crisis. Everyone is by now aware that a nuclear conflict would mean the immediate annihilation of mankind. A recent analysis of "nuclear winter" by the Secretary-General of the United Nations provided further scientific evidence of that fact. Nevertheless, the approaching ecological catastrophe could produce similar results. The only difference is that they would be gradual. It is therefore becoming increasingly evident that there is a vital and urgent need for special measures to conserve nature in every part of the planet, in order not only to save mankind from suffering irreparable losses but also to protect humanity against new destabilising factors in the development of international relations.

There is growing understanding that the field of humanitarian co-operation, with primary emphasis on the defence of human rights, must be free from confrontation. Democratic society as a whole has in common the same objectives as those enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the related International Covenants, and the task of bringing the internal practices of each country up to the level of recognized international standards is one that has to be assumed by all. Efforts in the new and delicate sphere of information have also been raised to a new level.

Problems which used to be considered as relating to the purely "internal" jurisdiction of States are now moving into the forefront of international discussions. The special session of the United Nations General Assembly on the campaign against narcotic drugs and the Assembly's adoption of a resolution stating the commitment of the United Nations to the prevention of international terrorism show that world society is not indifferent to these threats.

There is now a pressing need for efforts to deal with every aspect of international security. This is the most important facet of the comprehensive approach. What we need is not to establish linkages and aggregate problems, but to solve them simultaneously and in a co-ordinated manner in each specific sphere. This approach is consistent with the need to harmonize international relations and to strengthen the links between States in their search for world stability, including their quest for social and other types of change on a basis of widely diverse systems of development.

The point at which the new thinking that has emerged in the Soviet Union was incorporated into United Nations activities may be

said to have been four years ago, when the Soviet Union and certain other States proposed the establishment of a comprehensive system of international security, a proposal which was later consolidated and developed by Mikhail Gorbachev in his messages to the United Nations in 1987 and 1988. The Soviet Union unequivocally pronounced itself in favour of building a new world order, to be supported by the authority and facilities of the United Nations.

As may be seen, these initiatives have achieved their objective, which was, first and foremost, to usher in a broad democratic dialogue on the methods and principles whereby comprehensive security could be established, to enhance the role of the United Nations and eventually to lead the dialogue towards some sort of common denominator. This was done in a period of less than four years. Considering that the cold war lasted for over 40 years, this period is really quite short.

If we compare the proposal on comprehensive security with resolution 44/21, differences in wording immediately leap to the eye. But their essential meaning and basic provisions are entirely consistent. Previously, the primary emphasis was on the need to unite the efforts of States with a view to establishing comprehensive security; the resolution also addresses the need to strengthen the system of peace and security. Previously, the idea of a comprehensive approach was given prominence; now another—possibly more precise—expression is to be found: "multifaceted approaches". In other words, the essential meaning remains the same, but language has been found which suits all States Members of the United Nations.

In the course of discussions it proved possible to identify a number of areas of agreement, which now provide a clear framework for the immediate trends in the activisation of multilateralism. These are to strengthen the principal organs of the United Nations, to enhance the possibilities for the conduct of United Nations peace-keeping operations, to strengthen the role of international law and actively involve the International Court of Justice in this process. The essential purpose of these measures is to promote the collective search for ways and means to increase the effectiveness of the United Nations through the full and non-selective implementation of the provisions of its Charter and the active utilisation of its mechanisms and procedures. Further ahead lies the genuine possibility of proceeding to concentrate the efforts of the United Nations on preventive diplomacy and developing its ability to take effective measures to prevent differences of opinion from growing into conflicts.

As a result, the United Nations is now witnessing its own renaissance. This is being noted by all Member States, as well as by the Secretary-General. It may be said, without exaggeration, that the Organisation has now begun—for the first time since 1945—once again to operate under external conditions comparable to those which were seen as a premise underlying its structure by its founder Members. The trend towards dialogue and the solution of problems by means of negotiations—in other words, multilateralism and the rule of law and order—must prevail over approaches based on military methods and the use of force and over reliance on unilateral action. The United Nations, having entered with vigour into the world-wide processes of renewal, is now to some extent becoming their catalyst and a powerful force for their acceleration.

A universal instrument has also emerged: the solution of problems by political methods and by means of co-operation, together with a determination to ensure that interests are balanced. In the efforts to harmonize interests, the patterns of parliamentary diplomacy are now assuming particular significance. Parliamentary diplomacy involves refusing to think in terms of outdated stereotypes, engaging in civilized dialogue from the speakers' rostrum and searching persistently behind the scenes for solutions to disagreements. In the case of the United Nations, it was essential that preliminary consultations should be held in each and every body that has a bearing on the balance of interests.

We are convinced that the world, in breaking with the philosophy of hostility and confrontation, is becoming more balanced, mature and wise. No longer is it an obligation to endure manifestations of national egocentricity, high-handed ways or any kind of *idee fixe.* It is now in the interests of all that policies should always be designed to strengthen the international community and to promote its survival and development.

In order to ensure the transition to political approaches using negotiating mechanisms and law, military prescriptions must be rejected, and ways of thinking generally demilitarized.

While in the last century it was the practice to describe political subjects in terms of the theatre (the international scene, the actors and performers on the stage, the curtain), the twentieth century has seen the general adoption of concepts borrowed from military theory, such as those of an offensive, a front, a breakthrough. The need is now urgently felt—and *perestroika* has clearly illustrated this—for a fresh

new language of diplomacy which both reflects the creative values shared by all and operates in accordance with the interests of nations and States.

The principle of universal membership in the United Nations and related international organisations is also viewed today in a new light. The United Nations and its system have now become the only ramified mechanism for interaction between States which exercises a real influence on the external and internal political practice of any given country. Full-fledged participation in United Nations activities not only meets the interests of the world community as a whole in identifying multifaceted approaches to a strengthening of the system of peace, security and co-operation but also fulfils the long-term interests of each participant in the maintenance of international contacts. "To practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours": that phrase from the preamble of the Charter serves as a logical prelude to the provision whereby membership in the Organisation is open to all peace-loving States. The task ahead— that of ensuring a prolonged period of peaceful development for mankind—is more than ever inseparable from realising in practice the principle of universality of the United Nations and erasing the heritage of the cold war and of colonial and racist oppression.

There is also a need to ensure the active participation in the United Nations of all the basic groups of States. The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries is an important force in the Organisation, and its voice should be heard to the full, not only in the General Assembly but also in the Security Council. A special role is now played by public, non-governmental organisations, which must work in close contact with the United Nations, keeping open a permanent channel of communication with the broadest masses of the population in different countries. A commitment to reaching consensus on the greatest number of problems under consideration is the most effective way to further the progressive development of international organisations. The positive results of the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly confirm this. It is no coincidence that at that session more resolutions were adopted by merging separate draft resolutions submitted initially by different sponsors. In other words, the general ethos of conducting international affairs is entering an entirely new phase; and there is a growing readiness to consider the arguments put forward by the other side and to take them into account in refining one's position.

Of course, politicians are still faced with the task of reaching a sort of "consensus about consensus". But it is already clear to us now that a consensus, by its legal status, occupies a special place among the various means at the disposal of multilateral forums. By virtue of its effectiveness it differs from recommendations and is similar to binding decisions, in view of the moral authority of the world community on which it is based. For precisely this reason, it is important always to apply the rule of consensus during both the period of drafting a document and the stage of implementing its provisions once it is adopted. We see consensus as a means to promote responsible behaviour by States and a guarantee that the interests of all will be considered, which opens up the possibility of the participation of each and every party in the taking of major decisions. The right of veto of the five permanent members of the Security Council also appears in a different light through the prism of consensus— the veto here exerts a positive influence and forces the permanent members of the Council to reach agreement among themselves.

This dramatic breakthrough is, of course, not easy to achieve; there are still many difficulties to be overcome in revitalising the United Nations. We cannot rid ourselves of the past immediately. There are still instances of reversion to power politics and a bipolar view of the world, and this influences the actions of many States within and outside the United Nations.

A critical re-evaluation of past experience is needed to overcome outmoded stereotypes, and create the conditions necessary to prevent a repetition of past mistakes. Since April 1985 in the Soviet Union we have been evaluating the history of our activities in the United Nations from this standpoint. We see that we sometimes used a position of strength in a way that reduced the effectiveness of the Organisation. We believe that the urgent task of diplomacy now is to consider objectively the prevailing attitudes in the United Nations, to initiate a dialogue involving the entire spectrum of the world's political forces, and to realize that in solving problems affecting all mankind we do not have and cannot have opponents, only allies and partners.

But we do not claim a monopoly with regard to the need for self-criticism. All States, and particularly the nuclear Powers that are permanent members of the Security Council, must take a critical look at their past policies, correct them where necessary and focus this analysis on the future. Ignoring the will of the United Nations is today, as in the past, inadmissible.

The ability and readiness to undertake self-criticism is perhaps only one of the elements of a truly up-to-date policy. The efforts of all are needed to consolidate a radical breakthrough in world affairs and create guarantees ensuring the irreversibility of positive changes. The cumulative effect of joint action by peoples, States, their blocs and groups—East and West, North and South—is necessary.

It is important to bring about also a change of style in relations between States. One-sided approaches and the posturing of a schoolmaster lecturing others have little effect today. If accompanied by pressure involving the use of force, then such actions are unacceptable and dangerous. No, a mature and wise civilisation requires, not instructions from one side, but rather collective efforts, in the spirit of a "new internationalism", which is responsible and devoid of double standards.

The post-confrontational era requires as never before the intelligent management of world affairs. The period of joint creation and development is precisely what constitutes, in our view, a real challenge for politicians and diplomats. Finding a multifaceted approach leading to a comprehensive solution of the problems confronting mankind is an extremely complicated task, one which is in no way comparable to the simplistic pattern of relations during the cold-war period. It demands of those participating in the task constant work, creative initiative and a good deal of common sense. The ultimate common goal—bringing about a marked change in the overall picture of the world through co-operation—cannot be compared in terms of its importance with the selfish interests of individual countries and blocs that prevailed earlier.

The path to achieving this goal is a long one, since adapting to new realities is never an easy matter. It is encouraging, however, to note that dialogue has already made it possible to single out a number of common connecting elements in a comprehensive approach to security. These include the demilitarisation of the thinking and behaviour of States, the democratisation and humanisation of international relations, and the elimination of ideology from relations between States.

The vulnerability of the contemporary world faced with man-made means of destruction has focused attention on the urgent need to demilitarize by gradually reducing arms and moving towards the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Mankind must once and for all reject war as a means for resolving political and economic differences and ideological disputes between States.

The democratisation of international life requires the elimination of exclusive clubs, including the nuclear club, and the participation of one and all in working out solutions. It is closely linked to the task of humanising international relations, since the human dimension is now becoming particularly important as a goal and a means of achieving a safe world. A non-nuclear and non-violent world would tend also to be a more just world. One of the functions of the human factor in formulating policy is to strengthen the moral basis of the policy. Our new thinking holds that man deserves a better fate than being the hostage of nuclear weapons. His living conditions and political position are increasingly determining the direction in which international relations will develop and the way in which the problems that arise in them are solved.

Eliminating ideological barriers from such relations has become a prerequisite for improving co-operation along new lines. The primacy of law, respect for human rights, and the progress of society as a whole are essential to eliminating ideology from relations between States and the rejection by States of claims to knowledge of the "absolute truth". Of course, this does not entail abandoning one's views and convictions. The fundamental right of peoples to choose their own path of development is unquestionable. The human right to freedom of conscience, belief and opinion, enshrined in universally recognized international instruments, is just as inalienable. This involves the inadmissibility of making the clash of ideological views into a battlefield between States. General moral principles must be put into practice by means of one's own example and the methods used by countries in their foreign and domestic policies.

Eliminating ideology from multilateral interaction requires the deliberate rejection of ideological attitudes towards machinery for co-operation; it is necessary to overcome the artificial politicisation of the activities of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, focus their attention on carrying out specific tasks in accordance with their mandates, and raise the professional level of their activities.

A multifaceted and comprehensive approach requires that greater attention should be given also to the question of administering the Organisation itself, an issue which has become acutely political in nature. The task is to make optimum use of the United Nations financial and material resources, co-ordinate and rationalize the activities of international organisations, and eliminate duplication and overlapping.

The post-confrontational period requires practical steps. Only convergent unilateral, bilateral and multilateral actions can give assurance that the system of peace, security and co-operation laid down in the Charter of the United Nations will become an effective barrier preventing a return to confrontation and provide an assurance that the twenty-first century will be marked by a new approach to developing our civilisation as a unified whole by combining all the finest achievements of mankind.

Yes, the model social system of the third millennium will be characterized first of all by a synthesis of positive experience and the United Nations will become the forum for this process. This synthesis is creating progressive norms that can be used in all countries in order to establish constitutionally governed States and civil societies. The synthesis represents the new culture of a united and interdependent world which, on the one hand, rejects rapacious behaviour, condemns such "breaches" of civilisation as fascism and racism, and repudiates oppression and violence; and on the other hand, creates a culture based on tolerance, diversity and recognition of the right of different ideological and political viewpoints to exist regardless of whether they are supported at any given time by a majority or a minority.

The 1990s, undoubtedly, must be a time of change, a time for entering a peaceful era. They must also be a period in which the world community makes determined efforts to create guarantees for ensuring stability and making positive changes irreversible. Not everything is easy in the world and not everything is clear-cut in the discussions conducted in the United Nations. Much work remains to be done in order to ensure that General Assembly resolution 44/21 shall be implemented in all fields of activity of the United Nations.

The adoption of this resolution was not a goal in itself. It is designed to promote the further expansion of dialogue, cooperation through specific measures and greater co-ordination of concrete actions by States.

The main thing, in our view, is to ensure that the resolution on enhancing international peace, security and cooperation represents a further stage in the dialogue about a fundamentally new, post-confrontational world order based on the Charter of the United Nations.

51

The Role of the United Nations in Disarmament

It is particularly appropriate that this Conference on "The United Nations, Disarmament and Security: Evolution and Prospects" is being held here in Moscow. In recent years, the Soviet Union has been an advocate of constructive change in international relations as well as a source of creative thinking about the possibilities of multilateral diplomacy. An apt example of such creative thinking is the Soviet Government's recent memorandum "The United Nations in the post-confrontation world", which contains many ideas that deserve careful study. When the history of our present period is written, it may well conclude that Soviet efforts were instrumental in remaking the United Nations into the kind of instrument for peace and security that its founders truly intended.

What brings us together is a shared conviction that multilateral arms limitation and disarmament offer a gateway to a more peaceful, secure world. Very few of the enduring security problems of the past and very few of the emerging ones facing the world today can be solved without the co-ordinated actions of large numbers of States. Thus, multilateralism is not some lofty Utopian goal; it is not a favour that strong States offer to weak ones; and, above all, it cannot be regarded as an option that we pursue at our leisure. Rather, multilateralism has become an urgent necessity—one that must engage the creative energies of all States.

It is a truism to say that we live in a period of unprecedented change. The events of the past year in Europe, and more recently in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere, continue to reverberate through the United Nations. The Organisation is being called upon as never before to act collectively against aggression; to mediate disputes; to keep the

peace; to promote democracy; to defend human rights; and to fight poverty, under-development and environmental decay. Throughout the United Nations there is a renewed sense of pride and purpose. The question we need to address here is how to find the proper "fit" between disarmament diplomacy and these other security-related activities that will define the role of the United Nations in the next decade and beyond.

Frankly, the task of forging collective global action on disarmament in this new era is going to put our strength and our wits to a severe test. While the end of the cold war is immensely promising, it has not ushered in a millennium of peace; the road ahead is still strewn with obstacles. Regional instability, ethnic violence and religious strife are obvious factors for continuing discord; so too is the hitherto unparalleled militarisation of many societies which has become a central characteristic of our age. Given these challenges, it is imperative that we re-examine both the ends and the means of the United Nations' disarmament activities from a fresh perspective. In this spirit I should like to address two related questions. First, what are the proper lessons to be drawn from past experience? Secondly, what kind of steps do we need to take to achieve progress in the future?

Lessons of the Past

The path of global arms limitation and disarmament negotiations over the past three decades is so familiar to all of you that it scarcely requires even a brief summary. From the early 1960s to the mid-1970s—that is about one half of the past thirty years—an impressive number of multilateral agreements were brought into force. The major milestones are well known—they include the partial test-ban Treaty, the outer space Treaty, the non-proliferation Treaty, the sea-bed Treaty, the biological weapons Convention, and other agreements.

Looking back, many observers regard these years as something of a *belle epoque* for multilateral disarmament diplomacy in the United Nations system. The work was substantive and wide-ranging; global forums were the centre of world-wide attention; and everyone sensed that the stakes were high. Most important, perhaps, the governing concepts for global diplomacy were clear and compelling: wherever weapons of mass destruction are not yet deployed, do not deploy them; and whoever does not yet possess such weapons, do not acquire them. These were the goals of global diplomacy, with formal agreements as the primary means.

From the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, the pattern of diplomacy was starkly different. Bilateral diplomacy between the two major Powers and European arms-control negotiations moved to centre-stage, leaving multilateral forums in the shadows. The momentum towards new global agreements slackened noticeably, and criticisms were heard that the multilateral agenda was being skewed towards grandiose or over-ambitious goals and away from long-standing priorities such as a halt to nuclear testing and chemical disarmament. Moreover—and this is important—the character of the diplomacy itself was changing. From the number of review conferences and the outcome of the last two special sessions devoted to disarmament, it would seem that while our agendas and our forums were growing in size, our workload was becoming ever more managerial and procedural in nature.

Amidst all of these changes—indeed perhaps in part because of them—multilateral disarmament diplomacy lost its clear conceptual focus. Comprehensive prohibitions and truly preclusive agreements have not proved to be very practicable outside the category of weapons of mass destruction. It is one thing to preclude the stationing of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed or in orbit, but quite another thing even to agree on whether or how to address a broader range of military activities occurring in international domains such as outer space or the high seas. Furthermore, because of problems that scarcely need elaboration here, the idea of using the non-proliferation Treaty as a model for future agreements has not proved very attractive to a substantial part of the international community, notwithstanding the impressive number of states that are now parties to that agreement.

I would like to think that we have left the frustrations of this earlier era behind. In the next few years we have a new opportunity to reinvigorate multilateral diplomacy; to get it back on track; and to give it a clear direction. Fortunately, the dissolution of tensions between East and West will help matters considerably; we have already seen a marked improvement in the atmosphere of our debates. At the same time, to seize the opportunities that may exist, I think we are well advised to heed several important lessons of the past.

First, we must be more discerning in the way we define success or failure in our multilateral disarmament endeavours. If experience teaches anything, it is that progress cannot be measured solely by the number and frequency of new agreements or conventions. Treaties are not like trophies; we do not mount them on walls or put them up on shelves where they gather dust. Rather, treaties require constant

vigilance to ensure compliance with them and they represent but one step—albeit an important one—in a continuous process of activity.

Indeed, what we sometimes casually refer to as the multilateral process deals as much with identification of issues, determination of priorities and choice of mechanisms as with reaching agreements. In the field of disarmament, this "process" may go through several phases. It often starts with an in-depth study of the issue by small groups of experts, where problems are identified and alternative approaches are suggested and clarified. It then moves to a second, wider deliberative stage, where consensus among States is forged on the need for active negotiation. Should consensus be reached, active negotiations are then conducted in a third stage, which is crowned by the completion of an agreement.

A fourth stage occurs when an agreement is implemented. Here, the initial institutional arrangements for reductions and data-exchange are carried out, A fifth stage involves monitoring and the verification of compliance. Problems which arise may be dealt with through consultation among parties and, if necessary, enforcement activity aimed at offsetting violations. Finally, in a sixth stage, an agreement may be modified, amended or extended as appropriate, through a periodic review process.

I am not suggesting that the disarmament process is always as neat or orderly as this. The essential point I wish to make is that in charting our future efforts, we should measure progress by the kinds of improvements and innovations we can make in each of these steps. Activities such as expert studies and keeping treaties up to date are not nearly as glamorous as negotiating new agreements; but they are vital from the standpoint of keeping the disarmament process attuned to changing political realities.

A second lesson is that multilateralism in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament requires a dynamic and effective bilateral process. Many observers tend to see bilateral and multilateral endeavours as being competitive rather than complementary. But the kind of bilateralism to which I refer is quite different from that which we have seen in the past fifteen years or so. Concretely, it means that the two major Powers must reach accord on two principal issues.

One issue concerns the scope for future global negotiations, be they on outer space, on navies, on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, on arms transfers, on advanced weapons technology, or on the many

other current issues. Most existing agreements would not have been completed without a degree of prior consensus at the bilateral level on basic objectives and on a strategy for assuring the active participation of key states in such multilateral negotiations. I wish I could say that such a strategy exists now but, to be frank, I see little evidence of it apart from the notable exception of that relating to chemical disarmament.

The other dimension of bilateralism concerns the conduct of North-South relations. The major Powers must be able to agree on the types of compromises that they are prepared to make with the larger community of States, including other developed countries, in the interests of obtaining fair and workable global agreements. As I noted earlier, it is often argued that the non-proliferation Treaty is fatally flawed as a model for future negotiations because it divides the world into "have" and "have not" States. While I understand the reasoning behind this criticism, I do question its implications for policy.

To my mind, the appropriate point to be drawn from the NPT experience is not that restrictions aimed at non-proliferation cannot work *a priori* but rather that obligations undertaken by nuclear weapon States in order to balance the basic inequality accepted by "have not" States were prone to differing interpretations. Thus, we have endured numerous and at times confrontational debates over what actions would constitute a minimum level of compliance with article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty as it pertains to good-faith efforts to halt the nuclear arms race and to proceed with disarmament.

In the future, global regimes based on the principle of offsetting inequalities may well be necessary in addressing certain global insecurities. But they cannot work without clear understandings on how to apportion the burdens and benefits of agreements—and such understandings, I submit, cannot be reached without effective and mutually beneficial interactions between bilateral and multilateral realms.

A third lesson to be drawn from recent history pertains to the machinery of disarmament. It is that institutional adjustments and fixes should not be allowed to divert our creative energies away from the truly hard issues of gaining agreement on substantive matters. Granted, steps to streamline and rationalize the work of our various forums should be carefully considered and vigorously pursued where appropriate; and we should always be conscious of the need to review

the mandates and procedures of existing bodies to keep them focused and relevant. However, there is a clear distinction between these kinds of pursuits and more far-reaching restructuring activity, which can be costly in terms of time, effort and financial resources.

One of the unheralded accomplishments of the past decade is the degree to which the machinery within the United Nations system has become well-integrated and robust. There is a logical correspondence between our existing mechanisms and the six stages of the disarmament process that I mentioned earlier. Bodies such as UNIDIR, the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, groups of governmental experts and the Secretariat can contribute in different ways to the research and analytical phases; the First Committee, the special sessions, and of course the General Assembly act as our deliberative "agenda-setting" bodies; and the Disarmament Commission is becoming a useful place to deal with selected issues that are worthy of special attention but do not as yet lend themselves to formal negotiation.

In the "treaty-making" phase of the process, the Conference on Disarmament retains its unique character as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body with a representative membership, including the five permanent members of the Security Council. And of course within the ambit of particular agreements we have achieved well-developed procedures and mechanisms for review, consultation and amendment.

The one phase of the process that still lacks a clear institutional focus is that of monitoring and verification. The trend in this area has been to utilize or create institutions for treaty-specific verification purposes, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the prospective organisation for the prohibition of chemical weapons to be set up under the convention. Because monitoring is a highly technical activity that is performed for the benefit of the parties to a treaty, there is inherent logic in the idea of relying upon single-mission institutions. This is not, of course, to exclude the longer-term possibility of a centralized verification institution within the United Nations system. But such an organisation would of course have to prove itself effective on legal, political, cost-effectiveness, and perhaps even technical grounds, and as our Group of Experts concluded in their study on the role of the United Nations in verification, such a development is best seen as an evolutionary process.

In the meantime, the United Nations can work in concert with interested States in alleviating verification concerns and setting priorities. As our Group of Experts noted, valuable experience has been gained from the Secretary-General's fact-finding activities that may be applied selectively to various agreements, as and when parties deem it appropriate. In addition, the Secretariat is taking steps to strengthen the United Nations disarmament data base, especially in the arms expenditure area as well as in the chemical weapons area. Practical steps such as these can help to deepen Member States' knowledge of the intricacies of monitoring and verification, and thereby enable them to participate more effectively in the operation of treaties to which they are a party.

Prospects for the Future

How might the role of the United Nations in disarmament evolve in the future? One of our most distinguished Secretaries-General, Dag Hammarskjold, once said that the United Nations is

> "... part of the great pattern of change in our time. It functions as a tool in the hands of Governments and peoples and individuals, in their effort to give that change a constructive direction."

In this post-cold-war era, Hammarskjold's words capture the essence of our future endeavours. The rapid changes that are now occurring are simply too pervasive and all-encompassing to be met with a "business as usual" attitude. Together, we must truly take steps to give change a constructive direction. This task requires that we adapt and adjust multilateral diplomacy to the current sources of conflict and tension in the world, and that we be open to new methods and techniques for achieving our common goals of peace and security at the lowest possible levels of armament.

By virtue of its universal character, the United Nations is the most appropriate and indeed the only place where global consensus on key security and disarmament issues can be forged. Yet, the Organisation's precise roles cannot be summed up in short phrases or "sound-bites" that appear on the evening news. They involve aspects of a global sounding-board, agenda-setting, co-ordination, research, expert study and evaluation, fact-finding, mediation, and active negotiation, as well as information and education. Moreover, the job of strengthening these functions requires that we exercise judicious judgement on how to allocate our time and resources fairly among a growing number of priorities that vie for attention each year.

Let me briefly touch upon two critical areas where such judgements are needed.

First, we need to become more adept at managing the increasingly complex interrelationships between global negotiations and regional peace and stability. The great virtue of global multilateralism is that it offers all States, in every region, a chance to speak out on those issues that confront humanity as a whole. But there is also growing recognition of the fact that security problems are region-specific and are often best addressed with region-specific solutions. This applies increasingly to conventional armaments, ballistic missiles and arms transfers.

The United Nations has a responsibility to promote the principles of restraint and reciprocity in all regions. Obviously, we must be sensitive to the characteristics that distinguish one region from another: the kinds of techniques for disarmament and confidence-building that apply in one area may not be appropriate elsewhere. Nevertheless, the United Nations could help to strengthen peace and security:

- by formulating general guidelines for regional negotiation;
- by examining the lessons of existing regional approaches, for instance in Europe, and their applicability elsewhere;
- by promoting regional dialogues within forums that are already in existence at the global level; and
- by applying the methodology of arms limitation and disarmament to selected peace-keeping and peace-making activities, such as those in Central America and other areas.

In all these endeavours, I regard the regional and global forms of multilateralism as complementary and mutually reinforcing. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that one could exist without the other.

A second choice that is pivotal from the standpoint of future prospects involves the question of formal agreements on the one hand, and that of co-ordinated, unilateral measures on the other. Quite obviously, not every issue that comes before Member States at the United Nations will have as its ultimate solution the entry into force of a formal treaty. Negotiations are often slow and painstaking; and at times it is simply easier for countries to take sensible unilateral actions in a multilateral context than to hammer out every last detail of negotiated agreements that have the same effect.

Using the tools of transparency, such as data-exchange and standardized reporting formats, some of which are already available

at the United Nations, Member States can take useful steps to clarify intentions and build confidence as a first step towards harmonising national policies in the interests of restraint. This approach applies most clearly to military expenditures, defence conversion, arms transfers, and other issues where the rationales and justification for specific actions may vary widely among Member States.

Time has permitted me to touch upon only a few of the many issues that bear upon the question of future directions in disarmament and arms limitation. As I said at the outset, the challenges that lie ahead are substantial ones. No one can ignore the very real threat of conflict that looms over certain parts of the world. Over the longer term, however, I am optimistic about our prospects for success. The futility of over-armament and the logic of restraint are now more widely understood in the world than ever before in human history. We at the United Nations have both a duty to act and, I believe, the will to succeed.

52

The General Assembly

The hall is a giant oval, 165 feet (50 metres) long by 115 feet (30 metres) wide. At one end, two flights of steps lead to a podium of dark green marble. Behind it the wall looks like beaten gold from old Byzantium, and on either side long golden slats converge like the sides of some giant tepee, rising to a blue dome 75 feet (23 metres) above. It is in this hall, part of a complex of buildings set along the eastern edge of Manhattan in New York, that the General Assembly of the United Nations meets. The only one of the Organisation's five deliberative "principal organs" to have every Member State represented, the General Assembly has been called the "open conscience of humanity" and the "town meeting of the world". It meets in regular session once a year, from the third Tuesday in September until, usually, the third week of December, although the session may be resumed, depending on pressure of business, at a later date.

For nearly four decades now, the General Assembly has reflected and often been part of the major dramas of the world. War and pestilence, famine, flood and storm, the death of great leaders and the dissolution of empires have all been noted in its proceedings and formal resolutions. Though parliamentary in appearance and procedure, the Assembly differs from national legislatures in that most of its resolutions are recommendatory to Member States. Only resolutions on the budget and personnel of the Organisation are binding. But despite this, the Assembly has initiated action—political, economic, social, legal and humanitarian—that has touched the lives of millions in countries around the globe. In many cases it has been instrumental in shaping the policies of Governments and world opinion. Even when its resolutions do not result in action, they tend to reflect the levels of international consensus, identify elements of controversy and indicate the nature and magnitude of world problems. It is an enormous

achievement that the Assembly meets at all: that delegates speaking a multitude of languages and from every kind of cultural and social background, motivated by ideologies not merely different but often seen as inimical to each other, can assemble in civility, discuss their problems, and frequently, decide on co-operative action.

Each session begins with the President of the last session of the General Assembly, or the chairman of his country's delegation, gavelling the meeting to order, the delegations seated from the front of the hall in an alphabetical order determined prior to each session by drawing by lot the name of the first country to be seated at the right of the President.

The President asks for a moment of silence and the delegates stand in prayer or meditation. The President then proposes the names of the nine States selected to 'be the members of the Credentials Committee entrusted with the task of checking that everyone present is properly authorized to be there. The names are usually accepted without further ado, and the Assembly passes on to the election of the President. This is supposed to be done by secret ballot and there are no nominations, but the results are usually predetermined by wide consultations. Since 1963 the post of President has rotated among the five regional groups that have evolved in the Assembly *(see list below)*. Once a regional group decides on its candidate, the election is a formality; since 1977 it has been by acclamation, without any vote, except in 1981 and 1983, when the Asian Group and the Latin American Group, respectively, had not been able to agree on a single candidate.

At the beginning of every session, there is a three-week period of "general debate" that allows delegations to air their broad concerns to the assembly of world representatives. While there is a certain amount of give and take in the process, it is, strictly speaking, not a debate but a series of speeches on the state of the world as viewed from different national viewpoints. The Foreign Ministers who participate in the debate—about 100 of them in recent years—provide, in sum, a multidimensional view of every major international problem. A number of Heads of State, Heads of Government and other world figures also address the Assembly during the session. The numerous private consultations among the gathered dignitaries—which would take them months of travel, as well as often undesired formal and public arrangements, outside the context of the General Assembly—are a little publicized bonus that many consider as valuable as the debate itself. Unseen are the thousands of words in cables sent by delegations

seeking instructions from their Governments to compromise on initial positions, modified during the exposition of the views, public and private, of others during the session.

The Assembly distributes most agenda items among its seven Main Committees, on which every Member State has the right to be represented. The main task of the Main Committees is deliberative, with the discussion of international questions attempting to "harmonize" the actions of States and leading to recommendations in the form of draft resolutions for submission to a plenary meeting of the Assembly. Certain items of particular import, so decided by the Assembly, are discussed directly in plenary without reference to a committee.

Of the seven Main Committees, the First Committee, which originally dealt with a broad range of political and security matters, now concentrates on disarmament and the maintenance of international peace and security. The Second Committee concerns itself with economic questions, the Third Committee with social issues, including human rights, and the Fourth Committee with a dwindling agenda relating to Non-Self-Governing Territories. The Fifth Committee focuses on the Organisation's administration and budget, while the Sixth deals with international legal matters. And finally, there is the Special Political Committee, which deals with a variety of subjects, including outer space, peace-keeping, *apartheid* and refugee relief in the Middle East. Whenever there is need to devote special consideration to an issue, *ad hoc* committees are created to work during the periods when the Assembly is not in session. These special committees have been set up to deal with disarmament, peace-keeping, information, science and technology, *apartheid,* decolonisation, Palestinian rights, outer space, economic negotiations and international years relating to women, the disabled, the ageing, youth and other concerns.

The Assembly is without peer among international bodies as a sounding-board and index of world opinion, and an area of unheralded compromise but also of trumpeted confrontation. This view was emphasized by the former Assembly Presidents and the current Assembly President who met at United Nations Headquarters in June 1985 under the auspices of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research. They said that the Assembly's importance as a global instrument capable of assessing, reflecting and analysing various world currents should not be under-estimated. They unanimously advocated even greater use of the Assembly, organising it in such a way that

from time to time Heads of State or Government could hold summit meetings on specific issues during the general debate.

As the Assembly can discuss any matter within the scope of the Charter (subject to the exception that it may not make recommendations on a dispute being dealt with by the Security Council), the number of items on its agenda has grown steadily over the last 40 years.

The finances of the United Nations are controlled by the Assembly, which approves the regular budget and apportions the expenses among the Members. It also examines the administrative budgets of the specialized agencies. Decisions on important questions, such as recommendations on the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the 10 non-permanent members of the Security Council and the members of the Economic and Social Council, the admission of new Members, and budgetary matters, require a two-thirds majority. Other questions require a simple majority.

In looking at how the General Assembly has functioned over the last 40 years, it is necessary to consider the broad political evolution of which it has been a part. Perhaps the single most striking development has been the change in the size and nature of the Organisation's membership. It has more than tripled in four decades, growing from 51 States in 1945 to 159 in 1985. The founding Members were mainly American (north and south) and European; there were only four African States and eight Asian States. Today, the African States are the single largest regional group, numbering 50. Only three sizeable independent countries remain outside the Organisation: Switzerland, which does so by choice, and the two parts of Korea, which have not been able to agree on a formula for admission. Namibia remains the largest non-self-governing territory.

The growth and change in membership have transformed the ways in which the Assembly is perceived and used. What has hardly changed is that Member States give more or less importance to it depending on whether they are with the majority or the minority of the moment. A number of questions, such as *apartheid* and the situation in Palestine, were first brought not to the Security Council but to the General Assembly. It was there that the United Nations plan on the partition of Palestine was adopted; and the negotiations that led to the armistice in Korea resulted from proposals in the Assembly. The 1950 Assembly adopted a resolution entitled "Uniting for peace" which stated that if

lack of unanimity among the permanent members prevented the Security Council from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace, "the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including... the use of armed force when necessary...". The resolution authorized the convening on 24-hour notice of "emergency special sessions" of the Assembly, in addition to the special sessions provided for in the Charter.

What Trygve Lie said about the Assembly in 1949 still holds largely true: "Because many of the small nations have from the first spoken with great independence, the General Assembly has tended to act as a conciliating and moderating influence on the conflicts of the great Powers... I do not subscribe to criticisms of the General Assembly as a powerless debating society or as a propaganda forum. Most of the Assembly's recommendations are helping to build the foundations of world law and to prevent war. Whenever a Government uses the rostrum of the Assembly for propaganda purposes, that Government is submitting itself to the judgment of mankind."

However, attempts to have the General Assembly act when the Security Council was deadlocked have resulted in acute constitutional problems for the Organisation as a whole. The first was in 1950, when the General Assembly extended Trygve Lie's term of office as Secretary-General. The second crisis came to a head in 1964 because of the refusal of a number of countries to pay their Assembly assessed share of expenses for peace-keeping operations in the Middle East and the Congo on the grounds that the operations had been improperly constituted or continued. By the time the nineteenth session of the General Assembly opened in 1964, the arrears of a number of countries exceeded the financial contributions due to the United Nations from them for the previous two years. This meant that under Article 19 of the Charter they stood to lose their right to vote in the General Assembly. Though some urged the application of Article 19, the majority in the Assembly was unwilling to do so and a compromise was reached that allowed a saving of face on all sides: it was decided that no votes at all would be taken during that session of the Assembly.

General Assembly Special Sessions

The United Nations Charter provides for the General Assembly to meet in special sessions. Twelve such sessions have been held.

Special Session	Topic	Date of session	Requested or convened by
First	Palestine	28 April- 15 May 1947	United Kingdom
Second	Palestine	16 April-14 May 1948	Security Council
Third	Tunisia	21-25 August 1961	38 Member States
Fourth	Financial situation of the United Nations	14 May-27 June 1963	General Assembly
Fifth	South West Africa (Namibia)	21 April-13 June 1967	General Assembly
Sixth	Raw materials and development	9 April-2 May 1974	Algeria
Seventh	Development and international economic co-operation	1-16 September 1975	General Assembly
Eighth	Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon	20-21 April 1978	General Assembly
Ninth	Namibia	24 April-3 May 1978	General Assembly
Tenth	Disarmament	23 May-1 July 1978	General Assembly
Eleventh	New international economic order	25 August-15 Sep. 1980	General Assembly
Twelfth	Disarmament	7 June-10 July 1982	General Assembly

Emergency Special Sessions

Under the "Uniting for peace" resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1950, an "emergency special session" can be convened within 24 hours. Nine such sessions have been convened.

Emergency special session	Topic	Date of session	Convented by
First	Middle East	1-10 November 1956	Security Council
Second	Hungary	4-10 November 1956	Security Council
Third	Middle East	8-21 August 1958	Security Council
Fourth	The Congo question	17-19 September 1960	Security Council
Fifth	Middle East	17 June-18 September 1967	Soviet Union
Sixth	Afghanistan	10-14 January 1980	Security Council
Seventh	Palestine	22-29 July 1980 20-28 April 1982 25-26 June 1982 16-19 August 1982 24 September 1982	Senegal (Chairman, Palestinian Rights Committee) This session has not been formally closed and can be resumed whenever circumstances require it.
Eighth	Namibia	3-14 September 1981	Zimbabwe
Ninth	Occupied Arab territories	29 January-5 February 1982	Security Council

Over the years there has been criticism of the voting patterns in the Assembly. Most noticeably, before 1960 some States complained about an "automatic" majority; after 1960 others complained about a "dictatorship" or "tyranny" of the majority. Whatever the merits of those complaints, what has been most clearly characteristic of the newly independent nations is a steady opposition to colonialism and racism and a desire to improve their economic lot. It is also evident that, since the latter half of the 1960s, Assembly resolutions have very often borne the stamp of neither East nor West but of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (initiated in 1961) and of the Group of 77 (which took its name from the number of signatories to a 1964 declaration of common aims). Voting patterns have, however, tended to change pragmatically with the issue, the division on Afghanistan being quite different from that on Central America. On a number of topics, especially *apartheid,* Namibia, the Middle East and matters affecting economic and social development, there are lop-sided majorities in the Assembly, reflecting, overall, a real convergence of interests among an otherwise disparate group of countries.

The political evolution of the General Assembly would seem to reflect the development of a multipolar world. It is also possible to regard the changes as an innovative response to that phenomenon, for in some ways the Assembly now resembles a multiparty legislature, with different groups of countries representing regional, ideological and economic interests. Among developing countries these include, in addition to the 101-member Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the 127-member Group of 77, the 44-member Organisation of the Islamic Conference, the 22-member League of Arab States and the six-member Association of South-East Asian Nations. Their memberships often overlap, allowing a large measure of almost automatic co-ordination.

At the United Nations, the group of "Western European and other States" co-ordinates not only regional views but political ones as well. The same is true of the Eastern European Group, which consults also with some centrally planned developing countries (Cuba, Mongolia, Vietnam). During Assembly sessions, the 10-member European Community is a well-established caucus. The five Nordic countries also often express a joint position. Consultations within and among these groups now routinely speed the way for formal action on complex matters.

Regional Groups

The regional groups in the General Assembly are not formally mandated. They have evolved over the years as the main vehicles for consultations on much of the procedural work necessary for the functioning of as mammoth a body as the Assembly. Four countries: Albania, Israel, South Africa and the United States are not members of any regional grouping. For election purposes, the United States is considered under "Western European and Other States". Turkey, which for election purposes is in the Western European Group, is also a member of the Asian Group.

African States: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Asian States: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Burma, China, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Qatar, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Vanuatu, Vietnam and Yemen.

Eastern European States: Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian SSR, USSR and Yugoslavia.

Latin American States: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Western European and Other States: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal

Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and United Kingdom.

The web of informal consultations made possible by these groups is kept in good repair by another major innovation in modern diplomacy, the "Permanent Missions" which countries maintain in New York. Staffed by career diplomats, the Missions keep tabs on every item on the international agenda. Socially and in more formal gatherings, the diplomats get to know and understand their peers, allowing a level of fine-tuned communication among nations that would be impossible elsewhere. During sessions of the General Assembly, these missions serve as bases for the Foreign Ministers and their teams who arrive in New York from capitals around the world. In times of crisis, as during the tense days in 1948 and 1949 when access to the divided city of Berlin was in dispute, the 1962 confrontation of the Soviet Union and the United States over Cuba and later Middle East crises, the closeness and speed of contact possible at the United Nations has proved invaluable. In those crises and a number of others, the world has benefited from consultations at the United Nations. Often high-level officials have come to United Nations Headquarters at the very moment of crisis, because of its convenience. Such convenience has also helped in summit meeting arrangements. The remark that if the United Nations did not exist, it would have to be invented takes on added meaning when "face-saving" has become an evident necessity in conflict resolution. The medium by which the message is delivered is sometimes almost as important as the message itself.

The process described in the paragraphs above—the trend away from ideological confrontation and the growing capacity for group negotiations and consensus—would seem to be conducive to pragmatic negotiations. This has happened, to some extent, in areas where vital national interests are not seen to be in conflict. An increasing number of Assembly resolutions have been adopted without a vote (from 33 per cent in 1972 to 55 per cent in 1982 and 59 per cent in 1984). When circumstances require it, States have shown themselves capable of accommodating to the emergence of different types and perceptions of national interests. During negotiations on the law of the sea, for instance, when States had to define a whole new horizon of international policy, traditional alliances and enmities did not survive for long the logic dictated by brand new situations. But in well-defined controversies, such as those on southern Africa, the Middle East, South-

East Asia, Afghanistan, Central America and global economic problems, "pragmatism" has had little chance. Governments have sometimes appeared to pay little initial heed to the urgings of resolutions. It is not, as is often said, that the majorities are powerless, for they in several cases include most of the medium Powers and one or another of the big Powers. The problem has often been their unwillingness or inability to translate resolutions into coherent policy outside the Assembly.

In the absence of real negotiations in areas of crisis and confrontation, the Assembly has at times adopted resolutions which are useful mainly in keeping problems internationally visible. But as Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar said in his 1984 annual report on the work of the Organisation, "the non-implementation of resolutions, as well as their proliferation, has tended to downgrade the seriousness with which Governments and the public take the decisions of the United Nations". Asking Governments to assess "very carefully" how they were using the Organisation, he warned that the United Nations, "a willing and patient horse... should not be ridden to a standstill without thought of the consequences". What, then, is the answer? As the Secretary-General also said in his report, there is no simple one:

> Obviously a radical improvement in the international political climate would make a profound difference, but we cannot rely on miracles. In the meantime we could perhaps work on a few ideas for improving the situation, on the assumption that our common and agreed objective is human survival in reasonably decent conditions."

Can the effectiveness of the Assembly be improved by changing the way it functions? Some commentators have pointed to the Assembly's one-country, one-vote system as responsible for the situation. According to them, a system of weighted voting, taking into account each country's power, population and contribution to the Organisation's budget would make resolutions more "realistic". Others have said that the existence of such large groupings as the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 tend to make regional problems into global ones, drawing into confrontational stances countries which would otherwise not be involved. Such diagnoses do not, however, appear to deal with the main problem. Even if resolutions were entirely drafted by groups of countries directly involved in the problems at hand, and if they were all adopted by a voting system intricately geared to the realities of power, situations of entrenched conflict and continuing inequity would not change unless there were a new willingness to

compromise and carry out decisions. Nevertheless, there is no doubt, as the former Presidents of the Assembly suggested, that there is room for promotion of more constructive debate in the Assembly and systematic introduction of the art of consensus-building before a final vote, so that a debate could be concluded with the widest support.

On a number of topics—albeit not generally on the core political problems—such a willingness to compromise has, in fact, existed over the last four decades, and in dealing with those topics the General Assembly has had considerable success. For instance, its actions to care for and protect those most in need—underprivileged children, political refugees and victims of natural disasters—constitute a major achievement. Another is the systematic manner in which the world's attention has been focused on problems of the environment, food, water, natural resources and population, all emerging as inextricably intertwined with the population explosion and the maturation of industrial civilisation and its spread across the earth. Yet, another success story is the erection of the legal framework essential for a peaceful world order and the gradual elaboration of a broad set of humane values necessary to underpin the transition from international conflict to global community.

There are also the Assembly's activities in proclaiming standards of international behaviour. In doing this, the Assembly has often taken up and expanded on elements in the Charter. It has condemned war-like propaganda (1947); called on nations to refrain from the threat or use of force (1949); decried intervention by a State in the internal affairs of another in order to change its legally established Government (1950); and called upon all States to develop friendly and co-operative relations and to settle disputes by peaceful means (1957). The "inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of States" was stressed in a 1965 Declaration, and the following year the threat or use of force in international relations was proscribed. In 1970, two Declarations were adopted, one on "strengthening of international security" and the other on "principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among states". In 1974 the Assembly, taking over inconclusive work from the League of Nations of half a century earlier, adopted an eight-article Definition of Aggression. Also in 1974 it adopted the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. In 1977, the Declaration on the Deepening and Consolidation of International Detente was adopted, which followed by two years the articulation of eight principles for achievement of a

just and durable peace for present and future generations. In 1981, the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe as well as the Declaration on the Inadmossibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States were adopted. In 1984, the Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace.

Are all these solemn declarations of any value? Is it not hypocrisy for States which breach the norms enunciated above merely to subscribe to them in United Nations resolutions? The answers are not simple, but those who would have a world order more securely based on peace, human dignity and international understanding must begin by setting out aims and agreeing on acceptable means to achieve them. Getting all to agree to those standards is a necessary and a big first step. The General Assembly has taken it, and in the long scale of history this could be of primary importance.

53

The First Committee of the General Assembly

Introduction

At the first plenary meeting in London, on 10 January 1946, the United Nations General Assembly elected the Prime Minister of Belgium, Paul-Henri Spaak, as its President. The following day the First Committee (Political and Security)—one of the six Main Committees entrusted with the substantive work of the Assembly— met for the first time. The single disarmament item on its agenda, of transcendental importance, was entitled "Resolution regarding the establishment of a Commission to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and other related matters".

For the next three decades, the agenda of the First Committee consisted of a number of specific political questions (from the treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa to the question of Korea), as well as disarmament and related security questions. With the passing of time, however, the number of the former decreased, while that of the latter rapidly increased.

The continuing process that began in January 1946 has made the First Committee the depositary of vast collective expertise in the field of disarmament. The Committee, over the years, has never failed to identify the problems as they developed and to make appropriate recommendations for their solution. Through the General Assembly, it has been a source of recommendations and directives to Member States, the major Powers, other deliberative disarmament bodies (the Disarmament Commission) and various negotiating bodies, including the Conference on Disarmament. As such it has provided a focal point for multilateral efforts to achieve disarmament. In particular, it has

prepared the ground for the conclusion of important multilateral arms control agreements such as the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, the outer space Treaty of 1967 and the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968. It has decisively contributed to the convening of three special sessions of the General Assembly on disarmament, two held in 1978 and 1982 respectively. What is more important, it would. hardly have been possible to achieve, in 1978, the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament had it not been for the knowledge and expertise that had been accumulated by the First Committee in the preceding years.

The General Assembly decided in 1978, at its first special session on disarmament, that the First Committee would deal in the future only with questions of disarmament and related international security questions. Accordingly, the Committee has made disarmament and security its exclusive field of activity. Disarmament and security resolutions emanating from the First Committee now encompass more than one-fifth of all those adopted by the General Assembly. (Resolutions are adopted by the General Assembly upon reports from its Main Committees or without reference to a Main Committee.)

Of course, deliberations on disarmament by the First Committee continue to take place in a political context. When matters of arms limitation and disarmament are involved, deliberations, no less than negotiations, can hardly be expected to take place in a vacuum. Necessarily they are part and parcel of international security politics, and it is the task of the First Committee to make sure that they fit into the peace and security framework of the Charter of the United Nations and that they serve the world-wide aims of the Organisation.

Thus, there is a very important element of continuity in the work of the First Committee—that same element that is found in the work of the Organisation as a whole. In the words of Secretary-General Hammarskjold, "The work of the United Nations should always be viewed as a continuing process over a long period of time in which there is constant change and development.... Often the unspectacular or the unnoticed may prove to be a significant forward step on the long road towards peace in a world of organized co-operation and of more equal partnership among nations".

We are now passing through a period of deep and rapid change in the international political environment, particularly in the relations between the two major Powers, and, in the interest of effectiveness,

the First Committee can be expected to adjust to the new situation. In the following pages, an attempt is made to look at the First Committee retrospectively, with a view to drawing some projections for the future.

An Auspicious Start

The first session of the General Assembly was held in two parts: at London from 11 January to 12 February, and at Lake Success, New York, from 2 November to 13 December 1946. At the opening meeting of the First Committee, the single disarmament item on the agenda, namely, the establishment of a Commission to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy, was of such importance that it could be dealt with effectively only at a very high level of representation.

There was no shortage of political talent in that First Committee of 1946. Going over the two lists of Committee members at the first and second parts of the session, one meets, among others, the names of Senator Tom Connally, at that time Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate; Andrei Gromyko, Deputy Foreign Minister and Permanent Representative of the USSR to the United Nations; Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, and, with him, Philip Noel-Baker and Sir Hartley Shawcross, both members of Parliament; Georges Bidault, Minister for Foreign Affairs under General de Gaulle, and later Prime Minister of France; Wellington Koo, former Prime Minister of China; the Right Honourable Louis Saint-Laurent, M.P., who later became Prime Minister of Canada. There was also a long list of prominent persons, including Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit of India, who was elected President of the General Assembly at its eighth session (1953); Camille Chamoun of Lebanon, a political leader who served as President of Lebanon from 1952 to 1958; Luis Padilla Nervo, who for many years was to represent Mexico at the United Nations, and who later became a judge of the International Court of Justice; Oesten Unden, who was to hold the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden for an unsurpassed length of time in the history of his country; Field-Marshall Jan Christiaan Smuts, a major figure in the history of World War I and a progenitor of the League of Nations. The delegation of Belgium to the First Committee was headed, it's worth recalling, by Spaak himself and, as we shall see in reviewing the Committee's activities, he was personally involved in the work of that body, in spite of His duties as President of the General Assembly.

That year, upon the recommendation of the First Committee, the General Assembly unanimously adopted two resolutions on disarmament, which were of great political significance and value: resolutions 1 (I) and 41 (I). By resolution 1 (I) of 24 January 1946—the very first in the history of the Organisation—the General Assembly decided to establish a commission—the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission—to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy, that is, to make recommendations to the United Nations (in practice to the Security Council) for the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes; for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction; and for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means. The draft resolution, which was presented jointly to the First Committee by the delegations of the five permanent members of the Security Council and Canada, represented the result of long and careful negotiations at the highest governmental level, negotiations in which the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada had a leading role. The draft resolution was approved without any change by the First Committee (by 46 votes to none, with one abstention) and adopted by the General Assembly without a vote. As the representative of France significantly stated in the First Committee, in view of the very great importance of the resolution and the care with which it had been prepared, changes in the text should be avoided if possible. He also expressed appreciation of the actions of the Powers concerned in referring the matter to the United Nations.

