

Online Study Materials on
**UNITED NATIONS PEACE
BUILDING STRATEGY**

25

**United Nations Truce Supervision
Organisation**

HEADQUARTERS: Government house, Jerusalem

DURATION: June 1948 to present

CURRENT STRENGTH: 217 military observers

FATALITIES: 28

OFFICER-IN-CHARGE: Colonel Joseph Bujold (Canada)

Background

From its early days, the United Nations has been concerned with the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East. Since 1948, there have been five full-fledged wars directly connected with the conflict, and five United Nations peace-keeping operations have been established in the region. Of these, three are still deployed.

The Arab-Israeli conflict has its origins in the problem of Palestine, which was brought before the United Nations early in 1947. At the time, Palestine was a Territory administered by the United Kingdom under a Mandate from the League of Nations, with a population of about 2 million, two-thirds of whom were Arabs and one-third, Jews.

In November 1947, the General Assembly endorsed a plan for the partition of the Territory, providing for the creation of an Arab State and a Jewish State, with Jerusalem to be placed under international status. The plan was not accepted by the Palestinian Arabs and Arab States. On 14 May 1948, the United Kingdom relinquished its Mandate over Palestine and the State of Israel was proclaimed. On the following day, the Palestinian Arabs, assisted by Arab States, opened hostilities against Israel.

Establishment of UNTSO

On 29 May, the Security Council, in its resolution 50 (1948), called for a cessation of hostilities in Palestine and decided that the truce

should be supervised by the United Nations Mediator, with the assistance of a group of military observers. This resolution formed the basis for the establishment of the first United Nations peace-keeping operation which became known as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO). The first group of observers arrived in the region between 11 and 14 June 1948 and were immediately deployed in Palestine and some of the Arab countries.

UNTSO'S Operations

While UNTSO was initially used in supervising the original truce of 1948, its function was radically altered in 1949 with the conclusion of four General Armistice Agreements between Israel and the four neighbouring Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria). Its main responsibility then was to assist the parties in supervising the application and observance of those Agreements. Its headquarters was established at Government House in Jerusalem, where it remains today.

Following the 1967 war, UNTSO established two ceasefire observation operations, in the Israel-Syria sector and in the Suez Canal zone. In 1972, a similar operation was set up in southern Lebanon. When United Nations peace-keeping forces were later deployed, in the Sinai in 1973, on the Golan Heights in 1974 and in southern Lebanon in 1978, UNTSO observers were attached to the new forces to assist them in their operations.

Today, UNTSO observers continue to be assigned to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights in the Israel-Syria sector. They man eleven observation posts located in the area of separation maintained by the Force and in the vicinity of the lines on both sides. They also conduct the fortnightly inspections of the areas of limitation in armaments and forces provided for under the disengagement agreement of 1974. This group of UNTSO observers is formed into Observer Group Golan (OGG). The Observer Detachment Damascus (ODD), a separate UNTSO unit, serves UNTSO in Syria and performs support functions for OGG.

In the Israel-Lebanon sector, UNTSO observers who have been detailed to assist the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) form the Observer Group Lebanon (OGL). This Group, which is under operational control of the UNIFIL commander, maintains five observation posts along the Lebanese side of the Armistice Demarcation Line and operates five mobile teams in parts of the UNIFIL area of operation that are under Israeli control and where UNIFIL infantry units are not deployed.

UNTSO continues to maintain its presence in the Egypt-Israel sector, where its observers are organized as Observer Group Egypt (OGE). The Group has its headquarters in Ismailia, operates outposts in the Sinai and conducts patrols in most parts of the peninsula. OGE maintains liaison for UNTSO with the Egyptian authorities. In addition, UNTSO maintains offices in Amman, Beirut and Gaza.

Other Activities

Over the years, UNTSO has also made available its personnel to assist in the setting up of other United Nations peace-keeping operations not connected with the Arab-Israeli conflict. The rapid deployment of experienced United Nations observers has been most valuable in setting up the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 1960, the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) in 1963, the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) and the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) in 1988, the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) in 1991, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 1992 and the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) also in 1992.

Composition

UNTSO's military observers come from the following countries (figures as at 30 November 1994):

<i>Country</i>	<i>Observers</i>
Argentina	6
Australia	13
Austria	14
Belgium	6
Canada	14
Chile	3
China	5
Denmark	11
Finland	16
France	14
Ireland	17
Italy	8
Netherlands	15
New Zealand	7
Norway	15

Russian Federation	12
Sweden	17
Switzerland	7
United States	17
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TOTAL	217

Figures may vary from month to month due to rotation.

Financial Aspects

Since its establishment in 1948, UNTSO has been financed from the regular budget of the United Nations. Its costs are therefore assessed as part of each biennial programme budget. The rough cost to the United Nations of the operation in 1994 was approximately \$28.6 million.

26

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

LOCATION: Syrian Golan Heights

HEADQUARTERS: Damascus

DURATIONS: June 1974 to present

CURRENT STRENGTH: 1,031 troops assisted by the military observers of UNTSO's Observe. Group Golon

FATALITIES: 37

FORCE COMMANDER: Major-General Roman Misztal (Poland)

Background

On 6 October 1973, war erupted again in the Middle East between Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Suez Canal area and the Sinai and between Israeli and Syrian forces on the Golan Heights. On 24 October, as fighting between Egypt and Israel reached a critical stage, the Security Council decided to set up a second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II). The Force was immediately moved into place between the Israeli and Egyptian armies in the Suez Canal area, and its arrival effectively stabilized the situation.

In the Israel-Syria sector tension remained high, and from March 1974 the situation became increasingly unstable. Against this background, the United States undertook a diplomatic initiative, which resulted in the conclusion of an Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces. The Agreement provided for an area of separation and for two equal zones of limited forces and armaments on both sides of the area, and called for the establishment of a United Nations observer force to supervise its implementation. The Agreement was signed on 31 May 1974.

Establishment of UNDOF

Later on the same day, the Security Council adopted resolution 350 (1974) by which it set up the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). As provided in the Agreement on Disengagement, UNDOF's mandate was to maintain the ceasefire between Israel and Syria, to supervise the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces, and to supervise the areas of separation and limitation. Since then, the Security Council has periodically extended UNDOF's mandate for periods of six months at a time.

UNDOF's Activities

Advance parties of the Force arrived in the area on 3 June 1974, and within two weeks its total strength was brought to near its then authorized level of about 1,250. Following the completion of the disengagement operation and the delineation of the lines bounding the area of separation, UNDOF set up a series of checkpoints and observation posts within that area. In addition, two base camps were established, one on the east side of the area of separation and the other on the west side. In the area of separation UNDOF operates static positions and observation posts, which are manned 24 hours a day, and conducts patrols by vehicle or on foot along predetermined routes by day and night. Temporary outposts and additional patrols are set up from time to time to perform specific tasks.

Under a programme undertaken by the Syrian authorities, civilians have continued to return to the area of separation, the population of which has doubled since the establishment of UNDOF. The Syrian Arab Republic has stationed police in the area of separation in exercise of its administrative responsibility. UNDOF has adjusted its operations accordingly to take account of these developments and to continue to carry out effectively its supervisory tasks under the Agreement on Disengagement. UNDOF headquarters maintains close liaison with the Israeli and the Syrian authorities through their senior military representatives. At the local level, the commanders of the UNDOF units maintain liaison with one side or the other through liaison officers designated by the parties.

UNDOF conducts fortnightly inspections of armament and force levels in the area of limitation. These inspections are carried out with the assistance of liaison officers from the parties, who accompany the inspection teams. The findings of the inspection teams are communicated to the two parties. The inspections have generally proceeded smoothly with the cooperation of the parties concerned,

although on both sides restrictions are regularly placed on the movement of the teams in some localities.

In his most recent report on the activities of UNDOF submitted to the Security Council on 18 November 1994, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, stated that UNDOF had continued to perform its tasks effectively, with the cooperation of the parties. Despite the present quiet in the Israel-Syria sector, however, the situation in the Middle East continued to be potentially dangerous and was likely to remain so, unless and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem could be reached. The Secretary-General believed that, in the prevailing circumstances, the continued presence of the Force in the area was essential and recommended that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNDOF for a further period of six months.

The Security Council, by its resolution 962 (1994) of 29 November, renewed the mandate of UNDOF until 31 May 1995, and called upon the parties concerned to implement its resolution 338 (1973), which had called for a just and durable settlement to the Middle East conflict.

Humanitarian Functions

In addition to its normal peace-keeping functions, UNDOF has carried out activities of a humanitarian nature. At the request of the parties, UNDOF from time to time exercised its good offices in arranging for the transfer of released prisoners and the bodies of war dead between Israel and Syria. It assisted the International Committee of the Red Cross by providing it with facilities for the hand-over of prisoners and bodies, for the exchange of parcels and mail and for the passage of persons and personal effects across the area of separation. Within the means available, UNDOF has also provided medical treatment to the local population.

Composition

UNDOF was originally composed of Austrian and Peruvian infantry units and Canadian and Polish logistic elements transferred from the Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II). The Peruvian contingent was withdrawn in July 1975 and replaced by an Iranian contingent. This contingent was in turn withdrawn in March 1979 and replaced by a Finnish contingent. Until December 1993, UNDOF comprised contingents from Austria, Canada, Finland and Poland, as well as a number of military observers, detailed from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO). In addition, UNTSO

observers assigned to the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission have assisted UNDOF in the execution of its tasks. In 1993, the Government of Finland decided to withdraw its contingent by the end of the year. Poland offered, and the Security Council agreed, to replace the Finnish infantry battalion. Canada also agreed to assume all logistics functions. Thus UNDOF currently' comprises infantry battalions from Austria and Poland and a logistic unit from Canada as follows (figures as at 30 November 1994):

<i>Country</i>	<i>Troops</i>
Austria	465
Canada	212
Poland	354
Total	1,031

Figures may vary from month to month due to rotation. "Troops" include any Infantry, logistics, engineering, medical, movecon, staff, etc.

Approximately 80 UNTSO observers continue to assist UNDOF as before. There are also some 35 international and 90 locally recruited civilian staff.

Financial Aspects

From its inception, UNDOF has been financed from the Special Account established for UNEF II. Following the termination of UNEF II in July 1979, the account remained open for UNDOF. The rough cost to the United Nations of the operation in 1994 was approximately \$32.2 million. As at 30 November 1994, total contributions outstanding to the Special Account of UNDOF for the period from the inception of the operation to 30 November 1994 amounted to approximately \$29.7 million.

NOTE

1. After his departure on 30 November 1994, General Misztal was succeeded by Major-General Johannes C. Kusters (Netherlands), who assumed command on 6 January 1995.

27

United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission

LOCATIONS: The demilitarized zone along the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait

HEADQUARTERS: Umm Qasr

DURATION: April 1991 to present

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: 3,645 military personnel

CURRENT STRENGTHS: 243 military observers, 881 troops and support personnel, and 80 international and 130 local civilian staff

FATALITIES: 3

FORCE COMMANDERS: Major-General Krishna Narayan Singh Thapa (Nepal)

Background

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. The same day, the United Nations Security Council condemned the invasion and demanded Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal. A few days later, the Council instituted economic sanctions against Iraq. The Council subsequently adopted a number of resolutions on various aspects of the situation and, on 29 November 1990, it decided to give Iraq until 15 January 1991 to implement those resolutions; if not, Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait were authorized to use "all necessary means" to uphold and implement the Council's resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.

The deadline passed and the next day the armed forces of those States began air attacks against Iraq, followed on 24 February by a ground offensive. Hostilities were suspended on 27 February, by which

time the Iraqi forces had vacated Kuwait. On 3 April 1991, while still maintaining the economic sanctions against Iraq, the Security Council adopted resolution 687 (1991), which set detailed conditions for a ceasefire and established the machinery for ensuring implementation of those conditions. Following Iraq's acceptance of the resolution's provisions, the ceasefire became a formal one.

Establishment of UNIKOM

By resolution 687 (1991) the Council established, among other things, a demilitarized zone (DMZ) along the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, to be monitored by a United Nations observer unit, and requested the Secretary-General to submit to the Council for approval a plan for the unit's immediate deployment. The Secretary-General reported back on 5 April 1991, and on 9 April the Security Council approved his plan for the setting up of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) (resolution 689 (1991)). It decided further that the modalities for the Mission should be reviewed every six months.

The mandate of the Mission is to monitor the DMZ and the Khawr 'Abd Allah waterway between Iraq and Kuwait; to deter violations of the boundary through its presence in, and surveillance of, the demilitarized zone; and to observe any hostile action mounted from the territory of one State against the other. The Khawr 'Abd Allah waterway is about 40 kilometres (25 miles) long. The DMZ, which is about 200 kilometres (125 miles) long, extends 10 kilometres (6 miles) into Iraq and 5 kilometres (3 miles) into Kuwait.

The military observers of UNIKOM are unarmed. Responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in the DMZ rests with the Governments of Iraq and Kuwait in their respective parts of the zone. Police are allowed only sidearms.

According to its original mandate, UNIKOM did not have the authority or the capacity to take physical action to prevent the entry of military personnel or equipment into the DMZ.

UNIKOM's Activities

The UNIKOM advance party arrived in the area on 13 April 1991. By 6 May, the Mission was fully deployed. UNIKOM then monitored the withdrawal of the armed forces that were still deployed in its assigned zone. That withdrawal having been completed, the DMZ established by the Security Council came into effect at 2000 hours GMT on 9 May, and UNIKOM assumed in full its observation responsibilities.

Initially, to provide essential security during the setting-up phase, UNIKOM included five infantry companies, drawn from the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). These troops were withdrawn by the end of June 1991.

UNIKOM's concept of operations is based on a combination of patrol and observation bases, observation points, ground and air patrols, investigation teams and liaison with the parties at all levels.

UNIKOM enjoys full freedom of movement throughout the DMZ and observes the length and breadth of the zone. It verifies that no military personnel and equipment are within the zone and that no military fortifications and installations are maintained in it. For operational purposes, UNIKOM has divided the DMZ into three sectors. Each sector has a headquarters and six observation posts/patrol bases, from which the observers patrol their assigned sectors and visit temporary observation points established in areas of particular activity or where roads and tracks enter the DMZ. In fact, all movements, including supply runs, are used for observation. UNIKOM patrols the Khawr 'Abd Allah waterway by helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft. There are also air patrols in the DMZ, especially in the southern sector, where mines and unexploded ordnance limit UNIKOM's ability to carry out ground patrols.

UNIKOM has also maintained contact and provided technical support to other United Nations missions working in Iraq and Kuwait, in particular to the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission until its dissolution in May 1993, and to the United Nations office dealing with the return of property from Iraq to Kuwait. UNIKOM has provided movement control in respect of all United Nations aircraft operating in the area. The Mission also provided assistance in connection with the relocation of Iraqi citizens from the Kuwaiti side of the border to Iraq, following the demarcation of the international boundary. This was completed in February 1994.

UNIKOM headquarters is located at Umm Qasr. The Mission maintains liaison offices in Baghdad and Kuwait City and a logistic base at Doha (Kuwait). The latter is currently being moved to facilities in Kuwait City, which it will share with the liaison office.

From May 1991 to November 1994, UNIKOM observed mainly three types of violations: minor incursions on the ground by small groups of soldiers, overflights by military aircraft, and the carrying by policemen of weapons other than sidearms. UNIKOM also investigated a number of complaints by Iraq and Kuwait.

Reinforcement of UNIKOM Decided

On 5 February 1993, following a series of incidents on the newly demarcated boundary between Iraq and Kuwait involving Iraqi intrusions into the Kuwaiti side of the DMZ and unauthorized retrieval of property from Kuwaiti territory, the Security Council, by its resolution 806 (1993), expanded the tasks of UNIKOM to include the capacity to take physical action to prevent or redress small-scale violations of the DMZ or the boundary. The Council increased the authorized strength of the Mission to 3,645 and requested the Secretary-General to plan and execute a phased deployment of the additional elements of UNIKOM. It also requested him to report on any steps he intended to take following an initial deployment.

In his 2 April 1993 report, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of his intention, in the first phase, to retain the military observers and to reinforce them by one mechanized infantry battalion to be deployed in the northern sector of the DMZ. The Mission's logistic support elements would also be slightly reinforced. On 13 April, the President of the Council informed the Secretary General that the Council concurred with his recommendations.

The infantry battalion from Bangladesh was fully deployed in January 1994.

On 29 September 1994, in his periodic report on the operations of UNIKOM, the Secretary-General noted that the Mission "has continued to exercise a high degree of vigilance and through its patrols and liaison activities has contributed to the calm which has prevailed along the Iraq-Kuwait border". He recommended that UNIKOM be maintained.

Composition

The current authorized strength of UNIKOM is 3,645 military personnel, including 300 military observers. Initially, administrative and logistic support was provided by Canada (engineers), Chile (helicopters), Denmark (logistics) and Norway (medical). Chile withdrew its helicopter unit at the end of October 1992; it was replaced by a civilian unit, under contract to UNIKOM. Canada withdrew its engineer unit at the end of March 1993 and the Secretary-General accepted an offer from Argentina to replace it. The Norwegian medical unit was replaced in November 1993 by a combined medical team composed of 16 members from

Bangladesh and 12 members from Austria. Two fixed-wing aircraft operated by civilians have been made available at no cost to the United

Nations by the Government of Switzerland. The Mission also has the use of a chartered AN-26 aircraft for the transport of personnel and equipment between Kuwait City and Baghdad. In addition, UNIKOM includes 80 international and 130 local civilian staff.

As at 30 November 1994, the following countries were providing military elements:

<i>Country</i>	<i>Troops</i>	<i>Observers</i>
Argentina	50	7
Austria	12	7
Bangladesh	775	9
Canada		5
China		15
Denmark	44	6
Fiji		6
Finland		6
France		15
Ghana		6
Greece		7
Hungary		6
India		6
Indonesia		6
Ireland		7
Italy		6
Kenya		7
Malaysia		7
Nigeria		6
Pakistan		7
Poland		6
Romania		7
Russian Federation		15
Senegal		6
Singapore		6
Sweden		6
Thailand		6
Turkey		6
United Kingdom		15
United States		15
Uruguay		6
Venezuela		2
Total	881	243

Figures may vary from month to month due to rotation. "Troops" include any infantry, logistics, engineering, air, medical, movcon, staff, etc.

Financial Aspects

The rough cost of UNIKOM in 1994 was approximately \$68.6 million. Effective 1 November 1993, two-thirds of the cost of the operation is being paid by the Government of Kuwait. The remainder is met by the assessed contributions of the United Nations Member States. As at 30 November 1994, total contributions outstanding to the UNIKOM Special Account for the period from the inception of the operation to 31 March 1995 amounted to approximately \$31.3 million.

28

Peace-Keeping and Indo-Pak Conflict

A. Background

The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMPGIP) had its origin in the conflict between India and Pakistan over the status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir (referred to here as Kashmir). The United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) was an administrative adjunct, created when conflict occurred in 1965 along the borders of the two countries outside the UNIGIP area.

In August 1947, India and Pakistan became independent dominions, in accordance with a scheme of partition provided by the Indian Independence Act of 1947. Under that scheme, the State of Jammu and Kashmir was free to accede to India or Pakistan. The accession became a matter of dispute between the two countries and fighting broke out later that year.

The question first came before the Security Council in January 1948, when India complained that tribesmen and others were invading Kashmir and that extensive fighting was taking place. India charged that Pakistan was assisting and participating in the invasion. Pakistan denied India's charges and declared that Kashmir's accession to India following India's independence in 1947 was illegal.

B. United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan

Security Council Action

On 20 January, the Council adopted resolution 39(1948) establishing a three-member United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) "to investigate the facts pursuant to Article 34 of the Charter of the United Nations" and "to exercise... any mediatory influence likely to smooth away difficulties...."

Although India and Pakistan were consulted on the above resolution, serious disagreement arose between the two Governments regarding its implementation, and the proposed Commission could not be constituted.

On 21 April 1948, the Security Council met again and adopted resolution 47(1948), by which it decided to enlarge the membership of the Commission from three to five (originally it was composed of representatives of Argentina, Czechoslovakia and the United States; Belgium and Canada were now added), and instructed it to proceed at once to the subcontinent and place its good offices at the disposal of the two Governments, to facilitate the taking of the necessary measures with respect to both the restoration of peace and the holding of a plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Council also authorized the Commission to establish in Jammu and Kashmir such observers as it might require.

Commission Action

The United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan arrived in the subcontinent on 7 July 1948 and immediately engaged in consultations with the Indian and Pakistan authorities. On 20 July, the Commission asked the Secretary-General to appoint and send, if possible at once, a high-ranking officer to act as military adviser to the Commission, and further to appoint officers and necessary personnel who would be ready to travel to the Indian subcontinent at a moment's notice in order to supervise the ceasefire if and when it was reached.

UNCIP Mission

After undertaking a survey of the situation in the area, UNCIP unanimously adopted a resolution on 13 August, proposing to India and Pakistan that their respective high commands order a ceasefire and refrain from reinforcing the troops under their control in Kashmir. The resolution provided for the appointment by the Commission of military observers who, under the Commission's authority and with the co-operation of both commands, would supervise the observance of the ceasefire order. It also proposed to the Governments that they accept certain principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, and stated that UNCIP would have observers stationed where it deemed necessary.

C. Supervision of the Ceasefire, 1948-1965

Military Adviser

On 19 November 1948, the Commission received an urgent communication from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan

concerning alleged reinforcements of the Indian troops in Kashmir and attacks by those troops against positions held by forces of the *Azad* (Free) Kashmir movement. There was immediate need, for an independent source of information on the military situation in the State, and UNCIP recommended urgently that a military adviser be appointed and proceed forthwith to the subcontinent. It further requested the Secretary-General to provide an adequate number of military observers to assist the adviser. On 11 December 1948, UNCIP submitted to India and Pakistan some new proposals for the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir upon the signing of a truce agreement, which were accepted by the two Governments. On 1 January, 1949, both Governments announced their agreement to order a ceasefire effective one minute before midnight, local time, on that day.

Arrival of Observers

The Secretary-General appointed Lieutenant-General Maurice Delvoie of Belgium as Military Adviser to the Commission. General Delvoie arrived in the mission area on 2 January 1949. On 15 January, the Indian and Pakistan high commands conferred in New Delhi and formalized the ceasefire in Kashmir. The UNCIP Military Adviser, who was invited to join the conference, presented to them a plan for the organisation and deployment of the military observers in the area. This plan was put into effect on the Pakistan side on 3 February, and on the Indian side on 10 February 1949. A first group of seven United Nations military observers had arrived on 24 January. Their number was increased to 20 in early February. These observers, under the command of the Military Adviser, formed the nucleus of UNMOGIP.

Observers' Tasks

In accordance with the Military Adviser's plan, the observers were divided into two groups, one attached to each army. The senior officer of each group established a "control headquarters" under the direct command of the Military Adviser and in close liaison with the commander of the operations theatre on his side. Each group was divided into teams of two observers, attached to the tactical formations in the field and directly responsible to the control headquarters. The control headquarters on the Pakistan side was located at Rawalpindi. The one on the Indian side was first established at Jammu; later, at the end of March, it was transferred to Srinagar.

The tasks of the observers, as defined by the Military Adviser, were to accompany the local authorities in their investigations, gather as much information as possible, and report as completely, accurate

and impartially as possible to the observer in charge of the group. Any direct intervention by the observers between the opposing parties or any interference in the armies' orders were to be avoided. The local commanders might bring alleged violations of the ceasefire by the other side to the attention of the observers for their action. These arrangements remained in effect until the conclusion of the Karachi Agreement.

The administrative arrangements laid down for the UNMOGIP observers and the general principles under which they function are the same as those for the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation in Palestine.

Plebiscite Administrator

With the entering into force of the ceasefire, the situation became quieter. After a brief visit to New York, UNCIP returned to the subcontinent on 4 February 1949 and resumed negotiations with the parties towards the full implementation of Security Council resolution 47 (1948). Earlier in the year, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, of the United States, had been appointed by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the two parties and with UNCIP, as United Nations Plebiscite Administrator.

Supervision of the Karachi Agreement

On 18 July 1949, military representatives of the two Governments met at Karachi under the auspices of UNCIP, and on 27 July they signed an Agreement establishing a ceasefire line. The Agreement specifies that UNCIP would station observers where it deemed necessary, and that the ceasefire line would be verified mutually on the ground by local commanders on each side with the assistance of the United Nations military observers. Disagreements were to be referred to the Commission's Military Adviser, whose decision would be final. After verification, the Adviser would issue to each high command a map on which would be marked the definitive ceasefire line. The Agreement further sets forth certain activities which are prohibited on either side of the ceasefire line, such as the strengthening of defences or the increase of forces in certain areas, as well as the introduction of additional military potential into Kashmir.

Listing of Ceasefire Breaches

Interpretations of the Agreement were agreed upon during the demarcation of the ceasefire line on the ground and during the resulting adjustment of forward positions by both armies. An agreed list of acts

to be considered as breaches of the ceasefire was established by the Military Adviser on 16 September 1949.

This list was later revised with the agreement of the parties and, in its final form, encompassed six categories of activity, namely: (1) crossing of the ceasefire line, (2) firing and use of explosives within five miles of the line, (3) new wiring and mining of any positions, (4) reinforcing existing forward defended localities with men or warlike stores, (5) forward movement from outside Kashmir of any warlike stores, equipment and personnel, except for relief and maintenance, and (6) flying of aircraft over the other side's territory.

While the Karachi Agreement established a ceasefire line in Kashmir, it did not include the border between Pakistan and that State, which runs in a general easterly direction from the southern extremity of the ceasefire line at Manawar. In this connection, the Chief Military Observer agreed on 11 February 1950, at the request of both parties, that the UNMOGIP observers would investigate all incidents on the border between Pakistan and Kashmir reported to them by both armies, solely for the purpose of determining whether or not military forces from either side were involved.

UNCIP Report to the Security Council

In September 1949, UNCIP decided to return to New York to report to the Security Council. In a press statement issued on 22 September on this subject, the Commission recalled that Security Council resolution 47(1948) of 21 April 1948 envisaged three related but distinct steps: a ceasefire, a truce period during which the withdrawal of forces would take place and, finally, consultations to establish the conditions by means of which the free will of the people of Kashmir would be expressed. The first objective had been achieved but, despite the Commission's efforts, no agreement could be secured on the other two.

Concluding that the possibilities of its mediation had been exhausted, UNCIP decided to return to New York. In doing so, it reaffirmed its belief that a peaceful solution of the problem of Kashmir could be reached, and expressed the hope that its report to the Council would further this purpose.

Termination of UNCIP

Before leaving the subcontinent, the Chairman of the Commission, on 19 September, addressed letters to the two Governments informing them of the above decision. In doing so, he stressed that the Military

Adviser and the military observers would remain and pursue their normal activities.

Following the Commission's return to New York, the Security Council decided, on 17 December 1949, to request the Council President, General A.G.L. McNaughton of Canada, to meet informally with the representatives of India and Pakistan and examine with them the possibility of finding a mutually satisfactory basis for dealing with the Kashmir problem. On 14 March 1950, the Security Council, after examining the reports of UNCIP and of General McNaughton, adopted resolution 80(1950), by which it decided to terminate the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.

Appointment of a United Nations Representative

At the same time the Security Council decided to appoint a United Nations representative who was to exercise all of the powers and responsibilities devolving upon UNCIP. Sir Owen Dixon, of Australia, was appointed by the Council as United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan. A Chief Military Observer (Brigadier H. H. Angle of Canada) was appointed by the Secretary-General as head of UNMOGIP.

Continuance of UNMOGIP

On 30 March 1951, the Security Council, by resolution 91(1951), decided that UNMOGIP should continue to supervise the ceasefire in Kashmir, and requested the two Governments to ensure that their agreement regarding the ceasefire would continue to be faithfully observed. The United Nations Representative (at the time, Frank P. Graham of the United States, who succeeded Sir Owen Dixon) subsequently pointed out, in his report of 15 October 1951, that the debate in the Security Council leading to the adoption of resolution 91(1951) had indicated that it was the Council's intention that the Representative should deal only with the question of the demilitarisation of Kashmir. The Representative was therefore not concerned with the existing arrangements for the supervision of the ceasefire, the responsibility for which the Council had placed with UNMOGIP.

Since that time, UNMOGIP has functioned as an autonomous operation, directed by the Chief Military Observer under the authority of the Secretary-General. Its headquarters alternates between Srinagar in summer (mid-May to mid-November) and Rawalpindi in winter. An operational staff office is maintained in one of those two cities when it

is not hosting the headquarters. The supervision of the ceasefire in the field is carried out by a number of field observation teams stationed on both sides of the ceasefire line and also along the border between Pakistan and Kashmir.

Between 1949 and 1964, the number of military observers fluctuated between 35 and 67, according to need. Just before the outbreak of the hostilities of 1965, there were 45 observers, provided by 10 countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Italy, New Zealand, Sweden and Uruguay.

Brigadier Angle served as Chief Military Observer until his death in an air crash in July 1950, and he was later replaced by Lieutenant-General Robert H. Nimmo, of Australia. Like the UNCIP Military Adviser, the Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP, during the initial years, had the status of an observer, and continued to receive his military salary from his Government. In 1959, General Nimmo was given an appointment as an official of the United Nations Secretariat with the rank of Assistant Secretary-General. This administrative arrangement, which had been also applied to the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, was to become the general rule for all heads of United Nations peace-keeping operations.

Role and Activities of UNMOGIP

With the conclusion of the Karachi Agreement in 1949, the situation along the ceasefire line became more stable. Incidents took place from time to time, but they were generally minor and were dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement. This situation continued until 1965.

The role and activities of UNMOGIP were described by the Secretary-General in a report dated 3 September 1965 in this manner:

The United Nations maintains UNMOGIP with its 45 observers along the CFL (ceasefire line) of almost 500 miles, about half of which is in high mountains and is very difficult of access. UNMOGIP exercises the quite limited function of observing and reporting, investigating complaints from either party of violations of the CFL and the ceasefire and submitting the resultant findings on those investigations to each party and to the Secretary-General, and keeping the Secretary-General informed in general on the way in which the ceasefire agreement is being kept. Because the role of UNMOGIP appears frequently to be misunderstood, it bears emphasis that the operation has no authority or function entitling it to enforce or prevent anything, or to try to ensure that the ceasefire is respected. Its very presence in the area, of course, has acted to some extent as a deterrent, but this is not the case at present. The Secretary-

General exercises responsibility for the supervision and administrative control of the UNMOGIP operation.

D. The Hostilities of 1965 and the Establishment of UNIPOM

Background

In early 1965, relations between India and Pakistan were strained again because of their conflicting claims over the Rann of Kutch at the southern end of the international border.

The situation steadily deteriorated during the summer of 1965, and, in August, military hostilities between India and Pakistan erupted on a large scale along the ceasefire line in Kashmir. In his report of 3 September 1965, the Secretary-General stressed that the ceasefire agreement of 27 July 1949 had collapsed and that a return to mutual observance of it by India and Pakistan would afford the most favourable climate in which to seek a resolution of political differences.

Security Council Action for a Ceasefire

On 4 September 1965, the Security Council, by resolution 209(1965), called for a ceasefire and asked the two Governments to co-operate fully with UNMOGIP in its task of supervising the observance of the ceasefire. Two days later, the Council adopted resolution 210(1965), by which it requested the Secretary-General "to exert every possible effort to give effect to the present resolution and to resolution 209(1965), to take all measures possible to strengthen the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, and to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the implementation of the resolutions and on the situation in the area".

From 7 to 16 September, the Secretary-General visited the subcontinent in pursuit of the mandate given to him by the Security Council. In his report of 16 September to the Council, he noted that both sides had expressed their desire for a cessation of hostilities, but that each side had posed conditions which made the acceptance of a ceasefire very difficult for the other. In those circumstances, the Secretary-General suggested that the Security Council might take a number of steps: first, it might order the two Governments, pursuant to Article 40 of the United Nations Charter,* to desist from further

* In order to prevent an aggravation of a situation, the Security Council, under Article 40 of the Charter, before making recommendations or deciding on measures to be taken, may call upon the parties concerned to comply with provisional measures it deems necessary or desirable, without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of those parties.

military action; second, it might consider what assistance it could provide in ensuring the observance of the ceasefire and the withdrawal of all military personnel by both sides; and, third, it could request the two Heads of Government to meet in a country friendly to both in order to discuss the situation and the problems underlying it, as a first step in resolving the outstanding differences between their two countries.

On 20 September, after the hostilities had spread to the international border between India and West Pakistan, the Council adopted resolution 211(1965), by which it demanded that a ceasefire take effect at 0700 hours GMT on 22 September 1965 and called for a subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel to the positions held before 5 August. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the ceasefire and the withdrawal of all armed personnel.

Establishment of UNIPOM

In Kashmir, the supervision called for by the Security Council was exercised by the established machinery of UNMOGIP. For this purpose, its observer strength was increased to a total of 102 from the same contributing countries as before.

Since the hostilities extended beyond the Kashmir ceasefire line, the Secretary-General decided to set up an administrative adjunct of UNMOGIP, the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM), as a temporary measure for the sole purpose of supervising the ceasefire along the India-Pakistan border outside the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

The function of UNIPOM was primarily to observe and report on breaches of the ceasefire called for by the Security Council. In case of breaches, the observers were to do all they could to persuade the local commanders to restore the ceasefire, but they had no authority or power to order a cessation of firing. Ninety observers from 10 countries (Brazil, Myanmar, Canada, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Ethiopia, Ireland, Nepal, the Netherlands, Nigeria and Venezuela) were assigned to UNIPOM.

The Mission was closely co-ordinated both administratively and operationally with UNMOGIP. The Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP, General Nimmo, was initially also placed in charge of UNIPOM. After the arrival of the newly appointed Chief Officer of UNIPOM, Major-General B.F. Macdonald of Canada, in October 1965,

General Nimmo was asked by the Secretary-General to exercise oversight functions with regard to both operations.

Further Security Council Action

On 27 September 1965, after learning that the ceasefire was not holding, the Security Council adopted resolution 214(1965), by which it demanded that the parties urgently honour their commitments to the Council to observe the ceasefire, and called upon them to withdraw all armed personnel as necessary steps in the full implementation of resolution 211(1965).

As ceasefire violations continued to occur and there were no prospects of the withdrawal of troops, the Security Council met again in November and adopted resolution 215(1965) of 5 November. By this decision, the Council called upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to instruct their armed personnel to co-operate with the United Nations and cease all military activity.

The Security Council further demanded the prompt and unconditional execution of the proposal already agreed to in principle by India and Pakistan that their representatives meet with a representative of the Secretary-General to formulate an agreed plan and schedule of withdrawals. In this connection, the Secretary-General after consultation with the parties, appointed Brigadier-General Tulio Marambio, of Chile, as his representative on withdrawals.

On 15 December, the Secretary-General reported that the two parties directly involved, India and Pakistan, had informed him of their desire that the United Nations should continue its observer function after 22 December 1965, which was the end of the first three months of the ceasefire demanded by the Security Council in its resolution 211(1965) of 20 September 1965.

In the circumstances, the Secretary-General indicated his intention to continue the United Nations activities relating to the ceasefire and withdrawal provisions of the resolution by continuing UNIPOM for a second period of three months and maintaining the added strength of the Military Observer Group.

Tashkent Agreement

On 10 January 1966, the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan, who had met in Tashkent, USSR, at the invitation of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, announced their agreement that the withdrawal of all armed personnel of both sides to

the positions they held prior to 5 August 1965 should be completed by 25 February 1966 and that both sides should observe the ceasefire terms on the ceasefire line.

Withdrawal Plan

The principles of a plan and schedule of withdrawals were subsequently agreed upon by military representatives of India and Pakistan, who had held meetings for that purpose since 3 January 1966 at Lahore and Amritsar under the auspices of General Marambio, the Secretary-General's representative on withdrawals. The plan for disengagement and withdrawal was agreed upon by the military commanders of the Indian and Pakistan armies in New Delhi on 22 January.

At a joint meeting on 25 January, under the auspices of the Secretary-General's representative, the parties agreed upon the ground rules for the implementation of the disengagement and withdrawal plan. The plan was to be implemented in two stages and the good offices of UNMOGIP and UNIPOM were to be requested to ensure that the action agreed upon was fully implemented. In the event of disagreement between the parties, the decision of General Marambio would be final and binding on both sides. The good offices of UNMOGIP and UNIPOM were similarly requested for the implementation of the second stage of the agreement, as were the good offices of the Secretary-General's representative on withdrawals.

Termination of UNIPOM

The Secretary-General reported on 23 February 1966 that the first stage of the withdrawals had been completed on 20 February and that it was expected that the entire operation would be completed by the target date of 25 February. In that event, the responsibilities of the Secretary-General's representative on withdrawals would come to an end on 28 February and his mission would be terminated on that date. The task of UNIPOM would also have been successfully completed and that phase of the ceasefire operation would be discontinued no later than 22 March 1966. There would also be a gradual reduction of the 59 additional observers appointed in September 1965 to the Military Observer Group.

On 26 February 1966, the Secretary-General reported that the withdrawal of the troops by India and Pakistan had been completed on schedule on 25 February, and that the withdrawal provisions of the Security Council's resolutions had thus been fulfilled by the two parties.

As planned, UNIPOM was terminated and the observer strength of UNMOGIP was reduced to 45, drawn from the same 10 contributing countries, by the end of March. From that date until December 1971, UNMOGIP functioned on the basis of the Karachi Agreement in much the same way as it had done before September 1965.

E. Hostilities of 1971 and Their Aftermath

Background

At the end of 1971, hostilities broke out again between the Indian and Pakistan forces. They started along the borders of East Pakistan and were related to the movement for independence which had developed in that region and which ultimately led to the creation of Bangladesh.

Secretary-General's Actions

When tension was mounting in the summer of 1971, Secretary-General U Thant, invoking his responsibilities under the broad terms of Article 99* of the United Nations Charter, submitted a memorandum to the Security Council on 20 July in which he drew attention to the deteriorating situation in the subcontinent and informed the Council of the action he had taken in the humanitarian field.

On 20 October, the Secretary-General sent identical messages to the heads of the Governments of India and Pakistan expressing increasing anxiety over the situation and offering his good offices with a view to avoiding any development that might lead to disaster. In these messages, he recalled the efforts of the Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP to ease tension and prevent military escalation along the ceasefire line in Kashmir.

In early December, after the outbreak of hostilities, the Secretary-General submitted a series of reports to the Security Council on the situation along the ceasefire line in Kashmir, based on information received from the Chief Military Observer. The reports showed that from 20 October onwards, both India and Pakistan greatly reinforced their forces along the ceasefire line. Both sides admitted that violations of the Karachi Agreement were being committed by them, but they continued to use the machinery of UNMOGIP to prevent escalation. However, on 3 December, hostilities broke out along the ceasefire line,

* Article 99 of the Charter states: "The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security."

with exchanges of artillery and small-arms fire and air attacks by both sides. The Secretary-General pointed out that he could not report on military developments in other parts of the subcontinent since the United Nations had no observation machinery outside Kashmir.

General Assembly Resolution

On 4 December, the Security Council met to consider the situation in the subcontinent. But it could not reach agreement and decided two days later to refer the matter to the General Assembly. On 7 December, the Assembly considered the question referred to it and adopted resolution 2793(XXVI), calling upon India and Pakistan to take forthwith all measures for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of their armed forces to their own side of the borders.

Between 7 and 18 December, the Secretary-General submitted another series of reports on the situation along the ceasefire line in Kashmir. Fighting continued, with varying intensity, until 17 December, 1930 hours local time, when a ceasefire announced by the two Governments went into effect. By that time, a number of positions on both sides of the 1949 ceasefire line had changed hands.

Security Council Action

The Security Council met again on 12 December, and, on 21 December, adopted resolution 307(1971), by which it demanded that a durable ceasefire in all areas of conflict remain in effect until all armed forces had withdrawn to their respective territories and to positions which fully respected the ceasefire line in Kashmir supervised by UNMOGIP.

Following the adoption of this resolution, the representative of India stated that Kashmir was an integral part of India. In order to avoid bloodshed, he added, his Government had respected the ceasefire line supervised by UNMOGIP, but there was a need to make some adjustments in that line and India intended to discuss and settle this matter directly with Pakistan. The representative of Pakistan insisted that Kashmir was disputed territory whose status should be settled by agreement under the aegis of the Security Council.

Reports on the Ceasefire

Subsequent reports of the Secretary-General indicated that following a period of relative quiet, complaints of violations of the ceasefire were received by the Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP in late January from the military commands of both sides. The

Secretary-General observed that, pending the withdrawals of the armed forces, the ceasefire under Security Council resolution 307(1971) must be regarded, for the time being and for practical purposes, as a simple ceasefire requiring the parties to refrain from any firing or forward movement along the lines where the respective armies were in actual control at the time the ceasefire had come into effect on 17 December.

In order to report to the Secretary-General on the observance of the ceasefire, the observers must have the co-operation of the parties and enjoy freedom of movement and access along the lines of control, but these conditions were not met. In this connection, the Secretary-General remarked, discussions aimed at securing the co-operation of the parties had been satisfactorily completed with Pakistan but were still continuing with the Indian military authorities.

Functioning of UNMOGIP

On 12 May 1972, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that, while the Pakistan military authorities continued to submit to UNMOGIP complaints of ceasefire violations by the other side, the Indian military authorities had stopped doing so. The situation concerning the functioning of UNMOGIP remained unchanged and, as a result, the Secretary-General could not keep the Council fully informed of developments relating to the observance of the ceasefire. The Secretary-General expressed the hope that, in keeping with the demand of the Security Council, the ceasefire would be strictly observed and that both sides would take effective measures to ensure that there was no recurrence of fighting. He noted in this connection that the UNMOGIP machinery continued to be available to the parties, if desired.

On the same day, India informed the Secretary-General that its efforts to open direct negotiations with Pakistan had made some progress and that it hoped the talks between the two countries would take place at the highest level as early as possible in a positive and constructive spirit, with a view to achieving durable peace in the subcontinent. India also indicated that many incidents had been satisfactorily settled at flag meetings between local commanders. India had refrained from sending to the Secretary-General lists of ceasefire violations by Pakistan in the firm belief that if Pakistan was indeed ready and willing to settle differences and disputes between the two countries in a truly friendly and co-operative spirit, direct negotiations provided the best means.

During May and June, Pakistan brought to the Secretary-General's attention long lists of alleged ceasefire violations by India in Kashmir and other sectors. In a letter dated 5 June, Pakistan stated that there were no flag meetings between Pakistan and Indian military commanders with regard to incidents along the ceasefire line in Kashmir, although such meetings had been held for incidents along the international border. It was clear that incidents along the ceasefire line should be investigated by UNMOGIP observers, and flag meetings held under the auspices of UNMOGIP, since both the 1949 Karachi Agreement and Security Council resolution 307(1971) prescribed UNMOGIP's responsibilities in this regard. It was therefore the view of the Pakistan Government that the activation of the machinery of UNMOGIP on the Indian side of the ceasefire line in Kashmir would serve to prevent incidents.

Present Position

In July 1972, the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan signed, at Shimla, India, an agreement defining a Line of Control in Kashmir which, with minor deviations, follows the same course as the ceasefire line established in the Karachi Agreement of 1949. This Line of Control was agreed to by both parties in December 1972 and was delineated on the ground by representatives of the two armies.

After conclusion of the Simla Agreement, relations between India and Pakistan progressively reverted to normal and the number of incidents along the line of control in Kashmir greatly decreased. However, the positions of India and Pakistan on the functioning of UNMOGIP have remained unchanged. The position of the Secretary-General has been that, given the disagreement between the two parties concerned, UNMOGIP can be terminated only by a decision of the Security Council. In the absence of such a decision, UNMOGIP has been maintained with the same administrative arrangements. Its headquarters continue to alternate between Srinagar and Rawalpindi.

Pakistan insists that UNMOGIP continue to carry out all the functions prescribed by the Karachi Agreement. The Indian Government, on the other hand, in light of its views on the applicability of that Agreement, restricts the activities of the observers on its side of the Line of Control. Since January 1972, the Indian military authorities have not submitted any complaints on ceasefire violations by the other side nor have they replied to the complaints submitted by

Pakistan, which the Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP continues to transmit to them. However, the Indian authorities have continued to provide UNMOGIP with the same administrative facilities as before, including the headquarters premises in Srinagar and a liaison office in New Delhi.

The number of observers, which stood at 44 at the end of 1971, had been reduced to 39 by October 1985 as a result of a decision by certain contributing countries to withdraw their observers. As of the latter date, the observers were provided by nine contributing countries: Australia, Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Uruguay.

29

United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

LOCATION: The ceasefire line between India and Pakistan in the State of Jammu and Kashmir

HEADQUARTERS: Rawalpindi (November-April); Srinagar (May-October)

DURATION: January 1949 to present

STRENGTH: 39 military observers

FATALITIES: 6

CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVER: Major-General Ricardo Jorge Galarza-Chans (Uruguay)

Background

For nearly four decades, the United Nations has been concerned with the conflict between India and Pakistan over the status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In August 1947, India and Pakistan became independent. Under the scheme of partition provided by the Indian Independence Act of 1947, Kashmir was free to accede to India or Pakistan. Its accession to India became a matter of dispute between the two countries and fighting broke out later that year.

The question first came before the Security Council in January 1948, when India complained that tribesmen and others, with Pakistan's support and participation, were invading Kashmir and extensive fighting was taking place. Pakistan denied the charges and declared that Kashmir's accession to India was illegal.

Establishment of UNMOGIP

On 20 January, the Security Council adopted resolution 39 (1948) establishing a three-member United Nations Commission for India

and Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate and mediate the dispute. On 21 April 1948, by its resolution 47 (1948), the Council decided to enlarge the membership of UNCIP and recommended various measures, including the use of observers, to stop the fighting. The ceasefire between India and Pakistan came into effect on 1 January 1949, and a first group of UN military observers arrived in the area on 24 January. On 18 July 1949, India and Pakistan signed the Karachi Agreement establishing a ceasefire line to be supervised by the observers. These observers formed the nucleus of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP).

UNMOGIP'S Activities

Following the termination of UNCIP, the Security Council, by its resolution 91 (1951) of 30 March 1951, decided that UNMOGIP should continue to supervise the ceasefire in Kashmir. Since that time, UNMOGIP has functioned as an autonomous operation, directed by the Chief Military Observer. UNMOGIP's functions were to observe and report, investigate complaints of ceasefire violations and submit its findings to each party and to the Secretary-General.

In early August 1965, hostilities again broke out on a large scale along the ceasefire line in Kashmir, and eventually spread to the international border between India and West Pakistan. The Security Council called for a ceasefire and a withdrawal of all armed personnel to the positions held before the hostilities began.

In Kashmir, the supervision called for by the Council was exercised by UNMOGIP. In addition, since the hostilities extended beyond the Kashmir ceasefire line, the Secretary-General established an administrative adjunct of UNMOGIP, the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM), as a temporary measure for the sole purpose of supervising the ceasefire along the India-Pakistan border outside the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Following the withdrawal of troops in February 1966, UNMOGIP reverted to its original task, while UNIPOM was terminated,

At the end of 1971, full-scale hostilities again broke out between India and Pakistan. By the time fighting had ended and a ceasefire had gone into effect, a number of positions on both sides of the 1949 ceasefire line had changed hands. In July 1972, India and Pakistan signed an agreement defining a Line of Control in Kashmir which, with minor deviations, followed the same course as the ceasefire line established by the Karachi Agreement of 1949. India took the position that the mandate of UNMOGIP had lapsed, since it had related

specifically to the ceasefire line under the Karachi Agreement and did not extend to the actual line of control that had come into existence in December 1971. Pakistan, however, did not accept this position.

Present Situation

Given the disagreement between the two parties about UNMOGIP's mandate and functions, the Secretary-General's position has been that UNMOGIP can be terminated only by a decision of the Security Council. In the absence of such a decision, UNMOGIP has been maintained with the same administrative arrangements. Its task is to observe, to the extent possible, developments pertaining to the strict observance of the ceasefire of 17 December 1971 and to report thereon to the Secretary-General. The military authorities of Pakistan have continued to lodge with UNMOGIP complaints about ceasefire violations. The military authorities of India have lodged no complaints since January 1972 and have restricted the activities of the United Nations observers on the Indian side of the Line of Control. They have, however, continued to provide accommodation, transport and other facilities to UNMOGIP.

The Observer Group's headquarters alternates between Srinagar in summer (mid-May to mid-November) and Rawalpindi in winter. An operational staff office is maintained in one of those two cities when it is not hosting the headquarters. The supervision of the ceasefire in the field is carried out by a number of field observation teams stationed on both sides of the Line of Control and also along the border between Pakistan and Kashmir.

Composition

The strength of UNMOGIP is 39 military observers from eight countries (figures valid as at 30 November 1994):

<i>Country</i>	<i>Observers</i>
Belgium	2
Chile	3
Denmark	6
Finland	7
Italy	5
Republic of Korea	5
Sweden	8
Uruguay	3
Total	39

Figures may vary from month to month due to rotation

Financial Aspects

Since its establishment in 1949, UNMOGIP has been financed from the regular budget of the United Nations. Its costs are therefore assessed as part of each biennial programme budget. The rough cost of the operation in 1994 was approximately \$7.2 million.

NOTE

1. In December 1994, General Galarza-Chans is to be succeeded by Major-General Alfonso Pessolano (Italy).

30

United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan

AUTHORISATION: Security Council resolution Resolution 968 (1994) of 16 December 1994

LOCATION: Tajikistan

HEADQUARTERS: Dushanbe

DURATIONS: December 1994 to present

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: 40 military observers, 18 international and 26 local civilian staff

SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: Ramiro Piriz-Ballon (Uruguay)

Mandate

To assist the Joint Commission to monitor the implementation of the Agreement on a Temporary Ceasefire and the Cessation of Other Hostile Acts on the Tajik-Afghan Border and within the Country for the Duration of the Talks; to investigate reports of ceasefire violations and to report on them to the United Nations and to the Joint Commission; to provide its good offices as stipulated in the Agreement; to maintain close contact with the parties to the conflict, as well as close liaison with the Mission of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and with the Collective Peace-keeping Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Tajikistan and with the border forces; to provide support for the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Envoy; to provide political liaison and coordination services, which could facilitate expeditious humanitarian assistance by the international community.

Estimated Cost

Approximately \$ 1,895,800 gross for the period from 1 December 1994 to 6 February 1995; the monthly cost thereafter estimated at approximately \$442,300.

Method of Financing

Assessments in respect of a Special Account.

Contributors of Military Personnel

As of 29 December 1994: Austria, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Denmark, Hungary, Jordan, Poland, Switzerland, Ukraine and Uruguay.

31

United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

LOCATION: Rwanda

HEADQUARTERS: Kigali

DURATION: October 1993 to present

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: Almost 5,400 military personnel, 50 military police and 90 civilian police personnel

FATALITIES: 15

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
AND HEAD OF MISSIONS: Shaharyar M. Khan (Pakistan)

FORCE COMMANDER: Major-General Guy Tourignant (Canada)

Background

Fighting between the Armed Forces of the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) first broke out in October 1990 across the border between Rwanda and its northern neighbour, Uganda. Despite a number of ceasefire agreements thereafter, hostilities resumed in the northern part of the country in early February 1993. These interrupted comprehensive negotiations between the Government of Rwanda and RPF, which were supported by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and facilitated by the United Republic of Tanzania.

In support of resumption of the negotiations, Rwanda and Uganda, in separate letters to the President of the Security Council on 22 February 1993, called for the deployment of United Nations military observers along the 150-kilometre common border in order to prevent the military use of the area, especially the transportation of military supplies. RPF control of the border area had been extensive.

Following consultations of the Security Council on 24 February concerning these letters, United Nations former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali decided to send a goodwill mission to Rwanda and Uganda. He instructed the mission to examine all major aspects of the peace process including the possibility of deploying military observers along the border. The goodwill mission carried out this mandate from 4 to 18 March 1993.

Meanwhile, efforts by OAU and Tanzania led to a meeting between the Government of Rwanda and RPF from 5 to 7 March at Dar-es-Salaam, the capital of Tanzania. In a closing joint communique, the Government of Rwanda and RPF pledged their commitment to a negotiated settlement and agreed to reinstate the ceasefire on 9 March and to the resumption of peace talks in Arusha, Tanzania. They also committed themselves to providing adequate security and protection to displaced persons.

On 12 March 1993, the Security Council, by its resolution 812(1993), called on the Government of Rwanda and RPF to respect the renewed ceasefire, to resume negotiations, to allow the delivery of humanitarian supplies and the return of displaced persons, and to fulfil the obligations and commitments the parties had made in the past. The Council also welcomed the goodwill mission the Secretary-General had sent to Rwanda and Uganda. Finally, it asked him to examine the requests of those two countries for the deployment of observers along their common border.

The Secretary-General dispatched a technical mission to the border area between Rwanda and Uganda which visited Uganda from 2 to 5 April and Rwanda on 6 April. It reported that it would be possible to deploy United Nations military observers to monitor the border between Uganda and Rwanda and verify that no military assistance—lethal weapons, ammunition and other material of possible military use—was being provided across it. It was decided that deployment of the observers would be on the Ugandan side of the border only.

Security Council Authorises UNOMUR

On 22 June 1993, the Security Council, by its resolution 846(1993), authorized the establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) on the Uganda side of the common border, for an initial period of six months, subject to review every six months. The Council decided that the verification would focus primarily on transit or transport, by roads or tracks which could accommodate vehicles, of lethal weapons and ammunition across the border, as well as any other material which could be of military use.

The Council welcomed the Secretary-General's decision to support the peace-keeping efforts of OAU by putting two military experts at its disposal to help expedite the deployment of OAU's expanded Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG)¹ to Rwanda. It also urged the Government of Rwanda and RPF to conclude quickly a comprehensive peace agreement, and requested the Secretary-General to report on the contribution the United Nations could make to assist OAU in implementing this agreement and to begin contingency planning in the event that the Council decided that such a contribution was needed. As requested by resolution 846 (1993), the United Nations undertook consultations with the Government of Uganda with a view to concluding a status of mission agreement for UNOMUR. The agreement was finalized and entered into force on 16 August 1993. This opened the way to deployment of an advance party which arrived in the mission area on 18 August. By the end of September, UNOMUR had reached its authorized strength of 81 military observers and was fully operational. Observers were provided by the following countries: Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Hungary, Netherlands, Senegal, Slovak Republic and Zimbabwe. The mission also included 10 international and six local civilian support staff.

Arusha Peace Talks

Meanwhile, the Arusha talks on a comprehensive peace agreement between the Government of Rwanda and RPF had reconvened on 16 March 1993. The United Nations Secretary-General was represented by Macaire Pedanou, head of the United Nations goodwill mission that visited Rwanda earlier that month.

The talks covered military issues, refugees and displaced persons, and outstanding political matters, including the amendment of the constitution, as well as the duration of the transitional period. Early in the talks, the parties also began to discuss an international neutral force to oversee the implementation of key aspects of the peace agreement and to create confidence during the transition period.

The talks in Arusha were successfully concluded on 4 August 1993 with the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement, which called for a democratically elected government and provided for the establishment of a broad-based transitional Government until the elections, in addition to repatriation of refugees and integration of the armed forces of the two sides. The two parties called for a neutral international force to help implement the agreement. In a joint request to the Security Council from Arusha on 11 June, the two parties had called on the

United Nations to send a reconnaissance mission to Rwanda. This mission would prepare for the quick deployment of a neutral international force as soon as the peace agreement under negotiation was signed. The request welcomed the OAU suggestion that the United Nations should assume responsibility for and command of such a force. The parties asked that the force should assist in the maintenance of public security and in the delivery of humanitarian aid. It would also assist in searches for weapons caches, neutralisation of armed bands, demining, disarmament of civilians and the cessation of hostilities. The parties also requested that the international force oversee the demobilisation of existing armed forces and of all aspects of the formation of the new National Army and National Gendarmerie.

UNAMIR Recommended

A United Nations reconnaissance mission visited Rwanda from 19 to 31 August 1993. Its senior officials also visited Dar-es-Salaam on 1 and 2 September and Addis Ababa on 3 September for consultations with the Government of Tanzania and the Secretary-General of OAU respectively. On the basis of the mission's findings, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council, on 24 September, a report, in which he recommended the establishment of a United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), with the mandate of "contributing to the establishment and maintenance of a climate conducive to the secure installation and subsequent operation of the transitional Government".

According to the Secretary-General, the principal functions of UNAMIR would be to assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali; monitor the ceasefire agreement, including establishment of an expanded demilitarized zone (DMZ) and demobilisation procedures; monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government's mandate leading up to elections; and assist with mine-clearance. The Mission would also investigate alleged non-compliance with any provisions of the peace agreement and provide security for the repatriation of Rwandese refugees and displaced persons. In addition, it would assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations.

The Secretary-General proposed that the military observers of UNOMUR come under the command of the new Mission, while maintaining their separate monitoring tasks on the Uganda-Rwanda border. The Mission would also incorporate elements of NMOG II which was mandated by OAU to supervise the ceasefire until 31 October 1993.

Security-General Outlines Mandate

The Secretary-General recommended that the operation be conducted in four phases.

The first phase would begin on the day the Security Council established UNAMIR and would end on D-Day, the day on which the transitional Government was installed. It was estimated that the transitional Government might not be installed until the end of 1993. The objective of the Mission would be to establish conditions for the secure installation of such a Government. By the end of that phase, the strength of UNAMIR would total 1,428 military personnel.

During phase two, expected to last 90 days or until the process of disengagement, demobilisation and integration of the Armed Forces and Gendarmerie began, the build-up of the Mission would continue to a total of 2,548 military personnel. During this phase, UNAMIR would continue to monitor the DMZ, to assist in providing security in Kigali and in the demarcation of the assembly zones, and to ensure that all preparations for disengagement, demobilisation and integration were in place.

During phase three, which would last about 9 months, the Mission would establish, supervise and monitor a new DMZ. Security would also continue to be provided in Kigali. The disengagement, demobilisation and integration of the Forces and the Gendarmerie would be completed in this stage, and the Mission would reduce its staff to approximately 1,240 personnel.

Phase four, which would last about four months, would see a further reduction of the Mission's strength to the minimum level of approximately 930 military personnel. UNAMIR would assist in ensuring the secure atmosphere required in the final stages of the transitional period leading up to the elections. In order to verify that law and order were maintained effectively and impartially, the Secretary-General proposed to deploy a small United Nations civilian police unit in Kigali and the nine prefecture capitals of Rwanda and in specific police installations.

UNAMIR Established

UNAMIR was established on 5 October by Security Council resolution 872 (1993) for an initial period of six months with the proviso that it would be extended beyond the initial 90 days only upon a review by the Council. In connection with this, the Secretary-General would report on any substantive progress made towards the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

The Council noted that UNAMIR's mandate would end following national elections and the installation of a new government in Rwanda, events which were scheduled to occur by October 1995, but no later than December 1995. In that context, the Council authorized the Secretary-General to deploy a first contingent to Kigali, which, when fully in place, would permit the establishment of the transitional institutions and implementation of the other relevant provisions of the Peace Agreement.

By resolution 872 (1993), the Council also urged the parties to implement the Arusha Agreement in good faith and called upon Member States, United Nations specialized agencies and non-governmental organisations to provide and intensify their economic, financial and humanitarian assistance in favour of the Rwandese population and of the democratisation process in Rwanda.

The Council welcomed the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative who would lead UNAMIR in the field and exercise authority over all its elements.

UNOMUR Activities

UNOMUR established its headquarters in Kabale, Uganda, about 20 kilometres north of the border with Rwanda. It also established observation posts at two major crossing sites and three secondary sites on the Ugandan side of the border. The mission monitored the border area through mobile patrols and enhanced its operational capability with airborne coverage.

The Secretary-General, in his 15 December 1993 report to the Security Council, noted that UNOMUR had been "a factor of stability in the area and that it was playing a useful role as a confidence-building mechanism". He therefore recommended to the Council that the mandate of the mission be extended for a period of six months.

The Security Council, by its resolution 891 (1993) adopted on 20 December 1993, extended UNOMUR's mandate by six months. The Council expressed its appreciation to the Government of Uganda for its cooperation and support for UNOMUR and also underlined the importance of a cooperative attitude on the part of the civilian and military authorities in the mission area.

UNAMIR Deployed

The UNAMIR Force Commander, Brigadier-General Romeo A. Dallaire (Canada), arrived in Kigali on 22 October 1993, followed by an advance party of 21 military personnel on 27 October. On 1

November, as foreseen in the Secretary-General's report, NMOGII was integrated into UNAMIR. The demilitarized zone sector headquarters was established upon the arrival of the advance party and became operational on 1 November 1993 when the NMOG II elements were absorbed into UNAMIR.