While General Assembly resolution 1 (I) has received due attention in the history of United Nations disarmament negotiations, the same cannot be said of resolution 41 (I), of 14 December 1946, on principles governing the general regulation and reduction of armaments. Yet, there are elements of the latter resolution that even today, more than 40 years after its adoption, have lost none of their validity. This is particularly true of its clear perception of the central role of disarmament in relation to peace and security. The resolution regards the problem of security as being "closely connected with that of disarmament." It considers it essential to ensure the use of atomic energy only for peaceful purposes, but also recognizes the great importance of ensuring the adoption of measures for the "early general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces". It calls for arms limitation and disarmament measures directed against "the major weapons of modern warfare and not merely towards the minor

weapons". It calls for the provision of "practical and effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions". The resolution further recommended the Security Council to accelerate as much as possible the placing at its disposal of the armed forces referred to in Article 43 of the Charter, with a view to maintaining or restoring peace and security.

It is worth noting that this resolution was drafted in a sub-committee of the First Committee (Sub-Committee 3), composed of 20 members—with the omnipresent Spaak in the Chair—on the basis of a draft text submitted by the United States. Representation in the Sub-Committee was at the same high level as in the First Committee itself.

Discord over Atomic Energy Priorities

The deliberations of the First Committee during the period from 1946 to 1949 were deeply affected by the course of the negotiations carried out by the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. Those negotiations were to prove that political talent, while always valuable, is no substitute for political will.

In 1947, when the Commission was involved in critical talks on the recommendations to be submitted to the Security Council and was faced with the difficult and delicate problem of trying to reconcile two quite different projects, as embodied in the Baruch plan and the Gromyko plan, the First Committee did not adopt any disarmament resolutions. It focused its attention on other political items on its agenda, by virtue of the fact that in those days, as already noted, the Committee was called upon to deal with many other political questions, in addition to disarmament and security.

Also between 1948 and 1950, the Committee's activities in the field of disarmament were limited and none of the very few resolutions approved by the Committee in those years was unanimous. The absence of a common endeavour reflected the situation which had developed in the meantime in the Atomic Energy Commission. There, the conflicting interests of the two major Powers were rapidly moving the Commission toward a stalemate. Indeed, by mid-1948 the talks had come to a standstill.

The position of the United States, as developed in the Commission, had first been expressed by Secretary-of State James F. Byrnes, on 30 December 1945, after a visit to Moscow. "At the root of the whole

matter", he stated, "lies the problem of providing the necessary safeguards." The Baruch plan clearly reflected that priority. According to that plan, an International Atomic Development Authority would be established, entrusted with all phases of the development and use of atomic energy and given freedom of inspection in connection with the carrying out of its statutory activities. Once a system of control and sanctions—with no veto—was effectively operating, further production of atomic weapons would cease and existing stocks would be destroyed. On the other hand, the Soviet Union held that a convention outlawing atomic weapons and providing for the destruction of existing weapons must precede any control agreement, because, it stated, the prohibition of atomic weapons would be the only valid reason for the establishment of a control system. The Soviet Union also found the United States proposal to adopt sanctions without "the so-called veto" (to use the words of the Soviet Union in the Security Council) unacceptable, and considered that decisions on sanctions should be taken by the Security Council in strict conformity with the provisions of the Charter.

Compromise solutions might have been possible in a different political climate and, above all, had the stakes not been so big. For instance, the United Kingdom observed that the principle of simultaneous conventions might be acceptable, provided it was understood that the convention on prohibitions would come into effect only after an effective control scheme had been made operative.

The Atomic Energy Commission never met again after 29 July 1949. In 1950, the General Assembly decided to establish a committee of twelve, consisting of representatives of the members of the Security Council as of 1 January 1951, together with Canada, to consider and report on ways and means whereby the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission on Conventional Armaments (established by the Security Council on 13 February 1947, with the same composition as the Council) might be merged and placed under a new and consolidated disarmament commission. In February 1952, the two Commissions were dissolved by the Security Council, in accordance with the recommendation of the General Assembly, and the Disarmament Commission came into existence.

Revised Disarmament Goals

After the Atomic Energy Commission was dissolved, the First Committee's work on disarmament for a number of years (1951-1957)

centred around the item "Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments", which had been placed on the agenda of the General Assembly at the joint request of France, the United Kingdom and the United States. In the light of the unfruitful efforts to establish international control over the atom, the idea of pursuing the goal of a limitation on and balanced reduction of *all* armed forces and *all* armaments offered a new possible approach. As the Governments of the three Western Powers expressed it in their statement of 7 November 1951, if all Governments sincerely joined in such a co-operative and effective effort, the danger of war would be greatly reduced and the security of all nations would be enhanced. Concerning, in particular, the international control of atomic energy, they stood by the United States plan as endorsed by the United Nations, which, they said, should continue to serve as the basis for the atomic energy aspects of any general disarmament programme "unless and until a better and more effective plan can be devised".

Many were the proposals submitted within the framework of the new item through the years, indeed, so many that it is impossible to recall them all in a brief space. However, one cannot fail to mention the two proposals that clearly stand out in the history of that phase of disarmament efforts—the French-British plan of 11 June 1954 and the Soviet plan of 10 May 1955. Both consisted of co-ordinated and comprehensive measures of arms limitation for negotiation in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission (1954-1957). Both had the merit to narrow to some extent, at a time of acute antagonisms and strife, the wide rift still dividing East and West.

In 1954, Secretary-General Hammarskjold, referring to the problems of collective security and disarmament, appealed for new approaches to those problems to "be opened before us where now there seems to be only a blank wall." But the following year (the tenth year of the United Nations) he was able to note that "the most recent meetings of the Disarmament Sub-Committee in London, while leaving vital questions unresolved, nevertheless did result in an important measure of progress towards the reconciliation of positions. By that much they represented also a step forward in a more general sense." And, speaking in a more general sense, his comments on the continuing disarmament effort were no less timely and appropriate. In his own words,

> "The Member Governments have been right never to give up this effort during all the years when no real advance was made towards closing the

gap between the respective positions. It is, of course, true that the actual establishment of an agreed international system for the control and reduction of armaments and armed forces can take place only in an atmosphere of confidence, trust and understanding among the nations, an atmosphere which has not yet come into being. But it was a mistake to draw from this the conclusion, as some did, that there was no use in the meantime striving for such agreement. The exchanges of views, the explorations of the respective positions, that have been taking place in the Disarmament Sub-Committee and in the General Assembly, have been an essential part of the processes through which the Member Governments have sought to find their way in their search for increased understanding and confidence."

It is not easy, even now, to give a clear explanation of the reasons why, after 1955, the two sides in the Sub-Committee abandoned their own plans and moved in new directions. In fact, in the course of 1956 and 1957, both sides submitted new proposals based on the premise that limited measures of disarmament might be implemented prior to agreement on a co-ordinated and comprehensive programme. The sudden change, however, did not make things any easier and the Sub-Committee ended its work in August 1957 on a note of acrimony and sharp disagreement.

Intense deliberations in the First Committee that year, to find a new basis for negotiations acceptable to both sides, were not successful. Thus, in view of the interruption of disarmament negotiations and the dissolution of the Sub-Committee in 1958, the Secretary-General had to take the initiative himself and proposed the inclusion of the item "Question of disarmament" in the agenda of the thirteenth session of the General Assembly (1958) in order to maintain continuity of consideration of the disarmament question by the Assembly. The First Committee deliberations under that item helped to improve the atmosphere considerably. Resolutions on new subjects, including cessation of nuclear weapon tests, were adopted.

This was only a prelude to the deliberations of the following year, when the Soviet Union requested that the item "General and complete disarmament" be placed on the agenda of the fourteenth session of the General Assembly. As a result of the Soviet initiative, on 20 November 1959, the General Assembly unanimously adopted the first resolution ever to be sponsored by all Member States. By it, the Assembly declared that it was "striving to put an end completely and forever to the armaments race", and stated that "the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important one facing the world today". The

term "general and complete disarmament" was taken to mean the disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military establishments, elimination of stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction, and discontinuance of military expenditure according to an agreed sequence of balanced measures under strict and effective international control. The ultimate outcome would be that States would have at their disposal only those non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as were agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and to fulfil, by common action, international obligations resulting from the United Nations Charter.

Differences in the approach to general and complete disarmament taken by the Western Powers and by the Soviet Union emerged during subsequent years, in spite of the fact that in the autumn of 1961, John J. McCloy of the United States and V. A. Zorin of the USSR, representing their respective nations in formal bilateral disarmament talks, were able to submit a joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations to the General Assembly. Those wide-ranging and forward-looking principles found very favourable response and were endorsed unanimously by the Assembly.

The goal of negotiations, the two sides agreed, was to ensure:

(a) That disarmament was general and complete and war was no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and that reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations would be established;

(b) That States would have at their disposal only such non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as were agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens, and that States would support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force;

(c) To that end, that the disarmament programme should be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages, until it was completed, with each measure and stage carried out within specified time-limits and in such a balanced manner as not to create advantages for any State or group of States;

(d) That all disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international

control as would provide firm assurance that all parties were honouring their obligations;

(e) That States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date and efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme had been achieved.

The difficulties, it will be remembered, began when the two sides put their own distinct plans on the negotiating table. The main emphasis of the Soviet plan was on the completion of the disarmament process within a fixed, short period of time as an essential means of ensuring military equality in the course of disarmament: the more quickly nuclear delivery vehicles were eliminated, the sooner would equality, and hence balance, be achieved. The United States plan was designed to keep the relative military positions and the pattern of armaments within each military establishment similar, as far as possible, to what they were at the beginning of the process. To that end, disarmament, beginning with a freeze, was to be gradual; as confidence developed, the military establishment would, by progressive reductions, shrink to zero.

By 1962, it was clear that there would be no general and complete disarmament in the foreseeable future. Since then, general and complete disarmament under effective international control has generally been viewed as the "ultimate goal", while efforts have increasingly focused on partial disarmament measures. Thus, for more than two decades, the all-embracing, long-range plans have been overshadowed by limited, confidence-building measures.

Overexpansion of the First Committee Agenda

As noted above, from 1951 to 1957 the First Committee had one main disarmament item on its agenda, entitled "Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all forces and all armaments". Occasionally, additional items of a less permanent character were placed on the agenda.

In 1958, for reasons already explained, the main item was the "Question of disarmament". There were, however, additional new items, including items relating to the question of the peaceful use of outer space and the discontinuance of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons. Through the years, these two basic questions have remained on the agenda of the First Committee and have generated several distinct

items. In 1959, there were two further important additions, namely, "General and complete disarmament" (which is still on the agenda) and the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, a dominant question until 1968, when the non-proliferation Treaty was achieved.

Beginning in 1960, year after year, new specific aspects of the question of disarmament (too numerous to be mentioned one by one) have found a place on the agenda of the First Committee. It will be sufficient to mention here some of the topics that have generated most active deliberations in the First Committee, with indication of the year in which they first appeared on the agenda. Very often, as we will see in the following pages, each topic has generated more than one agenda item.

With these clarifications, mention should be made of such major topics as the denuclearisation of Latin America (1963); the Declaration on the Denuclearisation of Africa (1965); prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons (1966); question of the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor (1967); question of chemical and biological weapons (1969); establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in the region of the Middle East (1974); establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia (1974); establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in the South Pacific (1975); strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament (1976); implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its first special session on disarmament (the tenth special session of the General Assembly, 1978); the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear weapon States (1978); non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war (1979); nuclear weapons in all aspects (1980); confidence-building measures (1980); implementation of the Concluding Document of the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament (the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, 1982); cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament (1983); freeze on nuclear weapons (1983); conventional disarmament (1986); verification in all its aspects (1986).

As a result of this steady expansion, the agenda of the First Committee is today a very lengthy and complex document (see annex II), which cannot be easily understood but by "the initiate". There are, for instance, 22 substantive disarmament items (not counting the security items), which in itself is a record number. The situation,

however, is much more complicated than the official number of items suggests, because we have to take into account the fact that there are three omnibus (or "umbrella") items, which provide coverage to a very large number of rather heterogeneous sub-items: general and complete disarmament; review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session; and review of the implementation of the Concluding Document of the twelfth special session of the General Assembly. Under these three omnibus items we find more than 30 sub-items (not to mention further sub-divisions), most of which are, in reality, full items like the other 22. Among the sub-items one finds, just to mention a few, such questions as nuclear disarmament, conventional disarmament, naval armaments and disarmament, freeze on nuclear weapons, non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war, and verification in all its aspects. Thus, in reality, the number of substantive items is not about 20—a very large number—but about 50, a number so large that it makes the agenda undesirably heavy and unwieldy.

It should be clear from the above that the First Committee agenda does not represent a well-co-ordinated and logical plan derived from unanimously agreed basic principles. It is, instead, the ever-changing product of (a) independent initiatives taken by individual Member States requesting the inclusion of a supplementary item in the agenda of a General Assembly session, or (b) resolutions promoted by groups of States requesting the inclusion of a new item in the agenda of the following General Assembly session. This has led to the addition, year after year, of many new items competing for consideration in an already crowded arena. On the other hand, as can well be expected, very few items have been dropped from the agenda by their sponsors once they have found a place in it.

In these circumstances, there is plenty of room for consolidation and simplification. For instance, one finds that on the current agenda there are four different items on cessation of nuclear tests, a specific question that has been debated for over 30 years in the First Committee and on which the General Assembly has adopted more resolutions (some 60) than on any other disarmament questions. It stands to reason that, at this point, one item and one resolution, aimed at bringing closer the day when the testing of nuclear weapons and other nuclear devices will come to an end, should be enough. There should be no need to recommend different paths to a comprehensive ban. Similar considerations apply to many other questions, including non-

use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war (3 items) and cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament (5 items). These—it is worth repeating—are just examples, and in no way do they exhaust a problem which runs throughout the agenda.

Of course, an overexpanded agenda unavoidably generates an inflationary spiral in the number of resolutions adopted at each session. During the period 1946-1987, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the First Committee, has adopted close to 800 resolutions on disarmament alone, i.e. resolutions distinct from those on the specific subject of international security. Of these, just above 20 (2 per session, as an average) were adopted during the 12-year period from 1946 to 1957. During the next 20 years, the number of resolutions increased to just above 200 (about 10 per session). Since 1978, in a 10-year period, the number has jumped to over 550 (close to 60 per session, and many are repetitions). Of these, 62 were adopted in 1987, 25 of them without a vote. However, only about half of the 25 consensus resolutions could be defined as substantive. The President of the forty-first session of the General Assembly could hardly have provided a more fitting guideline when he stated, in 1986:

> "The General Assembly is the only forum in which all issues may be discussed by all countries of the world regardless of their size and importance. It is therefore extremely important that we should organize our work in a manner that ensures constructive, purposeful and coherent discussions on the issues aimed at achieving practical and implementable decisions. We should give serious thought to the reduction in the number, and possibly the length, of the resolutions adopted by the Assembly."

Strengthening the Effectiveness of the First Committee

The question of how to strengthen the First Committee's role in the field of disarmament has been considered on several occasions during the past decade. The *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament included in its report of 1976 a section on ways to improve the methods of work of the First Committee in disarmament matters, with a view to making the Committee's work "more constructive and efficient".

In 1983, the Chairman of the First Committee, Ambassador Tom Eric Vraalsen of Norway, introduced the practice—still being followed today—of dividing the Committee's draft resolutions into clusters, so that texts on the same or related issues could be acted upon at the

same time. It was, in his words, "a modest innovation", though possibly a useful first step toward a more rational and more efficient use of the time and resources available to the Committee. It might even "provide the basis for a restructuring of the Committee's agenda". The First Committee's agenda, he noted, represented "a rather random, repetitious and arbitrary listing of the issues we are actually discussing, and new items tend to be added on top of existing items even if they deal with basically the same issues". (It is worth mentioning that, in 1986, Vraalsen was elected Chairman of the Group of High-Level Intergovernmental Experts to Review the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Functioning of the United Nations.)

Since 1985, pursuant to a decision of the General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission has been considering the question of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament with a view to the elaboration of concrete recommendations and proposals. Within this framework, it is possible that agreement on recommendations and proposals concerning the work of the First Committee may be achieved at the next session of the Disarmament Commission in 1988. Meanwhile, in 1987, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on the rationalisation of the work of the First Committee which, though very cautious in its approach, has the merit of identifying some of the problems that require immediate attention: among others, the grouping of related disarmament items in the Committee's agenda; the merging of draft resolutions on the same subject, whenever possible; and the allocation of time for organized informal consultations among delegations.

Sponsored by non-aligned and Western countries, this resolution received no negative votes. There were 20 abstentions in the final vote, all of them from non-aligned countries. Although those abstentions generally did not express disagreement with the recommendations of the resolution, it was felt that since the Disarmament Commission was already engaged in the delicate exercise of reviewing the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, nothing should be done that might prejudge or hamper the Commission's deliberations.

At this point, it would also be in the interest of the Organisation to broaden its approach to the question. First, there is the obvious need to strengthen the link between deliberations and negotiations. Deliberations on disarmament should not be viewed as an end, but as

a starting point in the disarmament process. Necessarily, deliberations must be closely related to negotiations, if principles and common goals are to be transformed into concrete accords. A major concern of the deliberative body, therefore, must be to keep the main issues clearly in focus, set concrete and realistic goals and stimulate the work of the negotiating body in order to accelerate progress at the negotiating table.

The Conference on Disarmament, the Geneva-based multilateral negotiating body which operates by consensus, has set out its basic negotiating issues in a 10-point permanent agenda. Within that framework, the Conference adopts an annual agenda and programme of work, which take into account the recommendations made to the Conference by the General Assembly, as well as the proposals presented by the members of the Conference itself. The annual agenda carries a close resemblance to the permanent 10-point agenda, although usually the number of items of the annual agenda is less than 10.

The agenda of the First Committee will always be broader than that of the Conference on Disarmament, because its deliberations cover matters going beyond the work of the multilateral negotiating body. However, the core of the First Committee agenda must logically be represented by items relating to the activities of the multilateral negotiating body if an effective relationship is to be maintained between deliberations and negotiations. The Committee can do so best by streamlining its deliberative process. Needless to say, the adoption of relatively few clear-cut consensus decisions by the General Assembly on key priority issues, on the recommendation of the First Committee, would greatly increase the effectiveness of the deliberative process and help to strengthen the Assembly's ability to influence the course of disarmament negotiations.

Secondly, as the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament declares, all the nuclear weapon States, in particular those which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility in disarmament. Since 1985, the two major Powers have developed a bilateral disarmament agenda, which includes not only medium-range and shorter-range missiles in Europe, but also radical reduction in the number of long-range strategic weapons, curbs on nuclear testing as a first step towards their elimination and prevention of an arms race in outer space. It further includes the elimination of chemical weapons and reductions in

conventional forces, because at no time can nuclear disarmament be allowed to become a license for waging war with chemical and/or conventional weapons. Because of the special responsibility of the two major Powers, this bilateral agenda has the status of a priority agenda, representing a major part of the international disarmament agenda. Consequently, the First Committee is called upon to perform a very delicate task. Without in any way interfering with the bilateral negotiations of the two major Powers, it must use its collective influence to make sure that there is accord between the global security goals pursued by the two super-Powers and the code of common security by which the United Nations is to be guided in the fulfilment of its goals.

Thirdly, the First Committee should focus more than in the past on the question of the non-use of force in international relations. There can be no real disarmament unless the basic principle of the Charter enjoining Member States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force is firmly upheld. In a world where States do not feel bound, both individually and collectively, by that principle, the search for disarmament is not likely to bear fruit. Whatever gain is made will only be temporary, because in a world dominated by the use of force, ways will easily be found to deflect the arms race in new directions.

The time has come to abandon the use of force in international relations and to seek security in disarmament. This basic precept, embodied in the first paragraph of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, establishes an organic link, not a distinction, between the non-use of force and disarmament. And the Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations, recently adopted without a vote, has clearly reaffirmed the validity of such a link. Thus, if the First Committee is to be the key organ of the General Assembly on disarmament matters it must also strongly sustain the Charter's rules on the non-use of force in international relations.

In conclusion, the Committee should never lose sight of the fact that the role of the United Nations in disarmament is inseparable from the role of the United Nations in world affairs. It is of crucial importance for the cause of disarmament that the Organisation should be used effectively as an instrument of world peace.

ANNEX I

FIRST COMMITTEE OFFICERS 1945 TO PRESENT

Chairman	Vice-Chairmen	Rapporteurs
1st Ukrainian SSR (D.Z. Manuilsky)	LUXEMBOURG (J. Bech)	ECUADOR (H.V. Lafronte)
2nd LUXEMBOURG (J. Bech)	BOLIVIA (A. Costa du Rels)	DENMARK (P. Federspiel/H. Kauffmann)
3rd BELGIUM (P. Spaak/F. van Langenhove)	BOLIVIA (A. Costa du Rels)	TURKEY (S. Sarper)
4th CANADA (L.B. Pearson)	TURKEY (S. Sarper)	PANAMA (M. de Diego)
5th COLOMBIA (R. Urdaneta Arbelaez)	BELGIUM (F. van Langenhove)	ICELAND (T. Thors)
6th NORWAY (F. Moe)	CUBA (C. Blanco)	ICELAND (T. Thors)
7th BRAZIL (J.C. Muniz)	BELGIUM (F. van) Langenhove	ICELAND (T. Thors)
8th BELGIUM (F. van Langenhove)	COLOMBIA (F. Urrutia)	ICELAND (T. Thors)
9th COLOMBIA (F. Urrutia)	CANADA (D.M. Johnson)	SWEDEN (O. Thorsing)
10th NEW ZEALAND (L. Munro)	IRAN (D. Abdoh)	COLOMBAI (C. Echeverri Cortes)
11th PERU (V.A. Belaunde)	CEYLON (R.S.S. Gunewardene)	AUSTRIA (F. Matsch)

12th	IRAN (D. Abdoh)	BRAZIL (J. de Barros)	AUSTRIA (F. Matsch)
13th	EL SALVADOR (M.R. Urquia)	SUDAN (Y. Osman)	AUSTRIA (F. Matsch)
14th	AUSTRIA (F. Matsch)	URUGUAY (C.M. Velazquez)	LIBYA (M. Fekini)
15th	CEYLON (C. Corea)	CZECHOSLOVAKIA (K. Kurka)	UKRAINIAN SSR (P.Y. Nedbailo)
16th	ARGENTINA (M. Amadeo)	DAHOMEY (L. Ignacio-Pinto)	FINLAND (R. Enckell)
17th	SUDAN (O.A. Hamid Adeel)	FINLAND (R. Enckell)	HUNGARY (K. Castorday)
18th	NETHERLANDS (C.W.A. Schurmann)	HUNGARY (K. Castorday)	COSTA RICA (F. Volio Jimenez)
19th	******	NO ELECTION OF OFFICERS	*******
20th	HUNGARY (K. Csatorday)	ECUADOR (L. Benites)	UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (I. Fahmy)
21st	ECUADOR (L. Benites)	UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (I. Fahmy)	BYELORUSSIAN SSR (G.G. Tchernouchtchenko)
22nd	UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (I. Fahmy)	BYELORUSSIAN SSR (G.G. Tchernouchtchenko)	SWEDEN (C. Torsten W. Orn)
23rd	ITALY (P. Vinci)	EL SALVADOR (R. Galindo Pohl)	DAHOMEY (M.L. Zollner)
24th	PAKISTAN (A. Shahi)	NIGERIA (S.D. Kolo)	JAMAICA (L.M.H. Barnett)

25th VENEZUELA (A. Aguilar)

26th BULGARIA (M. Tarabanov)

27th MAURITIUS (R.K. Ramphul)

28th DENMARK (O.R. Borch)

29th ARGENTINA (C. Ortiz de Rozas)

30th LEBANON (E. Ghorra)

31st POLAND (H. Jaroszek)

32nd GHANA (F.E. Boaten)

33rd FINLAND (I.O. Pastinen)

34th BAHAMAS (D.L. Hepburn)

SOMALIA (A. Abby Farah)

MAURITIUS (R.K.) Ramphul)

KUWAIT (A. Y. Bishara)

ROMANIA (I. Datcu) PAKISTAN (H. Medhi)

MADAGASCAR (B. Rabetafika)

GDR (B. Neugebauer)

AFGHANISTAN (M.A. Wahab Siddiq)

BURUNDI (P. Mikanagu)

FRG (R. von Wechmar)

GHANA (F.E. Boaten)

PORTUGAL (A. da Costa Lobo)

HUNGARY (I. Hollai)

FINLAND (I.O. Pastinen)

MOROCCO (B. Cherkaoui)

PERU (H.V. Palma)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA (Z. Cernik)

ITALY (G. Migliuolo)

GUATEMALA (G. Santiso Galvez)

PERU (A. de Soto)

PORTUGAL (A. da Costa Lobo)

VENEZUELA (H. Arteaga Acosta)

NEPAL (K.B. Shrestha)

MEXICO (F. Correa)

YUGOSLAVIA (M. Mihajlovic)

AUSTRIA (E. Sucharipa)

35th PAKISTAN (N.A. Naik)
LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA (A.S. Burwin)
UKRAINIAN SSR (Y.N. Kuchubey)
IRELAND (A. Mulloy)
SURINAME (R.L. Kensmil)

36th YUGOSLAVIA (I. Golob)
CAMEROON (F.L Oyono)
PHILIPPINES (A.D. Yango)
HONDURAS (M.Carias)
ETHIOPIA (A. Makonnen)

37th GHANA (J.V. Gbeho)
ARGENTINA (J.C. Carasales)
NORWAY (T.E. Vraalsen)
MONGOLIA (L. Erdenechuluun)

38th NORWAY (T.E. Vraalsen)
SUDAN (E.A. Elfaki)
ROMANIA (G. Tinea)
URUGUAY(H.Y. Goyen Alvez)

39th BRAZIL (C.A. de Souza e Silva)
CZECHOSLOVAKIA (M. Vejvoda)
FRG(H. Wegener)
CHAD (N. Kessely)

40th INDONESIA (A. Alatas)
CUBA (C. Lechuga Hevia)
ZAIRE (B.A. Nzengeya)
GREECE (Y. Souliatis)

41st GDR (S. Zachmann)
JAPAN (M. Aoki)
CANADA (D.J. Roche)
BURKINA FASO (D.C. Ki)

42nd ZAIRE (B.A. Nzengeya)
COSTA RICA C.J. Gutierrez)
JORDAN (A.M. Nashashibi)
POLAND (K. Tomaszewski)

ANNEX II

ALLOCATION OF AGENDA ITEMS TO THE FIRST COMMITTEE FORTY-SECOND SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1987)

1. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 41/45 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (item 48).

2. Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions: report of the Conference on Disarmament (item 49).

3. Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty: report of the Conference on Disarmament (item 50).

4. Establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in the region of the Middle East: report of the Secretary-General (item 51).

5. Establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia: report of the Secretary-General (item 52).

6. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects: report of the Secretary-General (item 53).

7. Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament (item 54).

8. Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament (item 55).

9. Prevention of an arms race in outer space: report of the Conference on Disarmament (item 56).

10. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 41/54 on the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear weapon tests: report of the Conference on Disarmament (item 57).

11. Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearisation of Africa (item 58):

    (a) Report of the Disarmament Commission;

    (b) Report of the Secretary-General.

12. Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament (item 59).

13. Reduction of military budgets (item 60):

    (a) Report of the Disarmament Commission;

    (b) Report of the Secretary-General.

14. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament (item 61).

15. General and complete disarmament (item 62):

    (a) Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons:

    (i) Report of the Conference on Disarmament;

    (ii) Report of the Secretary-General;

    (b) Objective information on military matters: report of the Secretary-General;

    (c) Conventional disarmament: report of the Disarmament Commission;

    (d) Nuclear disarmament;

    (e) Naval armaments and disarmament: report of the Disarmament Commission;

    (f) Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes: report of the Conference on Disarmament;

    (g) Conventional disarmament on a regional scale;

    (h) Notification of nuclear tests;

    (i) Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament: report of the Disarmament Commission.

16. Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly (item 63):

    (a) Regional disarmament: report of the Secretary-General;

    (b) World Disarmament Campaign: report of the Secretary-General;

    (c) United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa: report of the Secretary-General;

    (d) Freeze on nuclear weapons;

    (e) Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament;

    (f) United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament: report of the Secretary-General;

    (g) Implementation of General Assembly resolution 41 /601 on a nuclear-arms freeze;

    (h) United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America: report of the Secretary-General.

17. Third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament: report of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (item 64).

18. World Disarmament Conference: report of the Secretary-General (item 65).

19. Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session (item 66):

    (a) Report of the Disarmament Commission;

    (b) Report of the Conference on Disarmament;

    (c) Status of multilateral disarmament agreements: report of the Secretary-General;

    (d) Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies: report of the Secretary-General;

    (e) United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research: report of the Director of the Institute;

    (f) Review and appraisal of the implementation of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade: report of the Secretary-General;

    (g) Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war: report of the Conference on Disarmament;

    (h) United Nations disarmament studies:

        (i) Report of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies;

        (ii) Report of the Secretary-General;

    (i) Disarmament Week: report of the Secretary-General;

    (j) Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament: report of the Conference on Disarmament;

    (k) Prevention of nuclear war: report of the Conference on Disarmament;

(l) Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session: reports of the Secretary-General;

(m) Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session:

(i) Report of the Disarmament Commission;

(ii) Report of the Conference on Disarmament;

(iii) Verification in all its aspects: report of the Disarmament Commission;

(n) Comprehensive programme of disarmament: report of the Conference on Disarmament.

20. Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean (item 67).

21. Israeli nuclear armament: report of the Secretary-General (item 68).

22. Relationship between disarmament and development: report of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development (item 69).

23. Question of Antarctica: reports of the Secretary-General (item 70).

24. Strengthening of security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region: report of the Secretary-General (item 71).

25. Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security (item 72):

(a) Implementation of the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace: report of the Secretary-General;

(b) Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security: report of the Secretary-General.

26. Comprehensive system of international peace and security (item 73).

54

Disarmament Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly at its Forty-Second Session

15 September-21 December 1987

Resolution No.	Title	Voting result (for/against/abstraining)
42/25	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 41/45 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	147-0-7
42/26	Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions	137-3-14
	Resolution A	128-3-22
	Resolution B	
42/27	Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty	143-2-8
42/28	Establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in the region of the Middle East	Adopted without a vote
42/29	Establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia	114-3-36
42/30	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects	Adopted without a vote
42/31	Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	112-18-20

42/32	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	151-0-3
42/33	Prevention of an arms race in outer space (operative para. 9, 141-1-11)	154-1-0
42/34	Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearisation of Africa	
	A. Implementation of the Declaration	151-0-4
	B. Nuclear capability of South Africa	140-4-13
42/35	Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons	135-1-18
42/36	Reduction of military budgets	Adopted without a vote
42/37	Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons	
	A. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons	Adopted without a vote
	B. Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction	Adopted without a vote
	C. Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and to support the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention	Adopted without a vote
42/38	General and complete disarmament	
	A. Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations	115-0-39
	B. Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons	Adopted without a vote
	C. Notification of nuclear tests	147-1-8
	D. Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations	143-0-13
	E. Conventional disarmament	Adopted without a vote
	F. Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons	119-2-32
	G. Conventional disarmament	Adopted without a vote
	H. Nuclear disarmament	Adopted without a vote
	I. Objective information on military matters	133-0-12
	J. Implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament	128-2-24
	K. Naval armaments and disarmament	154-1-2
	L. Prohibition of the production of	149-1-6

	fissionable material for weapons purposes	
	M. Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements	Adopted without a vote
	N. Conventional disarmament on a regional scale	154-0-0
	O. Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament	Adopted without a vote
42/39	Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly	
	A. Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly	129-1-23
	B. Freeze on nuclear weapons	139-12-4
	C. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	135-17-4
	D. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia	Adopted without a vote
	E. Regional disarmament	Adopted without a vote
	F. Consideration of guidelines for confidence-building measures	Adopted without a vote
	G. World Disarmament Campaign	146-1-9
	H. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 41/601 on a nuclear-arms freeze	140-13-2
	I. United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament	156-1-0
	J. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa	Adopted without a vote
	K. United Nations Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America	Adopted without a vote
42/40	Convening of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament	Adopted without a vote
42/41	World Disarmament Conference	Adopted without a vote
42/42	Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session	
	A. Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war	125-17-12
	B. Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session	137-1-14
	C. Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament	137-13-7
	D. Prevention of nuclear war	140-3-14
	E. International co-operation for disarmament	118-18-14

F.	Verification in all its aspects	Adopted without a vote
G.	Report of the Disarmament Commission	Adopted without a vote
H.	Disarmament Week	133-0-21
I.	Comprehensive programme of disarmament	Adopted without a vote
J.	United Nations disarmament studies	Adopted without a vote
K.	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	127-0-28
L.	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	135-5-15
M.	Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session	142-12-3
N.	Rationalisation of the work of the First Committee	134-0-20

42/43	Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace	Adopted without a vote
42/44	Israeli nuclear armament (7th preambular para., 84-10-37; 10th preambular para., 80-22-33; operative para. 2, 84-18-37; operative para. 4, 80-23-36; operative para. 5, 83-22-35)	97-2-52
42/45	Relationship between disarmament and development	Adopted without a vote

55

Third Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament

OPENING ADDRESS

31 May 1988

Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar

This special session of the General Assembly is opening at a most opportune time. By a striking coincidence President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev are engaged in a dialogue in Moscow, partly in the context of the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. That historic endeavour adds to the timeliness of this special session. It also underscores the global responsibility of national leaders and representatives gathered here to set the course of concerted, world-wide action towards disarmament.

The dynamics of human affairs have brought us to a stage where we need no longer view the prospects of credible measures towards disarmament as remote. For many long years the world seemed to be settled in a fatalistic stance about the arms race. In a global climate of suspicion and fears, at times exaggerated, the arms race appeared inevitable and the goals of halting and reversing it Utopian. A sense of futility haunted negotiations in this field.

Recently, however, significant shifts have occurred in perception and attitude. A refreshing change was signified by the joint expressions by the two major military Powers of their shared recognition that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. That led to a renewal of constructive dialogue between them. The tangible result was the signing of the intermediate-range nuclear force Treaty by the USSR and the United States in December 1987. The Treaty, of course,

covers only a small percentage of the world's arsenal of nuclear weapons, yet it clearly shows that with political will agreements to reverse the nuclear-arms race are possible and compliance with them can be duly verified. Agreement on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons would undoubtedly be a major achievement. It would take previously unsuccessful arms-reduction negotiations onto a new plateau of confident and practical endeavour.

We have thus had encouraging developments, opening new possibilities, but they must be seen as only the beginnings of disarmament in the nuclear field. They undoubtedly provide a vital impetus to the disarmament effort, but they do not, by themselves, end that condition of over-armament that has aggravated fear and insecurity throughout the world and involved a gigantic waste of human and material resources.

The transformation of the present arms situation can only result from a joint undertaking by all States. Progress in bilateral co-operation in this field cannot be sustained indefinitely in an environment of tension and conflicts in the world. Similarly, significant multilateral agreements cannot be evolved in conditions of mistrust and confrontation between the two great military Powers. Indeed, all major questions of security and disarmament have bilateral, regional and global dimensions. Negotiating processes at each of those levels represent different aspects of the pursuit of the common goal of achieving greater security at progressively lower levels of armaments. Advances in one area would certainly stimulate progress, in another. Those efforts rightly support and complement each other.

There are two respects in which we can take advantage of the historic opportunity provided to us. First, the international community should strongly encourage the two major military Powers to sustain and develop the momentum in their mutual relationship, to broaden their understanding and to make progress on issues that have global implications. Secondly, their bilateral actions to halt and reverse the arms race should generate a corresponding multilateral response. Thus, the objective of the special session has been clearly defined by the challenge of events. The occasion calls for a combination of imagination and realism and for a readiness to accommodate the legitimate concerns of all Member States. We need to identify practical and innovative ways of moving ahead, recognising that security and disarmament demand bilateral, regional and global action in harness together.

Let me share with you my view of the tasks ahead. The Final Document of the special session on disarmament held in 1978 set out the broad and comprehensive framework for priorities and programmes in arms limitation and disarmament on the basis of the concept of security through disarmament. That gives us a foundation to build upon in the light of new developments. At this session we must agree on a common agenda that will serve us in the years ahead. There should be consensus on the main direction of our effort. It seems to me that the highest importance in the field of disarmament should be given to the reduction of nuclear weapons, of armed forces and of conventional weapons, to the conclusion of the international convention on the complete prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons, to prevention of the arms race in outer space and to the cessation of nuclear tests.

Survival and security are basic to human existence, and Governments have a duty to assure their citizens of both. Nuclear issues, however, go far beyond national security and impinge directly on human survival. A rational military policy is incompatible with the danger of annihilation of the human race. It is indisputable that a major nuclear exchange would have catastrophic effects on the peoples of combatant as well as non-combatant countries. Nuclear issues will, therefore, rightly remain a major concern of all States and central to global security. It is imperative that the international community continue to press for the sharp reduction and ultimate elimination of such weapons.

We must also evince an unmistakable determination to deal effectively and expeditiously with other weapons of mass destruction, in particular with chemical weapons. The international community has been dismayed to learn that chemical weapons have recently been used. A recent Security Council resolution left no doubt in this regard by condemning vigorously the continued use of chemical weapons, which is contrary to the obligations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol. That a humanitarian restraint on the conduct of war that was universally observed for six decades has been cast off constitutes a strong warning to all of us that we stand on the edge of catastrophe. No ambiguity is permissible on a matter of this kind.

The time has also come for us to recognize the need to deal squarely with the mounting toll of death, destruction and human suffering inflicted by the use of conventional weapons in conflicts around the world. We are witnessing not only the spread of highly sophisticated

weaponry but also the growing use of such weapons in conflict areas. The term "conventional" should not hide or render banal the vast destructive powers of some of those weapons, nor should the innocuous-sounding phrase "arms transfers" make us forget the devastating effect of the supply of weapons in local conflicts. To my mind, the fact that the arms component is a growing factor in the export figures of many countries, including developing countries, is a very sad commentary on the present state of affairs. With modern technology not only nuclear war but, increasingly, conventional war as well has acquired a dimension of destructiveness that it did not have in any earlier age. It is therefore necessary to restrict the spread of the most dangerous types of conventional weapons and, ultimately, to eliminate them altogether.

I would appeal to arms-exporting countries to adopt a policy, based on principle, not to supply those weapons to developing countries which, on objective grounds, are not needed for their security from likely aggression. This could act as a restraint on the proliferation of sophisticated and costly weapons which, apart from the fear and insecurity it has caused, is a heavy and unwarranted burden on the economy of those countries.

I should like to digress for a moment. It is was estimated that by 1987 world military spending would have grown to $1 trillion a year. While some might not consider it germane to the matters before us, I feel it may be appropriate, at this juncture in the history of the United Nations, to contrast that astronomic figure with the comparatively modest sum of $721 million which is the total annual net budget of this Organisation dedicated to peace, and indeed, the even smaller amount of $698 million, which is the total of outstanding contributions of Member States at 30 April 1988. would not mention it in this context were it not that, as we gather here today, we find ourselves quite simply facing insolvency, unless Member States honour their obligations deriving from the Charter.

Disarmament cannot continue with success if it is not placed within the context of the global international environment. It is part of international security and must be encouraged along with other measures aimed at strengthening peace and international confidence. There are many ways to increase confidence which might accelerate the conclusion of disarmament agreements and strengthen security. Military questions must be the subject of the greatest transparency, both at the worldwide level and the regional level. The document

adopted by the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe has set a useful precedent and makes it possible to pursue exploratory exchanges concerning stability in the area of conventional weapons in that part of the world.

The Second Review Conference of the biological weapons Convention has also developed ways of exchanging information. Similarly, by making greater use of United Nations instruments for the preparation of reports on military expenditures in order to obtain an objective evaluation of military capacities, one might avoid reacting to a presumed threat or erroneous perceptions. I note with satisfaction that it is being recognized more and more that we must make better use of existing machinery for conflict-prevention and resolution and the peaceful settlement of disputes so as to make it possible to adopt significant measures on arms limitation and disarmament.

Quite obviously we cannot expect progress in the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons if a corresponding effort is not made to settle the local and regional conflicts which continue to ravage numerous areas of the world. The need for multilateral action in this area is emphasized by the fact that bilateral efforts to resolve a number of regional conflicts have not borne fruit. We are here confronted by a problem of great scope. One of the imperatives flowing from this is that there must be a greater awareness on the part of the international community of the incalculable dangers of the conventional arms race and of arms transfers. Once again this presupposes that an urgent appeal will be made for Member States to act.

In the field of armaments, the technological revolution has made it possible thus far to invent and accumulate ever more sophisticated weapons at an unbridled pace and at an exorbitant cost. However, with international co-operation, the same revolution can be made available for peaceful objectives. Among the areas where we might make good use of modern technology, one might mention the verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements. One notes a renewed interest in this question because significant changes in attitude have made this a subject of great relevance over the past two or three years. Thus it has been possible to adopt the remarkable and unprecedented measures set forth in the intermediate nuclear forces Treaty. It is clear, however, that in order to ensure the reliability of verification measures, a number of problems must be the subject of negotiations. Although certain aspects of verification will continue to be taken up in

a bilateral framework, multilateral agreements on the limitation and reduction of armaments will require multilateral verification.

This is an area in which the United Nations might be able to make an important contribution. The United Nations might be able to help apply, by all the means accepted by the parties concerned, the verification measures provided for in multilateral treaties. The United Nations might be able to co-ordinate international debates on questions related to verification, to provide technical advice and to carry out research. Generally speaking, the participation of our Organisation in the search for generally acceptable and effective verification measures for observance of the agreements and the expansion of the functions of information and advice might make it possible in the future to create, under its auspices, verification machinery.

In addition, United Nations military observers and United Nations peace-keeping forces might be very useful in controlling and verifying the implementation of the agreements. It might also be useful in this task, and in other related activities, to call on the creative faculties of intellectuals and experts who are devoted to the cause of disarmament.

We must also give attention to the question of how to improve the functioning and to increase the effectiveness of multilateral bodies. The General Assembly quite obviously must remain the focus for debates on disarmament and the principal source of initiatives and recommendations of the international community concerning the broad range of questions relating to disarmament. In this connection, it has been proposed that the work of the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission should be made more efficient so that those bodies could continue to focus their efforts on concrete ways to make progress and to reach agreement on the decisions to be taken. These proposals deserve attention.

The Conference on Disarmament has broad knowledge and long experience in considering the vital questions which exist in the area of disarmament. The world community hopes that its members will contribute to promoting multilateral action in this area. I urge them to mobilize all their resources to respond to this legitimate expectation. The early conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons would show strikingly and irrefutably that the multilateral process of disarmament is capable of eliminating an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. There is hardly any need to stress the profound impact that it would have on other aspects of the work of the Conference, which also require examination and urgent solution.

The preparation of a treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear tests would indicate that Member States are prepared to protect the world from nuclear weapons. It is of the utmost importance that progress be made along these lines. Furthermore, the prevention of the arms race in outer space quite rightly is a source of universal concern, in view of its world-wide implications for international peace and security.

Like all other complex international questions, disarmament does not lend itself to simple solutions. Yet, its difficulties do not diminish its urgency. The outcome of disarmament debates and negotiations directly concerns the survival of mankind and the economic and social development of the world community. To make progress at the multilateral level, Member States must manifest complete understanding of the security interests and legitimate priorities of all. Acceptable solutions must be found through constructive, serious-minded dialogue. The disenchantment of today must be replaced by a common awareness of the imperative need to diminish radically the present level of arms and armed forces and to evaluate realistically the possibilities before us.

We must aim high: That is the spirit of the United Nations Charter. At the same time we must take account of the realities as we seek means to obtain concrete results. On the basis of the Final Document, we must—and we can—carry on the quest for disarmament by co-ordinating bilateral, regional and world-wide initiatives. For the sake of survival, of peace, of progress we have no other option.

I welcome the presence among us of a great many non-governmental organisations and outstanding individuals. This is a good opportunity to tell them how grateful we are for their heightened devotion to the cause of disarmament. For years they have championed initiatives to alert the public to the urgency of this cause. They have often adopted a bold and innovative approach in seeking to develop the co-operation that is indispensable to the disarmament process. But if public opinion is to have the impact it should, we must find more effective ways of reaching educators, scientists, the media, the world of the arts and other circles in order to encourage them to participate in this vital undertaking. The United Nations World Disarmament Campaign must contribute to achieving that purpose.

I urge the Assembly to consider all the ideas and proposals that have been put forward and to reconcile various intellectual approaches to reach decisions that will have real impact. In that way it will be

able to fulfil its mission in this period of fruitful change, in this demanding period.

I repeat: The events of today could have incalculable consequences for international peace and security. If their positive effect is magnified and strengthened by multilateral action, a promising horizon will open in the realm of international affairs. A unique combination of circumstances provides us with an opportunity that has long eluded us: let us take that opportunity.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND SSOD III

The month of June of this year will no doubt be remembered as a period of very close consideration of the subject of disarmament. Early in the month, at the Moscow summit between General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan, encouraging prerequisites were created for carrying on the process of nuclear disarmament and boosting it through the conclusion of a treaty on a 50 per cent cut in the strategic offensive arsenals of the USSR and the United States. The third special session devoted to disarmament (31 May to 25 June 1988) held a wide-ranging discussion on basic aspects of disarmament and international security. While the special session was winding up its proceedings, representatives of States and of a very broad segment of world public opinion were considering what action could be taken to remove the nuclear risk at the International Meeting for Nuclear weapon free Zones in Berlin. Other developments testifying to the favourable ambience surrounding the special session included the entry into force of the Treaty between the USSR and the United States on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) and the conclusion in Geneva of the accords on Afghanistan.

Multilateral Disarmament Discussion Attains New Quality

The fifteenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly, the third special session devoted to disarmament, has been a major event in the world Organisation's history of dealing with this crucial subject.

The eventful course of this special session was both an illustration of the realities and contradictions of the present-day world and a reflection of the great opportunities it offers. At the special session a productive and business-like general debate took place in which

representatives of 135 States, including many heads of State or Government and foreign ministers, took the floor.

The idea that the time has come to break the cycle of mistrust, the accumulation of arms and military rivalry, and to seek security for all was central to the statements made. In this connection, attention was drawn to the positive trends which have emerged in the last few years in the consideration of various international issues. There have been important developments in the areas of arms limitation and disarmament, the resolution of local conflicts and the easing of international tensions. The statement made by the USSR and the United States that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought met with broad approval. Tribute was paid to the progress these two countries have made in their bilateral negotiations.

German Democratic Republic Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer was giving expression to the appreciation felt by all participants when, in opening the special session, he referred to the recently concluded INF Treaty as "a first effective step of major scope in the field of nuclear disarmament".

In the multilateral framework, some recent review conferences have helped strengthen such important accords as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the biological weapons Convention. There has been progress in negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. The Treaty of Tlatelolco continues to make a valuable contribution to the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in Latin America. An important role in efforts to strengthen regional security is played by the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific by the Treaty of Rarotonga.

These and other positive developments and processes were seen by many delegations as encouraging and as justifying hopes for a secure world.

However, attention was also drawn to what continues to be a complex and contradictory situation. The arms race has not been halted. It continues, especially in qualitative terms, as a result of the growing exploitation of recent scientific and technological achievements. Nuclear testing continues. There is a danger of the arms race being extended to outer space. Regional conflicts persist. Huge resources urgently needed by the peoples of the world for their social and economic development are being diverted to military purposes. According to

some estimates, world military expenditures are now approaching the astronomical figure of one thousand billion dollars annually. The gap between developed and developing countries is widening.

This complex situation was also reflected at the special session. Old, outdated concepts hampered the discussion. In the end it proved impossible to reach agreement on a concluding document even though much of it had already been agreed upon. The differences of opinion on number of subjects turned out to be too big.

The decisive criterion for assessing the third special session should be: Did it advance the process of disarmament; did it give it a fresh impetus? It is of great importance that on a number of major aspects of security and disarmament the positions of States are drawing closer together. There has been benefit also in the frank and substantive dialogue on those matters on which differences persist. The Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Sir Geoffrey Howe, reflected this idea when he said that "while we recognize our differences—and there are many—we can all identify our common interest in disarmament. Each State can and must make its own distinctive contribution to the common goal of peace, peace with justice and with security".

The course of the general debate and the many constructive proposals discussed at the session justify the conclusion that the multilateral disarmament discussion has attained a new qualitative level. This is exemplified in particular by the following:

First, there is a growing awareness that notwithstanding all contradictions and differences, today's world forms an integral whole, with the fate of all its States and peoples being closely interrelated. In view of the interdependence of life on this planet, on the one hand, and in the face of the huge stockpiles of means of mass destruction and other weapons amassed, on the other, there is an urgent need for multilateral co-operation to solve international problems. A new approach to the questions of war and peace is called for. Constructive dialogue, result-oriented negotiations and confidence-building measures are considered indispensable to the objective of enhanced security for all States at the lowest possible level of armed forces and armaments. This view was expressed by the President of Zimbabwe and Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, Robert Mugabe, when he declared that "if there is one point that should be crystal clear to all with regard to the arms race and the threat of nuclear war, it is that we cannot go on as at present". And the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of

Germany, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, pointed out that "familiar concepts must be reconsidered and new concepts developed", and he also demanded "that we assume greater responsibility and become accessible to new thinking."

Secondly, the all-embracing approach to international security increasingly manifest in the attitude of States is a striking expression of this new thinking. Concepts like "common security" and "co-operative security partnership" reflect the growing awareness that security is not attainable against one another or at the expense of the other, but only through co-operation and if account is taken of the interests of all sides. The non-aligned States met with wide acceptance when they noted in their appeal at Havana that "common security for all States can only be assured by new concepts based on mutual confidence, co-operation and interdependence".

Greater account was taken at the special session of the complex nature of security in that, in addition to the military, non-military factors such as economic development and social, humanitarian and ecological aspects were included. The Warsaw Treaty States, in their memorandum entitled "Security through disarmament", identified disarmament as the "main road to security". They were of the view that "genuine security should be achieved through parallel efforts in all areas of a comprehensive approach to security and should be promoted by furthering international dialogue on a comprehensive system of international peace and security". India proposed that a comprehensive global security system under the aegis of the United Nations be established.

Thirdly, there have been all kinds of efforts to create a common platform for the continued pursuit and intensification of the disarmament process at all levels. The non-aligned States expressed the view that the special session "should make a substantial contribution to the achievement of lasting peace through the implementation of effective disarmament measures", and they underlined "the urgent need to achieve progress in bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations and for these processes to complement each other".

In their declaration, the twelve member States of the European Community stressed that "notwithstanding their specific nature, the concrete disarmament negotiations require constructive support and additional stimuli by the countries gathered here. Conversely, the

global debate on disarmament issues must take due account of the ongoing negotiations. We must seize the opportunities afforded by this constructive parallelism". The Member States of the United Nations were agreed that the Treaty between the USSR and the United States on the Elimination of Their Intermediate and Shorter Range Missiles should soon be followed by an accord on a reduction of the strategic offensive arsenals of the two countries by 50 per cent, with the 1972 ABM Treaty being adhered to, and by a global convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. Furthermore, many States came out in favour of further steps of nuclear disarmament, a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Of course, calls for such measures were directed first and foremost to the nuclear weapon States. Clearly in evidence was the will of many non- nuclear weapon States to advance disarmament by contributions of their own. This applies primarily to the establishment of nuclear weapon free and peace zones, conventional disarmament, confidence-building measures and other regional projects.

Finally, the international public's interest in and commitment to securing peace through disarmament have been in evidence throughout the preparatory stages and during the session itself. In the Committee of the Whole, 129 representatives of national and international non-governmental organisations and scientific research institutions took the floor. During the session there were many peace demonstrations. Petitions with millions of signatures were transmitted to the special session. All this symbolizes the confidence and the far-reaching expectations placed by people in the United Nations. Once again it was made clear that disarmament is by no means a matter to be attended to only by politicians and diplomats. Rather, the broadest sections of the public are committed to this cause. This is a factor which should not be underestimated when it comes to considering how to stimulate the disarmament process and make it irreversible.

New Ideas for the Future

The fifteenth special session proved to be a genuine clearing-house for the international dialogue on disarmament. There were a host of interesting proposals designed to translate into action what is an emerging international consensus: international peace and security cannot be attained through accumulating stocks of weapons but rather through determined disarmament measures. In this endeavour, the unique advantage of a special session devoted exclusively to disarmament was obvious, as it amounted to a concentration of the

international community's intellectual potential on the one issue which is so crucial for man's survival.

"A nuclear war would be totally unlike any previous form of warfare in its immeasurably greater destructive power". This is the convincing conclusion of the "Study on the climatic and other global effects of nuclear war", which was presented by an international group of experts before the opening of the special session. At the session all were agreed that the prevention of a nuclear war and nuclear disarmament continue to be concerns of high priority. The Soviet Union and the United States reaffirmed their resolve to conclude as soon as possible an agreement on halving their strategic offensive arsenals. George Shultz, United States Secretary of State, defined this as "the top arms control priority of the United States". The Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, made a similar statement and emphasized that the Soviet Union intends to work towards the goal of a phased elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000."

What also met with a ready response was the "Action plan for ushering in a nuclear weapon free and non-violent world order", submitted by the late Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, which contains detailed ideas on how to scrap nuclear arms in stages by the year 2010. Qian Qichen, China's Foreign Minister, reiterated his country's suggestion that following far-reaching Soviet and American disarmament measures, "a broadly represented international conference on nuclear disarmament can be convened with the participation of all nuclear States to discuss the steps and measures to be taken for a thorough destruction of nuclear armaments". While a great number of States spoke out for the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests, the non-proliferation of nuclear arms and the prevention of an arms race in outer space, different views were expressed on how to reach these goals.

The commitment of the non-nuclear weapon States was clearly reflected in the many projects for nuclear weapon free zones set forth at the session. It was proposed, among other things, that proceeding from the experience gained from the Tlatelolco and the Rarotonga Treaties, such zones be established in Africa, the Middle East, South-East Asia, South Asia, on the Korean peninsula, in Northern and Central Europe and in the Balkans. What met with great interest was the declared intention of the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, and representatives of other States of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), to transform the agreement in principle to

create a nuclear weapon free zone in South-East Asia into "an appropriate instrument to be subsequently presented to the other regional States and nuclear Powers for their concurrence and endorsement". Quite a few countries argued for establishing peace zones in the Indian Ocean, the South Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the South Pacific, South-East Asia, the Central American isthmus and other regions.

There was consensus on the need for a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and universal convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. It was expected that the Conference on Disarmament would intensify negotiations to ensure the speedy conclusion of the agreement. In addition, States could help bring the convention to a rapid conclusion by providing information relevant to a future convention. After the conclusion of the negotiations all States should ensure the entry into force of the convention through early signature and ratification. Proposals were made in regard to measures to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons and their use. It is now imperative that the words be followed by deeds and that these dangerous weapons of mass destruction be banished for good.

The discussion of the issues related to the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments has grown in scope and intensity. This can be seen partly as a response to the fact that conventional weapons have become more and more destructive, taking a huge toll of human life in regional conflicts, and partly as a response to the fact that the economic burden caused by the armament effort is weighing more and more heavily on all countries. The preparatory talks for negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, in particular, have revealed the great opportunities existing in this field. A notion widely supported was that international peace and security can only be made to last if the issues relating to the qualitative development, production and use of conventional weapons as well as all aspects of the issue of international arms transfers are resolutely addressed by the international community. It was understood that priority should be given to measures in those regions where armed forces and conventional armaments are most heavily concentrated. In this context, the USSR submitted a three-stage plan for conventional disarmament in Europe.

Various proposals related to the curbing of the naval arms race, the elimination of military bases on foreign territories, the reporting of military expenditures and the reduction of those expenditures. For

the first time, a thorough discussion was held on the implications of the use of new technologies for military purposes. India put forward wide-ranging ideas, including greater transparency in this sphere and a ban on the use of certain technologies in developing new weapons.

The special session illustrated the international consensus which has increasingly evolved in recent years over the questions of verification, confidence-building and openness in military matters. The principles of verification and guidelines for confidence-building measures, drafted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission, met with the approval of the Member States. The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards system and the verification system set out in the Soviet-American INF Treaty were praised as examples to be followed in considering new disarmament steps. Great interest was shown in the proposal of the Six Nation Initiative on setting up an integrated multilateral verification system within the framework of the United Nations. France suggested establishing within the United Nations an agency for the processing and interpretation of space images. Similarly, there was a favourable response to the initiative of Canada and the Netherlands concerning an in-depth study of activities of the United Nations in the verification of multilateral arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

An effective disarmament process would release resources which could be utilized for the solution of non-military security problems. Mindful of this, many States which participated in the 1987 International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development pleaded for the implementation of the Final Document adopted at that important Conference.

Disarmament concerns all countries. Being a universal organisation of States, the United Nations continues to have a central role and primary responsibility in the field of disarmament. There was a wealth of proposals designed to enhance the role of the United Nations and to make more effective, use of the possibilities offered by the United Nations system for advancing the disarmament process. This applies to the work of the General Assembly and its subsidiary bodies, the role of the Security Council pursuant to articles 26 and 47 of the United Nations Charter, and the responsibilities of the Secretary-General as well as those of the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat. Favourable mention was made of the contribution which the United Nations World Disarmament Campaign has rendered to the cause of disarmament through its information and educational activities.

Recognising the great number of tasks to be performed in the field of disarmament, the majority of States believed it was necessary to ensure that relevant bilateral, regional and global activities complement one another effectively. An important role was accorded to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva as the international community's multilateral negotiating body.

Disarmament Efforts Continue

The many constructive proposals submitted at the fifteenth special session should be put to use in the ongoing disarmament talks. Everything must be done to enhance the effectiveness of these negotiations and to strengthen the role of the United Nations in the disarmament field. The Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament remains a good basis for that. It continues to be the principal expression of the international community's determination to proceed along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament.

What is crucial for progress to be achieved is the common interest of all nations in safeguarding international peace and security, the universal commitment to a shared human destiny. The special session has shown again that disarmament problems are not easy to solve and that many obstacles have yet to be removed. However, a source of hope is the dedicated work of all delegations, in particular, delegates who were entrusted with conference functions, especially Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, and the Chairmen of the three Working Groups.

The third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament lies behind us. But disarmament efforts go on. The words which United Nations Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar addressed to us at the beginning of the session are as true as ever:

> "Like all other complex international questions, disarmament does not lend itself to simple solutions. Yet, its difficulties do not diminish its urgency.... Acceptable solutions must be found through constructive, serious-minded dialogue.... On the basis of the Final Document, we must—and we can—carry on the quest for disarmament by co-ordinating bilateral, regional and worldwide initiatives. For the sake of survival, of peace, of progress we have no other option."

IS THERE STILL LIFE AFTER SSOD III?

When I received the invitation of UNA/USA to address this meeting, I accepted it with alacrity, particularly because I know and appreciate

the sustained interest shown by you in the cause of securing peace and security through the United Nations. I also hoped to be able to report to you on the momentous decision to be taken by the Member States assembled at the third special session on disarmament.

Alas! The special session was not able to reach consensus on a concluding document, which had been laboriously negotiated during the last week of the session until the wee hours of Sunday, 26 June, As someone deeply involved in planning and preparing for the session after the decision was taken by the General Assembly to convene it, I am of course, disappointed. I am, however, not discouraged, and I shall ex- plain why

The third special session devoted to disarmament was attended by an impressive number of national leaders—24 Presidents and Prime Ministers, and 49 Foreign Ministers. The central message these leaders conveyed in unison was one of deep concern at the arms race and at ongoing conflicts, as well as their hopes for a more peaceful and less armed community of nations. The mood at the start of the session was characterized by an unprecedented degree of moderation and a constructive spirit was evident. Almost without exception, the statements were non-polemical, and national leaders made proposals which, for the most part, were less sweeping and more concrete than heretofore.

The participation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the session was also striking. More than 200 such organisations from all over the world applied to speak before the Committee of the whole making the task of selecting speakers a delicate one. The selection was made by a liaison group of the Geneva and New York Disarmament NGO Committees with the help of the Secretariat. The NGO speeches were given earlier in the session than during the two previous sessions, in order to make an impact on the official proceedings.

Many of the speakers were refreshingly candid in their assessment of policies pursued by Governments. Their 5-minute speeches mirrored the deeply held sentiment of people everywhere for a global community unencumbered by dangers of war and the oppressive expenses of the continuing arms race. While mobilisation of the public was less extensive this time than at the second special session, in 1982, when close to one million people demonstrated in the streets of New York, the NGO leaders consider that NGO participation at the third session was marked by greater sophistication and specificity in the views expressed. I agree with that assessment.

Despite the unquestionably constructive and even hopeful atmosphere which prevailed during much of the session, and despite the strenuous efforts made by delegations in support of the very able Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, Ambassador Mansur Ahmad of Pakistan, who received widespread confidence, a concluding document enjoying consensus did not finally emerge. It would, however, be hasty to conclude from this that the credibility of the United Nations as an organisation committed to the maintenance of peace was dealt "another damaging blow", as *The New York Times* reported. In my opinion, the United Nations disarmament efforts were only temporarily set back at the special session by the fact that a concluding document was not adopted. I am convinced that there are enough positive elements discernible at the session to give us justifiable hope for renewed vigour in multilateral disarmament efforts in the months and years to come.

My belief is based on the fact that the Member States were able to reach agreement on the bulk of the draft document, prepared by Chairman Ahmad with the assistance of the Secretariat. Many Member States said that they could go along with the Chairman's draft text in its entirety, though they were not completely satisfied with all parts of it. With some amendments, there was acceptance of most of the draft.

What is significant in these paragraphs is an attempt to adopt a fresh approach to global disarmament issues, using the Final Document of the first special session, in 1978, as a foundation—one to which Member States have varying degrees of attachment. Instead of using disarmament UN-ese, the language in the text is largely simple and direct. Taking into account encouraging recent developments in the Washington/Moscow negotiations, including the conclusion of the INF Treaty, the underlying approach in the paper is forward-looking without being euphoric. There is also a willingness to face the questions of national security in a broader context of global interdependence and the close interrelationship among social, humanitarian, economic, ecological and technological factors.

Three sections of the Chairman's draft, consisting of the "Introduction" "Assessment", and "Machinery", were largely agreed, leaving two sections—"Directions for the Future" and "Conclusions" still subject to further consideration. If you read the agreed paragraphs, I think it becomes evident that:

(a) There is acceptance of the notion that national security must be looked at and looked after in the broader context of global issues and international concerns;

(b)   While arms limitation and disarmament constitute a crucial element in the pursuit of international peace and security, there is interrelationship between the pursuit of disarmament and United Nations endeavours in other areas, such as the peaceful settlement of disputes, peace-keeping, economic and social development, self-determination and human rights;

(c)   Disarmament will be promoted when root causes of international tension are addressed and ancillary measures such as confidence-building, greater openness and transparency, and comparability in military expenditures are achieved;

(d)   Disarmament is not the sole responsibility of the two major Powers; all Member States, large and small, must contribute their ideas, efforts and initiatives in their own regions as well as in global forums;

(e)   While nuclear disarmament continues to be a high priority, conventional disarmament has acquired a new importance and urgency;

(f)   It is vital to strengthen further the nuclear non-proliferation regime;

(g)   The earliest possible conclusion of a chemical weapons convention is of great importance, to which the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva should devote maximum effort;

(h)   The qualitative aspect of the arms race or the manner in which science and technology are mobilized for armament and disarmament should not be ignored, but considered together with the quantitative aspect;

(i)   All States, in particular those with major space capabilities, should contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and the prevention of an arms race in outer space;

(j)   Arms transfer should not be treated as taboo, but should receive greater attention by the international community;

(k)   The potentially important role of the United Nations in the verification of multilateral disarmament and arms control agreements deserves in-depth study;

(l)   While the relationship between disarmament and development and welfare may not be direct or "organic", the way the finite resources of the Earth are used for these competing objectives must be of interest to all.

On the whole, the session was characterized by a remarkable spirit of compromise. Those countries which were sharply critical of the United States position on three issues—the nuclear test ban, outer space, and naval disarmament—were in the end willing to delete any reference to naval disarmament and to accept formulas negotiated with the United States on the test ban and outer space. The flexibility shown by the Soviet Union was noticeable throughout the negotiations.

Animated debate was conducted between the majority of countries which stressed the importance of maintaining and strengthening the non-proliferation Treaty regime and those outside it. In the end a compromise formula was accepted on this thorny issue, too.

It may, therefore, seem a matter of some surprise and great regret that a few remaining issues such as "nuclear weapon free zones", "zones of peace", the "relationship between disarmament and development", the question of the nuclear capability of South Africa and Israel, and the role of the Secretary-General in investigating the use of chemical weapons proved to be stumbling-blocks to a final agreement. In truth, however, these items happened to be the ones remaining when time ran out. The divisions between various national positions and attitudes were really of a more fundamental nature.

The last few hours of negotiations on the Chairman's text showed that national and regional concerns continue to cast long shadows over questions concerning war and peace and disarmament. Yet, there is a growing acceptance of the need to find universal approaches to many of these matters. At present, we undoubtedly stand at the confluence of these two opposing forces and cross-currents.

While there will continue to be set-backs now and then, it would seem to me that it is of cardinal importance for us not to lose sight of the direction in which the tide is running, and that direction is positive and in favour of a considerable attenuation of the traditional means of attaining security. The relentless search is on for more rational and multilateral methods. Thanks partly to the third special session, the international agenda concerning disarmament efforts has broadened. This, it seems to me, augurs well for the future, because new items on our informal agenda will be more pragmatic and balanced.

In hindsight, the outcome of the third session may indicate that its convening this year was somewhat premature, and that the international community had not had sufficient time to digest the remarkable transformation taking place not only in the super-Power relationship, but also in other relationships and factors which transcend national boundaries and compel co-operation.

Moreover, there seems to be an insufficient appreciation of the dynamic relationship between bilateral disarmament negotiations and multilateral endeavours through the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament.

It is understandable that intensive and complex negotiations taking place at the bilateral level have preoccupied policy makers and officials in the two capitals concerned, at some cost to a thorough exploration of multilateral possibilities. Nevertheless, it would be a great pity if short-term calculations of national security interest were to prevail over long-term interests in vital areas with global dimensions such as nuclear non-proliferation, the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, strengthening of the Secretary-General's hand in investigating the use of chemical weapons, and preventing an arms race in outer space and constraining it in maritime areas.

One hopes that there will be a continuing and serious search in national capitals to harmonize short-term and long-term perspectives on security, which should establish complementary and mutually reinforcing roles to be played by bilateral, regional and global activities in arms control and disarmament. One also hopes that the pursuit of national interest, narrowly defined, may not unintentionally bring about the weakening of multilateral institutions which could be instrumental in forging broader, long-term agreements for the good of all.

Perceiving the twin dangers of being too visionary and trying to achieve too much too soon, on the one hand, and taking a minimalist viewpoint in the name of realism, on the other, the Secretary-General and the Department for Disarmament Affairs have endeavoured to point to "a middle ground" through the creation of an improved climate for discussion in order to facilitate the achievement of tangible results at the special session. We have hoped and continue to hope that the international community will be able to take, stage-by-stage, one or more steps in the direction of serious disarmament efforts.

The Secretary-General's opening statement to the special session on 31 May was widely regarded as a clear and courageous effort to delineate the lines of action for the international community. Some even said that it constituted the framework for a concluding document.

It may be said that the Secretariat went to a considerable length in contributing to the elaboration of a conceptual framework acceptable to all and within which positive conclusions could be adopted at the session. The excellent working relationship between Ambassador

Ahmad and other key delegates and officers of the special session, including President Florin of the General Assembly, on the one hand, and the Secretariat, on the other, helped a great deal in this regard.

I also wish to pay warm and grateful tribute to your President, Ed Luck, who has worked closely with me in organising informal discussions among some of the key players dealing with disarmament. The weekend meetings at Arrowwood last November and this May, where his thought-provoking papers served as opening salvoes for lively discussion, provided a valuable opportunity to gain insight into the constraints as well as possibilities for negotiations on various issues. That experience has deepened my belief in the value of an informal framework for dialogue, which a body such as UNA/USA can provide, as a parallel to and stimulant for official contacts and negotiations.

In brief, the third special session on disarmament was an important event, but it should not be looked at as an isolated event. It was rather a chapter in the long and tortuous process of humanity's search for a more secure world, free from weapons of mass destruction and the threat of annihilation.

The lack of a concluding document was a disappointment, but it should not cloud the fact that the special session has confirmed an emerging common outlook on disarmament. It has also shown where the remaining obstacles lie.

I have no doubt that the forthcoming regular session of the General Assembly, as well as the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission next spring, will build upon the agreements already reached in several major areas during the special session—those agreements which could not be adopted because of the "package approach" of the session.

A United Nations role in the verification of disarmament agreements is one such area in which there will be no slackening of efforts to reach a generally acceptable formula this autumn. Another is the question of international machinery for disarmament, on which broad consensus was indeed reached.

These, together with many other useful proposals made by Member Governments, are on the table and will be pursued in such a way as to augment the positive momentum which now exists for global disarmament efforts.

56

Resolutions of the General Assembly

AN AGENDA FOR PEACE: PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AND RELATED MATTERS
A/RES/47/120 A, 18 December 1992

The General Assembly,

Recalling the statement of 31 January 1992, adopted at the conclusion of the first meeting held by the Security Council at the level of Heads of State and Government," in which the Secretary-General was invited to prepare, for circulation to the States Members of the United Nations by 1 July 1992, an "analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping",

Welcoming the timely presentation of the forward-looking report of the Secretary-General entitled *An Agenda for Peace, in* response to the summit meeting of the Security Council, as a set of recommendations that deserve close examination by the international community,

Recognising the need to maintain the increased interest in and momentum for revitalisation of the Organisation to meet the challenges of the new phase of international relations in order to fulfil the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Stressing that the implementation of the concepts and proposals contained in *An Agenda for Peace* should be in strict conformity with the provisions of the Charter, in particular its purposes and principles,

Recalling also its resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, the annex to which contains the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and its resolution 43/51 of 5 December 1988, the annex to which contains the Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten International peace and security and on the Role of the United Nations in this Field,

Emphasising that international peace and security must be seen in an integrated manner and that the efforts of the Organisation to build peace, justice, stability and security must encompass not only military matters, but also, through its various organs within their respective areas of competence, relevant political, economic, social, humanitarian, environmental and developmental aspects,

Stressing the need for international action to strengthen the socio-economic development of Member States as one of the means of enhancing international peace and security and, in this regard, recognising the need to complement an Agenda for Peace with an Agenda for Development,

Acknowledging that timely application of preventive diplomacy is the most desirable and efficient means of easing tensions before they result in conflict,

Recognising that preventive diplomacy may require such measures as confidence-building, early-warning, fact-finding and other measures in which consultations with Member States, discretion, confidentiality, objectivity and transparency should be combined as appropriate,

Emphasising the need to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations in the field of preventive diplomacy, through, *inter alia,* allocating appropriate staff resources and financial resources for preventive diplomacy, in order to assist Member States to resolve their differences in a peaceful manner,

Reaffirming the fundamental importance of a sound and secure financial basis for the United Nations in order, *inter alia,* to enable the Organisation to play an effective role in preventive diplomacy,

Emphasising the importance of cooperation between the United Nations and regional arrangements and organisations for preventive diplomacy within their respective areas of competence,

Emphasising also that respect for the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States is crucial to any common endeavour to promote international peace and security,

Recalling further other resolutions adopted by the Assembly during its forty-seventh session concerning various aspects of an Agenda for Peace,

Emphasising the need for all organs and bodies of the United Nations, as appropriate, to intensify their efforts to strengthen the role of the organisation in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and peace-building and to continue the discussion of the report of the Secretary-General with a view to adequate action being taken,

Stressing the need for adequate protection of personnel involved in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and humanitarian operations, in accordance with relevant norms and principles of international law,

Noting the definition of preventive diplomacy provided by the Secretary-General in his report entitled *An Agenda for Peace.*

I. Peaceful Aettlement of Disputes

Emphasising the need to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes,

1. *Invites* Member States to seek solutions to their disputes at an early stage through such peaceful means as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations;

2. *Decides* to explore ways and means for a full utilisation of the provisions of the Charter whereby the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which is deemed likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations;

3. *Encourages* the Security Council to utilize fully the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter on procedures and methods for peaceful settlement of disputes and to call upon the parties concerned to settle their disputes peacefully;

4. *Encourages* the Secretary-General and the Security Council to engage at an early stage in close and continuous consultation in order to develop, on a case-by-case basis, an appropriate strategy for the peaceful settlement of specific disputes, including the participation of other organs, organisations and

agencies of the United Nations system, as well as regional arrangements and organisations as appropriate, and invites the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly on such consultations;

II. Early-warning, Collection of Information and Analysis

Recognising the need to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations for early-warning, collection of information and analysis,

1. *Encourages* the Secretary-General to set up an adequate early-warning mechanism for situations which are likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, in close cooperation with Member States and United Nations agencies, as well as regional arrangements and organisations, as appropriate, making use of the information available to these organisations and/or received from Member States, and to keep Member States informed of the mechanism established;

2. *Invites* the Secretary-General to strengthen the capacity of the Secretariat for the collection of information and analysis to serve better the early-warning needs of the organisation and, to that end, encourages the Secretary-General to ensure that staff members receive proper training in all aspects of preventive diplomacy, including the collection and analysis of information;

3. *Invites* Member States and regional arrangements and organisations to provide timely early-warning information, on a confidential basis when appropriate, to the Secretary-General;

4. *Encourages* the Secretary-General to continue, in accordance with Article 99 of the Charter of the United Nations, to bring to the attention of the Security Council, at his discretion, any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security, together with his recommendations thereon;

5. *Invites* Member States to support the efforts of the Secretary-General in preventive diplomacy, including by providing assistance he may require;

6. *Encourages* the Secretary-General, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter, to notify the General Assembly, as appropriate, of any situation which is potentially dangerous or might lead to international friction or dispute;

7. *Invites* the Secretary-General to bring to the attention of Member States concerned, at an early stage, any matter which in his opinion may adversely affect relations between States.

III. Fact-finding

Recalling the statements made by the President of the Security Council, on behalf of the Council, on 29 October and 30 November 1992, and its own resolutions 1967 (XVIII) of 16 December 1963, 2104 (XX) of 20 December 1965, 2182 (XXI) of 12 December 1966 and 2329 (XXII) of 18 December 1967 on the question of methods of fact-finding,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolution 46/59 of 9 December 1991, the annex to which contains the Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations in the Field of the Maintenance of International peace and security, particularly its guidelines;

2. *Recommends* to the Secretary-General that he should continue to utilize the services of eminent and qualified experts in fact-finding and other missions, selected on as wide a geographical basis as possible, taking into account candidates with the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity;

3. *Invites* Member States to submit names of suitable individuals whom the Secretary-General might wish to use at his discretion in fact-finding and other missions;

4. *Recommends* that a request by a Member State for the dispatch of a fact-finding mission to its territory should be considered expeditiously;

5. *Invites* the Secretary-General to continue to dispatch fact-finding and other missions in a timely manner in order to assist him in the proper discharge of his functions under the Charter of the United Nations.

IV. Confidence-building Measures

Recognising that the application of appropriate confidence-building measures, consistent with national security needs, would promote mutual confidence and good faith, which are essential to reducing the likelihood of conflicts between States and enhancing prospects for the peaceful settlement of disputes,

Recalling its resolutions 43/78 H of 7 December 1988 and 45/62 F of 4 December 1990, as well as its resolution 47/54 D of 9 December 1992 on the implementation of the guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures,

Recognising that confidence-building measures may encompass both military and non-military matters, including political, economic and social matters,

Stressing the need to encourage Member States, and regional arrangements and organisations where relevant and in a manner consistent with their mandates, to play a leading role in developing confidence-building measures appropriate to the region concerned and to coordinate their efforts in this regard with the United Nations in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Invites* Member States and regional arrangements and organisations to inform the Secretary-General through appropriate channels about their experiences in confidence-building measures in their respective regions;

2. *Supports* the intention of the Secretary-General to consult on a regular basis with Member States and regional arrangements and organisations on further confidence-building measures;

3. *Encourages* the Secretary-General to consult with parties to existing or potential disputes, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, and with other interested Member States and regional arrangements and organisations, as appropriate, on the possibility of initiating confidence-building measures in their respective regions and to keep Member States informed thereon in consultation with the parties concerned;

4. *Commends* such confidence-building measures as the promotion of openness and restraint in the production, procurement and deployment of armaments, the systematic exchange of military missions, the possible formation of regional risk reduction centres, arrangements for the free flow of information and the monitoring of regional arms control and disarmament agreements.

V. Humanitarian Assistance

Recalling its resolution 45/100 of 14 December 1990 on humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters and similar emergency situations and its resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991 on the strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations,

Welcoming the increasing role of the United Nations system in providing humanitarian assistance,

Noting that, in certain circumstances, programmes of impartially-provided humanitarian assistance and peace-keeping operations can be mutually supportive,

1. *Encourages* the Secretary-General to continue to strengthen the capacity of the Organisation in order to ensure coordinated planning and execution of humanitarian assistance programmes, drawing upon the specialized skills and resources of all parts of the United Nations system, as well as those of non-governmental organisations, as appropriate;

2. *Also encourages* the Secretary-General to continue to address the question of coordination, when necessary, between humanitarian assistance programmes and peace-keeping or related operations, preserving the non-political, neutral and impartial character of humanitarian action;

3. *Invites* the Secretary-General to bring to the attention of appropriate organs of the United Nations any situation requiring urgent humanitarian assistance in order to prevent its deterioration, which might lead to international friction or dispute.

VI. Resources and Logistical Aspects of Preventive Diplomacy

Recognising the need for adequate resources in support of the United Nations efforts in preventive diplomacy,

1. *Invites* Member States to provide political and practical support to the Secretary-General in his efforts for the peaceful settlement of disputes, including early-warning, fact-finding, good offices and mediation;

2. *Also invites* Member States, on a voluntary basis, to provide the Secretary-General with any necessary additional expertise and logistical resources that he might require for the successful execution of these functions of increasing importance.

VII. Role of the General Assembly in preventive diplomacy

Emphasising that, together with the Security Council and the Secretary-General, it has an important role in preventive diplomacy,

Recognising that, having an important role in preventive diplomacy, it has to work in close cooperation and coordination with the Security Council and the Secretary-General in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and consistent with their respective mandates and responsibilities,

Decides to explore ways and means to support the recommendations of the Secretary-General in his report entitled *An Agenda for Peace* to promote the utilisation of the General Assembly, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, by Member States so as to bring greater influence to bear in pre-empting or containing any situation which is potentially dangerous or might lead to international friction or dispute.

VIII. Future Work

Bearing in mind that owing to time constraints it could not examine all the proposals contained in the report of the Secretary-General entitled *An Agenda for Peace,*

1. *Decides* to continue early in 1993 its examination of other recommendations on preventive diplomacy and related matters contained in the report of the Secretary-General entitled *An Agenda for Peace,* including preventive deployment, demilitarized zones and the International Court of Justice, as well as implementation of the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations, in conformity with the Charter and taking into account the relevant developments and practices in the competent organs of the United Nations;

2. Also decides to discuss and consider other proposals contained in *An Agenda for Peace.*

AN AGENDA FOR PEACE

A/RES/47/120 B, 20 September 1993

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 47/120 A of 18 December 1992 entitled "An Agenda for Peace: preventive diplomacy and related matters",

Reaffirming its resolution 46/59 of 9 December 1991, the annex to which contains the Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations in the Field of the Maintenance of International peace and security,

Recalling also its resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991 on the strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations,

Recalling farther its resolution 47/71 of 14 December 1992 on the comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects,

Emphasising that, together with the Security Council and the Secretary-General, it has an important role in preventive diplomacy,

Recognising that it has to work in close cooperation and coordination with the Security Council and the Secretary-General in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and consistent with their respective mandates and responsibilities.

I. Role of the General Assembly

Recalling the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations relating to the functions and powers of the General Assembly,

Recalling also the report of the Secretary-General entitled *An Agenda for Peace* which refers to the utilisation of these functions and powers,

1. *Resolves* to make full and effective use of the functions and powers set out in Articles 10 and 14 of the Charter of the United Nations, in conformity with other relevant provisions of the Charter;

2. *Decides* to consider the use of existing or new machinery, including subsidiary organs under Article 22 of the Charter, to facilitate consideration of any situation coming within the scope of Article 14 of the Charter, with a view to recommending measures for the peaceful adjustment of such a situation;

3. *Also decides* to consider appropriate ways and means consistent with the Charter to improve cooperation among the competent United Nations organs in order to strengthen the role of the United Nations in the promotion of peace, including the possibility that the General Assembly receives reports, as appropriate, from the Secretary-General on matters related to the items on its agenda or on other matters within its competence.

II. Preventive Deployment and Demilitarized Zones

Taking note of paragraphs 28 to 33 on preventive deployment and demilitarized zones contained in the report of the Secretary-General entitled *An Agenda for Peace,"* within the larger context of preventive diplomacy, as well as the views expressed on these issues by Member States,

Stressing that the implementation of any concepts and proposals on preventive deployment and demilitarized zones contained in *An*

Agenda for Peace should be undertaken in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular its purposes and principles, and other relevant principles of international law,

Welcoming the instances of effective use of United Nations preventive deployment and the establishment of demilitarized zones,

Stressing the importance of appropriate consultations with Member States and transparency in any decision-making concerning the undertaking of preventive deployment or the establishment of a demilitarized zone,

Recognising that a United Nations preventive deployment or the establishment of demilitarized zones could promote the prevention or containment of conflicts, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,

Emphasising that respect for the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States and nonintervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State is crucial to any common endeavour to promote international peace and security,

Bearing in mind that, as each situation in which preventive deployment may be undertaken or a demilitarized zone established has its own special characteristics, it is of the utmost importance to make decisions on such measures on a case-by-case basis with due regard to all relevant factors and circumstances, including consultations with Member States,

Recognising the need to preserve the impartiality of the United Nations when engaged in preventive deployment or in the establishment of demilitarized zones,

Recognising also that preventive deployment and the establishment of demilitarized zones are evolving concepts,

1. *Acknowledges* the importance of considering, on a case-by-case basis, the use of preventive deployment and/or the establishment of demilitarized zones as a means to prevent existing or potential disputes from escalating into conflicts and to promote efforts to achieve the peaceful settlement of such disputes, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security;

2. *Reaffirms* that a United Nations preventive deployment and/or the establishment of a demilitarized zone should be undertaken with the consent of and, in principle, on the basis of a request by the Member State or Member States involved, having taken into account the positions of other States concerned and all other relevant factors;

3. *Also reaffirms* that a United Nations preventive deployment and/or the establishment of a demilitarized zone should be undertaken in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular its purposes and principles and other relevant principles of international law, also taking into account relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions;

4. *Invites* the competent organs of the United Nations, within their respective mandates, to consider implementing preventive deployment and/or the establishment of a demilitarized zone with the objective of preventing conflict and of promoting efforts to achieve the peaceful settlement of disputes, and to continue to examine practical, operational and financial aspects of such preventive deployment and demilitarized zones with a view to increasing their efficacy and effectiveness.

III. Use of the International Court of Justice in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

Emphasising the role of the International Court of Justice under the Charter of the United Nations in the peaceful settlement of disputes,

1. *Encourages* States to consider making greater use of the International Court of Justice for the peaceful settlement of disputes;

2. *Recommends* that States consider the possibility of accepting the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, including through the dispute settlement clauses of multilateral treaties;

3. *Notes* that the use of chambers of the International Court of Justice for dealing with particular cases submitted to the Court by the parties is a means of providing increased use of the Court for the peaceful settlement of disputes;

4. *Requests* States to consider making, if possible on a regular basis, contributions to the Trust Fund of the Secretary-General to assist States in resolving their disputes through the International Court of Justice, and invites the Secretary-

General to report periodically both on the financial status and the utilisation of the Fund;

5. *Recalls* that the General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question, and that other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities;

6. *Decides* to keep under examination all the recommendations of the Secretary-General concerning the International Court of Justice, including those related to the use of the advisory competence of the Court.

IV. Special Economic Problems Arising from the Implementation of Preventive or Enforcement Measures

Recalling Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations, which entitles States that find themselves confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of preventive or enforcement measures taken by the Security Council against any other State to consult the Council with regard to a solution to those problems,

Recalling also the recommendation of the Secretary-General in his report entitled *An Agenda for Peace* that the Security Council devise a set of measures involving the financial institutions and other components of the United Nations system that can be put in place to insulate States from such difficulties and his view that such measures would be a matter of equity and a means of encouraging States to cooperate with decisions of the Council,

Recalling further the statement made on 30 December 1992 by the President of the Security Council, in which the Council expressed its determination to consider this matter further and invited the Secretary-General to consult with the heads of international financial institutions, other components of the United Nations system and Member States of the United Nations, and to report to the Council as early as possible,

Recalling its resolution 47/120 A entitled "An Agenda for Peace: preventive diplomacy and related matters", in which it decided to continue early in 1993 its examination of other recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General entitled *An Agenda for Peace,* including implementation of the provisions of Article 50 of

the Charter, in conformity with the Charter and taking into account the relevant developments and practices in the competent organs of the United Nations,

Stressing the importance of economic and other measures not involving the use of armed forces in maintaining international peace and security, in accordance with Article 41 of the Charter,

Recalling Article 49 of the Charter, which requires the Members of the United Nations to join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council,

Noting that the implementation of Article 50 of the Charter has been addressed recently in several forums, including the General Assembly and its subsidiary organs and the Security Council,

Recognising that, in the conditions of economic interdependence that exist today, the implementation of preventive or enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter against any State continues to create special economic problems for certain other States,

Recalling that Member States have engaged previously in consultations with bodies established by the Security Council regarding special economic problems confronted by them as a result of the implementation of preventive or enforcement measures against Iraq and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),

Concerned that certain States continue to be confronted with adverse economic problems owing to the implementation of preventive and enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter,

Recognising the need for appropriate means to find solutions to these problems as soon as possible,

1. *Decides* to continue its examination of ways to implement Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations, with a view to finding solutions to the special economic problems of other Member States when preventive or enforcement measures are decided upon by the Security Council against a State;

2. *Invites* the Security Council to consider what could be done within the United Nations system and involving international financial institutions with regard to solutions to the special economic problems of States arising from the carrying out of the measures imposed by the Council and to consider, *inter alia,* the following measures:

(a) Strengthening of the consultative process for studying, reporting on and suggesting solutions to the special economic problems, with a view to minimising such economic problems through consultations with States adversely affected or, as appropriate, with States likely to be adversely affected as a result of their implementing the preventive or enforcement measures, as well as with the Secretary-General, the principal organs, programmes and agencies of the United Nations, and international financial institutions;

(b) Other measures, in consultation with Member States and, as appropriate, with international financial institutions, such as voluntary funds to provide assistance to States experiencing special economic problems arising from carrying out the measures imposed by the Security Council, additional credit lines, assistance for the promotion of exports of the affected countries, assistance for technical cooperation projects in such countries and/or assistance for the promotion of investment in the affected countries;

3. *Also invites* the committees of the Security Council and other bodies entrusted with the task of monitoring the implementation of preventive and enforcement measures to take into account, in discharging their mandates, the need to avoid unnecessary adverse consequences for other Member States, without prejudice to the effectiveness of such measures;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report annually to the General Assembly on the implementation of Article 50 of the Charter;

V. Post-conflict Peace-building

Noting that post-conflict peace-building is a new and evolving concept,

Recognising the need for sustained cooperative efforts by the United Nations to deal with the underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian causes and effects of conflicts in order to promote a durable foundation for peace,

Recalling the provisions of Article 55 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recognising also that the concept of post-conflict peace-building is aimed at the creation of a new environment to forestall the recurrence of conflicts,

Bearing in mind that each situation in which post-conflict peace-building may be undertaken is unique and therefore should be considered on a case-by-case basis,

Bearing in mind also that post-conflict peace-building should complement efforts at peacemaking and peace-keeping in order to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people and States,

1. *Acknowledges* the usefulness of the proposals of the Secretary-General contained in paragraphs 55 to 59 of his report entitled *An Agenda for Peace,* particularly in relation to the range of activities for post-conflict peace-building;

2. *Emphasizes* that post-conflict peace-building should be carried out in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the principles of sovereign equality and political independence of States, territorial integrity, and non-intervention in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State;

3. *Recalls* that each State has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems;

4. *Stresses* that activities related to post-conflict peace-building should be carried out within a well-defined time-frame;

5. *Also stresses* that post-conflict peace-building be undertaken on the basis of agreements ending conflicts or reached after conflicts, or at the request of the Government or Governments concerned;

6. *Emphasizes* the need for measures to promote peace and cooperation among previously conflicting parties;

7. *Stresses* the need for coordinated action by relevant components of the United Nations system, including the contributions that the international financial institutions can make in the area of socio-economic development in post-conflict peace-building;

8. *Also stresses* the importance for post-conflict peace-building of contributions from diverse sources, including components of the United Nations system, regional organisations, Member States and non-governmental organisations;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to inform the General Assembly of requests relating to post-conflict peace-building by the Government or Governments concerned, or emanating from

peace agreements ending conflicts or reached after conflicts by parties concerned;

10. *Affirms* its readiness to support, as appropriate, post-conflict peace-building;

VI. Cooperation with Regional Arrangements and Organisations

Recognising the importance of the role of regional organisations and arrangements in dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, and the need to enhance, in this respect, cooperation between such organisations and arrangements and the United Nations,

Recalling Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations and its acknowledgement of the role of regional arrangements and agencies in dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

Taking into account the experience gained and the favourable results achieved by regional organisations in the peaceful settlement of disputes in different parts of the world,

1. *Recognizes* that regional organisations, arrangements and agencies can, in their fields of competence and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, make important contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building;

2. *Encourages* regional organisations, arrangements and agencies to consider, as appropriate, in their fields of competence, ways and means for promoting closer cooperation and coordination with the United Nations with the objective of contributing to the fulfilment of the purposes and principles of the Charter;

3. *Also encourages* the Secretary-General to continue his efforts at promoting cooperation between the United Nations and regional organisations, arrangements and agencies, in accordance with the Charter;

VII. Safety of Personnel

Recalling its resolution 47/72 of 14 December 1992 on protection of peace-keeping personnel, and all other relevant resolutions,

Bearing in mind the concern expressed by the Secretary-General over the safety of United Nations personnel in his report entitled *An Agenda for Peace,*

Also recalling the relevant resolutions of the Security Council,

Taking note with appreciation of the statement made on 31 March 1993 by the President of the Security Council on the protection of United Nations forces and personnel,

Noting with appreciation the work done by the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations on the issue of the status and safety of United Nations peace-keeping personnel,

Gravely concerned about the growing number of fatalities and injuries among United Nations peace-keeping and other personnel resulting from deliberate hostile actions in dangerous areas of deployment,

1. *Welcomes* the report of the Secretary-General on the security of United Nations operations;

2. *Decides* to consider further steps to enhance the status and safety of United Nations personnel involved in United Nations operations, taking into account the need for concerted action by all relevant bodies of the United Nations in this regard.

57

The Security Council

The former Presidents of the General Assembly who met in 1985 to assess the United Nations after 40 years summarized the reasons for peoples' frustrations with the United Nations. They stated that the model on which the United Nations was built had proved to be too ambitious. The Charter had been drafted on the assumption that the victors of the Second World War would continue to co-operate as they had done during the hostilities. As a result, from the very beginning, the United Nations had been unable to function as designed.

This contrast between what the Charter signatories envisaged and what latter-day participants had to confront is probably most evident in the workings of the Security Council, the body which is designed to ensure the strong beat of the heart of the Charter, its collective security provisions.

On the wall behind the horseshoe curve of the great ashwood table of the Security Council is a mural by Norwegian artist Per Krohg graphically depicting what is and what might be in this regard. Symbolising both the grim realities of the world and its hopes for the future, it has at its centre a huge and luminous phoenix rising from its ashes. Around and above the glowing bird are figures of bright renaissance, of fellowship, freedom and trust. Below, humanity is portrayed in sinister shades of verdigris and rust, struggling to free itself from the slough of despond, slavery and war. The painting reflects the potential for renewal and progress as well as the reality of continuing struggle that has characterized the work of the Security Council, the body charged in the United Nations Charter with the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security".

The Council, which originally had 11 members, became a 15-member body on 1 January 1966, in accordance with amendments—

which came into effect on 31 August 1965—to Article 23 of the Charter. Five of the members (China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States) are permanent members. The other ten are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms.

Each member of the Council has one vote. On procedural matters—such as adoption of the agenda, invitations to Member States to participate in the Council's deliberations, adoption or alteration of the rules of procedure-decisions are made by the affirmative vote of any nine members. Decisions of the Council on all other matters are to be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members. A negative vote by any permanent member on a non-procedural matter means rejection of the draft resolution or proposal, even if it has received nine affirmative votes. The effect of this so-called "veto" right has been that the Council's members seek to obtain unanimous support for proposals submitted for adoption. This trend has been especially marked in the years since 1970. The Council searches for unanimity and consensus through informal consultations. Moreover, it has interpreted "the concurring votes of the permanent members" (Article 27 (3)) to mean that the permanent members may abstain in a vote or not participate at all in the voting and still satisfy the stipulation of their concurring in the affirmative vote. Thus, the impact of the "veto" has been softened in the Council's practice.

The Security Council is so organized as to be able to function continuously. It holds itself in readiness to meet at any time. For this purpose, each member of the Council is represented at all times at United Nations Headquarters. The Presidency of the Council rotates each month in alphabetical order among its 15 members.

Under the Charter, any United Nations Member (Article 35), the General Assembly (Article 11) or the Secretary-General (Article 99) can bring to the Council's attention any matter that may endanger international peace and security. A State which is not a Member of the Organisation may also bring before the Council a dispute to which it is a party, provided that the State accepts in advance the Charter obligations for peaceful settlement. Whenever the Council receives a request for a meeting, its President and the members in consultation decide whether to accede to the request and to consider the issue. The Council cannot be compelled to have a meeting if a majority of its members does not wish it.

Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

Chapter VI of the Charter is devoted to the "pacific settlement of disputes" and the role of the Security Council. Article 33 provides that the parties to a dispute "shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice". When the Council deems it necessary, it may call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

When, in January 1946, Iran complained that the presence of Soviet troops on its soil was causing a situation which threatened peace, the Council, after discussion, took note of the readiness of the parties to negotiate and asked them to report the result of their negotiations. In May, Iran reported to the Council the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. Thereupon the Council adjourned its discussion of the case.

In 1947, the United Kingdom brought to the Council its dispute with Albania over damage to British warships and injury to naval personnel by mines in the Corfu Channel during October 1946. The United Kingdom claimed that Albania was responsible. Albania denied this and accused the United Kingdom of violating its territorial waters. The Council recommended that the parties take the case to the International Court of Justice, which they did.

In subsequent years, the Council has continued to recommend to the parties to disputes and other situations which might lead to international friction that they take steps in pursuit of a peaceful settlement of their conflicts. Such recommendations or appeals in accordance with Chapter VI of the Charter were issued in connection with the situation in the Middle East in 1967, when the Council adopted a framework for a settlement (resolution 242 (1967)). Similarly, the Council has, since 1964, urged the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in the Republic of Cyprus to seek a solution through negotiations, with the help of the Secretary-General's good offices.

In a number of cases, the Council has requested the Secretary-General to make his good offices available in the search for a peaceful solution, to name special representatives in connection with efforts to promote the resolution of conflict situations, or to undertake missions in international crises with a view to seeking a peaceful solution.

Under Article 34 of the Charter, the Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or

give rise to a dispute. The Council has employed this instrument of fact-finding missions throughout the history of the Organisation.

Such missions usually involve a visit by a group of Council members to the area of conflict and an in-depth report to the Council. Basing its work on these reports and recommendations for action, the Council is better equipped to judge the validity of the complaints which are brought to its attention and to issue its suggestions in the form of a resolution to reduce the tension and to adjudicate the claims and counter-claims. Sometimes the Council asks the Secretary-General to carry out the task of fact-finding on its behalf.

Response to Hostilities and Conflict

When armed conflict erupts or when situations reach a critical tension level, the Security Council has at its disposal a range of measures designed to end hostilities, prevent an exacerbation of the conflict and lessen tension. It may also condemn a breach of the peace or violations of sovereignty and territorial integrity and demand compensation for damages inflicted by the transgressor.

Throughout the years of its existence, the Council has dealt with a wide variety of issues involving often complex political aspects barring easy solutions. Since the 15-member Council requires at least a majority of nine votes, while avoiding the threat of a negative vote by one of the five permanent members, it is easy to understand that the resolutions and decisions of the Council reflect the difficulties inherent in the process of consultation and adoption.

When questions have been brought to the Council's attention by the Governments of countries that have suffered territorial aggression, armed attacks, intervention, mercenary activities, threats and intimidation, with a call for help against such actions, the Council has adopted resolutions demanding an end to these hostile acts, usually condemning the perpetrators and often asking compensation for damages incurred.

In many cases, when armed conflicts have broken out and the Council has been convened urgently to consider the hostilities, the Council members have sought a cessation of fighting by adopting a call for an immediate ceasefire. Frequently, it has had to reiterate its calls for a ceasefire and to deplore the continued fighting or the resumption of hostilities.

Since the Council began to exercise its mandate under the Charter, it has devised, in response to difficult crisis situations, the instrument of observer missions and peace-keeping forces in order to ascertain

that a ceasefire in place is being maintained and that the parties are not able to resume fighting across a buffer zone manned by United Nations peace-keepers and supervised by the Security Council and the Secretary-General. This novel and imaginative response to crisis, unforeseen by the Charter, is considered in detail in the chapter on peace-keeping.

The General Assembly has been able to take up issues when the Security Council could not act because of lack of agreement among the permanent members. Under the Charter, the Assembly is not empowered to make recommendations on a question affecting international peace and security when the Security Council is dealing with the matter, unless the Council itself so requests. However, the "Uniting for peace" resolution—resolution 377 (V), adopted in 1950 by the General Assembly —provided that an emergency special session of the Assembly could be convened either at the request of the Security Council (on the vote of any nine members) or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations. The Council requested such involvement of the General Assembly in a number of instances, including the war in Korea (1950), the Suez crisis (1956), and the situations in the Congo (1960), the India-Pak subcontinent (1971) and Afghanistan (1980).

On two occasions, the Security Council has agreed to hold meetings away from Headquarters in order to devote special attention to specific regions: the first was a session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1972 to consider questions relating to Africa, and implementation of the Council's relevant resolutions; the second was a series of meetings in Panama City, Panama. In 1973 to consider measures for the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security in Latin America in conformity with the provisions and principles of the Charter. Both of these sessions resulted in an in-depth examination of the peace and security situation in the regions and in the adoption of resolutions designed to bring about improvements.

Since the inception of the world Organisation, matters have often been brought to the Council's attention and discussed without any decisions being reached—because no resolution was submitted, because a draft resolution failed of adoption, or because a proposal for action was not pressed to the vote. Nevertheless, consideration by the Council of a highly controversial issue, frequently involving Council members, may serve to clarify the issues, transfer the confrontation from hostilities on the battlefield to dialogue in or out of the Council chamber, or otherwise lessen tensions between the parties and other Member States.

Armed Force and Sanctions

Under Chapter VII of the Charter, conceived as a key element of the United Nations system of collective security, the Security Council "shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security".

In Korea in 1950, the United Nations employed armed force in connection with a breach of the peace—one of the subjects addressed in Chapter VII of the Charter, although that chapter's provisions were not specifically invoked in the enabling resolutions. With respect to southern Africa, on the other hand, the Council did invoke Chapter VII, having made a determination that a threat to the peace existed, and, under Article 41, imposed mandatory economic sanctions against the white minority regime in Southern Rhodesia in 1966 and 1968 and a mandatory arms embargo against the *apartheid* regime in South Africa in 1977. The sanctions against Southern Rhodesia were terminated in 1979 after agreed steps were taken that led to the creation of majority rule in independent Zimbabwe. The arms embargo against South Africa continues in effect.

In addition to imposing economic sanctions under Chapter VII, the Council may, under Article 42, take action by air, sea or land forces to maintain or restore international peace and security, including interruption of economic relations and communications and severance of diplomatic relations. Member States pledge, under Article 43, to make available to the Council armed forces, assistance and facilities necessary to maintain international peace and security—if the Council calls for such forces and assistance—in accordance with special agreements to be concluded by them with the Council and subject to their ratification.

The Charter envisaged that plans for the application of armed force were to be made by the Security Council with the assistance of its Military Staff Committee—consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Council or their representatives—established to advise the Council on all questions relating to its military requirements, force employment and command, the regulation of armaments and possible disarmament. The Committee was to be responsible for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the Council's disposal. While the Committee meets regularly, its potential has never been realized, a further reflection of the realities of current international relations within which the United Nations operates.

The Security Council has other duties apart from its main task of maintaining international peace and security. It makes recommendations to the General Assembly on the admission of new Member States. The Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. The Council approves trusteeship agreements for areas designated as "strategic" (the only such area is the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, administered by the United States) and, together with the General Assembly, elects the judges of the International Court of Justice.

Behind the Scenes

Throughout the last four decades, the Security Council has remained, in many cases, the court of last resort, the place where States bring their most bitter quarrels only after unsuccessful attempts have been made to settle them. The Council's record in settling these well-developed and entrenched conflicts has therefore been limited, despite the often ingenious use of the capacities given it by the Charter.

The practice of using the Security Council to apportion blame publicly, which began with the Cold War, has continued, except that today a larger number of countries participate. But there has been one particularly positive development: the apparatus of the Council is used far more frequently now on an informal basis to keep channels open. In this process, informal consultations have assumed such importance that the old practice of meeting in the cramped office of the Council President has been given up and delegates now use a new room built alongside the main Council Chamber. It is smaller than the main Chamber, more intimate, and no formal records are kept of the talks there.

The new room is an institutionalized acknowledgement that informal consultations are important in defusing tense situations. Late in 1948, for instance, the Council was unable to act formally on the dispute between France, the United Kingdom and the United States, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other, about access from the Western zones of occupation in Germany to the divided city of Berlin. While acrimonious charges were being traded publicly, informal consultations at the United Nations began the process that led to a solution. By May 1949, the "Berlin crisis" was officially declared to be over. Today almost all formal action is preceded by informal consultations, and the Council meets frequently in closed sessions to keep tabs on tense situations as they develop. Unfortunately, the consultations often end with polite agreements to disagree, but channels are kept open.

On some issues, informal consultations have played a routine but important role over the years. The appointment of the Secretary-General, which has proved problematic on more than one occasion, has always depended on close consultations among Council members. Applications for membership in the United Nations—which the Council must approve before the General Assembly can act—have also required informal negotiations.