The deployment of a UNAMIR battalion in Kigali that was composed of contingents from Belgium and Bangladesh was completed in the first part of December 1993. The Kigali weapons-secure area was established on 24 December.

The Secretary-General's Special Representative for Rwanda, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, former Minister for External Relations of Cameroon, arrived in Kigali on 23 November 1993 and established his headquarters in the Rwandese capital.

At a meeting on 10 December 1993, initiated by the Special Representative, the Government and RPF issued a joint declaration reaffirming their commitment to the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement. They agreed to set up a broad-based transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly before 31 December 1993.

In his 30 December 1993 report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General pointed out that most of the projected tasks of phase I of the implementation plan had been accomplished. He underlined that, despite signs of mutual intransigence, the parties had continued to show good will and cooperation in their contacts with each other and with the United Nations. The ceasefire was also respected.

The Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council agree that UNAMIR should continue to implement its mandate. In this regard, he intended to proceed with the implementation plan, including the early deployment of the second battalion in the DMZ.

The Security Council, by its resolution 893 (1994) of 6 January 1994, endorsed these proposals. The Council strongly urged the parties to cooperate with UNAMIR in furthering the peace process, to comply fully with the Arusha Peace Agreement and, in particular, to establish a broad-based transitional Government at the earliest opportunity.

Implementation Plan Delayed

In accordance with the Arusha Peace Agreement, which provided that the incumbent head of State would remain in office until the elections, Major-General Juvenal Habyarimana was sworn in as President of Rwanda on 5 January 1994. However, expectations that

the transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly would also be installed on that same day could not be met because of the inability of the parties concerned to agree on several issues, including the lists of members of these bodies.

The failure to set up the transitional institutions not only delayed the completion of phase of the implementation plan, but also contributed to a deterioration of the security situation in the country and posed a threat to the peace process. January and February 1994 saw increasingly violent demonstrations, roadblocks, assassination of political leaders and assaults on and murders of civilians.

Following an upsurge in violent incidents in late February, culminating in the assassination of two prominent political leaders and the ambush of a UNAMIR-escorted RPF convoy, the Government imposed a curfew in Kigali and in a number of other cities. Subsequently, the security situation began to stabilize, especially following the increased support provided to the National Gendarmerie by UNAMIR military and civilian police components.

In the course of January-March 1994, the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, supported by a number of Governments both within and outside the region, as well as the OAU Secretary-General and the observer States to the peace process, continued to promote agreement among the parties on the setting up of the transitional institutions. However, notwithstanding some progress in the negotiations, all attempts to install those institutions failed.

Ceasefire Holds

On the positive side, despite the increased tensions and insecurity engendered by the political impasse, the ceasefire was generally holding. UNAMIR forces, whose operational capacity was enhanced with the deployment of additional personnel and equipment, continued to play a stabilising role.

Although the persistent stalemate on the establishment of the transitional institutions delayed the start of phase II operations, UNAMIR forces earmarked for that phase were in place and ready to begin operations on short notice. In addition, preparations for phase III, which would involve the actual disengagement, demobilisation and integration of the armed forces of the parties, had begun.

With the arrival of the UNAMIR Police Commissioner, Colonel Manfred Bliem (Austria), on 26 December 1993 and of the police units in January and February 1994, the UNAMIR civilian police contingent (CIVPOL) set up its headquarters in Kigali and reached its authorized

strength of 60 civilian police monitors. In carrying out its mandate, which was to assist in maintaining public security through the monitoring and verification of the activities of the Gendarmerie and the Communal Police, CIVPOL worked closely with both bodies in Kigali.

Humanitarian Assistance up to April 1994

On 15 April 1993, the United Nations launched an inter-agency appeal for international assistance to Rwanda to cover the period from April to December 1993, amounting to \$78 million to meet the needs of over 900,000 war-displaced people, or approximately 13 per cent of the nation's population. The appeal was the result of a request by the President of Rwanda to the Secretary-General earlier in 1993, following a three-fold increase in the number of the displaced persons, whose emergency needs had overwhelmed local capacity to supply them.

Most of the displaced people were living in and around 30 camps where serious malnutrition and disease were prevalent. The situation was exacerbated by Rwanda's already precarious economic condition, overpopulation and rapidly declining agricultural production.

An inter-agency mission, led by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, had been fielded between 18 and 25 March 1993 to prepare a consolidated appeal with all concerned United Nations agencies. The appeal presented priority emergency relief projects focusing on food, nutrition, health, water and sanitation, shelter and household items and education. As of the end of November 1993, contributions in cash and in kind amounting to some \$33 million had been made available to the United Nations agencies carrying out humanitarian activities in Rwanda.

With the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement, it was estimated that some 600,000 individuals had returned home, thus easing the emergency situation that had prevailed earlier in the year; as a result, the emphasis of the humanitarian assistance efforts had shifted to meeting the needs of the displaced returning home. At the same time, some 300,000 people who remained displaced continued to rely on emergency assistance in the camps.

In recommending the establishment of UNAMIR, the Secretary-General had stated that humanitarian assistance to displaced persons and refugees, as well as to demobilized soldiers, would have to be coordinated with the Mission's activities. Mine-clearance had been earmarked as a priority to ease the threat to displaced persons and to humanitarian agencies seeking to deliver assistance.

Extension on UNAMIR Mandate

The Secretary-General again reported to the Security Council on the situation in Rwanda on 30 March 1994. He stated that continued international support for UNAMIR would depend upon the full and prompt implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement by the parties concerned and urged them to make a determined effort to reach agreement on the establishment of the broad-based transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly.

The Secretary-General was encouraged by the fact that, in spite of increasing tensions, the parties had maintained the process of dialogue. He believed that UNAMIR should continue to support the dialogue to resolve the remaining differences in order to complete phase I of the implementation plan and to facilitate phase II operations. Therefore, the Secretary-General recommended that the Council extend the mandate of UNAMIR for a period of six months, during which time he would keep the Council informed of the pace of progress in the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement. However, in the event that the transitional institutions were not installed within the following two months and if sufficient progress in the implementation of the next phase of the agreement had not also been achieved, the Council should then review the situation, including the role of the United Nations.

On April 5, 1994, the Security Council, by its resolution 909 (1994), expressed its "deep concern at the delay in the establishment of the broad-based transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly" and, slating that it was "concerned at the deterioration in security in the country, particularly in Kigali," decided to extend the mandate of UNAMIR until 29 July 1994. It noted that it would review the situation within six weeks if the Secretary-General informed it that the transitional institutions provided for under the Arusha Peace Agreement had not been established and that insufficient progress had been made for implementation of phase II of UNAMIR's activities.

Renewed Fighting in Rwanda

On 6 April 1994, a plane carrying President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi crashed at Kigali airport, killing all those on board. The cause for the crash could not be determined without a full investigation, which has not taken place.

Following the deaths of the two Presidents, widespread killings having apparently both ethnic and political dimensions began in Kigali

and also in other parts of the country. A civil war broke out after the air-crash which led to country-wide massacres of the Hutu opposition and intelligentsia, as well as members of the Tutsiminority and other RPF supporters.

Within two weeks, the deaths were considered to number tens of thousands. According to reports at the time, the killings were started by unruly members of the Presidential Guard, and then spread quickly throughout the city. RPF units subsequently became involved in the fighting. After the provisional Government disintegrated, an interim Government was proclaimed on 8 April 1994, but it left the capital on 12 April 1994 as fighting between the armed forces and RPF intensified and established itself in Gitarama, 40 kilometres southwest of Kigali.

Victims in the violence included Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and 10 Belgian members of UNAMIR. The Secretary-General condemned the acts of violence and attacks on the members of UNAMIR in the strongest terms.

Following the murder of the Belgian soldiers and threats to Belgian nationals, the Government of Belgium decided to withdraw its battalion from UNAMIR. UNAMIR found it impossible to carry on with its original mandate, and instead concentrated on: securing an agreement on a ceasefire to be followed by political negotiations; protecting civilians in all possible ways; negotiating a truce with the two parties to permit the evacuation of expatriates; assisting in evacuations; rescuing those trapped in the fighting; and providing humanitarian assistance to large groups of displaced persons under UNAMIR protection.

New Measures

On 14 April, the Secretary-General discussed with the Security Council possible ways of dealing with the situation.

Despite direct contacts between the two sides under the auspices of UNAMIR on 15 April, both adopted rigid positions, undermining negotiations for a ceasefire. Violence continued in the streets, as did fighting between Rwandese Government Forces (RGF) and RPF forces. UNAMIR headquarters was hit on 19 April, although there were no casualties.

On 20 April 1994, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that UNAMIR personnel "cannot be left at risk indefinitely when there is no possibility of their performing the tasks for which they were dispatched." The military personnel in UNAMIR stood at 1,515 on that date, down from 2,165, while military observers numbered 190, down from 321.

The Secretary-General proffered three alternatives to the Security Council.

Assuming there was no realistic prospect of the two sides agreeing on an effective ceasefire in the immediate future, combat and massacres could only be averted by an immediate and massive reinforcement of UNAMIR and a change in its mandate to allow it to coerce opposing forces into a ceasefire. This would require several thousand additional troops and could require that UNAMIR be given enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

Alternatively, a small group, headed by the Force Commander, would remain in Kigali to act as an intermediary between the two parties in an attempt to bring them to an agreement on a ceasefire. This effort could be maintained for a period of up to two weeks or longer, should the Council so prefer. The total military personnel would number about 270. But a full relief effort would be impossible without a ceasefire under this arrangement, the Secretary-General pointed out.

Finally, the Secretary-General noted that UNAMIR could be completely withdrawn, although he did not favour this alternative. The cost of withdrawal in human lives could be very severe, the Secretary-General cautioned.

In presenting the alternatives, the Secretary-General emphasized that the Government of Rwanda, or its successor, and the RPF bore responsibility for seeking peace. He also expressed sympathy for bereaved Rwandese families, offered condolences to the Government of Belgium and the families of the Belgian peace-keepers who were killed, and recorded his high commendation to the personnel of UNAMIR, his Special Representative and the Force Commander for their work.

On 21 April 1994, the Security Council decided in its resolution 912(1994) to reduce UNAMIR to the numbers recommended by the Secretary-General in his second alternative. It also adjusted the mandate of UNAMIR so that it would act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a ceasefire; assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible; and monitor developments in Rwanda, including the safety and security of civilians who sought refuge with UNAMIR. In the resolution, the Security Council also stressed that the Arusha Peace Agreement remained central to the peace process in Rwanda, strongly condemned the attacks against UNAMIR and other United Nations

personnel, and demanded an immediate cessation of hostilities between the forces of the Government of Rwanda and RPF.

The Secretary-General's Special Representative participated in the Arusha talks on 22 and 23 April where a ceasefire statement was presented. Although ceasefire negotiations could not take place, the meeting contributed to a unilateral declaration of a ceasefire by RPF.

Humanitarian Activities

Because of the deterioration in the security situation, the evacuation of humanitarian personnel was recommended on 9 April 1994, and humanitarian activities were temporarily suspended. However, the United Nations agencies participating in the United Nations Disaster Management Team in Rwanda recommenced their coordination efforts in Nairobi within days of the evacuation, under the aegis of the newly-created United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO). Efforts at limited cross-border humanitarian assistance proved possible, primarily from Uganda but also from Burundi. The World Food Programme (WFP) was able to carry out limited food distribution from existing WFP stocks in southern Rwanda.

As fighting continued in and around Kigali, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Peter Hansen led an inter-agency Advance Humanitarian Team (AHT) into the city on 23 April 1994. Composed of members of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations Development Programme, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organisation, the team assessed needs in the Kigali area and, in conjunction with United Nations and other humanitarian agencies operating out of Uganda, in most RPF-controlled areas as well. Aid efforts in Kigali, such as the provision of UNICEF medical and health kits and high nutrition biscuits, were immediately initiated by the AHT in close collaboration with UNAMIR. Efforts by members of the humanitarian team to obtain access to WFP food stocks held in warehouses in Kigali, however, were repeatedly blocked by hostile fire.

Within a week of the humanitarian team's mission, a sub-office of UNREO was set up in Kabale, Uganda. Staffed with personnel seconded by UNHCR and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), the Kabale office helped coordinate cross border relief efforts into Rwanda. Uganda-based efforts to provide humanitarian aid in RPF-controlled areas expanded rapidly as security conditions allowed. These coordinated efforts included a number of international NGOs and were coordinated

closely with the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Access to most of the needy population in RGF-controlled areas, where the number of internally displaced people was estimated to be as many as a million, continued to prove virtually impossible due to severe security problems. United Nations agencies based in Burundi, especially UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP, continued efforts to obtain first-hand information on needs in these areas, and to provide aid whenever the security situation allowed. On 25 April, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs launched a "flash appeal" on behalf of United Nations agencies for immediate emergency operations and contingency actions related to Rwanda. This appeal, for \$8 million, received a mixed response from donors.

Soon after the launch of the "flash appeal", the humanitarian situation changed dramatically. In the most rapid exodus of this scale UNHCR had ever recorded, more than 250,000 Rwandese refugees poured across the Rusumo Falls border crossing point into Tanzania within 24 hours. Although UNHCR had pre-positioned food, blankets, and other relief supplies for 50,000 persons, the continued exodus along this border forced the creation of a massive relief operation. The international relief community, with overall coordination by UNHCR, rushed to help the Tanzanian Government and local residents cope with the massive influx of refugees. UNHCR made an urgent appeal to donors for an additional \$56 million to meet the needs of refugees in the region, and particularly those crossing into Tanzania.

Secretary-General Seeks Further Action

On 29 April 1994, the Secretary-General wrote to the Security Council that the situation had further deteriorated in Kigali and other parts of Rwanda. The capital city was effectively divided into sectors controlled by RGF and RPF, the Secretary-General wrote, with frequent exchanges of artillery and mortar fire between the two sides. UNAMIR reported strong evidence of preparations for further massacres of civilians in the city, while massacres continued on a large scale in the countryside, especially in the south.

The developments raised serious questions about the viability of the revised mandate which the Security Council gave to UNAMIR on 21 April. It had become clear that UNAMIR did not have the power to take effective action to halt the continuing massacres, and would be unable to protect threatened people in Kigali if a new wave of massacres were to start. According to some estimates, as many as 200,000 people had died over the previous three weeks.

While some of the massacres had been, the work of uncontrolled military personnel, most of them had been perpetrated by armed groups of civilians taking advantage of the complete breakdown of law and order in Kigali and many other parts of Rwanda, the Secretary-General continued, and they could be prevented only if law and order were restored. The Secretary-General urged the Security Council to consider again what action, including forceful action, it could take or could authorise Member States to take, in order to end the massacres.

Although such action would require a commitment of human and material resources on a scale which Member States had so far proved reluctant to contemplate, the Secretary-General said the scale of human suffering and its implications for the stability of neighbouring countries left the Security Council with no alternative but to examine this possibility. The Secretary-General continued to provide daily briefings to the Security Council, including details on Rwanda's security situation. This had rapidly deteriorated, with large-scale massacres taking place.

On 30 April 1994, the President of the Security Council issued a statement demanding that the interim Government of Rwanda and RPF take effective measures to prevent any attacks on civilians in areas under their control. It called on the leadership of both parties to condemn publicly such attacks and to commit themselves to ensuring that persons who instigate or participate in such acts are individually responsible, noting that the killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group in whole or in part constitutes a crime punishable under international law.

The Security Council also called on all States to assist UNHCR and other humanitarian and relief agencies operating in the area in meeting the urgent humanitarian needs in Rwanda and its bordering States, and asked bordering States, working with OAU, to provide appropriate protection to refugees and to facilitate transfer of goods and supplies to meet the needs of the displaced persons within Rwanda.

It appealed to all States to refrain from providing arms or any military assistance to the parties to the conflict, and stated its willingness in principle to consider promptly the application of an arms embargo to Rwanda.

Along with other requests, the Council asked the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Secretary-General of OAU, to report further on how to help restore law and order in Rwanda and provide security for displaced persons and to explore urgently ways of extending humanitarian relief assistance to refugees and displaced persons.

Among other measures in response to the Security Council's statement, the Secretary-General wrote to a number of African countries and to the Secretary-General of OAU to explore ways through which such countries could contribute troops to help resolve the tragic situation in Rwanda.

On 3 May 1994, the Secretary-General sent a letter to the President of the Security Council in which he informed him of the action he had taken with respect to communications sent to African leaders, and also mentioned that he had personally spoken with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Chairman in Office of OAU, about the problems in Rwanda, in addition to discussing the matter with the OAU Secretary-General.

In a subsequent letter, dated 6 May 1994, the President of the Security Council asked the Secretary-General to prepare contingency plans to deliver humanitarian assistance and support of displaced persons in Rwanda, and indicated that the Council might later seek indications on logistics and financial implications of an expanded United Nations or international presence in Rwanda,

UNAMIR Expanded

The Secretary-General reported on 13 May 1994 to the Security Council that UNAMIR had been reduced to 444 all ranks in Rwanda, with 179 military observers at Nairobi pending repatriation or redeployment to the Mission. He also stated that the situation in Rwanda remained "highly unstable and insecure, with widespread violence." A "major humanitarian crisis" had developed, with nearly 2 million people having been displaced.

He noted that in collaboration with other United Nations organisations, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs had established UNREO to coordinate humanitarian relief activities. Medical and nutritional supplies from UNICEF had been distributed in parts of Kigali where access was possible, he noted, while WFP had been able to deliver more than 500 tons of food in the north and 840 tons of food in the south.

UNAMIR, UNREO, the operational United Nations agencies and NGOs working in Rwanda agreed on a division of labour for humanitarian assistance and on a set of principles to serve as the basis for humanitarian operations in Rwanda. These included ensuring the security of relief efforts; joint identification of distribution sites by responsible authorities and United Nations humanitarian organisations; clear identification of interlocutors to represent the authorities

for discussion of humanitarian operations; acceptance by authorities of the monitoring and reporting responsibilities of the United Nations organisations regarding the distribution and use of relief materials; and an understanding that aid should be provided based on need, regardless of race, ethnic group, religion or political affiliation. Both sides subsequently agreed on the principles.

The Secretary-General recommended to the Security Council that it provide a new mandate to create UNAMIR II, which would include 5,500 troops. UNAMIR II would, *inter alia*, support and provide safe conditions for displaced persons and other groups in Rwanda and would help with the provision of assistance by humanitarian organisations. The force would work on behalf of displaced persons in the interior of the country, as well as on the border.

Displaced persons in the interior of the country outnumbered those in border areas or in neighbouring countries by a factor of five, the Secretary-General pointed out. In addition, if humanitarian efforts were concentrated on border areas, the protected sites could act as a magnet to people in need in the interior of the country and increase the number of displaced persons.

UNAMIR II would also monitor border crossing points and the two parties' deployment. While its rules of engagement would not envisage enforcement action, it could be required to take action in self-defence against those who threatened protected sites and populations and the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief.

Deployment of UNAMIR II would be conducted in three phases over a one-month period. During the first phase, which would last for one week following the adoption of the enabling resolution by the Security Council, one full-strength battalion would ensure the protection of Kigali International Airport and other sites in the city where thousands had sought refuge. In the second phase, extending for two weeks after the adoption of the resolution, two more battalions would be deployed, along with advance elements of a support battalion and all of the force headquarters and signal squadron. The rest of the support battalion and two other infantry battalions would be deployed during the third phase, to be completed one month after adoption of the enabling resolution. The Secretary-General estimated that deployment of approximately 5,500 troops for a six-month period would cost about \$ 115 million.

On 17 May 1994, the Security Council in resolution 918 (1994) demanded that all parties to the conflict immediately cease hostilities

and agree to a ceasefire. It expanded UNAMIR's mandate to enable it to contribute to the security and protection of refugees and civilians at risk, through means including the establishment and maintenance of secure humanitarian areas, and the provision of security for relief operations to the degree possible.

It authorized the expansion of UNAMIR to 5,500 troops, and requested the Secretary-General to redeploy immediately, as a first phase, the UNAMIR military observers from Nairobi to Rwanda, and to bring up to full strength the infantry battalion currently in the country. The Secretary-General was asked to report as soon as possible on the next phase of UNAMIR's deployment, including updates on cooperation of the parties, progress toward a ceasefire, availability of resources and the proposed duration of the mandate for further review.

At the same time, the Council imposed an arms embargo on the country. It also asked the Secretary-General to present a report as soon as possible on the investigation of serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda during the conflict and invited the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, in coordination with OAU and countries in the region, to continue their efforts to achieve a political settlement in Rwanda within the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

Speical Mission Visits Rwanda

Shortly after the Security Council adopted its resolution, Iqbal Riza, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and Maj.-Gen. J. Maurice Baril, Military Adviser to the Secretary-General, left on a special mission to Rwanda. The purposes of the mission were to move the warring parties towards a ceasefire, to ascertain from them their views on and intentions towards the implementation of resolution 918 (1994) and to review with UNAMIR the modalities of the operations outlined in the Secretary-General's report of 13 May 1994.

On 31 May 1994, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that the special mission had been in the area from 22 to 27 May 1994, and had met with officials from both sides, and with UNAMIR officials. Although both sides had given assurances that they would observe an informal truce during the visit, firing and shelling continued, especially in and around Kigali, causing the special mission to lose much time. The special mission was informed that those responsible for the killings in Rwanda included members of the Rwandese government forces, but in the main were drawn from the

Presidential Guard and the *interhamwe*, the youth militia recruited and formed by the late President's party. Allegations by representatives of the interim Government and the Rwandese Armed Forces and the Gendarmerie that the RPF bore equal culpability for the killings were not corroborated by other sources.

The mission also found that the RPF zone was virtually empty. In the zones controlled by the Rwandese government force, however, increasing numbers of displaced persons were fleeing the RPF advance and were seeking refuge in camps in subhuman conditions. This exodus was in part due to alarming radio broadcasts from Rwandese government forces zones, especially Radio Mille Collines, which also broadcast incitements to eliminate RPF supporters.

UNAMIR's Mandate Extended

On 31 May 1994, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that the special mission had been able to obtain the agreement of the two sides to initiate talks for the establishment of a ceasefire as called for by resolution 918(1994). RPF's insistence that it would not deal, directly or indirectly, with the *de facto* authorities in Gitarama was accepted by the other side. A working paper, to serve as a basis for the talks, was prepared by the special mission and the Force Commander, and the first meeting was held between military staff officers on 30 May at UNAMIR headquarters with the Deputy Force Commander acting as intermediary.

During discussions with the mission, both sides had recognized that only a political settlement could bring stability to Rwanda and there could be no military solution. However, while both sides declared that the principles of the Arusha Peace Agreement remained valid as a framework, each stated that the new circumstances would necessitate renegotiation of certain parts of the agreement.

Since national reconciliation was unlikely to be swift, the Secretary-General recommended that UNAMIR's expanded mandate be authorized by the Council for at least six months, with the anticipation that at least another six-month renewal would be required. He also declared his intention to establish a special trust fund to support effective rehabilitation programmes in Rwanda.

As for deployment of the expanded UNAMIR, the special mission had secured assurances from both parties of cooperation with the mandate established by resolution 918(1994), although these would later need formalisation as operations were initiated. The implementation of phase 1 of the deployment remained urgent and had to

be commenced even before a ceasefire was effected, the Secretary-General reported. He also stated that the Government of Ghana was prepared to dispatch troops immediately, but these were waiting for necessary equipment, especially armoured personnel carriers, to be made available by other Member States. It was estimated that phase 1 would not be operational for another four to six weeks, depending on how soon the resources required were made available by Member States and delivered on the ground. Considering the projected delays in deploying the troops and equipment for phase 1, the Secretary-General recommended that phase 2 should be initiated immediately, in close synchronisation with phase 1, while urgent preparations for phase 3 should continue.

The repercussions of the convulsions in Rwanda were enormous, the Secretary-General said, with displaced persons in the range of 1.5 million and an additional 400,000 refugees in bordering countries. These figures would mean that over a quarter of Rwanda's population had been afflicted. Neither United Nations agencies nor non-governmental organisations had been able to begin an effective humanitarian assistance programme, beyond sporadic deliveries where possible, in zones controlled by Rwandese government forces, where authority beyond Gitarama, Gisenyi and Butare appeared to be uncertain. More systematic humanitarian assistance programmes had begun in the RPF zone, but worked under strict RPF controls. The special mission had emphasized to the de facto authorities in Gitarama and to the Rwandese government forces military commanders the urgency of assuring conditions that would allow humanitarian assistance programmes to begin areas controlled by them.

In his report, the Secretary-General noted that while the information on human rights violations obtained by the special mission carried *prima facie* credibility in the light of circumstantial evidence, only a proper investigation could establish the facts and definite culpability. The efficacy of such an exercise would diminish as time weakened evidence and dispersed living witnesses.

The international community's delayed reaction to the genocide in Rwanda "demonstrated graphically its extreme inadequacy to respond with prompt and decisive action to humanitarian crises entwined with armed conflict," the Secretary-General added. He also noted that while attempting to redeem the failings in the Rwandese crisis, the entire system required review to strengthen its reactive capacity.

There was little doubt that the killing in Rwanda constituted genocide, since there had been large-scale killings of communities and

families belonging to a particular ethnic group, but the continuing hostilities impeded a full investigation into the massacres. The Secretary-General noted that the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Jose Ayala Lasso, had visited Rwanda in early May, and the Commission on Human Rights had subsequently designated Rene Degni-Segui as Special Rapporteur for Rwanda.

In its resolution 925 on 8 June 1994, the Security Council endorsed the Secretary-General's recommendations for the deployment of an expanded UNAMIR, invited the international community to contribute generously to the trust fund for Rwanda, and demanded that all parties to the conflict cease hostilities.

Subsequently, in its resolution 935 of 1 July 1994, the Security Council, expressing its grave concern at reports of violations of international law, including genocide, requested that the Secretary-General establish as a matter of urgency an impartial Commission of Experts that would provide him with its conclusions about the evidence of these violations.

The Commission could obtain information through its own investigations or through the efforts of others, including the Special Rapporteur. The Council also called on States, relevant United Nations bodies and organisations to inform the commission within the next 30 days of substantiated grave violations.

Termination of UNOMUR's Mandate

Initially, UNOMUR had restricted its monitoring activities in Uganda along the area of the border with Rwanda controlled by RPF. After RPF gained control of the entire Uganda-Rwanda border, the Mission extended its observation and monitoring activities to that area. This necessitated the readjustment of tasks and the reassignment of United Nations military observers.

UNOMUR carried out its tasks essentially through patrolling, monitoring and surveillance of the whole stretch of the operational area, involving both mobile and fixed observations as well as on-site investigations of suspected cross-border traffic. The arrival in the mission area of three helicopters in early April 1993 strengthened UNOMUR's overall operational capacity.

On 16 June 1994, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council his second progress report on UNOMUR, in which he reiterated that UNOMUR had continued to be a factor of stability in the area and had been particularly critical in recent months as UNAMIR had sought to defuse tensions resulting from the resumption of hostilities.

Nevertheless, he noted that there appeared to be little rationale for monitoring one of Rwanda's borders and not the others. As UNOMUR's activities allowed UNAMIR to address, at least to some degree, the issue of outside interference in the Rwandese civil war, he believed that UNOMUR should continue its monitoring activities until an effective ceasefire was established. The Secretary-General therefore recommended that UNOMUR's mandate be renewed for a period of three months. During that period, the number of military observers would be reduced by phases, adjusting to operational requirements. UNOMUR would be closed down by 21 September 1994.

On 20 June 1994, the Security Council adopted resolution 928 (1994) endorsing the Secretary-General's recommendations and requesting him to report to the Council on the termination of UNOMUR before the completion of its mandate.

The Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on 19 September, informing it that UNOMUR would be officially closed on 21 September 1994. He stated that while the tragic turn of events in Rwanda prevented UNOMUR from fully implementing its mandate, the Observer Mission had played a useful role as a confidence-building mechanism in the months following the conclusion of the Arusha Peace Agreement and during UNAMIR's initial efforts to defuse tensions between the Rwandese parties and to facilitate the implementation of that agreement.

The Secretary-General expressed his appreciation to the Government of Uganda for the cooperation and assistance it had extended to the Mission. He commended both the military and the civilian personnel of UNOMUR for the dedication and professionalism with which they had carried out their tasks.

Operation Turquoise

Meanwhile, on 19 June 1994, the Secretary-General, in a letter to the President of the Security Council, reiterated the need for an urgent and coordinated response by the international community to the genocide which had engulfed Rwanda. He enumerated the offers which the United Nations had received after over 50 potential contributing countries had been approached for contributions to UNAMIR, in anticipation of the expansion of the UNAMIR mandate, as authorized by the Council in its resolution 918 (1994), and explained that the United Nations expected, in the best of circumstances, to complete the deployment of the first phase of UNAMIR in the first week of July 1994.

The Secretary-General indicated that the Security Council might wish to consider the offer of the Government of France to undertake a French-commanded multinational operation, subject to Security Council authorisation, to assure the security and protection of displaced persons and civilians at risk in Rwanda. Such an operation would last until UNAMIR was brought up to the necessary strength to take over from the multinational force. This would imply that the multinational force should remain deployed for a minimum period of three months. The activities of the multinational force and those of UNAMIR would be closely coordinated by the respective force commanders.

In his letter, the Secretary-General stressed that the efforts of the international community to restore stability in Rwanda were directed at the resumption of the Arusha peace process. In that connection, his new Special Representative for Rwanda, Shaharyar Khan, former Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, planned to take up his assignment shortly.

On 22 June 1994, the Security Council, by its resolution 929 (1994), welcomed the Secretary-General's letter and agreed that a multinational operation might be set up for humanitarian purposes in Rwanda until UNAMIR was brought up to the necessary strength, and decided that it would be limited to two months following the resolution, unless the Secretary-General determined before then that an expanded UNAMIR was able to carry out its mandate. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council authorized Member States to conduct the operation using all necessary means to achieve their humanitarian objectives; costs of implementing the operation would be borne by the Member States concerned.

The French initiative, named Operation Turquoise, was launched on 23 June 1994. On 2 July, France announced that Operation Turquoise would establish a "humanitarian protected zone" in the Cyangugu-Kibuye-Gikongoro triangle in south-western Rwanda, covering about one fifth of Rwandese territory. While expressing its strong opposition to the French move, RPF did not seek confrontation with French forces which, on their side, avoided provocation.

From the start, close cooperation at all levels was established between UNAMIR and Operation Turquoise with frequent contact between both force commanders. Resolution 929 (1994) had authorized the deployment of the French force until 21 August 1994, and, on 11 July, the Prime Minister of France informed the Security Council and the Secretary-General of the French Government's decision to commence its withdrawal by 31 July.

In the first week of July an UNREO/Department of Humanitarian Affairs officer was dispatched to the French military base of operations at Goma in order to establish communications and ensure liaison between the command of Operation Turquoise, United Nations agencies and some 30 NGOs engaged in humanitarian assistance in the region.

UNHCR, with field staff in Goma, had been stockpiling relief supplies for as many as an additional 500,000 needy people in the entire region. UNHCR and other agencies increased their staff in the field and mobilized emergency stocks, both from facilities in the region and from warehouses in Europe. Needs exceeded resources available to the United Nations agencies, however. UNHCR resources were already strained by an outflow of more than 600,000 Rwandese refugees since late April, and another 500,000 Burundi refugees dependent on the agency for assistance. WFP, which had also begun redirecting food stocks, transport and personnel to deal with the massive flow to Zaire, was already providing 40,000 tons of food per month to Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zaire and Uganda to cover a caseload estimated at 2.5 million people. On 14 July, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees urgently appealed for trucks, water tankers, aircraft and funds to meet the crisis. UNICEF, which had pre-positioned some stocks of essential relief items in anticipation of new population movements, released \$1 million from its emergency programme fund to secure additional supplies.

Government of National Unity

On 1 July 1994, the Secretary-General called for a halt to military operations in Rwanda, warning that the mass exodus of civilian populations could otherwise destabilize the region. Another call for a ceasefire was issued on 14 July 1994 by the President of the Security Council, who, in his statement, expressed the Council's alarm at the continuation of fighting in Rwanda.

The exodus of the population from the fighting could lead very quickly to a further humanitarian disaster, the President said, and could endanger the stability of the region. The Council demanded an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, urged the resumption of the political process in the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement, and also urged Member States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organisations to mobilize all available resources in order to provide humanitarian assistance.

On 18 July, RPF unilaterally declared a ceasefire, effectively ending the civil war which had broken out immediately after the deaths of the

presidents of Rwanda and Burundi on 6 April. On 19 July, a broad-based Government of national unity was formed.

Appeal for Humanitarian Support

Meanwhile, on 22 July 1994, the Secretary-General launched a \$434.8 million consolidated inter-agency appeal for the Rwandese crisis. Noting that UNREO had been constantly engaged in coordinating humanitarian activities, he said the deterioration of the situation was now beyond the resources and capacity of the United Nations humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organisations. The immediate priority was to take care of the refugees who had left the country and provide humanitarian assistance for those who were still in Rwanda, he said.

While contingency planning by United Nations agencies, UNAMIR and NGOs was an ongoing process, as the consolidated inter-agency appeal was prepared in June a particularly intensive exercise was undertaken. Possible scenarios requiring a humanitarian response were considered, including the potential "nightmare scenario" of an influx of a million or more refugees into Zaire. Contingency measures such as identifying and positioning needed equipment and supplies were undertaken. It was recognized, however, that such a massive influx into Zaire would present tremendous logistics and security problems in a location with few viable sites for refugee camps, a weak infrastructure and considerable ethnic tensions of its own.

The Secretary-General also noted that clandestine radio broadcasts which were fanning the hatred and fear had aggravated an already dramatic situation. In addition, he said, retreating soldiers had urged and forced whole populations to leave their homes and follow them into exile, while in some cases, massacres had even been perpetrated deliberately in order to create situations of panic, chaos and fear.

He also announced that he was immediately sending the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs to Rwanda and the surrounding region to assess the situation and satisfy himself that coordination arrangements were in place.

The Under-Secretary-General, together with senior representatives of all principal United Nations humanitarian organisations and other international organisations, visited Rwanda from 24 to 28 July. On 2 August, he chaired the donors' pledging conference at Geneva, which resulted in contributions amounting to some \$ 137 million against the \$434.8 million July Appeal.

As the emergency evolved, the consolidated inter-agency appeal was revised to reflect increasing needs. By 30 November 1994, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs reported that total requirements for United Nations agencies and the International Organisation for Migration to provide assistance had risen to \$585 million, against which contributions totalling \$483.5 million had been received.

Commission Established

On 25 July, the Secretary-General sent to the President of the Security Council a report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the investigation of serious violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda, in response to the Council's request for such information in resolution 918. The report included information on the visit of the Special Rapporteur, which took place from 9 to 20 June 1994.

On 26 July 1994, the Secretary-General reported to the Council that he had established a Commission of Experts pursuant to the Council's request in resolution 935 (1994). The Commission would provide the Secretary-General with its conclusions on the evidence of grave violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda, including the evidence of possible acts of genocide. The Secretary-General had taken note of the similarity of the Commission's mandate to that of the Special Rapporteur, and he would take administrative steps to ensure continuing collaboration between the two. The Commission would be located at the United Nations office in Geneva, where it could benefit from the resources of the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

The first stage of the Commission's work would be to review available information and carry out its own investigations in Rwanda. In the second stage, it would draw up its conclusions on the evidence of specific violations of international humanitarian law, and, in particular, of acts of genocide, on the basis of which identification of persons responsible for those violations could be made. In the light of those conclusions, the Commission would examine the question of the jurisdiction, international or national, before which such persons should be brought to trial.

The Secretary-General on 29 July 1994 announced that he had appointed three members to the Commission. He designated Atsu-Koffi Amega, a former President of the Supreme Court and former Foreign Minister of Togo, as Chairman of the Commission; other members were Mrs. Habi Dieng, Attorney-General of Guinea, and

Salifou Fomba, Professor of International Law from Mali and a Member of the United Nations International Law Commission.

Secretary-General Seeks Support

The Secretary-General on 1 August 1994 wrote to the Security Council that even though two and a half months had elapsed since the adoption of resolution 918 (1994), UNAMIR was as far from attaining the authorized troop strength as it was at the time of the adoption of the resolution, even though the Council had urged Governments to respond urgently to his request for resources for UNAMIR in resolutions 925 (1994) and 929(1994).

While several Governments had responded positively, their offers were conditional and entailed complicated efforts to match troops from one country with equipment from another, the Secretary-General said. The result was that as of 25 July, fewer than 500 were on the ground apart from a number of military observers. While it was understandable that the appalling events in Rwanda constituted a strong disincentive against involvement, it had to be recognized that the hesitations and consequent delays had contributed to the catastrophe.

The need for reinforcements for UNAMIR remained urgent. The Secretary-General added that he was convinced that resources to help Rwanda did exist, and what was required was the political will in the countries around the world coalescing into a collective political will at the United Nations.

On 3 August 1994, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that RPF had established military control over most of the country, and recalled that about 1.5 million Rwandese had sought refuge in Zaire over a two-week period in July. The swift RPF advance had had the effect of causing large numbers of civilians to take flight from the areas of combat, but this displacement might well have been containable had not panic been caused by deliberately inflammatory broadcasts from radio stations controlled by elements of the former Government.

The protracted violence in Rwanda had created an almost unprecedented humanitarian crisis. According to the estimates at that time, of a total population of approximately 7 million, as many as 500,000 had been killed, 3 million displaced internally and more than 2 million had fled to neighbouring countries. The international community was confronted with four basic humanitarian challenges: to respond to the immediate life-saving needs of refugees; to facilitate the early return of those who had fled their homes; to restore basic

infrastructure in Rwanda; and to ensure a smooth transition in the humanitarian protected zone established by French forces.

Among those who had fled Rwanda, an outbreak of cholera had already claimed as many as 20,000 lives, and remained a continuing threat, while the logistics of arranging the daily supply and distribution of 30 million litres of drinking water and 1,000 tones of food were daunting. It was essential to promote and facilitate the early return of Rwandese to their homes, given the conditions in the refugee camps and the need within the next two weeks to harvest the crops there.

Meanwhile, short and medium-term rehabilitation was essential for the absorption of the returnee population as well as the resettlement of the internally displaced, including at the least restoration of electricity, the water supply and telecommunications. It was also important to restore the capacity of the Government to carry out its responsibilities.

In addition, as many as 2 million internally displaced persons were estimated to be in the humanitarian protected zone in south-west Rwanda. To prevent an outflow of this group into Zaire, it was necessary to ensure the capacity of UNAMIR to take over responsibility in the area and to increase the humanitarian presence and activities there

During his visit to Rwanda from 24 to 28 July, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs had met with senior officials of the new Government in Rwanda to discuss how humanitarian aid could be delivered to all parts of the country and the urgent steps required to re-establish a climate conducive to the return of refugees and displaced persons. The new Government had indicated its commitment to encourage people to return to Rwanda, to ensure their protection and to permit full access to all those in need throughout the country. UNREO, headquartered in Kigali and with offices in Goma, Kabale and Bujumbura, continued to work with the United Nations agencies and the growing number of humanitarian NGOs to identify needs in Rwanda by sector and region.

UNAMIR's main tasks then were to ensure stability and security in the north-western and south-western regions of Rwanda; to stabilise and monitor the situation in all regions of Rwanda to encourage the return of the displaced population; to provide security and support for humanitarian assistance operations inside Rwanda; and to promote, through mediation and good offices, national reconciliation in Rwanda. UNAMIR had already deployed a company along the border near Goma,

Zaire, as well as a number of observers in that region and in the zone controlled by Operation Turquoise. In the expectation that UNAMIR would eventually receive the 5,500 troops authorized by the Security Council, the Force Commander had planned deployment in five sectors. The Force headquarters would remain at Kigali, with the minimum units required for protection, along with specialized units for communications and logistics, as well as the field hospital. United Nations military observers and United Nations civilian police monitors would be deployed in all sectors according to operations requirements.

The principal areas of concern were in the northwest to resettle returning refugees, and in the south-west to avert possible outbreaks of violence. In the northwest, substantial numbers of the former Rwandese government forces and militia, as well as extremist elements suspected of involvement in the massacres of the Hutu opposition and RPF supporters, were mingled with the refugees in Zaire, and were reportedly trying to prevent their return. In the southwest a more volatile situation prevailed where armed elements of the Rwandese government forces had sought refuge in the French-protected zone; this situation was particularly pressing in view of the anxiety of the French Government to complete its withdrawal by 21 August. In discussions with UNAMIR, the new Rwandese Government had indicated that it would not insist on taking control of this area immediately, provided that UNAMIR would ensure its stability.

The Secretary-General said that by its failure to intervene sooner in Rwanda, the international community had acquiesced in the horrifying loss of human life and the suffering of an entire people. To make amends, the international community at the very least should ensure that those individuals responsible in their personal and official capacities for unleashing and instigating this cataclysm were brought to justice, he said.

To avoid problems of coordination, all foreign forces engaged in support of humanitarian efforts in the area should ideally be part of UNAMIR. If this was not possible, deployment of foreign forces should be authorized by the Security Council even if their mandate was purely humanitarian, and formal liaison arrangements should be established between them and UNAMIR, as had been the case with Operation Turquoise.

The Secretary-General also urged the newly installed Government to commit itself to genuine and full reconciliation. The ultimate political aim must be the installation of a broad-based system of government that would give all elements of society, irrespective of ethnic origin or

social level, a sense of security and a stake in the country. The Arusha Agreement still provided principles and a broad framework for establishing such a system, the Secretary-General said.

In a statement by its President issued on 10 August, the Security Council stated that the most immediate task was to respond to the massive humanitarian crisis in Rwanda created by the population movements. It urged the country's former leadership and those who had assumed political responsibility in refugee camps to cooperate with the new Rwandese Government in reconciliation and repatriation efforts and to cease propaganda campaigns inducing refugees to stay in exile. The Council called upon the new Government to ensure that there were no reprisals against those wishing to return to their homes and resume their occupations.

The Council encouraged the new Government to cooperate with the United Nations in ensuring that those guilty of atrocities, in particular the crime of genocide, were brought to justice through an appropriate mechanism which would ensure fair and impartial trials in accordance with international norms of justice. In this connection it welcomed the Government's recent statement supporting the establishment of an international tribunal and welcomed the report of the Secretary-General of 26 July 1994 on the establishment of the Commission of Experts.

Welcoming the Secretary-General's intention to adapt the practical tasks of UNAMIR to the evolving situation in the country, the Council stated that it was essential that the contingents to be part of UNAMIR be deployed without further delay and the technical assistance they required be provided as soon as possible.

The Council also reaffirmed that the 1993 Arusha Peace Agreement constituted an appropriate frame of reference for promoting reconciliation in Rwanda.

Commission of Experts Interim Report

The Commission of Experts began its work on 15 August 1994 and, after a series of meetings in Geneva, conducted a field mission to Rwanda and some neighbouring countries from 29 August to 17 September. On 1 October, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the Commission's interim report. The main conclusions were the following:

- (a) Individuals from both sides of the armed conflict had perpetrated serious breaches of international humanitarian law;

- (b) Individuals from both sides of the armed conflict had perpetrated crimes against humanity in Rwanda;
- (c) Acts of genocide against the Tutsi group had been perpetrated by Hutu elements in a concerted, planned, systematic and methodical way. These acts of mass extermination against the Tutsi group as such constituted genocide within the meaning of article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The Commission had not uncovered any evidence to indicate that Tutsi elements perpetrated acts committed with the intent to destroy the Hutu ethnic group as such.

The Commission recommended that the Security Council take action to ensure that the individuals responsible for the grave violations of human rights in Rwanda during the armed conflict were brought to justice before an Independent and impartial international criminal tribunal. The Commission further recommended that the Council amend the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia so that it could consider crimes under international law committed during the armed conflict in Rwanda.

Signs of Stabilisation in Rwanda

On 6 October, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council his report on the progress of UNAMIR in the discharge of its mandate, the safety of population at risk, the humanitarian situation and progress towards a ceasefire and political reconciliation. In his report, the Secretary-General stated that there were signs that the situation in Rwanda was stabilising. He cited the broad efforts undertaken by the Rwandese Government towards national reconciliation, and urged the international community to support those efforts.

He also endorsed the recommendation made by the Commission of Experts that trials of individuals suspected of serious breaches of international humanitarian law, crimes against humanity and acts of genocide be carried out by an international criminal tribunal and that the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia be expanded to cover crimes in Rwanda.

The Secretary-General urged the Government to maintain an open dialogue with all other political interest groups in Rwanda, including former government officials, except for individuals who were directly implicated in acts of genocide.

Stating that Rwanda needed extensive external technical and financial assistance, the Secretary-General urged donor Governments and international bodies urgently to implement their assistance for Rwanda. He further asked them to communicate with the United Nations about bilateral assistance programmes so there could be a coordinated response to Rwanda's needs.

Political Aspects

The Secretary-General believed that there was steady progress in efforts to normalize the situation inside Rwanda and that the Government had also begun to put civilian administrative structures in place at the central, provincial and local levels.

The Secretary-General noted that in order to create a stable and lasting peace in Rwanda, the Government seemed to recognize the need to include all its citizenry, regardless of ethnicity, within its administrative and security structures. The Government encouraged members of the former Rwandese government forces to join the new national army. Members of the Government made several visits to the refugee camps in Zaire in an attempt to encourage the refugees to return voluntarily to their places of origin.

The Secretary-General also stated that while initial progress had been made in normalising the situation, the Government was faced with the arduous task of rebuilding a country and establishing safety and security for all while it suffered from a severe lack of basic resources.

Human Rights

According to the Secretary-General's report, the Government urged the Commission of Experts to conclude its work expeditiously and also urged that an international tribunal be created. The Government gave assurances that it would make every effort to prevent summary trials, revenge executions and other acts of violence and it would arrest those accused of such crimes.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights deployed human rights officers to Rwanda to assist the Special Rapporteur in investigating violations of human rights and humanitarian law; monitoring the ongoing situation; helping redress existing problems and prevent possible human rights violations from occurring; and implementing programmes of technical cooperation in the field of human rights, particularly the administration of justice.

Military Aspects

The Secretary-General reported that the military situation in Rwanda had been relatively calm since the 18 July ceasefire. At that time, the armed forces of the new Government, the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA), had established control over the entire country, with, the exception of the humanitarian protection zone in the south-west, which was under the control of Operation Turquoise.

UNAMIR began deploying troops in the zone on 10 August 1994 and on 21 August it assumed responsibility from Operation Turquoise. UNAMIR troops established a presence throughout the zone, ensuring stability and security and providing support for humanitarian relief operations. The Government also launched a concerted effort to reassure the population. As a result, a new major exodus of civilians to Zaire was averted. Civil administration in the humanitarian protection zone was being restored as a first priority and RPA troops were gradually being deployed there.

The Secretary-General noted that the main objective of the UNAMIR deployment was to promote security in all sectors of Rwanda and to create a climate conducive to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, as well as to support humanitarian operations. Relations between UNAMIR and the RPA were cordial and cooperative. However, movement restrictions were sometimes imposed on UNAMIR troops.

Civilian Police

Speaking of the activities of UNAMIR's civilian police component, the Secretary-General noted that initially it had been envisaged that its main task would be to maintain liaison with the local civilian authorities on matters relating to public security. However, as a result of the civil war and the ensuing collapse of the country's administrative structures, no real police force or gendarmerie remained in place when the new Government was established on 19 July. The Government sought the urgent assistance of UNAMIR in establishing a new, integrated, national police force. UNAMIR responded positively to that request and, on 16 August, initiated a training programme with students selected by the Government as volunteers from different social and ethnic groups. The activities of the civilian police component thus evolved from liaison to assisting the Government in the creation of a new police/gendarmerie. The component has also been charged with monitoring the activities of local police and gendarmerie and those of the civil authorities with regard to human rights violations, and

assisting UNAMIR military observers and troops in dealing with police matters.

Humanitarian Aspects

In the report, the Secretary-General stated that the first priority in Rwanda remained the resolution of the humanitarian crisis. According to the estimates, Rwanda's pre-war population of 7.9 million had fallen to 5 million. Estimates of internally displaced persons ranged from 800,000 to 2 million. There were more than 2 million refugees in Zaire, the United Republic of Tanzania, Burundi and Uganda. At the same time, it was estimated that some 360,000 refugees had returned to Rwanda spontaneously since the ceasefire on 18 July. The victims of the genocidal slaughter could number as many as 1 million.

The Secretary-General noted that the Government was concerned about elements in the refugee camps who continued to incite people to flee from Rwanda, and to threaten those who might return home. The Government was engaged in efforts to find a solution to these problems, with the support of United Nations agencies and programmes on the ground, coordinated by the Secretary-General's Special Representative. In addition, reports and preliminary investigations suggested that returning refugees might have been subjected to reprisals by Government troops. Therefore, determined efforts would have to be made by the Government to create conditions under which the refugees and displaced persons could return in safety and dignity.

As the country strove to return to normalcy, the Secretary-General continued, increasing attention must be given to the transition from emergency relief to rehabilitation. It was vital that the international community provide quick and efficient rehabilitation assistance. In that connection, the Special Representative and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs distributed among donor countries, agencies and NGOs the Rwanda Emergency Normalisation Plan, outlining the initial areas requiring both financial and technical assistance. The Secretary-General believed that without national reconciliation among the various parties to the conflict, it was likely that humanitarian operations would be protracted and difficult.

Security in Camps Deteriorates

After having considered the Secretary-General's progress report, the Security Council, through a Presidential statement issued on 14 October, expressed concern at the plight of millions of refugees and displaced persons in Rwanda and the countries of the region. It deplored

the continuing acts of intimidation and violence designed to prevent refugees from returning home and called on the Governments of the neighbouring countries to do all in their power to ensure the safety of both the refugees and the international personnel providing humanitarian assistance.

The Council affirmed the importance it attached to the avoidance of reprisals against returnees and to the safeguarding of their property rights. It also welcomed the Government's efforts to facilitate the return of refugees and to begin the process of national reconciliation and reconstruction.

The Council took note of the Secretary-General's view that the most effective way to ensure the safety of the refugees would be the separation of the political leaders, former RGF soldiers and militias from the rest of the camp population. It also reaffirmed its view that those responsible for serious breaches of international humanitarian law and acts of genocide must be brought to justice, and stated that it was considering the recommendations of the Commission of Experts on the establishment of an international tribunal and would act expeditiously on the matter.

In the meantime, security conditions in refugee camps outside Rwanda continued to deteriorate. On 21 October, UNHCR expressed grave concern about the worsening situation which was particularly dangerous in the camps around Goma and Zaire. The threatening presence and activities of former Rwandese Army, militia, and civilian leaders in the camps seriously disrupted humanitarian operations. In some camps, the former authorities virtually took control of all food and relief distribution in order to consolidate their power and to dominate and manipulate the camp population. The lives of relief workers were repeatedly threatened, and refugees who expressed desire to repatriate were terrorised and some even killed. The law and order enforcement agents in the countries of asylum were not adequately equipped to cope with the situation.

The Secretary-General's Special Representative, after visiting some camps, also reported increasing politisation and intimidation of refugees.

International Tribunal Established

On 8 November 1994, the Security Council, by its resolution 955 (1994), decided to establish an international tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for genocide and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda and Rwandese citizens

responsible for such acts in neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994, and to this end to adopt the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. It requested the Secretary-General to make practical arrangements for the effective functioning of the International Tribunal, including recommendations to the Council as to possible locations for the seat of the Tribunal.

Worsening Situation in Refugee Camps

On 18 November 1994, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a report in which he described the worsening situation in the refugee camps and outlined three major military options for addressing the problem of security in the camps.

The Secretary-General noted that according to UNHCR estimates there were approximately 1.2 million Rwandese refugees in the camps in Zaire. The camps were overcrowded, chaotic and increasingly insecure. The refugees were completely dependent on United Nations and relief agencies for basic their needs.

The former Rwandese political leaders, Rwandese government forces soldiers and militia, the Secretary-General continued, controlled the camps. They were determined to ensure by force, if necessary, that the refugees did not repatriate to Rwanda, and also made it difficult for relief agencies to carry out their work in safety. It was believed that these elements might be preparing for an armed invasion of Rwanda and that they might be stockpiling and selling food distributed by relief agencies in preparation for such an invasion. In addition, security was further undermined by general lawlessness, extortion, banditry and gang warfare between groups fighting for control of the camps. As a result, NGOs responsible for the distribution of relief supplies had begun to withdraw.

It was estimated that there were approximately 230 Rwandese political leaders in Zaire, including former ministers, senior civilian and military officials, members of parliament and other political personalities, many of whom were living in good conditions outside the refugee camps. The number of former Rwandese government forces personnel in Zaire was estimated at about 50,000 persons, including dependants. As to the armed militia, it was difficult to determine their exact number as they neither wore uniforms nor carried any insignia that would distinguish them from the rest of the civilian refugee population. However, some estimates indicated that their number could amount to some 10,000 or more.

The Secretary-General stated further that in August and early September 1994, an estimated 200,000 refugees had returned to Rwanda. This movement, however, had been interrupted by the activity of militia and political leaders opposed to voluntary repatriation. As a result, since September, the number of refugees returning home had fallen drastically. At the same time, some 400,000 refugees of mainly Tutsi origin, many of whom had been in exile in Uganda and Burundi for decades, had returned to Rwanda and in many cases, settled on land belonging to those who had fled most recently.

The Secretary-General noted that the refugees' fear of reprisals by the new Government for atrocities committed against Tutsis and moderate Hutus seemed to be another main reason for their hesitancy to return to Rwanda. In expressing their distrust of the Government, refugees indicated a desire for their security to be guaranteed by a neutral body or for their own leaders to participate in the new Government.

In order to improve security in the camps in Zaire, the Secretary-General identified three major military options, namely:

- (a) A United Nations peacekeeping operation, set up in accordance with normal procedures, to establish security progressively in the camps, area by area, over a period of time;
- (b) A United Nations force, set up to separate the former political leaders, military personnel and militia from the ordinary refugee population of the camps, thereby ensuring their security;
- (c) A multinational force, authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter but not under United Nations command, to carry out those functions.

Other measures which could be associated with any of the above options would be the provision of foreign security experts to train and monitor the local security forces and an appropriate public information campaign.

The Secretary-General underlined that any operation conducted without parallel efforts towards national reconciliation in Rwanda would be futile, and could even lead to an intensification of extremist activities in the camps. National reconciliation would require both a political understanding between the former leadership of the country and the present Government and the establishment of conditions in the camps, and in Rwanda itself, conducive to the return of the refugees.

The Secretary-General believed that, under the circumstances, the United Nations peace-keeping operation might be the most realistic

way of progressively improving security in the camps. However, it would be a difficult, complex and, to some extent, unprecedented enterprise. Member States would have to provide the necessary human, financial and logistical resources in a timely manner for it to be effective.

Describing the tasks of such a peace-keeping force, the Secretary-General said that it would provide security for international relief workers, protection for the storage and delivery of humanitarian assistance and safe passage to the Rwandese border for those refugees who wished to return. From the border, UNAMIR troops would then provide assistance in returning the refugees to their home communities. The force would have a mandate separate from that of UNAMIR but would be under the operational control of, and supported logistically by, UNAMIR.

The Secretary-General noted that given the dimensions of the problem, the incremental approach to establishing security would have to be adopted. Depending on the situation in the camps and the rate of repatriation, it was estimated that, given a force strength of 3,000 all ranks, it would take 24 to 30 months to complete the operation. However, with an additional 2,000 troops, it was estimated that the duration of the operation could be reduced by about 10 months.

At the same time, the Secretary-General continued, the new Government of Rwanda must be assisted in creating conditions inside the country under which large-scale repatriation and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced people could take place. The Government indicated its commitment to creating such conditions and requested assistance from the international community for this purpose. This would require the rehabilitation of the basic economic and social infrastructure, the establishment of a fair and effective judicial system, the maintenance of law and order, and the resolution of the issue of property rights.

The Secretary-General said that his Special Representative had formulated and presented to potential donors a Rwanda emergency normalisation plan, outlining areas in which the assistance was urgently required. In addition, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs was preparing a new consolidated inter-agency appeal covering both continuing emergency requirements and short-term rehabilitation needs.

In concluding his report, the Secretary-General stressed that, given the crucial importance of establishing secure conditions in the Rwandese refugee camps in Zaire, as well as the pressing need for

financial and technical assistance to reach the Government of Rwanda, he would concentrate all the efforts of the United Nations system on those immediate priorities. Once progress had been made on those two fronts, he would work with OAU to address the wider problems of the subregion.

On 30 November 1994, the Security Council, in a statement by its President, condemned the actions being taken by former Rwandese leaders, and by former Rwandese government forces and militias to prevent the repatriation of refugees. It also condemned the interference by those groups and individuals with the provision of humanitarian relief, actions which had led to the withdrawal of some non-governmental relief agencies from the camps.

The Council expressed alarm that those same groups might be preparing for an armed invasion of Rwanda and deplored the fact that food distributed by relief agencies for those in the camps was apparently being misappropriated to support such an invasion. It condemned those actions and warned those persons, many of whom might have been implicated in the genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, that their actions would only reinforce the determination of the international community to ensure that such persons were brought to justice.

The Council stated that the options described in the Secretary-General's report for tackling the problem of security raised complex issues which required further elucidation. It requested the Secretary-General to consult potential troop contributors to assess their willingness to participate in a possible peace-keeping operation to create secure areas within large camp sites. Further, the Council encouraged the Secretary-General to assess initial measures for immediate assistance to the Zairian security forces in the camps, including the possibility of deploying security experts, from member Governments or through contract arrangements, to train and monitor the local security forces.

The Council recognized that the Government of Rwanda needed immediate and major financial assistance, and called upon the international community to provide the resources required. Given the urgent need to take forward the political process, the Council requested the Secretary-General to consider acceleration of preparations for the proposed joint United Nations/OAU conference to address a range of political and other issues in order to identify long-term solutions to ensure peace, security and development in the subregion.

Secretary-General Reviews Situation

On 25 November, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council his further report on the situation in Rwanda, as well as his recommendations for the continuing role of the United Nations in that country.

Political Aspects

Speaking of the political aspects of the situation, the Secretary-General noted that since his last report dated 6 October 1994, the situation in Rwanda had witnessed both positive and negative developments. The Broad-based Government of National Unity continued to place emphasis on creating conditions that would allow the Rwandese refugees and the displaced persons within the country to return home. In that regard, it was concentrating its efforts on ensuring public security, restoring the civil administration and reconstructing the country's social and economic infrastructure. However, in the aftermath of the civil war, the Government was facing severe financial and material resources obstacles in achieving those objectives.

While unstable and insecure conditions still prevailed in many parts of the country, the Secretary-General continued, there had been some progress in the private sector and the education field, but the reactivation of the public sector remained constrained by a severe lack of resources, including supplies such as telephones, computers, means of transport, office equipment and fuel. Cash reserves were also inadequate to pay salaries or to meet other essential payments. Moreover, it had not been possible to restore public utilities or deal with the nearly 1 million mines believed to be planted in the countryside.

The Government continued to advocate publicly the fair treatment of returning refugees and displaced persons, as well as reconciliation between all political groups. A further measure towards national reconciliation had been the incorporation of over 2,000 soldiers of the former RGF into the RPA.

The Secretary-General noted further that while the lack of financial resources had been a major factor in impeding activities towards national reconciliation, there were some reasons to believe that the Government could do more to ensure that all Rwandese were part of the political process. The President of Rwanda assured the Secretary-General's Special Representative that efforts were continuing to make the Government more inclusive by inviting into it some "members of

the Mouvement republicain national pour le developpement (MRND), which was the only major political party not represented in it.

The Secretary-General went on to say that there was a growing problem of land tenure and rival claims to property rights. Almost 400,000 long-standing refugees had returned home since mid-July and were claiming property they once held. Some refugees who had fled more recently were returning home to find their property held by others. Although the Government had emphasized that the wrongful occupation of another person's home or property was unlawful, it was increasingly difficult to implement that policy.

In response to the need for factual and objective information on the situation both in the refugee camps and in Rwanda, as well as on United Nations activities in the country, the Secretary-General said, UNAMIR was in the process of establishing a broadcasting facility to cover the city of Kigali and the western part of the country, with plans for more powerful transmitters capable of covering the entire country, as well as the refugee camps. The report noted, however, that despite repeated efforts, the Government had still not approved UNAMIR's request for formal authorisation to broadcast and for a frequency allocation.

Human Rights

The Secretary-General also informed the Security Council that the Special Rapporteur, Rene Degni-Segui, had visited Rwanda from 15 to 22 October and had also travelled to the United Republic of Tanzania and Zaire. The Commission of Experts had visited Rwanda from 29 October to 10 November. The human rights field operation in Rwanda launched by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights had established seven regional offices and about 60 human rights officers and special investigators, out of a planned total of 147, had arrived in Rwanda. Another 40 human rights observers and teams of forensic experts were expected by the end of December 1994. The Secretary-General stated that he expected to receive the findings of the Special Rapporteur and of the Commission of Experts on their investigations of alleged reprisal killings by RPA forces.