In the exercise of its power to recommend solutions, the Council has a very mixed record. While some of its recommendations are significant political achievements—for example, resolution 242 (1967) which sets out the basis for a peace settlement in the Middle East, or resolution 435 (1978) which endorses a United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia—their implementation has been virtually impossible despite wide support from the world community. In the generally go-it-alone atmosphere that has prevailed in post-war international relations, States have seldom obeyed Council resolutions unless they found it expedient to do so. Consequently, dangerous situations have festered in every region of the world. Most of these involve conflicts between small or poor countries, often overtly or covertly encouraged and supported by larger Powers.

Since the Council itself decides who is a party to a dispute, a determination subject to the veto, the Charter provision requiring parties to abstain from voting when the Council is considering the pacific settlement of disputes has not been applied in most cases where a permanent member has been perceived by others to be involved. Consequently, when faced with situations of conflict between parties linked to one or more permanent members of the Council, or when the big Powers are themselves directly involved, the Council has been able to do no more than adopt vague resolutions or none at all. Consideration of such issues in the public forum of the Council, however, may prove useful: it can focus world attention on problems that might otherwise be neglected, and it can keep the parties involved in a verbal dispute and prevent an escalation to armed conflict. In some cases, the Council has expressed support for regional efforts to find solutions.

But even in its state of unrealized potential, the Council has played a valuable role over the last four decades, providing the place where the major nuclear Powers have maintained regular contact during periods of high tension, reflecting and helping when possible to change the complex realities of situations such as those in the Middle East and southern Africa. While acknowledging that the achievements of the Council may be meagre when compared to the needs of a world in turmoil, it is necessary to keep in mind that it has no autonomous

power beyond what the nations of the world acknowledge to be the force of its decisions. Like the rest of the United Nations, it mirrors the reality of a divided world.

To some degree, entirely unforeseen developments since the founding of the United Nations have contributed to the reduced effectiveness of the Council. Nuclear weapons and the strategy of deterrence, for example, have unalterably changed the concept of international security that existed when the Charter was written. If the balance of nuclear terror has changed the framework of global security, the proliferation of terrorist movements has redefined its internal balances. Where once aggression meant the movement of armies across national borders, today it can be economic subversion, the covert provocation of ethnic, racial or religious strife or, finally, guerrilla war. The processes of decolonisation, the renaissance of Europe, the emergence of major-Power centres in Asia, as well as immediate post-war antagonisms, have all helped undermine the premise of a collective security system based on a concert of some Great Powers which, as Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim observed in his report on the work of the Organisation in 1972, seems in some respects now to belong more to the nineteenth century than to the present.

Even if the most powerful States suddenly decided today to resolve their differences and undertake their responsibilities, as set out in the Charter, to maintain international peace and security, it does not necessarily follow that in today's multipolar world their collective opinion or enforcement would be as readily acceptable as might have been the case at the time of the San Francisco Conference in 1945.

Perhaps the most disturbing development in the last 40 years in the area of international peace and security is the erosion of commitment to the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter. As the former Assembly Presidents said at their 1985 meeting, problems are not so much related to the institutional imperfections of the Organisation but rather to the lack of respect for the Charter by Member States.

People seem to have forgotten the lesson of two great wars and the intervening depression. Concepts of nations "being number one", of somehow "winning" over others, are used to rouse public support for parochial and short-sighted policies, without thought as to where the path of national chauvinism has led in the past. The dangers inherent in that process was the theme voiced by Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, whose first report on the work of the Organisation, in 1982, focused entirely on its capacity to keep the peace and serve as a forum

of negotiations. The world, he said, had "strayed far from the Charter". Urging action to "reconstruct the Charter concept of collective action for peace and security", the Secretary-General made a number of specific suggestions to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations. He called for more timely action by the Council, proposing that it keep a watch on dangerous situations and act to help countries involved in disputes to prevent the outbreak of violence. The Council, he said, should act on its own initiative and not necessarily wait until the problem was brought to it at the last minute. He himself would consider a more forthright approach in bringing dangerous situations to the attention of the council. To help in this, "a wider and more systematic capacity for fact-finding in potential conflict areas" would need to be developed, he said. To deal better with potential conflicts, he recommended the swift dispatch of good offices missions, military or civilian observers, and the establishment where necessary of a United Nations presence. To strengthen peace-keeping operations, he suggested that ways be studied to underpin their authority, perhaps by States guaranteeing supportive action. He called on States to be more conscientious in implementing Security Council resolutions and following up when necessary with requisite action.

Since that report, the Security Council has discussed it on numerous occasions, meeting informally in the small room set aside for consultations alongside the main chamber. Late in 1984, the President of the Council issued a brief progress report listing the topics that had been considered; no decisions had been taken. What will emerge as these talks continue is hard to predict, but 40 years after the experiment of the United Nations was initiated, there is clear need for a new beginning, as well as a greater perception of the realities of the United Nations.

After the Secretary-General issued his 1982 report, many seemed surprised by his forthright views. One major United States newspaper, invoking the old standard of what is news, headed its favourable editorial with the words "Man Bites Dog". At a subsequent meeting with newspaper editors, Perez de Cuellar observed wryly that he thought what he had written about was "Man Bites Man".

58

A Way to Control Conflicts and Promote Peace

Peace-keeping was pioneered and developed by the United Nations as one of the means for maintaining international peace and security. Interposed between hostile States, or sometimes between hostile communities within a State, international military personnel under the United Nations command have saved countless lives and contributed to creating the conditions necessary for the peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiations.

United Nations peace-keeping activities have increased and broadened dramatically in recent years. In the span of only five years, the Organisation has launched more operations than in the previous 40 years. The growth is not only in quantity but also in quality. Peace-keeping operations are taking on new tasks and often go far beyond traditional activities. They may protect relief shipments, provide services for victims, respond to refugee needs, enforce embargoes, remove mines and seek to disarm warring parties. In addition to military-related aspects, many United Nations operations now involve a large civilian dimension: election monitoring, human rights verification, humanitarian relief, administrative management, institution-building, and the restoration of infrastructure and services.

From 1948 through May 1993, over 600,000 soldiers and civilians have served under the United Nations flag in 28 peacekeeping operations. Over 900 peace-keepers have died while monitoring ceasefires, patrolling demilitarised areas, manning buffer zones and defusing conflicts. In May 1993, more than 80,000 United Nations personnel—military, police and civilian—were deployed in 13 ongoing operations; and an anticipated expansion of several operations could require an additional 40,000 or more personnel.

The effectiveness of peace-keeping forces derives from a combination of factors, foremost among them the presence of United Nations peace-keepers as physical expression of the moral authority of the Organisation and the concern of the international community.

In traditional peace-keeping operations, United Nations troops carry light arms and are allowed to use minimum force only in self-defence, or if armed persons try to stop them from carrying out the orders of their commanders. United Nations observers carry no arms at all. When acting under peace enforcement measures, however, United Nations troops may be authorised to use force in carrying out their responsibilities (see p. 5).

Receiving the Nobel Peace Prize

In 1988, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to United Nations peace-keepers for "demanding and hazardous service in the cause of peace". In accepting the award on their behalf, the then Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar said:

"Peace-keeping operations symbolise the world community's will to peace and represent the impartial, practical expression of that will. The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to these operations illustrates the hope and strengthens the promise of this extraordinary concept."

Of the peace-keepers, he said:

"To remain calm in the face of provocation, to maintain composure when under attack, the United Nations troops, officers and soldiers alike, must show a special kind of courage, one that is more difficult to come by than the ordinary kind. Our United Nations troops have been put to the test and have emerged triumphant..."

The United Nations Charter and Collective Security

Under its Charter, the first of the purposes of the United Nations is "To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace."

Chapters VI and VII of the Charter spell out concrete measures which the United Nations Security Council—the principal organ vested with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace

and security—can take to achieve this purpose. Chapter VI, on the peaceful settlement of disputes, provides that international disputes "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security" can be brought to the attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly. The Security Council is mandated to call on the parties to settle their disputes by peaceful means, to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment and, in addition, to recommend actual terms of a settlement. The action of the Security Council in this context is limited to making recommendations; essentially, the peaceful settlement of international disputes must be achieved by the parties themselves, acting on a voluntary basis to carry out the decisions of the Council in accordance with the Charter.

If the Security Council determines that a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression exists, it may use the broad powers and enforcement measures at its disposal under Chapter VII of the Charter. To prevent a situation from deteriorating, the Security Council may call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it considers necessary or desirable. Next, it may decide, under Article 41, what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed by the Members of the United Nations, including the complete or partial interruption of economic relations and means of communication and the severance of diplomatic relations. Should the Security Council consider those measures inadequate, it may take, under Article 42, "such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security". For this purpose, all Members of the United Nations undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with special agreements, the necessary armed forces, assistance and facilities. Plans for the application of armed force are to be made by the Security Council with the advice and assistance of its Military Staff Committee.

The measures outlined in Articles 41 and 42 constitute the core of the system of collective security envisaged by the Charter. A basic feature of this system is the determining role assigned to the five permanent members of the Security Council—China, France, the Russian Federation the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. These Powers can use their veto (negative vote) to block any substantive decision by the Council. Therefore, the United Nations collective security system, and especially its key provision concerning the use of armed force, can work only if there is full agreement and cooperation among the permanent members.

Peace-keeping as a concept is not specifically described in the United Nations Charter. It goes beyond purely diplomatic means for the peaceful settlement of disputes described in Chapter VI, but falls short of the military or other enforcement provisions of Chapter VII. As former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold stated, peace-keeping might be put in a new Chapter "Six and a half". Peace-keeping has evolved over the years as a flexible, internationally acceptable way of controlling conflicts and promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes. This technique—born of necessity, largely improvised, and used as a practical response to a problem requiring action—partly compensated for the impaired ability of the Security Council to function fully during the cold war.

How Peace-keeping Operations are Set Up

When a United Nations Member State or group of States, or the Secretary-General, proposes the establishment of a peacekeeping operation, a number of basic conditions have to be met to be met. First, the proposal must command the consent of the parties to the conflict. The operation must neither interfere in the internal affairs of the host countries nor favour one party against another. Second, the proposal must enjoy broad support from the international community—specifically, it must be adopted by the Security Council. Third, Member States must be ready to volunteer personnel to serve under the command of the United Nations Secretary-General.

The success of a peace-keeping operation also requires a clear and practicable mandate, the cooperation of the parties in implementing that mandate, effective United Nations command at Headquarters and in the field, and adequate logistic and financial support.

In order for the 15-member Security Council to adopt a proposal for a peace-keeping operation, there have to be at least nine votes in favour and no negative vote from any of its five permanent members. The Secretary-General reports to the Council on how the operation can be launched and carried out. Subject to the Council's approval, he must then make the necessary arrangements: choosing the head of the mission and asking Member States to provide troops, police or other civilian personnel, supplies and equipment, transportation and logistics support. He also consults with the parties to the conflict about the troop-contributing countries.

In approving the Secretary-General's report, the Council also decides how the operation will be paid for: on a voluntary basis or, as

is usually the case, on an obligatory basis as expenses of the Organisation in accordance with provisions in the Charter. In the latter case, the General Assembly decides how those costs are apportioned among the Member States.

The Secretary-General keeps the Security Council informed of relevant developments; all matters which may affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of the operation are referred to the Council for its decision.

Peace-keeping—an Evolving Technique

Peace-keeping operations have been used most commonly to supervise and help maintain ceasefires, to assist in troop withdrawals and to provide a buffer between opposing forces. However, peace-keeping operations are flexible instruments of policy and have been adapted to a variety of uses.

Of the 13 operations which were set up before the cold war era began to dissipate around 1988, all, with the exception of the operation in West Irian, were what are now described as "traditional" peace-keeping operations. They were largely military in composition and in functions, entrusted to maintain calm on the front lines while giving the peacemakers time to negotiate a settlement of the dispute. Sometimes the peacemakers succeeded. Sometimes they did not. Five of the "traditional" peace-keeping operations remain in the field today, as they continue to ensure calm in spite of the intractability of the conflicts.

In the course of the past few years, the new political climate emerging from the end of the cold war has contributed to an increase in demand for United Nations peace-keeping. Of the 28 peace-keeping operations established by the United Nations since its inception, 15 have been set up since 1988; only five of these "post-cold war" operations have been of the traditional military kind.

The character of peace-keeping operations is also undergoing some profound changes, as the "second generation" of peace-keeping is emerging to respond to new facts of international life in the post-cold war era. One such development is the difficulties being experienced by some regimes in coping with the withdrawal of super-Power support, weak institutions, collapsing economies, natural disasters and ethnic strife. As new conflicts take place within nations rather than between them, the United Nations today deals with civil wars, secessions,

partitions, ethnic clashes and tribal struggles. Rescuing "failed States", according to former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, may become an inherent part of second-generation peace-keeping. Complicated military tasks must be complemented by measures to strengthen institutions, encourage political participation, protect human rights, organise elections and promote economic and social development.

The reality of these remarkable changes in United Nations peace-keeping is also revealed in numbers. In 1987, there were some 10,000 United Nations military personnel deployed. In May 1993, the number rose to almost 70,000. As for civilian police, 35 were deployed in 1987, as against over 4,500 in May 1993. In 1987, there were approximately 900 civilians employed in peacekeeping operations; five years later, the number of international and local civilian personnel reached more than 10,000.

The first in the new generation of peace-keeping operations was the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), which supervised the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia's transition to independence. Although UNTAG's military tasks were similar to those of earlier peace-keeping operations, the operation's civilian components were equally vital to the success of the mission. They supervised every aspect of the difficult political process which led to Namibia's first free and fair elections in November 1989. Namibia acceded to independence on 21 March 1990 and was admitted to the United Nations on 23 April of the same year.

Another example of the new multidimensional peacekeeping operation is the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), which, since 1991, has been verifying the implementation of all agreements negotiated, with the assistance of the Secretary-General and his Personal Representative, between the Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional. These agreements involve not only a ceasefire and related measures but also reform and reduction of the armed forces, creation of a new police force, reform of the judicial and electoral systems, human rights, land tenure and other economic and social issues. ONUSAL will also verify the March 1994 elections in El Salvador.

The United Nations operation in Cambodia is one of the most ambitious and complex operations thus far in the Organisation's history. The Peace Agreement signed by four Cambodian parties in October

1991 has required the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to supervise various parts of the existing administration, organise elections, monitor the police, promote human rights, repatriate 350,000 refugees and begin rehabilitation of the country, as well as to carry out a familiar range of traditional military functions.

When the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was established in the territory of the former Yugoslavia in early 1992, its mandate in Croatia was consistent with the traditional concept of interposition and was intended to maintain and promote peace pending a final overall settlement. Later, however, the deteriorating situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina prompted the Security Council to expand UNPROFOR's mandate to include protection of humanitarian convoys and convoys of released civilian detainees. Also, in a first preventive operation in the history of United Nations peace-keeping, UNPROFOR has been deployed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

The United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) has been designed to restore order in the country through massive military presence, humanitarian relief operations, reconciliation and political settlement, as well as the rehabilitation of political institutions and the economy. Acting on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter, on enforcement measures, the Security Council authorised UNOSOM II troops to use force in their very important task of disarming Somali factions. In fact, UNOSOM II, with the enforcement element in its mandate, may well represent the emergence of a third generation of peace-keeping operations.

An Agenda for Peace

On 31 January 1992, the Security Council held its first summit meeting at the level of heads of State and Government, marking an unprecedented recommitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The summit noted the increased and broadened peace-keeping tasks in recent years, and called on the former Secretary-General to recommend ways of strengthening the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. In June 1992, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali presented to the Member States a report entitled *An Agenda for Peace,* in which he analysed recent developments affecting international peace and security and introduced proposals for more effective United Nations operations in identifying potential conflicts, their short- and long-term

resolution and post-conflict measures to build peace among former adversaries.

Among the recommendations for enhancing the United Nations' performance in preventing conflicts was the increased use of confidence-building and fact-finding measures, as well as preventive deployment of a United Nations presence or establishment of demilitarised zones in potential conflict areas. The Secretary-General also suggested new ways of using military force under United Nations command in the pursuit of peace, either in response to aggression, as foreseen by the United Nations Charter, or to enforce ceasefires. He also envisaged various post-conflict—"peace-building"—measures designed to foster confidence between the parties to an armed conflict.

With regard to peace-keeping operations themselves, the Secretary-General's recommendations focused on meeting the growing need for personnel, logistical and financial support for United Nations operations, including the holding in reserve of basic peace-keeping equipment, such as vehicles and communications gear to facilitate the quick deployment during the start-up phase of a new peace-keeping operation. He also supported the idea of financing such missions out of States' defence, rather than foreign affairs, budgets.

Financial Aspects

Assured and adequate financing for peace-keeping operations is vital. Whenever a new operation is established, all personnel must be transported to the area of operation. Once in the field, they must be provided with accommodation, food, medical care, transport, communications and all the other equipment needed to carry out their functions.

The recent dramatic increase in demands for United Nations peace-keeping has resulted in a corresponding increase in expenditures. In the last two years, the annual United Nations peace-keeping budget grew fivefold, from some $600 million in 1991 to $2.8 billion in 1992. The operations now envisaged in 1993 may bring the annual budget to $4.3 billion. As of mid-May 1993, overdue payment of Member States' obligatory contributions to peace-keeping operations amounted to some $1.4 billion.

As the Secretary-General stated in *An Agenda for Peace:* "The contrast between the costs of United Nations peace-keeping and the costs of the alternative war—between the demands of the Organisation

and the means provided to meet them—would be farcical were the consequences not so damaging to global stability and to the credibility of the Organisation." He also noted that, at the end of the last decade, global defence expenditures' had reached $1 trillion a year, or $2 million per minute.

Following up on one of the recommendations contained in *An Agenda for Peace,* the General Assembly, in December 1992, decided to establish, under the Secretary-General's authority, a Peace-keeping Reserve Fund of $150 million as a cash-flow mechanism to ensure that the United Nations is able to respond rapidly to the needs of peace-keeping operations.

The Operations—A Brief Overview

United Nations peace-keeping operations have traditionally fallen into two broad categories: observer missions, which consist largely of officers who are almost invariably unarmed; and peace-keeping forces, which consist of lightly armed infantry units, with the necessary logistic support elements. These categories, however, are not mutually exclusive. Observer missions are sometimes reinforced by infantry and/or logistic units, usually for a specific purpose and a brief period of time. Peace-keeping forces are often assisted in their work by unarmed military observers. And many recent peace-keeping operations have large civilian components, which carry out essential political, humanitarian and administrative functions.

The first use of military personnel by the United Nations was in 1947, in two United Nations bodies: the Consular Commission in Indonesia and the Special Committee on the Balkans. Since the small officer groups worked not under the Secretary-General's authority but as members of the national delegations comprising those bodies, they cannot be considered United Nations peace-keeping operations, as the term has come to be used.

Observer Missions

The first observer mission established by the United Nations was the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), set up in Palestine in June 1948. Later observer missions were the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), in 1949; the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), in 1958; the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM), in 1963; the Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in

the Dominican Republic (DOMREP), in 1965; the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM), in the same year; the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), in 1988; the "United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), also in 1988; the United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I), in 1989; and the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), in the same year. In 1991, four new missions were established: the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), ONUSAL and the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC). Of these, UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNIKOM, UNAVEM II and ONUSAL are still in operation.

Peace-keeping Forces

There have been, in all, 15 peacekeeping forces. The first was the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), which was in operation in the Egypt-Israel sector from 1956 until 1967. The United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was deployed in the Republic of the Congo (now Zaire) from 1960 to 1964. The United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian) (UNSF) was in place from 1962 until 1963. The Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) functioned between Egypt and Israel from 1973 until 1979. UNTAG was deployed in Namibia from 1989 to 1990. The United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) was functional from 1992 to 1993. The other forces, which are still in operation, are the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), established in 1964; the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), deployed in the Syrian Golan Heights in 1974; the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), established in 1978; the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), set up in 1991; UNPROFOR, UNTAC and the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), all three established in 1992; and UNOSOM II, set up in 1993.

59

High-Level Meeting of the Security Council: Note by the President of the Security Council on Behalf of the Members

United Nations, New York, 31 January 1992

At the conclusion of the 3046th meeting of the Security Council, held at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 in connection with the item entitled "The responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security", the President of the Security Council issued the following statement on behalf of the members of the Council.

"The members of the Security Council have authorized me to make the following statement on their behalf."

"The Security Council met at the Headquarters of the United Nations in New York on 31 January 1992, for the first time at the level of Heads of State and Government. The members of the Council considered, within the framework of their commitment to the United Nations Charter, 'The responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security'.

"The members of the Security Council consider that their meeting is a timely recognition of the fact that there are new favourable international circumstances under which the Security Council has begun to fulfil nmore effectively its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

A Time of Change

"This meeting takes place at a time of momentous change. The ending of the Cold War has raised hopes for a safer, more equitable

and more humane world. Rapid progress has been made, in many regions of the world, towards democracy and responsive forms of government, as well as towards achieving the Purposes set out in the Charter. The completion of the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa would constitute a major contribution to these Purposes and positive trends, including to the encouragement of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms."

"Last year, under the authority of the United Nations, the international community succeeded in enabling Kuwait to regain its sovereignty and territorial integrity, which it had lost as a result of Iraqi aggression. The resolutions adopted by the Security Council remain essential to the restoration of peace and stability in the region and must be fully implemented. At the same time, the members of the Council are concerned by the humanitarian situation of the innocent civilian population of Iraq."

"The members of the Council support the Middle East peace process, facilitated by the Russian Federation and the United States, and hope that it will be brought to a successful conclusion on the basis of Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973)."

"They welcome the role the United Nations has been able to play under the Charter in progress towards settling long-standing regional disputes, and will work for further progress towards their resolution. They applaud the valuable contribution being made by United Nations peace-keeping forces now operating in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe."

"The members of the Council note that United Nations peace-keeping tasks have increased and broadened considerably in recent years. Election monitoring, human rights verification and the repatriation of refugees have in the settlement of some regional conflicts, at the request or with the agreement of the parties concerned, been integral parts of the Security Council's effort to maintain international peace and security. They welcome these developments."

"The members of the Council also recognize that change, however welcome, has brought new risks for stability and security. Some of the most acute problems result from changes to State structures. The members of the Council will encourage all efforts to help achieve peace, stability and cooperation during these changes."

"The international community therefore faces new challenges in the search for peace. All Member States expect the United Nations to

play a central role at this crucial stage. The members of the Council stress the importance of strengthening and improving the United Nations to increase its effectiveness. They are determined to assume fully their responsibilities within the United Nations Organisation in the framework of the Charter."

"The absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security. The United Nations membership as a whole, working through the appropriate bodies, needs to give the highest priority to the solution of these matters."

Commitment to Collective Security

"The members of the Council pledge their commitment to international law and to the United Nations Charter. All disputes between States should be peacefully resolved in accordance with the provisions of the Charter."

"The members of the Council reaffirm their commitment to the collective security system of the Charter to deal with threats to peace and to reverse acts of aggression."

"The members of the Council express their deep concern over acts of international terrorism and emphasize the need for the international community to deal effectively with all such acts."

Peacemaking and Peace-keeping

"To strengthen the effectiveness of these commitments, and in order that the Security Council should have the means to discharge its primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, the members of the Council have decided on the following approach."

"They invite the Secretary-General to prepare, for circulation to the Members of the United Nations by 1 July 1992, his analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping."

"The Secretary-General's analysis and recommendations could cover the role of the United Nations in identifying potential crises and areas

of instability as well as the contribution to be made by regional organisations in accordance with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter in helping the work of the Council."

They could also cover the need for adequate resources, both material and financial. The Secretary-General might draw on lessons learned in recent United Nations peace-keeping missions to recommend ways of making more effective Secretariat planning and operations. He could also consider how greater use might be made of his good offices, and of his other functions under the United Nations Charter.

Disarmament, Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction

"The members of the Council, while fully conscious of the responsibilities of other organs of the United Nations in the fields of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation reaffirm the crucial contribution which progress in these areas can make to the maintenance of international peace and security. They express their commitment to take concrete steps to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations in these areas."

"The members of the Council underline the need for all Member States to fulfil their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament; to prevent the proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction; to avoid excessive and destabilising accumulations and transfers of arms; and to resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems concerning these matters threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability. They emphasize the importance of the early ratification and implementation by the States concerned of all international and regional arms control arrangements, especially the START and CFE Treaties."

"The proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The members of the Council commit-themselves to working to prevent the spread of technology related to the research for or production of such weapons and to take appropriate action to that end."

"On nuclear proliferation, they note the importance of the decision of many countries to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and emphasize the integral role in the implementation of that Treaty of fully effective IAEA safeguards, as well as the importance of effective export controls. The members of the Council will take appropriate measures in the case of any violations notified to them by the IAEA."

"On chemical weapons, they support the efforts of the Geneva Conference with a view to reaching agreement on the conclusion, by the end of 1992, of a universal convention, including a verification regime, to prohibit chemical weapons." "On conventional armaments, they note the General Assembly's vote in favour of a United Nations register of arms transfers as a first step, and in this connection recognize the importance of all States providing all the information called for in the General Assembly's resolution."

"In conclusion, the members of the Security Council affirm their determination to build on the initiative of their meeting in order to secure positive advances in promoting international peace and security. They agree that the United Nations Secretary-General has a crucial role to play. The members of the Council express their deep appreciation to the outgoing Secretary-General, His Excellency Javier Perez de Cuellar, for his outstanding contribution to the work of the United Nations, culminating in the signature of the El Salvador peace agreement. They welcome the new Secretary-General, His Excellency Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and note with satisfaction his intention to strengthen and improve the functioning of the United Nations. They pledge their full support to him, and undertake to work closely with him and his staff in fulfilment of their shared objectives, including a more efficient and effective United Nations system."

"The members of the Council agree that the world now has the best chance of achieving international peace and security since the foundation of the United Nations. They undertake to work in close cooperation with other United Nations Member States in their own efforts to achieve this, as well as to address urgently all the other problems, in particular those of socio-economic development, requiring the collective response of the international community. They recognize that peace and prosperity are indivisible and that lasting peace and stability require effective international cooperation for the eradication of poverty and the promotion of a better life for all in larger freedom."

START AND BEYOND

START: An End and a Beginning

Linton F. Brooks

Introduction

On 31 July 1991, President George Bush of the United States and President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union signed the most

significant arms control agreement on strategic offensive weapons ever negotiated by the two countries. The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (commonly known as the START Treaty) represents a milestone in over two decades of negotiations and is a symbol of the dramatic change in the relationship between the two countries.

The START Treaty governs each side's intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers. For over 40 years, these strategic forces have been a mainstay of the United States approach to security through deterrence. Because of the continued need to rely on these weapons to ensure stability throughout the cold war, the negotiations were prolonged and, at times, difficult, with each side seeking to be certain that there were no unilateral advantages for the other side. The resulting START Treaty is detailed and complex, totalling over 800 manuscript pages.

In one sense, the fundamental United States aims in START were no different from those that guided negotiations of the SALT-I and SALT-II agreements in the early 1970s: ensuring stability and reducing the risk of nuclear war. Unlike the SALT agreements, however, the START Treaty succeeded in fulfilling our primary objectives. The START Treaty represents a new era in negotiations that breaks tradition with the past in at least three ways:

- START involves actual and significant reductions in the strategic forces of each side.

- By including direct and equal limits on ballistic missile throw-weight (a measure of the lift capability of ballistic missiles) and on ballistic missile warheads, the Treaty ensures equal rights between the two sides, the basis of more meaningful measures of strategic capability.

- The verification provisions, which are perhaps the most significant aspects of the Treaty, are the most extensive and intrusive ever negotiated, going far beyond what was possible in earlier strategic arms negotiations. As a result, the START Treaty promotes openness and military transparency to an extent that heretofore was not feasible.

The START Treaty represents a turning-point in the very nature of strategic arms control. The successful results of our work, as characterized by the verification provisions, will make the START

Treaty the foundation for future arms control initiatives. There will almost certainly never be another protracted negotiation such as that which led to this massive Treaty. The provisions of the START Treaty were designed to be relevant, not just for the next few years, but well beyond the 15-year duration of the Treaty, if the parties agree to extend it, and the extensive verification measures are strong enough to endure. If minor modifications are required, the Treaty establishes a forum—the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission—for making those modifications and for discussing issues of Treaty implementation, whether such issues arise tomorrow, next week, or in years to come.

In addition to being a major accomplishment in its own right, the START Treaty provides a foundation for continuing United States initiatives to enhance international security and stability and reduce the risk of war, especially nuclear war. These future initiatives may take many forms—including unilateral initiatives that may not involve formal negotiations at all. An example of such flexibility is the series of measures proposed by President Bush in September 1991. The prompt and positive reaction by President Gorbachev is an indication of the new relationship between the United States and the former Soviet Union as we move beyond confrontation to cooperation.

Background

The goal of enhancing stability and reducing the risk of war through meaningful reductions in strategic offensive arms—a goal long sought by the United States—has its roots in the very beginning of the atomic age. For many years, this goal was elusive. As the number and potency of such weapons continued to increase, strategic weapons came to epitomize a bipolar relationship based on confrontation and mistrust. Attempts to limit such arms managed only to slow their increase temporarily.

On 29 June 1982, the United States and the Soviet Union began the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in Geneva. The goal of the United States was to achieve deep reductions in the most destabilising systems of strategic offensive arms. The United States sought a verifiable agreement that would enhance stability and reduce the risk of war. With various interruptions, the Talks continued for the next nine years, supplemented by several ministerial meetings at Geneva, Washington, Houston and Moscow, and summit meetings in Geneva in 1985, Reykjavik in 1986, Washington in 1987, Moscow in 1988,

Malta in 1989, and Washington in 1990. On 31 July 1991, the Treaty was signed at the Moscow summit.

The START Treaty

The START Treaty is comprised of the Treaty itself, two annexes, six protocols, and a memorandum of understanding covering data on the two nations' strategic forces. In addition, there are several associated documents which, although they are not integral parts of the Treaty in the legal sense, are integral to the overall negotiated regime. Together, these historic documents contain the rules by which the strategic offensive forces of both countries will be reduced and limited and by which these actions will be verified. The START Treaty achieves equal overall ceilings on the strategic nuclear forces that can be deployed by either side through a series of interrelated limits and sublimits. Each side is limited to no more than:

- 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers), a limit that is 36 per cent below the current Soviet level and 29 per cent below the current United States level;

- 6,000 total accountable warheads, 41 per cent below the current Soviet level and 43 per cent below the current United States level;

- 4,900 accountable warheads deployed on ICBMs or SLBMs, 48 per cent below the current Soviet level and 40 per cent below the current United States level;

- 1,540 accountable warheads deployed on 154 heavy ICBMs, a 50 per cent reduction in current Soviet forces (the United States has no heavy ICBMs);

- 1,100 accountable warheads deployed on mobile ICBMs; and

- An aggregate throw-weight of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs equal to 3,600 million metric tons, about 54 per cent of the current Soviet aggregate throw-weight. (Because current United States aggregate ICBM and SLBM throw-weight falls below this level, no United States throw-weight reductions are required.)

In addition, there are a number of subsidiary limits, covering such areas as the numbers of test and training heavy bombers, the number of space-launch facilities using converted ICBMs and SLBMs, the number of spare missiles and launchers for mobile ICBMs, the number of storage facilities, and the quantity of ICBM loading equipment. These secondary limits are designed to close off possible circumvention routes while allowing flexibility in implementation.

Unlike the limits set in earlier strategic nuclear arms agreements, these limits will result in real reductions, including reductions in the near term. The provisions are such that, by the end of the first three years of the seven-year reduction period called for in the Treaty, the two sides will be limited to equal levels of deployed strategic forces. Reaching these levels will require the removal of nuclear weapons from the deployed forces of both sides, beginning as soon as the Treaty enters into force. Overall, the deepest percentage reductions will be in the Soviet Union's SS-18 heavy ICBMs.

The central limits set in the Treaty are designed to strengthen strategic stability by encouraging the restructuring of the Soviet strategic arsenal away from its historic emphasis on first-strike weapons, such as the SS-18, and towards less threatening, more survivable systems, such as heavy bombers. It is important to note that the START Treaty places no restrictions on conventional capabilities, nor on the development of stabilising defences: thus, it encourages a lessening of reliance on nuclear weapons.

In the early years of strategic arms control negotiations, the sides were prepared to rely only on so-called national technical means (NTM) of verification. As the focus of control shifted over the years from large, fixed units, such as ICBM silos, to restrictions on items such as mobile ICBMs, numbers of warheads on ballistic missiles and production of mobile ICBMs, it became necessary to augment monitoring assets by using such techniques as data exchanges and on-site inspections. Initially, many were sceptical of the notion of foreign inspectors getting too close to weapons systems and installations containing highly sensitive technology, but over the years it became apparent that effective arms control required not only the continued use of NTM but also the use of other kinds of "intrusive" verification measures.

Consequently, the reductions and limitations of the START Treaty will be conducted under the terms of highly intrusive verification procedures. The Treaty builds on the three years of experience derived from the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Soviet Union on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the INF Treaty), with inspections by each side of virtually every significant strategic installation of the other side. All told, the START Treaty includes 12 different types of inspections plus continuous monitoring in each country at the facilities that produce mobile ICBMs or their first stages.

The Treaty also creates an extensive system of over 80 separate notifications—each side being required to tell the other about new systems as well as about movements, operations and eliminations of the existing forces subject to the Treaty—to increase the understanding each side has of the other's intentions and actions.

START Treaty

The START Treaty is clearly one of the significant milestones in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, even in relation to the sweeping changes that the world has witnessed inside the Soviet Union. Still, critics ask whether the START Treaty continues to be relevant. Such critics sometimes claim either that there is no need for any formal agreement, or that START should be set aside in favour of more sweeping reductions. The same question will also be asked of future efforts to reduce and regulate strategic offensive arms.

In answering such criticisms, it is important first to note that the START Treaty is not about eliminating deterrence; it is about reducing the risk of war. Therefore, any criticism of the sufficiency of the reductions under START ignores the realities of cost, environment and stability that weigh heavily in the implementation of any treaty.

Secondly, the START Treaty still has great value, after the attempted coup within the Soviet Union. The military transparency and structured approach to reductions of strategic offensive arms increase the stability that is needed during this period in which the different republics are charting their future and defining their relationship, if any, with the Union.

Thus far, each of the "nuclear" republics of the former Soviet Union has, at least verbally, endorsed the outcome of the Treaty, but it is obvious that each wants to be more involved in the control and final disposition of the nuclear arms and facilities within its borders. With the START Treaty, we will be able to enhance stability and reduce mistrust, as the relationships of the republics and the Union develop. Therefore, near-term implementation of the START Treaty will make it one of the pillars of our overall continued strategic relationship with the former Soviet Union.

Initiatives After START

Until recently, discussion of the steps that the super-Powers might take following the entry into force of START focused almost exclusively

on formal, follow-on negotiations. The changed relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, along with the strong and stable foundation provided by START, allows us to explore new approaches to enhancing stability. Protracted, formal negotiations may no longer be the only—or even the best—approach. In their place, we may see unilateral initiatives that spark reciprocal measures by the other side. This approach discards the traditional arms control process in the light of the changed world situation.

The best example of this new approach to stability is the sweeping set of nuclear initiatives proposed by President Bush on 27 September 1991. In announcing a number of initiatives affecting the entire spectrum of United States nuclear weapons, the President proposed to take advantage of recent dramatic changes within the Soviet Union that allow the United States to take steps that enhance stability and dramatically reduce the size and nature of United States' nuclear deployments worldwide.

In addition to initiatives on ground-launched theatre nuclear weapons and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons, the President took a number of initiatives on strategic nuclear forces, all designed to build upon START. Seeking to "use START as a springboard to achieve additional stabilising changes", President Bush:

- Directed that all United States strategic bombers be removed from day-to-day alert;
- Called upon the Soviet Union to confine its mobile missiles to their garrisons, where they would be safer and more secure;
- Announced that all United States ICBMs scheduled for deactivation under START would stand down from alert at once and that elimination of these systems would be accelerated once START was ratified;
- Called upon the Soviet Union to accelerate its reduction schedule under START as well;
- Terminated development of the Peacekeeper ICBM Rail Garrison system and the mobile elements of the small ICBM programme. As a result, the small single-warhead ICBM will be the sole remaining United States ICBM modernisation programme;
- Called upon the Soviet Union to match United States restraint by terminating any and all programmes for future ICBMs with more than one warhead, and limit Soviet ICBM modernisation efforts to only one type of single-warhead missile;

- Cancelled development of the nuclear short-range attack missile for heavy bombers;

- Created a new United States Strategic Command, designed to improve command and control of all United States strategic forces;

- Proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union seek early agreement to eliminate from their inventories all ICBMs with multiple warheads;

- Called upon the Soviet leadership to join the United States in taking concrete steps to permit the deployment of non-nuclear defences that would protect against limited ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source.

These proposals, and the prompt, favourable response by Soviet President Gorbachev, point the way to a new era in the search for international security and stability. Discussion on the details, as necessary, will be more, streamlined and rapid, with the possibility of results being achieved in weeks or months, not years. The foundation of this new era, however, remains the START Treaty.

Summary

We are living in one of the most dynamic, interesting and significant periods in the history of civilisation. All nations can take heart in the fact that, regardless of the recent changes in many aspects of United States-Soviet relationships, both sides continue to endorse the general principles associated with maintaining a national security at lower levels and with more stable nuclear forces. There is no indication that such a trend will change in the near term. It is clearly possible, however, that the traditional arms control *modus operandi* will need to give way, at least to some degree, to a more dynamic approach to arms control.

The START Treaty, the subsequent proposals by President Bush, and the prompt response to those proposals by President Gorbachev all demonstrate the extraordinary results that can be achieved when the leaders of both countries work together for a common goal. Negotiating limitations on strategic nuclear weapons has never been an easy task, nor is it ever likely to be. Yet, recent developments show that great progress can be made. We can remain hopeful that further means towards a safer, more stable world are now within our grasp.

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN A NEW ERA
Yuri Nazarkin

I

With the emergence in 1945 of nuclear—or, as they were then called, atomic—weapons, there came also the question of nuclear disarmament. Actual negotiations on the issue did not begin in earnest until the 1960s, when military and strategic parity had been established between the then Soviet Union and the United States. It was the Caribbean crisis of October 1962 that acted as shock therapy: those involved in the crisis, and indeed humanity at large, looked into the nuclear abyss, shied away and began looking for ways to avoid it.

In August 1963 the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water— the so-called partial test-ban Treaty—was signed in Moscow by the United States and the Soviet Union, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on 1 July 1968. Negotiations on comprehensive constraints on both the delivery vehicles for strategic offensive nuclear arms and anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defences were also undertaken. Strategic arms limitation talks—later known as SALT-I—finally began on 16 November 1969. In 1972 the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on certain measures regarding the limitation of strategic offensive arms were signed. That Interim Agreement was to be superseded by the SALT-II Treaty, which was signed in 1979 but never ratified. The *detente* of the 1960s and 1970s was being replaced by growing confrontation, and dark clouds were gathering on the international horizon.

None the less, Soviet-United States talks on limiting nuclear arms in Europe and on limiting and reducing strategic arms began in the 1980s. Late in 1983, both were suspended without having achieved any positive results. That outcome was inevitable, given the Soviet-United States relations of the day and the unwillingness of either side to take the first step towards overcoming the confrontational inertia.

Common sense was, however, slowly but surely beginning to prevail. Even though the war in Afghanistan was still going on, the barometer of the international climate shifted in the direction of "clear". On 12 March 1985 the Soviet-United States Nuclear and Space talks began. The process known as perestroika got under way in the USSR, and in foreign policy new approaches, to be known as "new political thinking", were adopted.

A statement by Mikhail S. Gorbachev dated 15 January 1986 heralded that new thinking. Despite certain quite specific and very important steps mentioned in the statement (such as the extension of the moratorium on all nuclear testing), the West largely treated his proposals as a publicity stunt. The West did not perceive a nuclear-free world by the year 2000 to be a realistic goal. Some elements in his programme, however, were later implemented.

What was needed to make headway in talks on the limitation of strategic offensive arms were more specific steps that could help overcome the inertia of mistrust and confrontation. The summit meeting held at Reykjavik on 11 and 12 October 1986 had a major role to play in this regard.

From a formal viewpoint, the meeting did not lead to any result: the two sides did not draft any joint documents to codify agreements because the United States side failed to accept the Soviet proposal on non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty during the 10-year period. The euphoria surrounding the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) persisted, and the ABM Treaty was blocking the implementation of that programme.

At the same time the Reykjavik meeting showed that it was realistic to work towards agreements on intermediate-range missiles and strategic offensive arms alike. Discussions on these issues were very detailed and substantive and they demonstrated great flexibility on the Soviet side. It was in Reykjavik that the Soviet side agreed to the procedure—proposed by the United States—of attributing to heavy bombers (HB) all nuclear weapons that were not long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs): all such weapons, regardless of their actual numbers, were to be attributed to each heavy bomber equipped for such weapons as 1 warhead (counting rules for long-range nuclear ALCMs were to be agreed upon at a later date).

Certainly this put the United States in a highly advantageous position in terms of actual numbers of warheads, because it enjoyed vast superiority in strategic aviation. True, these advantages were to a certain extent compensated because the Soviet position on the range criterion for ALCMs was adopted: missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometres were defined as long-range missiles (under the initial United States position the criterion was 1,500 kilometres). As a result, heavy bombers with shorter-range ALCMs would be launching them within reach of Soviet air defences.

Nevertheless, the Soviet agreement to the United States counting rules constituted a substantial concession. Was it justified? An answer

to this question should take into account the following aspects. A major and quite concrete step was required on the part of the Soviet Union at that time to demonstrate the seriousness of its intentions and to help overcome the inertia of distrust on the other side. Finally, a treaty was signed, undoubtedly in the interests of both sides and balancing their mutual concessions. It is in this perspective that they should be viewed—in their totality rather than in regard to individual elements.

II

It was the asymmetry of strategic offensive arms that occasioned the greatest difficulties in the talks: the United States has more heavy bombers and re-entry vehicles (RVs) for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), while the Soviet Union has more intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), particularly many more with RVs on them; it also has mobile and heavy ICBMs while the United States has no such systems. Finding a common denominator for these asymmetries and accounting for them in the interest of achieving a balance underlies the final compromise that constitutes the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START).

It is the ceilings and subceilings that serve as such denominators. Under the START Treaty, after seven years of its operation each side may have no more than:

- 1,600 deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed HBs, including 154 deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers;

- 6,000 warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, including 4,900 warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and SLBMs; 1,100 warheads attributable to deployed ICBMs on mobile ICBM launchers; and 1,540 warheads attributable to deployed heavy ICBMs;

- the aggregate throw-weight of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs not to exceed 3,600 tons.

For the purpose of accounting for ICBM or SLBM warheads, such a re-entry vehicle counts as 1 warhead. However, a limit of 10 RVs is set for both existing and new types of ICBMs and SLBMs.

Existing types of ballistic missiles are attributed with the number of warheads specified in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty. In the event of

downloading on existing types of ballistic missiles, accountability is adjusted in accordance with special rules to prevent the RV balance from being upset, should one party decide, for instance, in a crisis, to revert quickly to the original higher number of RVs.

The number of warheads attributed to new types of ICBMs or SLBMs is the maximum number of RVs with which an ICBM or SLBM of that type has been flight-tested. In this connection, for the front sections of existing designs the number of accountable warheads must not be fewer than the nearest integer resulting from a division of 40 per cent of the accountable throw-weight of an ICBM or an SLBM by the weight of the lightest RV flight-tested on the ballistic missiles (BM) of that type. The 40 per cent rule was introduced to preclude instances where a ballistic missile was tested with a lower number of RVs although it could actually carry a greater number of them.

The rules for counting heavy-bomber warheads are given below.

For the USSR, each HB equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, up to a total of 180 such heavy bombers, shall be attributed with 8 warheads, and the United States shall be attributed with 10 warheads on no more than 150 HB. In excess of that number, such HBs shall be attributed with the number of warheads equal to the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which they are actually equipped.

The specifications of 8 warheads for the USSR and 10 warheads for the United States are average numbers reflecting the long-range nuclear ALCM delivery capability of Soviet and United States HBs, respectively.

Each HB equipped for nuclear armaments that are not long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be attributed with 1 warhead.

Following is a chart of reductions under the START Treaty.

Type of strategic offensive arms	USSR		USA	
	Number of ICBMs, SLBMs and HBs	Number of warheads	Number of ICBMs, SLBMs and HBs	Number of warheads
ICBMs	1398	6612	1000	2450
SLBMs	940	2804	672	5760
HBs	162	855	574	2353
Total	2500	10271	2246	10563
Percentage reductions under START Treaty	36.0	41.6	28.8	43.2

Taking into account, the additional reduction announced by President Gorbachev on 5 October 1991, the number of warheads on Soviet strategic offensive arms will be reduced to 5,000, that is, by 51.3 per cent.

According to the data published on 1 August 1991, it had been the intention of the USSR, on a tentative basis, to reduce the number of ICBMs approximately by 400 (that is, approximately, by more than 30 per cent), the number of SLBMs by 500 (approximately 50 per cent) and not to reduce HBs. Naturally, those data are superseded by the latest statement by President Gorbachev that the USSR would carry out greater reductions.

The counting rules for HB warheads enable the two sides actually to exceed the agreed 6,000 limit. In view of the considerable United States advantage as regards the number of HBs, the United States may exceed that limit by a greater margin than the USSR (namely, by approximately 2,000 to 2,500 actual warheads, mostly on nuclear arms that are not long-range nuclear ALCMs).

This concession by the Soviet side is to some extent balanced by the fact that it preserves two kinds of strategic offensive arms which the United States does not possess— heavy silo ICBMs and road- and rail-mobile ICBMs. At early stages of the negotiations the United States insisted on a complete ban on both heavy and mobile ICBMs, but later on compromise solutions were found according to which the ban was replaced by limitations.

Mobile ICBMs are the only type of strategic offensive arms regarding which there exist numerical limitations on non-deployed systems: 250 ICBMs, including 125 for rail-mobile ICBM launchers, and 110 launchers, including 18 rail launchers. This limit precludes rapid deployment of additional mobile ICBMs using already existing non-deployed means and also limits the reload capability. The reload of mobile launchers can be carried out more rapidly than that of silo launchers—the term "rapid reload" means reloading a silo launcher of ICBMs in less than 12 hours or a mobile launcher in less than four hours after a missile has been launched or removed from such a launcher. Moreover, additional measures are envisaged to preclude the rapid reload of a mobile launcher, which will limit the locations of non-deployed missiles and launchers as well as of transporter-loaders.

To enhance the efficiency of the verification of mobile ICBMs, their movement and locations must be limited.

Throughout the talks on the START Treaty, reference has been made to linking it to the ABM Treaty, which has been in effect since 1972. Such a linkage is a fact of life and certainly cannot be neglected, since the military and strategic balance of forces is affected, not only by offensive systems, but also by defensive ones capable of neutralising some of the offensive systems. Nevertheless, it was essential to decide upon the way to reflect the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and anti-ballistic missiles. Initially, the Soviet Union suggested that the sides undertake not to exercise the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified fixed period of time. The United States side was opposed to this proposal as well as to other forms of linking the two agreements in the Treaty texts. To remove this obstacle in the way of the Treaty, the Soviet side agreed to drop this formal linkage. At the same time, the Soviet side noted that extraordinary events referred to in article XVII of the START Treaty also covered situations involving the withdrawal of one side from the ABM Treaty or a material breach of the Treaty itself.

The United States made a statement in response giving its views on this matter.

Some time later, declaring on 27 September 1991, an initiative on nuclear disarmament, United States President George Bush called on the Soviet leaders, in particular, to allow a limited deployment of non-nuclear defences in order to provide protection against limited missile strikes wherever they might come from without undermining the credibility of the existing deterrent forces.

In his statement in response, on 5 October 1991, President Gorbachev expressed among other things a willingness to discuss the United States proposal on non-nuclear anti-ballistic missile defences.

In addition to quantitative restrictions on strategic offensive arms, the Treaty envisages limitations on the qualitative improvement of strategic offensive arms. The production, testing and deployment of heavy ballistic missiles of a new type are prohibited. A ban is envisaged on the foreseen but so far non-existent new kinds of strategic offensive arms (ballistic air-to-surface missiles, MIRVed nuclear air-launched cruise missiles). A procedure is envisaged for preventing the future development of strategic nuclear arms unknown today. The Treaty limits the modernisation of the existing types of strategic offensive arms: in the event of the modernisation of a ballistic missile, its throw-weight should not exceed 21 per cent of the original throw-weight. It

should be taken into account that modernisation does not necessarily mean adding to the more destructive capabilities of the weapons. Upgrading also leads to lower cost (that is, cutting operational cost per unit of effectiveness) and enhances the safety of weapons, that is, improvement of its properties with a view to ruling out its accidental and unauthorized use.

III

A scrupulously developed verification system enforces compliance with the START Treaty. No other agreement on arms limitation and disarmament has anything comparable in scope and detail in terms of verification procedures. Moreover, whenever we speak of the limitation and reduction of arms and not of the complete elimination of a given category, additional procedures are needed. Lastly, the fact that the basis of the verification system within the START framework was taking shape in the period when mutual mistrust between the sides was rather high has also played its role. That is why each party proceeded from the "worst-case" scenario; in other words, they took into account hypothetical cases of the most deliberate cheating—cases that were implausible, but theore—tically possible.

Compliance with the START Treaty is verified and ensured through the following measures:

- data and notifications exchange;
- national technical means (NTMs) of verification in combination with "cooperative measures"—display in the open, at the request of another Party, of ICBM launchers, heavy bombers and former heavy bombers to enhance the efficiency of NTMs;
- access to telemetric information;
- exhibitions and inspections of 12 different kinds;
- continuous monitoring at portals and along the perimeter of the ICBM production facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs with a view to confirming the number of missiles produced for mobile launchers (of all types of strategic offensive weapons: independent quantitative levels are envisaged only for mobile ICBMs— 1,100 for deployed missiles and 250 for non-deployed missiles);
- establishment of the Joint Compliance and Inspections Commission (JCIC).

The JCIC is to be established after signature of the Treaty but prior to its ratification. Its goals are:

- to resolve issues related to compliance with the obligations assumed;

- to agree on additional measures that might be necessary to enhance the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty; and

- to resolve issues related to the extension of the corresponding provisions of the Treaty to new kinds of strategic offensive weapons.

The JCIC shall be convened at the request of either party.

IV

Even at the time when the Treaty on strategic offensive arms was being negotiated, both parties began to articulate certain ideas with regard to the follow-on measures after the conclusion of the Treaty. As a result, on 1 June 1990 a joint statement regarding follow-on negotiations on nuclear and space arms and on the further enhancement of strategic stability was made at the Washington Soviet-United States summit meeting. The two sides agreed to engage in new negotiations on strategic offensive arms and on the linkage between strategic offensive and defensive arms, building on the results of START I. Having done so, the two sides agreed to place emphasis during such new negotiations on the elimination of first-strike incentives and on the reduction of the concentration of warheads, on strategic delivery systems and on the preferential choice of systems of enhanced survivability.

The rapid pace of events in the world not only does not eliminate this task but creates more favourable conditions for its speedy accomplishment, especially since we now have the Treaty on strategic offensive arms, which will serve as a good foundation for achieving further progress. Naturally, new agreements regarding strategic offensive arms that might emerge in the future will not supplant, but will rather supplement, the Treaty.