The Secretary-General was also actively pursuing the completion of practical arrangements for the effective functioning of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, and in particular its investigations/prosecutorial unit in Kigali, the appointment of a Deputy Prosecutor unit and support and administrative staff, and the election of judges. The High Commissioner for Human Rights had placed the services of

the special investigations unit, established within the framework of the human rights field operation, at the disposal of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal, with a view to pursuing the investigative work initiated under the mandate of the Special Rapporteur and the Commission of Experts.

Military Aspects

On the military aspects of the situation, the Secretary-General said that UNAMIR had reached its full authorized strength of 5,500 all ranks. The troops and military observers were deployed in six sectors: Sector 1 (north-east), Sector 2 (south-east), Sector 3 (south), Sector 4 (south-west), Sector 5 (northwest) and Sector 6 (Kigali City).

The Secretary-General noted that UNAMIR continued to assist with the transport of refugees and internally displaced persons returning voluntarily to their homes, while maintaining protection for populations at risk in various areas and at displaced persons camps in Rwanda. UNAMIR was currently working with the humanitarian agencies and the Government of Rwanda to develop and implement a strategy to close the displaced persons camps in Rwanda gradually by ensuring the voluntary return of the occupants to their homes. UNAMIR troops and observers had also intensified their monitoring, observation and patrol duties.

Civilian Police

Continuing, the Secretary-General said that since no real police force or gendarmerie remained in place, when the Government had been established on 19 July, police functions were entrusted to an embryonic gendarmerie consisting mainly of RPA soldiers. At the request of the Government, the UNAMIR civilian police component had initiated training of candidates nominated by the Government to serve in the two services that make up Rwanda's police structure, namely, the *Gendarmerie nationale* and the *Police communale*. The component was also involved in efforts to restore and reform the penal system within the framework of the implementation of the Rwanda Emergency Normalisation Plan. In addition, the component was helping to restore and reform the penal system.

Humanitarian Aspects

The humanitarian situation within Rwanda, the Secretary-General went on, presented the international community with a pressing and unusually complex crisis. In the conventional sense, the emergency

within Rwanda had abated, though at least 1.5 to 2 million displaced persons remained dependent upon assistance from aid agencies. However, the country at large faced a clear emergency as government institutions found themselves unable to sustain the nation's basic infrastructure and provide for the welfare of its people.

Surrounding Rwanda were over 2 million Rwandese refugees in camps along the borders in Zaire, Burundi and the United Republic of Tanzania. Although the voluntary return of those refugees was critical to the normalisation of the situation in Rwanda, violent harassment and misinformation in the refugee camps, especially in Zaire, prevented many of the *bona fide* refugees from returning home.

The Secretary-General pointed out that the situation of the internally displaced persons in Rwanda paralleled that of the refugees on the country's borders. The urgent need to bring internally displaced persons back to their home communities was thwarted by intimidation within the camps and fear of reprisals. In addition, a perception in the areas around the camps that those within the camps had better lives than those outside was generating increased tension between local and camp populations. At the same time, the camp sites occupied much-needed farmland and were increasingly an ecological hazard. In that regard, the Secretary-General said that his Special Representative, in close collaboration with the Government, and through the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator, was in the process of finalising an integrated humanitarian response to address the issue of the internally displaced persons.

The Secretary-General indicated that international and other concerned organisations continued to provide much-needed assistance to the displaced and other vulnerable sectors of society. In addition, many humanitarian organisations had made efforts to strengthen the capacity of the Government. Efforts were being made to restore some semblance of institutional structure through the provision of vehicles and basic office equipment, and quick disbursement of funds to re-establish the generation of electricity and similar activities.

The Secretary-General stated that the international community would have to provide the support needed to ensure that the army did not become a disruptive social force. At the same time, if the human rights of the internally displaced and returnees from outside Rwanda were to be protected on a lasting basis, rapid assistance must be provided to restore the country's police force and judicial system. In parallel, government authorities concerned with the welfare of the Rwandese people must be restored.

In concluding his 25 November report, the Secretary-General stated that the situation in Rwanda remained critical and the country continued to face daunting problems. While he was encouraged by the Government's efforts to stabilize the situation, new threats and challenges continued to emerge, in particular, the creeping militarisation of the refugee camps. In that regard, the Secretary-General referred to his report of 18 November, in which he set out ideas on action that could be taken to address the problem of insecurity in the camps and ensure that the humanitarian efforts to protect the refugees and bring about their eventual safe and voluntary repatriation would not be fatally undermined.

The Secretary-General called on the Government of Rwanda to ensure that its proclaimed resolve to promote conditions conducive to safe and voluntary repatriation and national reconciliation was translated into concrete action and programmes, notwithstanding its lack of adequate financial resources. He also called on the international community to respond to the Government's need for assistance for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Rwanda. He believed that if the unsettled situation was not addressed promptly by both the Government and the international community, the residual problems and emerging threats might not only endanger what had been achieved, but could push Rwanda backward and revive the spectre of renewed conflict.

Speaking of UNAMIR, the Secretary-General noted that it was firmly in place, as a focal point of the international community's effort in Rwanda, to provide the coordinated leadership necessary to move forward the overall process of peace and reconciliation. He recommended that the mandate of the Mission be extended for a further six months. During that period, UNAMIR would continue its mandated functions and strengthen its good offices role in order to facilitate more expeditious movement towards peace and national reconciliation. It would also continue to support efforts towards a regional approach to the problems created by the crisis in Rwanda.

UNAMIR's Mandate Extended

On 30 November, the Security Council extended the mandate of UNAMIR to 9 June 1995. It also expanded the mandate to enable the Mission to contribute to the security in Rwanda of personnel of the International Tribunal for Rwanda and for human rights officers, including full time protection of the Prosecutor's office. UNAMIR would also assist in the establishment and training of a new, integrated, national police force.

The Council strongly urged the Rwandese Government to continue cooperating with UNAMIR in the implementation of its mandate and in particular in ensuring unimpeded access to all areas in the country by UNAMIR forces, personnel of the International Tribunal and human rights officers.

The Council called on the international community to provide resources needed to meet the immediate needs of the Government, directly or through the Trust Fund for Rwanda. It requested the Secretary-General to report to it on UNAMIR's discharge of its mandate, the safety of populations at risk, the humanitarian situation and progress towards repatriation of refugees. The Council also asked him to recommend possible steps that the United Nations could take to promote effective mine clearance.

Composition of UNAMIR

Originally, the authorized peak military strength of UNAMIR was 2,548 military personnel, including 2,217 formed troops and 331 military observers. As of 31 March 1994, UNAMIR had a strength of 2,539 military personnel from the following countries: Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Congo, Egypt, Fiji, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia, Uruguay and Zimbabwe. At that time, the Mission also comprised 60 civilian police monitors from Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Guyana, Mali and Togo, while it was authorized to have 110 international and 61 locally recruited civilian staff.

Following the outbreak of violence in April 1994, the Security Council adjusted UNAMIR's mandate and decided to reduce the Mission to 270 military personnel. After the situation in Rwanda further deteriorated, the Council authorized an expansion of UNAMIR's mandate and authorized an increase of the UNAMIR force level up to 5,500 troops. The larger mission was to include five infantry battalions numbering some 4,000 all ranks, a force support battalion of approximately 721 personnel, a military observer group of 320 officers, 219 headquarters personnel, a helicopter squadron of some 110 all ranks and 16 helicopters, 50 military police personnel and a force of 90 civilian police.

UNAMIR is headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Rwanda, Shaharyar M. Khan (Pakistan). Khan succeeded Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh (Cameroon), who had served as the Secretary-General's Special Representative and Head of Mission from October 1993 to June 1994. Two military officers have served as

UNAMIR Force Commander: Major-General Romeo A. Dallaire (Canada), from October 1993 to August 1994; and, currently, Major-General Guy Tousignant (Canada) who took up his duties on 19 August 1994.

As of 30 November 1994, UNAMIR included 5,442 military personnel and 80 civilian police officers from the following countries:

<i>Country</i>	<i>Police</i>	<i>Troops</i>	<i>Observers</i>
Argentina			1
Australia		308	
Austria			15
Bangladesh			29
Canada		376	20
Chad		132	
Congo		38	
Djibouti	15		
Ethiopia		805	
Fiji			1
Ghana	10	829	57
Guinea			15
Guinea Bissau	20	35	
India		326	16
Jordan	5		
Malawi		170	10
Mali	10	200	29
Niger		43	
Nigeria	10	338	15
Poland			2
Russian Federation			15
Senegal		241	
Tunisia		844	10
United Kingdom		7	
Uruguay			24
Zambia	10	455	10
Zimbabwe			26
Total	80	5,147	295

Figures may vary from month to month due to rotation. "Troops" include any infantry, logistics, engineering, air, medical, mov-con, staff, etc.

Financial Aspects

The rough cost to the United Nations of UNAMIR in 1994 (including costs related to UNOMUR) was approximately \$197.5 million. Costs

are met by the assessed contributions from United Nations Member States. As at 30 November 1994, total contributions outstanding to the Special Account of UNAMIR (including UNOMUR) for the period from the inception of the operation to 31 October 1994 amounted to approximately \$18.2 million.

NOTE

1. From July 1992 to July 1993, the OAU Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG I), made up of 50 observers from OAU countries, monitored the ceasefire in Rwanda. In early August 1993, it was replaced by an expanded NMOG II force, composed of some 130 personnel.

32

UN Observation Group in Lebanon

Background

In May 1958, armed rebellion broke out in Lebanon when President Camille Chamoun—(a Maronite Christian) made known his intention to seek an amendment to the Constitution which would enable him to be re-elected for a second term. The disturbances, which started in the predominantly Moslem city of Tripoli, soon spread to Beirut and the northern and north-eastern areas near the Syrian border, and assumed the proportions of a civil war.

On 22 May, the Lebanese Government requested a meeting of the Security Council to consider its complaint "in respect of a situation arising from the intervention of the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security". It charged that the United Arab Republic* was encouraging and supporting the rebellion by the supply of large quantities of arms to subversive elements in Lebanon by the infiltration of armed personnel from Syria into Lebanon and by conducting a violent press and radio campaign against the Lebanese Government.

On 27 May, the Security Council decided to include the Lebanese complaint on its agenda but, at the request of Iraq, agreed to postpone the debate to permit the League of Arab States to try to find a settlement of the dispute. After the League had met for six days without reaching agreement, the Council took up the case and, on 11 June, adopted resolution 128(1958), by which it decided to dispatch urgently to Lebanon an observation group "so as to ensure that there is no

* From February 1958 until October 1961, Egypt and Syria joined together to form the United Arab Republic.

illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other *materiel* across the Lebanese borders". The Secretary-General was authorized to take the necessary steps to dispatch the observation group, which was asked to keep the Council informed through him.

This resolution, supported by both Lebanon and the United Arab Republic, formed the basis for the establishment of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL).

Creation of UNOGIL

Following adoption of the Security Council's 11 June resolution, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold told the Council that the necessary preparatory steps had already been taken. The Observation Group proper would be made up of highly qualified and experienced men from various regions of the world. They would be assisted by military observers, some of whom would be drawn from UNTSO and could be in Beirut on the very next day. Hammarskjold stressed that the Group would not be a police force like the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) deployed in Sinai and the Gaza Strip.

Following the adoption of the resolution, the Secretary-General appointed Galo Plaza Lasso of Ecuador, Rajeshwar Dayal of India and Major-General Odd Bull of Norway as members of UNOGIL. Plaza acted as Chairman.

In order to start the operation without delay, 10 observers were immediately detached from UNTSO for assignment with UNOGIL. Five of them arrived in Beirut on 12 June and began active reconnaissance the following morning. The plan was to cover as many areas as possible and to probe further each day in the direction of the Syrian border so as to observe any illegal infiltration of personnel and supply of arms across the border. The number of observers was rapidly increased with new arrivals and reached 100 by 16 June. They were drawn from 21 countries: Afghanistan, Argentina, Burma (now Myanmar), Canada, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Sweden and Thailand.

The contributing countries were selected by the Secretary-General in accordance with the same criteria as those he had developed for UNEF in 1956, namely the agreement of the host Government and exclusion of nationals of the permanent members of the Security Council and of "special interest" countries. Two helicopters with Norwegian pilots were placed at the disposal of the Group on 23 June

and they were supplemented shortly thereafter by four light observation aircraft.

Method of Operation

The three members of UNOGIL assembled in Beirut on 19 June under the personal chairmanship of Dag Hammarskjold, who had arrived in the area the day before. As outlined by the Secretary-General, the role of UNOGIL was strictly limited to observation, to ascertain whether illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other *materiel* across the Lebanese borders was occurring. It was not UNOGIL's task to mediate, arbitrate or forcefully to prohibit illegal infiltration, although it was hoped that its very presence on the borders would deter any such traffic. The borders meant those between Lebanon and Syria, since the Armistice Demarcation Line between Israel and Lebanon was covered by UNTSO and not involved in the present case.

It was decided that the Group should discharge its duties by the following methods:

- (a) The UNOGIL military observers would conduct regular and frequent patrols of all accessible roads from dawn to dusk, primarily in border districts and the areas adjacent to the zones held by the opposition forces. Following the practice already established by UNTSO, the patrolling was to be carried out in white jeeps with United Nations markings, equipped with two-way radio sets.
- (b) A system of permanent observation posts was to be established and manned by military observers. These posts were in continuous radio contact with UNOGIL headquarters in Beirut, with each other, and with the patrolling United Nations jeeps. There were initially 10 such stations sited with a view to being as close as possible to the dividing-line between the opposing forces, as near to the frontier as possible or at points commanding supposed infiltration routes or distribution centres. The observers at these stations attempted to check all reported infiltration in their areas and to observe any suspicious development.
- (c) An emergency reserve of military observers was to be stationed at headquarters and main observation posts for the purpose of making inquiries at short notice or investigating alleged instances of smuggling.
- (d) An evaluation team was to be set up at headquarters to analyse, evaluate and co-ordinate all information received from observers and other sources.

- (e) Aerial reconnaissance was to be conducted by light aeroplanes and helicopters, the former being equipped for aerial photography. The aircraft were in radio communication with headquarters and military observers in the field.
- (f) The Lebanese Government would provide the Observation Group with all available information about suspected infiltration. Based on this information, instructions would be given to observers for maintenance of special vigilance within the areas in question. The Group would also request the military observers to make specific inquiries into alleged activities as occasion required.

First UNOGIL Report to the Security Council

On 1 July 1958, UNOGIL submitted its first report to the Security Council. The report, which dealt with the problems of observation arising from the political, military and geographical circumstances prevailing in Lebanon, indicated that the observers were facing difficulties in gaining access to much of the frontier area held by the opposition forces and could provide no substantiated or conclusive evidence of major infiltration.

The Lebanese Government criticized what it called the report's "inconclusive, misleading or unwarranted" conclusions. It took strong exception to the report and insisted that the United Arab Republic was continuing "massive, illegal and unprovoked intervention in the affairs of Lebanon".

Initially, the military observers encountered serious difficulties in approaching the eastern and northern frontiers, where large areas were in opposition hands. In the early stage, these areas could only be patrolled by aircraft, including photographic and night reconnaissance. But the situation greatly improved by mid-July, when UNOGIL finally obtained full freedom of access to all sections of the Lebanese frontier and received assurances of complete freedom to conduct ground patrols throughout the area north of Tripoli and to establish permanent observation Posts anywhere in that area. Arrangements were also made for inspection by military observers of all vehicles and cargoes entering Lebanon across the northern frontier.

Dispatch of United States Forces

In the mean time, however, new complications arose outside Lebanon's borders. On 14 July 1958, the Hashemite Kingdom of Iraq was overthrown in a *coup d'état* and replaced with a republican regime.

This event had serious repercussions both on Lebanon and Jordan. On the same day, President Chamoun requested United States intervention to protect Lebanon's political independence and territorial integrity.

On 15 July, the Security Council was convened at the request of the representative of the United States, who informed it of his Government's decision to respond positively to the Lebanese request. He stated that United States forces were not in Lebanon to engage in hostilities of any kind but to help the Lebanese Government in its efforts to stabilize the situation, brought on by threats from outside, until such time as the United Nations could take the necessary steps to protect the integrity and independence of Lebanon. He added that his Government was the first to admit that the dispatch of United States forces to Lebanon was not an ideal way to solve the current problems and that these forces would be withdrawn as soon as the United Nations could take over.

Secretary-General's Position

During the same meeting, the Secretary-General made a statement reviewing the actions he had taken under the mandate given to him in the Security Council's resolution of 11 June. He stated that he had acted solely with the purpose stated by the Council, "to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other *materiel* across the Lebanese borders". His actions had had no relation to developments that must be considered as the internal affairs of Lebanon, nor had he concerned himself with the wider international aspects of the problem other than those referred to in the resolution. As a matter of course, he had striven to give the observation operation the highest possible efficiency. Hammarskjold also mentioned his own diplomatic efforts in support of the operation, which now had full freedom of movement in the northern area as well as in the rest of Lebanon.

On 16 July, UNOGIL submitted an interim report stating that on the previous day it had completed the task of obtaining full freedom of access to all sections of the frontier of Lebanon. The next day, in a second interim report, the Group expressed its intention to suggest to the Secretary-General that a force of unarmed non-commissioned personnel and other ranks should be assigned to it. It also indicated that the number of observers would have to be raised to 200, with additional aircraft and crews. With the envisaged increase in the observer force, and the addition of enlisted personnel and supporting equipment, it would be possible to undertake direct and constant

patrolling of the actual frontier. In transmitting this report, the Secretary-General stated that he fully endorsed the plan contained in it.

Events in Jordan

On 17 July, the representative of Jordan requested the Security Council to give urgent consideration to a complaint by his Government of interference in its domestic affairs by the United Arab Republic. The Council decided on the same day to consider this complaint concurrently with the Lebanese complaint.

During the ensuing discussions, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that his Government had no doubt that a fresh attempt, was being prepared to overthrow the regime in Jordan. In response to an appeal by the Jordanian Government, British forces were being dispatched to Jordan to help its King and Government to preserve the country's political independence and territorial integrity. This action would be brought to an end if arrangements could be made by the Council to protect the lawful Government of Jordan from external threats and so maintain international peace and security.

At the beginning of the Council's debate, the Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution, later revised, by which the Council would call upon the United Kingdom and the United States "to cease armed intervention in the domestic affairs of the Arab States and to remove their troops from the territories of Lebanon and Jordan immediately". The United States proposed a draft resolution which would request the Secretary-General "immediately to consult the Government of Lebanon and other Member States as appropriate with a view to making arrangements for additional measures, including the contribution and use of contingents, as may be necessary to protect the territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon and to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other *materiel* across the Lebanese borders". A third draft resolution was later submitted by Sweden to have the Council request the Secretary-General to suspend the activities of the observers in Lebanon until further notice.

The Soviet and Swedish draft resolutions were rejected by majorities, while the United States proposal was vetoed by the Soviet Union.

Following those votes, Japan proposed a draft resolution under which the Secretary-General would be requested to make arrangements for such measures, in addition to those envisaged by the Council's

resolution of 11 June 1958, as he might consider necessary in the light of the present circumstances, "with a view to enabling the United Nations to fulfil the general purposes established in that resolution, and which will, in accordance with the Charter, serve to ensure the territorial integrity and political independence of Lebanon, so as to make possible the withdrawal of the United States forces from Lebanon". This draft resolution was also rejected, owing to a Soviet negative vote.

Secretary-General's Plan

Following the rejection of the Japanese proposal, the Secretary-General stated that, although the Security Council had failed to take additional action in the grave emergency facing it, the United Nations responsibility to make all efforts to live up to the purposes and principles of the Charter remained. He was sure that he would be acting in accordance with the Council's wishes if he used all opportunities offered to him, within the limits set by the Charter, towards developing those efforts, so as to help prevent a further deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and to assist in finding a road away from the dangerous point now reached. The continued operation of UNOGIL being acceptable to all Council members would imply concurrence in the further development of the Group, so as to give it all the significance it could have, consistent with its basic character as determined by the Council in its resolution of 11 June 1958 and the purposes and principles of the Charter. He indicated that, should the members of the Council disapprove of the way these intentions were to be translated by him into practical steps, he would, of course, accept the consequences of its judgement.

The Secretary-General's plan was to increase the strength of UNOGIL as soon as possible to enable it to carry out fully its mission and thus expedite the withdrawal of the United States troops. The number of personnel, which stood at 200 on 17 July 1958, was increased to 287 by 20 September and to 591 in mid-November, including 32 non-commissioned officers in support of ground operations and 90 such officers in the air section. In November, UNOGIL had 18 aircraft, six helicopters and 290 vehicles, and 49 permanently manned posts of all types had been established.

Further UNOGIL Report

On 30 July, UNOGIL submitted a periodic report on its activities and observations. It stated that the military observers were operating with skill and devotion, often in conditions of considerable danger and

difficulty. Intensive air patrolling had been carried out by day and by night, and air observations had been checked against the results of ground patrolling and observation. The Group reached the conclusion that the infiltration which might be taking place could not be anything more than of limited scale and was largely confined to small arms and ammunition.

With regard to illegal infiltration of personnel, UNOGIL stated that the nature of the frontier, the existence of traditional tribal and other bands on both sides of it and the free movement of produce in both directions were among the factors which must be taken into account in making an evaluation. In no case, however, had the observers, who had been vigilantly patrolling the opposition-held areas and had frequently observed armed bands there, been able to detect the presence of persons who had undoubtedly entered from across the border for the purpose of fighting. From the observations made of the arms and organisation in the opposition-held areas, the fighting strength of opposition elements was not such as to be able successfully to cope with hostilities against a well-armed regular military force.

The United States troops, which had landed in Beirut on 15 July, were confined at all times to the beach area and there were no contacts between them and the United Nations military observers. However, UNOGIL indicated in its report that the impact of the landing of those forces in the Beirut area on the inhabitants of opposition-held areas had occasioned difficulties and caused setbacks in carrying out the tasks of the observers.

General Assembly Emergency Session

During the discussions in the Security Council in July, both the USSR and the United States proposed the convening of an emergency special session of the General Assembly, but the matter was not taken up until 7 August. In the intervening period, the leaders of France, India, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States held consultations through exchanges of letters in an effort to find a way out of the impasse. The idea of a "summit" meeting on the Middle East was advanced, but no agreement could be reached. On 7 August, the Security Council met again and decided to call an emergency special session of the Assembly.

That session took place from 8 to 21 August 1958. By the time, the Assembly convened, two events which had an important bearing on the developments in the Middle East had occurred. First, General Fuad Chehab, who was acceptable to the Moslem leaders, had been

elected President of Lebanon, and this effectively removed from the scene the controversial question of a second term for Chamoun. Second, the new Iraqi revolutionary Government had accepted the obligations of States under the United Nations Charter and had been recognized by the United Kingdom and the United States.

In a report, of 14 August, UNOGIL indicated that just before the election of President Chehab there had been a noticeable reduction of tension throughout the country and a comparable absence of armed clashes between Government and opposition forces. Since 31 July, there had been a virtual nation-wide truce with only occasional reports of sporadic firing in some areas. The report also indicated that by dint of their perseverance and tact in dealing with difficult and often dangerous situations, the observers had won back the ground lost after 15 July. Most of the permanent stations in opposition-held areas envisaged by the Group had been established, and other stations were expected to be set up shortly.

At the end of the emergency special session, the General Assembly unanimously adopted, on 21 August, a proposal submitted by 10 Arab States. This became resolution 1237(ES-III), by which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to make forthwith, in consultation with the Governments concerned and in accordance with the Charter, such practical arrangements as would adequately help to uphold Charter purposes and principles in relation to Lebanon and Jordan in the present circumstances, and thereby facilitate the early withdrawal of the foreign troops from the two countries.

Secretary-General's Special Representative

In a report dated 29 September to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General commented on the practical arrangements mentioned in the Assembly's August resolution.

He noted that, in the case of Lebanon, the United Nations had already made extensive plans for observing the possible infiltration or smuggling of arms across the border. The work of the Observation Group had had to be re-evaluated within the new practical arrangements to be made. As to Jordan, its Government had indicated that it did not accept the stationing of a United Nations force in Jordan nor the organisation of a broader observation group like UNOGIL. But it would accept a special representative of the Secretary-General to assist in the implementation of the resolution. Consequently, the Secretary-General asked Pier P. Spinelli, the Under-Secretary in charge of the United Nations Office at Geneva, to proceed to Amman and to serve as his Special Representative, on a preliminary basis.

With regard to the withdrawal issues, the Secretary-General had been informed that Lebanon and the United States were discussing a schedule for the completion of the withdrawal of the United States forces, and that they hoped this might take place by the end of October. Jordan and the United Kingdom were also discussing the fixing of dates for the withdrawal of the British troops from Jordan, which would begin during October.

In its fourth report to the Security Council, which was circulated on 29 September 1958, UNOGIL stated that, during the period being reviewed, its military observers had not only been able to re-establish confidence in the independent nature of their activities, but had worked for themselves the trust and understanding of all sections of the population. Despite the presence of a considerable number of men under arms, there had been no significant clashes between the Lebanese army and organized opposition forces. No cases of infiltration had been detected and, if any infiltration was still taking place, its extent must be regarded as insignificant.

Withdrawal of United Kingdom and United States Forces

In a letter dated 1 October, the United Kingdom informed the Secretary-General that it had agreed with the Jordanian Government that the withdrawal of British troops should begin on 20 October. On 8 October, the United States announced that, by agreement with the Lebanese Government, it had been decided to complete the withdrawal of United States forces by the end of October. The withdrawal of United States troops was completed by 25 October, and of the British troops by 2 November. Some of the UNOGIL observers played a role in assisting in the evacuation of the British forces from Jordan.

Termination of UNOGIL

In a letter dated 16 November 1958, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lebanon stated that cordial and close relations between Lebanon and the United Arab Republic had resumed their normal course. In order to dispel any misunderstanding which might hamper such relations, the Lebanese Government requested the Security Council to delete the Lebanese complaint from its agenda.

In its final report, dated 17 November 1958, UNOGIL recommended that the operation should be withdrawn since its task might be regarded as completed. On 21 November, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a plan for the withdrawal of the operation, formulated by the Observation Group, which was acceptable to Lebanon.

In accordance with that plan, the closing down of stations and substations preparatory to the withdrawal of UNOGIL began on 26 November and was completed by the end of the month. The observers were withdrawn in three phases, with the key staff, the personnel required for air service and the logistic components leaving last. The withdrawal was completed by 9 December.

UN YEMEN OBSERVATION MISSION

Background

A civil war which broke out in Yemen in September 1962 contained the seeds of a wider conflict with international dimensions because of the involvement of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic. Saudi Arabia shared an extended border with Yemen, much of it still undefined. The United Arab Republic (Egypt) had had a special relationship with Yemen in the past. In March 1958, Yemen joined it to form the United Arab States, but this association was dissolved in December 1961, shortly after Syria seceded from the United Arab Republic.

A further factor in the situation was that Yemen had long claimed that the Aden Protectorate was legally part of its territory. The British-controlled Government of the South Arabian Federation, which included the Aden Protectorate, therefore also closely followed developments in Yemen.

On 19 September 1962, Imam Ahmed bin Yahya died and was succeeded by his son, Imam Mohammed Al-Badr. A week later, a rebellion led by the army overthrew the new Imam and proclaimed the Yemen Arab Republic. The new Government was recognized by the United Arab Republic on 29 September and by the USSR the next day, but other major Powers with interests in the area, including the United Kingdom and the United States, withheld action on the question of recognition.

Following his overthrow, Imam Al-Badr managed to escape from San'a, the capital, and, with other members of the royal family, rallied the tribes in the northern part of the country. With financial and material support from external sources, the royalists fought a fierce guerrilla campaign against the republican forces. The revolutionary Government accused Saudi Arabia of harbouring and encouraging Yemeni royalists, and threatened to carry the war into Saudi Arabian territory. The Imam, on the other hand, claimed that the army rebellion was fostered and aided by Egypt, which denied the charge. At the

beginning of October, large numbers of United Arab Republic forces were dispatched to Yemen at the request of the revolutionary Government to assist the republican forces in their fight against the royalists.

On 27 November, the Permanent Mission of Yemen to the United Nations, which was still staffed by the royalists, addressed a letter to the Secretary-General urging the United Nations to establish an inquiry to ascertain whether or not the rebellion was fostered from Cairo. This letter was informally circulated to the United Nations missions. A delegation of Yemeni republicans which had arrived in New York by that time let it be known that they would not object to a United Nations on-the-spot investigation.

The General Assembly, which began its seventeenth session in New York in September 1962, had before it credentials from both the royalist and republican regimes in Yemen. It took up the question of the representation of Yemen on 20 December, the very last day of its session. On that day, the Credentials Committee decided, by a vote of 6 to none, with 3 abstentions, to recommend that the Assembly accept the credentials submitted by the President of the Yemen Arab Republic. Later on the same day, the Assembly approved, by 73 votes to 4, with 23 abstentions, the Committee's report.

King Hussein of Jordan earlier that month had suggested that the presence of United Nations observers might be useful in finding a solution.

Secretary-General's Initiative

Secretary-General U Thant undertook a peace initiative, which eventually led to the establishment of the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM).

In a report dated 29 April 1963, the Secretary-General stated that, since the autumn of 1962, he had been consulting regularly with the representatives of the Governments of the Arab Republic of Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic about "certain aspects of the situation in Yemen of external origin, with a view to making my office available to the parties for such assistance as might be desired towards ensuring against any developments in that situation which might threaten peace of the area". He had requested Ralph J. Bunche, Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs, to undertake a fact-finding mission in the United Arab Republic and Yemen. As a result of the activities carried out by Bunche on his behalf, and by Ellsworth Bunker, who had been sent by the United States Government on a somewhat

similar but unconnected mission, he had received from each of the three Governments concerned formal confirmation of their acceptance of identical terms of disengagement in Yemen.

Under those terms, Saudi Arabia would terminate all support and aid to the royalists of Yemen and would prohibit the use of Saudi Arabian territory by royalist leaders for carrying on the struggle in Yemen. Simultaneously, with that suspension of aid, Egypt would undertake to begin withdrawal from Yemen of the troops that had been sent at the request of the new Government, the withdrawal to be phased and to take place as soon as possible. A demilitarized zone would be established to a distance of 20 kilometres on each side of the demarcated Saudi Arabia-Yemen border, and impartial observers would be stationed there to check on the observance of the terms of disengagement. They would also certify the suspension of activities in support of the royalists from Saudi Arabian territory and the outward movement of the Egyptian forces and equipment from the airports and seaports of Yemen.

The Secretary-General asked Lieutenant-General Carl C. von Horn of Sweden, Chief of Staff of UNTSO, to visit the three countries concerned to consult on the terms relating to the functioning of United Nations observers in implementation of the terms of disengagement.

In a second report, dated 27 May, the Secretary-General told the Council that on the basis of information provided by General von Horn, he concluded that United Nations observers in the area were necessary and should be dispatched with the least possible delay. The personnel required would not exceed 200, and it was estimated that the observation function would not be required for more than four months. The military personnel in the Yemen operation would be employed under conditions similar to those applying to other United Nations operations of this nature. The total cost was estimated to be less than \$1 million, and he hoped that the two parties principally involved, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, would undertake to bear this cost. He submitted more detailed estimates of the costs of the proposed Mission in a supplemental report on 3 June.

In a further report, submitted on 7 June, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that Saudi Arabia had agreed to accept a "proportionate share" of the costs of the operation, while Egypt agreed in principle to provide \$200,000 in assistance for a period of two months, which would be roughly half the costs of the operation for that period. Thus, there would be no financial implications for the United Nations

in getting the Observation Mission established and for its maintenance for an initial two-month period. The Secretary-General announced his intention to proceed with the organisation and dispatch of the Mission without delay.

Security Council Action Establishing UNYOM

The next day, the USSR requested the convening of the Council to consider the Secretary-General's reports on developments relating to Yemen, since the reports contained proposals concerning possible measures by the United Nations to maintain international peace and security, which, under the Charter, should be decided by the Council.

After considering the reports, the Council adopted, on 11 June 1963, resolution 179(1963), requesting the Secretary-General to establish the observation operation as he had defined it, and urging the parties concerned to observe fully the terms of disengagement set out in his 29 April report and to refrain from any action that would increase tension in the area. The Council noted with satisfaction that Saudi Arabia and Egypt had agreed to defray, over a period of two months, the expenses of the observation function called for in the terms of disengagement.

This resolution constituted the basis for the establishment of UNYOM. It did not set a specific time-limit for the Mission, although two months was mentioned in the preamble in connection with its financing. The Secretary-General took the position that he could extend UNYOM without a decision of the Security Council if he considered that its task had not been completed, provided that he could obtain the necessary financial support.

Reports on UNYOM Operations

In his first report on the operation, which was submitted to the Security Council on 4 September 1963, the Secretary-General pointed out that the Mission's task would not be completed on the expiration of the two-month period, and for that reason he had sought and received assurances from both parties that they would defray the expenses of the operation for a further two months.

In his second report, dated 28 October, the Secretary-General reported that there had been no decisive change in the situation in Yemen and, because of the limiting and restrictive character of the UNYOM mandate, the Mission would have to be withdrawn by 4 November 1963, since there would be no financial support for it after that date. However, three days later, he informed the Council that

Saudi Arabia and Egypt had agreed to participate in the financing of UNYOM for a further two-month period and, accordingly, preparations for the withdrawal of the Mission had been cancelled. He indicated that, although no Security Council meeting was required for the extension of UNYOM, he had consulted Council members to ascertain that there would be no objection to the proposed extension.

On 2 January 1964, before the expiration of the third two-month period, the Secretary-General reported that he considered that the continuing functioning of UNYOM was highly desirable, that the two Governments concerned had agreed to continue their financial support for another two months, and that he had engaged in informal consultations with the members of the Council before announcing his intention to extend the Mission. This process was repeated at the beginning of March, May and July 1964, and UNYOM was extended for successive periods of two months until 4 September 1964.

In late August 1964, Saudi Arabia informed the Secretary-General that it found itself unable to continue the payment of expenses resulting from the disengagement agreement, and Egypt indicated that it had no objection to the termination of UNYOM on 4 September. The Secretary-General therefore advised the Council of his intention to terminate the activities of the Mission on that date.

Organisation of UNYOM

Following the adoption of resolution 179(1963), the Secretary-General appointed General von Horn as Commander of UNYOM and took steps to provide the Mission with the required personnel and equipment. The resolution had requested the Secretary-General to establish UNYOM as he had defined it in his report of 29 April 1963, and he selected the various components of the Mission accordingly. In selecting those components and the contributing countries, he informally consulted the parties concerned. Practical considerations were also taken into account, including the proximity of the existing United Nations peace-keeping operations, namely UNTSO and UNEF.

In the initial stage, UNYOM was composed mainly of six military observers, a Yugoslav reconnaissance unit of 114 personnel and a Canadian air unit of 50 officers and men. In addition, 28 international staff members and a small military staff were assigned to UNYOM headquarters. The military observers were detailed from UNTSO and the reconnaissance unit personnel were drawn from the Yugoslav contingent of UNEF, which had experience in United Nations peace-keeping operations in similar terrain. The UNEF air base at El Arish

provided support for the Canadian air unit, including six aircraft and a similar number of helicopters.

The strength and composition of UNYOM remained unchanged until November 1963, when a reappraisal of its requirements in terms of personnel and equipment was undertaken. It was felt that in view of the co-operation shown by the parties and the peaceful and friendly attitude of the people in the area covered by the Mission, it was no longer necessary to maintain a military unit in the demilitarized zone; therefore, it was decided to withdraw progressively the Yugoslav reconnaissance unit and to deploy instead up to 25 military observers, while the aircraft of the Mission were reduced to two. The new observers were provided by Denmark, Ghana, India, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia.

With the arrival of General von Horn and the first group of military personnel, UNYOM began operations on 4 July 1963. In August, General von Horn resigned, and his deputy, Colonel Branko Pavlovic of Yugoslavia, took over as acting Commander until September 1963 when Lieutenant-General P. S. Gyani of India, then Commander of UNEF, was temporarily detailed from that Force and appointed Commander of UNYOM.

Secretary-General's Special Representative

At the end of October 1963, when the Secretary-General thought UNYOM had to be withdrawn for lack of financial support, he announced his intention to maintain a civilian presence in Yemen after the withdrawal of the Observation Mission, and he had in mind the appointment of Pier P. Spinelli, head of the United Nations Office at Geneva, as his Special Representative for this purpose. After the withdrawal plan was cancelled, as mentioned earlier, the idea of appointing Spinelli was retained, particularly since General Gyani had to return to his command in UNEF.

In November 1963, upon the departure of General Gyani, Spinelli was appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General, as well as head of UNYOM. Spinelli assumed this dual responsibility until the end of the Mission.

Functioning of UNYOM

The mandate of UNYOM stemmed from the disengagement agreement entered into by the three Governments concerned, namely, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Republic and the Arab Republic of Yemen, set out in the report of the Secretary-General of 29 April 1963.

The function and authority of UNYOM as defined in the agreement were considerably more limited than in the case of other United Nations observation missions. For example, its establishment was not based on any ceasefire agreement and there was no ceasefire to supervise. The tasks of UNYOM were limited strictly to observing, 'certifying and reporting in connection with the intention of Saudi Arabia to end activities in support of the royalists in Yemen and the intention of Egypt to withdraw its troops from that country.

To carry out these tasks in the initial stage, detachments of the Yugoslav reconnaissance unit were stationed in Jizan, Najran and Sa'dah in the demilitarized zone and the surrounding areas. They manned check-posts and conducted ground patrolling. In addition, air patrolling was carried out by the Canadian air unit, which had bases at San'a as well as Jizan and Najran, particularly in the mountainous central part of the demilitarized zone where there were few passable roads. The six military observers detailed from UNTSO, who were stationed at San'a, and the two positions at Hodeida (Al Hadaydah) were primarily responsible for observing and certifying the withdrawal of Egyptian troops.

In order to check on the reduction or cessation of assistance from Saudi Arabia to the royalists, a pattern of check-points and air/ground patrolling was established to cover all main roads and tracks leading into Yemen and the demilitarized zone. Air and ground patrols were carried out daily with varied timings and routes, the patrol plan being prepared and co-ordinated every evening.

Experience quickly showed that air and ground patrolling had two main limitations, namely, that traffic could be observed only by day while, for climatic reasons, travel during hours of darkness was customary in the area, and that cargoes could not be checked. These problems were met by periodically positioning United Nations military observers at various communication centres for 40 hours or more, so that traffic could be observed by day or night and cargoes checked as necessary. Arrangements were also made to have Saudi Arabian liaison officers assigned to United Nations check-points and check cargoes when requested by United Nations observers.

Various complaints were received by UNYOM from one or the other of the parties concerned. They fell mainly into two categories: on the one hand, allegations of offensive actions by Egyptian forces against the royalists in Yemen and in Saudi Arabian territory, and, on the other, alleged activities in support of the royalists emanating from Saudi Arabia. UNYOM authorities would transmit these complaints

to the parties involved and, whenever possible and appropriate, investigate them.

In accordance with the disengagement agreement, the responsibilities of UNYOM concerned mainly, in addition to the cities of San'a and Hodeida, the demilitarized zone on each side of the demarcated portion of the Saudi Arabia-Yemen border. It did not extend to the undefined portion of that border nor to the border between Yemen and the British-controlled South Arabian Federation.

From the very beginning, the Secretary-General pointed out that UNYOM, because of its limited size and function, could observe and report only certain indications of the implementation of the disengagement agreement. However, despite its shortcomings, the Mission did have a restraining influence on hostile activities in the area. The Secretary-General repeatedly expressed the view that the responsibility for implementing the agreement lay with Saudi Arabia and Egypt and progress could be best achieved through negotiations between them.

With this in view, he informed the Security Council that UNYOM could, within limits, serve as an intermediary and as an endorser of good faith on behalf of the parties concerned, and that it was his intention to have the Mission perform these roles to the maximum of its capability. When Spinelli was appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNYOM in November 1963, he devoted a great deal of his time and attention to good-offices efforts and held extensive discussions with officials of the three Governments concerned. These discussions were of an exploratory character to try to ascertain whether there were areas of agreement between the parties which might, through bilateral discussions or otherwise, lead to further progress towards disengagement and the achievement of a peaceful situation in Yemen.

Secretary-General's Assessment

The assessment of the Secretary-General on the functioning of UNYOM and the implementation of the disengagement agreement, as set out in his successive periodic reports to the Security Council, are outlined below. In his first report on this subject, which was dated 4 September 1963, the Secretary-General found no encouraging progress towards effective implementation of the agreement, although both parties had expressed a willingness to co-operate in good faith with UNYOM. He noted reluctance by each side to fulfil its undertakings regarding the agreement before the other side did so.

His second report, which was submitted on 28 October 1963, indicated limited progress. He stated that although the developments observed by UNYOM were far short of the disengagement and regularisation of the situation which had been hoped for, they were in a limited way encouraging in that the scale of fighting had been reduced and conditions of temporary truce applied in many areas.

On 2 January 1964, he reported that UNYOM observations tended to confirm that, during the period under review, no military aid of significance had been provided to the royalists from Saudi Arabia, and that there had been a substantial net withdrawal of Egyptian troops from Yemen. Ground operations had further decreased in intensity. The Secretary-General reiterated his belief that the solution of the problem lay beyond the potential of UNYOM under its original mandate, and he referred to the extensive discussions his Special Representative had had with members of the three Governments concerned with a view to furthering progress towards disengagement and the achievement of a peaceful situation in Yemen.

A later report, submitted on 3 March 1964, raised a new problem: Yemeni and Egyptian sources asserted that large quantities of supplies were being sent to the royalists from the Beihan area across the frontier with the South Arabian Federation. The Secretary-General pointed out in this connection that since that frontier was not included in the disengagement agreement, United Nations observers did not operate in that area. However, he mentioned that the nature and extent of the military operations carried out by the royalists during January and February would seem to indicate that arms and ammunition in appreciable amounts had been reaching them from that source.

The Secretary-General also reported that the royalists appeared to be well provided with money and to have engaged foreign experts to train and direct their forces, and that they had recently launched attacks against Egyptian troops. From the developments observed by UNYOM, he felt that progress towards the implementation of the disengagement agreement had been very disappointing during the period under review; a state of political and military stalemate existed inside the country, which was unlikely to be changed as long as external intervention in various forms continued from either side. On the other hand, he noted certain encouraging factors, particularly the increasing unity of feeling and purpose within the Arab world arising from a Conference of Arab Heads of State held in Cairo in mid-January 1964 and the resulting improvement in relations between Saudi Arabia and

Egypt. The Secretary-General expressed the hope that the meeting to be held between the two parties in Saudi Arabia would result in some progress towards the implementation of the agreement and towards an understanding between the two Governments to co-operate in promoting political progress and stability in Yemen.

In his report dated 3 May 1964, the Secretary-General stated that there was no progress in troop reduction towards the implementation of the disengagement agreement and that no actual end of the fighting appeared to be in sight. He noted; however, that the two parties had reported noticeable progress in discussions of a number of problems at issue between them, and that a meeting between President Nasser of Egypt and Crown Prince Feisal of Saudi Arabia would be held in Cairo in the near future.

On 2 July, the Secretary-General reported that the military situation in Yemen had remained fairly quiet over the past two months, that no military aid by Saudi Arabia to the Yemeni royalists had been observed and that some slight progress in Egyptian troop reduction appeared to have occurred. Once again he appealed to the parties concerned to meet at the highest level with a view to achieving full and rapid implementation of the disengagement agreement.

Termination of UNYOM

In his final report, dated 2 September 1964, the Secretary-General again acknowledged the failure of the parties to implement the disengagement agreement and the difficulties UNYOM faced in observing and reporting on these matters. There had been a substantial reduction in the strength of the Egyptian forces in Yemen but it seemed that the withdrawal was a reflection of the improvement in the situation of the Yemeni republican forces rather than the beginning of a phased withdrawal in the sense of the agreement. There were also indications that the Yemeni royalists had continued to receive military supplies from external sources. Observing that UNYOM had been able to observe only limited progress towards the implementation of the agreement, he reiterated his view that UNYOM's terms of reference were restricted to observation and reporting only, and that the responsibility for implementation lay with the two parties to the agreement. He stated that UNYOM had actually accomplished much more than could have been expected of it in the circumstances, and that during the 14 months of its presence in Yemen, the Mission had exercised an important restraining influence on hostile activities in the area.

On 4 September 1964, the activities of UNYOM ended and its personnel and equipment were withdrawn.

Shortly after the withdrawal of UNYOM, relations between the parties steadily improved and issues were resolved between them. There has been no consideration of the matter in United Nations organs since the termination of that Mission.

33

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

LOCATION: Southern Lebanon

HEADQUARTERS: Naqoura

DURATION: March 1978 to present

STRENGTH: 5,127 troops assisted by 59 military observers of UNTSO's Observer Group Lebanon, and approximately 540 international and local civilian staff

FATALITIES: 200

FORCE COMMANDER: Major-General Trend Furuhoide (Norway).

Background

In the early 1970s, tension along the Israeli-Lebanon border intensified, especially after the re-location of Palestinian armed elements from Jordan to Lebanon. Palestinian commando operations against Israel and Israeli reprisals against Palestinian bases in Lebanon intensified. On 11 March 1978, a commando attack in Israel resulted in many dead and wounded among the Israeli population; the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) claimed responsibility for that raid. In response, Israeli forces invaded Lebanon on the night of 14/15 March, and in a few days occupied the entire southern part of the country except for the city of Tyre and its surrounding area.

Establishment of UNIFIL

On 15 March, the Lebanese Government submitted a strong protest to the Security Council against the Israeli invasion, stating that it had no connection with the Palestinian commando operation. On 19 March, the Security Council adopted resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), in which it called upon Israel immediately to cease its military action and withdraw its forces from all Lebanese territory.

It also decided to establish immediately a United Nations interim force for southern Lebanon for an initial period of six months, subject to extension. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was set up with the mandate to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, to restore international peace and security and to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. The first UNIFIL troops arrived in the area on 23 March 1978.

UNIFIL'S Activities

Until now, however, it has not been possible for UNIFIL to carry out in full its original mandate. From its inception, the Force had to operate under extremely difficult conditions. The PLO and the Government of Israel never fully accepted the UNIFIL mandate with all its implications. Given these attitudes, the Force was prevented from deploying fully in the area evacuated by the Israeli forces between April and June 1978. In fact, the enclave along the border was turned over to the "de facto forces (Christian and associated militias supported and supplied by Israel). Israel thus retained a degree of military power in the area and continued its fight against the PLO and its Lebanese allies. UNIFIL's efforts to implement its mandate in these conditions inevitably met with only partial success and caused the Force to suffer significant casualties.

In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon again. This invasion changed UNIFIL's situation drastically. For three years, UNIFIL in its entirety remained behind the Israeli lines, with its role limited to providing protection and humanitarian assistance to the local population to the extent possible. In 1985, Israel carried out a partial withdrawal, but it retained control of an area in southern Lebanon, manned by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and by Lebanese de facto forces (DFF), the so-called "South Lebanon Army".

The situation in southern Lebanon continues to be tense and volatile. The boundaries of the Israeli-controlled area have not been clearly defined but are determined *de facto* by the forward positions of IDF/DFF. Within the area of operation of UNIFIL, IDF/DFF maintain 72 military positions. IDF/DFF remain targets for attacks by armed groups opposed to the occupation. For their part, IDF/DFF react vigorously to these attacks, often with heavy weapons and with aerial support from Israel.

UNIFIL has thus been prevented from carrying out its mandate. In these circumstances, it endeavours, to the best of its ability, to

prevent its area of operations from being used for hostile activities and to protect civilians caught in the conflict. In carrying out its tasks, the Force is sometimes hampered by firing in close vicinity to its positions and personnel. On a few occasions, UNIFIL has itself been the target of violence.

UNIFIL's operations are based on a network of 'positions which are manned 24 hours a day. The Force maintains 45 checkpoints, whose function is to control movement on the principal roads in UNIFIL's area; 95 observation posts, whose function is to observe movement on and off the roads; and 29 checkpoints/observation posts which combine the functions of control and observation. Each is assigned responsibility for ensuring that hostile activities are not undertaken from the area surrounding it. This involves not only keeping watch from the position but also patrolling on foot or by vehicle in its vicinity.

In addition, unarmed military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) maintain five observation posts and operate five mobile teams in the area under Israeli control. The UNTSO observers are under the operational control of UNIFIL's Commander.

UNIFIL's network of positions and the patrols mounted from them also play a central role in the Force's performance of its humanitarian task. They provide the civilian population with protection and with a source of help if they are subjected to harassment. Within available resources, UNIFIL also provides civilians with medical supplies, water, food, fuel, electricity, engineering work and escort for farmers. UNIFIL medical centres and mobile teams have provided care to an average of 3,000 civilian patients per month and a field dental programme has also been provided.

In accordance with its mandate of assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the UNIFIL area, UNIFIL and the Lebanese military authorities worked out arrangements for the transfer to the Lebanese army of responsibility for the western part of the Force's Ghanaian battalion sector. The hand-over, which involved the vacating of eight UNIFIL positions, was completed in early April 1992. In a follow-up hand-over, additional area comprising three villages, including the former Ghanaian battalion headquarters at Marakah, was handed over to the Lebanese Army on 16 February 1993.

In July 1994, in his periodic report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated that although UNIFIL continued to be

prevented from implementing its mandate, its contribution to stability in the region and the protection it provided to the local population remained important. He recommended that the Council extend UNIFIL's mandate for a further period of six months, that is until 31 January 1995. The Security Council approved that recommendation.

Composition of UNIFIL

At present, UNIFIL has 5,187 troops provided by the following countries (figures as at 30 November 1994):

<i>Country</i>	<i>Troops</i>
Fiji	646
Finland	524
France	411
Ghana	788
Ireland	733
Italy	45
Nepal	671
Norway	806
Poland	563
Total	5,187

Figures may vary from month to month due to rotation. "Troops" include any infantry, logistics, engineering, medical, move-con, staff, etc.

In addition, 59 military observers from UNTSO's Observer Group Lebanon assist the Force in the performance of its tasks. UNIFIL employs some 540 civilian staff, of whom 148 are recruited internationally.

Financial Aspects

The rough cost to the United Nations of UNIFIL in 1994 was approximately \$142.3 million. The costs of the operation are met by the assessed contributions of the United Nations Member States. As at 30 November 1994, total contributions outstanding to the UNIFIL Special Account for the period from the inception of the operation to 31 January 1995 amounted to approximately \$232.4 million.

34

Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic

Background

Towards the end of April 1965, a political crisis developed in the Dominican Republic, resulting in civil strife that had considerable international repercussions. On 24 April, the three-man junta headed by Donald Reid Cabral was overthrown by a group of young officers and civilians who sought the return to office of former President Juan Bosch, who had been deposed by a military *coup* in September 1963, and the restoration of the 1963 Constitution.

Bosch's supporters were opposed by a group of high-ranking officers of the Dominican armed forces, with the result that two rival governments emerged in the Dominican Republic during the first weeks of the civil war. The pro-Bosch forces organized themselves into what was called the "Constitutional Government", headed by Colonel Francisco Caamano Deno. The opposing forces established a civilian-military junta which called itself the "Government of National Reconstruction", headed by General Antonio Imbert Barrera.

The military phase of the Dominican crisis took place mainly in Santo Domingo, capital of the country, where heavy fighting broke out between the two contending factions on 25 April 1965.

On 28 April, the United States announced that its troops had been ordered to land in the Dominican Republic. On the following day, the United States representative informed the Security Council of his Government's action and of its call for a meeting of the Council of the Organisation of American States (OAS). His letter asserted that the President of the United States had ordered troops ashore in the Dominican Republic in order to protect United States citizens there and escort them to safety. The President had acted, the letter stated,

after being informed by the military authorities in the Dominican Republic that lives of United States citizens were in danger, that their safety could no longer be guaranteed, and that the assistance of United States military personnel was required.

On 29 April, the Secretary-General of the OAS informed the United Nations Secretary-General that the OAS Council had appealed for the suspension of armed hostilities in the Dominican Republic. On 1 May, the Assistant Secretary-General of the OAS informed the Security Council that the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the American Republics had decided on that day to establish a committee, composed of representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala and Panama, and had instructed it to proceed immediately to Santo Domingo to bring about the restoration of peace and normality and to offer its good offices to the contending factions there with a view to achieving a ceasefire and the orderly evacuation of persons.

On 1 May, the USSR requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the question of the armed intervention by the United States in the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic.

The Security Council considered this question at 29 meetings held between 3 May and 26 July 1965.

Security Council Action, May 1965

On 6 May, the Assistant Secretary-General of the OAS transmitted to the Security Council the text of a resolution by which the Tenth Meeting of Consultation had requested OAS members to make available land, air and naval contingents or police forces for the establishment of an inter-American force, to operate under its authority. The purpose of the force would be to help restore normal conditions in the Dominican Republic, maintain the security of its inhabitants and the inviolability of human rights, and create an atmosphere of peace and conciliation that would allow the functioning of democratic institutions.

On 14 May, Jordan, urging action by the Security Council, submitted, together with Malaysia and the Ivory Coast, a draft resolution whereby the Council would call for a strict ceasefire, invite the Secretary-General to send, as an urgent measure, a representative to the Dominican Republic to report on the situation, and call upon all concerned in the Dominican Republic to co-operate with that representative in carrying out his task.

The three-Power text was unanimously adopted by the Council the same day, as resolution 203(1965).

Representative's Activities

In a report dated 15 May, the Secretary-General informed the Council that he had appointed Jose Antonio Mayobre, Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America, as his Representative in the Dominican Republic. An advance party, led by Major-General I. J. Rikhye as Military Adviser, had arrived in Santo Domingo earlier that day. The Military Adviser was assisted by two military observers at any one time from three made available from Brazil, Canada and Ecuador.

On 18 May, the Secretary-General informed the Council that his Representative had left for Santo Domingo on 17 May. He had asked Mayobre to notify formally all the parties concerned of the Council's call for a strict ceasefire and to convey to all those involved in the conflict his most earnest appeal to heed that call so that a propitious climate for finding a solution might be brought about.

On 19 May, the Secretary-General reported that, shortly after his arrival, Mayobre had met with Colonel Caamano, President of the "Constitutional Government", and with General Imbert, President of the "Government of National Reconstruction".

Late in the evening of 18 May, Mayobre had informed the Secretary-General by telephone of heavy fighting in the northern section of the capital and of the numerous casualties caused by it. It had not been possible to persuade General Imbert to agree to a ceasefire, although he had expressed willingness to agree to a suspension of hostilities some time on 19 May to facilitate the work of the Red Cross in searching for the dead and wounded.

Appeal by the Security Council President

At the Council's meeting on 19 May, the Council President made a statement, which was supported by all Council members, requesting the Secretary-General to convey to his Representative the Council's desire that his urgent efforts be devoted to securing an immediate suspension of hostilities so that the Red Cross's work in searching for the dead and wounded might be facilitated.

Communications from the OAS

Also on 19 May, the OAS transmitted the text of a second report submitted by the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation. The Committee said that efforts to arrange for a meeting between Colonel Caamano and General Imbert to iron out their differences had proved unsuccessful, and that the Committee had issued

an appeal to the parties for strict compliance with the ceasefire agreed upon in the Act of Santo Domingo, signed on 5 May, formalising a ceasefire achieved earlier through the efforts of the Papal Nuncio in Santo Domingo. The report added that the presence of the United Nations in the Dominican Republic had created a factor which had compromised and interfered with the task of the Committee. It recommended that the Meeting of Consultation agree upon the measures necessary to reestablish peace and normality in the Republic, and that the Security Council be requested to suspend all action until regional procedures had been exhausted.

The OAS also transmitted to the Council the text of a resolution adopted by the Meeting of Consultation on 20 May, entrusting the OAS Secretary-General with negotiating a strict ceasefire and with providing his good offices for establishing a climate of peace and reconciliation that would permit democratic institutions to function. The resolution asked him to co-ordinate his action, in so far as relevant, with that of the Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General.

Reports by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General informed the Security Council that his Representative, on the morning of 19 May, had met with representatives of the Dominican Red Cross, the International Red Cross and the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, and had suggested that they meet with the leaders of the two factions engaged in the fighting and request a 12-hour suspension of hostilities to remove the dead and wounded from the battle area. On 21 May, the Secretary-General reported on further information from his Representative that, following negotiations with the leaders of the two factions, agreement had been reached for the suspension of hostilities for 24 hours beginning on 21 May, at 1200 hours local time.

Further Security Council Action

During a Council meeting of 21 May, the Secretary-General said that his Representative had reported that the ceasefire of 21 May was effective. The Red Cross, which had gone into the battle area early that morning, had been fully engaged in its humanitarian task. In view of the need to evacuate the sick and wounded to less congested hospitals, the Representative was trying to obtain an extension of the truce. On 22 May, France submitted a draft resolution by which the Council would request that the suspension of hostilities in Santo

Domingo be transformed into a permanent ceasefire, and would invite the Secretary-General to report to it on the implementation of the resolution. This was adopted as resolution 205(1965).

On 25 May, the Council President noted that it appeared that a *de facto* cessation of hostilities continued to prevail in Santo Domingo and that the Secretary-General had informed him that it was being observed. He therefore suggested that the Council adjourn, on the understanding that it could reconvene if the situation required it.

Further OAS Communications

On 2 June, the OAS advised the Security Council that the Tenth Meeting of Consultation had appointed an *ad hoc* committee—composed of representatives of Brazil, El Salvador and the United States—to assist all parties in the Dominican Republic to achieve a climate of peace and to enable democratic institutions to function. It also informed the Council of the arrival in Santo Domingo of the Chairman of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in response to requests made by both of the contending Dominican groups.

Security Council Consideration (3-11 June 1965)

The question of the Dominican Republic was again considered by the Council at four meetings held between 3 and 11 June. The Council was convened at the request of the USSR to take up two communications from the “Constitutional Government”, asking for the dispatch of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to the Dominican Republic to investigate atrocities allegedly carried out by General Imbert’s forces against the civilian population in Santo Domingo.

The question of the scope of the mandate of the Secretary-General’s Representative arose during these meetings from suggestions made by France, Jordan and Uruguay to enlarge Mayobre’s staff to enable him to supervise the ceasefire and to investigate complaints of human rights violations. They considered that his mandate was sufficiently wide to cover both tasks. The suggestions were supported by the USSR.

Bolivia, the Ivory Coast, Malaysia, the United Kingdom and the United States, on the other hand, expressed doubt as to the advisability of extending Mayobre’s mandate at that stage. The United States observed, in this connection, that the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, which had been sent to Santo Domingo, was actively investigating human rights violations.

Secretary-General's Position

The Secretary-General stated that his Representative's current mandate involved observing and reporting, functions which did not include the actual investigation of complaints and charges about specific incidents, other than those connected with ceasefire violations. Investigative functions would require a directive from the Security Council, a substantially larger staff and increased facilities. Moreover, he could give no assurance that such added responsibility would receive from the contending parties the co-operation necessary to secure effective implementation by his Representative.

The Secretary-General remarked that his Representative was keeping a watchful eye on all aspects of the situation and was reporting what he observed. The size of his staff was under constant review, and he would be provided with the necessary assistance as the circumstances demanded.

Security Council Consideration, 16-21 June 1965

On 16 June, the Secretary-General reported that an exchange of fire had taken place on the morning of 15 June between Colonel Caamano's forces and troops of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF). There was no evidence, however, as to which side had started the firing. By nightfall his Representative had arranged for a cessation of hostilities.

In a later report, the Secretary-General informed the Council that, on 16 June, fighting between the Caamano forces and the IAPF had been renewed along the newly established IAPF positions manned by United States troops. Although the firing had stopped on the evening of 16 June, the situation remained very tense

This situation was discussed by the Security Council from 16 to 21 June. During these meetings, the Council received from the OAS the text of proposals for a political settlement submitted on 18 June by the OAS *ad hoc* committee to the "National Reconstruction Government" and the "Constitutional Government". The principal points in the OAS proposals were: general elections within six to nine months, under OAS supervision; a general amnesty for all who had participated in the civil strife; surrender of all arms in the hands of civilians to the OAS establishment of a provisional government which would exercise its authority under an institutional act and would call elections; and the convening of a constitutional assembly within six months following assumption of office by the elected government.

On 21 June, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he had just received a report from his Representative which stated that the ceasefire had been effective since 16 June.

Secretary-General's Report, 16 July 1965

On 16 July, the Secretary-General submitted a report on the situation in the Dominican Republic covering the period from 19 June to 15 July 1965.

Despite a number of isolated incidents, the ceasefire in Santo Domingo had been maintained. The Secretary-General indicated that, as of 26 June, the IAPF was composed of 1,700 troops from six Latin American countries and 12,400 from the United States, of which 1,400 would be withdrawn shortly. He went on to report that the situation outside Santo Domingo—which had been potentially explosive since May, owing mainly to deteriorating economic conditions, to the ineffectiveness of civilian authority and to military and police repression—had become more acute following an abortive uprising by armed civilians at San Francisco de Macoris on 25 June and an attack against a police post at Ramon Santana on 2 July.

The Secretary-General drew attention to repeated complaints of violations of human rights in Santo Domingo as well as in the provinces, involving alleged executions, arbitrary arrests, and cases of missing persons following arrest. He also drew attention to the worsening economic situation. In his Representative's view, an early political solution accompanied by an emergency programme of external financial and technical assistance was essential.

Security Council Meetings, July 1965

The Security Council resumed consideration of the question at four meetings held between 20 and 26 July.

The Council President ultimately summed up the agreed views of the members of the Council:

- Information received by the Council as well as the Secretary-General's reports showed that, in spite of the Council's resolutions of 14 and 22 May 1965, the ceasefire had been repeatedly violated. Acts of repression against the civilian population and other violations of human rights, as well as data on the deterioration of the economic situation in the Dominican Republic, had been brought to the Council's attention.

- Members of the Council had condemned gross violations of human rights in the Republic, expressed the desire that such violations should cease, and indicated again the need for the strict observance of the ceasefire in accordance with the Council's resolutions.
- The Council members considered it necessary that the Council continue to watch the situation closely and that the Secretary-General continue to report on it.

Secretary-General's Reports, 22 July 1965-5 January 1966

In a report covering the period between 22 July and 17 August 1965, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that, except for a few minor incidents, the ceasefire had been maintained. While his Representative continued to receive complaints of alleged cases of arbitrary arrest by forces of the "Government of National Reconstruction", the situation in general had improved. The report referred to negotiations for a political settlement being carried out by the OAS *ad hoc* committee on the basis of new proposals the committee had submitted to the two contending parties on 9 August 1965.

A proposed Act of Dominican Reconciliation provided that the parties would accept a provisional government presided over by Hector Garcia Godoy as the sole and sovereign government of the Dominican Republic, and that they would accept a proposed Institutional Act as the constitutional instrument under which the provisional government would exercise its authority. The latter Act also provided for: a proclamation of a general amnesty by the provisional government; the disarmament and incorporation of the "Constitutionalist" zone into the security zone; a procedure for the recovery of arms in the hands of civilians; the reintegration of "Constitutionalist" military personnel who had participated in the conflict; and, finally, a procedure to be followed for the withdrawal of the IAPF.

In a report covering the period of 17 August to 2 September 1965, the Secretary-General reported the resignation on 30 August of the members of the "Government of National Reconstruction" headed by General Imbert, and the signing, on 31 August, of an amended text of the Act of Reconciliation by the leaders of the "Constitutional Government". On the same day, the chiefs of the armed forces and the national police had signed a declaration in which they had pledged acceptance of the Act of Reconciliation and the Institutional Act, and support of Dr. Garcia Godoy as provisional President.

On 3 September, Garcia Godoy was installed as President of the Provisional Government.

On 23 October, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that since the inauguration of the Provisional Government much progress had been made in efforts to restore normal conditions in the Dominican Republic. Little progress had been made, however, towards the reintegration of "Constitutionalist" military personnel into the regular armed forces, owing mainly to continuing tension between the high command of the Republic's armed forces and "Constitutionalist" officers. The situation had been aggravated by acts of terrorism and violence, and armed clashes between civilians and elements of the police and regular Dominican troops.

In subsequent reports, the Secretary-General informed the Council that the Government had announced that troops of the Dominican armed forces had been ordered to return to their barracks and that law and order in Santo Domingo would be maintained by the national police with the assistance of the IAPF. By 25 November, he reported, the situation had improved and the country was returning to normalcy. The bulk of the IAPF had been withdrawn from the capital and the national police were gradually assuming responsibility for the maintenance of law and order. There had also been some improvement in the relations between the civilian authorities and the armed forces. In a report issued on 3 December, the Secretary-General informed the Council that the Provisional Government had promulgated a law calling for national elections to be held on 1 June 1966.

Later in December, the Secretary-General reported on new disturbances. The main disturbance, took place on 19 December at Santiago, where former "Constitutionalist" forces and Dominican air force units engaged in heavy fighting that resulted in many casualties, including 25 dead. The Santiago incident was followed by a wave of terrorist activities in Santo Domingo which caused the deaths of eight persons and considerable material damage. The reports indicated that mixed patrols of the IAPF, Dominican troops and national police faced a difficult task in maintaining order, as they were continually stoned and shot at by roving civilian groups.

Tension had again subsided by 25 December. On the evening of 3 January 1966, President Garcia Godoy announced that within a few hours an important group of military personnel would leave the country on missions abroad. The Secretary-General concluded his report by stating that, while Santo Domingo had remained calm since 1 January, the situation there was reported to be tense and unstable.

Secretary-General's Observations

The Secretary-General, in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organisation covering the period from 16 June 1964 to 15 June 1965, discussed the problems and character of the United Nations role in the Dominican Republic situation. He described the task of his Representative there as a "new United Nations mission in the peace-keeping category."

The situation, the Secretary-General wrote, was of unusual complexity and had considerable international repercussions, particularly with regard to the unilateral military involvement of the United States in the initial stage and to the later role of the Inter-American Peace Force. While his Representative's mandate had been a limited one, the effect of his role had been significant, since he had played a major part in bringing about a cessation of hostilities on 21 May 1965, and had supplied information as to the situation both in Santo Domingo and in the interior of the country.

His presence had undoubtedly been a moderating factor in a difficult and dangerous situation, the Secretary-General said, adding that this had been the first time a United Nations peace mission had operated in the same area and dealt with the same matters as an operation of a regional organisation, in this instance the OAS.

Further, the Secretary-General maintained the view that the developments in the Caribbean should stimulate thought by everyone concerning the character of the regional organisations and the nature of their functions and obligations in relation to the responsibilities of the United Nations under the Charter.

Secretary-General's Reports, January-February 1966

In one of eight reports covering developments in the Dominican Republic during January 1966, the Secretary-General informed the Council that, on 6 January 1966, President Garcia Godoy had issued decrees appointing a new Minister of the Armed Forces and new armed services chiefs, and providing for the transfer abroad of several high-ranking military officers, including Commodore Francisco Rivera Caminero, former Minister of the Armed Forces, and Colonel Caamano Deno, former "Constitutionalist" leader. The implementation of these decrees had met with some resistance from the Dominican armed forces, which at one point occupied radio and telecommunications buildings in Santo Domingo. However, by the end of January, 11 high-ranking former "Constitutionalist" officers had left the Dominican Republic to take up diplomatic posts abroad.

In six reports issued during February, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council several serious incidents and acts of terrorism which occurred in and outside Santo Domingo, beginning 7 February. As a result, economic activity in the city and nearby commercial areas had come to an almost complete standstill. Tension remained high from 12 to 15 February as hostile acts directed against IAPF military police and troops took place in Santo Domingo. A general strike was called off one day after a speech by President Garcia Godoy, broadcast on 16 February, in which he announced orders to put into effect decrees concerning changes and transfers in the Dominican armed forces and ordered all public employees to return to Work. The new Minister of the Armed Forces was sworn in on the same day and new chiefs of staff of the army, navy and air force were appointed on 26 February. Also, a new chief of the national police had been appointed by the Provisional Government.

Secretary-General's Reports, March-May 1966

In 17 reports issued from March to May 1966, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that, though fewer in number, acts of terrorism and other disturbances continued to occur in Santo Domingo and in the interior of the country. He stated that the electoral campaign had officially opened on 1 March.

In connection with national elections on 1 June 1966, the Central Electoral Board issued on 15 March a proclamation providing for the election of a President and Vice-President of the Republic, 27 Senators and 74 Deputies for a period of four years beginning 1 July 1966, and for the election, for a period of two years, of 70 mayors and 350 aldermen and their alternates. On 11 May, President Garcia Godoy, in a televised speech, expressed concern over certain signs of pressure exerted by minority groups intent upon disturbing the electoral process. He appealed to all sectors of the population to maintain a peaceful and orderly atmosphere for the elections, and indicated that the problem of the presence of the IAPF in the country should be solved before 1 July. On 13 May, the OAS *ad hoc* committee announced that IAPF personnel would be confined to barracks on election day. This was followed by an announcement on 18 May by President Garcia Godoy of his decision to confine all armed forces to barracks from 19 May until election day. On 29 May, the OAS *ad hoc* committee indicated, in a press statement, that 41 observers invited by the OAS would observe elections in 21 provinces of the Republic and in the National District. The observers would submit a report to the Provisional Government.

At midnight on 30 May, the electoral campaign officially ended. On that day, the Provisional President sent a communication to the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of OAS Foreign Ministers informing it that he had instructed the Dominican representative to the OAS to request a meeting of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation to ask for withdrawal of the IAPF from Dominican territory.

Election of 1 June 1966

During June and July 1966, the Secretary-General submitted four reports to the Council dealing mainly with the elections on 1 June and related events. According to those reports, the elections had proceeded on schedule in a calm and orderly manner. On 21 June, the final results of elections were announced by the Central Electoral Board. They showed 769,265 votes for Joaquin Balaguer, 525,230 for Juan Bosch and 39,535 for Rafael F. Bonnelly.

Installation of the Government, July 1966

In a report dated 2 July, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that on 1 July, Joaquin Balaguer and Francisco Augusto Lora had been sworn in as President and Vice-President, respectively, of the Dominican Republic by the President of the National Assembly. In his inaugural address, President Balaguer stated that the country was returning to a system of law and that no one would be permitted to live outside legal norms. He set forth a policy of austerity to place the Republic's economic, administrative and financial structure on a sounder footing. His Government would support the OAS and would work within it to ensure that national sovereignty would never again be infringed by foreign troops. While his Government intended to act drastically if extremists sought to disturb the peace, it would protect opponents against persecution and would ensure that the symbols of past oppression would disappear for ever from Dominican life.

Phased Withdrawal of the IAPF

Early in July, a plan for the withdrawal of the IAPF in four phases was approved by the OAS *ad hoc* committee in agreement with the Dominican Government.

On 24 June, the OAS Secretary-General had transmitted to the Security Council the text of a resolution adopted by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation that day. By this resolution, the Meeting of Consultation—noting that the purposes of the Tenth Meeting had

been fully achieved inasmuch as popular elections had been held in the Dominican Republic, the results of which had given that nation a constitutional and democratic Government—directed that the withdrawal of the IAPF should begin before 1 July 1966 and should be completed within 90 days. It further asked the OAS *ad hoc* committee, in agreement with the Dominican Government, to give the IAPF the necessary instructions concerning the dates for and the manner of effecting the withdrawal.

From 3 August to 21 September 1966, the Secretary-General, on the basis of information received from the office of his Representative in Santo Domingo, submitted a series of reports to the Security Council giving a detailed account of the withdrawal of the United States and the Latin American contingents (Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay) of the IAPF and of its military equipment. This withdrawal was completed on 21 September 1966.

Withdrawal of the United Nations Mission

In a letter of 13 October addressed to the Secretary-General, the Dominican Republic's Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed the appreciation of his country to the United Nations for its efforts to bring about the restoration of peace and harmony in the Republic, and stated that, in the view of his Government, the objectives of the Security Council's resolution of 14 May 1965 having been achieved, it would be advisable to withdraw the United Nations Mission from the Dominican Republic.

In a report issued on 14 October, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that in the light of the developments which had recently taken place in the Dominican Republic, including the installation on 1 July 1966 of the newly elected Government and the withdrawal the IAPF, he had initiated arrangements for the withdrawal of the Mission in the Dominican Republic, which was expected to be completed shortly.

The withdrawal of the United Nations Mission was completed on 22 October 1966.

35

United Nations Mission in Haiti

LOCATION: Haiti

HEADQUARTERS: Port-au-Prince

DURATION: September 1993 to present

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: 6,000 military present, 567 civilian police, and approximately 250 international civilian and 200 local staff

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HEAD OF MISSION: Lakhdar Brohimi (Algeria)

FORCE COMMANDER: Major-General Joseph Kinzer (United States)

Background

The President of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was democratically elected on 16 December 1990 by 67 per cent of Haitian voters. He took office on 7 February 1991. The validity of the election was upheld by the United Nations, the Organisation of American States (OAS), and the Caribbean community.

It was hoped that the election would put an end to a long period encompassing the dictatorship of Francois and Jean-Claude Duvalier followed by five years of political instability under five different regimes, and mark the beginning of an era of democracy and economic and social progress. However, on 30 September 1991, President Aristide was overthrown in a coup *d'etat*, headed by Lieutenant-General Raoul Cedras, and forced into exile.

Early Regional Efforts

The violent and unconstitutional actions of the Haitian military forces were immediately and strongly condemned by the international community. On the same day, while the whereabouts of President

Aristide were still unknown, the Permanent Council of OAS condemned the coup *d'état* and its perpetrators. It demanded adherence to the Constitution and respect for the legitimate Government, the physical safety of the President and the rights of the Haitian people. It also called for the reinstatement of the President.

That same day, then United Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar made a statement in which he expressed the hope that calm would soon be restored and that the democratic process would be pursued in accordance with the Constitution. The President of the Security Council associated himself with the statement.

Meeting on 2 October, the OAS Ministers for Foreign Affairs heard a statement by President Aristide, and on 3 October they adopted a resolution demanding his immediate reinstatement. The Ministers recommended the diplomatic, economic and financial isolation of the *de facto* authorities and the suspension of any aid except that provided for strictly humanitarian purposes. They decided to dispatch a mission to Haiti and urged the United Nations to consider the spirit and aims of the resolution.

On 3 October, President Aristide addressed the United Nations Security Council. The President of the Council made a statement condemning the *coup*, calling for the restoration of the legitimate Government, supporting the efforts of OAS and expressing the hope that the President of Haiti would soon return to his country and resume his functions.

On 4 October, a high-level OAS delegation arrived in Haiti and met with representatives of various groups within the country. The delegation's negotiations with the High Command of the Haitian Armed Forces were interrupted on 7 October, when soldiers ordered the delegation members to leave the country.

On 7 October, the two Chambers of the Haitian Parliament, under pressure from the military, named an Acting President", who in turn appointed, on 10 October, a "Prime Minister".

The OAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs adopted, on 8 October, a second resolution in which they condemned the decision to replace the President illegally and declared unacceptable any Government that might result from that situation. They urged OAS member States to freeze the financial assets of the Haitian State and to impose a trade embargo on Haiti, except for humanitarian aid. The Ministers called upon the Member States of the United Nations to adopt the same measures. They also decided to constitute, at the request of President

Aristide, a civilian mission, known as OEA/DEMOC, to re-establish and strengthen constitutional democracy in Haiti.

General Assembly Acts

On 11 October 1991, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 46/7, in which it condemned the illegal replacement of the constitutional President of Haiti, the use of violence and military coercion and the violation of human rights in Haiti; affirmed as unacceptable any entity resulting from that illegal situation; and demanded the immediate restoration of the legitimate Government of President Aristide, the application of the Constitution and thus the full observance of human rights in Haiti.

The Assembly appealed to Member States to take measures in support of the OAS resolutions and emphasized that, when constitutional order was restored in Haiti, increased cooperation would be necessary to support the country's development efforts in order to strengthen its democratic institutions. The Assembly also requested the United Nations Secretary-General to consider providing the support sought by the OAS Secretary-General in implementing the mandates arising from the OAS resolutions.

Special Envoy Appointed

The United Nations Secretary-General actively supported the intensive efforts by OAS and its mediator at the time, Ramirez Ocampo, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Colombia, aimed at finding a political solution to the Haitian crisis.

On July 15 1992, newly elected Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali informed the Security Council that he had accepted the offer of the then Secretary General of OAS, Joao Baena Soares, to include a United Nations participation in a mission to Haiti. The high-level mission led by the OAS Secretary-General visited Haiti from 18 to 21 August 1992. On 10 September, the United Nations Secretary-General informed the Council that his representative had taken part in the OAS mission and that the Haitian parties did not seem to have come closer together. He also reported that OAS was planning to deploy a first group of observers in Haiti and that it had decided to maintain the economic embargo. He concluded by saying that he intended to continue cooperating with OAS and stood ready to lend any other assistance.

On 3 November, the Secretary-General, in a report to the General Assembly, reviewed the efforts made by the international community

to resolve the Haitian crisis. He also cited reports of a pattern of gross and widespread human rights abuses during the year since the *coup d'état* in Haiti. As a result of the deteriorating political, economic and humanitarian situation, thousands of Haitians were fleeing their country.

On 24 November 1992, the General Assembly adopted resolution 47/20, in which, *inter alia*, it again demanded the restoration of the legitimate Government of President Aristide, together with the full application of the National Constitution and the full observance of human rights, and requested the Secretary-General to take the "necessary measures" in order to assist, in cooperation with OAS, in the solution of the Haitian crisis.

Following the adoption of the resolution, the Secretary-General, on 11 December 1992, appointed Dante Caputo, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, as his Special Envoy for Haiti. On 13 January 1993, the OAS Secretary-General also appointed Caputo as his Special Envoy.

Further Diplomatic Efforts

The Special Envoy held a series of preliminary consultations between 17 and 22 December 1992 in Washington, D.C., with President Aristide, and at Port-au-Prince, the capital of Haiti, with the Coordinator and members of the Presidential Commission, with the Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces, Lieu-tenant-General Raoul Cedras, with the Prime Minister of the *de facto* Government, Marc Bazin, and with the Presidents of the two Chambers of the National Assembly of Haiti. Further discussions were held with President Aristide in early January 1993.

On 8 January 1993, President Aristide, in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General, requested, among other things, the following: (a) the deployment by the United Nations and OAS of an international civilian mission to monitor respect for human rights and the elimination of all forms of violence; and (b) the establishment of a process of dialogue among the Haitian parties, under the auspices of the Special Envoy, with a view to reaching agreements for the solution of the political crisis, the designation of a Prime Minister by the President to lead a Government of national concord aimed at the full restoration of democratic order in Haiti; agreements for the rehabilitation of Haitian institutions, including the reform of the judicial system, the professionalisation of the armed forces and the separation of the police from the armed forces; international technical assistance for national

reconstruction; and a system of guarantees to ensure a lasting solution. An identical letter was addressed to the Secretary-General of OAS.

After further meetings at Port-au-Prince on 16 and 17 January 1993, the Special Envoy received two letters, one from Lieutenant-General Cedras and the other from Bazin, accepting in principle an international civilian mission and a dialogue among the Haitian parties to resolve the political crisis in the country.

In a letter dated 18 January 1993 to President Aristide, the Secretary-General agreed to the United Nations participation in the International Civilian Mission for verifying respect for human rights and the eradication of all forms of violence in Haiti, subject to the approval of the General Assembly and under terms to be agreed jointly with OAS.

In the meantime, faced with the announcement by the de facto Government of Haiti that it was proceeding with the holding of elections for a third of the Senate, the Permanent Council of OAS adopted, on 13 January 1993, a declaration repudiating the proposed elections and declaring them to be 'illegitimate and obstructive of the efforts under way by OAS and the United Nations towards restoring the democratic institutional framework in Haiti. The United Nations Secretary-General supported the OAS declaration. However, his request to the de facto Haitian authorities that the elections be cancelled was not heeded.

Civilian Mission Established

Following the Special Envoy's consultations with the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and of OAS concerning the mandate of the International Civilian Mission (MICIVIH) and the modalities of its operations, the joint ideas were presented to and agreed upon by President Aristide. The terms of the agreement regarding the Mission were subsequently incorporated in an exchange of letters between the de facto Prime Minister, Bazin, and the Special Envoy on 9 February 1993.

Under the agreement, MICIVIH would verify respect for human rights as laid down in the Haitian Constitution and in the international instruments to which Haiti is a party, in particular, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights. The Mission would devote special attention to the observance of the rights to life, to the integrity and security of the person, to personal liberty, to freedom of expression and to freedom of association. The Mission would be entitled to receive communications

relating to alleged human rights violations, to visit freely any place or establishment, to enjoy entire freedom of movement within Haitian territory, to interview anybody freely and privately, to make recommendations to the authorities and verify their follow-up, to undertake a public information and education campaign on human rights and to use the mass media to the extent useful for the fulfilment of its mandate. It would be understood that the Mission was authorized to resort to other international procedures for the promotion and protection of human rights.

The agreement also provided that once the Mission had been deployed, the Special Envoy would undertake discussions regarding ways and means through which the United Nations and OAS might assist in reinforcing democracy, accelerating economic development and professionalising national institutions, in particular, the judicial system, the armed forces and the police.

In his 24 March 1993 report to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General recommended that the Assembly establish the United Nations component of the joint International Civilian Mission in Haiti. The United Nations component of the Mission would comprise some 200 international staff, including 133 human rights observers. OAS would provide another 133 international observers, plus other required personnel for its component. The report also contained the proposals submitted by the team of three international human rights experts, which had visited Haiti from 15 to 22 February 1993, including its recommendations on the deployment of the Mission throughout Haiti, the modalities of its operation and its needs in terms of personnel and resources.

On 20 April 1993, the General Assembly adopted, without a vote, its resolution 47/20B approving the Secretary-General's report and authorising the United Nations participation, jointly with OAS, in the International Civilian Mission to Haiti. The Assembly reiterated the need for an early return of President Aristide to resume his constitutional functions as President and strongly supported the process of political dialogue under the auspices of the Special Envoy with a view to resolving the political crisis in Haiti. It reiterated that any entity resulting from actions of the *de facto* regime, including the partial elections to the Parliament in January 1993, was illegitimate.

By other provisions of the resolution, the General Assembly considered that any modifications regarding the economic measures recommended by the *ad hoc* meeting of the OAS Foreign Ministers should be considered according to progress in the observance of human

rights and in the solution of the political crisis. It reaffirmed the international community's commitment to increased technical, economic and financial cooperation when constitutional order was restored in Haiti, in order to strengthen institutions responsible for dispensing justice and guaranteeing democracy, political stability and economic development.

Pending the General Assembly's approval, the United Nations Secretary-General dispatched to Haiti on 13 February 1993 an advance team and a survey group to prepare for the deployment of the United Nations component of the Mission. On 14 February, an initial group of 40 observers from OAS arrived in Haiti, where they joined forces with a small team of OAS observers that had been in Port-au-Prince since September 1992.

The Mission operated under a Head of Mission, appointed jointly by the United Nations and OAS and reporting to the Special Envoy. Its headquarters was established at Port-au-Prince with 14 regional offices and sub-offices across the country. Deployment in the provinces began on 5 March 1993. By the end of March, the Mission had a team in each of the nine departments of the country. It was estimated that the financial requirements for the United Nations participation in the Mission in 1993 would amount to approximately \$24 million.

On 3 June 1993, MICIVIH submitted its first report on the human rights situation in Haiti. The report, which was of an interim nature, concentrated on such issues as violations of the right to integrity and security of person linked to violations of the right to freedom of expression and association; deaths in detention, disappearances and arbitrary executions; and other violations of the right to physical integrity and individual security.

Oil and Arms Embargo Imposed

In the meantime, the Secretary-General's Special Envoy conducted consultations with the parties concerned aimed at seeking a political solution to the Haitian crisis. The immediate objective of those consultations was to achieve agreement on three main issues, namely the return of President Aristide to Haiti, the appointment of a Prime Minister to head a Government of national concord and the resolution of the question of amnesty. Other critical issues included technical assistance for the economic and institutional reconstruction of the country, the nature and duration of the international presence in Haiti, coupled with international guarantees to ensure compliance with the agreements.

Despite the mounting international pressure, however, the negotiating process undertaken by Caputo was rejected by the de facto authorities and the military command in Haiti when they refused to accept the key elements of the proposed framework for a settlement.

On 7 June 1993, the Permanent Representative of Haiti to the United Nations addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council, in which he stated that despite the efforts of the international community, constitutional order had not yet been re-established in Haiti because the de facto authorities continued to obstruct all initiatives. In light of that situation, the letter went on, the Government of Haiti requested the Security Council to make universal and mandatory the sanctions against the de facto authorities adopted at the meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of OAS and recommended in the General Assembly resolutions, giving priority to an embargo on petroleum products and the supply of arms and munitions.

On 16 June, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, unanimously adopted resolution 841 (1993), by which it decided to impose an oil and arms embargo against Haiti as part of the continuing international effort to restore constitutional rule to that country. The President of the Council, in a statement on behalf of its members, said that the adoption of the resolution was warranted by the unique and exceptional situation in Haiti and should not be regarded as constituting a precedent.

The Council decided that the sanctions would enter into force on 23 June 1993 unless the Secretary-General, having regard to the views of the Secretary-General of OAS, reported to the Council that, in the light of the results of negotiations, the measures were no longer warranted. At any time after such reporting, should the de facto authorities in Haiti fail to comply in good faith with their undertakings in those negotiations, the sanctions measures would enter into force immediately.

The resolution obliged States to prevent the sale or supply, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of petroleum or petroleum products or arms and related *materiel* including military vehicles, police equipment and their spare parts, to any person or body in Haiti. States were also to prevent any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promoted or were calculated to promote such sale or supply. States were also required to freeze all funds in the name of the Government of Haiti or the de facto authorities there, as well as those funds controlled directly or indirectly by the two wherever located or organized.

Governors Island Agreement

On 21 June 1993, the Special Envoy, Caputo, received a letter from the Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces, Lieutenant-General Cedras, accepting the Special Envoy's earlier invitation to him to initiate a dialogue with President Aristide with a view to resolving the Haitian crisis.

On 3 July, after almost a week of talks on Governors Island, New York City, President Aristide and Lieutenant-General Cedras signed an agreement containing arrangements which the parties felt paved the way to a "satisfactory solution to the Haitian crisis and the beginning of a process of national reconciliation."

Under the Agreement, President Aristide was to appoint a new Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces to replace Lieutenant-General Cedras, who would take early retirement. President Aristide was to return to Haiti on 30 October 1993. The parties agreed to a political dialogue, under the auspices of the United Nations and OAS, between representatives of political parties represented in the Parliament, with the participation of representatives of the Presidential Commission. The objectives of the political dialogue were to reach a political truce and promote a social pact to create conditions necessary to ensure a peaceful transition; to establish procedures to enable the Haitian Parliament to resume its normal functioning; to reach an agreement enabling the Parliament to confirm the Prime Minister as speedily as possible; and to reach an agreement permitting the adoption of the laws necessary for ensuring the transition. The parties further agreed that the President would nominate a Prime Minister, to be confirmed by the legally reconstituted Parliament. Following his confirmation and assumption of office, all United Nations and OAS sanctions were to be suspended. Other provisions dealt with issues of amnesty, the creation of a new police force and international cooperation.

The Agreement specifically requested the presence of United Nations personnel in Haiti to assist in modernising the armed forces and establishing the new police force. The Secretary-General, after consultation with the constitutional Government of Haiti, was to report to the Security Council with his recommendations on that aspect of the implementation of the Agreement. The United Nations and OAS were called upon to verify the fulfilment of all the commitments set out in the Agreement. The Secretary-General entrusted the verification to his Special Envoy and asked him to report regularly to him and to the Secretary-General of OAS.

New York Pact

On 14 July 1993, representatives of political forces and parliamentary blocs, together with the members of the Presidential Commission which represented President Aristide in Haiti, began the inter-Haitian political dialogue under the auspices of the United Nations and OAS.

At the conclusion of the talks in New York on 16 July, the parties signed a new document, known as the New York Pact, which provided for a six-month truce "to guarantee a smooth and peaceful transition" in their country. In agreeing to the truce, the parties undertook to promote and guarantee respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and to refrain from any action that might lead to violence or disrupt the transition to democracy. They also undertook not to table motions of no-confidence against the new Government of national concord, in so far as it respected the Constitution and the laws of the Republic, or to obstruct the work of the Parliament.

The signatories invited President Aristide to appoint a new Prime Minister as soon as possible, and undertook to ensure that laws necessary for the transition of power were passed on the basis of an emergency procedure. They agreed that the members of Parliament elected as a result of the contested elections of 18 January 1993 would voluntarily refrain from occupying their parliamentary seats until the Conciliation Commission had rendered its verdict on this issue.

The United Nations and OAS agreed to make two experts available to help prepare and implement an act establishing the Conciliation Commission.

Suspension of the Sanctions

In his letter to the Secretary-General on 15 July, the President of the Security Council confirmed the readiness of the Council to suspend the sanctions imposed against (Haiti under Security Council resolution 841 (1993) immediately after the Prime Minister had been ratified and had assumed the functions of that office in Haiti. It was agreed that provisions would be made for the automatic termination of such suspension if the parties to the Agreement or any authorities in Haiti failed to comply in good faith with the Agreement. The Council also declared its readiness to terminate the sanctions, upon receipt of a report from the United Nations Secretary-General immediately after the return of President Aristide to Haiti.

On 25 August 1993, the Haitian Parliament ratified the appointment by President Aristide of Robert Malval as Prime Minister-

designate. This led the Security Council, on the Secretary-General's recommendation, to suspend immediately oil and embargo, sanctions against Haiti. The Council did so by unanimously adopting resolution 861 (1993) of 27 August in which it also confirmed its readiness to reimpose sanctions if the terms of the Governors Island Agreement were not fully implemented.

Peace-Keeping Mission Proposed

The Governors Island Agreement included provision for United Nations assistance for modernising the armed forces of Haiti and establishing a new police force. In his 25 August report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General outlined his plans in this regard.

The Secretary-General recommended the dispatch to Haiti of a mission consisting of 567 civilian police monitors, 60 military trainers and a military construction unit for an initial period of six months.

Although the Haitian Constitution provides for a police force separate from the Armed Forces, the responsibilities of the Armed Forces of Haiti included both military and police functions. The Secretary-General said that, pending the creation of a new police force, United Nations civilian police monitors would help the Government in monitoring the activities of those members of the Armed Forces involved in carrying out police functions, provide guidance and advice, monitor the conduct of police operations, and ensure that legal requirements were fully met.

As to the modernisation of the Armed Forces, the Secretary-General stated that the military training teams would provide training to officers and non-commissioned officers in non-lethal skills in order to prepare them for what would become their primary mission, including disaster relief, search and rescue, and surveillance of borders and coastal waters.

The military construction unit would work with the Haitian military in such areas as conversion of certain military facilities to civilian use and renovation of medical facilities.

The Secretary-General said that the mission would be headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General, namely the Special Envoy, Dante Caputo, who would also oversee the activities of the International Civilian Mission and who would coordinate the activities of the two missions.

On 31 August, the Security Council, by its resolution 862 (1993), approved the dispatch of an advance team to prepare for the possible deployment of the proposed United Nations mission to Haiti.

UNMIH Established

An advance team, headed by Caputo, travelled to Haiti on 8 September 1993. On the basis of the Team's findings, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council, on 21 September, a report containing further clarifications, including an estimate of the cost and scope of the mission, a time-frame for its implementation and conclusion, as well as recommendations on ensuring coordination between the United Nations and OAS.

In analysing the political situation in Haiti, the Secretary-General noted that both sides continued to be divided by deep mistrust and suspicion. The political and social climate in the country continued to be characterized by widespread violations of human rights and by other instances of violence. The Secretary-General shared the view of his Special Envoy that in these circumstances there was an 'urgent need to demonstrate through concrete steps the commitment of the international community to the solution of the Haitian crisis.' He recommended, therefore, that the Security Council approve the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) for an initial period of six months.

On 23 September, the Security Council, by its resolution 867 (1993) authorized the establishment and immediate dispatch of UNMIH for a period of six months. Extension of the mandate of the Mission beyond seventy-five days was made contingent upon a review by the Security Council of substantive progress towards the implementation of political agreements reached. The Council called upon all factions in Haiti to renounce publicly violence as a means of political expression.

Deployment Prevented

In accordance with resolution 867 (1993) and after necessary preparations and consultations, the advance team of UNMIH consisting of 53 military and 51 police personnel was deployed in Port-au-Prince in the period September-October 1993. However, when the ship, *Harlan County*, carrying 220 personnel of the United Nations military contingent arrived in Port-au-Prince on 11 October, armed civilians (known as "attaches") created disturbances in the area of the seaport and prevented the ship from landing. In addition, they threatened journalists and diplomats waiting to meet the contingent.

On the same day, the Security Council issued a statement "deeply deploring" the events of 11 October and reiterating that serious and consistent non-compliance with the Governors Island Agreement would prompt it to reinstate the oil and arms embargo against Haiti. In this

context, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report urgently whether the incidents of 11 October constituted such non-compliance by the Armed Forces of Haiti.

Following the departure of the Harlan County, the other members of UNMIH, the bulk of the MICIVIH staff and non-essential personnel of international agencies left Haiti. Many foreign nationals acted likewise, while Haitians living in the capital attempted to flee to the countryside. The Secretary-General's Special Representative remained at Port-au-Prince until 6 November 1993.

Sanctions Reimposed

The Secretary-General, in accordance with the Council's request, reported back on 13 October. He called attention to the "repeatedly observed lack of will on the part of the command of the Armed Forces of Haiti to facilitate the deployment and operation of UNMIH" and to administrative obstacles created to delay the start of the Mission. He also cited incidents demonstrating a lack of will to act against "attaches" who were terrorising the population through such actions as assassinations, attacks on the offices of the Prime Minister and the general strike against UNMIH. Moreover, police had facilitated and, in some cases, participated in the actions of the armed civilians.

The Secretary-General went on to say that most of the instructions issued by the Government of Haiti to the Haitian Armed Forces and police had not been carried out. That was a "clear violation of the principle of the subordination of military forces to civilian authority", which was a central feature of the Governors Island Agreement. The incidents described in the report reflected a lack of will to cooperate fully with the peaceful transition to a democratic society, as well as the "clear and explicit intent to prevent the democratic process, as accepted in that Agreement; from taking its course."

The Secretary-General stated that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Haiti and the police chief and commander of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area "have failed to fulfil the commitments entered into by General Cedras in his capacity as co-signatory of the Governors Island Agreement". The Secretary-General declared it necessary to terminate the suspension of the oil and arms embargo first imposed by resolution 841 (1993).

The Security Council, by its resolution 873 (1993) of 13 October, decided to reimpose its oil and arms embargo against Haiti as of 2359 hours Eastern Standard Time (EST) on 18 October unless the parties to the Governors Island Agreement and other authorities in Haiti

implemented in full the agreement to reinstate the legitimate Government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide and enable UNMIH to carry out its mandate. The Council said it would also consider additional sanctions if they continued to impede the activities of UNMIH or, to refuse to comply with relevant Security Council resolutions and the Governors Island Agreement.

Despite diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis and mounting international pressure, the military leaders in Haiti continued to defy the Governors Island Agreement. Moreover, on 14 October, the Minister of Justice in the Government of President Aristide, Francois-Guy Malary, was assassinated. In a letter dated 15 October, President Aristide requested the Security Council to call on Member States to take the "necessary measures to strengthen the provisions of resolution 873 (1993)."

On 16 October, the Security Council, by its resolution 875 (1993), called upon Member States to ensure the strict implementation of the oil and arms embargo against Haiti, and in particular to halt and inspect ships travelling towards Haiti in order to verify their cargoes and destinations. The Council also confirmed that it was prepared to consider further necessary measures to ensure full compliance with the provisions of relevant Council resolutions.

Reaffirming that, in "these unique and exceptional circumstances", the failure of the military authorities in Haiti to fulfil their obligations under the Governors Island Agreement constituted a threat to peace and security in the region, the Council called on Member States, acting nationally or through regional arrangements and in cooperation with the legitimate Government of Haiti, to use appropriate measures to implement the sanctions called for under resolutions 841 (1993) and 873 (1993).

On 30 October 1993, after the deadline for the return of President Aristide to Haiti had passed the Security Council, in a statement by its President condemned the fact that Lieutenant-General Cedras and the Haitian military authorities had so far not fulfilled their obligations under the Governors Island Agreement, and deplored their fostering and perpetuation of a political and security environment which prevented the return of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to Haiti as provided for in the Agreement.

The Council reaffirmed that the Governors Island Agreement remained fully in force as the only valid framework for the solution of the crisis in Haiti. It further reaffirmed its determination to maintain

and enforce sanctions on Haiti until the Agreement's commitments were honoured, and to consider strengthening them if the military authorities continued to interrupt the democratic transition.

Diplomatic Efforts Continue

The Secretary-General and his Special Representative, supported by several United Nations Member States ("Friends of the Secretary-General for Haiti"), in consultation with the OAS Secretary-General, continued to work intensively to break the impasse and promote agreement between the parties on measures which would make it possible to resume implementation of the Governors Island Agreement.

An important step forward was taken on 14-16 January 1994, when President Aristide convened a conference in Miami, Florida (United States), to which all the political groups that had signed the New York Pact were invited. At that conference a consensus emerged on a sequence of steps to be taken to break the deadlock. In the course of February 1994, further consultations took place in Washington between leading members of both Houses of the Haitian Parliament, representing all political tendencies in that Parliament. On 19 February, the Secretary-General received a letter from a representative group of those Parliamentarians containing a plan for resolving the crisis. On 3 March 1994, this plan was endorsed in a resolution by the Chamber of Deputies of the Haitian Parliament. The plan as presented to the Secretary-General by its authors was transmitted to the Security Council on 20 February 1994. On that occasion, the Secretary-General stated that he considered it to constitute a significant development.

The plan, which was subsequently set out in detail in a letter received on 23 February 1994, provided for the appointment of a Prime Minister, the departure of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Haiti, a vote on the amnesty law, as well as the adoption, after the installation of the new Government, of a law concerning the establishment of a police force, and the return of President Aristide to Haiti.

On 5 March 1994, the Secretary-General met with President Aristide. During the meeting, the President expressed his opposition to this initiative. He further expressed his position in a 7 March 1994 letter to the Secretary-General. Before appointing a new Prime Minister, President Aristide wished to bring about the departure of the leaders of the coup d'état, the adoption of the laws provided for within the framework of the New York Pact and the deployment of UNMIH.

MICIVIH Observers Return to Haiti

A small group of administrative personnel of MICIVIH remained in Port-au-Prince following the evacuation of the bulk of its personnel in October 1993. The Executive Director of MICIVIH returned to Port-au-Prince after four weeks of absence. Twenty-two United Nations and OAS observers returned on 26 January 1994, then six others on 2 February and an additional ten on 13 April, bringing the number of observers to thirty-eight.

MICIVIH reported an alarming increase in violence in Haiti. There had been an outbreak of violence in Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas, where the number of murders remained at a very high level, with the persistence of grave violations of human rights and, in particular, extrajudicial executions, suspicious deaths and enforced disappearances. There were a number of mutilations and many of those killed were supporters of President Aristide. In certain cases of suspicious death, the Mission obtained information leading to the conclusion that the culprits were members of the Armed Forces, their auxiliaries or members of the Front révolutionnaire pour l'avancement et le progrès en Haiti (FRAPH). In other cases, testimony pointed to armed civilians and left it unclear whether it was a question of "attaches" or of armed bands acting with the complicity of the Armed Forces.

Situation with UNMIH

The Security Council, by its resolution 867 (1993) which authorized the establishment of UNMIH for a period of six months, requested the Secretary-General to submit a progress report on the mission by 10 December 1993. The Secretary-General reported on 26 November 1993. He noted the Haitian military authorities' continued obstruction of the deployment of UNMIH and their failure to permit the mission to begin its work, and concluded that the mandate entrusted to UNMIH could not be implemented until there was a clear and substantial change of attitude on the part of the Haitian military leaders.

On 10 December 1993, the President of the Council addressed a letter to the Secretary-General containing the decision by the Council to continue the mandate of UNMIH for the full six-month period, that is until 23 March 1994.

In his further reports submitted to the Security Council on 19 January and 18 March 1994, the Secretary-General stated that notwithstanding the continued efforts, there had been "no change in the prevailing situation in Haiti that would have allowed the

reactivation of UNMIH." In these circumstances, he suggested that the Council might wish to consider authorising the extension of UNMIH's mandate for a period of three months. In his opinion, this would allow for the possibility of reactivating the mission with a minimum of delay, should the implementation of the Governors Island Agreement be resumed.

The Security Council, by its resolution 905 (1994) adopted on 23 March 1994, decided to extend the mandate of UNMIH until 30 June 1994.

MICIVIH Extended

On 29 April 1994, the Secretary-General, in a report to the General Assembly, recommended that the Assembly extend the mandate and financing of the United Nations component of MICIVIH for one year. In the report, he stated that although the Mission had been unable to rectify a distressing situation in Haiti, it had shed light on certain events there and denounced human rights abuses that would not otherwise have been disclosed.

The Secretary-General went on to say that President Aristide could only be returned to power, and democracy restored in Haiti, if both sides made "constructive and accepted concessions." He noted that a recent initiative by a group of Haitian Parliamentarians—which had been supported by the United Nations and OAS—had not been endorsed by President Aristide. Meanwhile, unity among the Friends of the Secretary-General for Haiti had waned and Security Council sanctions, reimposed in October 1993, had not been effective.

The Secretary-General said the international community's role had changed from that of mediator between the parties to that of sole agent responsible for finding and implementing a solution to the deadlock. There was a danger that the international community would have too extensive a mission, allowing the parties to shirk their own responsibilities in the negotiating process.

Given that negotiations had yielded no significant progress, the Secretary-General recommended that "a more specifically Haitian solution" be found. For this reason, the participants should resume an effective role in this process, and the international community and especially those countries most directly concerned should restore a unified approach in the negotiations.

The Secretary-General concluded his report by saying that without positive change, both from the Haitian side and from the international

community, it was difficult to determine what additional efforts the United Nations could undertake to resolve the serious crisis prevailing in the country. However, as long as material circumstances would allow, the Organisation must maintain its presence through MICIVIH and ensure the continuity of humanitarian assistance to Haiti.

The General Assembly, in its resolution 48/27B of 8 July 1994, authorized the extension of the mandate of the United Nations component of MICIVIH for an additional year, and requested the Secretary-General to expedite and strengthen the presence of the Mission in Haiti. At the end of June, MICIVIH had 104 international staff including 70 observers.

Additional Sanctions Against Haiti

On 6 May, the Security Council adopted resolution 917(1994), by which it decided to impose a number of additional sanctions against Haiti, which should take effect no later than 2359 hours EST on 21 May, and listed a number of specific conditions for their termination. The Council requested the Secretary-General to report to it no later than 19 May on steps the military had taken to comply with the terms of the resolution.

The military authorities in Haiti, however, continued to defy the will of the international community. Moreover, they supported the installation, on 11 May, of Supreme Court Judge Emile Jonassaint as "provisional President."

The Security Council, in a Presidential statement issued on 11 May, strongly condemned the attempt to replace the legitimate President of Haiti and reaffirmed the Council members' commitment to the restoration of democracy in Haiti and to the return of President Aristide.

After the Secretary-General reported on 19 May that the military authorities had not taken any steps to comply with resolution 917(1994), and, on the contrary, supported the illegal attempt to replace the legitimate President, the new sanctions against Haiti took effect as scheduled.

In order to tighten the cordon around the island, the United States deployed two additional navy vessels off Haiti, bringing to eight the number of United States ships working with one Canadian, one Argentine and one Dutch ship. A French vessel was also expected to arrive.

In addition to tightening the sea cordon around the island, steps were taken on land to enforce the sanctions against Haiti. At the request of the Dominican Republic, the Secretary-General dispatched a team of technical experts to assess the situation on the Dominican/Haitian border. On the basis of the team's report, on 9 June the Secretary-General communicated his observations and recommendations to the Government of the Dominican Republic.

Tensions in Haiti Increase

On 20 June, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that no progress had been made towards the implementation of the Governors Island Agreement. On the contrary, tensions in Haiti increased as a result of the installation of an illegitimate government, the growing impact of economic sanctions, the continued repression and the humanitarian crisis.

The "provisional President" announced that he would be organising elections by the end of 1994 and would leave office in February 1995, after the election of a new President in January 1995. On 11 June, he declared a state of emergency on the grounds that the nation was facing extreme danger and risks of invasion. Despite the electoral timetable, no legislative action was taken to prepare for the legislative elections due in November 1994.

As to human rights, the Secretary-General reported, that the situation had deteriorated sharply, with new patterns of repression such as the abduction and rape of family members of political activists. In a growing number of politically related killings, the implication of members of the Armed Forces or of the Front révolutionnaire pour l'avancement et le progrès (FRAPH), was established.

The humanitarian situation in Haiti also continued to deteriorate in spite of efforts by the United Nations and OAS, non-governmental organisations and bilateral donors.

In his further report submitted to the Security Council on 28 June, the Secretary-General stated that the continued deterioration of the situation in Haiti had substantially changed the circumstances under which UNMIH had been planned. The Council might wish to consider modifying the original mandate of the Mission. The Secretary-General recommended that the mandate of UNMIH be extended for a period of one month, to allow for consultations on the possible strengthening of UNMIH and its role in overall attempts to find a solution to the Haitian crisis.

In that report, the Secretary-General also recalled that in the statement of conclusions adopted at their meeting in New York on 3 June 1994, the Friends of the Secretary-General for Haiti had expressed their determination to promote the full deployment of UNMIH when conditions permitted and envisaged the reconfiguration and strengthening of the Mission.

The *Ad Hoc* Meeting on Haiti of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of OAS held during the twenty-fourth session of the OAS General Assembly at Belem, Brazil, unanimously adopted on 9 June 1994 a resolution which called on all Member States to support measures by the United Nations to strengthen UNMIH in order to assist in the restoration of democracy through the pro-fessionalisation of the Armed Forces of Haiti and the training of a new police, to help maintain essential civil order and protect the personnel of international and other organisations involved in human rights and humanitarian efforts in Haiti.

On 30 June, the Security Council adopted resolution 933 (1994) deciding to extend the mandate of UNMIH until 31 July 1994 and requesting the Secretary-General to report to the Council with specific recommendations on the strength, composition, cost and duration of UNAMIH, appropriate to its expansion and deployment after the departure of the senior Haitian military leadership.

MICIVIH Expelled from Hati

On 11 July, the de facto authorities in Haiti delivered to the Executive Director of MICIVIH in Port-au-Prince a decree of the "provisional President" declaring the international staff of MICIVIH "undesirable" and giving them 48 hours to leave Haitian territory.

On the same day, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Acting Secretary-General of OAS issued a joint statement resolutely condemning this illegal action. The Security Council also issued a statement condemning this decision of the de facto authorities stressing that this action further reinforced the Council's determination to bring about a rapid and definitive solution to the crisis.

On 12 July, the Secretary-General informed the General Assembly and the Security Council of his decision, made in consultation with OAS, to evacuate MICIVIH staff from Haiti for security considerations. Both United Nations and OAS personnel of MICIVIH left Haiti on 13 July.

USE of All Necessary Means

On 15 July, as requested by Security Council resolution 933 (1994), the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on a proposed expanded force in Haiti. In the report, he outlined its tasks, strength and concept of operations, and presented to the Council three options for the establishment of such a force. The Secretary-General supported action under Chapter VII of the Charter by a multinational force in order to ensure the return of the legitimate President and to assist the legitimate Government of Haiti in the maintenance of public order.

In his periodic report on the situation in Haiti dated 26 July, the Secretary-General stated that the situation in the country had deteriorated further as a result of actions taken by the illegal government of Emile Jonassaint. The human rights situation remained worrisome; reports coming out of the country indicated a continuation of the abuses being committed against Haitians. The humanitarian situation was becoming even more difficult, particularly for the poorest sectors of the population.

On 31 July 1994, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, adopted resolution 940 (1994) which welcomed the Secretary-General's report of 15 July. The Council authorized Member States to form a multinational force under unified command and control and "to use all necessary means" to facilitate the departure of the military leadership, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate Government authorities.

Under the terms of the resolution, the multinational force would terminate its mission and an expanded, strengthened UNMIH would assume the full range of its functions when a secure and stable environment had been established and UNMIH had the capability and structure to assume those functions. That determination would be made by the Council, on the basis of recommendations from Member States participating in the multinational force and from the Secretary-General.

The Council also approved the establishment of an advance team of UNMIH to monitor the operations of the multinational force. The team would also assess requirements and prepare for the deployment of UNMIH.

The Council extended the mandate of UNMIH for a period of six months and increased its troop level to 6,000. It established the objective of completing UNMIH's mission not later than February 1996. Under

its revised mandate, UNMIH would assist in sustaining the secure and stable environment established during the multinational phase and the protection of international personnel and key installations; and in the professionalisation of the Haitian armed forces and the creation of a separate police force. It would also assist the legitimate constitutional authorities of Haiti in establishing an environment conducive to the organisation of free and fair legislative elections to be called by those authorities, and, when requested by them, monitored by the United Nations, in cooperation with OAS.

Final Diplomatic Efforts

In August, as a personal initiative aimed at the peaceful implementation of resolution 940 (1994), the Secretary-General dispatched a United Nations official with an exploratory mission in order to consider the possibility of sending to Haiti a high-level delegation which would hold discussions with the military authorities. However, the military authorities refused to meet with the envoy.

The Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that the mission of his special envoy had not achieved its objectives. He was suspending these efforts unless the Council gave him a new mandate or the situation changed. However, he would continue to seek ways to implement resolution 940 (1994) peacefully.

The President of the Security Council, in a statement to correspondents, deplored the rejection by the *de facto* authorities of the Secretary-General's initiative, and reiterated its condemnation of repression, systematic violence and violations of international humanitarian law in Haiti.

On 15 September, the President of the United States, William Clinton, stated that all diplomatic efforts had been exhausted and, in accordance with Security Council resolution 940 (1994), force might be used to remove the military leadership from power in Haiti and ensure the return of the democratic Government of President Aristide. The President stated that more than 20 countries had agreed to join the United States in a multinational force.

On 17 September, in a final diplomatic effort, the President of the United States sent to Haiti a high-level mission, headed by former President Jimmy Carter. Faced with imminent invasion and after two days of intensive talks, the Haitian military leaders agreed to resign when a general amnesty would be voted into law by the Haitian Parliament, or by 15 October 1994, whichever was earlier. Under the

agreement, the Haitian military and police forces would cooperate with the multinational force in its efforts to establish and maintain a stable and secure environment during the transitional period.

Multinational Force Deployed

On 19 September 1994, in a first phase of the military operation authorized by Security Council resolution 940 (1994), the lead elements of the 28-nation multinational force, spearheaded by United States troops, landed in Haiti without opposition. Upon his arrival in Haiti on the same day, Lt. Gen. Hugh Shelton, the Commander of the force, coordinated the entry of the force with Haiti's military leaders.

The Secretary-General issued a statement welcoming the fact that a military intervention in Haiti had been averted and that conditions had been created for the peaceful implementation of resolution 940 (1994). In the statement, he said that an advance group of United Nations military observers would be dispatched to Haiti shortly and that he was considering the early redeployment of MICIVIH.

On 27 September, the multinational force submitted to the Security Council its first report summarising the first week of operations of the force in Haiti. The report stated that activities of the force constituted the foundation for establishing the secure and stable environment necessary to restore and maintain democracy in Haiti. There was also evidence that the force was on its way towards establishing the conditions necessary for the full implementation of resolution 940 (1994).

The second report of the multinational force was submitted to the Security Council on 10 October. According to the report, which summarized the second and third weeks of operations, the overall situation in Haiti was relatively quiet, with some incidents of violence among Haitians. The force continued to search aggressively for and seize weapons caches, to protect public safety and to expand its presence in the countryside the report stated that the force had made enough progress in establishing a secure and stable environment to allow it to be drawn down from its peak of 21,000 troops. Substantial progress was also made in re-establishing democracy in Haiti.

New Special Representative Appointed

On 19 September, Dante Caputo, having cited the changing context of the situation in Haiti, resigned as the Special Envoy of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and OAS for Haiti. The Secretary-General received the resignation with deep regret and

expressed to Caputo his thanks for the courage and devotion he had lent to the discharge of his duties.

To replace Caputo, the Secretary General appointed, on 23 September, Lakhdar Brahimi, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, as his Special Representative for Haiti.

UNMIH Advance Team Arrives in Haiti

The first group of UNMIH's advance team consisting of 12 United Nations military observers arrived in Haiti on 23 September. The Chief Military Observer established liaison with the Commander of the multinational force and the appropriate coordination mechanisms were put in place.

The tasks of the team include: coordinating with the multinational force in preparation for the full deployment of UNMIH, monitoring the operations of the multinational force, making its good offices available as required and reporting to the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 940 (1994).

On 29 September 1994, the Security Council, by its resolution 944 (1994), requested the Secretary-General to ensure the immediate completion of the deployment of the observers and other elements of the sixty-person UNMIH advance team. It also encouraged him, in consultation with the Secretary-General of OAS, to facilitate the immediate return to Haiti of MICIVIH.

By other provisions of the resolution, the Council decided to lift the sanctions imposed on Haiti, beginning at 0001 am EST on the day after the return to Haiti of President Aristide.

On 18 October, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that with the arrival in Port-au-Prince of seven additional members of the advance team on 30 September and 30 more personnel on 5 October, it had become fully operational.

In the report, the Secretary-General stated that the advance team had observed that the multinational force had made progress towards achieving objectives set out in Security Council resolution 940 (1994), while using minimum force. The great majority of the Haitian population welcomed the force, but might be developing unrealistically high expectations of what it would do.

The Secretary-General further noted that in preparation for the transition from the multinational force to UNMIH, the advance team's military component had established a joint working group with the force. The transition could only take place when a secure and stable

environment had been established, and when UNMIH's strength and structure were adequate for it to assume its functions. The advance team's tasks would expire when the force had completed its mission and when UNMIH had assumed the full range of its functions.

President Aristide Reinstated

On 28 September 1994, President Aristide convened an extraordinary session of the Haitian Parliament to consider draft legislation on an amnesty. On 10 October, after the Parliament had passed the amnesty legislation, Lieutenant-General Raoul Cedras resigned as Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces. Other members of the military leadership, Brigadier-General Philippe Biamby and Colonel Michel Francois, also submitted their resignations. The President of Panama, at the request of President Aristide, agreed to give asylum to Lieutenant General Cedras and Brigadier-General Biamby. Earlier, Colonel Francois had gone to the Dominican Republic.

The Secretary-General issued a statement expressing his satisfaction at the resignation of the military leadership in Haiti, and his hope that this step would facilitate the return to power of President Aristide and the restoration of democracy in Haiti.

On 15 October, after the departure of the military leadership, President Aristide returned to Haiti and resumed his functions, after three years of enforced exile. The Secretary-General welcomed the long-awaited return of the President and the resumption of the democratic process in Haiti.

On the same day, the Security Council, by its resolution 948 (1994), also welcomed the return of President Aristide and, with his return, the lifting of sanctions at 0001 am EST on 16 October.

The Council expressed full support for efforts by President Aristide, democratic leaders in Haiti, and the legitimate organs of the restored Government to bring Haiti out of the crisis and return it to the democratic community of nations. Commending the efforts of all States, organisations and individuals who had contributed to that outcome, the Council recognized in particular the efforts of the multinational force in creating the conditions necessary for the return of democracy in Haiti. It also expressed its support for the deployment of the advance team of UNMIH, and urged that cooperation continue between the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and OAS, especially regarding the rapid return to Haiti of MICIVIH.

Secretary-General Visits Haiti

On 25 October, President Aristide designated Smarck Michel the new Prime Minister. His appointment was ratified by both Chambers of the Parliament on 4 November and his platform was approved unanimously in the Senate on 6 November and by overwhelming majority in the Chamber of Deputies on 7 November. The new Government took office on 8 November 1994.

From 23 to 29 October, the Secretary-General's Special Representative visited Haiti and had a series of discussions dealing with the situation on the ground, the operation of the multinational force and conditions for the transition from the multinational force to UNMIH.

On 15 November, the Secretary-General himself paid a visit to Haiti. During the discussion with President Aristide, a number of issues were addressed including national reconciliation, the reinforcement of democratic institutions and the revitalisation of the Haitian economy, as well as the forthcoming legislative and local elections. The Secretary-General assured President Aristide that the United Nations, in collaboration with OAS, would continue to assist Haiti on the road to national reconciliation, political stability and reconstruction.

Preparations for UNMIH Deployment

In the meantime, the advance team of UNMIH reported that the multinational force continued to operate smoothly towards achieving its objectives under resolution 940 (1994), with few incidents and with evident widespread acceptance by the Haitian population. No acts of intimidation or violence against the United Nations or other international presence were reported. In addition to monitoring the operations of the multinational force, the military and police personnel of the advance team were engaged in on-site planning for the transition from the force to UNMIH.

On 21 November, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that discussions were under way between the United Nations, the Government of Haiti, the Government of the United States and other interested parties to assure a smooth transition. The issues being addressed included the training of the Haitian police, the timetable for forthcoming legislative elections, and the establishment of a secure and stable environment.

The Secretary-General noted that of particular concern was the setting up of an interim Haitian police pending the creation of a National Police. While training had begun, time would be required for the interim police force to reach the strength necessary to enforce law and order. As soon as it was functioning effectively, UNMIH could assist the Haitian Government in sustaining the secure and stable environment to be established during the operations of the multinational force.

The head of the UNMIH advance team believed that the strength of the team should be increased in order to further facilitate planning of the Mission, identification of conditions required for the transition and, most important, preparation for the actual transition. The Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council authorize expansion of the advance team up to 500 members to allow it to be progressively strengthened so that it would be fully prepared to enter the transition period.

On 29 November, the Security Council, by its resolution 964 (1994) authorized the Secretary-General to strengthen progressively the advance team of UNMIH up to 500 personnel. The Council welcomed the positive developments in Haiti since the deployment of the multinational force, and the establishment of a joint working group to prepare for the transition by the UNMIH's advance team and the force. The Secretary-General was requested to inform the Council at regular intervals on increases in the strength of UNMIH's advance team.

MICIVIH Returns to Haiti

The core group of MICIVIH returned to Haiti on 22 October 1994 to join the Executive Director of the Mission, Colin Granderson, and the staff of the Office of Human Rights, who had arrived on 6 October to evaluate the conditions for a return of MICIVIH. The activities of the Mission resumed on 26 October with the reopening of an office in Port-au-Prince.

In the meantime, a joint United Nations/OAS Working Group on MICIVIH was set up to look at the future of the Mission in terms of its redeployment and possible expansion of its mandate. At the meeting on 4 November in Washington, it was decided that MICIVIH would continue to give priority to the monitoring and promotion of respect for human rights in Haiti. As in the past, it would document the human rights situation, make recommendations to the Haitian

authorities, implement an information and civic education programme and help to solve problems such as those relating to detentions, medical assistance to victims and the return of displaced persons. MICIVIH would observe the forthcoming electoral campaign, during which it would monitor respect for freedom of expression and association. It might participate in the observation of the election itself. MICIVIH would also contribute to institution-building, particularly the strengthening of human rights organisations.

In his 23 November 1994 report to the General Assembly on the situation of democracy and human rights in Haiti, the Secretary-General proposed that MICIVIH, while continuing to verify compliance with Haiti's human rights obligations and to promote respect for the rights of all Haitians, should contribute, in so far as possible, to the strengthening of democratic institutions. The broadening of the responsibilities of the Mission would not have any financial implications, for the total number of its staff would remain unchanged.

Composition of UNMIH

Originally, as authorized by Security Council resolution 867 (1993) UNMIH was to comprise 567 police monitors and a military construction unit with a strength of approximately 700, including 60 military trainers. Military personnel were to be provided by Argentina, Canada and the United States. Police personnel were to be contributed by Algeria, Austria, Canada, France, Indonesia, Madagascar, the Russian Federation, Senegal, Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia and Venezuela.

By its resolution 940 (1994), the Council expanded the mandate of UNMIH and its authorized troop level to 6,000. The Mission would also include 567 civilian police personnel and approximately 250 international civilian staff and 200 local staff.

UNMIH is headed by the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Haiti, Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria). Mr Brahimi replaced Dante Caputo who had served as the Special Envoy of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and OAS for Haiti from December 1992 to September 1994.

The advance team is led in the field by the Chief of Staff of UNMIH, Col. William Fulton. As of 30 November 1994, military and civilian police personnel of the advance team were provided by the following countries:

<i>Country</i>	<i>Police</i>	<i>Troops</i>	<i>Observers</i>
Austria		1	
Bangladesh		1	4
Canada	13	4	
Djibouti			2
France	1		2
Guatemala			2
Ireland			2
New Zealand			4
United States		5	
Total	14	11	16

Figures may vary from month to month due to rotation. "Troops" include any infantry, logistics, engineering, air, medical, movcon, staff, et.