The new era that came to replace the period of confrontation is gaining ground. The methods of negotiating reductions in armaments are complemented by new forms-unilateral measures and steps taken on the basis of mutual example. As a result of reciprocal initiatives by President Bush and President Gorbachev, such steps have already been taken to reduce the state of combat readiness of ICBMs and heavy bombers and to limit the qualitative improvement of ICBMs and certain types of nuclear weapons for heavy bombers. The Soviet

side has also declared unilaterally that it will reduce the number of nuclear warheads not to the level of 6,000 units as provided for in the Treaty on strategic offensive arms but to the level of 5,000.

It is possible that steps undertaken on the basis of mutual example might necessitate certain preliminary coordination.

Naturally, the traditional practices of negotiation will also retain their importance. In any case, they may be needed to achieve the further reduction of strategic offensive weapons roughly by half, as was proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev. It would be in line with the requirements of strategic stability and of the diminishing concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles if due attention were paid to measures related to MIRVed ICBMs in the course of further negotiations.

V

The disintegration of the USSR and the emergence of independent States which proclaimed themselves a Commonwealth became a new and important factor both for the process of ratification of the Treaty and for the further reduction of strategic armaments.

By the Agreement on Joint Measures with respect to Nuclear Weapons the four independent States which have strategic armaments on their territories—Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine—undertake to present the START Treaty to their respective Supreme Soviets for ratification (see "Documentation Relating to Disarmament", below). All of the eleven States members of the Commonwealth have agreed to comply with international treaties concluded by the USSR.

Russia has already declared itself the successor to the Soviet Union in the field of international undertakings. Certainly, this is true in the case of the START Treaty, but strategic offensive armaments are located not only in Russia (83.6 per cent) but also in Ukraine (8.48 per cent), Kazakhstan (5.76 per cent) and Belarus (2.16 per cent). So it is evident that all four of these States should guarantee the implementation of the START Treaty. At the same time, the Treaty should retain its bilateral nature, otherwise a review and an amendment process would be required. A search for appropriate juridical arrangements is now under way.

As for further measures relating to strategic offensive arms, States members of the Commonwealth have agreed to conduct a joint policy

in the field of international security, disarmament and arms control. They undertake to negotiate without delay among themselves and with other States which were a part of the Soviet Union but which are not members of the Commonwealth with a view of ensuring guarantees and elaborating mechanisms for implementing those treaties.

60

Achieving Peace and Security

Introduction

During the 1990s, we have witnessed major changes in the patterns of global conflict and in the international community's responses to them. Today, more than 90 per cent of armed conflicts take place within, rather than between, States. With relatively few inter-State wars, traditional rationales for intervention have become decreasingly relevant, while humanitarian and human rights principles have increasingly been invoked to justify the use of force in internal wars, not always with the authorisation of the Security Council. Sanctions have been used far more frequently in the 1990s than ever before, but with results that are ambiguous at best.

One of the more encouraging developments of the last decade has been an increase in the number of conflicts settled by negotiation. Three times as many peace agreements were signed in the 1990s as in the previous three decades, reflecting a more than 30 per cent decline in the overall number and intensity of armed conflicts around the world from 1992 to 1997. With the sharp upturn in the number of wars in 1998, however, it seems doubtful that the positive trend of the previous five years will be sustained.

Comprehensive peace agreements have led to complex implementation processes involving many different agencies. While some traditional peacekeeping operations remain, peacekeepers throughout this decade have been involved in the broader post-conflict peace-building processes associated with the implementation of peace agreements. Post-conflict peace-building involves the return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons, reconciliation, rebuilding judicial systems, strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights, electoral assistance and assistance in

rebuilding war-torn political, economic and social infrastructures, as well as more traditional peacekeeping tasks.

In response to the changing international normative climate, the number of legal instruments, particularly relating to humanitarian and human rights law, has increased considerably. Growing public concern about gross human rights violations provided much of the political impetus for the creation of the International Criminal Court; concern about the humanitarian costs of landmines fuelled the successful campaign to ban them.

The past decade has also been a period of tension and difficulty for the United Nations as it has sought to fulfil its collective security mandate. Earlier this year, the Security Council was precluded from intervening in the Kosovo crisis by profound disagreements between Council members over whether such an intervention was legitimate. Differences within the Council reflected the lack of consensus in the wider international community. Defenders of traditional interpretations of international law stressed the inviolability of State sovereignty; others stressed the moral imperative to act forcefully in the face of gross violations of human rights. The moral rights and wrongs of this complex and contentious issue will be the subject of debate for years to come, but what is clear is that enforcement actions without Security Council authorisation threaten the very core of the international security system founded on the Charter of the United Nations. Only the Charter provides a universally accepted legal basis for the use of force. Disagreements about sovereignty are not the only impediments to Security Council action in the face of complex humanitarian emergencies. Confronted by gross violations of human rights in Rwanda and elsewhere, the failure to intervene was driven more by the reluctance of Member States to pay the human and other costs of intervention, and by doubts that the use of force would be successful, than by concerns about sovereignty.

Preventive Diplomacy and Peacemaking

Early warning is now universally agreed to be a necessary condition for effective preventive diplomacy. It is not, unfortunately, a sufficient condition, as the tragedy in Kosovo has demonstrated. As the crisis unfolded, I twice addressed the Security Council in the hope that consensus could be achieved for effective preventive action. Regrettably, diplomatic efforts failed, and the destructive logic of developments on the ground prevailed.

What lessons should be drawn from this and other recent failures in conflict prevention? First, that if the primacy of the Security Council with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security is rejected, the very foundations of international law as represented by the Charter will be brought into question. No other universally accepted legal basis for constraining wanton acts of violence exists. Second, that conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacemaking must not become an area of competition between the United Nations and regional organisations. We work together best when we respect each other's prerogatives and sensitivities. Third, that prevention can only succeed with strong political commitment from Member States and if the provision of resources is adequate.

Healing the wounds of a war-torn society is never an easy task. It presents a particularly difficult challenge in Kosovo, which remains embedded in the complicated and contentious political fabric of the Balkans. We recognize the real potential for further disruption of the fragile ethnic equilibrium in a number of the surrounding countries.

While the crisis in Kosovo has dominated global media headlines during the past year, equally or more serious crises in other parts of the world have been largely ignored. If this neglect were restricted to the media it would not be of great consequence, but media inattention reflects the attitude of much of the international community, as has become evident in the decline in support for humanitarian appeals for Africa.

Security developments in Africa continue to cause the gravest concern. In West and Central Africa in particular, the threat that internal conflicts will spread and lead to armed confrontations between sovereign African States is an especially worrying development.

This risk is perhaps best illustrated by the ongoing hostilities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in which a large number of African countries have become involved. My Special Envoy, Moustapha Niasse, whom I dispatched to the region in the spring, has been working in support of the diplomatic solution put forward by President Frederick Chiluba, on behalf of the Southern African Development Community. President Chiluba's efforts have the support of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations.

The prospects for peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have improved. On 10 July, all the belligerents except the Rassemblement congolais pour la democratic signed a ceasefire

agreement in Lusaka. The Security Council welcomed the agreement and authorized the deployment of United Nations military and civilian personnel in the region to facilitate the implementation of the ceasefire. After concerted efforts by South Africa, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and others, the disagreement between the Kisangani and Goma factions of the Rassemblement congolais pour la democratic over who should sign the ceasefire agreement appears to have been resolved. Once the agreement is signed, the United Nations will dispatch a multi-disciplinary technical survey team to the region to assess the security and infrastructure of the areas provisionally identified for future deployments.

The peace process in Burundi has also shown some progress, with the Arusha negotiations, under the leadership of former President Julius Nyerere, having reached a crucial stage.

In Sierra Leone, whose people have been the victims of one of the most brutal conflicts of recent times, the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) has worked assiduously to help facilitate a negotiated solution. In close cooperation with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), its Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and other interested Member States, UNOMSIL actively supported the process of negotiations between the Government and the Revolutionary United Front, which led to the signing on 7 July 1999 of the Lome Peace Agreement. Following the signing of the Peace Agreement, the Security Council authorized an expansion of UNOMSIL. Recognising the close relationship between the promotion of human rights and sustainable peace, UNOMSIL, in collaboration with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, continues to monitor and report on human rights abuses in Sierra Leone with a view to ending further violations.

The outbreak of war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in May 1998 was also a cause of profound disquiet. I immediately contacted the leaders of both parties, urging restraint and offering assistance in resolving the conflict peacefully. I have maintained contacts with both sides. I also requested Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun to assist the mediation efforts of OAU as my Special Envoy. Ambassador Sahnoun participated in various meetings organized by OAU and visited the Eritrean and Ethiopian capitals to press for the acceptance of the peace plan, the OAU Framework Agreement.

The conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia has also had a tragic regional impact, particularly with regard to the conflict in Somalia.

The United Nations Political Office for Somalia continues to assist regional efforts at peacemaking in Somalia that are led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). However, a lack of consensus on the mode of power-sharing among the various factions has precluded settlement of the conflict. The main challenge in the year ahead will be to strengthen international peacemaking efforts and to identify initiatives that can be supported by all the relevant actors.

I have also been closely following the continuing complex humanitarian emergency in the Sudan, where developments again highlight the need to address the root causes of the conflict in order to speed the search for a political solution. In 1998, visited the area and reiterated my offer of good offices to the parties and the mediators. Following a number of internal and external consultations, we have taken further steps to support and invigorate the IGAD peace initiative on the Sudan. Assisting this process, which sadly has not been sustained, remains our primary objective in the quest to help the parties achieve a just and lasting settlement.

The United Nations has been involved for many years in Western Sahara, where recent consultations with the Government of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO have finally resolved a longstanding impasse over a referendum for self-determination. A new date, 31 July 2000, has been set for the referendum.

Africa is not, of course, the only area of security concern for the United Nations. Relations with Iraq took a turn for the worse during the year, despite a brief period of compliance with the Memorandum of Understanding signed by Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz and myself in February 1998. In the face of continuing Iraqi non-compliance, the use of force by two Member States and the division in the Security Council that followed it was predictable. Our principal demands remain unchanged, however: Iraq must fully comply with all relevant Security Council resolutions; the international community must be assured that Iraq no longer has the capacity to develop or use weapons of mass destruction; missing Kuwaiti and third country nationals must be accounted for; and Kuwait's irreplaceable archives must be returned. Meanwhile, the people of Iraq continue to suffer the effects of sanctions, although since December 1996 the oil-for-food programme has helped to alleviate some of the suffering by allowing the delivery of humanitarian goods to the country.

The overall situation in the Middle East remains troubling. The international community has expressed its strong support for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East based on relevant Security Council resolutions and the principle of land for peace. The recent resumption of the peace process and indications of a real commitment to achieving a settlement by the key protagonists are grounds for cautious optimism.

In some conflicts, however, hostility is so intense, and distrust so pervasive, that progress becomes extraordinarily difficult to achieve. This is still the case in Afghanistan. My Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, visited the region in October 1998 and late in February this year for talks with the authorities of neighbouring countries, as well as with the Taliban and the United Front. In July of this year, the "six plus two" group held a meeting in Tashkent following which my Special Envoy again visited the region. The United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan succeeded in convening two rounds of intra-Afghan talks in Ashgabat in February and March 1999. The parties managed to reach an agreement in principle on the sharing of government institutions. Unfortunately, in mid-spring, the Taliban leadership announced that it would not resume the negotiations started under United Nations auspices. In July, the Taliban launched an offensive against the United Front but failed to gain a decisive advantage. In August, severe fighting continued with grave humanitarian consequences. Notwithstanding these setbacks, I intend continuing my efforts to persuade both sides to resume consultations and to draw in interested Member States and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, where this may be helpful, in order to explore the prospects for an eventual peace agreement.

The recent upsurge of fighting along and across the line of control in Kashmir, especially in the Kargil area, is a reminder of the fragility of the situation in this region. The process initiated in Lahore needs to be put back on track as there are serious grounds for concern, not least because of the dangers of an unintended escalation in a subcontinent in which nuclear devices have been tested.

On 5 May 1999, after intensive diplomatic efforts, Indonesia, Portugal and the United Nations concluded a set of agreements calling for the United Nations to conduct a popular consultation of the East Timorese people on whether they would accept the special autonomy status offered by Indonesia. Rejection of autonomy would lead to East Timor's separation from Indonesia and transition, under United

Nations authority, to independent statehood. The United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was established by the Security Council on 11 June 1999. A region-wide structure established by the Mission's Electoral Unit completed a successful registration process despite adverse security conditions. UNAMET also organized and conducted a comprehensive voter education campaign, worked with local authorities and East Timorese groups to foster reconciliation, and deployed civilian police and military liaison officers to advise local police and liaise with the Indonesian military on security issues. Following the successful consultation on 30 August, the United Nations will remain in East Timor to assist in implementing the result.

The situation in Myanmar is of continuing concern. My Special Envoy, Alvaro de Soto, visited Myanmar in October 1998 to hold consultations with the Myanmar authorities, as well as with other political actors, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, General Secretary of the National League for Democracy. Despite our concerted efforts, I am unfortunately unable to report on any genuine, substantive response by the Government of Myanmar to the appeals made to it, in successive resolutions, by the General Assembly.

The United Nations Political Office in Bougainville, which was established in August 1998, has played a critical role in facilitating the search for a peaceful resolution of the crisis in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea. The National Government of Papua New Guinea and the Bougainville parties have asked the Office to supervise the process of disarmament, which will allow implementation of the programme of rehabilitation and reconstruction of the island to begin as soon as possible. The new Government of Papua New Guinea has stressed that the continuation of the peace process is one of its most important objectives.

There have been a number of encouraging signs of improved security relations in Latin America over the past year. The Governments of Ecuador and Peru finally took the steps needed to bring their long-standing border dispute to an end, while Argentina and Chile have also agreed to settle the dispute over their frontier.

Peacekeeping

The past year has been a tumultuous one for United Nations peacekeeping. We are facing major new challenges with the creation of the large-scale, and in many ways unprecedented, operation in Kosovo, with preparations for a complex new mission in the Democratic

Republic of the Congo, the expansion of the mission in Sierra Leone, the strong likelihood of a new operation in Eritrea and Ethiopia, the continuing evolution of the situation in Timor, and the recent agreement by the Government of Angola for a continued United Nations presence in that country.

The closure of two major missions, the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola and the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force, and the completion of a follow-on operation, the United Nations Police Support Group in Croatia, have brought the current number of peacekeeping operations to 16.

A sudden deterioration in the security situation led to the evacuation of the United Nations Observation Mission in Sierra Leone in January 1999. The restoration of security in Freetown allowed UNOMSIL to return in March to help in supporting the peace process, which culminated in the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement on 7 July. The implementation of that Agreement will involve an expanded peacekeeping presence, which we are currently examining with ECOWAS.

The volatility and danger of the environments in which the United Nations operates are underlined by the number of casualties suffered by United Nations peacekeepers. From 1 January 1998 to 19 August 1999, 34 United Nations personnel gave their lives in peacekeeping operations. We owe them a debt of gratitude that can never be repaid.

Perhaps the most disturbing trend has been the growing contempt for international norms. In addition to the savage attacks on civilians, peacekeepers have also been targeted, or used as pawns to manipulate international public opinion. In this context, I warmly welcome the entry into force of the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and I would strongly encourage further ratifications by Member States. In response to these developments, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is undertaking a systematic review of the problem of violence against peacekeepers. I look forward to informing Member States of its findings as this work progresses.

Just as the year was tumultuous for peacekeeping, it was similarly testing for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In accordance with the wishes of the General Assembly, gratis personnel were phased out by the end of February. As a consequence, the Department as a whole has been reduced by almost 20 per cent during the past year. In

order to adjust to the new realities, while continuing to perform its mandated functions, the Department underwent a significant restructuring. The creation or expansion of several missions, the closure and liquidation of others, and mandated planning for possible future operations have occurred in this context. Ironically, the logistics and communications area—vital for the deployment of new missions as well as the liquidation of old ones—was hardest hit by the reduction of staff.

This experience shows once again that preparedness requires capacities beyond those needed for current activities. The demand for peacekeeping and other field operations is, by its very nature, difficult to predict and such operations must often be established at short notice. The credibility and effectiveness of any new operation are affected by the promptness with which it is deployed. Delays provide an opportunity for those who oppose the peace process, or the terms of a settlement, to seize the initiative before United Nations personnel arrive. In determining resource requirements for the Organisation, including its Headquarters staff, I trust that Member States will bear this in mind.

In spite of the unpredictability of events over the past year, some things remained constant. One was the continued emphasis on multidimensional peacekeeping, which is now the norm for the Organisation. Multidimensional peacekeeping operations tackle a number of challenges concurrently: helping to maintain ceasefires and to disarm and demobilize combatants; assisting the parties to build or strengthen vital institutions and processes and respect for human rights, so that all concerned can pursue their interests through legitimate channels rather than on the battlefield; providing humanitarian assistance to relieve immediate suffering; and laying the groundwork for longer-term economic growth and development on the understanding that no post-conflict system can long endure if it fails to improve the lot of impoverished people. The Organisation is continuing to develop the methods to coordinate these diverse activities more effectively.

I have previously reported on ways in which the United Nations programmes, funds and agencies are brought together by my appointed Special Representatives in support of integrated security and development strategies. Additional innovations this year have included our work with the World Bank in the Central African Republic, where the United Nations responsibilities in security, elections and

institutional reform have been matched by the Bank's efforts to assist with economic stabilisation and to promote longer-term growth. The United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) played an important supportive role that enabled the peaceful and successful conduct of legislative elections in November/ December 1998. MINURCA is to provide support for the presidential elections scheduled for September 1999. Unfortunately, funding for MINURCA is suffering from a worrying lack of enthusiasm among donors, and lack of funding will undoubtedly hamper the efforts of MINURCA to support and observe the elections.

Similarly, in Tajikistan, there was initially a very low donor response to appeals for funds to support demobilisation projects, an important aspect of the mandate of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan. The resulting delays again point to the drawbacks of funding essential elements of a mandate through voluntary contributions, rather than through assessed contributions as is normally the case in peacekeeping operations. There has nevertheless been significant progress in advancing the peace process, and we are cautiously optimistic that the Mission's mandate will be fulfilled. The case of Kosovo is the latest in a series of innovations in peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building that have been pursued in the 1990s in cooperation with regional and subregional organisations. In Kosovo, we are cooperating with the European Union in reconstruction and rehabilitation programmes, and with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in institution-building. Both of those organisations operate under the authority of my Special Representative. We are also working closely with the international military forces responsible for security in Kosovo to ensure unity of civilian and military efforts.

In 1999, the Secretariat, in collaboration with the International Committee of the Red Cross, finalized principles and rules on the observance of international humanitarian law by peacekeepers; these rules have been issued as a Secretary-General's bulletin. I hope that the promulgation of that bulletin will help to clarify the scope of the application of international humanitarian law to United Nations forces and operations and ensure that the required standards are observed.

Post-conflict Peace-building

Post-conflict peace-building seeks to prevent the resurgence of conflict and to create the conditions necessary for a sustainable peace

in war-torn societies. It is a holistic process involving broad-based inter-agency cooperation across a wide range of issues. It encompasses activities as diverse as traditional peacekeeping and electoral assistance.

Achieving the necessary coordination and complementarity between agencies in conflict and fragile post-conflict situations continues to present a major challenge to the United Nations and its partners. Recognising the scope of this challenge, in 1997 I designated the Department of Political Affairs, in its capacity as convener of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security, as the focal point for post-conflict peace-building.

The past year has seen a number of developments in United Nations post-conflict peace-building operations. Activities in the field include forward planning for a future United Nations presence in the Central African Republic when the mandate of MINURCA expires; establishing a new office dedicated to peace-building in Guinea-Bissau; sustaining the major United Nations presence in Guatemala; and consolidating long-standing peace processes in Cambodia and El Salvador and elsewhere.

After a year of divisive and destructive conflict in Guinea-Bissau, prospects for a return to normality have improved, albeit gradually. The United Nations Peace-building Support Office is working with the Government and people to coordinate an integrated response to the challenges of peace-building. In Liberia, the United Nations Peace-building Support Office is about to complete its second year of operation. Despite limited financial resources, the Office has supported a number of projects dealing with national reconciliation and rebuilding respect for the rule of law and human rights.

The United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala is mandated by the General Assembly to carry out a range of post-conflict peace-building activities in addition to verifying the peace agreements, providing good offices and undertaking advisory and public information activities. Since 1997, considerable emphasis has been placed on human rights, particularly indigenous rights; social investment; decentralisation of State activities; rural development; fiscal and judicial reforms; and the reform of public security and national defence. In 1998, these initiatives provided the basis for a constitutional reform package, which was approved by Congress but which the people failed to ratify in a national referendum in May 1999. As presidential and

legislative elections approach in November 1999, continuing commitment to the peace agenda will be crucial to its sustainability.

In neighbouring El Salvador, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is responsible for assisting the Government with peace accord issues that remain unresolved. UNDP works in close coordination with the Department of Political Affairs, which retains responsibility for good offices. One of the greatest challenges facing the newly inaugurated Government is consolidation of the institutions that were created, or reformed, as part of the peace process, particularly those responsible for dealing with the country's public security crisis and the protection and promotion of human rights.

Institution-building, particularly of the judicial sector, and the protection and promotion of human rights are the key tasks of the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH). As in previous years, there remains much to be done to strengthen State institutions and civil society organisations. The reduced participation of the Organisation of American States in MICIVIH, as from 1 July 1999, will necessarily affect our continued role, although core functions will continue to be performed. Meanwhile, the United Nations and the international community have pledged to support the holding of legislative and local government elections by the end of 1999—a crucial requirement for Haiti's future progress.

During the past year, there have been welcome developments in Cambodia. With the establishment of a new Government and the collapse of the Khmer Rouge movement, the country is finally at peace and able to devote its attention to reconstruction. My Personal Representative in Cambodia and the United Nations agencies in the country remain committed to assisting the Government in its nation-building efforts, including the strengthening of democratic institutions and assistance in the promotion and protection of human rights.

Electoral Assistance

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements in Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique and Nicaragua required the presence of major United Nations electoral missions to help organize the mandated elections. Often viewed as the final step in a long-term peacemaking process, elections symbolize the re-establishment of national authority in a new multi-party system of government. Experience has demonstrated, however, that the relationship of elections to the long-term process of

peace-building is highly complex. As the "age of democratisation" has entered into a new phase, the Organisation has shifted its electoral assistance strategy to encompass a broader understanding of post-conflict peace-building. Elections that have in the past served predominantly as an exit strategy out of conflict situations are now seen as providing an opportunity for institution-building and the introduction of programmes for good governance.

Elections are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for creating viable democracies. That requires the establishment or strengthening of democratic infrastructures such as electoral commissions, electoral laws and election administration structures and the promotion of a sense of citizenship and its attendant rights and responsibilities. The recent experience of the United Nations in Nigeria shows how a partnership in electoral assistance can build a base for long-term post-electoral assistance activities.

The United Nations wealth of experience in electoral assistance allows the Organisation to tailor its programmes to meet the particular demands of its Member States with great efficacy.

The United Nations, Regional Organisations and Security

During the 1990s, regional organisations have played an increasingly active role in regional security affairs, not only in the realms of preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and confidence-building, but also with respect to peace enforcement. The relationship between the United Nations and regional organisations is complex, usually fruitful, but sometimes difficult. Several lessons have emerged from recent experience.

First, it is imperative that regional security operations be mandated by the Security Council if the legal basis of the international security system is to be maintained. Frequently, such operations will also need the wider political support that only the United Nations can provide, and peace settlements will often require United Nations involvement under Security Council authority.

Second, security policies that work in one region may not in others. Most regions do not have organisations with the capacity to carry out major peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. Some regional organisation's—most notably OAU—would like to develop a peacekeeping capacity and it is important for the international community to assist them. This is a long-term undertaking, however,

and one in which the parties can count on the United Nations to play an active supporting role.

Third, today's complex humanitarian emergencies require equally complex multidisciplinary responses, which only the United Nations has the qualifications and experience to provide. Whether responding to crises or implementing comprehensive peace agreements, the United Nations has an unparalleled ability to coordinate action across a wide range of sectors and disciplines.

I support moves towards greater cooperation with regional organisations. However, as multilateral activity expands, both the Secretariat and Member States are finding that the human and financial resources allotted for new operations have not kept pace with increased demands, and are at times barely adequate. It is crucial that this situation be addressed with energy and resolve if the United Nations is to avoid a cycle in which expectations exceed capacity, bringing inevitable disappointment and a decline in confidence in the potential of the Organisation.

Disarmament

During the past year, existing disarmament agreements were threatened by a number of developments which are likely not only to undermine global security but also to cause an increase in global military expenditures. The disarmament machinery in the United Nations was not fully utilized during the year, and no consensus was reached on the convening of a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which could set universal goals for the immediate future. However, the United Nations has remained committed to upholding existing norms and to facilitating the necessary political will among Member States to establish new agreements to achieve global security at the lowest level of armaments commensurate with legitimate self-defence and security requirements.

The development of longer-range missiles and their testing by several countries, together with the development of missile defences and the fact that large numbers of missiles are ready to be launched on warning, seriously threaten peace and security. Multilaterally negotiated norms against the spread of ballistic missile technology for military purposes and restraint in missile development would considerably reduce the threat posed by ballistic missiles, whether armed with conventional weapons or capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, they would substantially improve

prospects for progress on bilateral and multilateral disarmament and arms control negotiations, including the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The systematic and progressive reduction of nuclear weapons, with the ultimate goal of their complete elimination, will remain one of the priority tasks of the international community. Little was achieved in this area in the past year, however. Long-standing differences over how to tackle questions of nuclear disarmament continued to prevent the start of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material, which, in the autumn of 1998, had seemed possible. Meanwhile, we have continued to support ongoing negotiations on the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in Central Asia, and a text of the treaty is evolving.

Efforts to promote entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty continue, and a conference to consider the issue is scheduled for the autumn. It is crucial that the three nuclear weapon States that have not yet ratified the Treaty, as well as those States whose ratification is required for its entry into force, deposit their instruments promptly. The path to the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will be smoother if there has been tangible progress in this and other areas of nuclear disarmament.

Disarmament activity—in the form of treaties, components of peacekeeping mandates or confidence-building measures—both supports, and is supported by, progress in social and economic development. Promotion of mine awareness, progress in mine clearance, and the provision of medical, psychological and technical assistance to mine victims, who are mainly women and children, sustain the process of socio-economic reconstruction and development in countries emerging from conflict. In May, the worldwide efforts to abolish landmines took a major step forward with the convening of the First Meeting of the States Parties to the Ottawa Convention, which bans antipersonnel mines and mandates their destruction. A further step towards reducing the devastation wrought by land—mines will be taken in December, when the parties to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which constitutes a partial prohibition on landmines, will hold their first annual conference.

Other practical disarmament measures, such as the collection and destruction of small arms and light weapons, can reduce the potential

for violence and enhance stability, thus facilitating the development process. The reduction of military budgets, especially in post-conflict countries, will increase the resources available for development. The latter issue will, we hope, be considered in depth by the re-established high-level Steering Group on Disarmament and Development.

The failure of the Conference on Disarmament, for the third year in succession, to agree on a programme of work and the lack of consensus on holding a special session of the General Assembly on disarmament are a source of grave and ongoing concern.

Sanctions

It is increasingly accepted that the design and implementation of sanctions mandated by the Security Council need to be improved, and their humanitarian costs to civilian populations reduced as far as possible. This can be achieved by more selective targeting of sanctions, as proponents of so-called "smart sanctions" have urged, or by incorporating appropriate and carefully thought through humanitarian exceptions directly in Security Council resolutions. I support both approaches.

Intense debate continues, both within and outside the United Nations, on how effective the existing sanctions regimes have been, whether comprehensive, like those against Iraq, or more targeted, as in the case of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Questions remain on how best to address the problems arising from their application.

Since 1997, the Government of Switzerland has facilitated a dialogue between sanctions practitioners and experts, known as "the Interlaken process". Its goal has been to explore the potential effectiveness of targeted financial sanctions, which may include freezing the financial assets and blocking the financial transactions of targeted entities or individuals. Although their efficacy remains to be tested, and several issues require resolution, the technical feasibility of such sanctions has now been established, as reflected in a report submitted to the Security Council in June 1999.

61

Supplement to an Agenda for Peace

Introduction

On 31 January 1992, the Security Council met for the first time at the level of heads of State or Government. The Cold War had ended. It was a time of hope and change and of rising expectations for—and of the United Nations. The members of the Council asked me to prepare an "analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping" (UN document S/23500: see page 115). Five months later, in June 1992, I submitted my report entitled *An Agenda for Peace (UN* document A/47/277-S/24111: see page 39). It dealt with the three problems the Council had requested me to consider, to which I added the related concept of post-conflict peace-building. It also touched on peace enforcement

In submitting my recommendations on how to improve the Organisation's capacity to maintain peace and security, I said that the search for improved mechanisms and techniques would be of little significance unless the new spirit of commonality that had emerged, of which the Summit was such a clear manifestation, was "propelled by the will to take the hard decisions demanded by this time of opportunity" *(An Agenda for Peace,* para. 6).

Subsequent discussion of *An Agenda for Peace* in the General Assembly, in the Security Council and in Member States' parliaments established that there was general support for the recommendations I had put forward. That discussion, and the new process initiated in 1994 for the elaboration of an Agenda for Development, have also served to advance international consensus on the crucial importance at economic and social development as the most secure basis for lasting peace.

Since the Security Council Summit the pace has accelerated. There have been dramatic changes in both the volume and the nature of the United Nations activities in the field of peace and security. New and more comprehensive concepts to guide those activities, and their links with development work, are emerging. Old concepts are being modified. There have been successes and there have been failures. The Organisation has attracted intense media interest, often laudatory, more often critical, and all too often focused on only one or two of the many peace-keeping operations in which it is engaged, overshadowing other major operations and its vast effort in the economic, social and other fields. All this confirms that we are still in a lime of transition. The end of the cold war was a major movement of tectonic plates and the after-shocks continue to be relt. But even if the ground beneath our feet has not yet settled, we still live in a new age that holds great promise for both peace and development.

Our ability to fulfil that promise depends on how well we can learn the lessons of the Organisation's successes and failures in these first years of the post-Cold-War age. Most of the ideas in *An Agenda for Peace* have proved themselves. A few have not been taken up. The purpose of the present position paper, however, is not to revise *An Agenda for Peace* nor to call into question structures and procedures that have been tested by time. Even less is it intended to be a comprehensive treatise on the matters it discusses. Its purpose is, rather, to highlight selectively certain areas where unforeseen, or only partly foreseen, difficulties have arisen and where there is a need for the Member States to take the "hard decisions" I referred to two and a half years ago.

The Organisation's half-century year will provide the international community an opportunity to address these issues, and the related, major challenge of elaborating an agenda for Development. and to indicate in a comprehensive way the direction the Member States want the Organisation to take. The present position paper is offered as a contribution to the many debates I hope will take place during 1995 and perhaps beyond, inside and outside the intergovernmental bodies, about the current performance and future role of our Organisation.

II. Quantitative and Qualitative Changes

It is indisputable that since the end of the cold war there has been a dramatic increase in the United Nations activities related to the

maintenance of peace and security. The figures speak for themselves. The table on page 8 gives them for three dates: 31 January 1988 (when the cold war was already coming to an end); 31 January 1992 (the date of the first Security Council Summit); and today, on the eve of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations.

This increased volume of activity would have strained the Organisation even if the nature of the activity had remained unchanged. It has not remained unchanged, however: there have been qualitative changes even more significant than the quantitative ones.

One is the fact that so many of today's conflicts are within States rather than between States. The end of the cold war removed constraint that had inhibited conflict in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. As a result there/has been a rash of wars within newly independent States, often of a religious or ethnic character and often involving unusual violence and cruelty. The end of the cold war seems also to have contributed to an outbreak of such wars in Africa, in addition, some of the proxy wars fuelled by the cold war within States remain unresolved. Inter-State wars, by contrast, have become infrequent.

Of the five peace-keeping operations that existed in early 1988, four related to inter-State wars and only one (20 per cent of the total to an intra-State conflict. Of the 21 operations established since then, only 8 have related to inter-State wars, whereas 13 (62 per cent) have related to intra-State conflicts, though some of them, especially those in the former Yugoslavia, have some inter-State dimensions also. Of the 11 operations established since January 1992, ail but 2 (82 per cent) relate to intra-State conflicts.

The new breed of intra-State conflicts have certain characteristics that present United Nations peace-keepers with challenges not encountered since the Congo operation of the early 1960s. They are usually fought not only by regular armies but also by militias and armed civilians with little discipline and with ill-defined chains of command. They are often guerrilla wars without clear front lines.

Civilians are the main victims and often the main targets. Humanitarian emergencies are commonplace and the combatant authorities, in so far as they can be called authorities, lack the capacity to cope with them. The number of refugees registered with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has increased from 13 million at the end of 1987 to 26 million at the end of 1994. The number of internally displaced persons has increased even more dramatically.

Some Statistics on United Nations Activities Related to Peace and Security, 1988 to 1994

	As at 31 January 1988	*As at 31 January 1992*	*As at 16 December 1994*
Security Council resolutions adopted in the preceding 12 months	15	53	78
Disputes and conflicts in which the United Nations was actively involved in preventive diplomacy or peacemaking in the preceding 12 months	11	13	28
Peace-keeping operations deployed			
Total	**5**	**11**	**17**
Classical	5	7	9
Multifunctional	—	4	8
Military personnel deployed	9,570	11,495	73,393
Civilian police deployed	35	155	2,130
International civilian personnel deployed	1,516	2,206	2,260
Countries contributing military and police personnel	26	56	76
United Nations budget for peace-keeping operations (on an annual basis) (millions of US dollars)	230.4	1,689.6	3,610.0[a]
Countries in which the United Nations had undertaken electoral activities in the preceding 12 months	—	6	21
Sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council	1	2	7

[a] Projected.

Another feature of such conflicts is the collapse of State institutions, especially the police and judiciary, with resulting paralysis of governance, a breakdown of law and order, and general banditry and chaos. Not only are the functions of government suspended, its assets are destroyed or looted and experienced officials are killed or flee the country. This is rarely the case in inter-State wars. It means that international intervention must extend beyond military and humanitarian tasks and must include the promotion of national reconciliation and the re-establishment of effective government.

The latter are tasks that demand time and sensitivity. The United Nations is, for good reasons, reluctant to assume responsibility for

maintaining law and order, nor can it impose a new political structure or new State institutions. It can only help the hostile factions to help themselves and begin to live together again. All too often it turns out that they do not yet want to be helped or to resolve their problems quickly.

Peace-keeping in such contexts is far more complex and more expensive than when its tasks were mainly to monitor ceasefires and control buffer zones with the consent of the States involved in the conflict. Peace-keeping today can involve constant danger.

I cannot praise too highly or adequately express my gratitude and admiration for the courage and sacrifice of United Nations personnel, military and civil, in this new era of challenge to peace and security. The conditions under which they serve are often extremely harsh. Many have given their lives. Many must persevere despite the loss of family members and friends.

It must also be recognized that the vast increase in field deployment has to be supported by an overburdened Headquarters staff that resource constraints have held at levels appropriate to an earlier, far less demanding, time.

A second qualitative change is the Use of United Nations forces to protect humanitarian operations. Humanitarian agencies endeavour to provide succour to civilian victims of war wherever they may be. Too often, the warring parties make it difficult or impossible for them to do so. This is sometimes because of the exigencies of war but more often because the relief of a particular population is contrary to the war aims of one or other of the parties. There is also a growing tendency for the combatants to divert relief supplies for their own purposes. Because the wars are intra-State conflicts, the humanitarian agencies often have to undertake their tasks in the chaotic and lawless conditions described above. In some, but not all, such cases the resulting horrors explode on to the world's television screens and create political pressure for the United Nations to deploy troops to facilitate and protect the humanitarian operations. While such images can help build support for humanitarian action, such scenes also may create an emotional environment in which effective decision-making can be far more difficult.

This has led, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Somalia, to a new kind of United Nations operation. Even though the use of force is authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter, the United Nations

remains neutral and impartial between the warring parties, without a mandate to stop the aggressor (if one can be identified) or impose a cessation of hostilities. Nor is this peace-keeping as practised hitherto, because the hostilities continue and there is often no agreement between the warring parties on which a peace-keeping mandate can be based. The "safe areas" concept in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a similar case. It too gives the United Nations a humanitarian mandate under which the use of force is authorized but for limited and local purposes and not to bring the war to an end.

A third change has been in the nature of United Nations operations in the field. During the cold war United Nations peace-keeping operations were largely military in character and were usually deployed after a ceasefire but before a settlement of the conflict in question, had been negotiated. Indeed one of their main purposes was to create conditions in which negotiations for a settlement could take place. In the late 1980s a new kind of peace-keeping operation evolved. It was established after negotiations had succeeded, with the mandate of helping the parties implement the comprehensive settlement they had negotiated. Such operations have been deployed in Namibia, Angola, El Salvador, Cambodia and Mozambique. In most cases, they have been conspicuously successful.

The negotiated settlements involved not only military arrangements but also a wide range of civilian matters. As a result, the United Nations found itself asked to undertake an unprecedented variety of functions: the supervision of ceasefires, the regroupment and demobilisation of forces, their reintegration into civilian life and the destruction of their weapons; the design and implementation of de-mining programmes; the return of refugees and displaced persons; the provision of humanitarian assistance; the supervision of existing administrative structures; the establishment of new police forces; the verification of respect for human rights; the design and supervision of constitutional, judicial and electoral reforms; the observation, supervision and even organisation and conduct of elections; and the coordination of support for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Fourthly, these multifunctional peace-keeping operations have highlighted the role the United Nations can play after a negotiated settlement has been implemented. It is now recognized that implementation of the settlement in the time prescribed may not be enough to guarantee that the conflict will not revive. Coordinated programmes are required, over a number of years and in various fields,

to ensure that the original causes of war are eradicated. This involves the building up of national institutions, the promotion of human rights, the creation of civilian police forces and other actions in the political field. As I pointed out in *An Agenda for Development* only sustained efforts to resolve underlying socio-economic, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation.

III. Instruments for Peace and Security

The United Nations has developed a range of instruments for controlling and resolving conflicts between and within States. The most important of them are preventive diplomacy and peacemaking; peace-keeping; peace-building; disarmament; sanctions; and peace enforcement. The first three can be employed only with the consent of the parties to the conflict. Sanctions and enforcement, on the other hand, are coercive measures and thus, by definition, do not require the consent of the party concerned. Disarmament can take place on an agreed basis or in the context of coercive action under Chapter VII.

The United Nations does not have or claim a monopoly of any of these instruments. All can be, and most of them have been, employed by regional organisations, by ad hoc groups of States or by individual States, but the United Nations has unparalleled experience of them and it is to the United Nations that the international community has turned increasingly since the end of the cold war. The United Nations system is also better equipped than regional organisations or individual Member States to develop and apply the comprehensive, long-term approach needed to ensure the lasting resolution of conflicts.

Perceived shortcomings in the United Nations performance of the tasks entrusted to it have recently, however, seemed to incline Member States to look for other means, especially, but not exclusively, where the rapid deployment of large forces is required. It is thus necessary to find ways of enabling the United Nations to perform better the roles envisaged for it in the Charter.

A. Preventive Diplomacy and Peacemaking

It is evidently better to prevent conflicts through early warning, quiet diplomacy and, in some cases, preventive deployment than to have to undertake major politico-military efforts to resolve them after they have broken out. The Security Council's declaration of 31 January 1992 (UN document S/23500) mandated me to give priority to preventive and peacemaking activities. I accordingly created a

Department of Political Affairs to handle a range of political functions that had previously been performed in various parts of the Secretariat. That Department has since passed through successive phases of restructuring and is now organized to follow political developments worldwide, so that it can provide early warning of impending conflicts and analyse possibilities for preventive action by the United Nations, as well as for action to help resolve existing conflicts.

Experience has shown that the greatest obstacle to success in these endeavours is not, as is widely supposed, lack of information, analytical capacity or ideas for United Nations initiatives. Success is often blocked at the outset by the reluctance of one or other of the parties to accept United Nations help. This is as true of inter-State conflicts as it is of internal ones, even though United Nations action on the former is fully within the Charter, whereas in the latter case it must be reconciled with Article 2, paragraph 7.

Collectively Member States encourage the Secretary-General to play an active role in this field; individually they are often reluctant that he should do so when they are a party to the conflict. It is difficult to know how to overcome this reluctance. Clearly the United Nations cannot impose its preventive and peacemaking services on Member States who do not want them. Legally and politically their request for, or at least acquiescence in, United Nations action is a *sine qua non.* The solution can only be long-term. It may lie in creating a climate of opinion, or ethos, within the international community in which the norm would be for Member States to accept an offer of United Nations good offices.

There are also two practical problems that have emerged in this field. Given Member States' frequently expressed support for preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, I take this opportunity to recommend that early action be taken to resolve them.

The first is the difficulty of finding senior persons who have the diplomatic skills and who are willing to serve for a while as special representative or special envoy of the Secretary-General. As a result of the streamlining of the senior levels of the Secretariat, the extra capacity that was there in earlier years no longer exists.

The second problem relates to the establishment and financing of small field missions for preventive diplomacy and peacemaking. Accepted and well-tried procedures exist for such action in the case of peace-keeping operations. The same is required in the preventive and

peacemaking field. Although special envoys can achieve much on a visiting basis, their capacity is greatly enhanced if continuity can be assured by the presence on the ground of a small support mission on a full-time basis. There is no clear view amongst Member States about whether legislative authority for such matters rests with the Security Council or the General Assembly, nor are existing budgetary procedures well-geared to meet this need.

Two solutions are possible. The first is to include in the regular budget a contingency provision, which might be in the range of $25 million per biennium, for such activities. The second would be to enlarge the existing provision for unforeseen and extraordinary activities and to make it available for all preventive and peacemaking activities, not just those related to international peace and security strictly defined.

B. Peace-keeping

The United Nations can be proud of the speed with which peace-keeping has evolved in response to the new political environment resulting from the end of the cold war. but the last few years have confirmed that respect for certain basic principles of peace-keeping are essential to its success. Three particularly important principles are the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence. Analysis of recent successes and failures shows that in all the successes those principles were respected and in most of the less successful operations one or other of them was not.

There are three aspects of recent mandates that, in particular, have led peace-keeping operations to forfeit the consent of the parties, to behave in a way that was perceived to be partial and/or to use force other than in self-defence. These have been the tasks of protecting humanitarian operations during continuing warfare, protecting civilian populations in designated safe areas and pressing the parties to achieve national reconciliation at a pace faster than they were ready to accept. The cases of Somalia and of Bosnia and Herzegovina are instructive in this respect.

In both cases, existing peace-keeping operations were given additional mandates that required the use of force and therefore could not be combined with/existing mandates requiring the consent of the parties, impartiality/and the non-use of force. It was also not possible for them to be executed without much stronger military capabilities than had been made available, as is the case in the former Yugoslavia.

In reality, nothing is more dangerous for a peace-keeping operation than to ask it to use force when its existing composition, armament, logistic support and deployment deny it the capacity to do so. The logic of peace-keeping flows from political and military premises that are quite distinct from those of enforcement; and the dynamics of the latter are incompatible with the political process that peace-keeping is intended to facilitate. To blur the distinction between the two can undermine the viability of the peace-keeping operation and endanger its personnel.

International problems cannot be solved quickly or within a limited time. Conflicts the United Nations is asked to resolve usually have deep roots and have defied the peacemaking efforts of others. Their resolution requires patient diplomacy and the establishment of a political process that permits, over a period of time, the building of confidence and negotiated solutions to long-standing differences. Such processes often encounter frustrations and set-backs and almost invariably take longer than hoped. It is necessary to resist the temptation to use military power to speed them up. Peace-keeping and the use of force (other than in self-defence) should be seen as alternative techniques and not as adjacent points on a continuum, permitting easy transition from one to the other.

In peace-keeping, too, a number of practical difficulties have arisen during the last three years, especially relating to command and control, to the availability of troops and equipment and to the information capacity of peace-keeping operations.

As regards command and control, it is useful to distinguish three levels of authority

(a) Overall political direction, which belongs to the Security Council;

(b) Executive direction and command, for which the Secretary-General is responsible;

(c) Command in the field, which is entrusted by the Secretary-General to the chief of mission (special representative or force commander/chief military observer).

The distinctions between these three levels must be kept constantly in mind in order to avoid any confusion of functions and responsibilities. It is as inappropriate for a chief of mission to take upon himself the formulation of his/her mission's overall political objectives as it is for the Security Council or the Secretary-General in New York to decide

on matters that require a detailed understanding of operational conditions in the field.

There has been an increasing tendency in recent years for the Security Council to micro-manage peace-keeping operations. Given the importance of the issues at stake and the volume of resources provided for peace-keeping operations, it is right and proper that the Council should wish to be closely consulted and informed. Procedures for ensuring this have been greatly improved. To assist the Security Council in being informed about the latest developments I have appointed one of my Special Advisers as my personal representative to the Council. As regards information, however, it has to be recognized that, in the inevitable fog and confusion of the near-war conditions in which peace-keepers often find themselves, as for example in Angola, Cambodia, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, time is required to verify the accuracy of initial reports. Understandably, chiefs of mission have to be more restrained than the media in broadcasting facts that have not been fully substantiated.

Troop-contributing Governments, who are responsible to their parliaments and electorates for the safety of their troops, are also understandably anxious to be kept fully informed, especially when the operation concerned is in difficulty. I have endeavoured to meet their concerns by providing them with regular briefings and by engaging them in dialogue about the conduct of the operation in question. Members of the Security Council have been included in such meetings and the Council has recently decided to formalize them. It is important that this should not lead to any blurring of the distinct levels of authority referred to above.

Another important principle is unity of command. The experience in Somalia has underlined again the necessity for a peace-keeping operation to function as an integrated whole. That necessity is all the more imperative when the mission is operating in dangerous conditions. There must be no opening for the parties to undermine its cohesion by singling out some contingents for favourable and others for unfavourable treatment. Nor must there be any attempt by troop-contributing Governments to provide guidance, let alone give orders, to their contingents on operational matters. To do so creates division within the force, adds to the difficulties already inherent in a multinational operation and increases the risk of casualties. It can also create the impression amongst the parties that the operation is serving the policy objectives of the contributing Governments rather

than the collective will of the United Nations as formulated by the Security Council. Such impressions inevitably undermine an operation's legitimacy and effectiveness.

That said, commanders in the field are, as a matter of course, instructed to consult the commanders of national contingents and make sure that they understand the Security Council's overall approach, as well as the role assigned to their contingents. However, such consultations cannot be allowed to develop into negotiations between the commander in the field and the troop-contributing Governments, whose negotiating partner must always be the Secretariat in New York.

As regards the availability of troops and equipment, problems have become steadily more serious. Availability has palpably declined as measured against the Organisation's requirements. A considerable effort has been made to expand and refine stand-by arrangements, but these provide no guarantee that troops will be provided for a specific operation. For example, when in May 1994 the Security Council decided to expand the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), not one of the 19 Governments that at that time had undertaken to have troops on stand-by agreed to contribute.

In these circumstances, I have come to the conclusion that the United Nations does need to give serious thought to the idea of a rapid reaction force. Such a force would be the Security Council's strategic reserve for deployment when there was an emergency need for peace-keeping troops. It might comprise battalion-sized units from a number of countries. These units would be trained to the same standards, use the same operating procedures, be equipped with integrated communications equipment and take part in joint exercises at regular intervals. They would be stationed in their home countries. But maintained at a high state of readiness. The value of this arrangement would of course depend on how far the Security Council could be sure that the force would actually be available in an emergency. This will be a complicated and expensive arrangement, but I believe that the time has come to undertake it.

Equipment and adequate training is another area of growing concern. The principle is that contributing Governments are to ensure that their troops arrive with all the equipment needed to be fully operational. Increasingly, however, Member States offer troops without the necessary equipment and training. In the absence of alternatives, the United Nations, under pressure, has to procure equipment on the

market or through voluntary contributions from other Member States. Further time is required for the troops concerned to learn to operate the equipment, which they are often encountering for the first time. A number of measures can be envisaged to address this problem, for example, the establishment by the United Nations of a reserve stock of standard peace-keeping equipment, as has been frequently proposed, and partnerships between Governments that need equipment and those ready to provide it.

An additional lesson from recent experience is that peacekeeping operations, especially those operating in difficult circumstances, need an effective information capacity. This is to enable them to explain their mandate to the population and, by providing a credible and impartial source of information, to counter misinformation disseminated about them, even by the parties themselves. Radio is the most effective medium for this purpose. In all operations where an information capacity, including radio, has been provided, even if late in the day, it has been recognized to have made an invaluable contribution to the operation's success. I have instructed that in the planning of future operations the possible need for an information capacity should be examined at an early stage and the necessary resources included in the proposed budget.

C. Post-conflict peace-building

The validity of the concept of post-conflict peace-building has received wide recognition. The measures it can use - and they are many - can also support preventive diplomacy. Demilitarisation, the control of small arms, institutional reform, improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring of human rights, electoral reform and social and economic development can be as valuable in preventing conflict as in healing the wounds after conflict has occurred.

The implementation of post-conflict peace-building can, however, be complicated. It requires integrated action and delicate dealings between the United Nations and the parties to the conflict in respect of which peace-building activities are to be undertaken.

Two kinds of situation deserve examination. The first is when a comprehensive settlement has been negotiated, with long-term political, economic and social provisions to address the root causes of the conflict, and verification of its implementation is entrusted to a multifunctional peace-keeping operation. The second is when peace-building, whether preventive or post-conflict, is undertaken in relation to a potential or

past conflict without any peace keeping operation being deployed. In both situations the essential goal is the creation of structures for the institutionalisation of peace.

The first situation is the easier to manage. The United Nations already has an entree. The parties have accepted its peacemaking and peace-keeping role. The peace-keeping operation will already be mandated to launch various peace building activities, especially the all-important reintegration of former combatants into productive civilian activities

Even so, political elements who dislike the peace agreement concluded by their Government (and the United Nations verification provided for therein) may resent the United Nations presence and be waiting impatiently for it to leave. Their concerns may find an echo among Member States who fear that the United Nations is in danger of slipping into a role prejudicial to the sovereignty of the country in question and among others who may be uneasy about the resource implications of a long-term peace-building commitment.

The timing and modalities of the departure of the peace-keeping operation and the transfer of its peace-building functions to others must therefore be carefully managed in the fullest possible consultation with the Government concerned. The latter's wishes must be paramount; but the United Nations, having invested much effort in helping to end the conflict, can legitimately express views and offer advice about actions the Government could take to reduce the danger of losing what has been achieved. The timing and modalities also need to take into account any residual verification for which the United Nations remains responsible.

Most of the activities that together constitute peace-building fall within the mandates of the various programmes, funds, offices and agencies of the United Nations system with responsibilities in the economic, social, humanitarian and human rights fields. In a country ruined by war, resumption of such activities may initially have to be entrusted to, or at least coordinated by, a multifunctional peace-keeping operation, but as that operation succeeds in restoring normal conditions, the programmes, funds, offices and agencies can re-establish themselves and gradually take over responsibility from the peace-keepers, with the resident coordinator in due course assuming the coordination functions temporarily entrusted to the special representative of the Secretary-General.

It may also be necessary in such cases to arrange the transfer of decision-making responsibility from the Security Council, which will have authorized the mandate and deployment of the peace-keeping operation, to the General Assembly or other intergovernmental bodies with responsibility for the civilian peace-building activities that will continue. The timing of this transfer will be of special interest to certain Member States because of its financial implications. Each case has to be decided on its merits, the guiding principle being that institutional or budgetary considerations should not be allowed to imperil the continuity of the United Nations efforts in the field.