Financial Aspects

The rough cost to the United Nations of UNMIH in 1994 was approximately \$5.3 million. The costs of the operation are met by the assessed contributions of United Nations Member States. As of 30 November 1994, contributions outstanding to the UNMIH Special Account for the period from the inception of the operation to 31 December 1994 amounted to approximately \$0.3 million. The cost of the operation of the multinational force is borne by the participating Member States. The Secretary-General has estimated that the total cost of the expanded UNMIH for a six-month period would amount to approximately \$215 million.

Humanitarian Assistance

Following the 1991 coup *d'etat*, the humanitarian situation in Haiti deteriorated in spite of the efforts of the United Nations and non-governmental organisations. In March 1993, the United Nations and OAS launched a consolidated appeal for a humanitarian plan of action designed to respond to the urgent humanitarian needs of the Haitian people. The budget required for the implementation of this plan was estimated at \$62.7 million, for the areas of health, nutrition, agriculture and education.

Donors, however, provided only \$9.6 million in response to the 1993 humanitarian appeal. Throughout 1994 eight agencies working under the United Nations/OAS umbrella—the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, the World Food Programme, the

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Children's Fund, the Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO)/World Health Organisation and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation—drew on their core resources to fund the shortfall in donor response to the inter-agency appeal and continued humanitarian assistance programmes in Haiti, despite difficulties created by the de facto authorities and the sanctions regime imposed by the Security Council. United Nations programmes operated under a United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator serving concurrently as Resident Representative of UNDP.

Working with over 150 Haitian, international and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), United Nations agencies focused on maintaining health and hospital emergency services, distributing basic drugs and medical supplies, helping control transmissible diseases and maintaining the 'cold chain' needed for vaccinations. Food relief was also critical. By the time of the arrival of the multinational force in the country, with United Nations help humanitarian agencies were distributing food to some 940,000 needy Haitians. United Nations agency efforts also sought to prevent the breakdown in farm production and income and to improve water supply and sanitation in areas subject to high public health risks.

Bilateral donors also continued to carry out significant humanitarian activities, directly and through NGOs, in 1994.

In its resolution 873 (1993) of 13 October 1993, the Security Council terminated the suspension of the embargo on petroleum and petroleum products and arms and related *materiel of all* kinds imposed on Haiti by resolution 841 [1993]. Within the strict framework of the provisions of the resolution providing for possible exemptions for essential humanitarian needs, the United Nations and OAS invited PAHO to assume responsibility for a fuel management plan to permit the continued functioning of humanitarian activities. This programme, which commenced in January 1994, was managed by a steering committee composed of representatives of the organisations of the United Nations system, donors, NGOs and members of the Government. By mid-September 1994, a total of 1.2 million gallons of diesel fuel and over 206,000 gallons of gasoline had been distributed under the fuel management plan to NGOs and agencies engaged in humanitarian operations.

In view of the uncertainty and potential for violence expected to accompany a military intervention in Haiti, United Nations agencies established a communications network among NGOs and public and

private hospitals, made contingency plans for dealing with epidemics and built up decentralized stocks of medicines, health supplies, water supply equipment and food to the maximum degree possible.

In late September 1994, an advance team from the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs arrived in Haiti to strengthen the office of the Humanitarian Coordinator. The team provided liaison between the multinational force and the humanitarian assistance community in Haiti, and led an inter-agency effort to identify post-intervention humanitarian needs. On the basis of its consultations with bilateral donors, and international and Haitian NGOs, the United Nations, OAS and the Government of Haiti prepared an appeal to meet immediate humanitarian needs and to facilitate the transition to reconstruction and development in the country.

36

United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia

LOCATIONS: Liberia

HEADQUARTERS: Monrovia

DURATION: 1993 to present

AUTHORISED STRENGTH: 303 military observers, 20 military medical personnel, 45 military engineers, 58 United Nations Volunteers, 89 international civilians and 136 local civilian staff

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: Trevor Livingston Gordon-Somers (Jamaica)

CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVER: Major-General Daniel Ishmoel Opande (Kenya)

Background

The United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) is the first United Nations peace-keeping mission undertaken in cooperation with a peace-keeping operation already set up by another organisation. Established in September 1993 by the Security Council, UNOMIL works with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) a subregional organisation, in assisting the Liberians to establish peace in the country.

The civil war in Liberia broke out in 1990, when the government headed by President Samuel Doe was overthrown, causing a complete breakdown of law and order in the country. The war claimed the lives of between 100,000 and 150,000 civilians, and displaced scores of others both internally and beyond the borders, resulting in some 700,000 refugees in the neighbouring countries. Liberia was divided, with the

Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), headed by President Amos Sawyer, administering Monrovia, the country's capital, and its environs; the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, controlling the majority of the country; and the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), led by Alhaji Kromah, having taken control of the remaining areas.

Since the outset of the conflict, ECOWAS has taken various initiatives aimed at a peaceful settlement. These included creating a Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) in August, 1990, and mediating a series of agreements which became the basis for the peace plan of November 1990. On 30 October 1991, ECOWAS brokered the Yamoussoukro IV Accord which outlined steps to implement the peace plan, including the encampment and disarmament of warring factions under the supervision of an expanded ECOMOG, as well as the establishment of transitional institutions to carry out free and fair elections.

The United Nations, from the beginning of the conflict, has supported the efforts of the ECOWAS member states. In addition, it has provided humanitarian assistance to the affected areas through coordinated activities of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the United Nations Population Fund (UNPF), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the World Health Organisation (WHO).

The United Nations Special Coordinator's Office (UNSCOL) opened in December 1990; its operation, initially focusing on the desperate situation in the Monrovia area, was expanded in 1991 to respond to the needs of Liberians throughout the country. Regional arrangements were also made to assist those who fled to the neighbouring countries, mainly Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone.

United Nations Actions on Liberia

The Security Council first took up the question of Liberia on 22 January 1991, when the President of the Council made a statement commending the efforts of the heads of State of ECOWAS and called upon the parties to the conflict to respect the ceasefire agreement. On 7 May 1992, the Council again commended ECOWAS and indicated that the Yamoussoukro IV Accord offered the best possible framework for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Liberia.

On 19 November 1992, the Security Council, by adopting resolution 788 (1992), imposed a general and complete embargo on all deliveries

of weapons and military equipment to Liberia—except for those destined for the sole use of the peace-keeping forces of ECOWAS. The Council also called on the Member States of the United Nations to exert self-restraint in their relations with all parties to the conflict in Liberia, and to refrain from taking any action that would be inimical to the peace process. Further, it requested the Secretary-General to dispatch urgently a special representative to Liberia who would evaluate the situation and make recommendations as soon as possible.

On 20 November 1992, the Secretary-General appointed Trevor Livingston Gordon-Somers, a national of Jamaica, as his Special Representative for Liberia. Following his appointment, the Special Representative visited Liberia as well as Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal and Sierra Leone.

On 12 March 1993, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that the discussions his Special Representative had held with the parties concerned, including the Executive Secretary and member States of ECOWAS, indicated the existence of general consensus that the United Nations should assume a larger role in the search for peace in Liberia. Reaffirming his commitment to a “systematic cooperation between the United Nations and a regional organisation, of the Charter” and stating his intention to continue working with ECOWAS in the peace process, the Secretary-General outlined three areas in which the United Nations could play a role in Liberia: political reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and electoral assistance.

Further, the Secretary-General proposed that ECOWAS convene a meeting at the summit level where the President of the Interim Government and the warring factions in Liberia would conclude and sign an agreement, reaffirming their commitment to promptly implementing the peace process as envisaged in the Yamoussoukro IV Accord.

On 26 March, the Security Council, by resolution 813 (1993), requested the Secretary-General to consider the possibility of convening a meeting of the Liberian parties to reaffirm their commitment to the implementation of the Yamoussoukro IV Accord, and also to discuss with ECOWAS and the parties concerned the contribution which the United Nations could make in support of the Yamoussoukro IV Accord, including the deployment of United Nations observers.

Massacre of Civilians

On the morning of 6 June 1993, nearly 600 Liberians, mainly displaced men, women, children and the elderly, were killed in an

armed attack near Harbel, Liberia. In response, the Security Council strongly condemned the killings and warned that those responsible would be held accountable for the serious violations of international humanitarian law, and requested the Secretary-General to commence immediately an investigation into the massacre.

After a preliminary investigation by his Special Representative, the Secretary-General, on 7 August, appointed a Panel of Inquiry composed of Amos Wako of Kenya as Chairman, and Robert Gersony of the United States and Mahmoud Kassem of Egypt as members, to undertake a more comprehensive investigation. In a report dated 10 September 1993, the Panel concluded that the killings were planned and executed by units of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and that NPFL, to which the act of violence had initially been attributed, had no role in it. The Panel named three AFL soldiers who had participated in the massacre, and recommended that criminal investigations be undertaken with a view to prosecuting them. The Panel added, however, that this finding did not mitigate or diminish the responsibility of NPFL, ULIMO and others alleged to have engaged in similar atrocities against unarmed, innocent civilians throughout the conflict. It further recommended investigations into a number of major atrocities attributed to all parties to the Liberian conflict.

Peace Accord is Reached

On 25 July 1993, after a three-day meeting held in Cotonou, Benin, under the co-chairmanship of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, President Canaan Banana of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and Abass Bundu, Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, the parties to the conflict in Liberia signed the Cotonou Peace Agreement. The Agreement laid out a continuum of action, from the ceasefire through disarmament and demobilisation to the holding of national elections.

On military aspects, the Agreement provided for a ceasefire to take effect on 1 August 1993, and outlined steps for the encampment, disarmament and demobilisation of military units. To ensure against any violation of the ceasefire between 1 August and the arrival of the additional ECOMOG troops as well as the main body of a United Nations observer contingent, the parties agreed to establish a Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee, comprising representatives of the three Liberian sides, ECOMOG and the United Nations. For that period, the United Nations was asked to consider dispatching 30 advance military observers to participate in the work of the Committee.

On the political side, the parties reaffirmed the Yamoussoukro IV Accord. They agreed that there should be a single Liberian National Transitional Government which would have three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. The Agreement also provided for general and presidential elections to take place within seven months from the signing of the Agreement, and set out the modalities for the elections to be supervised by a reconstituted Electoral Commission.

On humanitarian issues, the parties agreed that every effort should be made to deliver humanitarian assistance throughout Liberia using the most direct routes, and under inspection to ensure compliance with the embargo provisions of the Agreement. The United Nations, in particular the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), was requested to facilitate the speedy return of refugees and their reintegration into their communities.

In his 4 August 1993 report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General, while recognising the difficulties ahead, welcomed the Agreement as offering the "hope that the violent and destructive civil war which has afflicted Liberia may at long last be brought to an end." On 10 August, the Security Council, by resolution 856 (1993), authorized the Secretary-General to dispatch an advance team of 30 United Nations military observers to Liberia.

UNOMIL is Established

On 22 September 1993, the Security Council, by resolution 866 (1993), established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) for an initial period of seven months. UNOMIL was to work with ECOMOG in the implementation of the Cotonou Peace Agreement.

Structure of UNOMIL

As in the case of all United Nations peace-keeping operations, UNOMIL is under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General under the authority of the Security Council. It is led in the field by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and is composed of military and civilian components. Command of the military component is entrusted to the Chief Military Observer reporting to the Secretary-General through the Special Representative.

The civilian component includes humanitarian assistance and electoral assistance, as well as the necessary political and administrative staff. The deployment plan calls for the Mission to operate out of its headquarters in Monrovia, as well as four regional headquarters,

co-located with ECOMOG's four sector headquarters, in the eastern, northern and western regions and Greater Monrovia.

Relationship with ECOMOG

UNOMIL and ECOMOG work closely together in facilitating the implementation of the military aspects of the Cotonou Peace Agreement. In accordance with the Agreement, ECOMOG has primary responsibility for ensuring the implementation of the Agreement's provisions, and UNOMIL's role is to monitor the implementation procedures in order to verify their impartial application. While UNOMIL and ECOMOG have separate chains of command, the missions consult formally, through the established committees, as well as informally, on matters affecting them both.

Under Security Council resolution 866 (1993), UNOMIL's mandate includes, in addition to military aspects, assistance in the coordination of humanitarian activities, observation and verification of elections, and reporting on any major violations of humanitarian law. UNOMIL keeps ECOMOG informed, as necessary, of the activities it undertakes in pursuance of these aspects of its mandate.

Citing that the cooperation of ECOMOG was critical to UNOMIL's success, the Secretary-General warned that the failure to deploy additional ECOMOG troops or their premature withdrawal would gravely jeopardize the peace process. "In such an event," he declared, "I shall immediately bring the situation to the attention of the Security Council; depending on the prevalent circumstances, I might be obliged to recommend the withdrawal of UNOMIL." The Secretary-General, in his 9 September 1993 report to the Security Council, announced his intention to conclude with ECOWAS a formal agreement defining the relationship between UNOMIL and ECOMOG. Such an agreement was concluded in, November 1993.

UNOMIL Military Component

The military component of UNOMIL is to monitor and verify compliance with the ceasefire, the embargo on delivery of arms and military equipment, as well as the cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation of combatants.

As a way of providing ECOMOG with sufficient means to ensure the implementation of the Agreement, and with the support of the Security Council, the Secretary-General established a trust fund, under the auspices of the United Nations, that can be utilized to enable African countries to send reinforcements to ECOMOG, to provide

necessary assistance to countries already participating in ECOMOG, and for humanitarian assistance, elections and demobilisation.

UNOMIL Civilian Component

The civilian component is to include political, humanitarian, and electoral personnel. The humanitarian assistance element works closely with UNDP, the United Nations specialized agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in assisting in the coordination of relief activities and facilitating the return of refugees, the resettlement of displaced persons and the reintegration of ex-combatants.

The electoral assistance element will observe and verify the entire election process, from the registration of voters until the voting itself. The work is to be carried out by 13 Professionals, 40 United Nations Volunteers and necessary support staff. The Liberian National Transitional Government, through the Liberian Elections Commission consisting of representatives of the three Liberian parties, is to be responsible for organising and holding elections, which were originally scheduled for February/March 1994. Several potential bottlenecks to the holding of elections were foreseen, including operationalising the Electoral Commission, repatriating refugees, settling internally displaced population, and completing demobilisation. Expressing concern over whether the electoral process could be completed in time, the Secretary-General, in his September 1993 report to the Security Council, called on the Liberian parties to cooperate fully with ECOMOG and UNOMIL, and to work together in a spirit of national reconciliation. "Only under these conditions," he added, "will it be possible to hold the elections on schedule in February/March 1994, and to enable the people of Liberia to begin the arduous task of rebuilding their ravaged country and to look forward to a future of peace, stability and well-being."

Delays in Implementation

In establishing UNOMIL the Security Council stipulated that the mission would continue beyond 16 December 1993 only upon a review by the Council based on a report from the Secretary-General on whether or not substantive progress had been made towards the implementation of the Peace Agreement and other measures at establishing a lasting peace.

The Secretary-General reported to the Council on 13 December 1993. He noted that on 17 August 1993, following consultations between the Liberian parties, the five members of the Council of State had

been selected. The swearing in of the Council, however, did not take place as it was awaiting the beginning of disarmament, the start of which, in accordance with the Cotonou Agreement was dependent on the expansion of ECOMOG and the parties providing necessary information on the number and location of their combatants, weapons and mines.

The Chairman of ECOWAS, President Nicephore Dieudonne Soglo of Benin, arranged for consultations among the parties at a meeting in Cotonou from 3 to 5 November 1993. At this meeting the parties agreed on the distribution between them of 13 of a total of 17 cabinet posts. The distribution of the remaining 4 ministerial portfolios, as well as other issues related to the installation of the Transitional Government would await further talks. The parties also reached agreement on the composition of the Elections Commission, on the Speaker of the Legislature and the members of the Supreme Court.

As to the deployment of UNOMIL, the Secretary General reported that following the adoption of Security Council resolution 856 (1993) on 10 August 1993, the advance party of military observers began arriving in Liberia. The Chief Military Observer arrived in the country on 10 October 1993 and by mid-December there were 166 UNOMIL military observers. UNOMIL was fully deployed by the end of December.

In accordance with the Peace Agreement, a Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee, composed of representatives of the Liberian parties and ECOMOG and chaired by the United Nations, was established. Its function was to monitor, investigate and report all ceasefire violations between the period of its coming into force on 1 August 1993 and the arrival of the additional ECOMOG troops and the full contingent of UNOMIL. In addition to regular patrolling and ceasefire monitoring through the Joint Committee, UNOMIL military observers were conducting reconnaissance missions in cooperation with ECOMOG in many areas of the country in preparation for their deployment to these areas and in preparation for disarmament and demobilisation.

Throughout the negotiations leading to the Cotonou Agreement in July 1993, the expansion of ECOMOG was viewed as a crucial prerequisite for progress towards a lasting peace in Liberia. On 30 September 1993, the United States pledged \$ 19.83 million to the Trust Fund, exclusively to meet the cost of deployment, equipment and maintenance needs of the expanded ECOMOG troops. On the

basis of consultations with potential troop contributing countries and discussions with ECOMOG, and in accordance with the terms of reference of the Trust Fund, a budget estimate covering the requirements of the expanded ECOMOG battalions was developed.

The Secretary-General informed the Security Council that planning and preparation for disarmament and demobilisation which had been undertaken by UNOMIL in consultation with the Liberian parties, ECOMOG, United Nations specialized agencies and non-governmental organisations, was well under way. In accordance with the Peace Agreement, the commencement of actual disarmament was linked to the expansion of ECOMOG which had been delayed. The Secretary-General hoped that the additional ECOMOG troops would soon be deployed to Liberia, thus enabling the disarmament and demobilisation to start immediately.

On the question of general and presidential elections, the Secretary-General reported that the United Nations and the International Foundation for Election System had undertaken a joint mission to Liberia in October 1993 to assess the requirements for holding elections and to evaluate the probability of maintaining the timetable set out in the Peace Agreement. The mission concluded that this timetable, which provided for holding elections in February/March 1994, was optimistic but that elections could possibly be held in May 1994, on the assumption that disarmament and demobilisation, installation of the Transitional Government and unification of the country were achieved "expeditiously."

In concluding his 13 December 1993 report, the Secretary-General noted that from the beginning of the peace process in Liberia, all parties had been aware that the timetable, which called for disarmament to begin within 30 days of signature of the Agreement, concomitant with the establishment of the Transitional Government, was "highly ambitious, especially given the complexities in establishing the joint UNOMIL/ECOMOG peace-keeping mission, including the deployment of additional ECOMOG troops". In spite of delays in the implementation of the Agreement, there were no major violations of the ceasefire and the Liberian parties displayed a willingness to move the peace process forward. The Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council agree that UNOMIL should continue to implement the mandate entrusted to it under resolution 866 (1993). However, he indicated that it was unlikely that the original timetable for elections would be met.

In a letter dated 16 December 1993 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General, the members of the Council took note of the Secretary-General's report and informed him that they shared his expectation that, despite the unavoidable delays, disarmament would begin presently, the Transitional Government would soon be installed and the elections would be held in the first half of 1994. The Council looked forward to the Secretary-General's next report on or before 16 February 1994.

Inter-Agency Appeal

On 16 December 1993, the United Nations launched a Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for \$284 million for emergency humanitarian assistance to Liberia covering a broad spectrum of activities to facilitate Liberia's transition from a war-torn nation to a peaceful and democratic State. United Nations agencies had identified priority needs, amounting to \$96.41 million through the first quarter of 1994. The total appeal for \$284 million was for 13 months, through December 1994.

In the Appeal, WFP had estimated that 65,000 tons of food would be needed to meet emergency requirements through March 1994 at a cost of approximately \$34 million. This covered a beneficiary population of 1.5 million in Liberia. For health and medical care, WHO would require some \$6.4 million. UNICEF had identified priority programmes costing \$17 million. UNHCR had made an appeal for over \$60 million for the voluntary repatriation of some 700,000 Liberian refugees. FAO would need \$8.8 million and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlement would require \$3.5 million.

Difficulties Remain

In December 1993, the Liberian parties resumed their talks on the composition of the Transitional Government. After two weeks of intense negotiations, however, they failed to reach agreement on the disposition of the four remaining ministerial portfolios, i.e. Defence, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Finance. They were also unable to agree on the date for the seating of the Transitional Government and for the beginning of encampment, disarmament and demobilisation of combatants.

UNOMIL attained its total authorized strength in early January 1994 and began deployment of its military observers throughout Liberia. As to the expansion of ECOMOG, the battalions from the United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda arrived in Monrovia on 8 January and 28 January 1994 respectively and started preparations for deployment to the northern and eastern regions of the country.

In a letter dated 18 January 1994, the President of the Security Council expressed the concern of the Council that the Transitional Government had not yet been installed, disarmament had not yet commenced, the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement was thus being delayed and efforts to deliver humanitarian assistance to all parts of the country had met with difficulties. He further noted that the continued support of the international community for the efforts of UNOMIL would depend on the full and prompt implementation by the parties of the Agreement.

The Secretary-General's Special Representative held bilateral consultations with each of the three Liberian parties and relayed to them the message of the Security Council, namely that the Council expected to see tangible progress in the peace process. The parties reiterated their willingness to cooperate in the effective implementation of the Peace Agreement.

Following the arrival of the additional battalions, consultations with ECOMOG and the parties on the date for disarmament intensified. Ten encampment sites were identified, two for the Armed Forces of Liberia, four for NPFL/NPRAG and another four for ULIMO. The parties agreed that the disarmament of their forces would commence simultaneously and was likely to continue over a two-to-three-month period. At the same time, UNOMIL had developed a plan for the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian society, covering the continuum from military disarmament to reintegration into civilian society and involving the coordination of activities to be implemented by United Nations agencies and non-governmental organisations.

In his report to the Security Council on 14 February 1994, the Secretary-General stated that the impasse in the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement had resulted from differing views among the parties on the date for the installation of the Transitional Government and the commencement of disarmament. He believed, however, that the remaining outstanding issues impeding the implementation were not insurmountable. The Secretary-General therefore urged the Liberian parties to make a renewed and determined effort to reach consensus and cooperate in good faith with UNOMIL and ECOMOG. He also urged the international community to contribute the necessary logistical and financial resources to both the existing and expanded ECOMOG troops in order to enable it to meet its obligations under the Cotonou Agreement. In order to enable United Nations agencies and non-governmental organisations to provide humanitarian assistance

to all areas of the country, the Secretary-General called upon the parties to create the necessary conditions to ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all parts of Liberia.

Transnational Government Installed

On 23 February 1994, the Secretary-General reported that the Liberian parties, at a meeting held at Monrovia on 15 February, "reached agreement on most of the outstanding issues which had impeded the commencement of disarmament and the installation of the Transitional Government... It was also agreed that free and fair elections would be held on 7 September 1994".

Although the question of the disposition of the four remaining Cabinet posts was not resolved at that meeting, the parties agreed that disarmament would commence on 7 March 1994 and that installation of the Transitional Government would take place on the same day.

On 25 February 1994, the Security Council, in a statement by its President, welcomed the agreement and urged the parties to demonstrate maximum flexibility and spare no effort to resolve quickly their differences on the disposition of the Cabinet posts. Having expressed concern at the delays in implementing the commitments entered into by the parties under the Cotonou Agreement, the Council said that the support of the international community would not continue in the absence of tangible progress towards full and prompt implementation of the Agreement, in particular, the revised Timetable.

On 8 March 1994, the Permanent Representative of Liberia to the United Nations informed the Secretary-General that the Council of State of the Transitional Government had been installed in Monrovia on 7 March 1994. Three demobilisation centres were opened on the same day. On 11 March, the Transitional Legislative Assembly was inducted into office, with ULIMO being given the responsibility for naming the Speaker of the Assembly. The Supreme Court of Liberia opened for the 1994 term on 14 March.

In his 7 March acceptance speech, the Chairman of the Council of the State confirmed that the holding of elections on 7 September 1994 was a foremost concern of the Transitional Government. The Elections Commission had intensified its organisational work in order to finalize a calendar of activities leading up to the elections and submitted a draft electoral budget to the Council of State for its consideration. It estimated that \$ 13.7 million would be required for the electoral process, of which the Transitional Government would attempt to provide some

\$8.5 million and would seek international support for the remaining \$5.2 million.

Deployment of UNOMIL and ECOMOG

Meanwhile, UNOMIL proceeded with deployment throughout the country. By April 1994, the Mission had deployed its military observers in 27 team sites out of a total of 39 projected sites. Four regional headquarters were established at Monrovia (central region), Tubmanburg (western region), Gbarnga (northern region) and Tapeta (eastern region). The military observers were engaged in the patrolling of border crossings and other entry points, observation and verification of disarmament and demobilisation and the investigation of ceasefire violations.

ECOMOG deployed into the western (Tubmanburg) and northern (Gbarnga) regions. Deployment of both UNOMIL and ECOMOG in Upper Lofa was impeded by insecurity in the area. Likewise, deployment in the south-east was curtailed by the activities of the Liberian Peace Council (LPC), which emerged in the south-eastern part of Liberia after the Cotonou Agreement was signed in July 1993. UNOMIL and ECOMOG were engaged in consultations with ULIMO and with the NPFL and LPC in order to reach agreement on further deployment in the western and south-eastern regions.

Three demobilisation centres, one for each of the warring parties, were opened on 7 March 1994. It was reported that the total number of combatants of all factions was approximately 60,000 soldiers. In the first month of disarmament, more than 2,000 combatants, from all parties, were disarmed and demobilized. Owing to political difficulties, however, disarmament was slower than anticipated. Assuming the full cooperation of the parties, it was estimated that disarmament could be completed in two months.

Following the deployment of UNOMIL and ECOMOG, the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee was replaced by a Violations Committee, chaired by the UNOMIL Chief Military Observer. The Committee is the body through which UNOMIL and ECOMOG address issues of ceasefire violations with the parties.

Extension of Mandate Recommended

In his 18 April 1994 progress report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General noted that the Liberian parties had achieved progress in their search for peace with the installation of the Council of State and the start of disarmament, and the agreement to hold free and fair elections on 7 September 1994.

However, a number of obstacles impeding the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement still existed, including the disposition of the four remaining Cabinet posts, the question of allocation of posts to head the public corporations and autonomous agencies, continued military conflict involving various parties, and the slow pace of the disarmament and demobilisation process. A number of issues in the electoral process must also be addressed, including voter education, the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons and the mobilisation of resources required for the elections.

The Secretary-General urged the parties to make concerted efforts and to cooperate with one another in order to overcome the remaining impediments to the full installation of the Transitional Government. At the same time, taking into account the progress made thus far in the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement, he recommended that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNOMIL for a further period of six months, which would include the elections scheduled for September 1994. Provision must also be made for the liquidation phase of the Mission, which would end by 31 December 1994. The Secretary-General stated, however, that if the disposition of the four remaining ministries was not resolved within two weeks, and if there was no further progress in the peace process within this period, he would request the Council to review the mandate of UNOMIL.

Mandate Extended

The Security Council met to consider the Secretary-General's progress report on 21 April 1994. At the meeting, the representative of Liberia informed the Council that on 19 April 1994 the Ministers of Defence, Finance and Justice had been designated and that the Minister for Foreign Affairs would be appointed soon.

By its resolution 911(1994), the Council extended the mandate of UNOMIL until 22 October 1994, on the understanding that it would review by 18 May 1994 the situation in Liberia and UNOMIL's role there. That review would be based on whether the Transitional Government had been fully installed, and whether there had been substantial progress in implementing the peace process. The Council decided to conduct a further review by 30 June 1994. That review would focus, on the effective operation of the Transitional Government, progress in disarmament and demobilisation, and preparations for the holding of elections on 7 September.

The Security Council called on the Liberian parties to give urgent priority to the complete installation, by 18 May 1994, of the Transitional

Government, especially the seating of the full Cabinet and the Transitional National Assembly, so that a unified civil administration of the country could be established and appropriate arrangements completed for national elections to be held on 7 September.

By other terms of the resolution, the Council urged the parties to cease hostilities immediately and cooperate with ECOMOG to complete the disarmament process. It also encouraged Member States to contribute to the Trust Fund for the Implementation of the Cotonou Agreement or to provide other assistance to facilitate the work of ECOMOG, and to assist in humanitarian, development and electoral assistance. The Council called once again on the Liberian parties to cooperate fully in the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance to all parts of the country in accordance with the Cotonou Peace Agreement.

Continued Fighting

On 18 May, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that the Council of State of the Liberian Transitional Government had been fully installed, and that the Ministers for Justice, Defence and Finance had been confirmed by the Transitional Legislative Assembly on 20 April, with the newly appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs scheduled to be formally inducted on 19 May. At the same time, the Secretary-General noted that a dispute had arisen within the leadership of ULIMO, along ethnic lines, between Chairman Alhaji Kromah (Mandingo) and General Roosevelt Johnson (Krahn) over ULIMO nominees to the Council of State. The dispute had resulted in an outbreak of fighting in the western region among the ULIMO forces. He also pointed to fighting that had erupted in the eastern part of Liberia between NPFL and LPC, and to the efforts of the Transitional Government, UNOMIL and ECOMOG to bring about a ceasefire between the two groups and to bring LPC into the disarmament and demobilisation process.

On 23 May, the Security Council, in a Presidential statement, called upon the parties to resolve their differences within the forum of the Transitional Government and the Cotonou Agreement, to end any hostilities and to accelerate the pace of disarmament. The Council reminded the parties of the importance it attached to the holding of elections on 7 September 1994 and reaffirmed its intention to review the situation in Liberia before 30 June.

Secretary-General Reviews Situation

The Secretary-General submitted his next report to the Security Council on 24 June. He stated that the continuing fighting within and

between the parties constituted one of the most serious obstacles in the way of the peace process. Mediation efforts to resolve the dispute within ULIMO resulted, on 6 May, in a ceasefire and an agreement for further negotiations. However, the negotiations collapsed and serious fighting resumed on 26 May. In the eastern part of Liberia, attacks by LPC against NPFL also continued. All attempts to negotiate the end of hostilities were unsuccessful.

Moreover, the Secretary-General continued, the parties' mistrust for one another had, in the case of some parties, extended to ECOMOG. Soldiers of the Nigerian and Ugandan contingents were abducted and held for varying lengths of time by Mandingo elements of ULIMO and LPC, both of which claiming that ECOMOG had lost its impartiality and became involved in the conflict. NPFL also asserted complicity between some elements of ECOMOG and AFL in supplying material and logistical support to LPC. All these assertions added complexity to ECOMOG's performance of its peace-keeping role.

As a result of mistrust and hostilities between and within some factions, and despite the efforts of ECOMOG and UNOMIL, the parties had refused to engage actively in the disarmament of their combatants or to give up control of territory; three months after the start of demobilisation, a total of only 3,192 combatants had been demobilized (ULIMO, 739; NPFL, 731; AFL, 685). Insecurity in some areas of the country had also impeded full deployment of ECOMOG and UNOMIL throughout Liberia.

As to the humanitarian situation, the Secretary-General reported that of an estimated 1.5 million people in need, approximately 1.1 million were receiving humanitarian assistance. Approximately 400,000 people were inaccessible because of factional fighting. Of the total number of beneficiaries, 800,000 were registered as displaced, of whom 150,000 had been displaced within the last six months. For 1994, 70 per cent of the estimated food needs had been mobilized by the international relief community.

Organized voluntary repatriation of the 700,000 Liberian refugees had also been affected by the slow pace in the peace process. However, UNHCR continued to facilitate the spontaneous repatriation. An average of 1,000 persons were returning every month from Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone.

In concluding the report, the Secretary-General reiterated that the basis for the establishment and maintenance of lasting peace and stability in Liberia was the faithful implementation of the Cotonou

Agreement. He continued to believe that UNOMIL's mandate was relevant to the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement and to assisting the Liberian National Transitional Government and the Liberian people to achieve national reconciliation.

The Secretary-General stated it was imperative that all the Liberian parties extend greater cooperation to ECOMOG and UNOMIL in order to move the peace process forward. It was also essential that the Transitional Government bring all the parties together to agree on specific steps that must be taken to ensure that the elections were held on schedule. Should the parties fail to maintain their commitment to the peace process, the Secretary-General warned, he would have no alternative but to recommend to the Security Council that the involvement of the United Nations in Liberia be reconsidered.

On 13 July, the Security Council, in a Presidential statement, noted with concern that preparations for national elections were hampered by the continued fighting and the consequent virtual halt of the disarmament process. The Council called on the Liberian National Transitional Government, in cooperation with ECOWAS and OAU with the support of UNOMIL, to convene a meeting of the Liberian factions not later than 31 July in order to agree on a realistic plan for resumption of disarmament and to set a target date for its completion. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to report by 2 September on the results of such a disarmament meeting.

Fact-Finding Mission Dispatched

In his 26 August report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated that the Transitional Government had not yet been able to organize the disarmament meeting for which the Council had set a deadline of 31 July. At the same time, he reported that the situation in Liberia had further seriously deteriorated. The Council of State remained ineffective. Fighting continued between the Krahn and Mandingo elements of ULIMO in the west of the country, and between LPC and the NPFL in the south-east. There were also signs of a split within the NPFL hierarchy. All factions were experiencing command and control problems resulting in an increase in banditry and harassment of civilians, including NGOs and unarmed United Nations military observers. Disarmament had virtually ceased and there was no clear prospect as to when elections would or could be held. Population displacement from the counties in the south-east and west continued to grow with every new wave of fighting and with each report of atrocities against civilians. ECOMOG was still not fully

deployed and UNOMIL had withdrawn from the western region because of the security problems. The Secretary-General informed the Council that he had decided to dispatch to Liberia a fact-finding mission which was to review the situation in the country and advise him on the most appropriate course of action. On the basis of the mission's report, the Secretary-General would submit to the Council his recommendations with regard to the future United Nations role in Liberia.

The mission, headed by Lakhdar Brahimi the Secretary-General's Special Envoy, visited the area from 16 to 26 August. The mission's findings and recommendations were conveyed to the Security Council in the Secretary-General's report dated 14 October 1994.

Further Developments

In that report, the Secretary-General also described several significant events that took place after the Special Envoy left Liberia, including the Akosombo Agreement, the Liberian National Conference and the attempted coup against the Transitional Government on 15 September.

Akosombo Agreement

On 7 September, the Chairman of ECOWAS, President Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, convened a meeting of the leaders of the warring factions at Akosombo, Ghana. The meeting was attended by the NPFL, both wings of ULIMO and AFL. LPC and the Lofa Defence Force (LDF)—the second faction which emerged in Liberia after the signing of the Cotonou Agreement—declined to attend the meeting. Representatives of the Liberian National Transitional Government, OAU and the United Nations were present as facilitators. The meeting culminated in the signing, on 12 September, of a supplementary agreement to the Cotonou Agreement.

The Agreement reaffirmed the Cotonou Agreement as the only framework for peace in Liberia and sought to strengthen the role of the Liberian National Transitional Government in governing the country during the transitional period giving it a more central role in the supervision and monitoring of the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement. The Agreement permitted the factions to review the status of their appointees to the Council of State. Also, participation in the Transitional Legislative Assembly would be broadened by adding 13 representatives from the various counties.

In regard to military aspects, the Akosombo Agreement called for an immediate ceasefire and provided more details concerning its

implementation, the disengagement of forces and the responsibilities of the factions with regard to assembly and disarmament of combatants. The Agreement foresaw that if disarmament and demobilisation took place according to the agreed timetable, general elections could be held by October 1995.

The Agreement also further outlined the peace enforcement powers of ECOMOG, and, in doing so, provided a more central role to the Liberian National Transitional Government.

Soon after its signing, however, the Akosombo Agreement became engulfed in controversy and there has been no movement towards its implementation.

Liberian National Conference

The Conference, organized at the initiative of private citizens, convened on 24 August to deliberate on the many aspects of the peace process. After extended sessions, lasting until 3 October, the Conference adopted a set of resolutions concerning the peace process and suspended further consultations for a period of two months, after which it planned to reconvene to assess progress made in disarmament and demobilisation.

The Conference, like the Akosombo Agreement, reaffirmed the Colonou Agreement as the only framework for restoring peace in Liberia and sought to enable the Liberian National Transitional Government to play a more central role in its implementation. The Conference made a number of recommendations regarding disarmament, governance and the electoral process, which converge with the Akosombo Agreement.

The Conference also called for the Transitional Legislative Assembly to be expanded by an additional 13 persons. The most significant point of divergence between the resolutions of the Conference and the Akosombo Agreement is that the Conference called for the retention of the existing members on the Council of State.

With respect to the holding of elections, both the Agreement and the Conference concurred on a similar time-frame, with elections scheduled to take place around October 1995.

Attempted Coup

The attempted coup by a dissident group within AFL came at a time when the Liberian National Transitional Government was seeking to restore the army to its constitutional status. The coup was successfully foiled by ECOMOG's decisive action.

Situation on the Ground

Analysing the situation on the ground, the Secretary-General in his 14 October report to the Security Council stated that the military situation in Liberia remained confused, with groups aligning and realigning themselves depending on their short-term interests and the breakdown of command and control within factions. The situation was reaching the point where warlords, without any particular political agenda but with control of a certain number of soldiers, were seeking territory for the sake of adding to their own claim to power. The results were not large military victories, but deaths mostly of civilians, the decimation of entire villages and the breakdown of any semblance of law and order.

The Secretary-General further reported that the recent factional fighting had resulted in some 200,000 persons being uprooted from their places of temporary or permanent residence. Because of insecurity, international and local relief organisations located in Liberia had not been able to deal with the growing tragedy inside the country; it had been made impossible for the movement of relief supplies, including across the border from Cote d'Ivoire, leaving thousands without access to the assistance. As a result, almost all international humanitarian assistance operations ceased, except at Buchanan and Monrovia.

As to UNOMIL, the continued fighting significantly limited the ability of the Mission to perform its functions. Moreover, on a number of occasions, unarmed United Nations military observers were themselves the target of harassment and violence. On 9 September, NPFL elements detained 43 UNOMIL observers and 6 NGO personnel at nine sites in the northern and eastern regions, confiscating their transport, communications and most other equipment. UNOMIL immediately undertook round-the-clock contacts with faction representatives, NPFL interlocutors, neighbouring countries and ECOMOG in order to secure the release of those detained. By 18 September, all military observers and NGO personnel had been released. Some of them, however, had been mistreated, beaten and terrorized by those who had detained them.

The Secretary-General informed the Security Council that given the breakdown in the ceasefire and the fact that ECOMOG could not provide security for UNOMIL observers, UNOMIL was unable to carry out many of its mandated activities. As a result, all UNOMIL team sites were evacuated except for those in the Monrovia area. It was also decided to reduce, as a temporary measure, the personnel of the Mission

from its authorized strength of 368 (including engineering and medical elements) to approximately 90 observers. This temporary reduction would be matched by a commensurate reduction in the civilian staff of UNOMIL.

As to ECOMOG, the Secretary-General reported that at a summit of ECOWAS, held at Abuja, Nigeria, on 5 and 6 August, Chairman Jerry Rawlings, President of Ghana, said that he would consider withdrawing his Government's contingent of ECOMOG if there was no progress by the end of 1994. Nigeria had reportedly reduced its presence, and Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania indicated they might withdraw theirs. According to the Secretary-General, the frustration of troop-contributors was based upon both the lack of financial resources for the operation, and on the lack of progress in the peace process.

Mandate Extended for Two Months

The Secretary-General concluded his 14 October report by saying that "the political, military and humanitarian developments of the past month have left Liberia in a desperate state." The Liberian National Transitional Government, the factions and the people of Liberia needed to focus on political accommodation to stop the country from sliding deeper into chaos.

The Secretary-General informed the Security Council that, in view of the need to consult with ECOWAS on its intentions for ECOMOG and in order to support the mediation efforts by its Chairman, President Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, he decided to dispatch a high-level mission to consult him about the respective roles and responsibilities of ECOMOG and UNOMIL in Liberia. This review would seek to determine how best the international community could continue to assist Liberia in bringing about a cessation of hostilities. The Secretary-General, therefore, recommended that the Council extend the mandate of UNOMIL for a period of two months to allow the high-level mission time to conduct its work and present its conclusions.

On 21 October, the Security Council by its resolution 950 (1994) extended the mandate of UNOMIL until 13 January 1995. It welcomed the Secretary-General's intention to dispatch a high-level mission to consult with ECOWAS on how the international community could best continue to assist the peace process in Liberia. The Council recognized that circumstances there warranted the Secretary-General's decision to reduce UNOMIL's strength, and stated that any decision

to return it to the authorized level would depend on a real improvement in the situation on the ground, particularly the security situation.

The Council called on all factions in Liberia to cease hostilities immediately, and to agree to a timetable for disengagement of forces, disarmament and demobilisation. It further called on the Liberian National Transitional Government and all Liberians to seek political accommodation and national reconciliation and to work with the Chairman of ECOWAS and the Secretary-General's Special Representative to achieve a durable settlement.

The Council condemned the widespread killings of civilians and other violations of international humanitarian law by the factions in Liberia. It demanded that they strictly respect the status of ECOMOG and UNOMIL, and of other international organisations and relief agencies working there.

Humanitarian Crisis

Between 1993 and August 1994, the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance in Liberia had grown from 1.5 million to an estimated 1.8 million. By September, however, due to increased fighting humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation activities were limited to the areas immediately in and around Monrovia and Buchanan.

The United Nations Resident Coordinator in the country issued a press statement on 12 November 1994 saying that the crisis had affected more than 700,000 innocent civilians in rural Liberia and 1.2 million residents and displaced persons in Monrovia, its environs and the rest of Monserrado country. The Resident Coordinator noted that continued fighting severely restricted most relief activities, and that the plight of those suffering in rural Liberia could not be significantly eased until minimum conditions of security existed that would permit an orderly resumption of emergency food deliveries.

By the end of November 1994, donors had provided approximately 49 per cent of the \$ 168.4 million in prioritized needs requested in the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal, covering the period from November 1993 to December 1994.

Composition of UNOMIL

The authorized strength of UNOMIL is 303 military observers, 20 military medical personnel and 45 military engineers. As at 30 November 1994, they were provided by the following countries:

<i>Country</i>	<i>Troops</i>	<i>Observers</i>
Bangladesh	8	9
China		10
Czech Republic		5
Egypt		6
Guinea Bissau		5
India		6
Jordan		8
Kenya		7
Malaysia		7
Pakistan		8
Uruguay	5	
Total	13	71

Figures may vary from month to month due to rotation. "Troops" include any infantry, logistics, engineering, air, medical, staff, etc.

There is also a provision for 89 civilian international personnel, 58 United Nations Volunteers and 136 local staff.

Financial Aspects

The rough cost to the United Nations of UNOMIL in 1994 was approximately \$36.4 million. The costs of the operation are met by assessed contributions from United Nations Member States. As at 30 November 1994, contributions outstanding to the UNOMIL Special Account for the period from the inception of the operation amounted to approximately \$5.7 million.

With regard to the Trust Fund for the Implementation of the Cotonou Agreement, as at 10 October 1994, voluntary contributions received amounted to \$17.8 million, of which disbursements totalling \$14.5 million had been authorized.

NOTES

1. Gordon-Somers is to be succeeded by Anthony B. Nyakyi, former Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations, in December 1994.
2. ECOWAS membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.
3. Following renewed hostilities, this figure was revised down to \$ 168.4 million, to reflect limits on implementation of rehabilitation activities.

37

Peace-Keeping in West New Guinea (West Irian)

Background

The territory of West New Guinea (West Irian) had been in the possession of the Netherlands since 1828. When the Netherlands formally recognised the sovereign independence of Indonesia in 1949, the status of West Irian remained unresolved. It was agreed in the Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty—concluded between the Netherlands and Indonesia at The Hague, Netherlands, in November 1949—that the issue would be postponed for a year, and that “the *status quo* of the presidency of New Guinea” would be “maintained under the Government of the Netherlands” in the mean time. The ambiguity of the language, however, led the Netherlands to consider itself the sovereign Power in West New Guinea, since this would be a continuation of the “*status quo*”. Indonesia, on the other hand, interpreted the Dutch role there to be strictly administrative, with the implication that West Irian would be incorporated into Indonesia after a year.

The status of the territory was still being disputed when Indonesia brought the matter before the United Nations in 1954. Indonesia claimed that the territory rightfully belonged to it and should be freed from Dutch colonial rule. The Netherlands maintained that the Papuans of West New Guinea were not Indonesians and therefore should be allowed to decide their own future when they were ready to do so. The future of the territory was discussed at the General Assembly’s regular sessions from 1954 to 1957 and at the 1961 session, but no resolutions on it were adopted.

In December 1961, when increasing rancour between the Indonesian and Dutch Governments made the prospect of a negotiated

settlement even more elusive, U Thant, who had been appointed Acting Secretary-General following the death of Dag Hammarskjold, undertook to resolve the dispute through his good offices. Consulting with the Indonesian and Dutch Permanent Representatives to the United Nations, U Thant suggested that informal talks take place between the parties in the presence of former United States Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, who would act as U Thant's representative. The parties agreed, and talks were begun in early 1962.

A sharpening of tension between the two Governments occurred shortly thereafter, however, when Indonesia landed paratroops in West New Guinea. The Netherlands charged that the landings constituted an act of aggression, but Indonesia refuted this on the grounds that "Indonesians who have entered and who in future will continue to enter West Irian are Indonesian nationals who move into Indonesia's own territory now dominated by the Dutch by force". U Thant urged restraint by both parties but declined a Dutch request to send United Nations observers to the scene, noting that such action could only be considered if both Governments made the request.

Further incidents were reported by the Netherlands during the first months of 1962, and there were intermittent lulls in the progress of Ambassador Bunker's talks. A number of communications from the Netherlands and from Indonesia were circulated as documents of the Security Council in connection with this question.

In one such letter, dated 16 May, the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, stating that Indonesia had landed more parachutists on West New Guinea and had continued its aggressive acts, requested that the Acting Secretary-General make an appeal to Indonesia to remind it of its primary obligations under the United Nations Charter and to refrain from all aggressive acts against the territory and people of West New Guinea. He added that the Netherlands' presence in New Guinea was of a temporary nature and that his Government was prepared to give its fullest co-operation to the Secretary-General's efforts to find an honest and just solution for the territory on the basis of Article 73 of the Charter—concerning responsibilities of administering Powers towards non-self-governing territories—and General Assembly resolutions on the question of colonialism.

In a reply dated 22 May, U Thant stated that, while he was concerned about developments in the area and had appealed already to the parties to exercise the utmost restraint, he could not accept the suggestion to approach Indonesia with an appeal which would imply that he was taking sides in the controversy. He did, however, keep a

close eye on the situation, frequently consulting with the representatives of both countries and appealing to them to resume formal negotiations on the basis of Ambassador Bunker's proposals.

The Acting Secretary-General was at last able to announce, on 31 July 1962, that a preliminary agreement had been reached, and that official negotiations were to take place under his auspices. The final negotiations were held at United Nations Headquarters under the chairmanship of U Thant, with Ambassador Bunker continuing to act as mediator. An agreement was signed at New York by Indonesia and the Netherlands on 15 August 1962. Ratification instruments were exchanged between the two countries on 20 September 1962 and, the next day, the General Assembly took note of the agreement in resolution 1752(XVII) of the same date, authorising the Secretary-General to carry out the tasks entrusted to him therein.

The agreement provided for the administration of West New Guinea (West Irian) to be transferred by the Netherlands to a United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA), to be headed by a United Nations Administrator who would be acceptable to both parties and who would be appointed by the Secretary-General. Under the Secretary-General's jurisdiction, UNTEA would have full authority after 1 October 1962 to administer the territory, to maintain law and order, to protect the rights of the inhabitants and to ensure uninterrupted, normal services until 1 May 1963, when the administration of the territory was to be transferred to Indonesia.

The agreement also stipulated that the Secretary-General would provide a United Nations Security Force (UNSF) to assist UNTEA with as many troops as the United Nations Administrator deemed necessary. In "related understandings" to the main agreement, it was established that United Nations personnel would observe the implementation of the ceasefire that was to become effective before UNTEA assumed authority. The United Nations was therefore entrusted with a dual peace-keeping role in addition to its administrative responsibilities as the executive authority.

Arranging a Ceasefire

To pave the way for the arrival in West Irian of UNTEA and UNSF, a ceasefire between Indonesian and Netherlands forces had to be enforced. The memorandum of understanding concerning the ceasefire—presented on 15 August 1962 in a note to the Acting Secretary-General from the representatives of Indonesia and the Netherlands—requested that U Thant undertake immediately some

of the functions outlined in the main agreement, so as to effect a cessation of hostilities as soon as possible. Such action would constitute an "extraordinary measure", because the General Assembly would not be voting on the establishment of UNTEA and UNSF until it convened in late September.

U Thant responded promptly, stating that he was prepared to undertake the responsibilities mentioned in the note. The memorandum on the cessation of hostilities specified that the Secretary-General would assign United Nations personnel to perform certain tasks, including: observing the ceasefire; protecting the security of Dutch and Indonesian forces; restoring the situation in the event of breaches of the ceasefire; assisting in informing Indonesian troops in the jungle of the existence of the ceasefire; and providing a non-military supply line to Indonesian troops.

Although there was no explicit reference to military observers in the memorandum, U Thant selected them to perform these tasks. Furthermore, he agreed to dispatch them without the prior authorisation of the General Assembly or the Security Council, a step never before taken by a Secretary-General. Finally, reference was made in the memorandum to UNSF and its law-and-order maintenance role, with the implication that the Secretary-General should address this responsibility with all possible speed.

U Thant appointed Brigadier-General (later Major-General) Indar Jit Rikhye, his Military Adviser, to head the military observer team that was to supervise all arrangements for the ceasefire. Six Member States (Brazil, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), India, Ireland, Nigeria and Sweden) agreed to provide 21 observers for this purpose. They were drawn from troops of these nations then serving either in the United Nations Emergency Force or the United Nations Operation in the Congo.

The observer force was assembled in West Irian within days of the signing of the agreement at United Nations Headquarters. The observers were informed at that time that the Netherlands military command had proclaimed a ceasefire as of 0001 GMT on 18 August 1962, and had ordered its ground forces to concentrate in the main garrison towns, although air and naval forces continued to patrol the territory. After a visit to Djakarta by General Rikhye, contacts were established with the Indonesian troops in the jungle. In this connection, frequent radio broadcasts on both the Netherlands-owned and Indonesian stations told the troops that hostilities had ceased. Printed pamphlets carrying the ceasefire message were dropped from aeroplanes over the jungle.

Besides supervising the ceasefire, the United Nations observers helped resupply the Indonesian troops with food and medicines and helped them regroup in selected places. The effort was successful owing to the full co-operation of the Indonesian and Netherlands authorities. Aerial support was given by the Thirteenth United States Task Force for the Far East and the Royal Canadian Air Force. Most of the emergency supplies were provided by the Netherlands military command, which also treated any Indonesian troops who were seriously ill. United Nations aircraft landed supplies in four staging areas: Sorong, Fakfak, Kaimana and Merauke.

By 21 September 1962, General Rikhye was able to report that all Indonesian forces in West Irian had been located and concentrated, that resupply had been assured and that over 500 Indonesian political detainees had been repatriated in accordance with the memorandum. The observers' mandate had thus been fulfilled and all actions concerning the cessation of hostilities had been completed without incident.

Establishment of UNSF and UNTEA

With the cessation of hostilities, the next step was to ensure the maintenance of law and order in the territory. In addition to supervising the observer team, General Rikhye had been charged with making preliminary arrangements for the arrival of UNSF.

Article VIII of the Indonesian-Netherlands agreement stipulated the role and purpose of such a force:

The Secretary-General will provide the UNTEA with such security forces as the United Nations Administrator deems necessary; such forces will primarily supplement existing Papuan (West Irianese) police in the task of maintaining law and order. The Papuan Volunteer Corps, which on the arrival of the United Nations Administrator will cease being part of the Netherlands armed forces, and the Indonesian armed forces in the territory, will be under the authority of, and at the disposal of, the Secretary-General for the same purpose. The United Nations Administrator will, to the extent feasible, use the Papuan (West Irianese) police as a United Nations security force to maintain law and order and, at his discretion, use Indonesian armed forces. The Netherlands armed forces will be repatriated as rapidly as possible and while still in the territory will be under the authority of the UNTEA.

UNSF was thus essentially an internal law and security force—the “police arm” of UNTEA—whose responsibilities would range from ensuring the smooth implementation of UNTEA's administrative mandate to supervising the buildup of a viable, local police force.

In the memorandum of understanding on the cessation of hostilities, it was provided that UNSF would commence its duties as soon as possible after the General Assembly adopted an enabling resolution, but no later than 1 October 1962. In fact, the UNSF Commander arrived in West Irian weeks before the Assembly resolution was passed.

Major-General Said Uddin Khan of Pakistan, appointed by U Thant as Commander of UNSF, arrived in Hollandia on 4 September for preliminary discussions with Netherlands authorities and for a survey of future requirements. Similar efforts had already been exerted to some extent by General Rikhye, who had been charged earlier with making preliminary arrangements for the arrival of UNSF. The two men co-operated closely before and after the establishment of UNSF in West Irian.

UNSF Activities Prior to UNTEA

UNSF comprised 1,500 Pakistan troops, made available at the request of the Secretary-General, as were the support units of Canadian and United States aircraft and crews.

By 3 October, an advance party of 340 men of UNSF had arrived in the territory. On 5 October, the balance of the Pakistan contingent took up its positions. Also included in UNSF were some 16 officers and men of the Royal Canadian Air Force, with two aircraft, and a detachment of approximately 60 United States Air Force personnel with an average of three aircraft. These provided troop transport and communications. The Administrator also had under his authority the Papuan Volunteer Corps, the civil police, the Netherlands forces until their repatriation, and Indonesian troops, totalling approximately 1,500.

Establishment of UNTEA

UNSF was created to uphold the authority of UNTEA. Whereas groundwork for the arrival of UNSF troops had been laid in West Irian prior to the General Assembly's recognition of the agreement, it was not until Assembly resolution 1752(XVII) was adopted that personnel associated with UNTEA were dispatched. This resolution, which would make the United Nations directly responsible for the administration of the western half of New Guinea, was approved by a vote of 89 to none, with 14 abstentions.

In the resolution, the Assembly took note of the agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands concerning West New Guinea (West Irian), acknowledged the role conferred by it upon the Secretary-General, and authorized him to carry out the tasks entrusted to him in the agreement.

Upon adoption of the resolution, U Thant noted that for the first time in its history the United Nations would have temporary executive authority established by and under the jurisdiction of the Secretary-General over a vast territory. He dispatched his Deputy Chef de Cabinet, Jose Rolz-Bennett, as his Representative in West New Guinea (West Irian), where he would make preliminary arrangements for the transfer of administration to UNTEA. Rolz-Bennett arrived in the territory on 21 September 1962, the date the enabling resolution was passed.

Transfer of Administration to UNTEA

Under the agreement, neither Dutch nor Indonesian officials were to hold any of the top administrative positions during the seven-month transition period. In addition, three quarters of the Dutch civil servants of lesser rank had decided to leave the territory before 1 October, thereby creating a vacuum that would have to be filled to prevent a disruption of essential functions and services. In some instances, this was accomplished by promoting Papuan officials to the vacant posts. There was, however, a great shortage of adequately trained Papuans.

Rolz-Bennett immediately set about assembling an emergency task force to be deployed in key areas of the administration, recruiting international as well as Dutch and Indonesian personnel. The Netherlands Governor of the territory and his senior officials assisted in this effort; measures were also taken by the Netherlands Government to encourage Dutch officials to remain and serve the Temporary Executive Authority. In addition, the Indonesian Government was requested to provide urgently a group of civil servants to fill certain high-priority posts. This request was made with a view to the gradual phasing-in of Indonesian officials, whose presence thus facilitated the subsequent transfer of administrative responsibilities to Indonesia. In all, 32 nationalities were represented in UNTEA, among them both Dutch and Indonesian personnel.

The transfer of the administration from the Netherlands to UNTEA took place on 1 October 1962 and, in conformity with article VI of the agreement and its related aide-memoire, the United Nations flag was raised and flown side by side with the Netherlands flag.

Before his departure from the territory on 28 September, the Netherlands Governor, Peter Johannis Plateel, appealed to the population to give its support to the United Nations administration. In messages from the Secretary-General and from Rolz-Bennett (who was designated as Temporary Administrator for approximately six

weeks), the population was informed that UNTEA would endeavour to ensure the welfare of the inhabitants. The Temporary Administrator signed an order effective 15 October granting amnesty to all political prisoners sentenced prior to 1 October 1962.

On 1 October, Indonesia and the Netherlands established liaison missions to UNTEA in Hollandia/Kotabaru. An Australian liaison mission replaced one which had formerly served in Hollandia/Kotabaru as an administrative liaison between the authorities of the territory of Papua/New Guinea and West New Guinea, and now provided effective liaison with UNTEA on matters of mutual interest.

The United Nations Administrator, Djalal Abdoh of Iran, was appointed by the Secretary-General on 22 October 1962, under article IV of the agreement. On 15 November, he arrived in the territory to take up his assignment and Rolz-Bennett returned to Headquarters the following day.

Activities After the Creation of UNTEA

The agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia entrusted to UNTEA a number of broad powers: to "administer the territory" (article V); to appoint government officials and members of representative councils (articles IX and XXIII); to legislate for the territory, subject to certain qualifications (article XI); and to guarantee civil liberties and property rights (article XXII).

Once the international team that comprised UNTEA was assembled in the capital of the territory, they immediately began to address the vast economic and social problems facing them.

The very nature of the country presented major difficulties. Roads were practically non-existent, with a total length estimated at 900 kilometres. There was no other means of land transportation, which made air transport of all supplies from ports to the hinterland essential. Coupled with the difficulties of physical movement were problems of communication. Telephone systems existed only inside the major towns. UNSF was, however, able to tackle adequately the problems which faced it.

The transfer of authority implied a need to adapt existing institutions from the Dutch pattern to an Indonesian pattern. The first problem was to rebuild the officer and inspection cadres which had almost completely disappeared with the exodus of Dutch officers, and to reinstate a sense of loyalty and discipline in the rank and file, at the same time keeping the police service serving the public. The

second problem was to reorient the entire service, substituting the Indonesian language and procedures for those of the Dutch so that there would be no upheaval when UNTEA handed over the reins of government to the Republic of Indonesia.

In accordance with the terms of article VII of the Indonesia-Netherlands agreement, the Papuan Volunteer Corps ceased to be part of the Netherlands armed forces upon the transfer of administration to UNTEA. The Corps, consisting of some 350 officers and men, was concentrated at Manokwari and was not assigned any duties in connection with the maintenance of law and order. As Dutch officers and non-commissioned officers left the area, they were replaced by Indonesian officers. This process was completed on 21 January 1963, when the command of the Corps was formally transferred to an Indonesian officer and the last Dutch officers left the territory.

During the period of UNTEA administration, the Papuan police were generally responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the territory. Before the transfer of administration to UNTEA, all the officers of the police corps were Dutch, there being no qualified Papuans. By the time UNTEA had assumed responsibility for the territory, almost all officers of Dutch nationality had left, having been temporarily replaced by officers from the Philippines who, in turn, were later replaced by Indonesians. By the end of March 1963, the entire corps was officered by Indonesians. However, in accordance with the provisions of article IX of the agreement, the chief of police continued to be an international recruit.

On 1 October 1962, when authority was transferred to UNTEA, the Indonesian troops in the territory consisted of those who had been brought in by parachute during the Dutch-Indonesian conflict and those who had infiltrated the territory. Agreement was reached with the Indonesian authorities to replace a large number of these troops with fresh territorial troops from Indonesia. It was also agreed that the number of Indonesian troops in the territory would not exceed the strength of the Pakistan contingent of UNSF, except with the prior consent of the UNTEA administration.

The withdrawal of the Netherlands naval and land forces from the territory was effected in stages in accordance with a timetable agreed upon by the Temporary Administrator, the Commander of UNSF and the Commander-in-Chief of the Netherlands forces in the territory. By 15 November 1962, this process had been completed without incident.

The situation was generally calm throughout the period of UNTEA. On 15 December 1962, however, two incidents involving the police and

a small group of Indonesian troops occurred in Sorong and Doom. One police constable was killed and four wounded. Order was immediately restored by UNSF units while the civil administration continued to perform its normal functions. The area remained quiet for the rest of the temporary administration. In general, the inhabitants of the territory were law-abiding and the task of maintaining peace and security presented no problems. The United Nations Administrator had no occasion to call on the Indonesian armed forces in that connection but only for the purpose of occasional joint patrols with elements of the Pakistan contingent.