The more difficult situation is when post-conflict (or preventive) peace-building activities are seen to be necessary in a country where the United Nations does not already have a peacemaking or peace-keeping mandate. Who then will identify the need for such measures and propose them to the Government? If the measures are exclusively in the economic, social and humanitarian fields, they are likely to fall within the purview of the resident coordinator. He or she could recommmend them to the Government. Even if the resident coordinator has the capacity to monitor and analyse all the indicators of an impending political and security crisis, however, which is rarely the case, can he or she act without inviting the charge of exceeding his or her mandate by assuming political functions, especially if the proposed measures relate to areas such as security, the police or human rights?

In those circumstances, the early warning responsibility has to lie with United Nations Headquarters, using all the information available to it, including reports of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) resident coordinator and other United Nations personnel in the country concerned. When analysis of that information gives warning of impending crisis, the Secretary-General; acting on the basis of his general mandate for preventive diplomacy, peace- making and peace-building, can take the initiative of sending a mission, with the Government's agreement, to discuss with it measures it could usefully take.

D. Disarmament

At their Summit on 31 January 1992, the members of the Security Council underscored their interest in and concern for disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, with special reference to weapons of mass destruction. They committed themselves to taking concrete steps to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations in those areas.

Considerable progress has been made since January 1992. The moratorium on nuclear testing continues to be largely observed. The Conference on Disarmament has finally decided to begin negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The General Assembly has recommended the negotiation of a treaty to ban the production of fissile material. Efforts are under way to strengthen the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex), ratified by 131 countries, through development of verification mechanism's. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction has been signed by 159 countries, but has not yet entered into force, pending ratification by the required 65 signatories. There have been some important accessions to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (resolution 2373 (XXII), annex).

I attach special importance to a successful conclusion of the forthcoming conference of the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is also of great importance that the Chemical Weapons Convention enter into force as soon as possible. The momentum in all these areas needs to be maintained. Ways have to be found for reconciling transfer of technology with measures necessary to prevent its misuse for military purposes.

These issues are of paramount importance both to the security of humankind and to the release of economic scientific and technological resources for peace and human progress. In the present paper, however, devoted as it is to the Organisation's recent experience in handling specific conflicts, I wish to concentrate on what might be called "micro-disarmament". By this I mean practical disarmament in the context of the conflicts the United Nations is actually dealing with and of the weapons, most of them light weapons, that are actually killing people in the hundreds of thousands.

The contemporary significance of micro-disarmament is demonstrated by the enormous proliferation of automatic assault weapons, anti-personnel mines and the like. Competent authorities have estimated that billions of dollars are being spent yearly on light weapons, representing nearly one third of the world's total arms trade. Many of those weapons are being bought, from developed countries, by developing countries that can least afford to dissipate their precious and finite assets for such purposes, and the volume of the trade in

light weapons is far more alarming than the monetary cost might lead one to suspect.

Micro-disarmament plays an important part in conjunction with all the other techniques discussed in the present paper. The assembly, control and disposal of weapons has been a central feature of most of the comprehensive peace settlements in which the United Nations has played a peace-keeping role. As a result, the Organisation has an unrivalled experience in this field. Micro-disarmament is equally relevant to post-conflict peace-building: Nicaragua has shown what can be achieved through imaginative programmes to mop up large numbers of small arms circulating in a country emerging from a long civil war. Disarmament can also follow enforcement action, as has been demonstrated in Iraq, where the United Nations Special Commission has played a pioneering role in practical disarmament, in this case involving weapons of mass destruction. All the sanctions regimes include an arms embargo and experience has confirmed the difficulty of monitoring cross-border arms flows into countries at war with their neighbours or within their own borders.

There are two categories of light weapons that merit special attention. The first is small arms, which are probably responsible for most of the deaths in current conflicts. The world is awash with them and traffic in them is very difficult to monitor, let alone intercept. The causes are many; the earlier supply of weapons to client States by the parties to the cold war, internal conflicts, competition for commercial markets, criminal activity and the collapse of governmental law and order functions (which both gives free rein to the criminals and creates a legitimate reason for ordinary citizens to acquire weapons for their own defence). A pilot advisory mission I dispatched to Mali in August 1994 at the request of that country's Government has confirmed the exceptional difficulty of controlling the illicit flow of small arms, a problem that can be effectively tackled only on a regional basis. It will take a long time to find effective solutions. I believe strongly that the search should begin now.

Secondly, there is the proliferation of anti-personnel mines. One of the positive developments in recent years has been the attention this problem has attracted. The international community has begun to address it. Current efforts in the context of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects are giving priority to anti-personnel mines,

and the General Assembly's call for a moratorium on their export has won much support from manufacturing countries. In addition, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is developing new protocols to the Convention. Meanwhile work continues to try to deal with the approximately 110 million land-mines that have already been laid. This is an issue that must continue to receive priority attention. I agree with the view that the Register of Conventional Arms is important in these endeavours. In the wider context, it is essential that the Register be developed into a universal and non-discriminatory mechanism.

Progress since 1992 in the area of weapons of mass destruction and major weapons systems must be followed by parallel progress in conventional arms, particularly with respect to light weapons. It will take a long time to find effective solutions'. I believe strongly that the search should begin now, and I intend to play my full part in this effort.

E. Sanctions

Under Article 41 of the Charter, the Security Council may call upon Member States to apply measures not involving the use of armed force in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such measures are commonly referred to as sanctions. This legal basis is recalled in order to underline that the purpose of sanctions is to modify the behaviour of a party that is threatening international peace and security and not to punish or otherwise exact retribution.

The Security Council's greatly increased use of this instrument has brought to light a number of difficulties, relating especially to the objectives of sanctions, the monitoring of their application and impact, and their unintended effects.

The objectives for which specific sanctions regimes were imposed have not always been clearly defined. Indeed they sometimes seem to change over time. This combination of imprecision and mutability makes it difficult for the Security Council to agree on when the objectives can be considered to have been achieved and sanctions can be lifted. While recognising that the Council is a political body rather than a judicial organ, it is of great importance that when it decides to impose sanctions it should at the same time define objective criteria for determining that their purpose has-been achieved. If general support for the use of sanctions as an effective instrument is to be maintained, care should be taken to avoid giving the impression that the purpose

of imposing sanctions is punishment rather than the modification of political behaviour or that criteria are being changed in order to serve purposes other than those which motivated the original decision to impose sanctions.

Experience has been gained by the United Nations of how to monitor the application of sanctions and of the part regional organisations can in some cases play in this respect. However, the task is complicated by the reluctance of Governments, for reasons of sovereignty or economic self-interest, to accept the deployment of international monitors or the international investigation of alleged violations by themselves or their nationals. Measuring the impact of sanctions is even more difficult because of the inherent complexity of such measurement and because of restrictions on access to the target country.

Sanctions, as is generally recognized, are a blunt instrument. They raise the ethical question of whether suffering inflicted on vulnerable groups in the target country is a legitimate means of exerting pressure on political leaders whose behaviour is unlikely to be affected by the plight of their subjects Sanctions also always have unintended or unwanted effects. They can complicate the work of humanitarian agencies by denying them certain categories of supplies and by obliging them to go through arduous procedures to obtain the necessary exemptions. They can conflict with the development objectives of the Organisation and do long-term damage to the productive capacity of the target country. They can have a severe effect on other countries that are neighbours or major economic partners of the target country. They can also defeat their own purpose by provoking a patriotic response against the international community, symbolized by the United Nations, and by rallying the population behind the leaders whose behaviour the sanctions are intended to modify.

To state these ethical and practical considerations is not to call in question the need for sanctions in certain cases, but it illustrates the need to consider ways of alleviating the effects described. Two possibilities are proposed for Member States' consideration.

The first is to ensure that, whenever sanctions are imposed, provision is made to facilitate the work of humanitarian agencies, work that will be all the more needed as a result of the impact of sanctions on vulnerable groups. It is necessary, for instance, to avoid banning imports that are required by local health industries and to devise a fast track for the processing of applications for exemptions for humanitarian activities.

Secondly, there is an urgent need for action to respond to the expectations raised by Article 50 of the Charter Sanctions are a measure taken collectively by the United Nations to maintain or restore international peace and security. The costs involved in their application, like other such costs (e.g. for peacemaking and peace-keeping activities), should be borne equitably by all Member States and not exclusively by the few who have the misfortune to be neighbours or major economic partners of the target country.

In *An Agenda for Peace* I proposed that States suffering collateral damage from the sanctions regimes should be entitled not only to consult the Security Council but also to have a realistic possibility of having their difficulties addressed. For that purpose I recommended that the Security Council devise a set of measures involving the international financial institutions and other components of the United Nations system that could be put in place to address the problem. In response, the Council asked me to seek the views of the heads of the international financial institutions. In their replies, the latter acknowledged the collateral effects of sanctions and expressed the desire to help countries in such situations, but they proposed that this should be done under existing mandates for the support of countries facing negative external shocks and consequent balance-of-payment difficulties. They did not agree that special provisions should be made.

75. In order to address all the above problems, I should like to go beyond the recommendation I made in 1992 and suggest the establishment of a mechanism to carry out the following five functions:

(a) To assess, at the request of the Security Council and before sanctions are imposed, their potential impact on the target country and on third countries;

(b) To monitor application of the sanctions;

(c) To measure their effects in order to enable the Security Council to fine-tune them with a view to maximising their political impact and minimising collateral damage;

(d) To ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable groups;

(e) To explore ways of assisting Member States that are suffering collateral damage and to evaluate claims submitted by such States under Article 50.

Since the purpose of this mechanism would be to assist the Security Council, it would have to be located in the United Nations Secretariat.

However, it should be empowered to utilize the expertise available throughout the United Nations system, in particular that of the Bretton Woods institutions. Member States will have to give the proposal their political support both at the United Nations and in the intergovernmental bodies of the agencies concerned if it is to be implemented effectively.

E. Enforcement action

One of the achievements of the Charter of the United Nations was to empower the Organisation to take enforcement action against those responsible for threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression. However, neither the Security Council nor the Secretary-General at present has the capacity to deploy, direct, command and control operations for this purpose, except perhaps on a very limited scale. I believe that it is desirable in the long term that the United Nations develop such a capacity, but it would be folly to[1] attempt to do so at the present time when the Organisation is resource-starved and hard pressed to handle the less demanding peacemaking and peace-keeping responsibilities entrusted to it.

In 1950, the Security Council authorized a group of willing Member States to undertake enforcement action in the Korean peninsula. It did so again in 1990 in response to aggression against Kuwait. More recently, the Council has authorized groups of Member States to undertake enforcement action, if necessary, to create conditions for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia and Rwanda and to facilitate the restoration of democracy in Haiti.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Security Council has authorized Member States, acting nationally or through regional arrangements, to use force to ensure compliance with its ban on military flights in that country's air space, to support the United Nations forces in the former Yugoslavia in the performance of their mandate, including defence of personnel who may be under attack, and to deter attacks against the safe areas. The Member States concerned decided to entrust those tasks to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Much effort has been required between the Secretariat and NATO to work out procedures for the coordination of this unprecedented collaboration. This is not surprising given the two organisations' very different mandates and approaches to the maintenance of peace and security. Of greater concern, as already mentioned, are the consequences of using force, other than for self-defence, in a peace-keeping context.

The experience of the last few years has demonstrated both the value that can be gained and the difficulties that can arise when the Security Council entrusts enforcement tasks to groups of Member States. On the positive side, this arrangement provides the Organisation with an enforcement capacity it would not otherwise have and is greatly preferable to the unilateral use of force by Member States without reference to the United Nations. On the other hand, the arrangement can have a negative impact on the Organisation's stature and credibility. There is also the danger that the States concerned may claim international legitimacy and approval for forceful actions that were not in fact envisaged by the Security Council when it gave its authorisation to them. Member States so authorized have in recent operations reported more fully and more regularly to the Security Council about their activities.

IV. Coordination

Just as the United Nations does not claim a monopoly of the instruments discussed above, neither can it alone apply them. All the efforts of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretary-General to control and resolve conflicts need the cooperation and support of other players on the international stage: the Governments that constitute the United Nations membership, regional and non-governmental organisations, and the various funds, programmes, offices and agencies of the United Nations system itself. If United Nations efforts are to succeed, the roles of the various players need to be carefully coordinated in an integrated approach to human security.

Governments are central to all the activities discussed in the present position paper. It is they who authorize the activities and finance them. It is they who provide directly the vast majority of the personnel required, as well as most of the equipment. It is they who set the policies of the specialized agencies of the United Nations system and of the regional organisations. It is they whose continuing support, and, as necessary, intervention with the parties, is essential if the Secretary-General is to succeed in carrying out the mandates entrusted to him. It is they who are parties, or at least one of the parties, to each conflict the United Nations is trying to control and resolve.

A new trend in recent years has been the establishment of informal groups of Member States created on an ad hoc basis to support the Secretary-General in the discharge of peacemaking and peace-keeping mandates entrusted to him. They are normally referred to as "Friends

of the Secretary-General for...". They have no formal mandate from the General Assembly or the Security Council and comprise States with a particular interest in the conflict in question. They have material and diplomatic resources that can be used to support the Secretary-General's efforts. Their value to him is as a sounding-board, as a source of ideas and comment and as a diplomatic instrument for bringing influence to bear on the parties.

This arrangement has been of value in a number of instances. It is nevertheless necessary to maintain a clear understanding of who is responsible for what. The Secretary-General has the mandate from the relevant intergovernmental body and must remain in the lead. The members of the "Friends" group have agreed to support the Secretary-General at his request. If they take initiatives not requested by the Secretary-General, there is a risk of duplication or overlapping of efforts, which can be exploited by recalcitrant parties. Such initiatives can also raise questions in the intergovernmental body that expects the Secretary-General to retain responsibility for the mandate entrusted to him and to report to that body on his implementation of it.

As for regional organisations, Chapter VIII of the Charter defines the role they can play in the maintenance of peace and security. They have much to contribute. Since the Security Council Summit, the United Nations has extended considerably its experience of working with regional organisations in this field. On 1 August 1994, I convened a meeting in New York of the heads of a number of such organisations with which the United Nations had recently cooperated on the ground in peacemaking and peace-keeping. The meeting permitted a useful exchange of views and it is my intention to hold further meetings of this kind.

Cooperation between the United Nations and regional organisations takes a number of forms. At least five can be identified:

(a) *Consultation:* this has been well-established for some time. In some cases it is governed by formal agreements and reports are made to the General Assembly; in other cases it is less formal. The purpose is to exchange views on conflicts that both the United Nations and the regional organisation may be trying to solve;

(b) *Diplomatic support:* the regional organisation participates in the peacemaking activities of the United Nations and supports them by diplomatic initiatives (in a manner analogous to groups

of "Friends" as described above) and/or by providing technical input, as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) does, for instance, on constitutional issues relating to Abkhazia. In the same way, the United Nations can support the regional organisation in its efforts (as it does for OSCE over Nagorny Karabakh);

(c) *Operational support:* the most developed example is the provision by NATO of air power to support the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia. For its part, the United Nations can provide technical advice to regional organisations that undertake peace-keeping operations of their own;

(d) *Co-deployment:* United Nations field missions have been deployed in conjunction with the Economic, Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia and with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Georgia. If those experiments succeed, they may herald a new division of labour between the United Nations and regional organisations, under which the regional organisation carries the main burden but a small United Nations operation supports it and verifies that it is functioning in a manner consistent with positions adopted by the Security Council. The political, operational and financial aspects of the arrangement give rise to questions of some delicacy. Member States may wish at some stage to make an assessment, in the light of experience in Liberia and Georgia, of how this model might be followed in the future;

(e) *Joint operations:* the example is the United Nations Mission in Haiti, the staffing, direction and financing of which are shared between the United Nations and the Organisation of American States (OAS). This arrangement has worked, and it too is a possible model for the future that will need careful assessment.

The capacity of regional organisations for peacemaking and peace-keeping varies considerably. None of them has yet developed a capacity which matches that of the United Nations, though some have accumulated important experience in the field and others are developing rapidly. The United Nations is ready to help them in this respect when requested to do so and when resources permit. Given their varied capacity, the differences in their structures, mandates and decision-making processes and the variety of forms that cooperation with the United Nations is already taking, it would not be appropriate

to try/to establish a universal model for their relationship with the United Nations. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify certain principles on which it should be based.

Such principles include:

(a)   Agreed mechanisms for consultation should be established, but need not be formal;

(b)   The primacy of the United Nations, as set out in the Charter, must be respected. In particular, regional organisations should not enter into arrangements that assume a level of United Nations support not yet submitted to or approved by its Member States. This is an area where close and early consultation is of great importance;

(c)   The division of labour must be clearly defined and agreed in order to avoid overlap and institutional rivalry where the United Nations and a regional organisation are both working on the same conflict. In such cases it is also particularly important to avoid a multiplicity of mediators;

(d)   Consistency by members of regional organisations who are also Member States of the United Nations is needed in dealing with a common problem of interest to both organisations, for example, standards for peace-keeping operations.

Non-governmental organisations also play an important role in all United Nations activities discussed in the present paper. To date, 1,003 non-governmental organisations have been granted consultative status with the United Nations and many of them have accredited representatives at United Nations Headquarters in New York and/or the United Nations Office at Geneva. The changed nature of United Nations (operations in the field has brought non-governmental organisations/into a closer relationship with the United Nations, especially in the/provision of humanitarian relief in conflict situations and in post-conflict peace-building. It has been necessary to devise procedures that do not compromise their non-governmental status but do ensure that their efforts are properly coordinated with those of the United Nations and its programmes, funds, offices and agencies. Non-governmental organisations have also had great success in mobilising public support and funds for humanitarian relief in countries affected by international or domestic conflict.

Within the United Nations system there are three levels at which coordination is required: within the United Nations Secretariat;

between United Nations Headquarters and the head offices of other funds, programmes, offices and agencies of the United Nations system; and in the field.

The multifunctional nature of both peace-keeping and peace-building has made it necessary to improve coordination within the Secretariat, so that the relevant departments function as an integrated whole under my authority and control. Proposals the Secretary-General makes to the General Assembly or the Security Council on peace and security issues need to be based on coordinated inputs from the Departments of Political Affairs, Peace-keeping Operations, Humanitarian Affairs and Administration and Management and others. Guidance to the field must similarly be coordinated, in order to ensure that chiefs of missions do not receive conflicting instructions from different authorities within the Secretariat.

In an international bureaucracy interdepartmental cooperation and coordination come even less naturally than they do in a national environment. It has required some effort to ensure that the above objectives are met. I have entrusted the main responsibility in this regard to my Task Force on United Nations Operations and to interdepartmental groups at the working level on each major conflict where the organisation is playing a peacemaking or peace-keeping role.

Improved coordination is equally necessary within the United Nations system as a whole. The responsibilities involved in multifunctional peace-keeping operations and in peace-building transcend the competence and expertise of any one department, programme, fund, office or agency of the United Nations. Short-term programmes are needed for ceasefires, demobilisation, humanitarian relief and refugee return; but it is the longer-term programmes that help rebuild societies and put them back on the path of development. Short-term and long-term programmes need to be planned and implemented in a coordinated way if they are to contribute to the consolidation of peace and development. The mechanism for ensuring a more effective and equitable application of sanctions, which I have recommended earlier in the present position paper, will equally require close coordination between a large number of players on the United Nations stage.

Such coordination has to date proved difficult to achieve. Each of the agencies concerned has its own intergovernmental legislative body and its own mandate. In the past, there also has been insufficient

interaction, in both directions, between those responsible in the Secretariat for designing and implementing peacemaking, peace-keeping and peace-building activities and the international financial institutions, who often have an all-important say in making sure that the necessary resources are available.

As regards coordination in the field, the current practice when a peace-keeping operation is deployed is to entrust this task to a special representative of the Secretary-General. Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique are successful examples, not least because of the cooperation extended to my Special Representatives, by the various other components of the United Nations system.

For my part, I shall maintain my efforts in the Administrative Committee on Coordination and in my bilateral relations with the executive heads of the various funds, programmes, offices and agencies to achieve better coordination within the United Nations system in the context of peace and security. Governments of Member States can support those efforts. Many of the problems of coordination arise from the mandates decreed for the agencies by discrete intergovernmental bodies. As such, they defy the capacity for inter-Secretariat coordination. I accordingly recommend that Governments instruct their representatives in the various intergovernmental bodies to ensure that proper coordination is recognized to be an essential condition for the Organisation's success and that it is not made hostage to inter-institutional rivalry and competition.

V. Financial Resources

None of the instruments discussed in the present paper can be used unless Governments provide the necessary financial resources. There is no other source of funds. The failure of Member States to pay their assessed contributions for activities they themselves have voted into being makes it impossible to carry out those activities to the standard expected. It also calls in question the credibility of those who have willed the ends but rot the means and who then criticize the United Nations for its failures. On 12 October 1994, I put to the Member States a package of proposals, ideas and questions on finance and budgetary procedures that I believe can contribute to a solution (UN document A/49/P V.28).

The financial crisis is particularly debilitating as regards peace-keeping. The shortage of funds, in particular for reconnaissance and planning, for the start-up of operations and for the recruitment and

training of personnel imposes severe constraints on the Organisation's ability to deploy, with the desired speed, newly approved operations. Peace-keeping is also afflicted by Member States' difficulties in providing troops, police and equipment on the scale required by the current volume of peace-keeping activity.

Meanwhile, there is continuing damage to the credibility of the Security Council and of the Organisation as a whole when the Council adopts decisions that cannot be carried out because the necessary troops are not forthcoming. The continuing problems with regard to the safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the expansion of UNAMIR in response to genocide in Rwanda are cases in point. In the future it would be advisable to establish the availability of the necessary troops and equipment before it is decided to create a new peace-keeping operation or assign a new task to an existing one.

Peace-building is another activity that, is critically dependent on Member States' readiness to make the necessary resources available. It can be a long-term process and expensive - except in comparison with the cost of peacemaking and peace-keeping if the conflict should recur. One lesson learned in recent years is that, in putting together the peace-building elements in a comprehensive settlement plan, the United Nations should consult the international financial institutions in good time to ensure that the cost of implementing the plan is taken into account in the design of the economic plans of the Government concerned. The problems in this area are aggravated by many donors' reluctance to finance crucial elements such as the conversion of guerrilla movements into political parties, the creation of new police forces or the provision of credit for the purchase of land in "arms for land" programmes.

Compensation to Member States affected by sanctions on their neighbours or economic partners will also be possible only if the richer Member States recognize both the moral argument that such countries should not be expected to bear alone costs resulting from action collectively decided upon by the international community and the practical argument that such compensation is necessary to encourage those States to cooperate in applying decisions taken by the Security Council. I recognize that the sums involved will be large but I am convinced that they must be made available if the Council is to continue to rely on sanctions.

VI. Conclusion

The present position paper, submitted to the Member States at the opening of the United Nations Fiftieth Anniversary year, is intended to serve as a contribution to the continuing campaign to strengthen a common capacity to deal with threats to peace and security.

The times call for thinking afresh, for striving together and for creating new ways to overcome crises. This is because the different world that emerged when the cold war ceased is still a world not fully understood. The changed face of conflict today requires us to be perceptive, adaptive, creative and courageous, and to address simultaneously the immediate as well as the root causes of conflict, which all too often lie in the absence of economic opportunities and social inequities. Perhaps above all it requires a deeper commitment to cooperation and true multilateralism than humanity has ever achieved before.

This is why the pages of the present paper reiterate the need for hard decisions. As understanding grows of the challenges to peace and security, hard decisions, if postponed will appear in retrospect as having been relatively easy when measured against the magnitude of tomorrow's troubles.

There is no reason for frustration or pessimism. More progress has been made in the past few years towards using the United Nations as it was designed to be used than many could ever have predicted. The call to decision should be a call to confidence and courage.

62

An Agenda for Peace

**Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping
Report of the Secretary-General
pursuant to the statement adopted by
the Summit Meeting of the Security Council
on 31 January 1992 A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992**

Introduction

In its statement of 31 January 1992, adopted at the conclusion of the first meeting held by the Security Council at the level of Heads of State and Government, I was invited to prepare, for circulation to the Members of the United Nations by 1 July 1992, an "analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping."

The United Nations is a gathering of sovereign States and what it can do depends on the common ground that they create between them. The adversarial decades of the cold war made the original promise of the Organisation impossible to fulfil. The January 1992 Summit therefore represented an unprecedented recommitment, at the highest political level, to the Purposes and Principles of the Charter.

In these past months a conviction has grown, among nations large and small, that an opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of the Charter—a United Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and of promoting, in the words of the Charter, "social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom". This opportunity must not

be squandered. The Organisation must never again be crippled as it was in the era that has now passed.

I welcome the invitation of the Security Council, early in my tenure as Secretary-General, to prepare this report. It draws upon ideas and proposals transmitted to me by Governments, regional agencies, non-governmental organisations, and institutions and individuals from many countries. I am grateful for these, even as I emphasize that the responsibility for this report is my own.

The sources of conflict and war are pervasive and deep. To reach them will require our utmost effort to enhance respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to promote sustainable economic and social development for wider prosperity, to alleviate distress and to curtail the existence and use of massively destructive weapons. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, the largest summit ever held, has just met at Rio de Janeiro. In 1994, Population and Development will be addressed. In 1995 the World Conference on Women will take place, and a World Summit for Social Development has been proposed. Throughout my term as Secretary-General, I shall be addressing all these great issues. I bear them all in mind as, in the present report, I turn to the problems that the Council has specifically requested I consider: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping—to which I have added a closely related concept, post-conflict peace-building.

The manifest desire of the membership to work together is a new source of strength in our common endeavour. Success is far from certain, however. While my report deals with ways to improve the Organisation's capacity to pursue and preserve peace, it is crucial for all Member States to bear in mind that the search for improved mechanisms and techniques will be of little significance unless this new spirit of commonality is propelled by the will to take the hard decisions demanded by this time of opportunity.

It is therefore with a sense of moment, and with gratitude, that I present this report to the Members of the United Nations.

I. The Changing Context

In the course of the past few years the immense ideological barrier that for decades gave rise to distrust and hostility - and the terrible tools of destruction that were their inseparable companions - has collapsed. Even as the issues between States north and south grow

more acute, and call for attention at the highest levels of government, the improvement in relations between States east and west affords new possibilities, some already realized, to meet successfully threats to common security.

Authoritarian regimes have given way to more democratic forces and responsive Governments. The form, scope and intensity of these processes differ from Latin America to Africa to Europe to Asia, but they are sufficiently similar to indicate a global phenomenon. Parallel to these political changes, many States are seeking more open forms of economic policy, creating a world wide sense of dynamism and movement.

To the hundreds of millions who gained their independence in the surge of decolonisation following the creation of the United Nations, have been added millions more who have recently gained freedom. Once again new States are taking their seats in the General Assembly. Their arrival reconfirms the importance and indispensability of the sovereign State as the fundamental entity of the international community

We have entered a time of global transition marked by uniquely contradictory trends. Regional and continental associations of States are evolving ways to deepen cooperation and ease some of the contentious characteristics of sovereign and nationalistic rivalries. National boundaries are blurred by advanced communications and global commerce, and by the decisions of States to yield some sovereign prerogatives to larger, common political associations. At the same time, however, fierce new assertions of nationalism and sovereignty spring up, and the cohesion of States is threatened by brutal ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife. Social peace is challenged on the one hand by new assertions of discrimination and exclusion and, on the other, by acts of terrorism seeking to undermine evolution and change through democratic means.

The concept of peace is easy to grasp that of international security is more complex, for a pattern of contradictions has arisen here as well. As major nuclear Powers have begun to negotiate arms reduction agreements, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction threatens to increase and conventional arms continue to be amassed in many parts of the world. As racism becomes recognized for the destructive force it is and as apartheid is being dismantled, new racial tensions are rising and finding expression in violence. Technological advances

are altering the nature and the expectation of life all over the globe. The revolution in communications has united the world in awareness, in aspiration and in greater solidarity against injustice. But progress also brings new risks for stability: ecological damage, disruption of family and community life, greater intrusion into the lives and rights of individuals.

This new dimension of insecurity must not be allowed to obscure the continuing and devastating problems of unchecked population growth, crushing debt burdens, barriers to trade, drugs and the growing disparity between rich and poor. Poverty, disease, famine, oppression and despair abound, joining to produce 17 million refugees, 20 million displaced persons and massive migrations of peoples within and beyond national borders. These are both sources and consequences of conflict that require the ceaseless attention and the highest priority in the efforts of the United Nations. A porous ozone shield could pose a greater threat to an exposed population than a hostile army. Drought and disease can decimate no less mercilessly than the weapons of war. So at this moment of renewed opportunity, the efforts of the Organisation to build peace, stability and security must encompass matters beyond military threats in order to break the fetters of strife and warfare that have characterized the past. But armed conflicts today, as they have throughout history, continue to bring fear and horror to humanity, requiring our urgent involvement to try to prevent, contain and bring them to an end.

Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, over 100 major conflicts around the world have left some 20 million dead. The United Nations was rendered powerless to deal with many of these crises because of the vetoes—279 of them–cast in the Security Council, which were a vivid expression of the divisions of that period.

With the end of the cold war there have been no such vetoes since 31 May 1990, and demands on the United Nations have surged. Its security arm, once disabled by circumstances it was not created or equipped to control, has emerged as a central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and for the preservation of peace. Our aims must be:

- To seek to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict, and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before violence results;
- Where conflict erupts, to engage in peacemaking aimed at resolving the issues that have led to conflict;

- Through peace-keeping, to work to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers;

- To stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts: rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war;

- And in the largest sense, to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression. It is possible to discern an increasingly common moral perception that spans the world's nations and peoples, and which is finding expression in international laws, many owing their genesis to the work of this Organisation.

This wider mission for the world Organisation will demand the concerted attention and effort of individual States, of regional and non-governmental organisations and of all of the United Nations system, with each of the principal organs functioning in the balance and harmony that the Charter requires. The Security Council has been assigned by all Member States the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter. In its broadest sense this responsibility must be shared by the General Assembly and by all the functional elements of the world organisation. Bach has a special and indispensable role to play in an integrated approach to human security. The Secretary-General's contribution rests on the pattern of trust and cooperation established between him and the deliberative organs of the United Nations.

The foundation-stone of this work is and must remain the State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress. The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world. Commerce, communications and environmental matters transcend administrative borders; but inside those borders is where individuals carry out the first order of their economic, political and social lives. The United Nations has not closed its door. Yet, if every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and economic well-being for all would become ever more difficult to achieve.

One requirement for solutions to these problems lies in commitment to human rights with a special sensitivity to those of minorities, whether ethnic, religious, social or linguistic. The League of Nations provided a machinery for the international protection of minorities. The General Assembly soon will have before it a declaration on the rights of minorities. That instrument, together with the increasingly effective machinery of the United Nations dealing with human rights, should enhance the situation of minorities as well as the stability of States.

Globalism and nationalism need not be viewed as opposing trends, doomed to spur each other on to extremes of reaction. The healthy globalisation of contemporary life requires in the first instance solid identities and fundamental freedoms. The sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of States within the established international system, and the principle of self-determination for peoples, both of great value and importance, must not be permitted to work against each other in the period ahead. Respect for democratic principles at all levels of social existence is crucial: in communities, within States and within the community of States. Our constant duty should be to maintain the integrity of each while finding a balanced design for all.

II. Definitions

The terms preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping are integrally related and as used in this report are defined as follows:

- Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.

- Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.

- Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.

The present report in addition will address the critically related concept of post-conflict peace-building action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to

avoid a relapse into conflict. Preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; peacemaking and peace-keeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peace-building, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples.

These four areas for action, taken together, and carried out with the backing of all Members, offer a coherent contribution towards securing peace in the spirit of the Charter. The United Nations has extensive experience not only in these fields, but in the wider realm of work for peace in which these four fields are set. Initiatives on decolonisation, on the environment and sustainable development, on population, on the eradication of disease, on disarmament and on the growth of international law - these and many others have contributed immeasurably to the foundations for a peaceful world. The world has often been rent by conflict and plagued by massive human suffering and deprivation. Yet, it would have been far more so without the continuing efforts of the United Nations. This wide experience must be taken into account in assessing the potential of the United Nations in maintaining international security not only in its traditional sense, but in the new dimensions presented by the era ahead.

III. Preventive Diplomacy

The most desirable and efficient employment of diplomacy is to ease tensions before they result in conflict or, if conflict breaks out, to act swiftly to contain it and resolve its underlying causes. Preventive diplomacy may be performed by the Secretary-General personally/or through senior staff or specialized agencies and programmes, By the Security Council or the General Assembly, and by regional organisations in cooperation with the United Nations. Preventive diplomacy requires measures to create confidence; it needs early warning based on information gathering and informal or formal fact-finding; it may also involve preventive deployment and, in some situations, demilitarized zones.

Measures to build confidence

Mutual confidence and good faith are essential to reducing the likelihood of conflict between States. Many such measures are available to Governments that have the will to employ them. Systematic exchange of military missions, formation of regional or subregional risk reduction centres, arrangements for the free flow of information, including the

monitoring of regional arms agreements, are examples. I ask all regional organisations to consider what further confidence-building measures might be applied in their areas and to inform the United Nations of the results. I will undertake periodic consultations on confidence-building measures with parties to potential, current or past disputes and with regional organisations, offering such advisory assistance as the Secretariat can provide.

Fact-finding

Preventive steps must be based upon timely and accurate knowledge of the facts. Beyond this, an understanding of developments and global trends, based on sound analysis, is required. And the willingness to take appropriate preventive action is essential. Given the economic and social roots of many potential conflicts, the information needed by the United Nations now must encompass economic and social trends as well as political developments that may lead to dangerous tensions.

(a) An increased resort to fact-finding is needed, in accordance with the Charter, initiated either by the Secretary-General, to enable him to meet his responsibilities under the Charter, including Article 99, or by the Security Council or the General Assembly. Various forms may be employed selectively as the situation requires. A request by a State for the sending of a United Nations fact-finding mission to its territory should be considered without undue delay.

(b) Contacts with the Governments of Member States can provide the Secretary-General with detailed information on issues of concern. 1 ask that all Member States be ready to provide the information needed for effective preventive diplomacy. I will supplement my own contacts by regularly sending senior officials on missions for consultations in capitals or other locations. Such contacts are essential to gain insight into a situation and to assess its potential ramifications.

(c) Formal fact-finding can be mandated by the Security Council or by the General Assembly, either of which may elect to send a mission under its immediate authority or may invite the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, including the designation of a special envoy. In addition to collecting information on which a decision for further action can be taken, such a mission can in some instances help to defuse a dispute

by its presence, indicating to the parties that the Organisation, and in particular the Security Council, is actively seized of the matter as a present or potential threat to international security.

(d) In exceptional circumstances the Council may meet away from Headquarters as the Charter provides, in order not only to inform itself directly, but also to bring the authority of the Organisation to bear on a given situation.

Early Warning

In recent years the United Nations system has been developing a valuable network of early warning systems concerning environmental threats, the risk of nuclear accident, natural disasters, mass movements of populations, the threat of famine and the spread of disease. There is a need, however, to strengthen arrangements in such a manner that information from these sources can be synthesized with political indicators to assess whether a threat to peace exists and to analyse what action might be taken by the United Nations to alleviate it. This is a process that will continue to require the close cooperation of the various specialized agencies and functional offices of the United Nations. The analyses and recommendations for preventive action that emerge will be made available by me, as appropriate, to the Security Council and other United Nations organs. I recommend in addition that the Security Council invite a reinvigorated and restructured Economic and Social Council to provide reports, in accordance with Article 65 of the Charter, on those economic and social developments that may, unless mitigated, threaten international peace and security.

Regional arrangements and organisations have an important role in early warning. I ask regional organisations that have not yet sought observer status at the United Nations to do so and to be linked, through appropriate arrangements, with the security mechanisms of this Organisation.

Preventive Deployment

United Nations operations in areas of crisis have generally been established after conflict has occurred. The time has come to plan for circumstances warranting preventive deployment, which could take place in a variety of instances and ways. For example, in conditions of national crisis there could be preventive deployment at the request of the Government or all parties concerned, or with their consent; in inter-State disputes such deployment could take place when two

countries feel that a United Nations presence on both sides of their border can discourage hostilities; furthermore, preventive deployment could take place when a country feels threatened and requests the deployment of an appropriate United Nations presence along its side of the border alone. In each situation, the mandate and composition of the United Nations presence would need to be carefully devised and be clear to all.

In conditions of crisis within a country, when the Government requests or all parties consent, preventive deployment could help in a number of ways to alleviate suffering and to limit or control violence. Humanitarian assistance, impartially provided, could be of critical importance; assistance in maintaining security, whether through military, police or civilian personnel, could save lives and develop conditions of safety in which negotiations can be held; the United Nations could also help in conciliation efforts if this should be the wish of the parties. In certain circumstances, the United Nations may well need to draw upon the specialized skills and resources of various parts of the United Nations system; such operations may also on occasion require the participation of non-governmental organisations.

In these situations of internal crisis the United Nations will need to respect the sovereignty of the State; to do otherwise would not be in accordance with the understanding of Member States in accepting the principles of the Chatter. The Organisation must remain mindful of the carefully negotiated balance of the guiding principles annexed to General Assembly resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991. Those guidelines stressed, *inter alia,* that humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality; that the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; and that, in this context, humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country and, in principle, on the basis of an appeal by that country. The guidelines also stressed the responsibility of States to take tare of the victims of emergencies occurring on their territory and the need for access to these requiring humanitarian assistance. In the light of these guidelines, a Government's request for United Nations involvement, or consent to it, would not be an infringement of that State's sovereignty or be contrary to Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter which refers to matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.

In inter-State disputes, when both parties agree, I recommend that if the Security Council concludes that the likelihood of hostilities

between neighbouring countries could be removed by the preventive deployment of a United Nations presence on the territory of each State, such action should be taken. The nature of the tasks to be performed would determine the composition of the United Nations presence.

In cases where one nation fears a cross-border attack, if the Security Council concludes that a United Nations presence on one side of the border, with the consent only of the requesting country, would serve to deter conflict, I recommend that preventive deployment take place. Here again, the specific nature of the situation would determine the mandate and the personnel required to fulfil it.

Demilitarized Zones

In the past, demilitarized zones have been established by agreement of the parties at the conclusion of a conflict. In addition to the deployment of United Nations personnel in such zones as part of peace-keeping operations, consideration should now be given to the usefulness of such zones as a form of preventive deployment, on both sides of a border, with the agreement of the two parties, as a means of separating potential belligerents, or on one side of the line, at the request of one party, for the purpose of removing any pretext for attack. Demilitarized zones would serve as symbols of the international community's concern that conflict be prevented.

IV. Peacemaking

Between the tasks of seeking to prevent conflict and keeping the peace lies the responsibility to try to bring hostile parties to agreement by peaceful means. Chapter VI of the Charter sets forth a comprehensive list of such means for the resolution of conflict. These have been amplified in various declarations adopted by the General Assembly, including the Manila Declaration of 1982 on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes and the 1988 Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten International peace and security and on the Role of the United Nations in this Field. They have also been the subject of various resolutions of the General Assembly, including resolution 44/21 of 15 November 1989 on enhancing international peace, security and international cooperation in all its aspects in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. The United Nations has had wide experience in/the application of these peaceful means. If conflicts have gone unresolved, it is not because techniques for peaceful settlement

were unknown or inadequate. The fault lies first in the lack of political will of parties to seek a solution to their differences through such means as are suggested in Chapter VI of the Charter, and second, in the lack of leverage at the disposal of a third party if this is the procedure chosen The indifference of the international community to a problem, or the margin-alisation of it, can also thwart the possibilities of solution. We must look primarily to these areas if we hope to enhance the capacity of the organisation for achieving peaceful settlements.

The present determination in the Security Council to resolve international disputes in the manner foreseen in the Charter has opened the way for a more active Council role. With greater unity has come leverage and persuasive power to lead hostile parties towards negotiations. I urge the Council to take full advantage of the provisions of the Charter under which it may recommend appropriate procedures or methods for dispute settlement and, if all the parties to a dispute so request, make recommendation's to the parties for a pacific settlement of the dispute.

The General Assembly, like the Security Council and the Secretary-General, also has an important role assigned to it under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. As a universal forum, its capacity to consider and recommend appropriate action must be recognized. To that end, it is essential to promote its utilisation by all Member States so as to bring greater influence to bear in pre-empting or containing situations which are likely to threaten international peace and security.

Mediation and negotiation can be undertaken by an individual designated by the Security Council, by the General Assembly or by the Secretary-General. There is a long history of the utilisation by the United Nations of distinguished statesmen to facilitate the processes of peace. They can bring a personal prestige that, in addition to their experience, can encourage the parties to enter serious negotiations. There is a wide willingness to serve in this capacity, from which I shall continue to benefit as the need arises. Frequently, it is the Secretary-General himself who undertakes the task. While the mediator's effectiveness is enhanced by strong and evident support from the Council, the General Assembly and the relevant Member States acting in their national capacity, the good offices of the Secretary-General may at times be employed most effectively when conducted independently of the deliberative bodies. Close and continuous consultation between the Secretary-General and the Security Council

is, however, essential to ensure full awareness of how the Council's influence can best be applied and to develop a common strategy for the peaceful settlement of specific disputes.

The World Court

The docket of the International Court of Justice has grown fuller but it remains an under-used resource for the peaceful adjudication of disputes. Greater reliance on the Court would be an important contribution to United Nations peacemaking. In this connection, I call attention to the power of the Security Council under Articles 36 and 37 of the Charter to recommend to Member States the submission of a dispute to the International Court of Justice, arbitration or other dispute-settlement mechanisms. I recommend that the Secretary-General be authorized, pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter, to take advantage of the advisory competence of the Court and that other United Nations organs that already enjoy such/authorisation turn to the Court more frequently for advisory opinions.

I recommend the following steps to reinforce the role of the International Court of Justice:

(a) All Member States should accept the general jurisdiction of the International Court under Article 36 of its Statute, without any reservation, before the end of the United Nations Decade of International Law in the year 2000. In instances where domestic structures prevent this, States should agree bilaterally or multilaterally to a comprehensive list of matters they are willing to submit to the Court and should withdraw their reservations to its jurisdiction in the dispute settlement clauses of multilateral treaties;

(b) When submission of a dispute to the full Court is not practical, the Chambers jurisdiction should be used;

(c) States should support the Trust Fund established to assist countries unable to afford the cost involved in bringing a dispute to the Court, and such countries should take full advantage of the Fund in order to resolve their disputes.

Amelioration through assistance

Peacemaking is at times facilitated by international action to ameliorate circumstances that have contributed to the dispute or conflict. If, for instance, assistance to displaced persons within a society is essential to a solution, then the United Nations should be able to

draw upon the resources of all agencies and programmes concerned. At present, there is no adequate mechanism in the United Nations through which the Security Council, the General Assembly or the Secretary-General can mobilize the resources needed for such positive leverage and engage the collective efforts of the United Nations system for the peaceful resolution of a conflict. I have raised this concept in the Administrative Committee on Coordination, which brings together the executive heads of United Nations agencies and programmes; we are exploring methods by which the inter-agency system can improve its contribution to the peaceful resolution of disputes.

Sanctions and special economic problems

In circumstances when peacemaking requires the imposition of sanctions under Article 41 of the Charter, it is important that States confronted with special economic problems not only have the right to consult the Security Council regarding such problems, as Article 50 provides, but also have a realistic possibility of having their difficulties addressed. I recommend that the Security Council devise a set of measures involving the financial institutions and other components of the United Nations system that can be put in place to insulate States from such difficulties. Such measures would be a matter of equity and a means of encouraging States to cooperate with decisions of the Council.

Use of military force

It is the essence of the concept of collective security as contained in the Charter that if peaceful means fail, the measures provided in Chapter VII should be used, on the decision of the Security Council, to maintain or restore international peace and security in the face of a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression". The Security Council has not so far made use of the most coercive of these measures the action by military force foreseen in Article 42. In the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, the Council chose to authorize Member States to take measures on its behalf. The Charter, however provides a detailed approach which now merits the attention of all Member States.

Under Article 42 of the Charter, the Security Council has the authority to take military action to maintain or restore international peace and security. While such action should only be taken when all peaceful means have failed, the option of taking it is essential to the credibility of the United Nations as a guarantor of international

security. This will require bringing into being, through negotiations, the special agreements foreseen in Article 43 of the Charter, whereby Member States undertake to make armed forces, assistance and facilities available to the Security Council for the purposes stated in Article 42, not only on an ad hoc basis but on a permanent basis. Under the political circumstances that now exist for the first time since the Charter was adopted, the long-standing obstacles to the conclusion of such special agreements should no longer prevail. The ready availability of armed forces on call could serve, in itself, as a means of deterring breaches of the peace since a potential aggressor would know that the Council had at its disposal a means of response. Forces under Article 43 may perhaps never be sufficiently large or well enough equipped to deal with a threat from a major army equipped with sophisticated weapons. They would be useful, however, in meeting any threat posed by a military force of a lesser order 1 recommend that the Security Council initiate negotiations in accordance with Article 43, supported by the Military Staff Committee, which may be augmented if necessary by others in accordance with Article 47, paragraph 2, of the Charter. It is my view that the role of the Military Staff Committee should be seen in the context of Chapter VII, and not that of the planning or conduct of peace-keeping operations.

Peace-enforcement units

The mission of forces under Article 43 would be to respond to outright aggression, imminent or actual. Such Forces are not likely to be available for some time to come. Ceasefires have often been agreed to but not complied with and the United Nations has sometimes been called upon to send forces to restore and maintain the ceasefire. This task can on occasion exceed the mission of peace-keeping forces and the expectations of peace-keeping force contributors. 1 recommend that the Council consider the utilisation of peace-enforcement units in clearly defined circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in advance. Such units from Member States would be available on call and would consist of troops that have volunteered for such service. They would have to be more heavily armed than peace-keeping forces and would need to undergo extensive preparatory training within their national forces. Deployment and operation of such forces would be under the authorisation of the Security Council and would, as in the case of peace-keeping forces, be under the command of the Secretary-General. I consider such peace-enforcement units to be warranted as a provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter. Such peace-

enforcement units should not be confused with the forces that may eventually be constituted under Article 43 to deal with acts of aggression or with the military personnel which Governments may agree to keep on stand-by for possible contribution to peace-keeping operations.

Just as diplomacy will continue across the span of all the activities dealt with in the present report, so there may not be a dividing line between peacemaking and peace-keeping. Peacemaking is often a prelude to peace-keeping—just as the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field may expand possibilities for the prevention of conflict, facilitate the work of peacemaking and in many cases serve as a prerequisite for peace-building.

V. Peace-keeping

Peace-keeping can rightly be called the invention of the United Nations. It has brought a degree of stability to numerous areas of tension around the world.

Increasing demands

Thirteen peace-keeping operations were established between the years 1945 and 1987; 13 others since then. An estimated 528,000 military, police and civilian personnel had served under the flag of the United Nations until January 1992. Over 800 of them from 43 countries have died in the service of the Organisation. The costs of these operations have aggregated some $8.3 billion till 1992. The unpaid arrears towards them stand at over $800 million, which represents a debt owed by the Organisation to the troop-contributing countries. Peace-keeping operations approved at present are estimated to cost close to $3 billion in the current 12-month period, while patterns of payment are unacceptably slow. Against this, global defence expenditures at the end of the last decade had approached $1 trillion a year, or $2 million per minute.

The contrast between the costs of United Nations peace-keeping and the costs of the alternative, war—between the demands of the Organisation and the means provided to meet them—would be farcical were the consequences not so damaging to global stability and to the credibility of the Organisation. At a time when nations and peoples increasingly are looking to the United Nations for assistance in keeping the peace - and holding it responsible when this cannot be so - fundamental decisions must be taken to enhance the capacity of the

Organisation in this innovative and productive exercise of its function. I am conscious that the present volume and unpredictability of peace-keeping assessments poses real problems for some Member States. For this reason, I strongly support proposals in some Member States for their peace-keeping contributions to be financed from defence, rather than foreign affairs, budgets and I recommend such action to others. I urge the General Assembly to encourage this approach.

The demands on the United Nations for peace-keeping, and peace-building, operations will in the coming years continue to challenge the capacity, the political and financial will and the creativity of the Secretariat and Member States. Like the Security Council, I welcome the increase and broadening of the tasks of peace-keeping operations.

New departures in peace-keeping

The nature of peace-keeping operations has evolved rapidly in recent years. The established principles and practices of peace-keeping have responded flexibly to new demands of recent years, and the basic conditions for success remain unchanged: a clear and practicable mandate; the cooperation of the parties in implementing that mandate; the continuing support of the Security Council; the readiness of Member States to contribute the military, police and civilian personnel, including specialists, required; effective United Nations command at Headquarters and in the field; and adequate financial and logistic support. As the international climate has changed and peace-keeping operations are increasingly fielded to help implement settlements that have been negotiated by peacemakers, a new array of demands and problems has emerged regarding logistics, equipment, personnel and finance, all of which could be corrected if Member States so wished and were ready to make the necessary resources available.

Personnel

Member States are keen to participate in peace-keeping, operations. Military observers and infantry are invariably available in the required numbers, but logistic units present a greater problem, as few armies can afford to spare such units for an extended period. Member States were requested in 1990 to state what military personnel they were in principle prepared to make available; few replied. I reiterate the request to all Member States to reply frankly and promptly. Stand-by arrangements should be confirmed, as appropriate, through exchanges of letters between the Secretariat and Member States concerning the

kind and number of skilled personnel they will be prepared to offer the United Nations as the needs of new operations arise.

Increasingly, peace-keeping requires that civilian political officers, human rights monitors, electoral officials, refugee and humanitarian aid specialists and police play as central a role as the military. Police personnel have proved increasingly difficult to obtain in the numbers required. I recommend that arrangements be reviewed and improved for training peace-keeping personnel - civilian, police, or military - using the varied capabilities of Member State Governments, of non-governmental organisations and the facilities of the Secretariat. As efforts go forward to include additional States as contributors, some Slates with considerable potential should focus on language training for police contingents which may serve with the organisation. As for the United Nations itself, special personnel procedures, including incentives, should be instituted to permit the rapid transfer of Secretariat staff members to service with peace-keeping operations The strength and capability of military staff serving in the Secretariat should be augmented to meet new and heavier requirements.

Logistics

Not all Governments can provide their battalions with the equipment they need for service abroad. While some equipment is provided by troop-contributing countries, a great deal has to come from the United Nations, including equipment to fill gaps in under-equipped national units. The United Nations has no standing stock of such equipment. Orders must be placed with manufacturers, which creates a number of difficulties. A pre-positioned stock of basic peace-keeping equipment should be established, so that at least some vehicles, communications equipment, generators, etc., would be immediately available at the start of an operation. Alternatively, Governments should commit themselves to keeping certain equipment, specified by the Secretary-General, on stand-by for immediate sale, loan or donation to the United Nations when required.

Member States in a position to do so should make air- and sea-lift capacity available to the United. Nations free of cost or at lower than commercial rates, as was the practice until recently.

VI. Post-conflict peace-building

Peacemaking and peace-keeping operations, to be truly successful, must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support

structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people. Through agreements ending civil strife, these may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.

In the aftermath of international war, post-conflict peace-building may take the form of concrete cooperative projects which link two or more countries in a mutually beneficial undertaking that can not only contribute to economic and social development but also enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to peace. I have in mind, for example, projects that bring States together to develop agriculture, improve transportation or utilize resources such as water or electricity that they need to share, or joint programmes through which barriers between nations are brought down by means of freer travel, cultural exchanges and mutually beneficial youth and educational projects. Reducing hostile perceptions through educational exchanges and curriculum reform may be essential to forestall a re-emergence of cultural and national tensions which could spark renewed hostilities.