With regard to UNTEA's responsibility to uphold the rights of the territory's inhabitants (as outlined in article XXII of the agreement), the Administration ensured the free exercise of those rights by the population, and UNTEA courts acted as their guarantor. One of UNTEA's first concerns was, in fact, the reactivation of the entire judiciary since, with the departure of Netherlands personnel from various judiciary organs, the administration of justice practically came to a standstill. Once UNTEA was established, all the vacant positions in the judicial offices were filled through recruitment of qualified judicial officers from Indonesia.

UNTEA was also responsible for opening and closing the New Guinea Council and for appointing new representatives to the Council, in consultation with the Council's members. On 4 December 1962, the Council members met in the presence of the Administrator and took their new oath of office. The Council's Chairman and all members pledged to support loyally the provisions of the agreement and swore allegiance to UNTEA. As it seemed desirable that members should return to their constituencies in order to explain personally to their constituents the new political situation of the territory, the session was closed on 5 December, after consultation with the Chairman.

During the period of UNTEA's administration, a number of vacancies in the membership of the New Guinea Council occurred because of resignation, departure or absence of members. At the request of the Council's Chairman to fill some of these vacancies, the United Nations Administrator, in conformity with article XXIII, signed appropriate decrees appointing two new members. However, no consultation could take place with representative councils since none existed in the districts from which the two members were appointed.

In addition to the New Guinea Council, there were 11 representative councils, known as regional councils, in the various districts. On 14 February 1963, the Administrator opened the new regional council at

Ransiki, Manokwari, elections to which had been held in December 1962.

The United Nations Administrator also toured the territory extensively in conjunction with article X of the agreement, which required that UNTEA widely publicize and explain the terms of the agreement. He took part in all public functions in order to explain personally those parts of the agreement which related to the United Nations presence in the territory and the changes that would take place on 1 May 1963. These efforts supplemented a United Nations information campaign which, with the help of special features, texts, posters and discussion groups, helped prepare the population for the transfer of administration to Indonesia, and informed them regarding the provisions of the agreement on the question of self-determination.

Articles XVII through XXI addressed the issue of self-determination. The relevant clauses of the agreement required that Indonesia make arrangements, with the assistance and participation of the United Nations Representative and his staff, to give the people of the territory the opportunity to exercise freedom of choice. The inhabitants were to make the decision to "remain with Indonesia" or to "sever their ties with Indonesia", under the auspices of a plebiscite to be held no later than 1969.

Day-to-day problems of the territory were addressed and handled smoothly by the civilian administration under UNTEA. In the sphere of public health, UNTEA had to deal with an epidemic of cholera which had begun to spread on the south-west coast of the island shortly after its administration was established. In this, it received valuable assistance from the World Health Organisation, which provided a health team and the necessary medical supplies. The administration was able not only to contain the epidemic within a short period but also to declare the whole territory free of cholera. The administration also vigorously pursued plans for establishing hospitals and clinics in various parts of the territory.

In the economic sphere, the administration was mainly concerned with maintaining stability and dealing with a serious unemployment problem. Only 32 of a total of 317 Netherlands officials engaged in public works had been willing to stay on after UNTEA's takeover. Contractors stopped work, and gradually maintenance and repair services came to a halt. Over 3,500 men were idle. In a land where only 300,000 people (a third of the population) were in regular contact with the administration and where skilled labour was at a premium, this was a significant figure. With the co-operation of the Indonesian

liaison mission, UNTEA was able to reactivate work on existing projects and draw up plans for similar projects which would be useful for the development of the territory. Forty-five projects were completed by the end of UNTEA, and 32 others were under construction. UNTEA was also able to keep in check the general price level of commodities, most of which had to be imported, and ensure adequate supplies for the population.

All costs incurred by UNTEA during its administration were borne equally by the Netherlands and Indonesia in compliance with article XXIV of the agreement. Consultations between the Secretariat and the representatives of the two Governments regarding the preparation of the UNTEA budget had taken place shortly after the agreement was signed. Later, at Hollandia/Kotabaru, a committee composed of the representatives of the two sides met under the chairmanship of the Deputy Controller of the United Nations and agreed on an UNTEA budget for the period 1 October 1962 to 30 April 1963, which was subsequently approved by the Secretary-General. As the budget committee doubted that UNTEA would be able to collect any revenue, no estimates of income were prepared. The Department of Finance was, however, able to collect a total of 15 million New Guinea florins by the end of the UNTEA period through taxes and customs duties. This was credited to the final budget figure.

On 31 December 1962, the Netherlands flag was replaced by the Indonesian flag, which was raised side by side with the United Nations flag, as contemplated in an aide-memoire attached to the agreement.

In the last months of 1962 and the beginning of 1963, a number of communications from Papuan leaders and various groups in the territory were addressed to the Secretary-General and the United Nations Administrator requesting that the period of UNTEA administration in West Irian be shortened. On 21 November 1962, a joint declaration by the representatives of the New Guinea Council was transmitted to the Secretary-General asking for the early transfer of the administration to Indonesia. A demonstration to the same effect took place on 15 January 1963, when a petition was presented to the Administrator by 18 political leaders from the area of Hollandia/Kotabaru.

These requests were brought to the attention of the Secretary-General in January 1963 by Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro, head of the Indonesian Liaison Mission to UNTEA. After consultation with the representative of the Netherlands, the Secretary-General decided that

any shortening of UNTEA would not be feasible. However, he sent his Chef de Cabinet, C. V. Narasimhan, in February 1963, to consult with the United Nations Administrator and the Government of Indonesia, with a view to facilitating the entry of Indonesian officials into the administration of West Irian in order to ensure the continuity and expansion of all essential services. Following these consultations, the Chef de Cabinet announced in Djakarta that the transfer of administration would take place as scheduled on 1 May 1963, and that the replacement of Netherlands officials by Indonesian officials would be accelerated. By the end of March 1963, Indonesian nationals occupied the second highest post in every administrative department in all six divisions in the territory.

The gathering momentum of the phasing-in operation was accompanied by an encouraging development in a different sphere. The resumption of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands was announced on 13 March 1963. Thus began a new era in the relationship between the two countries, one which notably helped UNTEA's work as the time approached for the transfer of authority.

In April, the Indonesian Government announced that a Papuan member of the New Guinea Council, E. J. Bonay, would be installed on 1 May as the first Governor of Irian Barat (the Indonesian name for West Irian). He would be assisted by an Indonesian deputy, and the territory would be administered as a province of the Republic of Indonesia.

The number of Indonesian officials in the Administration towards the end of April reached 1,564, while Papuans and other indigenous people of West Irian occupied 7,625 civil service posts. Only 11 Netherlands officials remained; they were to leave upon the transfer of authority to Indonesia. Stores of goods were procured to ensure adequate supplies for a period after the transfer. Direct negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia for the purchase of a number of Dutch interests proceeded smoothly. The economy had been largely stabilized, health and education services were in good order, and all the provisions of the agreement leading up to the transfer of administration fully implemented.

During the last days of April, some 30 Indonesian warships arrived in Biak and Hollandia for the ceremony, as had service squadrons of aircraft of the Indonesian air force. The Pakistan units of UNSF began their withdrawal to Biak, ready for embarkation; the various UNSF garrisons were replaced by incoming Indonesian troops.

Transfer of Administration to Indonesia

In accordance with article XII of the agreement, the UNTEA Administrator transferred full administrative control to the representative of the Indonesian Government, Tjondronegoro, on 1 May 1963. The ceremony was performed in the presence of the Chef de Cabinet as the Secretary-General's personal representative for the occasion, and the Indonesian Foreign Minister. At that time, the United Nations flag was taken down.

Secretary-General's Observations

On the completion of UNTEA, the Secretary-General declared that it had been a unique experience, which had once again proved the capacity of the United Nations to undertake a variety of functions, provided that it received adequate support from its Member States. He also announced that, in consultation with Indonesia, he had decided in principle to designate a few United Nations experts, serving at Headquarters and elsewhere, to perform the functions envisaged in article XVII of the agreement, insofar as the article required that the Secretary-General advise, assist and participate in arrangements which were the responsibility of Indonesia for the act of free choice. Those experts would visit West Irian as often as necessary and spend as much time as would enable them to report fully to him, until he appointed a United Nations representative to preside over them as a staff.

Looking to the future, the Secretary-General stated that he was confident that Indonesia would scrupulously observe the terms of the 1962 agreement, and would ensure the exercise by the territory's population of their right to express their wishes as to their future.

In accordance with the Indonesia-Netherlands agreement, the Secretary-General on 1 April 1968 appointed a representative, Fernando Ortiz-Sanz, to advise, assist and participate in arrangements which were the responsibility of Indonesia for the act of free choice, on retaining or severing ties with Indonesia.

In a report submitted to the Secretary-General, the Government of Indonesia stated that between 14 July and 2 August 1969, the enlarged representative councils (consultative assemblies) of West New Guinea (West Irian), which included 1,026 members, were asked to pronounce themselves, on behalf of the people of the territory, as to whether they wished to remain with Indonesia or sever their ties with it. All those councils chose the first alternative without dissent.

The representative of the Secretary-General reported that within "the limitations imposed by the geographical characteristics of the territory and the general political situation in the area, an act of free choice has taken place in West Irian in accordance with Indonesian practice, in which the representatives of the population have expressed their wish to remain with Indonesia".

Those reports were transmitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, which, by resolution 2504(XXIV) of 19 November 1969, acknowledged with appreciation the fulfilment by the Secretary-General and his representatives of the task entrusted to them under the 1962 agreement.

38

United Nations Angola Verification Mission II

LOCATIONS: Angola

HEADQUARTERS: Luanda

DURATIONS: June 1991 to present

CURRENT STRENGTH: 50 military observers, 18 police observers, 11 military paramedics, and some 50 International and 70 local staff

FATALITIES: 4

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
AND CHIEF OF MISSION: Alioune Blondin Beye (Mali)

CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVER: Major-General Chris Abutu Garuba
(Nigeria)

Background

The United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) was originally established by the Security Council on 20 December 1988 at the request of the Governments of Angola and Cuba. Its task was to verify the phased and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola in accordance with the timetable agreed between the two Governments. The withdrawal was completed by 25 May 1991—more than one month before the scheduled date. On 6 June, the Secretary-General reported to the Council that UNAVEM I had carried out, fully and effectively, the mandate entrusted to it.

Meanwhile, on 17 May 1991, the Government of Angola requested the Secretary-General to ensure the participation of the United Nations in verifying the implementation of the Peace Accords for Angola ('Acordos de Paz'), initialled by the Angolan Government and the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) on 1 May

1991, and consequently to prolong UNAVEM's presence in Angola. In accordance with the Accords, the United Nations was to verify the arrangements agreed by the Angolan parties for the monitoring of the ceasefire and for the monitoring of the Angolan police during the ceasefire period. On 30 May, following the Secretary-General's recommendation, the Security Council adopted its resolution 696 (1991), entrusting new mandate to UNAVEM (thereafter UNAVEM II) and establishing the Mission for a period of 17 months, until the general elections were held in Angola in the fall of 1992.

Verification of Ceasefire

The United Nations verification operation began as soon as the Angolan Peace Accords were formally signed on 31 May 1991. Advance parties of observers were deployed to the field on 2 June 1991. Subsequently, UNAVEM II teams of unarmed military observers were deployed at some 46 locations ("assembly areas") where the troops of the two sides were assembled during the ceasefire, as well as at several "critical points" (certain seaports-, airports and border posts).

In essence, their task was to verify that joint monitoring groups, composed in equal numbers of representatives of the Angolan Government and of UNITA and responsible for monitoring on the spot the observance of the ceasefire, carried out their responsibilities. Working closely with these monitoring groups, UNAVEM II verification teams provided support in the investigation and resolution of alleged violations of the ceasefire. They responded to requests for assistance and used their good offices to resolve problems within monitoring groups. In addition, UNAVEM II took the initiative in monitoring some aspects of the Accords, such as the regular counting of troops and weapons in the assembly areas, as well as monitoring of unassembled troops, demobilized troops, and troops selected to join the new Angolan Armed Forces. The neutrality of the Angolan police was to be verified by monitoring teams also composed of members designated by the Government of Angola and by UNITA. Their work was verified by UNAVEM II police observers. The monitoring teams and UNAVEM II observers were to visit police facilities, examine activities of the police and, if necessary, investigate alleged violations of political rights. The Angolan police monitoring teams were established in all 18 Angolan provinces only in June 1992, although UNAVEM II police observers were present in the designated areas by October 1991.

On many occasions the United Nations conveyed to the two sides suggestions to overcome difficulties related to the assembly and the

demobilisation of troops, proper custody of weapons and the monitoring of the police, as well as other matters relating to the peace process. At the request of the two parties, the United Nations launched an emergency food programme to relieve food shortages in the assembly areas.

Enlargement of UNAVEM II's Mandate

The Peace Accords for Angola provided for "free and fair elections for a new Government" under "the supervision of international election observers". On 5 December 1991, the Secretary-General received two letters signed by the Minister for External Relations of Angola. One of the letters contained a request for United Nations technical assistance to help the Angolan Government to prepare for and conduct the forthcoming elections. The other letter contained a formal request to the Secretary-General to send United Nations observers to follow the Angolan electoral process until its completion in the fall of 1992. It was later announced that elections would be held on 29 and 30 September 1992.

An agreement on technical assistance was signed with the Angolan Government in January 1992. As regards United Nations observation of the first-ever elections in Angola, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council on 20 December 1991 that he intended to recommend that the Council authorize such a mission. On 6 February 1992, the Secretary-General informed the Council of his decision to appoint Miss Margaret Joan Anstee, a national of the United Kingdom, as his Special Representative to coordinate the current and projected activities of the United Nations in connection with the Angola Peace Accords, and as the Chief of UNAVEM II. On 3 March, following the Special Representative's visit to Angola, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council his report with recommendations concerning the United Nations role in observing the forthcoming elections. On 24 March, the Security Council, by its resolution-747 (1992), decided to enlarge UNAVEM II's mandate to include election observation in Angola.

Observation of Electoral Process

In March 1992, the office of the Special Representative was established in Luanda, the capital of Angola, to coordinate all United Nations activities related to the Angolan peace process. In addition to its deployed military and police observers and civilian staff, UNAVEM II was enlarged to include an Electoral Division, headed by a Chief Electoral Officer. Offices of the Electoral Division were established in

Luanda, in the six Angolan regions and in the capitals of all 18 provinces. Approximately 100 international staff and the requisite number of local staff were deployed in the regional and provincial electoral offices.

The United Nations role was to observe and verify the elections, not to organize them. The electoral process was organized and directed by the National Electoral Council (NEC), on which all legalized political parties in Angola were represented, and supported by technical assistance provided by experts and consultants from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The electoral process comprised four phases: the registration of voters from 20 May to 10 August; the electoral campaign from 29 August to 28 September; the presidential and legislative elections on 29 and 30 September; and the counting of the votes, investigation of complaints and announcement of the final results by the President of NEC on 17 October.

In his report to the Security Council dated 9 September 1992, the Secretary-General stated that the results of the registration exercise had surpassed expectations, with NEC reporting the registration of 4.86 million eligible voters, representing some 92 per cent of an estimated voting population of 5.3 million.

The electoral campaign was conducted without major violence, although there were reports of intimidation by some political parties, notably UNITA and the Movimento Popular para a Libertacao de Angola (MPLA), as well as difficulties of access to certain areas, particularly those controlled by UNITA. The 18 political parties which had presented candidates campaigned actively. There were complaints, especially from the smaller parties, about the continued existence of the Government and UNITA armies, the slow progress in demobilisation and in forming the new Angolan Armed Forces, and lack of access to the Government-controlled radio and television, whose alleged partiality was criticized.

UNAVEM II electoral observers monitored the campaign, contributed to civic education programmes and provided information on UNAVEM II's role. In addition, UNAVEM II and UNDP organized the air support operation, consisting of 45 helicopters and 15 fixed-wing aircraft, to overcome the logistical difficulties in reaching the more inaccessible polling stations. For the observation and verification of the voting on 29 and 30 September 1992, UNAVEM II deployed 400 electoral observers. Operating largely as two-person mobile teams, the observers covered all 18 provinces and most of the 164 municipalities, and visited about 4,000 of some 6,000 polling stations.

As regards its mandate in military matters, UNAVEM II continued to carry out its verification functions at the assembly areas up to and after the announced disbandment of the two former armies of FAPLA (Government) and FAIA (UNITA) on 27 September 1992. As the elections drew near, demobilisation formally accelerated. By 7 October, a total of 96,620 Government troops had been demobilized, representing 80 per cent of the projected figure. However, a much lower proportion of ex-FALA troops were demobilized.

United Nations police observers continued their verification of police neutrality, with the Angolan joint monitoring groups being almost entirely dependent on UNAVEM II for transport and communications. Little progress was made in developing a representative national police force. Soon after the elections, however, UNITA withdrew its cooperation.

Situation Deteriorate

On 1 October 1992, the Secretary-General's Special Representative issued a statement in which she noted that the great majority of the registered voters had cast their ballots in peaceful and orderly conditions, despite organisational and logistical difficulties.

However, complaints were raised on 3 October and thereafter by UNITA and some other parties of widespread, massive and systematic irregularities and fraud during the elections. The Secretary-General urged the leader of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, not to reject the results of the elections, pending investigation of UNITA's complaints, and emphasized the urgency of a meeting between him and President Jose Eduardo dos Santos. The complaints were investigated by NEC, with the active assistance of UNAVEM II. Investigative commissions were sent to all 18 provinces, but found no conclusive evidence of systematic and massive fraud which would offset the overall results of the elections.

Meanwhile, a major violation of the Peace Accords occurred early in October, when 11 former UNITA generals, including the commander of UNITA's army, withdrew from the new, unified Angolan Armed Forces, in protest at what they called "fraud and cheating" in the elections.

In view of these developments, the Security Council sent to Angola, from 11 to 14 October, an *ad hoc* Commission, composed of the representatives of Cape Verde, Morocco, the Russian Federation and the United States, to support implementation of the Peace Accords. Notwithstanding all diplomatic efforts, the political and military situation in the country continued to deteriorate.

On 17 October 1992, the President of NEC announced the official election results. More than 91 per cent of those registered had voted. MAPLA had won the legislative elections, with 53.74 per cent of the votes, against UNITA's 34.1 per cent. In the presidential elections, President dos Santos had received 49.57 per cent, against Savimbi's 40.07 per cent; since neither had achieved 50 per cent, the Electoral Law required a second round. The Secretary-General's Special Representative issued a statement on 17 October, saying "there was no conclusive evidence of major systematic or widespread fraud, or that the irregularities were of magnitude to have a significant effect on the results officially announced on 17 October". She emphasized that, "with all deficiencies taken into account, the elections held on 29 and 30 September 1992 can be considered to have been generally free and fair".

After the election results were announced, UNITA launched a nationwide operation to occupy municipalities by force and remove the Government's local administrative structures. On 17 October, the Secretary-General conveyed to the Security Council his serious concern at the rising tension. The Council once again called upon both parties to abide by all their commitments under the Peace Accords, in particular the confinement of their troops and collection of weapons, demobilisation and the formation of the unified Angolan Armed Forces. It requested UNITA to respect the results of the elections and urged the leaders of the two parties to engage in immediate dialogue to enable the second round of the presidential elections to be held.

On 30 October, the Security Council, faced with further alarming reports of resumed hostilities in many parts of the country, adopted resolution 785 (1992), extending the existing mandate of UNAVEM II until 30 November 1992, and endorsing the statement by the Secretary-General's Special Representative on the elections having been generally free and fair.

Barely 23 hours later, on 31 October, heavy fighting broke out between the Government and UNITA forces, especially in Luanda. The Secretary-General's efforts, supported by a number of Member States, resulted in a ceasefire which came officially into effect on 2 November. UNAVEM II, which kept its military, police and civilian presence intact at 67 locations throughout the country, worked to maintain the ceasefire, patrolling trouble spots and using its good offices to foster dialogue between the parties.

Diplomatic Efforts

Diplomatic efforts continued after the ceasefire to arrange a meeting between President dos Santos and Savimbi. Immediately after the ceasefire, the Government stipulated four conditions for resuming political dialogue between the two leaders: (a) commitment to uphold the ceasefire, pursue dialogue and renounce violence; (b) commitment to the principles of the Peace Accords; (c) acceptance of the results of the September 1992 legislative elections; and (d) greater United Nations involvement in the peace process and the second round of the presidential elections.

On 5 November 1992, the Secretary-General sent Murrack Goulding, then Under-Secretary General for Peace-keeping Operations, to Angola to assist in implementing the ceasefire, put the peace process back on track and explore the future role of UNAVEM II. After the meetings in Angola, the Secretary-General's envoys concluded that the desire for a larger United Nations involvement constituted the main common ground between the two sides. Also, as a result of a telephone conversation and an exchange of letters with Goulding, Savimbi confirmed, in a letter dated 12 November, that UNITA accepted the results of the legislative elections so as to permit the implementation of the peace process.

Secretary-General Evaluates Situation

On 25 November 1992, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a detailed report on the situation in Angola, and recommended extension of the mandate of UNAVEM II for a further two-month period, until 31 January 1993. In the report, the Secretary-General stated that although it was too soon to analyse the causes of the deteriorating situation in Angola, it was already clear that a "root cause" was the incomplete fulfilment of key provisions in the Peace Accords. Among those failings were the less than effective demobilisation and storage of weapons; the delay in creating the unified Angolan Armed Forces, which only formally came into being two days before the elections; the failure to re-establish effective central administration in many parts of the country; and the delay in setting up a neutral police force. It had also been difficult to create in 16 months, after as many years of civil war, an atmosphere of mutual confidence, tolerance and respect.

Yet, the Secretary-General emphasized, "it is also too soon to despair of the Angolan peace process", noting the renewed commitment to the process by both parties. At the same time, he made it clear that he

could not recommend an enlargement of UNAVEM II's mandate and strength unless both sides could convince him that they would be genuine in their adherence to, and fulfilment of, the Peace Accords, especially the key provisions relating to the dissolution of the existing armies and the creation of unified and non-partisan military and police forces.

On 30 November, the Security Council, by its resolution 793 (1992), extended UNAVEM II's mandate until 31 January 1993. The Council demanded, *inter alia*, that the Government of Angola and UNITA scrupulously observe the ceasefire, stop military confrontations and all offensive troop movements and create the conditions for completing the peace process in Angola. It appealed to the two parties to engage in a dialogue aimed at national reconciliation and at the participation of all parties in the democratic process, and to agree on a clear timetable for the fulfilment of their commitments under the Peace Accords.

Meanwhile, the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative resulted in a meeting under UNAVEM II auspices on 26 November 1992 in the southern provincial capital of Namibe between senior delegations from the two sides, where they pledged themselves to full acceptance of the validity of the Peace Accords, to an effective ceasefire throughout the country and the immediate cessation of all offensive movements, and to the need for a larger United Nations involvement. However, almost immediately, this progress was followed by a set-back when, on 29 November, UNITA forces took the northern provincial capital of Uige and an important airbase nearby, Negage. Attempts to restore dialogue between the two sides, including the Secretary-General's personal invitation to President dos Santos and Savimbi to meet with him at an agreed location, failed.

Three Options for UNAVEM II

On 8 January 1993, the Secretary-General reported that the situation in Angola had severely deteriorated since the beginning of the year. There were outbreaks of heavy fighting in at least 10 provincial capitals and other population centres, with each side blaming the other for initiating those hostilities. In his further report submitted to the Council on 21 January, the Secretary General stated that "to all intents and purposes, Angola has returned to civil war, and is probably in an even worse situation than that which prevailed before the Peace Accords were signed in May 1991". The conflict engulfed towns and population centres in a way unprecedented during the previous 16 years, and there were "disturbing but unconfirmed reports" that new supplies of arms might be entering the country.

In addition, the Secretary-General stated, the widespread fighting and the absence of government administration in much of the countryside had led to widespread hunger and the flight of large numbers of people from the towns involved in the conflict. "An already serious humanitarian situation has become catastrophic in many areas", he pointed out, and the capacity of international humanitarian agencies to provide assistance had been severely disrupted.

According to the report, the crisis arising after the September 1992 elections thrust UNAVEM II into a central mediating role. However, with the outbreak of violent and widespread hostilities, and the total collapse of the joint monitoring mechanisms, 'UNAVEM II's original mandate has become less and less relevant'. Even its mediating role had been increasingly limited by the deteriorating security situation. At the same time, UNAVEM II teams in the field faced mounting dangers, which became so extensive that 45 of UNAVEM's 67 locations had to be evacuated.

The Secretary-General outlined three options for the future of UNAVEM II. The first option was to maintain the mission at its existing strength; the second was to reduce UNAVEM II's provincial deployment to approximately six locations. The Secretary-General's preferred option was to confine UNAVEM II's deployment to the capital, Luanda, and to one or two outstations but with the capability to deploy to six provincial sites if needed, to support his Special Representative's peacemaking efforts. At the same time, the Council stressed its readiness to expand substantially the United Nations presence in Angola in the event of significant progress in the peace process.

On 29 January, the Security Council, by its resolution 804 (1993), extended the mandate of UNAVEM II for a period of three months, until 30 April 1993. It did so with the proviso that, as a provisional measure based on security considerations, the Secretary-General could concentrate UNAVEM II's deployment in Luanda and, at his discretion, in other provincial locations, with the levels of personnel and equipment he deemed appropriate to allow for the subsequent expeditious redeployment of UNAVEM II as soon as this became feasible. By other provisions of the resolution, the Council demanded, *inter alia*, that the two parties establish a ceasefire immediately, restore continued and meaningful dialogue and agree on a clear timetable for the full implementation of the Peace Accords. Subsequently, the Secretary-General decided to temporarily decrease the strength of the Mission.

Further Efforts to Restore Peace

In January 1993, fighting intensified throughout the Angolan national territory between the Angolan Government and UNITA forces,

particularly in the central provincial capital of Huambo. After repeated efforts by the Secretary-General's Special Representative to arrange a dialogue between the two sides, the Government and UNITA agreed to hold talks in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to discuss the fulfilment of various prerequisites for the effective re-launching of the peace process in Angola.

During the first round of the Addis Ababa talks, which were held from 27 to 30 January 1993 under United Nations auspices and the chairmanship of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, the Government of Angola and UNITA reached agreement on a number of questions, but some key issues remained to be resolved before a ceasefire could be arranged. The parties accordingly agreed to meet again in Addis Ababa on 10 February, in order to resolve the outstanding questions. Later, at the request of UNITA, which indicated that its delegation was encountering logistical difficulties, and with the agreement of both sides, the date for the second meeting was postponed to 26 February 1993. Subsequently, the meeting in Addis Ababa had to be cancelled, due to the failure of UNITA to send its delegation there.

In the light of the steadily worsening situation and the collapse of the Addis Ababa negotiations, the Secretary-General asked his Special Representative to come to New York from 9 to 12 March 1993 for consultations. In her briefing to the Security Council, Miss Anstee outlined several options for UNAVEM II. Following informal consultations, the Security Council, by resolution 811 (1993) of 12 March, demanded an immediate ceasefire throughout the country. The Council also, *inter alia*, called on the two parties, particularly UNITA, to produce early evidence that real progress had been made towards implementing the Peace Accords, and invited the Secretary-General to seek to organize a meeting between the Government and UNITA at the highest possible level before 30 April 1993.

Consequently, the Secretary-General instructed Miss Anstee to consult with the Government and with UNITA on a date and venue for the resumption of direct talks under the auspices of the United Nations. As a result of these consultations, agreement was reached to meet in Abidjan on 12 April 1993 at the invitation of the Government of Cote d'Ivoire.

The Abidjan meeting began as scheduled, under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, and lasted six weeks. Regrettably, while very nearly reaching success, it ended, on 21 May 1993, without full agreement on the text of what became known as the Protocol of Abidjan.

In his 25 May 1993 report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General described the breakdown of the Abidjan talks as "a major and tragic setback to the peace process". Having stated that it would be unthinkable for the United Nations to abandon Angola at this critical juncture, he recommended a further interim extension of UNAVEM II, on a reduced basis, and in a manner which would respond to the evolution of the military and political situation. Such a mission would provide good offices and mediation, with the goal of restoring a ceasefire and reinstating the peace process along the lines of the Peace Accords. At the same time, the Secretary-General stressed that with the humanitarian situation deteriorating daily, it would also be important during this interim period to devote increasing resources to coordination of Humanitarian relief activities throughout Angola. To this end, a United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit, headed by a senior official with extensive operational experience, was set up in Luanda in late April 1993, under the overall authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

On 27 May 1993, the Secretary-General announced that he had agreed to accede to Ms. Anstee's wish to be released from her responsibilities. Subsequently, he appointed Alioune Blondin Beye, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mali, as his Special Representative for Angola, effective 28 June.

On 1 June, the Security Council, by its resolution 834 (1993), decided to extend UNAVEM II's mandate for a period of forty-five days until 15 July 1993 and stressed the importance of the functions of good offices and mediation by UNAVEM II and the Special Representative. The Council also welcomed the steps taken by the Secretary-General to strengthen United Nations humanitarian activities in Angola.

On 15 July 1993, the mandate of UNAVEM II was further extended by Security Council resolution 851 (1993) for a period of two months until 15 September. In recommending the extension, the Secretary-General noted that UNAVEM II had become an essential factor in a continuous United Nations effort to facilitate the resumption of negotiations, to support humanitarian activities in the country, as well as an indispensable channel for communication between the parties. By the same resolution, the Council reiterated its demand that UNITA accept unreservedly the results of the elections and abide fully by the Peace Accords.

Situation of UNAVEM II

UNAVEM II continued to be deployed at five locations (Luanda, Lubango, Namibe, Benguela and Sumbe), with its military and police

observers patrolling the areas, maintaining liaison with the respective local authorities, rendering support to humanitarian assistance operations, conducting investigations and other activities. On 15 September 1993, the Security Council, by resolution 864 (1993), further extended the existing mandate of UNAVEM II for a period of three months. It reiterated its readiness to consider expanding substantially the United Nations presence in Angola in the event of significant progress in the peace process.

Sanctions Against UNITA Imposed

By the same resolution, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, decided that all States should prevent the sale or supply of weapons, ammunition and military equipment as well as petroleum products to Angola other than through points of entry named by the Government of Angola. The embargo was to enter into force in 10 days unless a ceasefire was established. The Council also expressed its readiness to consider the imposition of further measures, including trade measures against UNITA and restrictions on the travel of UNITA personnel, unless by 1 November 1993 the Secretary-General reported that an effective ceasefire had been established and that agreement had been reached on the full implementation of the Peace Accords and relevant resolutions of the Security Council. It also decided to establish a committee to monitor the sanctions. The oil and arms embargo came into force at midnight on 25-26 September 1993.

In the meantime, the United Nations continued its efforts to facilitate the resumption of the peace process in consultation with the Angolan parties and interested countries, including, in particular, the observer States to the Peace Accords—Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States. Following extensive consultations, the Government of Angola and UNITA began exploratory talks in Lusaka, Zambia, on 25 October 1993 under the auspices of the United Nations. These talks were made possible by positive steps taken by both sides, including UNITA's proclamation of a unilateral ceasefire, its acceptance of the general legal framework of the Peace Accords and its agreement to withdraw from the localities it had occupied following the resumption of the hostilities.

As requested by Security Council resolution 864 (1993), the Secretary-General reported back on 27 October. He stated that not enough progress had been made towards implementing the Peace Accords and relevant Council resolutions, and therefore recommended that the Council impose additional measures against UNITA. However,

the Secretary-General said the Council should postpone such action until 1 December in view of the fact that the Angolan Government and UNITA were holding talks.

The Secretary-General recommended that UNAVEM II's authorized strength be increased from 50 to 175 military observers, from 18 to 60 police monitors, and from 11 to 14 military paramedics. Additional international and local staff would also be needed. These personnel would be deployed in the event of a breakthrough and would enhance the mission's ability to verify major developments on the ground and to provide good offices. He appealed to the Government of Angola and UNITA to make full use of the opportunity and to consolidate the progress made up to that point in the search for a solution to the conflict in Angola. He also appealed to the international community for further generous support to meet the growing humanitarian needs, noting that stocks of relief supplies were inadequate.

In his statement of 1 November 1993, the President of the Security Council affirmed, on behalf of the Council, complete support for the Secretary-General and his Special Representative in their efforts aimed at the earliest resolution of the Angolan crisis and encouraged the Secretary-General to carry out urgent contingency planning for the possible augmentation of the strength of the Mission. The Council expressed its readiness to impose further sanctions against UNITA at any time it observed that UNITA was not cooperating in good faith to implement the ceasefire, the Peace Accords and relevant Council resolutions. The Security Council, however, did not take any action on the Secretary-General's recommendation to increase the strength of the Mission.

Peace Talks Begin

The exploratory talks, held from 25 to 31 October 1993 in Lusaka, resulted in the acceptance by UNITA of the validity of the 1991 Peace Accords and the validity of the results of the legislative and presidential elections of 29 and 30 September 1992. UNITA also agreed to withdraw its troops from the localities occupied since the resumption of the hostilities and to return its troops to United Nations-monitored areas as a transitional measure pending full implementation of the Peace Accords.

Following the exploratory talks, the Secretary-General's Special Representative, in consultation with the representatives of the three observer States, set the date and venue for the talks. Accordingly, the Angolan peace talks began at Lusaka on 15 November 1993. By 11

December 1993, agreement was reached on the general and specific principles as well as on the modalities relating to all military issues on the agenda: the re-establishment of the ceasefire; the withdrawal, quartering and demilitarisation of all UNITA military forces; the disarming of all civilians; and the completion of the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces.

On 14 December 1993, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council in which, in view of the encouraging results achieved at Lusaka under United Nations auspices, he recommended the further postponement of action to impose additional measures against UNITA. He also recommended that the mandate of UNAVEM II be extended for three months.

The Security Council, by its resolution 890 (1993) of 15 December, agreed with the Secretary-General's recommendations and called upon both parties to honour the commitments already made by them at the talks in Lusaka. It urged them to exercise the maximum restraint and to stop immediately all military actions, and to agree on the modalities for the establishment of an effective and sustainable ceasefire and to conclude a peaceful settlement as soon as possible.

Political Process Continues

Following the 11 December 1993 agreement on the military issues, the discussions moved to the political issues, including the questions of the Police and national reconciliation. By 31 January 1994, after protracted negotiations, the parties reached an agreement on the general and specific principles and on the modalities relating to the police. On 17 February 1994, following several rounds of proximity talks, an agreement was also reached on a document containing a revised text of the general principles concerning the question of national reconciliation.

The Lusaka peace talks then focused on efforts to find ways to bridge the gap between the positions of the parties on the specific principles relating to the question of national reconciliation, which included the allocation of high-level government posts to UNITA.

It was expected that once agreement was reached on that issue, the remaining items on the agenda would be discussed. Those included the future mandate of the United Nations and the role of the observer States, the conclusion of the electoral process and the re-establishment of a national administration throughout the country. However, this proved to be difficult to resolve quickly.

Fighting Persists

The military situation in Angola remained volatile. Fighting in many provinces of the country continued and intermittently intensified; several major cities remained under siege by one or the other side resulting in increased hardship for the civilian population and aggravating the already disastrous humanitarian situation.

In the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 10 February 1994, the Council deplored the great loss of life and destruction of property caused by the outbreak of fighting at several locations throughout Angola and stressed that the only way to achieve an effective, verifiable and sustainable ceasefire was for the Government and UNITA to conclude and sign a comprehensive peace agreement. It called upon the parties to honour their commitments, to exercise maximum restraint, to put an immediate halt to all offensive military actions and to commit themselves to the urgent conclusion of the Lusaka talks.

UNAVEM II Mandate Further Extended

In a report submitted to the Security Council on 9 March 1994, the Secretary-General reviewed the negotiating process and the military and humanitarian situation in Angola. He again recommended that the Council extend UNAVEM II at its existing strength for an additional three months. The Secretary-General also recommended that the Council "authorize in principle" an increase in the operation's existing strength to its previous level of 350 military observers, 126 police observers and 14 military medical staff, with an appropriate number of international and local civilian staff. The additional personnel would be deployed when an overall settlement had been agreed or when the Secretary-General advised the Council that the successful conclusion of the Lusaka talks was imminent. In this connection, the Secretary-General stated that following such an agreement, it would be important for the United Nations to be able to deploy immediately military and police observers, at best in the most sensitive regions of the country. Failure to do so could jeopardize a settlement in its initial and most critical stages.

The Secretary-General also recommended that the Council continue adhering to the provisions of paragraph 14 of its resolution 890 (1993), in which it decided not to impose at present the additional measures against UNITA.

On 16 March 1994, the Security Council adopted its resolution 903 (1994), by which it decided to extend the mandate of UNAVEM II

until 31 May 1994 and not to impose, at that time, additional measures against UNITA. The Council also declared its readiness, in principle, to consider promptly authorising an increase in the strength of UNAVEM II to its previous level, following a report from the Secretary-General that the parties had reached an agreement. It invited the Secretary-General to proceed with contingency planning in that regard.

Demanding the end to all offensive military actions, the Council called upon both parties to honour commitments already made; and urged them to redouble their efforts to complete the remaining points on the agenda of the Lusaka talks, attain a sustainable ceasefire and conclude a peaceful settlement without "procrastination".

In addition, it called for full cooperation of all the parties to guarantee the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance and strongly appealed to the international community to respond generously to the 1994 revised inter-agency appeal for Angola.

Peace Talks Stalled

Efforts continued at all levels to make further progress at the Lusaka peace talks. The discussions focused after February 1994 on the specific principles and the modalities pertaining to the question of national reconciliation. Following consultations on proposals presented by the Secretary-General's Special Representative, the Government and UNITA agreed on 12 of the 18 specific principles. However, one of the six remaining principles—the question of UNITA's participation in the management of State affairs, including the crucial issue of the allocation of senior government post to UNITA—caused the talks to stall.

On 31 March 1994, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on the deadlock in the negotiating process. He was convinced that the remaining issues relating to national reconciliation could be resolved if approached with realism and the necessary political will. The Secretary-General urged the parties to the conflict to make every possible effort to show the flexibility needed to reach a comprehensive settlement.

The Secretary-General reiterated that it would be necessary to strengthen UNAVEM II as soon as a comprehensive peace agreement had been reached. He stressed that UNAVEM II would need adequate and timely financial resources in order to consolidate the agreement at its initial and most critical stage.

On 14 April 1994, the Security Council, in a letter from its President to the Secretary-General, expressed concern at continuing outbreaks

of hostilities in Angola and reaffirmed the importance its members attached to the "prompt and successful" conclusion of the Lusaka peace talks. The Council also reaffirmed its readiness, depending on the progress achieved towards the full implementation of the Peace Accords and relevant resolutions of the Security Council, to consider further action in accordance with its previous resolutions.

Continued Fighting

Reporting to the Council on 24 May 1994, the Secretary-General noted that agreement on the completion of the electoral process was reached between UNITA and the Government of Angola on 5 May 1994, while his Special Representative and the three observer States submitted to both parties new proposals aimed at breaking the impasse concerning the six remaining specific principles which had not yet been agreed upon.

While the intensity and scale of military activities decreased as of the second week of April, small-scale operations and guerilla-type activities, especially by UNITA, continued. On 19 April, Malange airport and the city itself were shelled while a World Food Programme (WFP) aircraft was unloading cargo, the Secretary-General noted, and humanitarian flights to the city were temporarily suspended. During May, the military situation remained tense throughout the country, as both the Government and UNITA continued to conduct military operations in several provinces. As a result of the continuing hostilities, emergency relief flights to some locations had been disrupted. UNAVEM II remained at its reduced strength, but while negotiations in Lusaka continued, the Secretariat and UNAVEM II had stepped up their contingency planning in anticipation of a comprehensive settlement.

The Secretary-General also urged Member States to confirm their contributions in response to the revised humanitarian assistance appeal, and accelerate the actual transfer of funds. United Nations organisations and non-governmental organisations continued to implement the emergency humanitarian assistance programme which was aimed at providing relief to all accessible locations. However, the humanitarian needs of recently accessed areas had to be urgently met, as the populations in those locations were on the verge of starvation. It was very likely that similar conditions would be found in other inaccessible areas.

Work had commenced on the development of a humanitarian programme for future needs which would have to be addressed once

a comprehensive peace settlement was reached. The Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs visited Angola from 15 to 18 April, reviewed the ongoing humanitarian operations there and discussed the expected increase in humanitarian needs in the event a peace agreement was concluded.

In its resolution 922 (1994) of 31 May 1994, the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of UNAVEM II until 30 June 1994, and stressed that its future decision concerning Angola would take into account the extent to which the parties demonstrated their political will to achieve a lasting peace. It encouraged both parties to finalize outstanding details in the peace process without further procrastination.

The Security Council also decided not to impose additional measures against UNITA with regard to its resolution 864 (1994) in view of the direct negotiations taking place, but reiterated its readiness to consider further steps should the Secretary-General recommend additional measures or the review of those in effect.

Progress in Lusaka Talks

On 20 June 1994, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that the Lusaka peace talks had recorded some positive developments, with agreement reached on all but one of the specific principles pertaining to the question of national reconciliation. The major problem remained UNITA's insistence on the post of Governor of Huambo. The Secretary-General suggested that the Council might wish not to impose further measures against UNITA if it gave an unequivocally positive response to the proposals put forward by and the observer States on its participation in the management of State affairs; but if UNITA persisted in its refusal to accept in their entirety the proposals which the Government of Angola had already accepted, the Council could consider their implementation.

The military situation continued to be a cause for serious concern, the Secretary-General added. Fighting had escalated in Angola since his previous report, and this had caused further loss of life and damage to infrastructures, and had hindered the delivery of humanitarian aid to many parts of the country. Both the Government and UNITA appeared to be determined to achieve their military objectives. The Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council, in addition to urging an immediate suspension of hostilities, press the Government and UNITA to grant immediately security clearances and guarantees for relief deliveries to all locations.

In its resolution 932 (1994) of 30 June 1994, the Security Council extended the mandate of UNAVEM II until 30 September 1994. The Council also declared its readiness to impose additional measures against UNITA if by 31 July 1994 UNITA had not formally accepted the complete set of proposals on national reconciliation put forward by the Special Representative and the three observer States. It strongly deplored the intensification of offensive military actions throughout Angola, condemned acts that imperiled humanitarian relief efforts and urged both parties to grant immediate security clearances and guarantees for relief deliveries to all locations.

National Reconciliation Plan

The international community continued to press the Angolan parties to show realism and the necessary political will to conclude a comprehensive agreement which would bring about a just and lasting peace to Angola.

Despite intensive diplomatic efforts, including those by the Secretary-General's Special Representative, the three observer States and a number of African leaders, only limited progress was achieved at the peace talks in June and July. Although agreements were reached on all the specific principles pertaining to national reconciliation, the modalities for the implementation of those principles, particularly the question of UNITA's participation in the management of the affairs of state, could not be agreed.

In the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 12 August 1994, Council members expressed their impatience over the protracted nature of the negotiations and warned that the peace process could not be delayed indefinitely. The Council strongly urged UNITA to demonstrate its commitment to peace and to accept the complete set of proposals put forward by the Secretary-General's Special Representative and the representatives of the three observer States.

In the meantime, discussions on the modalities of national reconciliation were actively pursued in Lusaka and finally significant progress was achieved. On 5 September, the Special Representative obtained a letter from UNITA that conveyed its formal acceptance of the complete set of proposals on national reconciliation. Thus, the plan was accepted by both the Government and UNITA.

In view of those developments, members of the Security Council decided, in a presidential statement made on 9 September 1994, to postpone consideration of the imposition of additional measures against UNITA as set forth in resolution 864 (1993). The Council considered

that the way was clear for an early conclusion of the negotiations in Lusaka towards a comprehensive agreement within the framework of the Peace Accords ("Acordos de Paz") and relevant Council resolutions.

Despite the above-mentioned progress in the peace talks, the military situation in Angola was marked by an increase in hostilities. Heavy fighting continued in Cabinda, Lunda Norte and Kwanza Sul provinces and, by the end of August, the military situation in the provinces of Huambo, Bie, Kwando Kubango and Bengo had also deteriorated. In other parts of the country, the situation remained tense.

31 October Deadline Set

In his 17 September report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General noted that the recent developments in the peace talks in Lusaka were encouraging, and gave rise to optimism that a comprehensive settlement to the tragic situation in Angola could be in sight. He said, however, that additional efforts and true statesmanship would be required from the leaders of both parties to solve several crucial and very sensitive issues. The Secretary-General recommended that the mandate of UNAVEM II be extended for a further short period, until 30 November 1994, to allow time for the talks to conclude, for follow-up meetings between the military representatives of the Government and UNITA, for the signing of the Lusaka protocols and for preparations for the expansion of UNAVEM.

The Security Council, by its resolution 945 (1994) of 29 September 1994, decided to extend UNAVEM II's mandate until 31 October 1994. The Council, *inter alia*, urged the parties to complete their negotiations as soon as possible and to make every necessary effort to have the Lusaka Agreement formally signed before 31 October 1994, and declared that any further "obstruction or procrastination" in the peace process would be unacceptable.

Authorised Strength Restored

On 20 October, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council his further report on the situation in Angola. The report also reflected the relevant findings of a special mission which the Secretary-General had sent to Angola in early September to assess the state of the United Nations efforts in the areas of peacemaking, peace-keeping and humanitarian activities. The mission was headed by former Under-Secretary-General James O.C. Jonah.

The Secretary-General reported that the peace talks were in their final phase. The parties were considering the last item on their agenda, namely, the future mandate of the United Nations and the role of the observer States, including the new mechanism for implementing the Peace Accords and the forthcoming Lusaka Protocol. Most of the sections of this agenda item were approved. In addition, some outstanding issues relating to the question of national reconciliation were discussed and agreed upon.

The Secretary-General strongly urged the Angolan parties to make every effort to conclude the peace talks by 31 October and to ensure that the subsequent military talks produced the earliest possible agreement on the important military questions that remained to be decided. In the expectation that an agreement would be concluded by 31 October, he recommended that the existing mandate of UNAVEM II be extended until 31 November 1994. He also suggested that the Council might wish to consider authorising the restoration of UNAVEM II's strength to its previous level so as to enable the Mission to consolidate implementation of the peace agreement in its initial and most critical stage.

In the meantime, the Secretary-General reiterated his appeal to both the Government and UNITA to exercise the utmost restraint and to desist from all military operations which could undermine the progress achieved in Lusaka.

On 27 October, the Security Council, by its resolution 952 (1994), urged the parties to conclude immediately an agreement and thereafter to establish and respect fully an effective and sustainable ceasefire. The Council renewed the mandate of UNAVEM II until 8 December 1994, and authorized the restoration of the Mission's strength to its previous level of 350 military and 126 police observers, following a report by the Secretary-General that a peace agreement had been initialled and an effective ceasefire was in place. It also reaffirmed its readiness to consider promptly, once the Lusaka peace agreement had been formally signed, any recommendation from the Secretary-General for an expanded United Nations presence in Angola.

Peace Agreement Initiated

After further intensive negotiations in Lusaka, the heads of the Government and UNITA delegations initialled a comprehensive peace agreement on 31 October.

The Secretary-General, in a statement issued on the same day, commended both sides and stated that the talks between high-ranking

military representatives which were to begin shortly must be brought quickly to a successful conclusion so that there was no delay in the formal signing of the Lusaka Protocol by mid-November.

He expressed hope that the necessary momentum had been created for the immediate establishment of an effective ceasefire and appealed to the Government of Angola and UNITA to take this decision without delay.

Despite the initialling of the agreement, however, the heavy fighting continued throughout Angola, with major offensives launched by Government armed forces in several important areas. As a result, they were able to retake many strategically important areas of the country, including all provincial capitals, some of which had been occupied by UNITA for many months.

On 4 November, the Security Council issued a statement in which it, while welcoming the initialling of the peace agreement, expressed grave concern over an intensification of military operations in Angola, in particular those towards Huambo, which put the lives of Angolan citizens at risk and jeopardized the successful completion of the peace process. The Council stressed once again that any obstruction to the peace process would be unacceptable, and urged the Government of Angola to exercise its authority to bring an immediate end to the military activities. It called upon the parties to honour their commitments, to exercise maximum restraint and responsibility, and to refrain from any action that could jeopardize the signing of the Protocol on 15 November 1994.

Lusaka Protocol Signed

However, because of the continued fighting, the talks between high-ranking military representatives were delayed and the Lusaka Protocol could not be signed as envisaged, on 15 November. On 16 November, after a meeting with the Special Representative and the three observer States in Lusaka, the Government of Angola and UNITA slated that they would sign the peace agreement on 20 November 1994. They also agreed to establish a truce as of 16 November, until the formal ceasefire provided for in the Protocol came into effect.

On 18 November, the Security Council expressed concern at allegations that the truce agreed to by the Government and UNITA was not being respected. The President of the Council sent identical messages to Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA's President Jonas Savimbi, calling upon them to ensure that their forces

adhered strictly to the terms of the truce, and urged them to sign the Protocol as had been agreed.

After further dramatic efforts, the Protocol was signed on 20 November in Lusaka by the Minister for External Relations of Angola, Venancio de Moura, and by the Secretary-General of UNITA and its chief negotiator at the Lusaka talks, Eugenio Manuvakola, in the presence of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos. The ceremony was witnessed by several heads of State, a number of Foreign Ministers and other dignitaries. Citing security concerns, Savimbi did not travel to the Zambian capital.

The Lusaka Protocol consists of eight annexes, each relating to a particular issue on the agenda of the peace talks. The annexes cover all legal, military and political issues agreed to at the talks. The main military issues concern the re-establishment of the ceasefire; the withdrawal, quartering and demilitarisation of all UNITA military forces; the disarming of civilians; and the completion of the formation of the Forças Armadas Angolanas (FAA). The major political issues include the police; the United Nations mandate and the role of the observers of the Peace Accords; the completion of the electoral process; and the question of national reconciliation.

On 21 November, the Security Council, in a statement by its President, welcomed the signing of the Lusaka Protocol and stated that the Protocol and the 1991 Peace Accords should lay the foundation for lasting peace in Angola. It emphasized that the parties must continue to demonstrate their commitment to peace through the full and timely implementation of the peace agreement. The Council noted with concern reports that the fighting in Angola was continuing, and reminded the parties that they must fully respect the ceasefire which was to go into effect on 22 November.

In the meantime, the Secretary-General issued a statement in which he said that the United Nations would be ready to start deploying UNAVEM II observers to former combat zones as soon as the ceasefire was effective and to begin implementation of provisions of resolution 952 (1994) concerning enlargement of the Mission.

The high-level military talks and the negotiations regarding the security arrangements for Savimbi and other senior UNITA leaders concluded at Lusaka on 23 November. At the same time, it was agreed that further talks would be held at Luanda on 29 November. However, the talks did not resume as scheduled since the UNITA delegation, citing logistical and transport problems, delayed its arrival at Luanda.

UNAVEM Teams to Countryside

Even after the ceasefire had gone into effect on 22 November, the military situation in many parts of Angola remained tense, with some fighting reported between Government forces and UNITA. In order to enhance the verification capabilities of UNAVEM II and as additional confidence-building measure, the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Beye, decided to deploy to the countryside small teams of military and police personnel already serving with the Mission. Accordingly, on 27—29 November, UNAVEM II regional headquarters were established in the cities of Huambo, Luena, Menongue, Saurimo and Uige, in addition to one already existing in Lubango.

In the meantime, the Secretary-General dispatched a small group of specialists from the Secretariat to Angola to conduct a technical survey. On the basis of the team's proposals, he intended subsequently to present to the Security Council comprehensive recommendations for the overall role of the United Nations in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol.

Composition of UNAVEM II

Originally, UNAVEM II's authorized strength was 350 military observers and 90 police observers. There were also a civilian air unit and a medical unit, as well as some 87 international and 155 local civilian staff. In May 1992, the Secretary-General recommended, and the Security Council agreed, to increase the police strength of the Mission to 126 officers. Military and police observers were provided by Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Congo, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Ireland, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Senegal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, former Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe. In addition, during the polling, the Electoral Division fielded a total of 400 electoral observers. They were of some 90 nationalities and included staff members from the United Nations system and observers contributed by Member States. UNAVEM II's military and police observers also participated in the observation of the electoral process.

Following the outbreak of the post-election fighting, the strength of UNAVEM II was reduced to 50 military observers, 18 police observers and 11 military paramedics. The Mission also included some 50 international civilian staff and approximately 70 local staff.

In October 1994, in anticipation of a new peace agreement in Angola, the Security Council authorized the restoration of UNAVEM's strength to its previous level of 350 military and 126 police observers,

after a report by the Secretary-General that a peace agreement had been initialled and an effective ceasefire was in place.

As of 30 November 1994, military and police personnel were contributed by the following countries:

<i>Country</i>	<i>Police</i>	<i>Troops</i>	<i>Observers</i>
Argentina	3		2
Brazil	6	11	8
Congo			2
Guinea Bissau			2
Hungary			4
India			3
Jordan			2
Malaysia	3		1
Morocco	2		
Netherlands	2		2
New Zealand			3
Nigeria			5
Norway			4
Slovak Republic			5
Sweden			3
Zimbabwe	2		4
Total	18	11	50

Figures may vary from month to month due to rotation. "Troops" include any infantry, logistics, engineering, air, medical, mov-con, staff, etc.

Financial Aspects

The rough cost to the United Nations of UNAVEM II in 1994 was approximately \$26.3 million. The costs of the operation are met by assessed contributions from United Nations Member States. As at 30 November 1994, total contributions outstanding to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I and UNAVEM II) for the period from the inception of the operation to 30 September 1994 amounted to approximately \$ 13.9 million.

Humanitarian Situation in Angola

From the outset of the renewed civil conflict in Angola, the United Nations agencies and programmes have made intensive efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to all Angolans in need. The United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit plays a major coordinating role in this process. On 21 May 1993, the United Nations

Department of Humanitarian Affairs launched an inter-agency appeal for Angola, seeking some \$226 million in emergency humanitarian assistance for 2 million Angolans in need. In July and August 1993, the situation in Angola worsened further despite all efforts by the Secretary-General, his Special Representative, as well as a series of diplomatic initiatives undertaken by the Organisation of African Unity, several African leaders and the three observer States. According to the Secretary-General's 13 September 1993 report to the Security Council, some 3 million people, particularly the most vulnerable population groups—children, women and the elderly—suffered from the consequences of the conflict. It was estimated that during 1993 more than 1,000 persons died every day from the direct or indirect effects of the war.

In the coastal provinces and other areas considered secure, the relief programme initiated by the United Nations, in cooperation with national and international non-governmental organisations, brought food aid and other emergency assistance to large numbers of Angolans displaced by the war or affected by the countrywide economic decline. However, the implementation of relief operations in the interior of the country and in zones of active conflict, where the needs were particularly acute, encountered serious difficulties. It was only in October 1993, following intensive negotiations with the two parties on humanitarian access and a general decrease in the intensity of fighting country-wide, that relief flights were able to reach besieged cities such as Kuito and Huambo, whose populations had been cut off from international assistance for many months.

In many of these previously inaccessible communities, people were found to be starving to death, and the malnutrition rates in many cases were higher than 35 per cent. The United Nations started a massive programme of humanitarian assistance with WFP spearheading the effort by providing air transport of relief supplies for other United Nations agencies, such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Donor response to the May 1993 appeal improved considerably, and nearly 50 per cent of the \$226 million target was reached by the end of January 1994.

Six months of relative stability and steady progress in relief efforts between November 1993 and April 1994 were followed by intensified conflict and a near standstill in humanitarian assistance to critical areas of the country. United Nations officials negotiated with both sides in the conflict in order to secure access to people in need. But

between mid-May and mid-August the delivery of humanitarian relief dropped sharply, due to increased security risks and curtailment or suspension of relief flights.

The Secretary-General, in an addendum to his 20 June 1994 report to the Security Council on UNAVEM II, drew attention to the dramatic escalation in the number of serious violations of humanitarian law in Angola, the rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situation in places where access was being denied, and threats to the safety of relief workers. In resolution 932 (1994) of 30 June 1994, the Security Council deplored the worsening of the humanitarian situation, urged the parties to grant all necessary security guarantees and to refrain from actions endangering relief personnel or disrupting humanitarian assistance.

Between February and September 1994, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs twice revised and updated the consolidated inter-agency appeals to support humanitarian action in Angola by United Nations agencies and non-governmental organisations. An appeal for the period February to June initially sought \$179 million. By mid-August donors had pledged nearly 70 per cent of that amount, and had responded particularly well with commitments in the agricultural sector. Funds for basic non-food relief and survival items were not forthcoming, however, and the affected population receiving assistance was 10 per cent larger than the figure anticipated in February. In September, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs further updated the appeal, seeking \$61 million to cover the estimated shortfall in funding for relief activities until the end of the year and estimated at \$188 million the total requirements for humanitarian assistance in Angola for the period February to December 1994. Donor pledges towards this overall total remained at roughly 70 per cent of requirements at the end of November 1994.

Resources requested by WFP constituted the largest share of the inter-agency appeal covering February to December 1994, accounting for some \$131 million. The cost of UNICEF humanitarian programmes was estimated at \$15 million and that of UNHCR at \$6 million. Other agencies whose activities were covered by the appeal were UNDP, the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, the World Health Organisation, the United Nations Volunteers and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs for coordination of assistance. Another important element of the appeals was the inclusion of humanitarian assistance programmes by a number of non-governmental organisations at a cost of \$23.5 million:

NOTE

1. In his progress report submitted to the Security Council on 4 December 1994, the Secretary-General reiterated that once his Special Representative had reported to him that the ceasefire was effective, he would proceed with the expansion of UNAVEM II to its previous level. In the meantime, the Secretary-General recommended that the mandate of UNAVEM II be extended for a further period, until 31 January 1995. It was his expectation that the ceasefire would solidify during this period and that the international community would be reassured of the commitment of the Angolan parties to the Lusaka process and to national reconciliation. At the same time, he would continue to prepare recommendations to the Council on the possible mandate for an expanded United Nations operation in Angola.

On 7 December, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that his Special Representative had informed him that the ceasefire was generally holding, despite some initial difficulties. Moreover, the Government and UNITA informed the Special Representative that they were reasonably satisfied with the status of the ceasefire and would like to see the planned enlargement of UNAVEM take place as soon as possible. The Secretary-General, therefore, intended to proceed with the restoration of the strength of UNAVEM to its previous level and the deployment of the mission throughout the country. In addition to existing tasks, the mission would monitor and verify all major elements of the Lusaka Protocol and provide good offices to the parties, including at the local level.

The Secretary-General's Special Representative, Beye, visited United Nations Headquarters early in December and briefed the members of the Security Council on the situation of the peace process in Angola.

On 8 December, the Security Council, by its resolution 966 (1994), decided to extend the mandate of UNAVEM II until 8 February 1995 to enable it to monitor the ceasefire established by the Protocol, and welcomed the Secretary-General's intention to restore UNAVEM II to its previous level, contingent on strict observance of an effective ceasefire and on guarantees of security for United Nations personnel. The Council noted the intention of the Secretary-General to submit a report on the possible mandate for a new United Nations operation in Angola, and welcomed the continued planning in this regard.

39

Peace-Keeping in Congo

A. Introduction

Background

The United Nations Operation in the Congo (Operation Nations Unies au Congo, or ONUC), which took place in the Republic of the Congo (now Zaire) from July 1960 until June 1964, is by far the largest peace-keeping operation ever established by the United Nations in terms of the responsibilities it had to assume, the size of its area of operation and the manpower involved. It included, in addition to a peace-keeping force which comprised at its peak strength nearly 20,000 officers and men, an important Civilian Operations component. Originally mandated to provide the Congolese Government with the military and technical assistance it required following the collapse of many essential services and the military intervention by Belgian troops, ONUC became embroiled by the force of circumstances in a chaotic internal situation of extreme complexity and had to assume certain responsibilities which went beyond normal peace-keeping duties. The policy followed by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold in the Congo brought him into direct conflict with the Soviet Union and serious disagreement with some other Powers. The Operation cost the life of Hammarskjold and led to a grave political and financial crisis within the United Nations itself.

With an area of some 2,344,000 square kilometres (about 1 million square miles), approximately the size of Western Europe, the Congo is the second largest country in Africa, after the Sudan. Encompassing the greatest part of the Congo basin in the very heart of Africa, the country has an important strategic position. The Congo is also exceptionally rich in minerals, much of them in the province of Katanga.

At the time of independence, the Congo had a population of about 14 million. The wind of change that had swept across Africa after the Second World War left the Territory largely untouched. The Belgian colonial administration practised a policy of paternalism which gave the indigenous population one of the highest living standards on the continent, but little political and educational advancement. Few Congolese studied beyond the secondary level and, at the time of independence, there among them only 17 university graduates and no doctors, lawyers or engineers.