In surveying the range of efforts for peace, the concept of peace-building as the construction of a new environment should be viewed as the counterpart of preventive diplomacy, which seeks to avoid the breakdown of peaceful conditions. When conflict breaks out, mutually reinforcing efforts at peacemaking and peace-keeping come into play. Once these have achieved their objectives, only sustained, cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation. Preventive diplomacy is to avoid a crisis; post-conflict peace-building is to prevent a recurrence.

Increasingly it is evident that peace-building after civil or international strife must address the serious problem of land mines, many tens of millions of which remain scattered in present or former combat zones. De-mining should be emphasized in the terms of reference of peace-keeping operations and is crucially important in the restoration of activity when peace-building is under way: agriculture cannot be revived without de-mining and the restoration of transport may require the laying of hard surface roads to prevent re-mining. In such instances, the link becomes evident between peace-keeping and

peace-building. Just as demilitarized zones may serve the cause of preventive diplomacy and preventive deployment to avoid conflict, so may demilitarisation assist in keeping the peace or in post-conflict peace-building, as a measure for heightening the sense of security and encouraging the parties to turn their energies to the work of peaceful restoration of their societies.

There is a new requirement for technical assistance which the United Nations has an obligation to develop and provide when requested: support for the transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities, and for the strengthening of new democratic institutions. The authority of the United Nations system to act in this field would rest on the consensus that social peace is as important as strategic or political peace. There is an obvious connection between democratic practices—such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order. These elements of good governance need to be promoted at all levels of international and national political communities.

VII. Cooperation with Regional Arrangements and Organisations

The Covenant of the League of Nations, in its Article 21, noted the validity of regional understandings for securing the maintenance of peace. The Charter devotes Chapter VIII to regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action and consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The cold war impaired the proper use of Chapter VIII and indeed, in that era, regional arrangements worked on occasion against resolving disputes in the manner foreseen in the Charter.

The Charter deliberately provides no precise definition of regional arrangements and agencies, thus allowing useful flexibility for undertakings by a group of States to deal with a matter appropriate for regional action which also could contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. Such associations or entities could include treaty-based organisations, whether created before or after the founding of the United Nations, regional organisations for mutual security and defence, organisations for general regional development or for cooperation on a particular economic topic or function, and groups created to deal with a specific political, economic or social issue of current concern.

In this regard, the United Nations has recently encouraged a rich variety of complementary efforts. Just as no two regions or situations are the same, so the design of cooperative work and its division of labour must adapt to the realities of each case with flexibility and creativity. In Africa, three different regional groups - the Organisation of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference - joined efforts with the United Nations regarding Somalia. In the Asian context, the Association of South-East Asian Nations and individual States from several regions were brought together with the parties to the Cambodian conflict at an international conference in Paris, to work with the United Nations. For El Salvador, a unique arrangement—"The Friends of the Secretary-General"—contributed to agreements reached through the mediation of the Secretary-General. The end of the war in Nicaragua involved a highly complex effort which was initiated by leaders of the region and conducted by individual States, groups of States and the Organisation of American States. Efforts undertaken by the European Community and its member States, with the support of Status participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, have been of central importance in dealing with the crisis in the Balkans and neighbouring areas.

In the past, regional arrangements often were created because of the absence of a universal system for collective security; thus their activities could on occasion work at cross-purposes with the sense of solidarity required for the effectiveness of the world Organisation. But in this new era of opportunity, regional arrangements or agencies can render great service if their activities are undertaken in a manner consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, and if their relationship with the United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, is governed by Chapter VIII.

It is not the purpose of the present report to set forth any formal pattern of relationship between regional organisations and the United Nations, or to call for any specific division of labour. What is clear, however, is that regional arrangements or agencies in many cases possess a potential that should be utilized in serving the functions covered in this report: preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, peacemaking and post-conflict peace-building. Under the Charter, the Security Council has and will continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, but regional action as a matter of decentralisation, delegation and cooperation with United

Nations efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratisation in international affairs.

Regional arrangements and agencies have not in recent decades been considered in this light, even when originally designed in part for a role in maintaining' or restoring peace within their regions of the world. Today a new sense exists that they have contributions to make. Consultations between the United Nations and regional arrangements or agencies could do much to build international consensus on the nature of a problem and the measures required to address it. Regional organisations participating in complementary efforts with the United Nations in joint undertakings would encourage States outside the region to act supportively. And should the Security Council choose specifically to authorize a regional arrangement or organisation to take the lead in addressing a crisis within its region, it could serve to lend the weight of the United Nations to the validity of the regional effort. Carried forward in the spirit of the Charter, and as envisioned in Chapter VIII, the approach outlined here could strengthen a general sense that democratisation is being encouraged at all levels in the task of maintaining international peace and security, it being essential to continue to recognize that the primary responsibility will continue to reside in the Security Council.

VIII. Safety of Personnel

When United Nations personnel are deployed in conditions of strife whether for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping, peace-building or humanitarian purposes, the need arises to ensure their safety. There has been an unconscionable increase in the number of fatalities. Following the conclusion of a ceasefire and in order to prevent further outbreaks of violence, United Nations guards were called upon to assist in volatile conditions in Iraq. Their presence afforded a measure of security to United Nations personnel and supplies and, in addition; introduced an element of reassurance and stability that helped to prevent renewed conflict. Depending upon the nature of the situation, different configurations and compositions of security deployments will need to be considered. As the variety and scale of threat widens, innovative measures will be required to deal with the dangers facing United Nations personnel.

Experience has demonstrated that the presence of a United Nations operation has not always been sufficient to deter hostile action. Duty

in areas of danger can never be risk-free; Nations personnel must expect to go in harm's way at times. The courage, commitment and idealism shown by United Nations personnel should be respected by the entire international community. These men and women deserve to be properly recognized and rewarded for the perilous tasks they undertake. Their interests and those of their families must be given due regard and protected.

Given the pressing need to afford adequate protection to United Nations personnel engaged in life-endangering circumstances, I recommend that the Security Council, unless it elects immediately to withdraw the United Nations presence in order to preserve the credibility of the Organisation, gravely consider what action should be taken towards those who put United Nations personnel in danger. Before deployment takes place, the Council should keep open the option of considering in advance collective measures, possibly including those under Chapter VII when a threat to international peace and security is also involved, to come into effect should the purpose of the United Nations operation systematically be frustrated and hostilities occur.

IX. Financing

A chasm has developed between the tasks entrusted to this Organisation and the financial means provided to it. The truth of the matter is that our vision cannot really extend to the prospect opening before us as long as our financing remains myopic. There are two main areas of concern: the ability of the Organisation to function over the longer term; and immediate requirements to respond to a crisis.

To remedy the financial situation of the United Nations in all its aspects, my distinguished predecessor repeatedly drew the attention of Member States to the increasingly impossible situation that has arisen and, during the forty-sixth session of the General Assembly, made a number of proposals. Those proposals which remain before the Assembly, and with which I am in broad agreement, are the following:

Proposal one: This suggested the adoption of a set of measures to deal with the cash flow problems caused by the exceptionally high level of unpaid contributions as well as with the problem of inadequate working capital reserves:

(a) Charging interest on the amounts of assessed contributions that are not paid on time;

(b) Suspending certain financial regulations of the United Nations to permit the retention of budgetary surpluses;

(c) Increasing the Working Capital Fund to a level of $250 million and endorsing the principle that the level of the Fund should be approximately 25 per cent of the annual assessment under the regular budget;

(d) Establishment of a temporary Peace-keeping Reserve Fund, at a level of $50 million, to meet initial expenses of peace-keeping operations pending receipt of assessed contributions;

(e) Authorisation to the Secretary-General to borrow commercially, should other sources of cash be inadequate

Proposal two: This suggested the creation of a Humanitarian Revolving Fund in the order of $50 million, to be used in emergency humanitarian situations. The proposal has since been implemented.

Proposal three: This suggested the establishment of a United Nations Peace Endowment Fund, with an initial target of $1 billion. The Fund would be created by a combination of assessed and voluntary contributions, with the latter being sought from Governments, the private sector as well as individuals. Once the Fund reached its target level, the proceeds from the investment of its principal would be used to finance the initial costs of authorized peace-keeping operations, other conflict resolution measures and related activities.

In addition to these proposals, others have been added in recent months in the course of public discussion. These ideas include: a levy on arms sales that could be related to maintaining an Arms Register by the United Nations; a levy on international air travel, which is dependent on the maintenance of peace; authorisation for the United Nations to borrow from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund—for peace and development are interdependent; general tax exemption for contributions made to the United Nations by foundations, businesses and individuals; and changes in the formula for calculating the scale of assessments for peace-keeping operations.

As such ideas are debated, a stark fact remains: the financial foundations of the Organisation daily grow weaker, debilitating its political will and practical capacity to undertake new and essential activities. This state of affairs must not continue. Whatever decisions are taken on financing the Organisation, there is one inescapable necessity: Member States must pay their assessed contributions in full and on time. Failure to do so puts them in breach of their obligations under the Charter.

In these circumstances and on the assumption that Member States will be ready to finance operations for peace in a manner commensurate with their present and welcome, readiness to establish them, I recommend the following:

(a)   Immediate establishment of a revolving peace-keeping reserve fund of $50 million;

(b)   Agreement that one third of the estimated cost of each new peace-keeping operation be appropriated by the General Assembly as soon as the Security Council decides to establish the operation; this would give the Secretary-General the necessary commitment authority and assure an adequate cash flow; the balance of the costs would be appropriated after the General Assembly approved the operation's budget;

(c)   Acknowledgement by Member States that, under exceptional circumstances, political and operational considerations may make it necessary for the Secretary-General to employ his authority to place contracts without competitive bidding.

Member States wish the Organisation to be managed with the utmost efficiency and care. I am in full accord. I have taken important steps to streamline the Secretariat in order to avoid duplication and overlap while increasing its productivity. Additional' changes and improvements will take place. As regards the United Nations system more widely, I continue to review the situation in consultation with my colleagues in the Administrative Committee on Coordination. The question of assuring financial security to the Organisation over the long term is of such importance and complexity that public awareness and support must be heightened. I have therefore asked a select group of qualified persons of high international repute to examine this entire subject and to report to me. I intend to present their advice, together with my comments, for the consideration of the General Assembly, in full recognition of the special responsibility that the Assembly has, under the Charter, for financial and budgetary matters.

X. An Agenda for Peace

The nations and peoples of the United Nations are fortunate in a way that those of the League of Nations were not. We have been given a second chance to create the world of our Charter that they were denied. With the Cold War ended we have drawn back from the brink of a confrontation that threatened the world and, too often, paralysed our Organisation.

Even as we celebrate our restored possibilities, there is a need to ensure that the lessons of the past four decades are learned and that the errors, or variations of them, are not repeated. For there may not be a third opportunity for our planet which, now for different reasons, remains endangered.

The tasks ahead must engage the energy and attention of all components of the United Nations system—the General Assembly and other principal organs, the agencies and programmes. Each has, in a balanced scheme of things, a role and a responsibility.

Never again must the Security Council lose the collegiality that is essential to its proper functioning, an attribute that it has gained after such trial. A genuine sense of consensus deriving from shared interests must govern its work, not the threat of the veto or the power of any group of nations. And it follows that agreement among the permanent members must have the deeper support of the other members of the Council, and the membership more widely, if the Council's decisions are to be effective and endure.

The Summit Meeting of the Security Council of 31 January 1992 provided a unique forum for exchanging views and strengthening cooperation. I recommend that the Heads of State and Government of the members of the Council meet in alternate years, just before the general debate commences in the General Assembly. Such sessions would permit exchanges on the challenges and dangers of the moment and stimulate ideas on how the United Nations may best serve to steer change into peaceful courses. I propose in addition that the Security Council continue to meet at the Foreign Minister level, as it has effectively done in recent years, whenever the situation warrants such meetings.

Power brings special responsibilities, and temptations. The powerful must resist the dual but opposite calls of unilateralism and isolationism if the United Nations is to succeed. For just as unilateralism at the global or regional level can shake the confidence of others; so can isolationism, whether it results from political choice or constitutional circumstance, enfeeble the global undertaking. Peace at home and the urgency of rebuilding and strengthening our individual societies necessitates peace abroad and cooperation among nations. The endeavours of the United Nations will require the fullest engagement of all of its Members, large and small, if the present renewed opportunity is to be seized.

Democracy within nations requires respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as set forth in the Charter. It requires as well a deeper understanding and respect for the rights of minorities and respect for the needs of the more vulnerable groups of society, especially women and children. This is not only a political matter. The social stability needed for productive growth is nurtured by conditions in which people can readily express their will. For this, strong domestic institutions of participation are essential. Promoting such institutions means promoting the empowerment of the unorganized, the poor, the marginalized. To this end, the focus of the United Nations should be on the "field", the locations where economic, social and political decisions take effect. In furtherance of this I am taking steps to rationalize and in certain cases integrate the various programmes and agencies of the United Nations within specific countries. The senior United Nations official in each country should be prepared to serve, when needed, and with the consent of the host authorities, as my Representative on matters of particular concern.

Democracy within the family of nations means the application of its principles within the world Organisation itself. This requires the fullest consultation, participation and engagement of all States, large and small, in the work of the Organisation. All organs of the United Nations must be accorded, and play, their full and proper role so that the trust of all nations and peoples will be retained and deserved. The principles of the Charter must be applied consistently, not selectively, for if the perception should be of the latter, trust will wane and with it the moral authority which is the greatest and most unique quality of that instrument. Democracy at all levels is essential to attain peace for a new era of prosperity and justice.

Trust also requires a sense of confidence that the world Organisation will react swiftly, surely and impartially and that it will not be debilitated by political opportunism or by administrative or financial inadequacy. This presupposes a strong, efficient and independent international civil service whose integrity is beyond question and an assured financial basis that lifts the Organisation, once and for all, out of its present mendicancy.

Just as it is vital that each of the organs of the United Nations employ its capabilities in the balanced and harmonious fashion envisioned in the Charter, peace in the largest sense cannot be accomplished by the United Nations system or by Governments alone. Non-governmental organisations, academic institutions, parliamen-

tarians, business and professional communities, the media and the public at large must all be involved. This will strengthen the world Organisation's ability to reflect the concerns and interests of its widest constituency, and those who become more involved can carry the word of United Nations initives and build a deeper understanding of its work.

Reform is a continuing process, and improvement can have no limit. Yet, there is an expectation, which I wish to see fulfilled, that the present phase in the renewal of this Organisation should be complete by 1995, its Fiftieth Anniversary. The pace set must therefore be increased if the United Nations is to keep ahead of the acceleration of history that characterizes this age. We must be guided not by precedents alone, however wise these may be, but by the needs of the future and by the shape and content that we wish to give it.

I am committed to broad dialogue between the Member States and the Secretary-General. And I am committed to fostering a full and open interplay between all institutions and elements of the Organisation so that the Charter's objectives may not only be better served, but that this Organisation may emerge as greater than the sum of its parts. The United Nations was created with a great and courageous vision. Now is the time, for its nations and peoples, and the men and women who serve it, to seize the moment for the sake of the future.

63

Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peace-keeping Operations in All Their Aspects

A/RES/48/42, 10 December 1993

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2006 (XIX) of 18 February 1965 and all other relevant resolutions,

Recalling in particular its resolutions 47/71 and 47/72 of 14 December 1992,

Welcoming the progress made by the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations during its recent sessions,

Convinced that peace-keeping operations constitute a considerable part of the efforts by the United Nations to maintain international peace and security and to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations in this regard,

Recognising that the peacemaking activities of the Secretary-General and of organs of the United Nations, which are actions to bring hostile parties to agreement essentially through peaceful means such as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations, constitute an essential function of the United Nations and are among the important means for the prevention, containment and resolution of disputes, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,

Emphasising that respect for the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States and

nonintervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any States is crucial to any common endeavour to promote international peace and security,

Taking note of the statement by the President of the Security Council of 28 May 1993 and the recommendations contained therein,[1]

Convinced that in order to ensure the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations it is necessary that they have precise and clearly defined mandates,

Taking into account that the increase in activities in the field of United Nations peace-keeping requires both increasing and better managed human, financial and material resources tor the Organisation,

Aware of the extremely difficult financial situation of the United Nations as described in the report of the Secretary-General[2] and of the heavy burden on all the troop contributors, many of which are developing countries,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organisation,[3] having examined the report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations,[4] and being aware of the relevant parts of the report of the Joint Inspection Unit on staffing of the United Nations peace-keeping and related missions (civilian component),[5]

Welcomes the report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations[4];

Resources

Notes with appreciation the initiative of the Secretary-General in establishing a stand-by forces planning team and looks forward to periodic reports on that initiative;

Recommends that contact between the Secretariat and Member States should be enhanced with a view to clarifying the military and civilian needs for United Nations peace-keeping operations and such capabilities of Member States as could be made available for those operations;

Encourages Member States, to the extent that their domestic arrangements permit, to develop, in cooperation with the Secretariat, arrangements for military, police and civilian personnel to participate in peace-keeping operations and to notify the Secretary-General of the existence and the modalities of such arrangements on an ongoing basis;

Calls upon the Secretary-General to develop a proposal for regularly updated data banks recording the type and availability of resources Member States could provide, as described in paragraph 4 above, as well as individuals with skills appropriate for civilian peace-keeping duties, and invites the Secretary-General to propose such other measures as he believes necessary to meet the urgent need for timely availability of personnel qualified to serve in the full spectrum of civilian peace-keeping capacities;

Stresses the need for the United Nations to be given the resources commensurate with its growing responsibilities in the area of peace-keeping, particularly with regard to the resources needed for the start-up phase of such operations;

Takes note of the recommendations of the Secretary-General concerning the timely provision of basic peace-keeping equipment,[6] and suggests the development of a limited revolving reserve of such equipment within existing resources;

Invites the Secretary-General to consult in advance with Member States on their willingness to earmark certain equipment specified by the Secretary-General for immediate sale, loan or donation to the United Nations when required;

Encourages Member States to make available air- and sea-lift resources to the United Nations at the best available rates in accordance with the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations;

Requests the Secretariat to develop guidelines concerning the disposition of United Nations equipment upon the termination of a peace-keeping operation;

Finances

Recalls that the financing of peace-keeping operations is the collective responsibility of all Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph *2,* of the Charter of the United Nations, notes the report of the Secretary-General on improving the financial situation of the United Nations, reiterates its call upon all Member States to pay their assessed contributions in full and on time, and encourages States to make voluntary contributions in accordance with the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations;

Invites the Secretary-General to review, as appropriate, the applicable United Nations financial and administrative regulations concerning peace-keeping operations, and to that end urges that steps

be taken to strengthen lateral communication and the distribution of information within the Secretariat;

Requests that the Secretary-General improve the financial control mechanisms relative to peace-keeping by strengthening the system of audit and inspection, including external controls, stresses the need to ensure that appropriate accountability is maintained, and in that regard notes with appreciation recent steps to strengthen the capacity for independent oversight and investigation;

Stresses the need to delegate the appropriate degree of financial and administrative authority to Force Commanders or Special Representatives while ensuring that measures relating to responsibility and accountability are strengthened in order to increase the missions' capacity to adjust to new situations and specific requirements;

Notes that a number of military officers have been made available on loan on a non-reimbursable basis to the Secretariat at its request, and welcomes the efforts of the Secretary-General to implement financial arrangements, within existing resources, which would enable all Member States to contribute to such a system in the future and would ease the costs borne by Member States contributing those officers;

Calls upon the Secretariat to prepare comprehensive budget estimates for all new and ongoing peace-keeping operations in a timely fashion in order to allow for a thorough examination by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the General Assembly;

Stresses also the importance of reimbursing all outstanding dues of troop-contributing or other participating States without delay, and notes the report of the Secretary-General in that regard;

Reaffirms the competence of the General Assembly for the appropriation and apportionment of the costs of United Nations peace-keeping operations, and notes the importance for the Security Council to be aware of, *inter alia,* the availability of adequate physical and material resources and the cost implications before it establishes new peace-keeping operations;

Considers that the issue of supplementing diversified financial resources to the assessed contributions should be studied further in all the appropriate United Nations forums;

Encourages the consideration in the appropriate forums of further measures that could improve the financing of peace-keeping operations, including the feasibility of an improved billing system;

Requests the Secretary-General to consult with Member States during his current review of the rates of reimbursement for depreciation of contingent-owned equipment deployed at the request of the United Nations;

Requests the Secretariat to compile all the existing financial and administrative rules, regulations, practices and procedures relating to peace-keeping into a comprehensive document available to Member States;

Welcomes the creation of the Peace-keeping Reserve Fund, notes the importance of adequate resources for peace-keeping startup costs and that sufficient resources have not been made available for this purpose, stresses that the Fund should be supplied with the amount specified in its resolution 47/217 of 23 December 1992, thereby making the Fund operational as soon as possible, and emphasizes that the Fund should, in the future, serve as an essential source of funds for peace-keeping start-up costs;

Organisation and Effectiveness

Suggests that the Security Council and the Secretary-General should continue to analyse a given situation very carefully before the establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation, that a realistic mandate, including clear objectives and a time-frame for the resolution of the problem, as appropriate, should be formulated in each case, conducive to the furtherance of the political process and that the Security Council should review periodically the effectiveness of current operations with a view to ensuring that they are consistent with the objectives and the mandates as approved by the Council, and affirms that no change in the mandate, character or duration of peace-keeping operations authorized by the Security Council is possible except through a specific decision of the Council;

Notes with appreciation the steps taken by the Secretary-General to strengthen and reform those units of the Secretariat dealing with peace-keeping, as outlined in his report on the implementation of the recommendations contained in "An Agenda for Peace";

Stresses the need for the Secretariat to deal effectively and efficiently with planning, launching, managing and providing administrative and logistics support to peace-keeping operations, and urges the Secretary-General, as the chief administrative officer of the Organisation, in consultation with Member States, to initiate a

comprehensive review of the role, tasks and functions, including civilian functions, of the various units of the Secretariat with a view to identifying the optimum Secretariat structure in that respect and to assuring the unity of command and control indispensable for successful peace-keeping by assigning executive responsibility for all aspects of a peace-keeping operation to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the Secretariat;

Also stresses the importance of coordination of all aspects of the planning process in peace-keeping operations, and suggests that the emergency relief coordinator should be fully consulted in the overall planning of a peace-keeping operation when the mandate for such an operation contains a humanitarian component and in other cases should be consulted at an early stage when close coordination between humanitarian and peace-keeping activities is required;

Notes the transfer of the Field Operations Division from the Department of Administration and Management to the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, and encourages the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to strengthen and make more effective the planning, management and administrative support for peace-keeping operations and the capability of the Secretarial for overall evaluation and analysis of peace-keeping operations from their initial stages to their conclusion;

Urges the Secretary-General in his review of Secretariat capabilities to improve information flow and to enhance coordination and communication between United Nations Headquarters and field missions in order to manage peace-keeping operations effectively and inform Member States as appropriate;

Requests the Secretary-General to keep Member States informed on organisational responsibilities of the various units of those Secretariat departments responsible for peace-keeping operations;

Invites the Secretary-General to identify a focal point for contact by Member States seeking information on all facets, including operational, logistics and administrative matters, of ongoing and planned peace-keeping operations;

Also invites the Secretary-General to continue arrangements and procedures for providing additional personnel on a short-term basis in order to ensure that the Secretariat can respond effectively and efficiently to fluctuations in its workload, particularly when new operations are planned and launched, and to keep the Member States informed of such procedures;

Once again invites the Secretary-General to consider means whereby Special Representatives, Force Commanders and other key personnel of newly approved missions are identified and involved in the planning process at the earliest possible time;

Welcomes the establishment in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of a situation centre functioning twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, which will be equipped with appropriately standardized communication and information management systems so as to enhance the management of all peace-keeping operations, and requests the Secretary-General to keep under review the efficiency and efficacy of the situation centre;

Also welcomes the initiative of the Secretariat in establishing a logistics doctrine and procedures project charged with developing a set of guidelines of United Nations logistics doctrine and procedures in order to standardize logistics practices and procedures and thereby enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of logistics support to peace-keeping operations;

Requests the Secretary-General to consider, in the ongoing restructuring of the Secretariat, the inclusion of a logistics planning capability in the Department of Peace-keeping Operations which would consider all aspects of support required for peacekeeping operations;

Stresses that the conclusion of a status-of-forces agreement between the United Nations and a host State is of the utmost importance when deploying peace-keeping operations and calls upon host States to give their fullest cooperation in that regard, and recommends that after the establishment of a peace-keeping operation by the Security Council the concerned Member States should cooperate fully with the operation in the implementation of its mandate;

Also requests the Secretary-General to include in the status-of-forces agreement between the United Nations and host States requirements for host States to treat United Nations peace-keeping forces at all times with full respect for the principles and relevant Articles of the Charter, for United Nations peace-keeping forces to respect local laws and regulations and for both parties to such an agreement to act at all times in accordance with the provisions of the status-of-forces agreement and the principles and relevant Articles of the Charter;

Notes the importance of concluding arrangements between the United Nations and troop contributors before deployment occurs and

urges implementation of the agreements along the lines of the model agreement outlined in the report of the Secretary-General of 23 May 1991;[7]

Further requests the Secretary-General to include, in the agreements to be concluded with States providing contingents, a clause by which those States would ensure that the members of their contingents serving in United Nations peace-keeping operations were fully acquainted with the principles and rules of relevant international law, in particular international humanitarian law and the purposes and principles of the Charter;

Stresses the importance of the institution of appropriate rules of engagement, on a case-by-case basis, for all United Nations peace-keeping operations;

Also notes the recent increase in the number of peace-keeping operations, and requests the Secretary-General to prepare a detailed report on operations that have significant difficulties in implementing their mandates by highlighting the root causes of such difficulties and suggesting possible measures to address them;

Requests the Secretary-General, once again, to report periodically to Member States on the performance of all peace-keeping operations;

Welcomes the increasingly frequent informal consultations between the Secretariat and contributing States, strongly recommends the continuation of such consultations on peace-keeping operations from their initial stages to their conclusion and strongly encourages the presence of the President of the Security Council and other members of the Council, as appropriate, at such consultations;

Recognizes that the training of peace-keeping personnel is primarily the responsibility of Member States;

Also welcomes the establishment of a focal point for peace keeping training in the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, and recommends that the focal point act as the coordinating centre for the relationship between the United Nations and national and regional training facilities;

Requests the Secretary-General to review and improve arrangements for training civilian, police and military peace-keeping personnel, using the appropriate capabilities of Member States, regional organisations and arrangements, in accordance with their constitutional mandates and Chapter VIII of the Charter, and of non-governmental organisations and the Secretariat;

Acknowledges the increasing challenge of forging large and cohesive peace-keeping missions from many and diverse contingents, stresses the need for the effective training of civilian, police and military personnel before deployment, and in that regard urges the Secretary-General to develop, in consultation with Member States, official United Nations guidelines combined with performance goals for individuals and units, so that peace-keepers can be trained within a national framework in accordance with agreed-upon common standards, skills, practices and procedures;

Also requests the Secretary-General to develop and publish peace-keeping training guidelines, manuals and other relevant training material, including material for correspondence instruction, in order to assist Member States in preparing their civilian, police and military personnel for peace-keeping operations in a standardized and cost-effective manner;

Further requests the Secretary-General, in close consultation with Member States, to initiate, within resources which may be allocated for training purposes, a trial programme designed to train national peace-keeping trainers as a supplement to national training programmes, as well as to develop a proposal to strengthen the leadership cadre available for peace-keeping by training potential Force Commanders and senior military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping leadership and management duties,

Recommends that training for peace-keeping operations be included, as appropriate, in the training of those military, civilian and police personnel being sent on peace-keeping operations, and encourages Member States that have already developed such training to share information and experience with other Member States;

Strongly recommends that peace-keeping operations personnel be made generally aware of relevant local laws and customs of the host State and of the importance of respecting them;

Encourages troop contributors to consider arrangements between themselves for the loan and/or exchange of peace-keeping operations experts to enhance operational effectiveness through sharing of information and experience gained in peace-keeping operations;

Once again requests the Secretary-General to consider establishing a training programme for key staff personnel of peace-keeping operations with a view to creating a pool of trained personnel with knowledge of the United Nations system and its working procedures;

Recognizes that public information on peace-keeping operations, particularly an understanding of their mandates, is important, and calls for significant enhancement of the press and public information function for peace-keeping missions and in particular for rapid deployment at the start of a peace-keeping operation of a robust and professional media outreach programme in the area of operation commensurate with the scope and needs of the missions;

Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with Member States, to establish guidelines for the public information function of peace-keeping operations;

Requests the Secretariat immediately to make all necessary arrangements for the reissue of *The Blue Helmets*[8] in 1995;

Also requests the Secretariat to take the appropriate steps to record, in a dignified and yet simple manner in a public area of the United Nations Headquarters, the names of those who have given their lives in the service of United Nations peace-keeping operations;

Welcomes the intention of the Secretariat to establish a memorial dedicated to those peace-keepers who have given their lives in the service of peace;

Issues Arising from An Agenda for Peace

Recalls its resolutions 47/120 A of 18 December 1992 and 47/120 B of 20 September 1993, and takes note of the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the recommendations contained in *An Agenda for Peace,* welcomes the efforts of the Secretary-General to take appropriate steps through preventive diplomacy and, recognising the need for those steps to be based on timely and accurate knowledge of relevant facts, encourages him to strengthen the capability of the Secretariat to secure and analyse all relevant information from as wide a variety of sources as possible in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter, urges Member States to assist the Secretary-General in this regard, and requests the Secretary-General to keep the Member States regularly informed of such capabilities and mechanisms;

Reaffirms its resolution 47/120 B, in particular section II, entitled "Preventive deployment and demilitarized zones", and in this context recalls the importance of considering, on a case-by-case basis, the use of preventive deployment and/or the establishment of demilitarized zones as a means to prevent existing or potential disputes from

escalating into conflicts and to promote efforts to achieve the peaceful settlement of such disputes, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security;

Encourages, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter, the involvement of Member States through regional organisations and arrangements, as appropriate, in accordance with their respective areas of competence and the purposes and principles of the United Nations;

Welcomes efforts by the Secretary-General to develop, in consultation with Member States, a set of guidelines governing cooperation between the United Nations and regional organisations;

Notes the existing cooperation between the United Nations and regional organisations, in particular in the area of peace-keeping;

Requests the Secretary-General, in Accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter, to consider ways to provide advice and assistance, in a variety of forms such as advisory services, seminars and conferences, to regional organisations and arrangements in their respective areas of competence, so as to enhance their capacity to cooperate with the United Nations in the field of peacekeeping operations;

Resolves to continue consideration of these items;

Status and Safety of United Nations Peace-keeping Personnel

Urges all Member States in whose territory United Nations peace-keeping operations are conducted to provide, in accordance with relevant Articles of the Charter and other instruments, comprehensive support to all United Nations peace-keeping operations personnel in fulfilling their functions, as well as to take all necessary measures to ensure respect for and guarantee the safety and security of those personnel;

Considers that any State in whose territory a United Nations peace-keeping operation is conducted should act promptly to deter and prosecute all those responsible for attacks and other acts of violence against all personnel of United Nations peace-keeping operations;

Notes the particular difficulties and dangers that can arise when United Nations peace-keeping operations are conducted in situations where no authority exercises jurisdiction or discharges responsibilities with regard to ensuring the safety and security of United Nations personnel, and in such an eventuality agrees that measures appropriate

to the particular circumstances and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations should be considered by the Security Council and other appropriate bodies of the United Nations;

Emphasizes the importance of all relevant information on conditions in the field of operations for the safety of United Nations peace-keepers, and invites the Secretariat to adopt measures to secure and analyse such information from as wide a variety of sources as possible for immediate transmission to field missions;

Considers that it is the responsibility of host countries to disseminate to their populations necessary information on the role of peace-keeping operations and the inviolability of the safety of peace-keepers, including the information the United Nations may make available for that purpose;

Also considers that host countries are required to provide all available information in a timely manner to the United Nations and the respective peace-keeping missions in the field on any potential dangers that might jeopardize the safety of the peace-keepers, and that that requirement should be clearly specified in the status-of-forces agreements;

Urges the Secretary-General to review the current arrangements of compensation for death, injury, disability or illness attributable to peace-keeping service with a view to developing equitable and appropriate arrangements, and to ensure expeditious reimbursement;

Recognizes that conditions in the field require practical steps aimed at enhancing the necessary operational, political and legal environment to deal effectively with the problem of the growing vulnerability of United Nations operations personnel deployed in the field;

Requests the Secretary-General to take concrete steps to improve the physical security of all United Nations peace-keeping personnel deployed in the field, including all aspects related to material, organisational, operational and other aspects of safety;

Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General on current measures and new proposals to ensure and enhance the security of United Nations operations[9] and will consider what further steps might be taken to enhance their status and safety, taking into account the need for concerted action by all relevant bodies of the United Nations, and in that context welcomes Security Council resolution 868 (1993) of 29 September 1993, in which connection the General Assembly:

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Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session the item entitled "Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects".

REFERENCES

1. *S/25859.*
2. A/48/503 and Add. I.
3. A/48/1.
4. A/48/173.
5. A/48/421, annex.
6. See A/47/965-S/25944.
7. A/46/185 and Corr.I, annex.
8. United Nations publication, Sales No E 90.1.18
9. A/48/349-S/26358.

64

International Law

"I invite all Governments that have not done so to sign and ratify the various conventions, covenants and treaties which form the central corpus of international law."

—*Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan in the Millennium Report*

Guilty!

"Despite the indisputable atrociousness of the crimes and the emotions evoked in the international community, the judges have examined the facts adduced in a most dispassionate manner, bearing in mind that the accused is presumed innocent.

With these words, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda handed down the first-ever judgement by an international court for the crime of genocide, declaring Jean Paul Akayesu guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity. The date was 2 September 1999 and the trial site was Arusha, Tanzania.

Genocide is the engagement in certain activities with the intention to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. Akayesu, who was mayor of the Taba commune in central Rwanda and belonged to the country's Hutu community, was held responsible for the death in 1994 of around 2,000 people. In that year, over 800,000 people, mostly members of Rwanda's minority Tutsi people, were slaughtered in a period of less than three months. The United Nations set up an international tribunal in 1995 to try those responsible for this genocide.

Setting Standard of Behaviour

The basis for determining the crime committed by Akayesu was the 1948 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime

of Genocide. It was one of the first international legal frameworks adopted by the United Nations. Now, five decades later, there are over 500 such conventions or international treaties. Each is legally binding for those States ratifying or acceding to it, and its enforcement at national and international levels can be monitored or verified.

International law did not begin with the United Nations, but the organisation has played an important role in consolidating and vastly expanding it. In 1873, when the International Law Association was founded, there were no more than 133 multilateral treaties in the world. In the past, multilateral treaties had only a few States which were party to it, often fewer than ten. Nowadays, a typical UN convention has at least 50 States parties, which means these that these States have ratified a convention and incorporated its norms into national law. Some major ones, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child, have as many as 191. These treaties or conventions, together with customary international law and other sources of international law, have come to form the body of international law.

Vital Statistics

- The United Nations has helped conclude more than 500 multilateral treaties and agreements.
- The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) works to develop uniform international norms and standards in international trade law.
- The International Law Commission of the United Nations, made up of 34 experts, encourages the development of international law and its codification.
- The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963) constitute the cornerstone of day-today relations between States.
- The Convention on the Law of the Sea (finalized in 1994 after 36 years of negotiations) is the world's most important international maritime law.
- Overall, there are more than 2,000 multilateral treaties in the world today; over 500 of them have been deposited in the custody of the Secretary-General.

The Charter of the United Nations identifies four goals: peace, development, human rights and the promotion of international law. In 1945, these were the goals of humanity; these remain humanity's goals in the new millennium.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his Millennium Report, draws attention to one of the fundamental objectives of the United Nations: to free all people from the scourge of war and, especially, from the violence of civil conflict and the fears of mass destruction, two great sources of terror faced in our world today. This is possible only if we strengthen respect for law on the international front, "in particular the agreed provisions of treaties on the control of armaments, and international humanitarian and human rights law".

These conventions, in the words of Secretary-General Annan, "define the ground rules of a global civilisation".

How Does International Law Work?

International law consists of a body of treaties, customary laws, judicial decisions and other relevant sources that play a central role in promoting economic and social development, as well as international peace and security among the nations of the world. The treaties negotiated under UN auspices have formed the basis for laws governing relations among nations. While the UN's work in this area does not always receive much attention, it has a daily impact on the lives of people everywhere.

Much of the political process of the United Nations is devoted to establishing or extending international laws, rules and standards covering the full range of human activities. These include norms governing human rights, refugees and stateless persons, traffic in persons, narcotic drugs, international trade and development, transportation and communications, the status of women, the freedom of information, the law of the sea, the use of outer space, telecommunications, disarmament, international terrorism and the protection of the environment.

While some of these topics may appear not to affect our daily lives, in reality they do, whether they regulate the quality of the air we breathe, the variety of goods available for purchase, the impact of drug trafficking on the functioning of a culture, or the interaction of people around us from other countries and cultures. For example, pollution from automobiles in London or Mexico City may affect the climate in Rabat or Tokyo, as carbon dioxide and other gases from factories and cars cause the atmosphere to heat up. Drug enforcement programmes in a country like Colombia can have significant consequences on employment sustained by drug money in the tourist industry. Civil unrest in a neighbouring country can produce large numbers of refugees seeking asylum across the border.

The United Nations has helped negotiate treaties setting the standard of inter-State relations on each of these areas. For example, under the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, developed countries are obliged to reduce emissions of carbon dioxde and other warming gases they release into the atmosphere. The 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances is designed to deprive drug traffickers of their ill-gotten financial gains and freedom of movement. And the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (and its 1967 Protocol) defines the rights and duties of refugees.

Creating Laws, Setting Standards

The United Nations systematically examines particular topics of interest and encourages either codification of the customary law that already exists or the formulation of new laws. States are participating with increasing vigour in this process. The large number of existing treaties and the continuing work on many more bear testimony to that fact. Over 50,000 treaties and international agreements developed by Member States, the only collection of its kind worldwide, are registered with the UN Secretariat.

Many parts of the United Nations are at work in developing international law. For example:

The General Assembly, as the main political forum of the United Nations, has become a key mechanism for elaborating rules of international law. It initiates, prepares and provides a forum for negotiating multilateral treaties. Conventions are adopted by the General Assembly and are then opened for signature and ratification by the Member States. The Assembly also adopts declarations on a broad range of issues regulating international relations. A declaration, which is an agreed-upon statement of goals on a particular subject, may have moral force but does not carry the force of law. By contrast, a convention, once ratified by a Member State, is implemented under national law.

The International Law Commission, created by the General Assembly in 1947, promotes the progressive development and codification of international law. It prepares drafts on topics of international law, either chosen by itself or referred to it by the General Assembly. When the Commission completes work on a topic, the General Assembly usually convenes an international conference to incorporate the draft into a convention. The convention is then opened

to States to become parties, meaning that countries formally agree to be bound by its provisions. The Commission has helped conclude many important international treaties. Currently, the Commission is addressing such issues as the prevention of transboundary damage from hazardous activities; State responsibility; unilateral acts of States; and the right of diplomatic protection.

The Security Council has become increasingly involved in the issues of protecting civilians in armed conflict, promoting human rights and protecting children affected by war. For example, mass violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda led the Council to establish two international tribunals to prosecute persons responsible for such violations. Both tribunals were established under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations (which deals with enforcement measures) and are subsidiary organs of the Security Council.

The International Court of Justice helps settle disputes between nations on the basis of existing international law. Based in The Hague, the Netherlands, the World Court (as it is popularly known) has settled disputes between States regarding their common borders; and has defined the delimitation of territorial waters, fishing jurisdictions, the rights of passage over foreign territory, decolonisation questions, military disputes, questions of nationality and the right of asylum. In 1999, the Court settled a sensitive frontier dispute between Botswana and Namibia. In another ruling made in 1994, the Court helped settle a border dispute between Chad and Libya. In 1992, the Court ended a dispute between El Salvador and Honduras that had led to a short but bloody war in 1969.

Specialized agencies and programmes of the United Nations, such as the United Nations Environment Programme, the United Nations Children's Fund, the International Labour Organisation, the International Civil Aviation Organisation, the International Maritime Organisation and the World Intellectual Property Organisation, have played a major role in the development and administering of international treaties in their areas of concentration.

How Does International Law Help World Trade?

International law helps regulate relations between countries. These relations include trading, exports and imports, and exchange of goods across boundaries. The United Nations, through the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), facilitates world

trade by developing conventions, model laws, rules and legal guides designed to harmonize international trade. Established by the General Assembly in 1966, this international Commission brings together representatives of the world's geographic regions and principal economic and legal systems.

UNCITRAL has helped develop some of the most fundamental treaties regulating international trade. These include the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, the 1976 UNICTRAL Arbitration Convention, the 1980 UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, the 1994 UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services and the 1995 United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and Standby Letters of Credit. In 1996, the General Assembly adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce.

Environmental laws negotiated in the United Nations facilitate not only the protection of the environment worldwide but also the promotion of healthy business practices. For example, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (2000) makes it compulsory to label clearly exports of agricultural commodities that may contain genetically modified organisms, and allows Governments to state whether they are willing to accept such imports. Another similar treaty is the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (1989). This treaty obligates States parties to reduce shipping and dumping of dangerous wastes across borders, to minimize the amount and toxicity generated by hazardous waste, and to ensure their environmentally sound management.

There are numerous ways the United Nations and its regime of international law help promote world trade. Here are some examples:

- Commercial airlines have the right to fly across borders and to land in case of emergency, because of agreements negotiated by the International Civil Aviation Organisation, part of the United Nations system.
- The World Intellectual Property Organisation, also affiliated with the United Nations, promotes international cooperation in the protection of copyrights, trademarks and patents around the world.
- The World Health Organisation sets criteria for pharmaceutical quality and standardizes the names of drugs.
- The Universal Postal Union's protocols allow mail to move across

borders. The International Telecommunications Union's allotment of frequencies keeps the airwaves from becoming hopelessly clogged.

- The United Nations Intellectual Property Organisation's arbitration helps determine the right to use domain names on the Internet and thus curb "cybersquatting".

Signs of Progress

Human rights: The world now has an impressive array of human rights conventions protecting the rights of all people, including children, women and minorities. The idea that individual human rights can be protected by the international community is one of the great intellectual and practical achievements of international law (*read sections on children's rights and human rights for more*).

Environmental law: Successful negotiation of major treaties has advanced environmental protection everywhere. International treaties now exist on such issues as desertification, biological diversity, biosafety, climate change, control of the movement and disposal of hazardous wastes across boundaries, the ozone layer, transboundary air pollution, endangered species and marine pollution. As a result of enforcement of these treaties, rare species of plants and animals are being saved, rainforests protected and desertification slowed or stopped.

Law of the sea: Considered one of the most comprehensive of international legal regimes, this Convention adopted in 1982 covers all aspects of ocean space and its uses—navigation and overflight, resource exploration and exploitation, conservation and pollution, fishing and shipping. So far, its major impact has been on the near-universal acceptance of 12 nautical miles as the limit of territorial sea a country with a seacoast can claim, and an exclusive economic zone up to 200 nautical miles for resource development. It covers other areas such as coastal State control over marine research, prevention of pollution and access by landlocked States to and from the sea. Three bodies established under the Convention to monitor its implementation have all become operational. They are: the International Seabed Authority, located in Kingston, Jamaica; the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, located in Hamburg, Germany; and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, based at UN Headquarters in New York.

International humanitarian law: The major instruments in this field regulate the means and methods of warfare, along with the

protection of the civilian population, of sick and wounded combatants and of prisoners of war. These major instruments were developed under the International Committee of the Red Cross. The General Assembly has created some other important instruments dealing with genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the use of certain conventional weapons.

International tribunals and the International Criminal Court: To punish war crimes in Rwanda and in the former Yugoslavia, the Security Council created international tribunals to prosecute violators. Several people have already been found guilty and sentenced accordingly. In August 2000, the Council also agreed to create a similar war crimes court for Sierra Leone. In 1998, in Rome, a statute for the creation of a permanent international court to prosecute crimes against humanity was adopted. The treaty needs to be ratified by at least 60 countries before the Court comes into existence. As of 30 July 2000, 98 countries have signed the treaty and 14 countries have ratified it.

International terrorism: In the legal sphere, the United Nations and its specialized agencies—such as the International Civil Aviation Organisation, the International Maritime Organisation and the International Atomic Energy Agency—have developed a network of international agreements that constitute the basic legal instruments against terrorism. These include conventions on offences committed on aircraft (1963), on the seizure of aircraft (1971), on hostage-taking (1979), on the protection of nuclear material (1979) and on marking plastic explosives to make them detectable (1988). At the political level, the General Assembly has repeatedly condemned all acts of international terrorism. In 1997, it adopted the International Convention against Terrorist Bombing, which asks States either to prosecute or to extradite those accused of terrorist bombing.

Looking Forward

The United Nations has already provided the world with a basic framework for a rule of law, both within countries and in relations between countries. The conventions deposited with the Secretary-General represent the expressed desire of the international community to establish rights and obligations among themselves, in effect, to be bound by an international rule of law. However, adopting a law or a multilateral treaty is only the beginning of creating such a global rule of law. From transportation to employment to preservation of the environment to trade to the ways we treat our fellow human beings, it

is only through the implementation of these conventions that we would see progress worldwide.

Secretary-General Kofi Annan has identified 25 core conventions and has asked UN Member States who have not already done so to consider ratifying them. These treaties are clearly related to the key policy goals of the United Nations in the new millennium and reflect the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations.

Most of these treaties are already in force but many have yet to achieve universal ratification. The countries which have not signed or ratified some of these treaties may not have done so because of a lack of technical and human resources rather than because of an absence of commitment. The United Nations wants to help them overcome some of the difficulties through a variety of ways:

- By providing, when requested, experts to draft national laws and advise and assist government officials and legislators, through seminars and briefing sessions;
- By training judges and lawyers to better understand and apply international law;
- By encouraging law schools and other institutions of higher education to teach international law.

25 Key Multilateral Treaties

Human rights

1. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1948. Entry into force: 12 January 1951.

2. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Open for signature at New York on 7 March 1966. Entry into force: 4 January 1969.

3. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 16 December 1966. Entry into force: 3 January 1976.

4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 16 December 1966.

5. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 16 December 1966. Entry into force: 23 March 1976.

6. Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1989. Entry into force: 1 July 1991.

7. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 18 December 1979. Entry into force: 3 September 1981.

8. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 6 October 1999. Not yet in force.

9. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1984. Entry into force: 26 June 1987.

10. Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20 November 1989. Entry into force: 2 September 1990.

11. Draft Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on involvement of children in armed conflicts. Not yet adopted by the General Assembly.

12. Draft Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography. Not yet adopted by the General Assembly.

13. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 18 December 1990. Not yet in force.

Refugees and stateless persons

14. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, signed at Geneva on 8 July 1951. Entry into force: 22 April 1954.

Penal matters

15. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1994. Entry into force: 15 January 1999.

16. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1997. Not yet in force.

17. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted at Rome on 17 July 1998. Not yet in force.

Disarmament

18. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (and Protocols), concluded at Geneva on 10 October 1980. Entry into force: 2 December 1983.

19. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol 11 as amended on 3 May 1996) annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, adopted by the Conference of the States Parties to the Convention at Geneva on 3 May 1996. Entry into force: 3 December 1998.

20. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature at Paris on 13 January 1993. Entry into force: 29 April 1997.

21. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 September 1996. Not yet in force.

22. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel, Mines and on Their Destruction, concluded at Oslo on 18 September 1997. Entry into force: 1 March 1999.

Environment

23. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted at Kyoto on 11 December 1997. Not yet in force.

24. Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature at Rio de Janeiro on 5 June 1992. Entry into force: 29 December 1993.

25. United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, particularly in Africa, opened for signature at Paris on 14 October 1994. Entry into force: 29 December 1996.

Suggested Activities for Students

1. For individual or group study, select an area of international law of strong concern and/or interest. Learn more about the issue and become well informed. Find out more about the conventions developed in that area. The UN Treaty Collection on the Internet (http://untreaty.un.org) is a helpful resource. See which countries have ratified specific conventions and which have not. Check out your own country. If it has not ratified a convention, write or contact your government officials to ask them why not. If your country has ratified the convention, it would be important to find out the steps followed to implement the convention. Invite knowledgeable speakers to your classroom.

2. There are many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with strong interests in one or perhaps several particular conventions. If so, they would be able to assist you with information concerning any plan of action your Government might have developed. Many NGOs will be participating in assemblies and regional public hearings held around the world. Will one be in your area? If you know of an NGO working on a particular convention, what does that convention say? What is being done to address local or national issues in your area of interest? Who is helping? What are voices in opposition saying? Why? Choose a side and find out how it can use your support. Your assistance in helping to inform the citizenry of the issues and steps being taken to improve the situation is a basis for constructive citizenship involvement.

3. Support national or local legislation that helps implement provisions of the convention of interest to you. Talk to your friends; help create a petition to support the passage of the legislation. Create a speakers bureau of students concerned about this issuer. For a sample, see the Free the Children web site developed on the issue of child labour (http://www.freethechildren.org). Make your own adaptations and take action.

4. Contact the department of Government most concerned with the issue you have chosen. Find out more about initiatives encouraged by that department. This can be especially helpful with conventions pertaining to the environment and, in the area of human rights, pertaining to children, women, refugees, labour and racial discrimination.

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65

Renewing the United Nations

"For the United Nations, success in meeting the challenges of globalisation ultimately comes down to meeting the needs of peoples. It is in their name that the Charter was written; realising their aspirations remains our vision for the twenty-first century."

—Secretary-General Kofi Annan in the Millennium Report

Same Values—New Methods

"We must put people at the centre of everything we do... A more people-oriented United Nations must be a more results-based organisation, both in its staffing and its allocation of resources." This quote from the Secretary-General's Millennium Report sums up the kind of renewal the Organisation is going through to serve both States and people better in the twenty-first century.

It is a renewal of the means used to achieve the goals of the United Nations: peace, prosperity, social justice and a sustainable future. These goals are increasingly being pursued through collaboration with private corporations and non-governmental and public organisations and through the use of new information technologies, such as the Internet. There is also renewal from within the Organisation in the form of streamlined and client-oriented programme delivery, designed to make the United Nations leaner and more effective.

The arrival of the new millennium and the events surrounding it present an outstanding opportunity for the UN Member States to rededicate themselves to the mission of the United Nations and its core values: freedom, tolerance, equity, non-violence, respect for nature and shared responsibility. When it was created more than half a century ago in the aftermath of the Second World War, the United Nations reflected humanity's greatest hopes for a just and peaceful global

community. The United Nations is still the only global institution with universal membership.

But the method for achieving the important goals of the United Nations must be as efficient and effective as possible. "The world's people are telling us that our past achievements are not enough, given the scale of the challenges we face. We must do more, and we must do it better," the Secretary-General writes in his Millennium Report. The United Nations has strongly embraced the Internet and other advanced technologies to improve its interaction with the rest of the world and to create opportunities to end the cycle of poverty. The Secretary-General has asked the information technology industry to help the Organisation in this effort.

Vital Statistics

- According to a 1999 international Gallup poll, less than half of respondents thought the performance of the United Nations was satisfactory.

- For the first time in UN history, up to 400 staff will be retiring each year for the next five years.

- The United Nations has developed into an organisation with a strong field presence: two of every three UN staff are currently involved in field operations.

- The United Nations is the world's largest publisher of international trade, economic and demographic statistics and the main authoritative source for international statistical methods and classifications.

- Global UN conferences of the 1990s spelled out practical solutions on great global issues nowhere else discussed by the international community as a whole.