Little political activity was allowed the Congolese population until 1959. Early that year, the Belgian Government, confronted with increasing disturbances, announced its intention to prepare the Congo for independence, and soon embarked upon a radical decolonisation plan. A charter granting freedom of speech, of the press and of association was put into effect in August 1959, and elections to municipal and territorial councils were held in December. In January 1960, at a round-table conference of Congolese leaders convened in Brussels, Belgium agreed to grant independence to the Congo as of 30 June that same year.

From then on it was a race against time to get the Congo ready for independence. Provisional executive councils with the participation of Congolese leaders were established at the central and provincial levels in March 1960. The "*Loi fondamentale*", which was to serve as the constitution for the Congo, was adopted by the Belgian Parliament and promulgated by King Baudouin of Belgium on 19 March. General and provincial elections leading to the establishment of the Congolese Parliament and the provincial assemblies were held during the same month.

The Parliament convened in the early part of June and, by 23 June, after lengthy wranglings, the newly elected representatives worked out a compromise whereby the two rival dominant Congolese leaders were elected to the two key positions in the new political structure: Joseph Kasa-Vubu as President of the Republic and Patrice Lumumba as Prime Minister. Thus, the apparatus for the independent state was completed barely days before independence.

On 29 June 1960, a treaty of friendship, assistance and cooperation between Belgium and the Congo was signed by the representatives of the two Governments (but never ratified). Under that treaty, most of the administrative and technical personnel of the colonial administration would remain in the Congo on secondment to the Congolese Government. The treaty also provided that the two military bases at

Kamina and Kitona would be ceded to Belgium and that the Belgian Government could, at the request of the Congolese Government, call out the Belgian troops from the bases to assist the latter Government in maintaining law and order. Belgium hoped that with this massive assistance and the guarantees accompanying it, it would be possible to ensure a smooth transition from colonial status to independence. Its main hope lay in the *Force publique*, the 25,000-man security force which had maintained law and order in the country in a forceful and effective way during the colonial times and which would continue to be commanded by Belgium's Lieutenant-General Emile Janssens, with an all-Belgian officer corps. It was what the Belgians called at the time the "*Pari congolais*", the Congolese gamble.

Dag Hammarskjold, who had visited the Belgian Congo in January 1960, was keenly conscious of the serious problems, that would confront the Congolese Government after independence. He felt that the Congo would need, in addition to massive assistance from Belgium, extensive United Nations technical aid that had no political strings attached. With this in mind, he asked his Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs, Ralph J. Bunche, to attend the independence ceremony in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) as his personal representative and to take the opportunity to discuss with the Congolese authorities the technical assistance which the United Nations could provide. Bunche arrived in Leopoldville on 26 June and stayed on after the independence ceremony to work out an extensive United Nations technical assistance programme for the country.

Shortly after independence, Congolese soldiers of the *Force publique* became restive and petitioned for more promotion opportunity. Their petition was dismissed by General Janssens. He made it clear that so far as the *Force publique* was concerned, independence had changed nothing. On 5 July, a mutiny broke out in the Leopoldville Garrison and spread to several other cities during the following days. As some mutineers attacked Belgians and other Europeans, and in some cases committed rape and other atrocities, most Belgian administrators and technicians fled the country and this led to the collapse of a number of essential services throughout the country.

The Belgian Ambassador to the Congo repeatedly urged Prime Minister Lumumba to request the assistance of Belgian troops, under the friendship treaty, to maintain law and order, but Lumumba adamantly refused. Instead, he attempted to regain control of the *Force publique* by agreeing to the Congolese soldiers' demand for reform. He renamed the *Force publique* the *Armee nationale congolaise* (ANC)

dismissed General Janssens and appointed Victor Lundula, a Congolese, as Commander of the Army with the rank of Major-General, and Joseph Mobutu, also a Congolese, as its Chief of Staff with the rank of Colonel. All Congolese soldiers and non-commissioned officers were promoted by one grade pending further measures to Africanize the entire officer corps.

As disorder spread and intensified, Ralph Bunche, who was in Leopoldville at the time, strongly advised the Belgian Ambassador not to call in Belgian troops without the prior agreement of the Congolese Government. At the same time, he was in close touch with the Congolese authorities and the Secretary-General in New York to work out a plan to help the Government control and strengthen the Congolese army through United Nations assistance. Hammarskjöld envisaged sending a large number of United Nations military advisers, experts and technicians for this purpose. He felt that if the Congolese Government were to request such military personnel as technical assistance of a military nature, rather than as military assistance, he could take immediate action on his own authority without referring the matter to the Security Council.

The Congolese Government agreed to this course of action and, on 10 July, submitted a formal request to the Secretary-General for technical assistance of a military nature, including military advisers, experts and technicians, to assist it in developing and strengthening the national army for the twin purposes of national defence and the maintenance of law and order.

Belgian Intervention and Security Council Action

However, a new situation developed on the next day when the Belgian Government ordered its troops into the Congo without the agreement of the Congolese Government, for the declared purpose of restoring law and order and protecting Belgian nationals. Belgian troops landed at Leopoldville, Matadi, Luluabourg (now Kananga) and Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi), in Katanga. Their intervention, which was followed in some cases by heavy fighting with Congolese soldiers, further increased tension and disorder throughout the country. On 11 July, shortly after the arrival of Belgian troops in Elisabethville, 'Moïse Tshombe', the provincial president, proclaimed the independence of Katanga, the richest province of the Congo, which provided the country with more than half of its revenues.

On 12 July, President Kasa-Vubu and Prime Minister Lumumba sent a joint telegram to the Secretary-General requesting United

Nations military assistance. They said that the essential purpose of the requested military aid was “to protect the national territory of the Congo against the present external aggression which is a threat to international peace”. The next day, they cabled a further message to the Secretary-General to make it clear that they were not asking for aid to restore the internal situation but to respond to Belgian aggression.

On 13 July, Hammarskjöld, invoking Article 99 of the United Nations Charter—which empowers the Secretary-General to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten international peace and security—requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the situation in the Congo. The Council met on the same evening. In an opening statement, Hammarskjöld outlined his ideas about the actions that the Council might take in response to the request of the Congolese Government. In essence, he recommended the establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping force to assist that Government in maintaining law and order until, with technical assistance from the United Nations, the Congolese national security forces were able fully to meet their tasks. He assumed that, were the United Nations to act as proposed, the Belgian Government would withdraw its forces from Congolese territory.

At the same meeting, during the night of 13/14 July, the Security Council adopted resolution 143 (1960), by which it called upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Congo and decided to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as might be necessary until, through that Government’s efforts with United Nations technical assistance, the national security forces might be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks. It requested the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as appropriate.

The Council resolution was adopted by 8 votes in favour (including the USSR and the United States) to none against, with 3 abstentions.

Secretary-General’s Principles Governing the United Nations Force

In his first report on the implementation of the resolution the Secretary-General outlined the principles which would govern the organisation and activities of the United Nations Force in the Congo,

its composition and the action he had taken or envisaged taking to establish it.

The proposals the Secretary-General set out for the Force were as follows:

- (a) The Force was to be regarded as a temporary security force to be deployed in the Congo with the consent of the Congolese Government until the national security forces were able, in the opinion of that Government, to meet fully their tasks.
- (b) Although dispatched at the request of the Congolese Government and remaining there with its consent, and although it might be considered as serving as an arm of the Congolese Government for the maintenance of law and order and protection of life, the Force was necessarily under the exclusive command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General under the control of the Security Council. The Force was thus not under the orders of the Congolese Government and could not be permitted to become a party to any internal conflict.
- (c) The host Government, when exercising its sovereign rights with regard to the presence of the United Nations Force in its territory, should be guided by good faith in the interpretation of the Force's purpose. Similarly, the United Nations should be so guided when it considered the question of the maintenance of the Force in the host country.
- (d) The United Nations should have free access to the area of operation and full freedom of movement within that area as well as all the communications and other facilities required to carry out its tasks. A further elaboration of this rule obviously required an agreement with the Government specifying what was to be considered the area of operation.
- (e) The authority granted to the United Nations Force could not be exercised within the Congo either in competition with the representatives of its Government or in co-operation with them in any joint operation. This principle applied also *a priori* to representatives and military units of Governments other than the host Government. Thus, the United Nations Operation must be separate and distinct from activities by any national authorities.
- (f) The units of the Force must not become parties to internal conflicts. They could not be used to enforce any specific political

solution of pending problems or to influence the political balance decisive for such a solution.

- (g) The basic rules of the United Nations for international service were applicable to all United Nations personnel employed in the Congo Operation, particularly as regards loyalty to the aims of the Organisation.
- (h) The United Nations military units were not authorized to use force except in self-defence. They were never to take the initiative in the use of force, but were entitled to respond with force to an attack with arms, including attacks intended to make them withdraw from positions they occupied under orders from the Commander, acting under the authority of the Security Council. The basic element of influence in this principle was clearly the prohibition of any initiative in the use of armed force.

With regard to the composition of the Force, the Secretary-General reiterated the principle that, while the United Nations must preserve its authority to decide on this matter, it should take full account of the views of the host Government. He recalled that in order to limit the scope of possible differences of opinion with host Governments, the United Nations had in recent operations followed two principles: not to include units from any of the permanent members of the Security Council nor units from any country which, because of its geographical position or for other reasons, might be considered as having a special interest in the situation that had called for the operation. He indicated his intention to seek, in the first place, the assistance of African States for the United Nations Force in the Congo. The Force would be built around a core of military units from African States and should also include suitable units from other regions to give it a truly international character. In selecting the contingents, the Secretary-General would necessarily be guided by considerations of availability of troops, language and geographical distribution within the region.

In order to set up the Force speedily, the Secretary-General said, he had accepted offers of troops by Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Morocco and Tunisia. These five countries would provide seven battalions, with a total strength of 4,000 men. Arrangements were being made to airlift the battalions to the Congo as soon as possible. An offer of troops from Mali had also been received and would be activated at a later stage.

With the deployment of the seven battalions, the first phase of the buildup of the Force would be completed. For the second phase, the

Secretary-General had requested troops from three European countries and one Asian and one Latin American country. In one of those cases—Sweden—he had asked and secured permission to transfer to the Congo on a temporary basis the Swedish battalion of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in Gaza, thus bringing the total Strength of the Force to eight battalions.

Requests for aircraft, signal and other logistic support, as well as for air transport facilities, had been addressed to a number of non-African nations. As soon as Security Council resolution 143(1960) was adopted, the Secretary-General appointed Ralph J. Bunche as his Special Representative in the Congo to head the new Operation. He also appointed Lieutenant-General Carl C. von Horn, of Sweden, as Supreme Commander of the United Nations Force in the Congo. General von Horn, who until then had occupied the post of Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), would be assisted in the initial stage by a small personal staff of officers drawn from UNTSO.

On the evening of 15 July 1960, less than 48 hours after the adoption of the Council's resolution, an advance party of the Tunisian contingent, consisting of about 90 officers and men, landed at Leopoldville. They were followed on succeeding days by the remainder of the Tunisian battalion and personnel of the Ethiopian, Ghanaian, Guinean and Moroccan battalions. Bunche, who was appointed temporary Commander of the Force pending the arrival of General von Horn, immediately deployed these units in sensitive localities in Leopoldville, Stanleyville (now Kisangani), Matadi, Thysville and Coquilhatville (now Mbandaka). On 18 July, General von Horn and his staff officers arrived in Leopoldville and immediately set up Force headquarters at the airport.

As the responsibilities of the United Nations in the Congo expanded, the Secretary-General requested and obtained more battalions and support personnel. The Force reached a total of 19,828 at its peak strength by July 1961. From then on, as some of its responsibilities were fulfilled, the strength of the Force was progressively reduced. In addition to the military units, ONUC had a Civilian Operations component which employed some 2,000 experts and technicians to provide the Congolese Government with extensive assistance in the administrative, technical and humanitarian fields.

While its original mandate as outlined in Council resolution 143(1960) remained valid, ONUC was given new responsibilities and

new tasks during the four years of its operation. The history of ONUC may be divided into four periods, as follows: restoration of law and order and withdrawal of Belgian forces (July-August 1960); constitutional crisis (September 1960-September 1961); termination of the secession of Katanga (September 1961-February 1963); and consolidation of the Congolese Government (February 1963-June 1964). Each of these periods is dealt with separately below.

B. Restoration, of Law and Order and Withdrawal of Belgian Forces (July-August 1960)

ONUC Objectives

The two main objectives of ONUC during the initial phase were to help the Congolese Government restore law and order and bring about the speedy withdrawal of the Belgian forces. These objectives were closely related.

In a statement made in the Security Council just before the adoption of resolution 143(1960), the representative of Belgium stated that his Government had no political designs in the Congo and that when the United Nations Force had moved into position and was able to ensure the effective maintenance of order and the security of persons in the Congo, his Government would withdraw its forces.

Immediately after the adoption of the resolution, Bunche initiated negotiations with the Belgian Ambassador in Leopoldville in order to work out agreement for the speedy and orderly withdrawal of the Belgian forces in accordance with the resolution and in the light of the undertaking given by the Belgian Government. The United Nations plan was to bring its forces into the Congo as rapidly as possible and deploy them in various parts of the country, first of all in those positions occupied by Belgian troops. Once deployed, United Nations troops would restore law and order and ensure the protection of civilians in co-operation with the Congolese Government and speed up the withdrawal of the Belgian forces from the area.

Withdrawal of Belgian Troops Outside Katanga

The first troops of the United Nations Force arrived at Leopoldville on the evening of 15 July and were deployed the next morning at the radio station and the power station and along the main thorough-fare of the capital. Their presence had an immediate calming effect in an extremely tense situation. On 16 July, the Belgian Ambassador informed Bunche that, consequent upon the arrival of the United

Nations troops, the first contingents of the Belgian armed forces had left Leopoldville and returned to their bases on that same day. On 19 July, Bunche reported to the Secretary-General that the United Nations was now in a position to guarantee that contingents of the United Nations Force drawn from both African and European countries would arrive during the week in sufficient numbers to ensure order and protect the entire population of Leopoldville, African and European. In the light of this assurance, it was decided that the Belgian forces would begin to withdraw completely from the Leopoldville area and return to their bases on 20 July. This withdrawal operation was to be completed by the afternoon of 23 July.

As more United Nations troops were flown into the Congo, they were deployed in other areas such as Thysville, Matadi, Luluabourg, Coquilhatville and Stanleyville. In each of these places, ONUC immediately began its task of maintaining law and order and protecting the local population, and initiated discussions with the Belgian representative to bring about the withdrawal of Belgian troops at an early date.

Although this speed could be achieved only through strenuous efforts, the Congolese Government did not consider it fast enough. On 17 July 1960, Lumumba and Kasa-Vubu addressed an ultimatum to the Secretary-General, warning that if the Belgian forces were not completely withdrawn within 48 hours, they would request troops from the Soviet Union. The Secretary-General brought the matter before the Security Council, which—by resolution 145(1960) of 22 July 1960, adopted unanimously—commended the action taken by the Secretary-General and called upon Belgium to speed up the withdrawal of its troops.

The original plan was therefore continued without change. As soon as new United Nations contingents arrived, they were deployed in the positions occupied by Belgian troops. They brought about the complete withdrawal of the Belgian troops from Leopoldville and the surrounding area on 23 July 1960, and from the whole of the Congo, except Katanga and the two bases, by the beginning of August 1960.

Withdrawal from Katanga

The next step was the entry of United Nations troops into the province of Katanga. On this question, the Secretary-General ran into a grave conflict with Prime Minister Lumumba, who wanted ONUC to help his Government put down the secession of Katanga by force. The Secretary-General refused to do this, taking the position that under

its mandate ONUC could not use force except in self-defence, and could not be a party to, or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of, any internal conflict in the Congo. He also encountered serious difficulties with the Katangese secessionist authorities and the Belgian Government. The Katangese authorities strongly opposed the entry of United Nations troops and, citing this opposition, the Belgian Government was reluctant to withdraw its forces from Katanga.

On 4 August 1960, the Secretary-General, who had arrived in Leopoldville a few days earlier, sent Bunche to Elisabethville to make arrangements with the Belgian representative there for the entry of United Nations troops into Katanga, which, if no difficulties arose, would take place on 6 August. But in the face of unqualified and unyielding opposition by the Katangese secessionist authorities, Bunche concluded that the entry of United Nations troops could not be achieved without bloodshed, The Secretary-General therefore decided to postpone the original plan and brought the matter before the Security Council.

By resolution 146(1960) of 9 August 1960, the Security Council confirmed the authority conferred upon the Secretary-General by its previous resolutions and called upon Belgium immediately to withdraw its troops from Katanga, under speedy modalities determined by the Secretary-General. At the same time, while declaring that the entry of the United Nations Force into Katanga was necessary, the Council reaffirmed that the Force should not in any way intervene in any internal conflict in the Congo or be used to influence the outcome of any such conflict, constitutional or otherwise. The resolution was adopted by 9 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (France and Italy).

After the adoption of the resolution, the Secretary-General returned to the Congo and, on 12 August, personally led the first United Nations unit into Katanga. But Prime Minister Lumumba strongly criticized the manner in which the Secretary-General had implemented the Council's resolutions and refused henceforth to co-operate with him. In view of the Prime Minister's reaction, the Secretary-General once again referred the matter to the Security Council.

The Council met on 21 August 1960, but did not vote on any resolution. During the discussion, the Secretary-General indicated that, in the absence of any new directive, he would consider his interpretation of the ONUC mandate as upheld. He also made known his intention to appoint an Advisory Committee, composed of Member States which had contributed troops to the United Nations Force, to advise him on future policy on the Congo.

The entry of United Nations troops into Katanga on 12 August 1960 set off a process of withdrawal of Belgian troops from the province, which was completed by the beginning of September. At that time, Belgian troops were also withdrawn from the military bases of Kamina and Kitona, which were taken over by ONUC.

Thus, despite difficult circumstances, ONUC brought about the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the whole of the Congo within six weeks. However, the secession of Katanga remained unresolved.

Maintenance of Law and Order

The maintenance of law and order was the heaviest of all the tasks falling upon ONUC. In order to carry out that task, the Secretary-General set up a United Nations Force which at its peak strength numbered nearly 20,000. But even at its peak strength, the Force was hardly sufficient and was severely strained, inasmuch as its responsibilities had to encompass such a vast land as the Congo.

On their arrival in the Congo, United Nations soldiers were officially instructed that they were members of a peace force, not a fighting force, that they had been asked to come in response to an appeal from the Congolese Government, that their task was to help in restoring order and calm in a troubled country and that they should give protection against acts of violence to all the people, Africans and Europeans alike. They were also told that although they carried arms, they were to use them only in self-defence; they were in the Congo to help everyone and to harm no one.

What ONUC sought to do was to assist the Congolese authorities to perform their normal duties, for instance by undertaking joint patrols with the local police for the maintenance of law and order in a given area. When, however, this was not possible on account of the breakdown of the security forces, the United Nations Force had to perform the normal security duties in the place of Congolese authorities. But in so doing it sought the consent and co-operation of the Congolese Government. Such was the case in Leopoldville during the operation's first stage, when United Nations soldiers performed police duties along the city's main arteries to ensure the protection of its essential services.

Following these procedures, the Force restored law and order, protected life and property, and ensured the continued operation of essential services wherever it was deployed. In many areas it brought under control unruly ANC elements, many of whom laid down their arms voluntarily or at the request of their Government. Thus the

Force carried out its task of maintaining law and order with success in the initial phase of the operation.

However, the internal situation in August began to worsen rapidly. Tribal rivalries, which had plagued the country before independence, flared up that month with added intensity in Kasai between Baluba and Lulua tribesmen. The Baluba of the Luluabourg area fled *en masse* to their tribal lands in the Bakwanga region, where their leader, Albert Kalonji, proclaimed the secession of South Kasai.

In Equateur and Leopoldville provinces, there was increasing opposition to the Government. To put down opposition and secessionist movements, Prime Minister Lumumba arrested some opposition leaders, and anti-Government newspapers were suspended. At the end of August, ANC troops were sent to South Kasai, and many civilians were killed, including women and children. Other ANC troops were being massed near the northern border of Katanga in preparation for an invasion of the province. During those days, elements of the ANC, which the Government was using to achieve its political objectives but which it was not always able to control, were a constant danger to the civilian population.

Without the co-operation of the Congolese Government which it had come to assist, ONUC faced a frustrating situation. Its activities were further hampered when the Government itself resorted to actions which tended to endanger law and order, or restrict human rights. Whenever this happened, ONUC endeavoured to induce and persuade Congolese authorities to change their course of action, and, to the extent possible, took measures to ensure the protection of the threatened persons. But it refused to use force to subdue Congolese authorities, or the ANC under their orders. Even when its own personnel were attacked, ONUC intervened only to prevent further excesses and to urge the Congolese Government to take disciplinary action against the culprits.

C. Constitutional Crisis (September 1960-September 1961)

Introduction

On 5 September 1960, a constitutional crisis developed, when President Kasa-Vubu, invoking the authority conferred upon him by the *Loi fondamentale*, decided to dismiss Prime Minister Lumumba. The crisis lasted 11 months, during which time there was no legal government and the country was divided into four opposing camps, each with its own Armed Forces. ONUC therefore could only deal with

de facto authority and do whatever it could to avert civil war and protect the civilian population. It attempted to prevent the leaders who wielded power from subduing opponents by force and at the same time encouraged those leaders to seek a solution through negotiation and conciliation.

Dismissal of Lumumba

In the days following Kasa-Vubu's dismissal of Lumumba, utter confusion prevailed in Leopoldville. Lumumba refused to recognize Kasa-Vubu's decision and, in turn, dismissed Kasa-Vubu as Chief of State. Parliament supported Lumumba, although it refused to endorse his decision to dismiss the Chief of State, but Parliament itself was soon suspended by Kasa-Vubu. Each contending party sought the support of the army and, whenever it could, ordered the arrest of its opponents. On 14 September 1960, Colonel Joseph Mobutu imposed by a *coup* an army-backed regime run by a Council of Commissioners (*College des Commissaires*) and supporting Kasa-Vubu. But the *coup* was not fully effective in that Lumumba and his supporters resisted the Commissioners' authority.

Emergency Measures

At the outset of the crisis, ONUC took emergency measures to avoid violence and bloodshed. It decided on the night of 5/6. September 1960 to close the Leopoldville airport to prevent the arrival of rival troops. The following day, in view of the likely dangerous effect of inflammatory speeches on an already disturbed populace and after a number of violent demonstrations had taken place in the city, it temporarily closed down the Leopoldville radio station. These measures were lifted by 13 September 1960, as soon as the tension had subsided to below the explosive level.

In response to appeals from political and other leaders of all sides in Leopoldville, ONUC agreed to protect the threatened leaders, and in so doing it endeavoured to show absolute impartiality. ONUC guards were stationed around the residences of both Kasa-Vubu and Lumumba. Protection was also given to the other leaders, though not to the same extent.

Containment of Hostilities

In the following months, ONUC endeavoured to prevent or control hostilities between the various Congolese factions.

In South Kasai, ONUC helped in arranging a ceasefire between ANC troops and Kalonji's secessionist army and in establishing a

neutral zone under ONUC control. It also persuaded the ANC command to withdraw its troops from the northern border of Katanga.

In northern Katanga, where violent fighting broke out between pro-Tshombe gendarmes and the anti-Tshombe Baluba population, ONUC put an end to the fighting by setting up, in agreement with both parties, neutral zones under its protection.

Protected areas were set up at various times and places, to where threatened persons, Africans and Europeans alike, could repair for safety. Neutral zones were established to stop tribal warfare. During this period of unrest, Europeans, many of whom were settlers in scattered, remote areas, were often threatened by hostile local authorities or populations. Whenever possible, ONUC took measures to rescue and protect them and, if they so desired, to evacuate them to safer areas.

The contending parties turned to ONUC for recognition and support. ONUC continued its policy of avoiding intervening or taking sides in the internal conflicts. While it recognized the unimpaired status of Kasa-Vubu as Chief of State, it refused to help him achieve political aims by force and, in particular, to recognize the Council of Commissioners supported by him.

Security Council and General Assembly Consideration

The crisis was examined by the Security Council from 14 to 17 September 1960 and, when the Council failed to take a decision, by an emergency special session of the General Assembly from 17 to 20 September.

By resolution 1474(ES-IV) of 20 September 1960, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to continue to take vigorous action in line with the Security Council's resolutions. In an effort to resolve the constitutional crisis, it appealed to all Congolese to seek a speedy solution, by peaceful means, of all their internal conflicts, and requested the Advisory Committee on the Congo to appoint a conciliation commission to assist them in that endeavour.

The Conciliation Commission was composed of Ethiopia, the Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, the Sudan, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic. Subsequently Guinea, Indonesia, Mali and the United Arab Republic withdrew from the Commission.

During the meeting of the Security Council, two Congolese delegations, one appointed by Kasa-Vubu and the other by Lumumba,

were sent to New York, but neither could win recognition. Two months later, during the fifteenth regular session of the General Assembly in December, Kasa-Vubu himself came to New York as the head of his delegation, which was seated by the Assembly after a long and heated debate. The Assembly's decision considerably enhanced Kasa-Vubu's personal prestige, but did not bring an immediate solution to the crisis.

Four Rival Groups

In the mean time, the internal situation rapidly worsened in the Congo. While the Council of Commissioners consolidated its position in Leopoldville, Antoine Gizenga, acting on behalf of Lumumba, succeeded in establishing a "government" in Stanleyville which was formally recognized as the legitimate government of the Republic by a number of Member States. With the support of the local ANC troops, led by General Victor Lundula, Gizenga extended his authority beyond Orientale province to Kivu and the northern part of Katanga.

At the same time, the secessionist authorities headed by Moise Tshombe and Albert Kalonji consolidated their hold, respectively, over southern Katanga and South Kasai, with the active assistance of certain foreign Powers. Thus the Congo came to be divided into four rival camps, each relying more on armed force than on popular support.

ONUC Casualties

In carrying out its mission of peace, the United Nations Force suffered many casualties. On 8 November 1960, a patrol of 11 Irish soldiers was ambushed by tribesmen in northern Katanga and eight of them were killed. Another incident occurred on 24 November when ANC troops attacked the Ghanaian Embassy in Leopoldville. The Tunisian unit which guarded the Embassy incurred several casualties, including one fatality.

Here again, when the authorities in power indulged in actions which endangered peace and order, or violated human rights, ONUC could not always prevent those actions, but sought to redress the situation by the use of persuasion or good offices. Thus ONUC could not prevent a number of political arrests made by the various local regimes. At the time, those regimes endeavoured to strengthen their armed forces by importing arms and military equipment from abroad. While ONUC did its best to stop such imports, its forces were insufficient to control all points of entry, and therefore it could not prevent quantities of arms and equipment from being smuggled into different parts of the country.

Lumumba's Death

From the beginning of the constitutional crisis, ONUC troops vigilantly guarded Lumumba's residence and, so long as he remained there, he was in safety. However, it was not possible to protect him when he voluntarily left his residence, as he did on the night of 27/28 November 1960, in an apparent attempt to get to Stanleyville, his political stronghold. Before he could get there, he was arrested by ANC soldiers controlled by Mobutu near Port-Francqui (now Ilebo) and brought back to Leopoldville. Once Lumumba was arrested by the *de facto* authorities of Leopoldville, ONUC was not in a position to take forcible action to liberate him from his captors, but it exerted all possible pressure to secure lawful, humane treatment for him. Upon learning of the arrest, the Secretary-General sent a succession of messages to President Kasa-Vubu, expressing his concern over the event and stressing the importance of giving the prisoner all the guarantees provided by law. Similarly repeated representations were later made to the President by Rajeshwar Dayal of India, at the time Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Congo. ONUC could not do more without exceeding the mandate given it by the Security Council and without using force.

Lumumba remained detained in Thysville until 17 January, when he and two other political prisoners, Joseph Okito and Maurice Mpolo, were transferred to Elisabethville in Katanga. This move brought strong protests from both the Secretary-General and the United Nations Conciliation Commission for the Congo, which was then in the territory. In particular, the Secretary-General took immediate action to urge the authorities concerned to return Lumumba to Leopoldville province and to apply the normal legal rules. But no remedial action was taken, and, four weeks later, the news came from Katanga that the three prisoners had been murdered. The circumstances of their death were later investigated by a United Nations commission, which accepted as substantially true evidence indicating that the prisoners had been killed on 17 January 1961 and probably in the presence of high officials of the Katanga provincial government.

Following Lumumba's death, there were a series of reprisals and counter-reprisals by pro-Lumumba and anti-Lumumba factions, including summary executions of political leaders. The civil war, already under way in northern Katanga, threatened to spread to other regions.

Several troop-contributing countries withdrew their national contingents from ONUC, reducing its strength from 20,000 to less than 15,000. At United Nations Headquarters, the Soviet Union called

for Hammarskjöld's dismissal and announced that it would not, henceforth, recognize him as Secretary-General.

Authorisation to Use Force

The Security Council met again on 15 February 1961, and after long debate adopted, on 21 February, resolution 161(1961), by which it authorized ONUC to use force, as a last resort, to prevent civil war in the Congo. It urged that the various Congolese armed units be reorganized and brought under discipline and control, and urged the immediate evacuation of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under United Nations command, as well as mercenaries. It also urged the convening of Parliament and the taking of the necessary protective measures in that connection.

Provisional Government

After January 1961, a number of steps were taken by various Congolese leaders attempting to resolve the crisis. On 25 January, a preliminary round-table was sponsored by Kasa-Vubu in Leopoldville. It was boycotted by pro-Lumumba and pro-Tshombe leaders, which considerably limited its usefulness. However, at the end of the conference, Kasa-Vubu decided to replace the Council of Commissioners by a provisional government headed by Joseph Ileo, a decision which was considered by the United Nations Conciliation Commission as a step in the right direction.

Situation in the Congo: February-April 1961

The period immediately following the adoption of the Security Council's resolution of 21 February 1961 was a critical one for the United Nations Operation in the Congo. Thinly deployed throughout the country, the United Nations Force had great difficulty in coping with its overwhelming tasks, and this difficulty increased with its reduction in strength.

The difficulties were compounded by the hostile attitude of the *de facto* authorities of Leopoldville and Elisabethville. These authorities interpreted the Council's new resolution as an attempt to subdue them by force and, in retaliation, ordered a number of harassing measures against ONUC and its personnel. The most serious of these was an attack by ANC troops on the United Nations garrison in Matadi on 4 March 1961, which forced the garrison to withdraw from the port city.

In order to cope with these difficulties and to implement the resolution, the Secretary-General took urgent action to increase the

strength of the United Nations Force. New contributions of personnel were obtained from several Governments, bringing the total of the United Nations troops to more than 18,000 in April 1961.

In April, the situation began to improve, first because of the increased strength of the Force, and secondly because after patient negotiations, ONUC reached an agreement with President Kasa-Vubu on 17 April 1961 for the implementation of the Security Council's February resolution.

The limited use of force, as authorized by the Council, was resorted to by ONUC at the beginning of April 1961 to stop the civil war, which was spreading dangerously in northern Katanga. Since mid-March 1961, Katangese gendarmerie led by foreign mercenaries had launched an offensive against the anti-Tshombe forces in northern Katanga in a determined effort to crush all opposition there. On 27 March, the United Nations Force Commander warned Tshombe to stop the offensive, but the warning was unheeded and his gendarmes entered Manono three days later and prepared to attack Kabalo. It was at this point that United Nations troops intervened, stopped the gendarmes and established control of the area between Kabalo and Albertville (now Kalemie).

Further Casualties

At the end of April, a tragic incident occurred when a Ghanaian detachment of ONUC in Port-Francqui was suddenly attacked and overpowered by ANC troops, and 44 of its members ruthlessly massacred. It was generally agreed that this brutal assault was mainly an act by undisciplined and unpredictable armed troops. Thereafter, the ONUC command made it a rule not to station small units in isolated areas.

Another series of incidents was related to the ANC campaign, late in 1961, to occupy northern Katanga. In connection with this military campaign, which is described in the section below on the problem of Katanga, a number of grave incidents were caused by undisciplined ANC elements. At the beginning of November 1961, ANC soldiers of the Leopoldville group assaulted several Belgian women in Luluabourg. On 11 November, ANC soldiers of the Stanleyville group massacred 13 ONUC aircrew members of Italian nationality in Kindu. Two days later, ANC soldiers of the same group, who had just entered Albertville, began looting houses and threatening civilians there. On 1 January 1961, 22 European missionaries and an undetermined number of Africans were killed in Kongolo by ANC soldiers, also from Stanleyville, in an incident reminiscent of the Kindu massacre.

Conciliation Efforts

During the first days of the constitutional crisis, ONUC endeavoured to prevent the leaders holding the reins of power from using force to subdue their opponents within or outside the zones they controlled and, at the same time, it encouraged all leaders to seek a solution of their differences through negotiation and conciliation.

Conciliation efforts were also made by the United Nations Conciliation Commission, established under the Assembly's resolution of 20 September 1960. This Commission, was composed of representatives of African and Asian countries which contributed troops to the United Nations Force, visited the Congo at the beginning of 1961. After spending seven weeks in that country, the Commission concluded that, while there was among most leaders a general feeling of weariness and a sincere desire to achieve a peaceful solution to the crisis, a small number of other leaders, among the very persons holding the reins of power, appeared to prefer a military rather than a political and constitutional solution. Because of those leaders' unco-operative and intransigent attitude, the Commission's attempts to reconcile the opposing groups had not led to positive results. The Commission also came to the conclusion that the crisis could be solved only if Parliament was reconvened and a national unity government was approved by it, and that one of the main obstacles to a speedy solution was foreign intervention in the internal affairs of the Congo.

Tananarive Conference

In the mean time, at the beginning of March 1961, a conference was held in Tananarive (now Antananarivo), Madagascar, on the proposal of Moïse Tshombe. It was attended by a number of top Congolese leaders, but Antoine Gizenga, who had at first agreed to come, did not show up. The Tananarive Conference proposed that the Congo be turned into a confederation of sovereign States. Under the proposed arrangement, the central Government would be abolished, and legislative and executive powers would be vested in the individual States. The Conference proposals also provided for the establishment of new States, but did not determine the criteria to be followed in that connection. This decision led some Congolese leaders, through personal ambition and tribal animosities, to lay claim for the creation of a score of new States. But the influence of the Tananarive Conference was short-lived. Soon afterwards, Kasa-Vubu and other leaders revised their positions and made it clear that the decisions of Tananarive were mere statements of intention and, unless approved by Parliament, had no force of law.

Coquilhatville Meeting

The following month, on 24 April 1961, a more important conference was convened in Coquilhatville, on the proposal of Kasa-Vubu. Gizenga again refused to attend. Tshombe came and sought to have the Conference endorse the Tananarive proposals. When his attempt was opposed by the overwhelming majority of the representatives, he decided to boycott the Conference. As he prepared to fly back to Elisabethville, he was arrested by the Leppoldville authorities, although he was released about a month later. The Conference continued nevertheless, and at the conclusion of its work, it recommended a reorganisation of the governmental structure of the Congo on a federal basis. From the outset, it had been made clear that Conference decisions would have to be endorsed by Parliament, and during the Conference, on 12 May, President Kasa-Vubu announced that Parliament would be reopened in the near future and requested United Nations assistance and protection for this purpose.

While carefully avoiding interference in the discussions between the Congolese leaders, ONUC assisted them whenever it was requested to do so. Thus it placed a guard at the site of the preliminary round-table conference in Leopoldville. It agreed to facilitate Gizenga's trip to Tananarive when he first accepted to go there. Before the Coquilhatville Conference, a Congolese leader, Cleophas Kamitatu, went to Stanleyville on an ONUC aeroplane in an effort to bring about a *rapprochement* between Gizenga and Kasa-Vubu. ONUC also made representations for Tshombe's release.

Reopening of Parliament

After Kasa-Vubu announced his intention to reconvene Parliament, ONUC spared no effort to help achieve this purpose. An essential condition for reconvening Parliament was a *rapprochement* between leaders of the Leopoldville and Stanleyville groups. To these two groups belonged the great majority of parliamentarians, and if one of them refused to attend meetings of Parliament, there would be no quorum. But the memory of Patrice Lumumba's death and its aftermath was still vivid, and leaders of the two groups were divided by deep suspicion and distrust. Through good offices and persuasion, ONUC officials did everything possible to dissipate their mutual suspicion and lay the groundwork for negotiations between them.

After Kasa-Vubu called the parliamentary session in Leopoldville, Gizenga condemned his action as illegal and ordered Parliament to meet in Kamina. Thanks to ONUC's good offices, Gizenga softened his

stand and agreed not to insist on Kamina, provided that full protection was given to parliamentarians by ONUC. Later, a meeting between Leopoldville and Stanleyville representatives was arranged at Leopoldville, under ONUC auspices, to consider the modalities of the reopening of Parliament. The Stanleyville representatives were brought to Leopoldville in an ONUC aircraft and the meeting took place at ONUC headquarters. After long discussions, an agreement was reached by the representatives of the two groups. At their joint request, ONUC accepted the responsibility for making arrangements for the session of Parliament and ensuring full protection to the parliamentarians.

In accordance with a request made by both delegations, ONUC also sought to persuade Congolese leaders of South Kasai and southern Katanga to subscribe to the agreement on the reconvening of Parliament. Both Kalonji and Tshombe', who was released from confinement by the Leopoldville authorities on 22 June 1961, promised to cooperate. Tshombe' signed a protocol calling for the reconvening of Parliament, but he changed his position after he returned to Elisabethville. Parliament reopened on 22 July with more than 200—out of a total of 221—members attending. Most of them were brought to Leopoldville with the assistance of ONUC.

Government of National Unity

On 2 August 1961, Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula, at the request of President Kasa-Vubu, constituted a Government of national unity, which was unanimously approved by both Chambers.

With the act of approval of the national unity Government, the constitutional crisis was ended. In response to a letter from Prime Minister Adoula, the Secretary-General confirmed that the United Nations would deal with his Government as the Central Government of the Republic and would render to it whatever aid and support the United Nations was in a position to give to the Congo.

Adoula endeavoured to secure Gizenga's co-operation, with the active assistance of other Stanleyville leaders and ONUC. His efforts seemed successful at first. On 7 August 1961, Gizenga recognized the Adoula Government as the sole legal Government of the Republic. Four weeks later, he came back to Leopoldville to assume the post of Deputy Prime Minister and accompanied Adoula in that capacity to a conference of non-aligned nations in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. However, Gizenga left again for Stanleyville at the beginning of October, ostensibly to collect some personal effects, and refused to return to Leopoldville despite the many appeals from Adoula. While he was in

Stanleyville, he attempted to form a new party, the Parti national lumumbiste (PANALU), and made several statements strongly hostile to the Government.

On 8 January 1962, the Chamber of Representatives adopted a resolution ordering Gizenga to return to Leopoldville without delay to answer charges of secessionism. Gizenga refused, and his defiant attitude led to fighting, on 13 January 1962, between gendarmes supporting him and ANC troops loyal to the Government, which was easily won by the latter. Thereafter, Gizenga was dismissed from the post of Deputy Prime Minister following a motion of censure by the Chamber of Representatives.

D. Termination of the Secession of Katanga (September 1961-February 1963)

United Nations Resolutions

Along with the breakdown of law and order and foreign armed intervention, the secession of Katanga was one of the main problems which confronted the Congo when it appealed to the United Nations for help. However, the Security Council's resolution of 14 July 1960 contained no mention of this point. In a second resolution, of 22 July, the Council requested all States to refrain from any action which might undermine the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo. In August, the Council called for the immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops from Katanga; however, it emphasized that the United Nations was not to take sides in Congolese internal conflicts, constitutional or otherwise, nor was the Organisation to be used to influence the outcome of any such conflict.

Secretary-General's Position

The Secretary-General's position was that, while ONUC originated from a request by the Congolese Government, the purpose of United Nations intervention as determined by the Security Council was not to achieve the domestic aims of the Government but to preserve international peace and security. The United Nations Force therefore could not, under the Council's decision, be used on behalf of the Central Government to subdue or to force the provincial government into a specific line of action in regard to an internal political controversy. At the same time, the problem of Katanga clearly had an international dimension.

What the United Nations sought to do was to encourage efforts at reconciliation and to eliminate foreign interference, which had been

instrumental in bringing about the secession of Katanga and which had helped it to endure. The withdrawal of Belgian troops from Katanga, which occurred in August 1960, did not end the secession of the province, and Tshombe's secessionist regime was able to consolidate its hold over southern Katanga, with active foreign assistance. While Belgian officers, supplemented by an increasing number of foreign mercenaries, continued to strengthen the gendarmerie, Tshombe imported large quantities of arms and war *materiel*, including aircraft, from abroad. With his improved armed forces, he launched a merciless extermination campaign against the Baluba and other political and tribal enemies. Helping to maintain law and order in Katanga and protecting large parts of the Katangese population against the brutal lawlessness of the gendarmerie accordingly became one of the principal aspects of the ONUC effort, along with the removal of the foreign political advisers, military and paramilitary personnel and mercenaries.

Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga

In carrying out its functions in Katanga, ONUC continually found itself opposed by certain foreign financial interests which, in effect, controlled the economy of the province. These interests centred about the vast industrial and mining complex of the Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga—with headquarters in Brussels, Belgium—which had apparently committed itself to Tshombe's secessionist policies.

The Union Miniere supported Tshombe' in four principal ways. Firstly, it paid nearly all of its taxes not to the Central Government, to which they were due, but to the Katangese provincial authorities. Secondly, it shipped its production not by way of the traditional "national" route, but by way of Portuguese Angola; this enabled it to credit hard-currency export duties to the account of the provincial government. Thirdly, the Congo's part of Union Miniere stock was withheld from the Central Government and kept in Brussels. Fourthly, the firm allowed its industrial facilities at Elisabethville and other places to be used by the mercenary-led gendarmerie for military purposes, including the making of some implements of war.

Non-recognition of Katanga

Despite Tshombe's efforts and the powerful financial and political support he enjoyed, his separatist movement never gained official international recognition, either in Belgium or elsewhere. Moreover, neither Belgium nor any other Government publicly espoused the cause of Katangese secession. In fact, after the establishment of the coalition Government in Brussels in the spring of 1961, its Minister for Foreign

Affairs, Paul-Henri Spaak, announced publicly his Government's opposition to the secession of Katanga.

Mercenaries

The problem of foreign elements who sought to influence the Congo's destiny in their own interests came to light soon after the country's accession to independence.

In the beginning, the bulk of these persons were Belgian professional military and civilian officials placed at the disposal of the Central Government of the Congo under the treaty of friendship with Belgium, which was signed in June 1960 but never ratified. After the severance of diplomatic relations between the Congo and Belgium, many of these men gathered in Katanga, where they gained prominent positions in the provincial administration and the gendarmerie. From these vantage points they vigorously promoted secession. In effect, they waged war on the Congolese Government at whose disposal they had been placed by their Government. Later these Belgians were joined by other nationalities.

On 21 February 1961, the Security Council urged "the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries". Implicit in this language was the finding that while the Congo was admittedly and direly in need of assistance from outside, and especially of personnel to carry out technical and professional tasks which the Congolese had not hitherto been trained to perform, there were other types of foreign personnel whose actions were incompatible with genuine Congolese independence and unity. In certain parts of the Congo, and especially in Katanga, such personnel had come to play an increasingly questionable role, obstructing the application of United Nations resolutions and, in effect, working in their own interest and in the interest of certain financial concerns, to break up the country into a balkanized congeries of politically and economically unviable states.

Secretary-General's Efforts, 1961

Immediately after the adoption of the resolution of 21 February, the Secretary-General undertook intensive diplomatic efforts to bring about the withdrawal of the foreign military and political personnel.

The Belgian Government took the position that there must be no discrimination against Belgians in engaging non-Congolese technical personnel; as for military personnel and mercenaries, the Belgian

Government divided them into several categories. Of these, it undertook to recall those whom it considered it had the legal right to request to return. But it would take no such action in respect of mercenaries or of Belgian personnel directly engaged by the Congolese Government, arguing that it was up to the Secretary-General to agree with the Congolese authorities on how to deal with them. The Secretary General expressed the view that the measures indicated by the Belgian Government fell far short of full compliance with the Security Council's resolution.

The exchanges with Belgium continued, fairly inconclusively, until the change of government in the first half of 1961, when some progress was made. A new Belgian Government notified 23 of its nationals serving in Katanga as political advisers to return to Belgium. It also acted to prevent the recruitment of mercenaries proper. But the effectiveness of these efforts soon became open to doubt. On 30 October 1961, the Government at Brussels acknowledged that this was the case and took more vigorous steps—including the withdrawal of passports from recalcitrant Belgians.

Tshombe, however, would not co-operate with ONUC. He continued to recruit foreign personnel, whose influence in the councils of the provincial government in fact tended to rise sharply. The complexion of the group also changed noticeably as mercenaries replaced Belgian professional officials. Thus the traditional colonial administrative and military elements were being supplemented through an influx of non-Belgian adventurers and soldiers of fortune, including outlawed elements previously involved in extremist, repressive and separatist policies. They drew political sustenance from the substantial non-Congolese community to which Katanga's extractive and processing industries had given rise.

Repatriation and Expulsion of Some Foreign Elements, 1961

Only after the United Nations had strengthened its position in April 1961 did the Katanga secessionist authorities, acting while Tshombe was under detention in the west, officially accept resolution 161(1961) of 21 February.

Those authorities drew up lists of persons whom they considered as falling within the terms of the resolution. By the end of June 1961, 44 Belgian nationals were thus selected for repatriation, and the cases of 22 others were under consideration. It was noted, however, that persons clearly not coming under the resolution had been included for political reasons, while others notorious for their activities had been

omitted. ONUC representatives continued to press for revision of the lists, and brought home to the provincial authorities their determination to take drastic action, if need be, to comply with the United Nations mandate.

In April 1961, 30 members of a mercenary unit known as the "*Compagnie Internationale*" were apprehended by ONUC personnel and evacuated from the Congo. By mid-June an estimated 60 more mercenaries had withdrawn from Katanga, and on 24 June the *Compagnie* was formally dissolved by the provincial government.

On 7 June 1961, following discussions with the Katangese authorities, the United Nations Force Commander dispatched a military mission to Katanga to help the authorities there to remove non-Congolese elements falling under the resolution. The mission reported that there were 510 foreign and non-commissioned officers active in the Katangese gendarmerie, as against 142 Congolese "cadres". Of the non-Congolese, 208 were the remaining Belgian professional military men; 302 were mercenaries.

But despite the unrelenting efforts of ONUC, the provincial authorities refused to take effective action to remove the foreign elements, without whom the secessionist movement might have collapsed. For its part, the Belgian Government said it was prepared to help in the removal of its professional and non-commissioned officers who had been serving the Congo and were currently in command of the gendarmerie, but it professed itself unable to do anything about "volunteers" and mercenaries. Persuasion by the Secretary-General, who discussed the matter with Foreign Minister Spaak at Geneva on 12 July 1961, was unavailing in this regard.

Gradually, the United Nations was compelled to shift to more vigorous and direct measures to achieve compliance with the Security Council's resolution. Tshombe's chief military adviser was compelled to leave in June 1961, and a prominent political adviser was apprehended, taken to Leopoldville, and evacuated in July. ONUC warned the Katangese authorities that it was prepared to compel the evacuation of other advisers and officers. Five French officers in politically sensitive gendarmerie posts were dismissed and repatriated, and a joint commission was established to list foreign political advisers, both those in official posts and others acting unofficially, who were to be repatriated.

Formation of the Adoula Government

The formation of the Adoula Government, enjoying unquestionable and internationally recognized authority, was of crucial importance in

enabling the United Nations to proceed with the elimination of foreign elements.

Before the formation of a legal government, United Nations efforts had been restricted by the requirement of avoiding political interference or support of one Congolese faction against another. Now the United Nations was able to do more effectively what the 11-month constitutional crisis had impeded—that is, help the Government remove the foreign elements that had provided the teeth of the attempt to sever, in their own interests, the Congo's richest province from the rest of the country.

Government Ordinance on Expulsions

Soon after the reopening of Parliament, Tshombe somewhat softened his stand and allowed the parliamentarians of his party in Katanga to participate in the work of Parliament. However, he himself remained in Elisabethville and showed no intention of relinquishing the powers he held in Katanga. For weeks, ONUC representatives urged Tshombe to co-operate in removing the remaining foreign elements, but to little avail.

When all attempts at negotiations failed, in order to remove what it believed to be the main obstacle to a peaceful solution to the Katanga question, Prime Minister Adoula's Government formally requested the expulsion of the mercenaries serving in Katanga and requested ONUC to assist it in carrying out the decision. An ordinance was issued on 24 August calling for expulsion of all foreign officers and mercenaries standing behind the secessionist policy.

Round-up of Mercenaries

On 28 August 1961, ONUC proceeded to round up the mercenaries for deportation. In the face of inflammatory rumours about an invasion by the ANC which had been disseminated by Godefroid Munongo, the provincial Minister of the Interior, certain security precautions were taken by ONUC in Elisabethville, including surveillance over Radio Katanga, gendarmerie headquarters and some other key points. Inflammatory broadcasts were thus prevented, and appeals for calm were put on the air.

Tshombe', who had been fully informed of the objectives of ONUC's action, expressed his readiness to co-operate. He broadcast a statement to the effect that the Katangese authorities accepted the decisions of the United Nations, and that the services of foreign military personnel were being terminated by his government.

At that point, ONUC representatives met with the Elisabethville consular corps, which offered to assume the responsibility, together with two senior Belgian officers formerly in the gendarmerie, for the orderly repatriation of the foreign personnel, most of whom were Belgians. In the interest of avoiding violence, ONUC accepted this arrangement, and suspended its own rounding-up operation.

However, the foreign military men being selected for repatriation were in the main personnel whose withdrawal had earlier been agreed to by the Belgian Government. By 9 September 1961, 273 had been evacuated and 65 were awaiting repatriation. But, while some of the volunteers and mercenaries had left, many others—about 104 of whom were known to be in Katanga—were “missing”. They were reinfiltrating into the gendarmerie, distributing arms to groups of soldiers over whom they could assert control, and getting ready for violent resistance.

At the same time, the political police (*Surete*), under Munongo and largely directed by foreign officers, launched a campaign of assaults and persecution against anti-Tshombe Baluba tribesmen in Elisabethville. An effort was made to convince the world that ONUC's actions were causing disorder. The terrorized Baluba streamed out of the city and sought safety by camping in primitive conditions near ONUC troop quarters. ONUC arranged protection for the encampment, into which 35,000 Baluba had crowded by 9 September, creating a serious food and health problem, as well as a continuing danger of tribal violence.

Attack on ONUC

When ONUC realized that the Katangese authorities had no intention of fulfilling their promises, it pressed its demand for the evacuation of foreign personnel of the Katangese security police and of the remaining mercenaries. The Katangese however, led by Tshombe, had manifestly fallen back under the domination of the foreign elements, and had let themselves be persuaded to launch violent action against ONUC. ONUC's plans for a solution of the difficulties in Elisabethville were rejected, and when on 13 September 1961 it applied security precautions similar to those of 28 August, the United Nations troops were violently attacked by gendarmes led by non-Congolese personnel.

In the morning of 13 September, Tshombe requested a ceasefire, but the attacks on United Nations troops continued. From the building housing the Belgian Consulate in Elisabethville, where a number of Belgian officers were known to be staying, sustained firing was directed

at United Nations troops. The United Nations base at Kamina was attacked, as were the United Nations garrison and installations at Albertville. Reluctantly, United Nations troops had to return the fire. All over Elisabethville, and elsewhere in Katanga, the foreign officers who had gone into hiding reappeared to lead operations against ONUC personnel.

Efforts to reinforce the troops were frustrated by the depredations of a Katangese jet fighter, piloted by a mercenary, which quickly managed to immobilize ONUC's unarmed air transport craft. The jet also played havoc with the ground movements of ONUC, which had deliberately refrained from securing offensive weapons such as fighter-planes or tanks as incompatible with its mission as a peace force.

Dag Hammarskjold's Death

In the mean time, the Secretary-General had arrived in Leopoldville at Prime Minister Adoula's invitation to discuss future prospects of the United Nations Operation in what was hoped would be a new setting created by the completion of the principal tasks assigned by the Security Council and General Assembly. He intended also to bring about a reconciliation between Leopoldville and Elisabethville. Confronted instead with a situation of confused fighting in Elisabethville, Hammarskjold devoted himself to the task of securing a cessation of hostilities and achieving reconciliation among Congolese factions. In quest of a ceasefire, he flew to Ndola, in what was then Northern Rhodesia, to meet Tshombe. On this flight, on the night of 17 September 1961, his aeroplane crashed and he was killed, together with seven other United Nations staff members and the Swedish crew.

Ceasefire, September 1961

The Secretary-General's mission was immediately taken up by the authorities of ONUC in Leopoldville. Mahmoud Khiari, the Chief of ONUC Civilian Operations, flew to Ndola and, on behalf of the United Nations forces, signed a military ceasefire agreement on 20 September. It was understood as an express condition that the agreement would not affect the application of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. A protocol for carrying out the provisions of the ceasefire was signed on 13 October 1961 at Elisabethville. While the protocol allowed firing back in case of attack, it prohibited Katangese and ONUC troop movements. In approving this protocol, the United Nations stressed its military nature, re-emphasized its support of the unity, integrity and independence of the Congo, and insisted on continued

enforcement of the Security Council resolution which called for the removal of mercenaries.

Katangese Violations of the Ceasefire

Although prisoners were exchanged and certain positions held by ONUC in Elisabethville during the fighting were duly released, in accordance with the protocol, Tshombe's regime was soon flouting the provisions of the ceasefire agreement. In Leopoldville, his emissaries made it clear that nothing less than independence along the lines of the Tananarive decisions would be acceptable to the Elisabethville authorities. Meanwhile, the remaining Katangese mercenaries were leading the gendarmerie in a long series of violations of the ceasefire agreement, going so far as to launch offensive air action along the Kasai Katanga frontier. This was strongly protested by the United Nations. While strictly abiding by the ceasefire in Katanga, ONUC took steps to prevent the recurrence of the September situation when it had found itself powerless to stop the attacks of Katanga's jet fighters. Three Member States—Ethiopia, India and Sweden—provided jet fighter squadrons to the United Nations Force to strengthen its defensive capacity.

At the same time, however, the Force's ground strength was being whittled away. The Tunisian contingent had been withdrawn in August 1961 because of events in Tunisia; the Ghanaian contingent subsequently withdrew, and certain other ONUC units were reduced. Not unaware of these developments, Tshombe and the foreign elements supporting him were determined to turn secession into an accomplished fact. ONUC-sponsored talks between the Central Government and Katanga were subjected to stalling tactics. At least 237 persons, chiefly mercenaries falling under the provisions of the Security Council's resolution, remained in Katanga, many of whom donned civilian garb.

ANC Offensives

Despairing of a peaceful solution, the Central Government attempted to deal with Katanga's secession independently, by the use of force, in late October 1961. The strength of the national army was built up on the border of northern Katanga in preparation for entry into that region. At the beginning of November, a detachment of the ANC entered northern Katanga in the Kamina area, but was immediately repelled by Katangese gendarmes. Later, ANC units from Stanleyville succeeded in reaching Albertville, Nyunzu, Kongolo and other towns of northern Katanga. To facilitate this move, the

Government had requested ONUC assistance for the transport of its troops. The request was turned down because, as had been the case from the outset, it remained against ONUC principles to become a party to an internal conflict.

Security Council Authorises ONUC to Remove Mercenaries

In the latter part of November 1961, the Security Council was convened once again to examine the situation in the Congo. By resolution 169(1961) of 24 November 1961, the Council strongly deprecated the secessionist activities in Katanga and authorized the Secretary-General to use force to complete the removal of mercenaries.

After the adoption of the resolution, Tshombe launched an inflammatory propaganda campaign against ONUC which soon degenerated into incitement to violence. The results were not long in coming. On 28 November 1961, two senior United Nations officials in Elisabethville were abducted and badly beaten; later an Indian soldier was murdered and an Indian major abducted. Several members of the United Nations Force were detained, and others were killed or wounded. Road-blocks were established by the gendarmerie, impeding ONUC's freedom of movement and endangering its lifelines. It subsequently became known that this was part of a deliberate plan to cut off the United Nations troops in Elisabethville, and either force them to surrender or otherwise destroy them. For one week, United Nations officials sought to settle the crisis by peaceful negotiations. But when it became evident that, in the face of the bad faith displayed by Katangese authorities, no commitments could be relied upon, and that, while pretending to negotiate, those authorities were preparing for more assaults, ONUC finally decided to take action to regain and assure its freedom of movement.

Fighting of December 1961

ONUC had few troops in Elisabethville when fighting broke out on 5 December 1961. Until 14 December, ONUC forces endeavoured to hold their positions and to maintain communications between units while reinforcements were hurriedly flown in from other parts of the Congo. On 15 December, having received enough reinforcements, ONUC troops moved to seize control of those positions in Elisabethville necessary to ensure their freedom of movement. In so doing, they worked their way around the perimeter of the city, in order to keep destruction and civilian casualties to the strict minimum. This objective was achieved within three days.

From the outset of the hostilities, United Nations military and civilian officers did their best, in co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, to relieve the distress caused to innocent civilians. Persons caught in areas where firing had been initiated by the gendarmerie were escorted to safety, at the risk of ONUC personnel's lives; food supplies were provided where needed; special arrangements for the evacuation of women and children were made by ONUC. notwithstanding the shortage of troops, ONUC employed a whole battalion to guard the Baluba refugee camp, where more than 40,000 anti-Tshombe Baluba lived under United Nations protection. ONUC troops, on the one hand, prevented them from raiding Elisabethville and, on the other, protected them from the gendarmes who launched several attacks on the camp.

Kitona Declaration

On 19 December 1961, having ensured the positions necessary for its security, ONUC ordered its troops to hold fire unless fired upon. The same day, Tshombe left Elisabethville to confer with Prime Minister Adoula at Kitona, the United Nations military base in Leopoldville province. After that, major fighting between ONUC and Katangese forces ceased. ONUC immediately turned its efforts to the re-establishment of normal conditions in Elisabethville. It co-operated closely with the local police to stop looting, to rid private houses of squatters and, in general, to restore and maintain law and order.

The Kitona meeting was arranged with the assistance of ONUC and the United States Ambassador in the Congo following a request by Tshombe on 14 December 1961, when the fighting in Elisabethville was in full swing. After meeting Prime Minister Adoula all day long on 20 December, Tshombe signed early in the morning of 21 December an eight-point Declaration. In this Declaration, he accepted the application of the *Loi fondamentale*, recognized the authority of the Central Government in Leopoldville over all parts of the Congo and agreed to a number of steps aimed at ending the secession of Katanga. He also pledged himself to ensure respect for the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly and to facilitate their implementation.

In accordance with the provisions of the Kitona Declaration, Tshombe sent 14 parliamentarians from Katanga to Leopoldville to participate in the session of Parliament. Three Katangese officials were also dispatched to the capital to participate in discussions for the modification of the constitutional structure of the Congo. In both cases,

ONUC ensured the safety of the representatives during their journey to and from Leopoldville and their stay there.

While making the concessions contained in the Declaration, Tshombe stated that he had no authority to decide on the future of Katanga, and he summoned the provincial Assembly to meet in Elisabethville to discuss the Declaration. On 15 February, that Assembly decided to accept the "draft declaration" of Kitona only as a basis for discussions with the Central Government.

Following this action, Prime Minister Adoula invited Tshombe to meet with him in Leopoldville to discuss the procedure for carrying out the provisions of the Declaration, but attempts at peaceful resolution through the talks failed; the agreement was not implemented owing to the procrastination and intransigence of the Katangese leader. The talks were suspended in June 1962 without agreement.

Secretary-General's Plan of National Reconciliation

Given the failure of the negotiations, after consultation with various Member States, Secretary-General U Thant, in August 1962, proposed a "Plan of National Reconciliation", which was ultimately accepted by both Adoula and Tshombe. It provided for: a federal system of government; division of revenues and foreign-exchange earnings between the Central and provincial governments; unification of currency; integration and unification of all military, paramilitary and gendarme units into the structure of a national army; general amnesty; reconstitution of the Central Government giving representation to all political and provincial groups; withdrawal of representatives abroad not serving the Central Government; and freedom of movement for United Nations personnel throughout the Congo.

End of the Secession of Katanga

After acceptance of the Plan of National Reconciliation, a draft federal constitution was prepared by United Nations experts, and amnesty was proclaimed by the Central Government in late November 1962. On the Katanga side, however, no substantial steps were taken to implement the Plan. In this situation, U Thant requested Member States, on 11 December, to bring economic pressure on the Katangese authorities, particularly by stopping the export of copper and cobalt. But before that action became effective, the Katangese, unprovokedly, fired on United Nations positions. Although the firing continued for six days, ONUC did not fire back but tried to resolve the situation by negotiation.