- The composition of the Security Council with its five permanent and ten non-permanent members has not been changed since 1965, when four members were added.

- The number of international non-governmental organisations has risen globally from some 5,000 in 1975 to almost 23,000 in 1998.

Renewing the United Notions

Without a strong United Nations, it will be much harder to meet all these challenges. Strengthening the United Nations depends on Governments, and especially on their willingness to work with others—

the private sector, non-governmental organisations and multilateral agencies—to find consensus solutions. The United Nations must act as a catalyst to stimulate action by others. And it must fully exploit the technologies, especially information technology. The Secretary-General recommends action in these four key areas:

Identifying core strengths. The United Nations must continue to be the place where new standards of international conduct are hammered out and broad consensus on them is established.

Networking for change. The United Nations must serve as a catalyst for collective action, both among its Member States and between them and the vibrant constellation of new non-State actors.

Making digital connections. The United Nations must harness the power of technology to improve the fortunes of developing countries.

Advancing the quiet revolution. As an organisation, the United Nations must become more effective, efficient and accessible to the world's peoples.

Identifying Core Strengths

The influence and impact of the United Nations on the world are much greater than many believe to be the case. This influence does not come from any exercise of power, but from the force of the values the United Nations represents: its ability to stimulate global concern and action, and the trust inspired by its practical work to improve people's lives. Consider the following facts:

- War was once a normal action by a State; it is now universally proscribed, except in very specific circumstances.
- Not only has democracy prevailed in much of the world, but is now generally seen as the most legitimate and desirable form of government.
- Human rights, once the concern of sovereign States alone, now transcends both Governments and borders.
- Emerging global legal order: the expansion of the rule of law has been the foundation of much of the social progress achieved in the last millennium.

The Secretary-General thinks we must build on those strengths, especially by insisting on the importance of the rule of law. But he also feels we need to adapt the United Nations itself, notably by reforming the Security Council so that it can both work effectively and

enjoy unquestioned legitimacy. And we must expand the UN's relationship with civil society organisations, as well as with the private sector and foundations.

One critical area, according to the Secretary-General, is the reform of the Security Council: "The Council must work effectively, but it must also enjoy unquestioned legitimacy. Those two criteria define the space within which a solution must be found."

Any change in the number of members of the Security Council requires an amendment to the Charter of the United Nations needing ratification by two thirds of UN Member States (including all five permanent members of the Security Council—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States). The discussion of potential changes to the composition of the Security Council in a post-cold-war era has been going on for a long time. So far no consensus has emerged.

> Two issues are salient: who sits on the Council? Who gets a veto? Armchair reformers have long talked about tinkering with the structure of the Council—Japan and Germany have been mentioned as candidates for permanent seats—but none of the Council's five permanent members was interested: 'If it ain't broke, don't fix it.' In the Western alliance, Italy has been particularly adamant against expansion of permanent members to include those two countries (which would leave it behind while Germany enters the inner circle).... The aggregate financial contributions of the 'Permanent Five' to the United Nations budget are today 41 per cent of the total—a far cry from the 75 per cent of the budget that the Permanent Five paid in 1946." Jeffrey *Laurenti,* UNA-USA)

"The UN Works"

The United Nations has embarked on a promotional campaign to highlight the link between its day-to-day work and the aspirations of people everywhere. Ordinary people, especially the young, as well as opinion makers who can help spread the message in both the developed and developing world, are the target audience.

The campaign uses the strong, proactive slogan that "The UN Works" to fight poverty, hunger and disease, to promote development, literacy and women's equality and to protect the environment, in order to tell the story in a simple, appealing way. The campaign, which started in the lead-up to the Millennium Summit (6-8 September 2000), continues after the event as a central part of a long-term communications strategy to increase awareness of the work of the United Nations and its positive impact on people's daily lives, and thereby to increase grass-roots support.

Networking for Change

The Secretary-General has argued for supplementing formal institutions with informal policy networks, bringing together international institutions, civil society and private sector organisations, and national Governments, in pursuit of common goals. With minimal resources, the United Nations has intensified its work with diverse and influential non-State actors, such as the private sector, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and government agencies. The goal is to expand the global policy network to engage all stakeholders in turning around the backlash of globalisation to create a better world for all.

> A historic meeting with business executives from around the world took place at the United Nations in New York on 26 July 2000. It was an exciting example of the UN's renewed push for collaboration with private-public companies to solve global problems.

> "Companies should not wait for Governments to pass laws before they pay a decent wage or agree not to pollute the environment," UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan told top executives from 50 well-known multinational companies and representatives from a dozen labour organisations and watchdog groups, which came to the United Nations to join a "Global Compact".

> The agreement commits them to support human rights, eliminate child labour, allow free trade unions and refrain from polluting the environment wherever they do business.

> Among the signers were Bayer, Dupont, Ericsson, Healtheon/WebMD and Unilever, as well as Amnesty International and the World Wildlife Fund. The meeting demonstrated how Governments and corporate leaders increasingly rely on each other to help people left behind by globalisation. The United Nations provides the infrastructure to address those important issues.

Making Digital Connections

By using the new information technology, the United Nations can be made more efficient, and improve its interaction with the rest of the world. But to do so it must overcome a change-resistant culture. The Secretary-General is asking the information technology industry to help accomplish this.

- The United Nations plans to set up a web site with links to 10,000 medical web sites to disseminate information to hospitals and clinics throughout the developing world, led by the WebMD Foundation and other foundations and corporate partners.

Beginning with India, a pilot phase of 6 to 12 months will focus on needs assessments in selected nations and on building the content of the Internet portal, stressing priority public health programmes.

- The United Nations has set up a UN Information Technology Service—UNITeS— a consortium of high-tech volunteer corps, including Net Corps Canada and Net Corps America, which will train groups in developing countries in using information technology. UNITeS became operational on 1 August 2000, with the first volunteer taking up assignment in India, in the State of Orissa. Other UNITeS initiatives in progress include projects in Bhutan, Botswana, Chile, Ecuador, Jordan, Mongolia, Senegal and South Africa.

Netaid.org Tackles Extreme Poverty

In rural villages in Rwanda, where one in every 77 live births results in the death of a mother and one out of nine infants dies before its first birthday, there are no computers, no Internet connections and no high-speed technology. Yet, the power of the Internet and the technology behind a unique anti-poverty web site, www.netaid.org. are giving thousands of expectant mothers and their newborn babies in the south-eastern Kibungo district in Rwanda a better chance of survival. Visitors to netaid.org—individuals from as far away as Chicago, Paris and Kuala Lumpur—can purchase one in a series of birthing kits for distribution to mothers in the district and the traditional birth attendants who help them.

The Mother and Baby Survival Project is a vivid example of how Netaid.org, the global poverty eradication initiative launched by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Cisco Systems in 1999, is educating Web visitors about extreme poverty, giving them the means to fight it and recording the impact of their contribution online. By early 2000, Netaid.org had received $12 million in donations.

Bringing People Together

The scope and severity of natural disasters over the last three decades has placed ever-increasing demands on disaster relief organisations. This has highlighted the need for better communications in the field. In order to respond to this challenge, the Ericsson Corporation has launched a major disaster response programme, "First on the Ground", which, among other initiatives, will provide and maintain mobile communications equipment and expertise for

humanitarian relief operations and also help improve existing communications networks where appropriate. The programme will draw on support from Ericsson's offices in more than 140 countries. This is just one example of UN-initiated private-public cooperation to put new technologies to work for disaster victims everywhere.

Hurricane Mitch whipped through Honduras in 1998, the worst natural disaster to hit the country in that century. A local office in Tegucigalpa with financial support from the United Nations had just four employees, four computers and 30 phone lines, but it was exactly in the right place at the right time when hurricane Mitch struck. In less than four hours, the first international pledge for assistance came in by e-mail. In the village of Santa Barbara in the Honduran Mountains, some 2,200 homeless villagers, including 900 children, were packed in makeshift shelters without enough food, clean water or medicines. Doctors and nurses offered their services by e-mail and many individuals and organisations responded to appeals for help.

Advancing the Quiet Revolution

The Secretary-General has proposed ambitious changes for the United Nations secretariat itself which he heads. A number of reform measures have already made the world body a leaner and more effective organisation:

- The post of Deputy Secretary-General has been created to deal with management issues;
- Management procedures have been streamlined;
- Resources have been shifted from administration to development work;
- Cabinet-style management has been introduced;
- Coordination among far-flung members of the UN family has been improved.

Reform of in-house procedures and policies is necessary if the United Nations is to achieve its goals within the minimal resources dedicated to its work. The budget for the UN's core functions is just $1.25 billion a year. That is about 4 per cent of New York City's annual budget, or nearly 1 billion dollars less than the annual cost of running Tokyo's fire department. "When the scope of our responsibilities and the hopes invested in us are measured against our resources, we confront a sobering truth... Our resources simply are not commensurate with our global tasks," says the Secretary-General.

Here is what is needed to make optimal use of the funds and meet the needs of the twenty-first century:

- A clearer consensus on priorities among Member States;
- Less intrusive oversight of day-to-day management;
- Decisions by the General Assembly to include time limits or "sunset provisions" for new initiatives;
- Results-based budgeting.

How Do You Measure Success?

The Secretary-General has called on Member States to make the United Nations more of a results-based organisation, both in its staffing and its allocation of resources. "When fully implemented, results-based budgeting will encourage greater efficiency and flexibility, while at the same time enhancing transparency and the UN Secretariat's accountability to Member States," says the Millennium Report. The management of the Organisation should focus on the impact of its work, rather than inputs and process. Placing people at the centre of the Organisation means focusing on how any given programme benefits the people who are the intended target.

Objectives should be clearly defined for each programme or activity, focusing on the needs of target audiences, not the creators or the institution. Because of limited financial resources, having such specific targets for programmes, products and services becomes even more important.

What Comes Next?

The Secretary-General has urged the Member States to discuss and take action on a number of areas, including:

- The challenge of the reform of the Security Council should be tackled without delay.
- The General Assembly should explore ways of improving its relationship with civil society, including non-governmental and governmental organisations, adapting its deliberative work so that it can benefit fully from their contributions. A study of "best practices" should be undertaken to examine how civil society contributes to the work.
- The United Nations should update and upgrade its internal information technology capacity and integrate its online information.

- The General Assembly should endorse the use of "sunset provisions", setting specific time limits for new initiatives.
- The General Assembly should fully support results-based budgeting.

Suggested Activities for Students

1. Better understanding of the complexities of the United Nations often comes from doing a simulation. Join your local Model UN club or start your own. Go to www.unausa.org for information on how to get started. From a discussion of issues and recommended activities that come from the debate in this forum, take positive steps to support those actions you favour by writing letters of support to individuals, Governments or organisations pursuing policies you favour or fund-raising to help these efforts.

2. Examine your country's interest in UN reform. Country positions on various issues are available on the UN web site. From there, contact your country's permanent mission to the United Nations. Go to www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html for information. How do you feel about your country's policy? Share your opinions with your elected officials.

3. A large number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) covering a wide range of interests are affiliated with the United Nations—not only at UN Headquarters but also with the various specialized agencies located around the world. Go to www.un.org/partners/civil_society/home.htm and www.un.org/ MoreInfo/ngolink/ dpingo.htm. to find the names of some familiar NGOs in your area. You may wish to interview members or invite them to class to discuss the ways their organisation cooperates with the United Nations.

4. Many major corporations have been invited to participate in the Global Cornpact. If you want to find out if corporations in your country are involved, go to www. unglobalcompact.org/ and www.un.org/partners/business/. You may wish to contact major corporations whose names do not appear on the list from your area and explore their interest in working with the United Nations.

5. Plan a special event for your class or school around United Nations Day (24 October) to learn more about the far-ranging work of the United Nations and its many parts. UN Information Centres in your country or local chapters of the United Nations

Association would be helpful in offering suggestions and assistance.

6. Interesting-ways to connect your curriculum with the United Nations and to engage in the current work of the Organisation is provided through the web site www.un.org/Pubs/ CyberSchoolBus/. Check it out.

7. Make your own survey of the United Nations at your school. Survey students' knowledge about UN issues; their opinion of the United Nations; where students get information about the United Nations; what the United Nations should do, etc. The web site www.itpolicy.gsa.'gov/mkm/pathways/ survey/ scoopl.htm has ideas on how to design a survey. Share the results with the local media, with your elected officials or with the Secretary-General.

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66

Address to the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, 1 July 1996

I welcome the opportunity to be with you again and to share with you my views on several disarmament and security-related questions. This distinguished Board plays a significant role as a source of novel, timely and practical ideas relevant to ongoing debates in the international arena.[1]

The founders of the United Nations had an inspiring vision of a peaceful world community whose members would not use armed force to accomplish political ends, who would seek to minimize the role of armaments and maximize the use of the earth's resources for economic and social advancement. That vision has guided United Nations disarmament activities and must continue to inform your discussions of the evolving and expanding disarmament agenda.

I would like to explore further with you the role of the United Nations in that agenda. Before I do, however, a word of caution. The Board is meeting only once this year because of financial constraints. The United Nations is experiencing the strains of reduction. It is facing a serious financial crisis. At the same time, it must execute to the best of its ability the many programmes decided on by Member States. If the ideas that we discuss here are to have an impact, they must be rooted in these realities.

Address of the Secretary-General

For nearly a half century, the United Nations has made concrete progress towards the goal of a world not threatened by nuclear weapons. We are very near to agreement on another milestone in that direction: the adoption of the nuclear-test-ban treaty. Last Friday, the end of the second part of the Conference on Disarmament, the Chairman of the

Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban put forward a new draft treaty. The outstanding issues, though crucial, are few. During this month, Governments should reflect carefully on these remaining issues. I shall continue to appeal to all Governments to exert maximum efforts and to demonstrate a great spirit of flexibility and compromise, so that the draft can be adopted at the opening of the third part of the session, at the end of this month.

Let me reiterate here what I have underlined in messages to the negotiators in the Conference: nothing should deter the adoption of the treaty this year, in accordance with the wish expressed by the General Assembly at its 50th session. A nuclear-test ban will be a step towards nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. It will further devalue the role of nuclear weapons in international security. It will supplement accomplishments made at the bilateral level since the end of the cold war. Its rigorous verification provisions will expand the scope of international cooperation in the nuclear field.

Conclusion of the test ban will thus be a victory for nuclear and non-nuclear nations. It will honour the solemn commitment to achieve the ban this year that was made by the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995. It will reinforce the non-proliferation regime in general and strengthen the commitment of the parties to the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In particular, it will pave the way for a constructive beginning of the Treaty review process in 1997.

The test-ban treaty will also be a signal achievement of multilateral diplomacy and negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament. It will be the culmination of more than three decades of work. And it will be the second treaty of global importance, after the Chemical Weapons Convention, concluded by the Conference this decade.

The parties have selected the Secretary-General as depositary. The primary duty of this function is to serve as a legal guardian and monitor of adherence to the treaty. But the responsibilities are also political. I have pledged to use my good offices to work towards universal adherence to the treaty.

I stand ready to begin consultations on the best time to re-convene the 50th session of the General Assembly in order to receive the treaty and open it for signature. Resources permitting, I have also offered the cooperation of the United Nations in establishing the treaty organisation in Vienna.

The test-ban treaty does not stand alone. Further disengagement and the downsizing of nuclear arsenals must be pursued. Reductions are under way under the terms of the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I). Solid commitments by the Russian Federation and the United States to implement fully the terms of START II are essential. I urge Russia to ratify that agreement. As long as nuclear weapons exist, States that have committed themselves to forgo the nuclear-weapon option are entitled to strong security assurances. A fissionable material production cut-off could also help to solidify the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Regional efforts have borne fruit during the past year. My own continent of Africa is now a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The nations of Southeast Asia have reached a similar agreement. The entire hemisphere of the South is now nuclear-weapon free. There is increased hope that these positive examples will encourage other regions to follow suit—I speak especially of the Middle East—in order to reach a nuclear-free world.

I would like to turn now from these issues of "macro-disarmament" to "micro-disarmament". The instruments of choice in most of today's conflicts are small arms and light weapons. Abundant and cheap, they are killing people by the thousands. "Kalashnikov" is a household word throughout the world. Mortars and portable anti-aircraft missiles are common. The anti-personnel land-mine, a durable and silent killer, is always present. Combatants, meanwhile, are not just regular troops but armed militias and gangs. Dramatic images of teenage soldiers brandishing their weapons are no longer shocking.

This is the new landscape of war. The challenge is to find innovative and constructive responses. One positive example comes to us from the Government and people of Mali.

In 1993, the President of Mali informed me of the rash of illicit small arms in his country and asked the United Nations for assistance in collecting them. In 1994, an advisory mission identified certain sources of the influx of weapons and stressed the need for strengthened internal security mechanisms. A follow-up mission to other countries in the region in 1995 confirmed the need for a "security first" approach.

Parallel to these efforts, a peace agreement was reached under which the Tuareg rebels in the north of the country were to surrender their weapons. President Konare again called upon the United Nations, this time to assist in the collection and destruction of nearly 3,000

small arms. Just four months ago in Timbuktu, the pile of weapons was set aflame in a vivid and symbolic display that the conflict had come to an end. The United Nations was glad to participate in such a celebration, and remains actively engaged in helping Mali to implement the peace agreement.

The experience of the United Nations in Mali shows that the international community understands the need to turn greater attention to micro-disarmament.

The Disarmament Commission has adopted guidelines on arms transfers, an event that marks the first step at the multilateral level to exert control over the thorny issue of illicit arms trading. I congratulate Japan on its initiative in bringing about the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms and thank it for its support of this vital body.

In Central Africa, States have proposed a regional arms register to increase transparency in military matters. This confidence-building measure deserves the widest possible support.

And as you know, I actively support a total ban on all anti-personnel landmines. A growing number of States have adopted unilateral bans on the transfer or use of mines. States should also increase their financial and technical assistance to countries in mine-clearance activities and in improving mine-clearance technology.

In addition, I urge all parties to ratify the revised protocol on land-mines. The agreement on revised Protocol II has set a new precedent for international humanitarian and arms control law. For the first time, a provision bans transfers of all non-detectable anti-personnel land-mines. The provisions governing the protection of peace and humanitarian missions have been strengthened. And the review mechanism of annual conferences will sustain momentum towards further improvements in the protocol and a complete ban on mines.

On 28 and 29 June, I was at the "Group of Seven" summit meeting, where Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini, in a press briefing, welcomed the intention of Japan and Canada to hold international conferences, as part of the effort towards a total ban on the production and use of anti-personnel land-mines.

The Board held a useful discussion in 1995 on the convening of a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The Disarmament Commission concluded its debate on the question

in May. There seems to be general agreement that a fourth special session should take place.

The United Nations plays a special role in promoting and formulating international consensus on the pressing global issues of our times, as seen through the recently completed cycle of landmark conferences. I attach great importance to that function.

The historical value of the consensus reached in the Final Declaration of the first special session on disarmament, in 1978, is essential. Although the nuclear-arms race was still raging, the international community seized the opportunity created by a period of *detente* between the two major Powers to harmonize global opinion in favour of disarmament.

Elements of the Programme of Action adopted at the session, covering nuclear issues, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons, are being implemented daily. Nevertheless, differences persist with regard to the Declaration's continuing relevance in the post-cold war world. The second and third special sessions, in 1982 and 1988, were relative successes. But for a variety of reasons, which you have examined in your discussions, the divergences of views on key issues among Member States could not be overcome. The next special session must be constructive and positive in both in its review of the past and its guidance for the future.

The Final Declaration in 1978 was achieved in large part through extensive advance preparations. Five meetings of the Preparatory Committee were held. A similar process might be agreed upon for the special session now being contemplated. The actual timing of the session could remain under discussion while substantive preparations are under way. The tenor and progress of those discussions would then help determine the appropriate moment to convene the session in order to ensure a positive outcome.

Disarmament is a global enterprise, involving individual States, regional organisations and the international community as a whole. Only the United Nations offers the global forum, the global framework and the global mandate needed to deal with the threat of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction. For the sake of human security in all its aspects, we must succeed in this essential endeavour.

67

Millennium Documents

EXCERPTS PERTAINING TO ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

WE THE PEOPLES: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Freedom from Fear

Pursuing arms reductions

The post-cold war era has seen both gains and setbacks in the realm of disarmament. On the positive side, the Ottawa Convention banning landmines and the Chemical Weapons Convention have both entered into force. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has been concluded, nuclear safeguards have been strengthened and nuclear-weapon-free zones now embrace all of the southern hemisphere. Nuclear weapons numbers have almost halved since 1982, and world military expenditures declined by some 30 per cent between 1990 and 1998.

The rest of the picture is much less encouraging. Little meaningful progress has been achieved in limiting the proliferation of small arms. The nuclear non-proliferation regime has suffered major blows as a result of clandestine nuclear weapon programmes, the nuclear tests in South Asia and the unwillingness of key states to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Advances in biotechnology are increasing the potential threat posed by biological weapons, while negotiations on a verification regime for the Biological Weapons Convention are being unnecessarily prolonged.

For three years in a row now, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has not engaged in any negotiations because its members have been unable to agree on disarmament priorities.

I cannot here review the entire arms control spectrum. Instead, I focus on two categories of weapon that are of special concern: small arms and light weapons, because they currently kill most people in most wars; and nuclear weapons, because of their continuing terrifying potential for mass destruction.

Small Arms

The death toll from small arms dwarfs that of all other weapons systems—and in most years greatly exceeds the toll of the atomic bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In terms of the carnage they cause, small arms, indeed, could well be described as "weapons of mass destruction". Yet, there is still no global non-proliferation regime to limit their spread, as there is for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

Small arms proliferation is not merely a security issue; it is also an issue of human rights and of development. The proliferation of small arms sustains and exacerbates armed conflicts. It endangers peacekeepers and humanitarian workers. It undermines respect for international humanitarian law. It threatens legitimate but weak governments and it benefits terrorists as well as the perpetrators of organized crime.

Much of the Cold War's small arms surplus finished up in the world's most dangerous conflict zones and, as the number of weapons in circulation increased, their price declined, making access to them ever easier even in the poorest countries. In parts of Africa in the mid-1990s, for example, deadly assault rifles could be bought for the price of a chicken or a bag of maize. Reducing the toll caused by these weapons will be difficult, not least because of the extraordinary number in circulation, which some estimates put as high as 500 million.

An estimated 50 to 60 per cent of the world's trade in small arms is legal—but legally exported weapons often find their way into the illicit market. The task of effective proliferation control is made far harder than it needs to be because of irresponsible behaviour on the part of some states and lack of capacity by others, together with the shroud of secrecy that veils much of the arms trade. Member States must act to increase transparency in arms transfers if we are to make any progress.

I would also urge that they support regional disarmament measures, like the moratorium on the importing, exporting or manufacturing of light weapons in West Africa.

Even if all arms transfers could be eliminated, however, the problem posed by the many millions of illicitly held small arms already in circulation in the world's war zones would remain.

Because most conflict-prone poor countries lack the capacity to detect and seize illicit weapons, a more promising path may be the use of market incentives. Outright buy-back programmes may simply stimulate arms imports from neighbouring countries, but non-monetary reimbursement schemes have worked in Albania, El Salvador, Mozambique and Panama. In return for weapons, individuals may receive tools, such as sewing machines, bicycles, hoes and construction materials, and entire communities have been provided with new schools, health-care services and road repairs.

Not only governments but also the private sector can and should help fund such programmes. This would be a particularly appropriate contribution by major international corporations that have a presence in conflict-prone regions.

Controlling the proliferation of illicit weapons is a necessary first step towards the non-proliferation of small arms. These weapons must be brought under the control of states, and states must be held accountable for their transfer. The United Nations is convening a conference on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in 2001, in which I hope civil society organisations will be invited to participate fully.

I urge Member States to take advantage of this conference to start taking serious actions that will curtail the illicit traffic in small arms.

The many recent expressions of concern about small arms proliferation are a welcome sign that the importance of the issue is being recognized, but words alone do nothing to prevent the ongoing slaughter of innocent people. Dialogue is critical, but we must match the rhetoric of concern with the substance of practical action.

Nuclear Weapons

When the bipolar balance of nuclear terror passed into history, the concern with nuclear weapons also seemed to drift from public consciousness. But some 35,000 nuclear weapons remain in the arsenals of the nuclear powers, with thousands still deployed on hair-trigger

alert. Whatever rationale these weapons may once have had has long since dwindled. Political, moral and legal constraints on actually using them further undermine their strategic utility without, however, reducing the risks of inadvertent war or proliferation.

The objective of nuclear non-proliferation is not helped by the fact that the nuclear weapon states continue to insist that those weapons in their hands enhance security, while in the hands of others they are a threat to world peace.

If we were making steady progress towards disarmament, this situation would be less alarming. Unfortunately the reverse is true. Not only are the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks stalled, but there are no negotiations at all covering the many thousands of so-called tactical nuclear weapons in existence, or the weapons of any nuclear power other than those of the Russian Federation and the United States of America.

Moreover, unless plans to deploy missile defences are devised with the agreement of all concerned parties, the progress achieved thus far in reducing the number of nuclear weapons may be jeopardized. Confidence-building is required to reassure states that their nuclear deterrent capabilities will not be negated.

Above all else, we need a reaffirmation of political commitment at the highest levels to reducing the dangers that arise both from existing nuclear weapons and from further proliferation.

To help focus attention on the risks we confront and on the opportunities we have to reduce them, I propose that consideration be given to convening a major international conference that would help to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers.

UNITED NATIONS MILLENNIUM DECLARATION

Peace, Security and Disarmament

We will spare no effort to free our peoples from the scourge of war, whether within or between States, which has claimed more than 5 million lives in the past decade. We will also seek to eliminate the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction.

We resolve therefore:

- To strengthen respect for the rule of law in international as in national affairs and, in particular, to ensure compliance by

Member States with the decisions of the International Court of Justice, in compliance with I the Charter of the United Nations, in cases to which they are parties.

- To make, the United Nations more effective in maintaining peace and security by giving it the resources and tools it needs for conflict prevention, peaceful resolution of disputes, peacekeeping, post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction. In this context, we take note of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations and request the General Assembly to consider its recommendations expeditiously.

- To strengthen cooperation between the United Nations and regional organisations, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter.

- To ensure the implementation, by States Parties, of treaties in areas such as arms control and disarmament and of international humanitarian law and human rights law, and call upon all States to consider signing and ratifying the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

- To take concerted action against international terrorism, and to accede as soon as possible to all the relevant international conventions.

- To redouble our efforts to implement our commitment to counter the world drug problem.

- To intensify our efforts to fight transnational crime in all its dimension, including trafficking as well as smuggling in human beings and money laundering.

- To minimize the adverse effects of United Nations economic sanctions on innocent populations, to subject such sanctions regimes to regular reviews and to eliminate the adverse effects of sanctions on third parties.

- To strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers.

- To take concerted action to end illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons, especially by making arms transfers more transparent and supporting regional disarmament measures, taking account of all the recommendations of the forthcoming

United Nations Conference on Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons.

- To call on all States to consider acceding to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, as well as the amended mines protocol to the Convention on conventional weapons.

MILLENNIUM SUMMIT DECLARATION

Pledges to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations in addressing conflict at all stages from prevention to settlement to post-conflict peace-building;

Reaffirms its determination to give equal priority to the maintenance of international peace and security in every region of the world and, in view of the particular needs of Africa, to give special attention to the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, and to the specific characteristics of African conflicts;

Stresses the critical importance of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, and *emphasizes* that such programmes should normally be integrated into the mandates of peacekeeping operations;

Calls for effective international action to prevent the illegal flow of small arms into areas of conflict;

Decides to continue to take resolute action in areas where the illegal exploitation and trafficking of high-value commodities contributes to the escalation or continuation of conflict;

Calls for the strengthening of cooperation and communication between the United Nations and regional or subregional organisations or arrangements, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter, and in particular in respect of peacekeeping operations;

Emphasizes the importance of continued cooperation and effective coordination between the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity and African subregional organisations in addressing conflict in Africa, and of enhanced support for the Organisation of African Unity Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution;

MILLENNIUM FORUM

Peace, Security, and Disarmament

Despite over 50 years of effort, no decisive progress has yet been made in eliminating nuclear weapons, which are still capable of destroying all life on this planet, and the circle of their possessors is expanding. For mainly commercial reasons, there is no adequate verification for treaties prohibiting biological weapons, while knowledge of how to produce them spreads. Rape continues to be used as a weapon of war. Space has been militarized and space weapons are being actively developed. For the moment, the problem is centred in a small group of eight States that are claiming for themselves the right to possess weapons that could destroy all of humankind.

Disarmament alone is not the way to peace; it must be accompanied by genuine human security. It is imperative that NGOs be included in the dialogue for peace. The world community—civil society, including younger and older people, and Governments—has the resources and knowledge to move from culture of violence to a culture of peace.

The Forum Urges

The United Nations

To carry out the objective of moving towards the abolition of war by practical means, the United Nations Secretariat and interested Governments, or a separate group of Governments, should develop a draft proposal for global disarmament to be discussed in a fourth special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. This proposal would be aimed specifically at reducing the level of armed violence throughout the world through continuing improved conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conventional disarmament and nuclear weapons abolition, in a programme designed to be promoted by a broad coalition of civil society organisations, particularly youth organisations, as well as by interested Governments.

To ensure that no "non-discriminatory" weapons, such as landmines and sub-munitions, are used by any military force, in particular by any force or coalition acting under a United Nations mandate.

To expand the United Nations arms register in order to show the production and sale of small arms and light weapons. It should include specific names their producers and traders.

To re-open the Peace Education Unit in the Department of Political Affairs, provisions for continuous liaison with NGOs.

Governments

To promptly carry out their obligations in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons and to ban them. For this purpose, Governments should, by the beginning of the year 2001, convene the conference eliminate nuclear dangers, as proposed by Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Govern-should immediately undertake to close laboratories that research and develop new nuclear weapons, to de-alert nuclear weapons and to withdraw nuclear weapons from foreign States.

Together with nearly all Governments that participated in the recent Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference, Forum participants consider that unilateral deployment of nationwide missile defence by any country could have dangerously destabilising effects and create pressures to permanently retain high levels of nuclear weapons or even to increase existing levels. The deployment of theatre missile defences in Asia or other regions could have seriouns regional destabilising effects. Such plans should be relinquished in favour of a worldwide missile launch warning system and a conference to review methods of ending production of long-range surface-to-surface missiles and long-range bombers.

To expand the network of nuclear free zones until they cover all areas other than territory of weapons States and to complement that network by maritime measures that close ports to naval vessels unless they certify that they are not carrying nuclear weapons. Civil society should energetically promote all these measures to control nuclear weapons.

To initiate a worldwide freeze on armed forces and a 25 per cent cut in production and export of major weapons and small arms, and to that end to adopt an international code of conduct on arms exports, as the beginning of worldwide build-down of conventional forces.

To implement the International Anti-Personnel Landmines Convention of 1997, also known as the Ottawa Treaty, to ban anti-personnel landmines.

To establish a commission at the United Nations to devise ways of stopping the technological development of new and more advanced weapons the create new imbalances in global power relationships. The Conference on Disarmament should also establish a working group on this subject.

To establish peace education, including coping with domestic conflict, covering all ages from young children to older adults, at all levels from pre-school through university and non-formal community education. Education for peace and conflict avoidance is essential for moving towards sustainable peace. Implementation of this obligation of each national Government should be assured by an appropriate treaty.

To increase their efforts to promote and to comply with international to manitarian laws, limiting the methods and means of war and protecting non-combatants, civilian populations and humanitarian personnel.

To immediately adopt measures to implement the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, so that children up to the age of 18 will be prohibited from participation in armed conflict.

Civil society

To give special attention and support to those disabled and injured by violent conflict, to children and the elderly, and to the reintegration into society of former combatants. Protection of war-affected children in conflict zones must become a worldwide campaign.

To maintain the impartiality and independence of all NGOs working for peace, security, disarmament and humanitarian issues from political, military and economic powers and institutions. At the same time, NGOs should organically link with popular movements promoting equity, justice and diversity (such as the labour movement, women's movements and civil rights movements).

To protect the humanitarian principles that are linked with human rights and reject all attempts to transform the field of humanitarian assistance into a new market open to private companies.

29. Freedom from Fear: Role of UN in Peace Disarmament and Global Security

The world is now in the fifty-fifth year without war among the major powers—the longest such period in the entire history of the modern system of states. In the area of Europe that now comprises the European Union—where most modern wars started—a security community has emerged: an association of states characterized by dependable expectations that disputes will be resolved by peaceful means.

Moreover, nearly five decades of cold war—sustained by a nuclear balance of terror that could have annihilated us all instantly—have passed. Some

observers have lamented that fact, claiming that bipolarity was stable, predictable and helped keep the peace. But that was hardly true in the developing world: there the cold war was a period of frequent armed conflict fuelled by both sides in the bipolar world. Once the cold war ended, that source of external political and material support ceased to exist.

Freeing the United Nations from the shackles of the cold war also enabled it to play a more significant role. The 1990s saw an upsurge both in our peacekeeping and in our peacemaking activities: three times more peace agreements were negotiated and signed during that decade than in the previous three combined.

The frequency of inter-state warfare has been declining for some time. Economic globalisation has largely eliminated the benefits of territorial acquisition, while the destructiveness of modern warfare has increased its costs. The near-doubling in the number of democracies since 1990 has been equally important, because established democratic states, for a variety of reasons, rarely fight each other militarily.

Wars since the 1990s have been mainly internal. They have been brutal, claiming more than five million lives. They have violated, not so much borders, as people. Humanitarian conventions have been routinely flouted, civilians and aid workers have become strategic targets, and children have been forced to become killers. Often driven by political ambition or greed, these wars have preyed on ethnic and religious differences, they are often sustained by external economic interests, and they are fed by a hyperactive and in large part illicit global arms market.

In the wake of these conflicts, a new understanding of the concept of security is evolving. Once synonymous with the defence of territory from external attack, the requirements of security today have come to embrace the protection of communities and individuals from internal violence.

The need for a more human-centred approach to security is reinforced by the continuing dangers that weapons of mass destruction, most notably nuclear weapons, pose to humanity: their very name reveals their scope and their intended objective, if they were ever used.

As we look ahead, we can see real risks that resource depletion, especially freshwater scarcities, as well as severe forms of environmental degradation, may increase social and political tensions in unpredictable but potentially dangerous ways.

In short, these new security challenges require us to think creatively, and to adapt our traditional approaches to better meet the needs of our new era. But one time-honoured precept holds more firmly today than ever: it all begins with prevention.

Preventing Deadly Conflicts

There is near-universal agreement that prevention is preferable to cure, and that strategies of prevention must address the root causes of conflicts, not simply their violent symptoms. Consensus is not always matched by practical actions, however. Political leaders find it hard to sell prevention policies abroad to their public at home, because the costs are palpable and immediate, while the benefits—an undesirable or tragic future event that does not occur—are more difficult for the leaders to convey and the public to grasp. Thus prevention is, first and foremost, a challenge of political leadership.

If we are to be successful at preventing deadly conflicts, we must have a clear understanding of their causes. Not all wars are alike; therefore no single strategy will be universally effective. What is different about the wars that people have suffered since the beginning of the 1990s?

Several major conflicts in the past decade were wars of post-communist succession, in which callous leaders exploited the most primitive forms of ethnic nationalism and religious differences to retain or acquire power. Some of those conflicts have already receded into the history books—along with those leaders—and it is to be hoped that the remainder soon will. The majority of wars today are wars among the poor. Why is this the case?

Poor countries have fewer economic and political resources with which to manage conflicts They lack the capacity to make extensive financial transfers to minority groups or regions, for example, and they may fear that their state apparatus is too fragile to countenance devolution. Both are routine instruments in richer countries.

What this means is that every single measure I described in the previous section—every step taken towards reducing poverty and achieving broad-based economic growth—is a step towards conflict prevention. All who are engaged in conflict prevention and development, therefore—the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, governments and civil society organisations—must address these challenges in a more integrated fashion.

We can do more. In many poor countries at war, the condition of poverty is coupled with sharp ethnic or religious cleavages. Almost invariably, the rights of subordinate groups are insufficiently respected, the institutions of government are insufficiently inclusive and the allocation of society's resources favours the dominant faction over others.

The solution is clean even if difficult to achieve in practice:to promote human rights, to protect minority rights and to institute political arrangements in which all groups are represented. Wounds that have festered for a long time will not heal overnight nor can confidence be built or dialogues develop while fresh wounds are being inflicted. There are no quick fixes, no short cuts. Every group needs to become convinced that the state belongs to all people.

Some armed conflicts today are driven by greed, not grievance. Whereas war is costly for society as a whole, it nevertheless may be profitable for some. In such cases, often the control over natural resources is at stake, drugs are often involved, the conflicts are abetted by opportunistic neighbours, and private sector actors are complicit—buying ill-gotten gains, helping to launder funds and feeding a steady flow of weapons into the conflict zone.

The best preventive strategy in this context is transparency: "naming and shaming". Civil society actors have an enormous role to play in this regard, but governments and the Security Council must exercise their responsibility. Greater social responsibility on the part of global companies, including banks, is also essential.

Finally, successful strategies for prevention require us to ensure that old conflicts do not start up again, and that the necessary support is provided for post-conflict peace-building. I regret to say that we do not fully enjoy that level of support in most of our missions.

While prevention is the core feature of our efforts to promote human security, we must recognize that even the best preventive and deterrence strategies can fail. Other measures, therefore, may be called for. One is to strengthen our commitment to protecting vulnerable people.

Protecting the Vulnerable

Despite the existence of numerous international conventions intended to protect the vulnerable, the brutalisation of civilians, particularly women and children, continues in armed conflicts. Women

have become especially vulnerable to violence and sexual exploitation, while children are easy prey for forced labour and are often coerced into becoming fighters. Civilian populations and infrastructure have become covers for the operations of rebel movements, targets for reprisal and victims of the chaotic brutalities that too often follow breakdowns in state authority. In the most extreme cases, the innocent become the principal targets of ethnic cleansers and *genocidaires.*

International conventions have traditionally looked to states to protect civilians, but today this expectation is threatened in several ways. First, states are sometimes the principal perpetrators of violence against the very citizens that humanitarian law requires them to protect. Second, non-state combatants, particularly in collapsed states, are often either ignorant or contemptuous of humanitarian law. Third, international conventions do not adequately address the specific needs of vulnerable groups, such as internally displaced persons, or women and children in complex emergencies.

To strengthen protection, we must reassert the centrality of international humanitarian and human rights law. We must strive to end the culture of impunity—which is why the creation of the International Criminal Court is so important. We must also devise new strategies to meet changing needs.

New approaches in this area could include establishing a mechanism to monitor compliance by all parties with existing provisions of international humanitarian law. Stronger legal standards are needed to provide for the protection of humanitarian workers. Consideration should also be given to an international convention regulating the actions of private and corporate security firms, which we see involved in internal wars in growing numbers.

Greater use of information technology can also help to reduce the pain and burdens of complex emergencies for the people involved; one example is a programme called "Child Connect", which helps reunite children and parents who have been separated in wars and natural disaster. Of one thing we may be certain: without protecting the vulnerable, our peace initiatives will be both fragile and illusory.

Addressing the Dilemma of Intervention

In my address to the General Assembly last September; I called on Member States to unite in the pursuit of more effective policies to stop organized mass murder and egregious violations of human rights.

Although I emphasized that intervention embraced a wide continuum of responses, from diplomacy to armed action, it was the latter option that generated most controversy in the debate that followed.

Some critics were concerned that the concept of "humanitarian intervention" could become a cover for gratuitous interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states.

Others felt that it might encourage secessionist movements deliberately to provoke governments into committing gross violations of human rights in order to trigger external interventions that would aid their cause. Still others noted that there is little consistency in the practice of intervention, owing to its inherent difficulties and costs as well as perceived national interests—except that weak states are far more likely to be subjected to it than strong ones.

I recognize both the force and the importance of these arguments. I also accept that the principles of sovereignty and non-interference offer vital protection to small and weak states. But to the critics I would pose this question: if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?

Child Connect: Using the Information Revolution to Find Lost Children

In wars and natural disasters children often get separated from their parents and re-uniting them can pose an immense challenge for aid agencies. The International Rescue Committee's "Child Connect" project was desined to solve this problem. The project uses a shared database open to all the agencies in the field seeking to reunite lost children with their parents. These agencies can submit data and photographs of unaccompanied children as well as search requests from parents search procedures that once took months can now be completed in minutes, saving both children and parents much heartache.

For children connect to realize its potential, all the tracing agencies in a region need to be able to submit and review the lost-and-found data on a regular basis. The easiest way to do this, of course is via the Internet, but armed conflicts rarely occur in places with robust Internet or communication infrastructures.

In Kosovo, the International Rescue Committee created a shared satellite/wireless Internet network in Pristina (www.ipko.org). Every United Nations agency, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, several national missions, and the majority of non-governmental organisations are connected to the Internet 24-hours per day via the network.

Because the marginal cost of this technology is so low, the project is also able to provide free Internet access to the university, hospital, libraries, schools,

local media and local non-governmental organisations. So not only are international organisations getting robust communications links and saving money, they are helping to support Kosovar civil society and build a long-term Internet infrastructure for Kosovo. The project has now been turned over to an independent local non-governmental organisation that is already completely self-sustaining.

This project can serve as a model for future humanitarian emergencies. By building a shared Internet infrastructure, international organisations will benefit from more reliable communications at a much lower cost and they will be able to take advantage of shared access to databases and other Internet-based applications to improve their effectiveness.

When the crisis ends, the infrastructure can be left in place and local people trained to maintain it

We confront a real dilemma. Few would disagree that both the defence of humanity and the defence of sovereignty are principles that must be supported. Alas, that does not tell us which principle should prevail when they are in conflict.

Humanitarian intervention is a sensitive issue, fraught with political difficulty and not susceptible to easy answers. But surely no legal principle—not even sovereignty—can ever shield crimes against humanity. Where such crimes occur and peaceful attempts to halt them have been exhausted, the Security Council has a moral duty to act on behalf of the international community. The fact that we cannot protect people everywhere is no reason for doing nothing when we can. Armed intervention must always remain the option of last resort, but in the face of mass murder it is an option that cannot be relinquished.

Strengthening Peace Operations

With the end of the Cold War confrontation and the paralysis it had induced in the Security Council, the decade of the 1990s became one of great activism for the United Nations. More peace operations were mounted in that decade than in the previous four combined, and we developed new approaches to post-conflict peace-building and placed new emphasis on conflict prevention.

While traditional peacekeeping had focused mainly on monitoring ceasefires, today's complex peace operations are very different. Their objective, in essence, is to assist the parties engaged in conflict to pursue their interests through political channels instead. To that end, the United Nations helps to create and strengthen political institutions and to broaden their base. We work alongside governments, non-governmental organisations and local citizens'groups to provide

emergency relief, demobilize former fighters and reintegrate them into society, clear mines, organize and conduct elections, and promote sustainable development practices.

International assistance to rebuild the economy is an essential complement to this work. People will quickly become disillusioned with fledgling institutions, and even the peace process itself, if they see no prospect for any material improvement in their condition. Post-conflict peace-building has helped to prevent the breakdown of numerous peace agreements, and to build the foundations for sustainable peace.

We can claim significant successes among our peace operations in the last decade or so, beginning with Namibia in the late 1980s, and including Mozambique, El Salvador, the Central African Republic, Eastern Slavonia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and, at least partially, Cambodia. We also encountered tragic failures, none more so than Rwanda and the fall of Srebrenica and the other safe areas in Bosnia. The many reasons for those failures, including those attributable to the United Nations Secretariat, are discussed frankly and in considerable detail in two reports I issued late last year

The structural weaknesses of United Nations peace operations, however, only Member States can fix. Our system for launching operations has sometimes been compared to a volunteer fire department, but that description is too generous. Every time there is a fire, we must first find fire engines and the funds to run them before we can start dousing any flames. The present system relies almost entirely on last minute, *ad hoc* arrangements that guarantee delay, with respect to the provision of civilian personnel even more so than military.

Although we have understandings for military stand-by arrangements with Member States, the availability of the designated forces is unpredictable and very few are in a state of high readiness. Resource constraints preclude us even from being able to deploy a mission headquarters rapidly.

On the civilian side, we have been starkly reminded in Kosovo and East Timor how difficult it is to recruit qualified personnel for missions. Where do we find police officers quickly, or judges, or people to run correctional institutions—to focus only on law enforcement needs? A more systematic approach is necessary here as well.

To bring greater clarity to where we stand and how we can hope to progress with regard to United Nations peace operations, I have established a high-level panel, which will review all aspects of peace operations, from the doctrinal to the logistical. It will suggest ways forward that are acceptable politically and make sense operationally.

I expect that the panel's report will be completed in time to enable the Millennium Assembly to consider its recommendations.

Targeting Sanctions

During the 1990s, the United Nations established more sanctions regimes than ever before. Sanctions, an integral element of the collective security provisions of the Charter offer the Security Council an important instrument to enforce its decisions, situated on a continuum between mere verbal condemnation and recourse to armed force. They include arms embargoes, the imposition of trade and financial restrictions, interruptions of relations by air and sea, and diplomatic isolation.

Sanctions have had an uneven track record in inducing compliance with Security Council resolutions. In some cases, little if any effort has gone into monitoring and enforcing them. In many cases, neighbouring countries that bear much of the loss from ensuring compliance have not been helped by the rest of the international community and, as a result, have allowed sanctions to become porous.

When robust and comprehensive economic sanctions are directed against authoritarian regimes, a different problem is encountered. Then it is usually the people who suffer, not the political elites whose behaviour triggered the sanctions in the first place. Indeed, those in power; perversely, often benefit from such sanctions by their ability to control and profit from black market activity, and by exploiting them as a pretext for eliminating domestic sources of political opposition.

Because economic sanctions have proved to be such a blunt and even counter-productive instrument, a number of governments, and numerous civil society organisations and think tanks around the world, have explored ways to make them smarter by better targeting them. Switzerland has led an effort to design instruments of targeted financial sanctions, including drafting model national legislation required to implement them, and Germany is supporting work on how to make arms embargoes and other forms of targeted boycotts more effective. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and

Canada have also contributed to the debate on how to target sanctions more effectively.

These efforts are now sufficiently well advanced to merit serious consideration by Member States. I invite the Security Council, in particular, to bear them in mind when designing and applying sanctions regimes.

Pursuing Arms Reductions

The post-Cold-War era has seen both gains and setbacks in the realm of disarmament. On the positive side, the Ottawa Convention banning landmines and the Chemical Weapons Convention have both entered into force. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has been concluded, nuclear safeguards have been strengthened and nuclear-weapon-free zones now embrace all of the southern hemisphere. Nuclear weapons numbers have almost halved since 1982, and world military expenditures declined by some 30 percent between 1990 and 1998.

The rest of the picture is much less encouraging. Little meaningful progress has been achieved in limiting the proliferation of small arms. The nuclear non-proliferation regime has suffered major blows as a result of clandestine nuclear weapon programmes, the nuclear tests in South Asia and the unwillingness of key states to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Advances in biotechnology are increasing the potential threat posed by biological weapons, while negotiations on a verification regime for the Biological Weapons Convention are being unnecessarily prolonged. For three years in a row now, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has not engaged in any negotiations because its members have been unable to agree on disarmament priorities.

I cannot here review the entire arms control spectrum. Instead, I focus on two categories of weapon that are of special concern: small arms and light weapons, because they currently kill most people in most wars; and nuclear weapons, because of their continuing terrifying potential for mass distruction.

Small Arms

The death toll from small arms dwarfs that of all other weapons systems—and in most years greatly exceeds the toll of the atomic bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In terms of the

carnage they cause, small arms, indeed, could well be described as "weapons of mass destruction". Yet, there is still no global non-proliferation regime to limit their spread, as there is for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

Small arms proliferation is not merely a security issue; it is also an issue of human rights and of development. The proliferation of small arms sustains and exacerbates armed conflicts. It endangers peacekeepers and humanitarian workers. It undermines respect for international humanitarian law. It threatens legitimate but weak governments and it benefits terrorists as well as the perpetrators of organized crime.

Much of the cold war's small arms surplus finished up in the world's most dangerous conflict zones and, as the number of weapons in circulation increased, their price declined, making access to them ever easier even in the poorest countries. In parts of Africa in the mid-1990s, for example, deadly assault rifles could be bought for the price of a chicken or a bag of maize. Reducing the toll caused by these weapons will be difficult, not least because of the extraordinary number in circulation, which some estimates put as high as 500 million.

An estimated 50 to 60 per cent of the world's trade in small arms is legal—but legally exported weapons often find their way into the illicit market. The task of effective proliferation control is made far harder than it needs to be because of irresponsible behaviour on the part of some states and lack of capacity by others, together with the shroud of secrecy that veils much of the arms trade. Member States must act to increase transparency in arms transfers if we are to make any progress. I would also urge that they support regional disarmament measures, like the moratorium on the importing, exporting or manufacturing of light weapons in West Africa.

Even if all arms, transfers could be eliminated, however, the problem posed by the many millions of illicitly held small arms already in circulation in the world's war zones would remain.

Because most conflict-prone poor countries lack the capacity to detect and seize illicit weapons, a more promising path may be the use of market incentives. Outright buy-back programmes may simply stimulate arms imports from neighbouring countries, but non-monetary reimbursement schemes have worked in Albania, El Salvador, Mozambique and Panama. In return for weapons, individuals may receive tools, such as sewing machines, bicycles, hoes and construction

materials, and entire communities have been provided with new schools, health-care services and road repairs.

Not only governments but also the private sector can and should help fund such programmes.This would be both a helpful and an appropriate contribution by major international corporations that have a presence in conflict-prone regions.

Controlling the proliferation of illicit weapons is a necessary first step towards the non-proliferation of small arms.These weapons must be brought under the control of states, and states must be held accountable for their transfer. The United Nations is convening a conference on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in 2001, in which I hope civil society organisations will be invited to participate fully.

> I urge Member States to take advantage of this conference to start taking serious actions that will curtail the illicit traffic in small arms.

The many recent expressions of concern about small arms proliferation are a welcome sign that the importance of the issue is being recognized, but words alone do nothing to prevent the ongoing slaughter of innocent people. Dialogue is critical, but we must match the rhetoric of concern with the substance of practical action.

Nuclear Weapons

Let me now turn to nuclear weapons. When the bipolar balance of nuclear terror passed into history, the concern with nuclear weapons also seemed to drift from public consciousness. But some 35,000 nuclear weapons remain in the arsenals of the nuclear powers, with thousands still deployed on hair-trigger alert. Whatever rationale these weapons may once have had has long since dwindled. Political, moral and legal constraints on actually using them further undermine their strategic utility without however; reducing the risks of inadvertent war or proliferation.

The objective of nuclear non-proliferation is not helped by the fact that the nuclear weapon states continue to insist that those weapons in their hands enhance security, while in the hands of others they are a threat to world peace.

If we were making steady progress towards disarmament, this situation would be less alarming. Unfortunately the reverse is true. Not only are the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks stalled, but there are no negotiations at all covering the many thousands of so-called tactical

nuclear weapons in existence, or the weapons of any nuclear power other than those of the Russian Federation and the United States of America.

Moreover, unless plans to deploy missile defences are devised with the agreement of all concerned parties, the progress achieved thus far in reducing the number of nuclear weapons may be jeopajadized. Confidence-building is required to reassure states that their nuclear deterrent capabilities will not be negated.

Above all else, we need a reaffirmation of political commitment at the highest levels to reduce the dangers that arise both from existing nuclear weapons and from further proliferation.

To help focus attention on the risks we confront and on the opportunities we have to reduce them, I propose that consideration be given to convening a major international conference that would help to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers.

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