Immediately after the breakdown of the negotiations, ONUC began action to restore the security of its troops and their freedom of movement, the first phase being the clearing of the road-blocks from which Katangese troops had been directing fire at ONUC personnel. Ethiopian, Indian and Irish troops took part in the operations.

Wherever ONUC troops appeared, the gendarmerie offered little or no resistance. By 30 December 1962, all the Katangese road-blocks around Elisabethville had been cleared and ONUC forces were in effective control of an area extending approximately 20 kilometres around the city. Meanwhile, around Kamina, Ghanaian and Swedish troops, advancing in a two-pronged attack, had succeeded in occupying that town on the morning of 30 December. Thus, the first phase of the operations was completed.

The second phase started on 31 December, when Indian troops of the United Nations Force began to move towards Jadotville (now Likasi). The next day, ONUC advance elements reached the Lufira River, which they crossed by nightfall, although both bridges had been destroyed. On 2 January 1963, after having met some gendarmerie resistance on the other side of that river, ONUC troops resumed their advance and reached Jadotville on 3 January, where they were greeted by the cheers of the population. At the same time, ONUC troops also reached the town of Kipushi, south of Elisabethville.

By 4 January, ONUC troops had secured themselves in the Elisabethville, Kipushi, Kamina and Jadotville areas. In all these areas, measures were taken to restore essential services and protect the local population. In the mean time, Tshombe, who had left Elisabethville on 28 December 1962, had proceeded through Northern Rhodesia to Kolwezi, his last stronghold. To avoid useless bloodshed and destruction of industrial installations, the United Nations ordered its troops to slow their advance towards Kolwezi while the Secretary-General continued his efforts to persuade Tshombe to cease all resistance.

On 14 January 1963, the Secretary-General received, through Belgian Government channels, a message from Tshombe and his ministers meeting at Kolwezi. They announced their readiness to end the secession of Katanga, to grant ONUC troops complete freedom of movement and to arrange for the implementation of the Plan of National Reconciliation. They asked that the Central Government immediately put into effect the amnesty called for in the Plan in order to guarantee the freedom and safety of the Katangese government and of all who worked under its authority.

The Secretary-General welcomed Tshombe's message and informed him on 15 January that the United Nations would do its utmost to assist in the fulfilment of the promise implicit in Tshombe's statement. On 15 January, President Kasa-Vubu and Prime Minister Adoula separately confirmed that the amnesty proclamation of November 1962 remained valid. It was also announced, on 16 January, that Joseph Ileo had been appointed Minister of State Resident at Elisabethville, for the purpose of facilitating the process of reintegration.

On 16 January, Tshombe informed the Secretary-General that he was prepared to discuss at Elisabethville arrangements for ONUC's entry into Kolwezi. The next day, after four hours of discussions at ONUC headquarters, the Acting Representative of the United Nations at Elisabethville, the general officer commanding ONUC troops in the Katanga area and Tshombe signed a document in which Tshombe undertook to facilitate the peaceful entry of ONUC into Kolwezi, to be completed by 21 January. It was understood that pending arrangements for the integration of the gendarmerie, the security of its members would be fully ensured by ONUC, They would not be treated as prisoners of war and would be able to continue to wear their uniforms in Kolwezi.

As agreed, Indian troops of ONUC entered Kolwezi in the afternoon of 21 January. Meanwhile, the situation became increasingly volatile in northern Katanga because of sizeable groups of disorganized but heavily armed gendarmes. Consequently, in the morning of 20 January, Indonesian troops disembarked at Baudouinville (now Moba) and shortly thereafter secured the town and its airport. On the same day, a Nigerian unit starting from Kongolo and a Malayan unit coming from Bukavu cleared the Kongolo pocket where there had remained a considerable gendarme force.

By 21 January, the United Nations Force had under its control all important centres hitherto held by the Katangese, and quickly restored law and order there. The Katangese gendarmerie ceased to exist as an organized fighting force. Thanks to the skill and restraint displayed by ONUC troops, the casualties incurred during the fighting were relatively light. In the 24 days of activity, ONUC casualties were 10 killed and 77 wounded. Katangese casualties also appeared to have been low.

At the beginning of January 1963, 22 officials and officers representing the Central Government arrived at Elisabethville to make up an administrative commission to prepare the way for the integration

of the provincial administration into the Central Government. Ileo and his party arrived on 23 January to assume their duties. Shortly before that, Prime Minister Adoula had requested ONUC to give Ileo all the assistance and co-operation he might require. It had been agreed between the Central Government and ONUC that all the military forces in Katanga would be placed under the single command of ONUC. At ONUC's suggestion, Adoula declared that gendarmes who rejoined the Congolese National Army by a certain date would retain their ranks.

Progress was also achieved with regard to the economic reintegration of Katanga. On 15 January, an agreement on foreign exchange was signed at Leopoldville by the representatives of the Central Government and a representative of the Union Miniere, who had come from Belgium, in the presence of the Director of the Bank of Katanga. In brief, that agreement provided that the Union Miniere would remit all its export proceeds to the Congolese Monetary Council, which would in turn allocate to the Union Miniere the foreign exchange it needed to carry out its operations. The allocation of foreign exchange by the Central Government to the provincial authorities was to be discussed separately by that Government and the provincial authorities of southern Katanga.

Under a decree of 9 January 1963, the Monetary Council assumed control of the "National Bank of Katanga" and ensured the resumption of the Bank's operations, with ONUC's assistance.

Thus, the secession of Katanga had been brought to an end, and with this an important phase of ONUC had been completed.

E. Consolidation of the Congolese Government (February 1963-June 1964)

Introduction

While the period from the end of the Katangese secession until ONUC's withdrawal in June 1964 is the main subject of this section, with the Congolese Central Government authority now extended to the whole country, it is convenient first to consider ONUC's early efforts to assist that Government in regard to civilian operations and the retraining of the Congolese army and security forces.

Civilian Operations

A main objective of ONUC was to provide the Congolese Government with technical assistance for the smooth operation of all

essential services and the continued development of the national economy. The situation faced by ONUC at the beginning immediately assumed unprecedented proportions. In the absence of functioning governmental and economic machinery which could receive and use expert advice and training services, the Secretary-General at once mobilized the resources of the United Nations family of organisations under the authority of a Chief of Civilian Operations. A consultative group of experts was set up, consisting of senior officials of the United Nations and the specialized agencies concerned.

The first task was to restore or maintain minimum essential public services. Engineers, air traffic controllers, meteorologists, radio operators, postal experts, physicians, teachers and other specialists were rushed into the country. An emergency project was carried out to halt the silting of the port of Matadi and to restore navigation. In response to the Central Government's appeal, the United Nations agreed, in August 1960, to provide \$5 million to finance essential governmental services as well as essential imports.

In the economic and financial fields, ONUC helped in setting up and managing monetary, foreign exchange and foreign trade controls, without which the country's slender resources might have been drained away and all semblance of a monetary system might have collapsed.

In all these fields, as well as in agriculture, labour and public administration, ONUC's efforts were designed chiefly to improve the ability of the Congolese authorities to discharge their responsibilities towards the population despite the precipitate departure of non-Congolese technicians and administrators. As it soon became obvious that the needs would continue for some time, the Secretary-General proposed and the General Assembly, by resolution 1474(ES-IV) of 20 September 1960, approved the establishment of a United Nations Fund for the Congo, financed by voluntary contributions. Its purpose was to restore the economic life of the country and to carry on its public services as well as possible.

The Assembly's action coincided with the outbreak of the constitutional crisis of September 1960. As a result of that crisis, ONUC could not deal with any authorities, except for President Joseph Kasa-Vubu, on the nation-wide plane, and could not furnish advice at the ministerial level. As the emergency conditions continued, however, the ONUC effort did not flag, and was carried on in co-operation with those Congolese authorities exercising *de facto* control in the provinces or localities where United Nations Civilian Operations were being undertaken.

Famine conditions in some areas, and widespread unemployment, led the Secretary-General to institute refugee relief and relief-work programmes. The worst conditions developed in South Kasai in the second half of 1960, where it was reported that some 200 persons were dying daily from starvation as a result of disruptions caused by tribal warfare. For six months, the United Nations shipped and distributed food and medical supplies in the area. While several thousand persons died before the United Nations effort began, the number of lives saved approximated a quarter of a million.

In the mean time, foreign exchange reserves were running low, owing to the political and economic situation. Accordingly, in June 1961, an agreement was arrived at between President Kasa-Vubu and the Secretary-General, by which the United Nations put funds at the disposal of the Republic for financing a programme of essential imports. It was agreed that such assistance must benefit the population of the country as a whole.

Despite the constitutional crisis, United Nations training services continued as a long-range operation. They were regarded as an investment in the development of human resources so as to fill the huge void caused by the shortage of indigenous operational and executive personnel. Training courses were organized for air traffic controllers, agricultural assistants, farm mechanics, foresters, medical assistants, labour officials, police commissioners, etc. To train Congolese operators and instructors, a telecommunications training centre was set up; to train primary and secondary school teachers and inspectors, a national pedagogical institute was established. Undergraduate medical studies were fostered. A national school of law and administration was opened to produce competent civil servants; a technical college was set up to train junior engineers, public works foremen and the like. Fellowships for study abroad were awarded to school directors, medical students, police officers, social workers and others in need of training, for whom adequate facilities were not available in the Congo. Furthermore, a programme was prepared for the reorganisation and retraining of the Congolese National Army.

In 1960 and 1961, ONUC Civilian Operations were able to provide about 600 experts and technicians to do the jobs of departing Belgian personnel. These experts and technicians, drawn from some 48 nationalities, were made available to the Congo by the United Nations and its specialized agencies for work in a variety of fields, such as finance and economics, health, transport, public administration, agriculture, civil aviation, public works, mining and natural resources,

postal services, meteorology, telecommunications, judicature, labour, education, social welfare, youth training and community development. In addition, a large number of secondary school teachers were recruited with the assistance of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation. These assistance programmes continued at about the same level until 1964, despite financial and other difficulties.

The end of the Katangese secession in January 1963 brought with it new responsibilities for the United Nations Civilian Operations programme, since experts became urgently needed to help the Central Government in the reintegration of services previously under Katangese rule, such as postal services, customs and excise, immigration, civil aviation, telecommunications and banking. An expert mission was required to survey the 40 rail and road bridges destroyed or damaged.

As a result of the various training programmes set up by ONUC, it became possible in 1963 to replace some international personnel by qualified Congolese, particularly in the postal, meteorological, telecommunications and civil aviation services. In 1963, 55 of the 130 medical assistants sent abroad for training in 1960-1961 under World Health Organisation auspices returned to the Congo and were assigned to various parts of the country.

Reorganisation of the Congolese Armed Forces, 1960-1963

Nearly all the grave incidents mentioned in earlier sections were caused by military elements of Congolese armed forces, whether they were part of the Congolese National Army, the Katangese gendarmerie or the Kalonji forces in South Kasai. From the outset, it was considered an essential task of ONUC to assist the Congolese Government in establishing discipline in the armed forces. These forces were to be brought under a unified command, the rebellious elements eliminated and the remaining ones reorganized and retrained. ONUC offered the Congolese Government full support and co-operation to achieve these objectives.

The United Nations Operation in the Congo took its first step towards the reorganisation of the Congolese National Army when the Deputy Commander of the United Nations Force was appointed adviser to the ANC at the end of July 1960, at the request of Prime Minister Lumumba. Shortly thereafter, the ANC began to re-form in new units and to engage in the training of its officers and men. This programme was interrupted at the end of August because of the Government's plan to invade Kasai and Katanga, and later ONUC was compelled to abandon it altogether because of the political struggle which began in September 1960.

After the Adoula Government was set up, in August 1961, ONUC's efforts were resumed and the new Deputy Force Commander prepared a reorganisation programme to be carried out in full cooperation with the Government.

Nevertheless, difficulties were later encountered in regard to ONUC assistance in this area. After December 1962, it became clear that Prime Minister Adoula wanted the Secretary-General to request six countries—Belgium, Canada, Israel, Italy, Norway and the United States—to provide personnel and *materiel* for reorganising and training the various armed services.

The Secretary-General had doubts—which were shared by the Advisory Committee composed of ONUC troop-contributors—about the advisability of the United Nations assuming sponsorship of what was, essentially, bilateral military assistance by a particular group of States. He therefore concluded that it was not feasible to grant Adoula's specific request, although he continued to hope that a way would be found to make it possible for the ANC to receive the necessary training assistance through ONUC. That hope was not realized, however, and eventually the programme for the training of the ANC was carried out outside the United Nations.

F. WINDING UP OF ONUC

Situation in February 1963

On 4 February 1963, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on the extent to which the mandates given to ONUC by the Council's resolutions had been fulfilled and on the tasks still to be completed.

Regarding the maintenance of the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, the secession of Katanga was ended and there was no direct threat to Congo's independence from external sources. That part of the mandate was largely fulfilled.

The mandate to prevent civil war, given in February 1961, was also substantially fulfilled as was, for all practical purposes, the removal of foreign military and paramilitary personnel and mercenaries.

Assistance in maintaining law and order was continuing and, with the vast improvements in that regard, a substantial reduction of ONUC forces was being made.

In view of these accomplishments, the phase of active involvement of United Nations troops was concluded, and a new phase was

beginning, which would give greater emphasis to civilian operations and technical assistance.

General Assembly Resolution of 18 October 1963

No specific termination date for the United Nations Force in the Congo had been set by any Security Council resolution. However, the General Assembly had, on 27 June 1963 at its fourth special session, adopted resolution 1876(S-IV) appropriating funds for the Force, which, in the absence of any subsequent action, would in effect have established 31 December 1963 as the terminal date for ONUC's military phase.

In a report to the Security Council dated 17 September 1963 the Secretary-General stated that, in the light of the Assembly's resolution, he was proceeding with a phasing-out schedule for the complete withdrawal of the Force by the end of 1963. He drew attention, however, to a letter dated 22 August 1963 from Prime Minister Adoula who, while agreeing with the substantial reduction of the Force that had already been carried out, saw a need for the continued presence of a small United Nations force of about 3,000 officers and men through the first half of 1964.

In this connection, the Secretary-General expressed the opinion that cogent reasons existed in support of prolonging the stay of the Force. There could be no doubt that the presence of a United Nations Force in the Congo would continue to be helpful through the first half of 1964, or longer. But the time must come soon when the Government of the Congo would have to assume full responsibility for security and for law and order in the country.

Acting upon the Congolese Government's request for reduced military assistance up to 30 June 1964, the General Assembly decided, on 18 October 1963, by resolution 1885(XVIII), to continue the *ad hoc* account for the United Nations Operation in the Congo until 30 June 1964, and authorized an expenditure of up to \$18.2 million to that effect.

In accordance with the Assembly's resolution, the United Nations Force in the Congo was maintained beyond-1963, but its strength was gradually brought down from 6,535 in December 1963 to 3,297 in June 1964.

Secretary-General's Report, 29 June 1964

The Secretary-General, in a report of 29 June 1964, affirmed his earlier conclusions that most of ONUC's objectives had been fulfilled.

He indicated his intention to continue technical assistance, within available financial resources, after OUNC's withdrawal.

As to maintenance of law and order, he noted considerable deterioration in a number of localities, especially in Kwilu, Kivu and northern Katanga. He observed, however, that maintenance of law and order, which was one of the main attributes of sovereignty, was principally the responsibility of the Congolese Government, and that ONUC's role had been limited to assisting the Government, to the extent of its means, when it was requested to do so.

The Secretary-General recalled the difficulties ONUC had encountered in attempting to assist the Government in training and reorganising the Congolese security forces. He said the ANC was now an integrated body of 29,000 soldiers with a unified command, but was still insufficiently trained and officered to cope with a major crisis.

In view of the uncertainties affecting the Congo, the Secretary-General observed, the question was often asked why the stay of ONUC had not been extended beyond the end of June 1964. First, he said, the Congolese Government had not requested an extension. Secondly, a special session of the General Assembly would be required to extend any mandate.

In any case, the Secretary-General concluded, a further extension would provide no solution to the Congo's severe difficulties. The time had come when the Congolese Government would have to assume full responsibility for its own security, law and order, and territorial integrity. He believed this was the position of the Congolese Government, since it had not requested a further extension of ONUC.

Withdrawal of the Force

On 30 June 1964, the United Nations Force in the Congo withdrew from that country according to plan. With the completion of the military phase of ONUC, the Civilian Operations programme was formally discontinued. However, the overall programme of technical assistance which had been supplied by the United Nations family of organisations continued under the responsibility of the Office of the Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme.

40

United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador

LOCATION: El Salvador

HEADQUARTERS: San Salvador

DURATION: July 1991 to present

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: Approximately 1,000 military and police personnel, 170 international civilian staff, and 187 local staff

FATALITIES: 3

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
AND CHIEF OF MISSION: Enrique ter Horst (Venezuela)

Background

ONUSAL was established under Security Council resolution 693 (1991 of 20 May 1991). Its divisions, set up at different times during the course of the mission, are: Human Rights, Military and Police. An Electoral Division was created in September 1993, pursuant to Security Council resolution 832 (1993) and was dissolved on 30 April 1994 upon the culmination of the electoral process. The first Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission of ONUSAL was Iqbal Riza (Pakistan), who served until March 1993. He was succeeded by Augusto Ramirez-Ocampo (Colombia), who served until March 1994, when he was succeeded by Enrique ter Horst (Venezuela).

The establishment of ONUSAL in 1991 came about as a result of a complex negotiating process, initiated by the Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) in September 1989 and conducted by the parties under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General. The objective of the negotiations was to achieve a series of political agreements aimed at resolving the

pronged armed conflict in El Salvador by political means as speedily as possible, promoting democratisation in the country, guaranteeing unrestricted respect for human rights and reunifying Salvadorian society. It was envisaged that implementation of all agreements that might be signed between the two parties would be subject to verification by the United Nations.

The first substantive agreement was achieved on 26 July 1990, when the Government of El Salvador and FMLN signed, at San Jose, Costa Rica, the Agreement on Human Rights. This Agreement provided for the establishment of a United Nations verification mission to monitor nationwide respect for and the guarantee of human rights and fundamental freedoms in El Salvador. According to the Agreement, the Mission was to take up its duties as of the cessation of the armed conflict. Shortly after signing the Agreement, however, the two parties independently requested that the Mission be set up even before a ceasefire, leading the Secretary-General to send a preliminary mission in March 1991 to help him determine the feasibility of acceding to this request.

Establishment of ONUSAL

On 20 May 1991, following the Secretary-General's recommendation, the Security Council, by its resolution 693 (1991), decided to establish the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), as an integrated peace-keeping operation, to monitor all agreements concluded between the Government of El Salvador and FMLN. The Mission's initial mandate was to verify the compliance by the parties with the San Jose Agreement on Human Rights.

At that stage, the tasks of the Mission included actively monitoring the human rights situation in El Salvador; investigating specific cases of alleged human rights violations; promoting human rights in the country; making recommendations for the elimination of violations; and reporting on these matters to the Secretary-General and, through him, to the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council.

Verification of San Jose Agreement

ONUSAL was launched on 26 July 1991, at which time it absorbed a small preparatory office established in San Salvador in January of that year. In assuming its initial tasks, ONUSAL adopted a two-phase approach. During the preparatory phase, from July through September, ONUSAL set up its regional offices and laid the operational and conceptual bases for its future work. On 1 October 1991, the Mission

entered its second phase of operations, in which it began to investigate cases and situations involving allegations of human rights violations and to follow them up systematically with the competent State organs and with FMLN. The purpose of these activities was to establish the veracity of such allegations and, where required, to follow the actions taken to identify and punish those responsible and to deter such violations in future. During this phase, ONUSAL significantly expanded its contacts with the parties, establishing flexible, stable coordination mechanisms with them. In addition, the Mission initiated both a human rights education programme and an information campaign on human rights.

First Enlargement of Mandate

Meanwhile, steady progress was made in the negotiations on other political agreements aimed at ending the armed conflict in El Salvador. On 31 December 1991, following more than two weeks of protracted negotiations at United Nations Headquarters in New York, the parties signed the Act of New York which, combined with the agreements previously signed at San Jose (26 July 1990), Mexico City (27 April 1991) and New York (25 September 1991), completed the negotiations on all substantive issues of the peace process. The parties also agreed that the final Peace Agreement would be signed at Mexico City on 16 January 1992.

The Peace Agreement included two sections in particular that required a substantial enlargement of ONUSAL's mandate, namely, those on the cessation of the armed conflict, according to which ONUSAL was to verify all aspects of the ceasefire and the separation of forces, and on the National Civil Police, which envisaged that ONUSAL should monitor the maintenance of public order during the transition period while the new National Civil Police was being set up.

On 14 January 1992, following the Secretary-General's recommendation, the Security Council, by its resolution 729 (1992), unanimously decided to enlarge ONUSAL's mandate and to increase its strength in order to fulfil verification requirements of the agreements. After signature of the "Peace Agreement" in Mexico City on 16 January 1992, the Secretary-General took immediate steps to enable the Mission to implement its expanded mandate.

ONUSAL Structure

The Human Rights Division was established in ONUSAL's first phase of operation to verify the implementation of the Agreement on

Human Rights. Following the enlargement of ONUSAL's mandate on 14 January 1992, two new Divisions—Military and Police—were established.

All ONUSAL Divisions have been under the overall direction of the Chief of Mission, whose office, composed of a team of political affairs officers, has been directly responsible for monitoring and promoting the implementation of all the political aspects of the Peace Agreement.

Human Rights Division

The Human Rights Division, which continues to be responsible for verifying the implementation of the Human Rights Agreement, comprises approximately 30 human rights observers and legal advisers. The Mission's Regional Coordinators also deal with all the human rights aspects of the Mission's mandate, and report directly to the Director of the Division in this respect. The active verification carried out by the Division is directed not only at an objective recording of facts, but also at the exercise of good offices aimed at assisting efforts by Salvadorians to find a remedy to violations. The Division also cooperates with Salvadorian institutions to strengthen their ability to work in promoting human rights. Of particular importance in this regard is the Division's cooperation with the National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights and the Division's activities with human rights non-governmental organisations, with a view to contributing to the training of their personnel and enhancing their leadership capacity.

During the course of the Mission, the Director of the Human Rights Division has prepared 12 periodic reports reflecting the situation of human rights in the country. These reports have been submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly and the Security Council. Beginning with the ninth report, the Division has included an analysis of trends, examining the quantitative data on a composite basis and making possible a qualitative approach to identifying trends in the evolution of the human rights situation.

Military Division

From its establishment in July 1991, ONUSAL benefited from the services of 15 military officers from Canada, Brazil, Ecuador, Spain and Venezuela, who provided liaison with the military chiefs of the two parties to the conflict, in order to facilitate the Mission's complex tasks. The officers also carried out, jointly with the United Nations Observer Mission in Central America (ONUCA), operations through

which FMLN commanders in the field were escorted from their respective conflict zones to and from the negotiations in Mexico and New York.

Once the Peace Agreement was signed, the Military Division, established on 20 January 1992 with an authorized strength of 380 military observers, was responsible for verifying the cessation of the armed conflict, dealing with the redeployment of the Armed Forces of El Salvador to the positions they would maintain in normal peace time, and the concentration of the FMLN forces in agreed "designated locations" in the areas of conflict. Its function was to monitor the troops of both parties in these locations, verify the inventories of weapons and personnel, authorize and accompany the movements of both forces, and receive and investigate complaints of violations. The Division was also engaged in the coordination of the Plan for the Prevention of Accidents from Mines, and has helped control and coordinate the clearing of 425 minefields. The Division was reduced in number, following the culmination, on 15 December 1992, of the ceasefire process. It was further reduced after 31 May 1993 and again in December 1994, given the advances in the peace process. ONUSAL military observers have continued to carry out a number of verification tasks within the framework of the Peace Agreement. Their current strength is 3.

Police Division

From its inception, ONUSAL benefited from the service of 16 police officials from Spain, France and Italy.

One of the fundamental components of the Peace Agreements is the creation of a new Salvadorian police force, the National Civil Police (PNC), to replace the old public security structures. The Police Division of ONUSAL, composed mostly of specialists in the organisation and operation of civilian police forces, has monitored National Police activities during the transition from armed conflict to national reconciliation, thereby providing the Salvadorian people with a sense of security. The authorized strength of the Police Division was 631. Its current strength is 31. The deployment of police observers throughout the territory of El Salvador began on 7 February 1992.

ONUSAL police observers also supervised and provided instruction to the Auxiliary Transitory Police (PAT), which operated between October 1992 and July 1993. PAT was responsible for maintaining public order and security in the former zones of conflict until their substitution by the new National Civil Police. It was made up of recruits

from the National Public Security Academy, which began its activities on 1 September 1992. ONUSAL monitors the admission examinations to the Academy and recommends improvements where necessary. The effective monitoring of the functioning of the Academy has been strengthened by the presence of an ONUSAL observer in the Academic Council. ONUSAL also provides support to the Academy to strengthen its training courses on human rights.

The Police Division assumed additional functions as territorial deployment of the National Civil Police began in March 1993. In response to a request submitted by the Government and in close coordination with the international technical team that provides advice to the Director-General of PNC, the Division carried out, between 1 April and 30 September 1993, an evaluation of the performance of the new police force in the field and provided it with technical advice and logistical support. On 27 July 1994, the National Civil Police and ONUSAL signed a framework agreement. The PNC also signed memorandums of understanding on technical cooperation with the Police Division and Human Rights Division of ONUSAL, respectively.

The Division also assisted in efforts to locate illegal arms caches and supported the Human Rights Division. Police observers have conducted special inquiries when required and ensured that appropriate security measures were provided for FMLN leaders, as established by the Accords. Support was also provided to the Electoral Division.

Adjustments to the Timetable

Under the timetable for the implementation of the Peace Agreements, the process of ending the armed conflict was to have been completed by 31 October 1992. By that time, the Government of El Salvador was to have completed several major commitments of a political and institutional nature and FMLN was to have demobilized all its combatants, destroyed their armament and reintegrated them into civilian life under programmes provided by the Government.

However, the tightness of the timetable, together with the complexity of the issues involved, led to major delays in completing certain commitments crucial for the overall implementation of the peace process. Consequently, adjustments had to be made, on 17 June and again on 19 August 1992, to those parts of the timetable that had been affected. In both these adjustments, the fulfilment of certain key commitments had to be postponed beyond 31 October 1992. Among them were the provision of agricultural land in the former zones of conflict, which was originally to have been completed by the end of

July 1992, and the establishment of the National Public Security Academy, which was due on 1 May 1992.

On 30 September 1992, FMLN informed the United Nations that, in order to maintain the link in the original timetable between the key undertakings of the two parties, it would suspend demobilisation of its forces until new dates had been set for the start of the transfer of land and other aspects of the Agreement that had fallen behind schedule. On 13 October, the Secretary-General presented a proposal regarding the solution of the land issue, which was accepted by FMLN and the Government on 15 and 16 October, respectively.

While an agreement on the land issue was reached, it became evident that the complete dismantling of the FMLN military structure by 31 October 1992 would be difficult to achieve. On 23 October, the Secretary-General proposed to the parties a new target date of 15 December 1992. FMLN accepted the proposal contingent upon its acceptance by the Government. The Government, however, reserved its position on some aspects of the proposal and suspended the restructuring, reduction and demobilisation of its Armed Forces.

In these circumstances, the Secretary-General sent Murrack Goulding, then Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, and Alvaro de Soto, Senior Political Adviser to the Secretary-General, to San Salvador in late October 1992 to assist in overcoming difficulties. He was informed subsequently that these consultations with the parties led to arrangements for the formal ending of the armed conflict on 15 December. The arrangements also included agreement by President Alfredo Cristiani of El Salvador to complete implementation of the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission on Purification of the Armed Forces. The Commission, the establishment of which was provided for by the Peace Agreements, was set up on 19 May 1992, and submitted its report to President Cristiani and to the Secretary-General on 22 September. However, difficulties emerged, *Inter alia*, regarding the timetable for the implementation of those recommendations.

ONUSAL has closely followed all issues related to the creation of the new National Civil Police, the political participation of FMLN, the restoration of public administration in former zones of conflict, and reforms of the judicial and electoral systems. In addition, the Mission participated as an observer in the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), mandated to oversee the implementation of all political agreements reached by the parties.

End of the Armed Conflict

On 23 December 1992, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that the armed conflict between the Government of El Salvador and FMLN had been brought formally to an end on 15 December in accordance with the agreed adjustments in the timetable for implementing the Peace Agreements. This event, which had been preceded the previous evening by the legalisation of FMLN as a political party, was marked by a ceremony presided over by President Cristiani and attended by the Secretary-General and a number of international statesmen.

The Secretary-General described the event as "a defining moment in the history of El Salvador, whose long-suffering people can now look forward to a future in which political, economic and social arguments will be settled through the processes of democracy and not by war." At the same time, he stressed that it did not mark the end of the peace process in El Salvador. It was important, he stated, that both parties, and the international community, should persevere in their efforts to ensure implementation of the remaining provisions of the Peace Agreements.

Second Enlargement of Mandate

ONUSAL's mandate was enlarged a second time after the Government of El Salvador, on 8 January 1993, formally requested United Nations observation of the elections for the presidency, the Legislative Assembly, mayors and municipal councils, due in March 1994. The Secretary General informed the Security Council of the request and stated that, given the importance of these elections, it was his intention to recommend that the Council accept it.

A technical mission visited El Salvador from 18 to 28 April 1993 to define the terms of reference, concept of operations and financial implications of expanding the ONUSAL mandate. The Secretary-General summarized the main findings of the mission in his 21 May 1993 report to the Security Council and stated that the elections were likely to be the culminating point of the entire peace process. The Salvadorian Supreme Electoral Tribunal would receive full cooperation from ONUSAL should the Security Council approve his recommendation that the Mission be authorized to observe the electoral process.

The Security Council approved the Secretary-General's report by its resolution 832 (1993) of 27 May 1993 and decided to enlarge

ONUSAL's mandate to include observation of the electoral process. It also requested the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to this effect. By the same resolution, the Council welcomed the continuing adaptation by the Secretary-General of the activities and strength of ONUSAL, taking into account progress made in implementing the peace process.

According to the Secretary-General, the Electoral Division was to be established in five stages. The preparatory stage, from 1 to 30 June 1993, was devoted to organisation at the central and regional levels; during the period July to December, the main tasks would be to verify citizens' registration and to follow political activities; from December 1993 to March 1994, efforts were to be concentrated on observation of the electoral campaign; the Division would then observe the elections, set for 20 March 1994, the counting of votes and the announcements of results. Should the first round yield a definitive result, the activities of the Division would conclude on 31 March 1994. Should a second round of elections for the presidency be necessary, observation would continue from 1 to 30 April 1994.

Commission on the Truth

In his report of 21 May 1993, the Secretary-General stated that the first phase of the timetable for implementation had successfully been brought to a close. The priority assigned to military aspects in the preceding period had shifted to other provisions of the agreements. Implementation of several key commitments had continued to progress. However, the deployment of the National Civil Police was behind schedule and difficulties continued to plague the transfer of land and other programmes essential to the reintegration of former combatants on both sides. The Military Division continued its verification of the destruction of FMLN weapons and the reduction of the Armed Forces of El Salvador. In the area of human rights, the National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights had opened regional offices.

The Secretary-General also reported that he had received the report of the Commission on the Truth on 15 March 1993. The Commission—established in accordance with the Mexico Agreements of 27 April 1991 to investigate serious acts of violence that had occurred since 1980 and whose impact on society was deemed to require an urgent public knowledge of the truth—was composed of three international personalities appointed by the Secretary-General after consultation with the parties: Belisario Betancur, former President of Colombia; Reinaldo Figueredo Planchart, former Foreign Minister of Venezuela;

and Thomas Buergenthal, former President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and of the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights. The Commission was to transmit a final report with its conclusions and recommendations to the parties and to the Secretary-General, who would make it public and would take the decisions and initiatives that he deemed appropriate. The parties undertook to carry out the Commission's recommendations.

The Commission received over 22,000 complaints of "serious acts of violence" which had occurred between January 1980 and July 1991. These were classified as violence by agents of the State; massacres of peasants by the Armed Forces; assassinations by death squads; violence by FMLN; and assassinations of judges. The Commission listed its recommendations under four headings: recommendations arising directly from the results of the Commission's own investigations; eradication of structural causes directly connected with the incidents investigated; institutional reforms to prevent the repetition of such events; and measures for national reconciliation.

According to the Secretary-General, the question of implementing these recommendations had given rise to controversy and remained outstanding. He instructed that a detailed analysis be made of the Commission's recommendations, examining whether any of them were outside the Commission's mandate or incompatible with the Constitution and identifying what action was required by whom and in what time-frame. The Secretary-General conveyed that analysis to the Government, FMLN and COPAZ on 20 May 1993, and requested each of them to inform him by 20 June 1993 of the action it had taken or planned to take to implement the recommendations for which it was designated as an addressee and to promote the implementation of the other recommendations. The Secretary-General later reported, on 14 October 1993, that the Commission's recommendations had been the subject of active exchanges of views and communications between the Secretariat and the Government, FMLN and COPAZ. Although some action had been taken on a large number of recommendations made by the Commission on the Truth, no implementation had been reported with regard to others. At a high-level meeting on 8 September 1993, in which ONUSAL participated, the Government and FMLN agreed on the need to step up the implementation process with a view to "sweeping the table clear" before the electoral campaign began.

Discovery of FMLN Arms Caches

The discovery in Nicaragua on 23 May 1993 of an illegal arms cache belonging to FMLN and the latter's subsequent admission that

it had maintained large quantities of weapons both within and outside El Salvador marked a serious violation of the Peace Accords. The Secretary-General reported to the Council on 29 June that he had made continuous efforts directly and through ONUSAL to establish the facts, to ensure that all remaining clandestine caches were declared to it and their contents destroyed and to limit the repercussions on the peace process. He also reported that the right of FMLN to maintain its status as a political party in these circumstances had been questioned in some quarters.

On 12 July, the Security Council took note of the Secretary-General's report and noted FMLN's promise to disclose all its holdings of arms and munitions and subsequently to destroy them by 4 August 1993. The members of the Council stressed that the complete disarmament of FMLN, and the reintegration of its members into the civil, political and institutional life of the country, formed an essential part of the peace process. They shared the Secretary-General's assessment that it was an indication of the strength and irreversibility of the peace process that a serious incident of this nature had not been allowed to derail the implementation of the Peace Agreements. They agreed with his view that the cancellation or suspension of FMLN's status as a political party could deal a severe blow to the peace process.

On 13 July, the Council welcomed confirmation by the Secretary-General on 7 July that the Government had complied with the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission on the Purification of the Armed Forces.

Completion of a Process

The Secretary-General submitted a further report to the Security Council on 30 August 1993, stating that the overall process of verification and destruction of FMLN weapons and equipment mandated by the Peace Agreements had been completed on 18 August 1993. The process had included two distinct phases. The first covered the period until the accidental explosion of the illegal arms cache in Managua, Nicaragua, on 23 May 1993. The second phase covered ONUSAL's operations with respect to arms discovered in the immediate aftermath of the Managua incident and those declared by FMLN in compliance with its renewed commitment to disclose all its remaining weapons. The Secretary-General also confirmed to the Council that the military structure of FMLN had been effectively dismantled and that its former combatants had been demobilized and reintegrated into the civil, institutional and political life of the country.

Following the report to the Council that the residual arms deposits declared by FMLN had been verified and destroyed by ONUSAL, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, in accordance with its request, had been duly informed. This had enabled FMLN to continue as a legally recognized political party. On 5 September 1993, FMLN held its national convention at which it decided to participate in the elections and chose its candidates.

ONUSAL Electoral Division

The Electoral Division of ONUSAL was established in September 1993 with a mandate to observe the electoral process before, during and after the elections under the following terms of reference:

- (a) to observe that measures and decisions made by all electoral authorities were impartial and consistent with the holding of free and fair elections;
- (b) to observe that appropriate steps were taken to ensure that eligible voters were included in the electoral rolls, thus enabling them to exercise their right to vote;
- (c) to observe that mechanisms were in place effectively to prevent multiple voting, given that a complete screening of the electoral rolls prior to the elections was not feasible;
- (d) to observe that freedom of expression, organisation, movement and assembly were respected without restrictions;
- (e) to observe that potential voters had sufficient knowledge of the mechanisms for participating in the election;
- (f) to examine, analyse and assess criticisms made, objections raised and attempts undertaken to delegitimize the electoral process and, if required, to convey such information to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal;
- (g) to inform the Supreme Electoral Tribunal of complaints received regarding irregularities in electoral advertising or possible interference with the electoral process; when appropriate, to request information on corrective measures taken by the Tribunal;
- (h) to place observers at all polling sites on election day to verify that the right to vote was fully respected.

The Division functioned with 36 Professional staff deployed throughout the Mission's 6 regional offices. Despite the rather small number of staff, the component performed its observation duties on

the basis of coordination with and close collaboration of the other components of ONUSAL.

Reporting to the Council on 20 October 1993, the Secretary-General stated that in the initial phase, the Division's chief task had been to verify the registration of citizens on the electoral rolls and to observe the political activities of the period preceding the electoral campaign.

The Secretary-General then explained that the institutional framework of the electoral process had been established. On 20 March 1994, four elections would be held simultaneously, namely, elections for the President, with a second round within the ensuing 30 days if no candidate had obtained an absolute majority; parliamentary elections for the 84 seats in the National Assembly on the basis of proportional representation; municipal elections in 262 mayoral districts on the basis of a simple majority; and for the Central American Parliament, treated as a single national district, for which 20 deputies would be elected on the basis of proportional representation. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal had already set up offices in all departments and municipalities of the country. The electoral law called for a Board of Vigilance consisting of representatives of all the political parties with authority to supervise the work of all Supreme Electoral Tribunal offices. Twelve political parties would take part in the elections.

Secretary-General Reports to Council

On 23 November 1993, the Secretary-General reported to the Council that, while on the whole the implementation of the Peace Accords had progressed well, it was a matter of serious concern that the electoral campaign should have begun when important elements in the Accords remained only partially implemented and when there were signs of the reappearance of some disturbing features of El Salvador's past.

Several key aspects of the Peace Accords continued to suffer serious delays, including the programme for the transfer of lands and the reintegration programmes for ex-combatants and war disabled. One year after the agreement on the land programme, and in spite of commitments by the two parties to accelerate the process, land titles had been issued to less than 10 per cent of the potential beneficiaries. The main problem still related to determining who should be entitled to land. The difficulties encountered and the slow rate of progress were also discouraging potential donors from making new commitments to the programme. The Secretary-General appealed to the two parties

to exercise flexibility in the belief that the remaining technical, financial and legal difficulties could be solved if the political will to do so existed.

Serious difficulties affected the operation of the National Public Security Academy and the deployment of the National Civil Police (PNC). There were also problems over the lack of a plan for the phasing out the National Police and the establishment of functional divisions of PNC. While the Secretary-General acknowledged the complexity of establishing a completely new police force and transferring responsibility for public order to it in the aftermath of a long civil war, ONUSAL's reports created the impression that at some levels in the Government there might be a lack of commitment to the objectives enshrined in the Peace Accords. This was reflected in the denial to the PNC of the necessary logistical and technical resources, the introduction into that force of military personnel, the prolongation of the existence of the National Police and the denial to ONUSAL of the information it required for verification purposes. Concerns also persisted that the military intelligence establishment might still be involving itself with internal security matters.

As for the collection of weapons issued for the exclusive use of the personnel of the Armed Forces of El Salvador, implementation of that provision of the Peace Agreement was incomplete.

Human Rights

With regard to human rights, the Secretary-General reported that important legal reforms were in progress, although many of them were only in the proposal stage and deficiencies in judicial practice persisted. The ONUSAL Human Rights Division had continued its active verification and its programmes in support of the institutions responsible for the administration of justice and protection of human rights. Of special relevance were activities being carried out with the Supreme Court of Justice for the training of judges and magistrates and support to the Armed Forces of El Salvador in the development of a new democratic doctrine and the revision of curricula in the military academies relating to human rights and constitutional law. The Division was cooperating with the Office of the National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights, with which it signed an agreement aimed at the transfer to the Council's Office of experience and investigative technology upon ONUSAL's withdrawal from El Salvador. A permanent consultative mechanism existed at the highest level between the Division and the Counsel's office with a view to conducting joint verification activities in the near future.

The human rights situation had shown in some areas signs of improvement and in others an increase in serious violations. Problems relating to the right to life, individual liberty, personal integrity and due process had intensified. A number of murders and assaults in preceding weeks had raised fears about the possible resurgence of illegal armed groups with political objectives, including the "death squads". The emergence of criminal organisations of this type seriously affected the stability of the peace process by eroding confidence and security. The Human Rights Division of ONUSAL had alerted the Government to this danger and stressed the usefulness of establishing an autonomous mechanism for the investigation of these incidents. The subsequent killings of two senior FMLN leaders, a member of the governing party (ARENA) and two former municipal officers belonging to that party brought this issue into sharper focus.

In view of these killings and the ONUSAL position, the Government had created an Interinstitutional Commission to investigate this type of crime. With the agreement of FMLN, foreign experts were invited to participate in the work of a subgroup of the Commission to investigate the cases of the two senior FMLN leaders. Although this subgroup did not meet United Nations criteria for the investigation of summary executions, ONUSAL closely followed its work.

The Secretary-General recalled that his concerns had been the subject of an exchange of letters with the President of the Council on 3 and 5 November, respectively. It was particularly important that, as endorsed by the Council in its statement of 5 November, arrangements should be agreed for the Human Rights Division to work with the National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights to help the Government carry out the recommendation of the Commission on the Truth that a thorough investigation of illegal armed groups be undertaken immediately.

With regard to the implementation of other recommendations of the Commission on the Truth and, at the same time, of those of the ONUSAL Human Rights Division, which had been fully endorsed by the Commission, a positive step had been taken when the Ministry of Justice had submitted to the Legislative Assembly a number of draft laws aimed at perfecting the guarantees for due process. Also included was the proposed repeal of a law which violated some of the fundamental rights enshrined in international instruments.

Other Matters

The Secretary-General had asked his Special Representative to obtain the agreement of the Government and FMLN to a new timetable

that would set the firmest possible dates for completing the implementation of the most important outstanding points. It was also important that, following the elections, the new Government should maintain its predecessor's commitment to implement the Accords in their entirety. In this regard, responding to an initiative by the Special Representative, six of the seven presidential candidates signed a statement in which they solemnly committed themselves to maintain the constructive evolution of the peace process and to implement all the commitments contained in the Peace Accords. The seventh candidate later explained that, although he agreed with its objectives, he had not signed the statement because he believed that it should contain more detailed commitments to specific measures.

The Secretary-General concluded his report with the recommendation to the Council that ONUSAL continue its activities for a further mandate period through 31 May 1994. After that time, it would probably be necessary to keep the Mission in existence at a reduced strength for a few months to verify the implementation of major points in the Peace Accords.

On 30 November, the Council, having studied the report, extended the mandate of ONUSAL through 31 May 1994. It condemned recent acts of violence and urged the Government and FMLN to make determined efforts to prevent political violence and accelerate compliance with their commitments under the Peace Accords. It also requested the Secretary-General to report by 1 May so that it might review ONUSAL's size and scope for the period after 31 May.

Investigation of Illegal Groups

In a letter to the President of the Council on 11 December 1993, the Secretary-General recalled the Council's approval on 5 November of his ideas on how the United Nations should help in an investigation of illegal groups. From 8 to 15 November, the Secretary-General had dispatched a mission to El Salvador led by Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Marrack Goulding. Extensive consultations had resulted in the establishment on 8 December of a Joint Group for the investigation of politically motivated illegal armed groups. The members of the Joint Group were two independent representatives of the Government of El Salvador nominated by the President, the National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights and the Director of the ONUSAL Human Rights Division. The Council informed the Secretary-General that it supported the "Principles" as well as the Secretary-General's role in ensuring the effectiveness and credibility of the investigation.

Run-up to the Elections

Beginning in October 1993, the Secretary-General submitted regular reports to the Council on the activities of the ONUSAL Electoral Division and the unfolding of the electoral process.

In his report of 16 February 1994, the Secretary-General noted that during the period from November 1993 to January 1994 the Electoral Division had focused on observing voter registration, monitoring the election campaign and providing assistance in the drawing up of an electoral roll. The electoral campaign had opened officially on 20 November 1993 for the election of the President and on 20 January 1994 for the election of the Legislative Assembly. The electoral campaign for the municipal elections was to begin officially on 20 February 1994.

The Electoral Division had held joint meetings on a regular basis with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Board of Vigilance, made up of representatives of all political parties, and the party campaign managers with a view to solving any possible problem arising during the electoral process. In addition, a system had been set up to receive and process allegations of violations of the Electoral Code. These allegations were then transmitted in writing to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, which was asked to report on the follow-up action taken.

In his report of 16 March 1994, the Secretary-General noted that, during the campaign period, ONUSAL teams had made an average of 9 observation visits to each of the country's 262 towns, or more than 2,350 visits, and dispatched a total of 3,700 patrols.

ONUSAL promoted discussions with a view to obtaining the signing of codes of conduct by political parties. Pacts of this kind were signed by all contending parties in each of the 14 departments of El Salvador as well as in a number of municipalities. On 10 March, at ONUSAL headquarters, all presidential candidates signed a declaration in which they declared their rejection of violence and their commitment to respect the results of the elections and to comply with the Peace Accords. Periodic meetings with political parties were held at the central and local levels in order to discuss ongoing problems and viable solutions. At these meetings, technical proposals to improve the registration process were discussed and evaluated.

ONUSAL teams attended more than 800 events, mainly political meetings and demonstrations, and monitored political advertising through the mass media. Complaints of irregularities in electoral publicity and other aspects of the electoral process were transmitted

in a timely manner by ONUSAL to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal in accordance with the terms of reference of the Electoral Division.

Communication with the Tribunal included not only complaints presented to ONUSAL by claimants from different sources, mostly political parties, but also reports on problems identified in the field by ONUSAL observers. In some cases, they were solved by action from the Tribunal. In this connection, ONUSAL made recommendations to the Tribunal as appropriate. Some 300 complaints were presented to ONUSAL during the campaign period dealing with arbitrary or illegitimate action by public authorities (23 per cent), acts of intimidation (21 per cent), destruction of propaganda materials (18 per cent), aggression (9 per cent), murder (7 per cent) and miscellaneous complaints (22 per cent).

Election Day

Election day was 20 March 1994. On 21 March, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General stated that, in the light of the information gathered by the observers on election day, and in view of the systematic observation of the electoral process over the preceding six months, ONUSAL believed that in general the elections had taken place under appropriate conditions in terms of freedom, competitiveness and security. Despite serious flaws regarding organisation and transparency, the elections could be considered acceptable.

The Secretary-General provided a general assessment of election day in his report to the Security Council of 31 March 1994. An estimated 1.5 million voters had participated in the election. This number was lower than many had hoped for, attributable, at least in part, to some structural problems of the system, including the complexities of Salvadorian registration and the limited number of polling centres. While official results had not yet been announced, the provisional count indicated that no candidate had obtained the required absolute majority in the presidential race. A second round would therefore be necessary, probably on 24 April. It would be some time before the results of the elections for the Legislative Assembly and the municipalities were known, although available data seemed to indicate that one political party, ARENA, would have a relative majority in the Assembly and that it had won most of the mayoral districts.

ONUSAL had monitored proceedings from the time the polling stations were set up until the completion of the count by deploying nearly 900 observers of 56 nationalities who covered all polling centres with teams of between 2 and 30 observers. This massive presence of

ONUSAL made it possible throughout election day to resolve countless practical problems of organisation of the voting. The observers collected information on the events of election day on more than 7,000 forms (one for each of the 6,984 polling stations and the 355 polling centres) which were subsequently compiled by the Electoral Division and which constituted the basic documentary source for evaluating the conduct of the elections.

ONUSAL's quick count, based on a random sample of 291 polling stations, had made it possible to have a reliable projection of the outcome of the presidential election two hours after the polls closed. The information was transmitted by the ONUSAL Chief of Mission to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. The difference between the quick count and the provisional results provided by the Tribunal was 0.5 per cent. ONUSAL assigned a team of 40 specialized observers to monitor the official count of the votes in the Supreme Electoral Tribunal.

The Secretary-General stated that the general conduct of the electoral process and the campaign had many positive aspects: massive expansion of the electoral rolls; participation by the political parties throughout the process and at all levels of the electoral authorities; peaceful exercise of the right to organize, of the right to freedom of expression and of the right of assembly; publicity by the parties in all the media, conduct of campaign activities without violent incidents; and proper functioning on the part of the security forces and armed forces.

He also pointed out that no party had rejected the results of the presidential election, and ONUSAL observers had not recorded any fraudulent acts that could have had a significant impact on the outcome. In general, the Assembly and municipal elections had been conducted under the same conditions as the presidential election. However the smaller size of constituencies at this electoral level, which meant that problems affecting a small number of votes could have a significant impact on the outcome, had given rise to a number of challenges. Such challenges were being dealt with in the manner laid down by the legislation, and ONUSAL would continue to observe how cases evolved until definitive solutions were found.

Continuing Concerns

Meanwhile, on 28 March 1994, the Secretary-General addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council in which he raised continuing concerns regarding the implementation of certain aspects of the original Peace Accords. It was essential to have an updated

agreement between the parties on a timetable for the implementation of pending matters so that the process should suffer no further delays during the transition to the new Government.

According to the Secretary-General, little progress had been achieved in certain aspects related to public security. The PNC was still being denied resources, there was no clear accounting of the transfer to the PNC of military personnel, and there seemed to be a desire to de-link the deployment of the PNC from the phasing out of the National Police. ONUSAL was being hindered from properly carrying out its verification responsibilities in this regard.

Notwithstanding progress in the reintegration of FMLN into the political life of El Salvador, much remained to be done in other critical areas of reintegration, the main one being the transfer of land, through which most former combatants and supporters of FMLN were to be reintegrated. Those transfers had been delayed and were short of the agreed goal. Other reintegration programmes were also moving extremely slowly. Another matter related to recommendations of the Commission on the Truth requiring constitutional amendments, particularly with regard to the decentralisation of the powers and competence of the Supreme Court. The Secretary-General stated that urgent action to implement those amendments was needed.

On 7 April, the Council noted that it had received the Secretary-General's report of 31 March as well as his letter of 28 March. The Council congratulated the people of El Salvador on the peaceful and historic elections and called upon those concerned to take the necessary measures, as recommended by the Secretary-General, to correct shortcomings which had appeared in the first round. It also called for the full implementation of the Peace Accords and shared the concerns expressed by the Secretary-General in his letter.

Official Results of the First Round

The official results of the voting in the presidential election in El Salvador were as follows: ARENA, 49.03 per cent; Coalition Convergencia Democratica (CD) -FMLN - Movimiento Nacional Revolucionaria (MNR), 24.9 per cent; Partido Democrata Cristiano (PDC), 17.87 per cent; Partido Conciliacion Nacional (PCN), 5.39 per cent; Partido Movimiento de Unidad (PMU), 2.41 per cent; Movimiento de Solidaridad Nacional (MSN), 1.06 per cent; and Movimiento Autentico Cristiano (MAC), 0.83 per cent.

As a result of the election for the Legislative Assembly, the 84 seats were allocated as follows: ARENA, 39; FMLN, 21; PDC, 18; PCN, 4; CD, 1; PMU, 1.

Finally, the 262 mayoralties were distributed as follows: ARENA, 206; PDC, 29; FMLN, 16; PCN, 10; MAC, 1.

Second Round of Voting

Since no candidate in the presidential election obtained the required absolute majority, a second round of voting was held on 24 April 1994 between the two candidates with the highest number of votes, namely, Armando Calderon Sol of ARENA and Ruben Zamora of the CD-FMLN-MNR coalition. ONUSAL deployed 900 observers in all the voting centres in the country, from the opening of the polling stations until completion of the first count of the votes from the ballot boxes.

On 25 April, ONUSAL issued a statement in which it reported that in general, the election had proceeded without serious incidents affecting public order or ballot-tampering. There were also signs of a clear improvement in the conditions in which the election was held, such as the management of the voting centres, the deployment of guides to direct voters to their voting places, identification on the electoral register, free public transport and early information on the night of 24 April concerning the election results. All those factors, the statement went on, made it possible to have a better-organized election day thanks to the joint efforts of the two presidential candidates, the political institutions which nominated them, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the donor countries.

At the same time, ONUSAL registered a number of irregularities. Some polling stations were not opened or closed on time and both parties complained of illegal campaigning inside the voting centres. It was also reported that a considerable number of citizens had been unable to cast their ballots despite having voting cards.

Although as of 30 April 1994 the official results of the second round were not yet announced, the preliminary vote count on 24 April showed Calderon Sol as apparent President-elect, and his opponent, Ruben Zamora, acknowledged the victory of his adversary. In his public statement on the night of 24 April, the President-elect reaffirmed his commitment to the process of peace and reconciliation in El Salvador.

New Timetable on Outstanding Issues

In a report submitted to the Security Council on 11 May 1994, the Secretary-General described the activities of ONUSAL for the period from 21 November 1993 to 30 April 1994. According to the agreed timetable, almost all aspects of the Peace Accords were to have been implemented before the new Government assumed office on 1 June

1994. The main exceptions were the deployment of the National Civil Police and demobilisation of the National Police, which were to be completed on 28 July and 31 October 1994 respectively. As for the land transfer programme, the Secretary-General reported that it had become clear that it would have to be extended into 1995.

It had therefore been expected that at least a vestigial presence of ONUSAL would be required after 1 June 1994. However, serious shortcomings in the implementation of the accords meant that on 1 June 1994 much would remain to be done, in spite of all the efforts to make up for lost time. The Secretary-General, believing that the United Nations had a continuing responsibility to honour its undertaking to verify compliance with the Peace Accords, held the view that the mandate of ONUSAL should be extended for a further six months, that is, until 30 November 1994. During this time, the Secretary-General would continue to reduce the size of ONUSAL as rapidly as implementation of the outstanding agreements permitted. He appealed to the Government of El Salvador, both the outgoing and incoming administrations, and to all others concerned, to make the effort necessary to ensure that their remaining commitments were implemented with the least possible delay.

On 24 May, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that the two Salvadorian parties had reached agreement on a new "Timetable for the implementation of the most important outstanding agreements." He also informed the Council that the President-elect of El Salvador, Calderon Sol, had reiterated to the Secretary-General his personal commitment to the terms of the Peace Accords and his desire to see those Accords implemented without delay.

By its resolution 920 (1994) of 26 May 1994, the Security Council welcomed the latest reports of the Secretary-General and decided to extend the mandate of ONUSAL until 30 November 1994 in the terms recommended by the Secretary-General in his report of 11 May. It also, among other things, urged the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN strictly to comply with the timetable agreement, and requested the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed on progress made on the implementation of that agreement.

Further Progress Reported

On 26 August 1994, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on compliance with the "Timetable for the implementation of the most important outstanding agreements".

The Secretary-General stated that since the inauguration on 1 June 1994, President Calderon Sol had taken steps to ensure compliance with the outstanding provisions of the peace accords. The high-level governmental team responsible for follow-up activities at the political level had been maintained, the fortnightly tripartite meetings envisaged by the 19 May 1994 agreement were held regularly and joint working groups on various outstanding issues had continued to function. Following events revealing involvement in criminal activities of individuals or groups within the public security apparatus, the Government had expressed its determination to take decisive action against all those involved. The appointment of the new Vice-Minister for Public Security and the new Director-General of the National Civil Police, the Secretary-General noted, should help strengthen that institution and improve its performance.

Since 1 May 1994, the Secretary-General continued, the Legislative Assembly had functioned with the participation of FMLN as the country's second political force, as well as with that of other political parties. The election by consensus of the new Supreme Court of Justice was also a laudable decision. COPAZ and several its subcommissions continued to function.

The Secretary-General also described specific measures taken and problems encountered in implementing outstanding agreements relating to the armed forces, public security, the land-transfer programme, reintegration programmes and the recommendations of the Commission on the Truth. Among other things, he stressed that during the last phase of the Mission, in which institution-building and strengthening were being emphasized, the justice and police sectors would continue to require careful attention.

In conclusion, the Secretary-General stated that, although difficulties in carrying out outstanding obligations should not be underestimated, the conditions necessary to ensure the full and final implementation of the Peace Accords seemed to be in place.

As to the deployment of ONUSAL, the Secretary-General stated that he had already reduced the military component of the mission to 12 military observers and 7 medical personnel from a total of 30 on 1 May 1994. By 1 October, he expected the medical personnel to be further reduced to 3, and during November all military observers would be phased out. The Secretary-General intended to reduce the size of the police division to 145 by 1 October, excluding 15 police instructors posted to the National Police Academy. He also intended

to begin the progressive phasing out of the substantive civilian staff of ONUSAL.

The Security Council, in a presidential statement issued on 16 September 1994, welcomed the steps taken by the President of El Salvador and reaffirmed the need for the police and public security provisions of the Peace Accords to be scrupulously observed, under the appropriate verification of ONUSAL. The Council reaffirmed the commitment undertaken by the United Nations to verify the implementation of the Accords and, in this context, expressed the hope that significant further progress would be made in the implementation of the Accords.

ONUSAL'S Mandate Extended

In a further report submitted to the Security Council on 31 October, the Secretary-General stated that political life in El Salvador continued to adjust to the rules of democracy. The legislative, executive and judicial branches of the State respected their respective attributions, public security and national defence were exercised through separate institutional structures and all major political parties had entered a process of internal discussion to adjust to a democratic system directed towards reconciliation, stability and development. Helped by political stability, the Salvadorian economy also continued to recover.

The Secretary-General noted, however, that despite the progress, certain issues remained to be resolved before all pending commitments under the Peace Accords could be said to have been implemented. These issues related to the full deployment of a new National Civil Police; the completion of the demobilisation of the old military-controlled National Police; the reform of the judicial and electoral systems; the transfer of land to former combatants and the conclusion of some important economic reintegration programmes for their benefit; the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission of the Truth; and the completion of the ongoing process to extend all public services to the former conflict zones.

In these circumstances, the Secretary-General believed that it was essential to retain ONUSAL in existence for one further mandate period, albeit at much reduced strength not exceeding a total of 100 international staff. This would help ensure that the incomplete undertakings were fully implemented, particularly until such a time as the National Police was completely disbanded and the National Civil Police was fully deployed and operational. These goals in the public security area could be attained in about five months. United

Nations military and police personnel would not be needed in El Salvador thereafter. It would then be possible to consider how best to approach the remaining verification duties.

Accordingly, the Secretary-General recommended to the Security Council the extension of ONUSAL until 30 April 1995, at which date that part of its functions which required military and police personnel would have been completed. He noted the widely held view that the termination of ONUSAL should not mark the end of United Nations efforts to consolidate peace in El Salvador.

On 23 November, the Security Council, by its resolution 961 (1994), approved the Secretary-General's recommendations regarding the implementation by ONUSAL of its mandate and decided to extend the mandate for one final period until 30 April 1995.

At the same time, the Council expressed concern that important elements of the Peace Accords remained only partially implemented, and called upon all concerned to cooperate with the Special Representative and ONUSAL in verifying implementation by the parties of their commitments. The Council urged the Government of El Salvador and FMLN to comply with their agreed-upon timetable for implementation of pending agreements. It also invited the Secretary-General to prepare, in consultation with competent specialized agencies, regional organisations and Member States, modalities for further assistance to El Salvador for the period after 30 April 1995.

Composition

At its peak strength in February 1992, ONUSAL's Military Division, headed by Brigadier-General Victor Suanzes Pardo, comprised 368 military observers. Although never realized, the authorized strength of the Police Division, headed by General Homero Vaz Bresque, was 631. As the peace process progressed, the strength of both Divisions was gradually reduced. As at 30 November 1994, the strength of the military component, then headed by Colonel Luis Alejandro Siutes, stood at 3 military observers, with the Police Division comprising 31.

ONUSAL military observers have been provided by Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Ireland, Spain, Sweden and Venezuela. In addition, medical officers have been contributed by Argentina and Spain. Police observers have come from Austria, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, France, Guyana, Italy, Mexico, Spain and Sweden. As at 30 November 1994, ONUSAL military and police observers were being provided by the following countries:

<i>Country</i>	<i>Police</i>	<i>Observers</i>
Brazil	1	1
Chile	5	
Colombia	2	
Guyana	1	
Italy	3	
Mexico	4	
Spain	15	1
Venezuela		1
Total	31	3

Figures may vary from month to month due to rotation.

The Electoral Division, under the direction of Rafael Lopez Pintor, had a normal strength of 36 observers, which increased to 900 during the elections of 20 March and 24 April 1994.

The Human Rights Division, initially headed by Philippe Texier, who was succeeded in late 1992 by Diego Garcia-Sayan and by Reed Broody in 1994, is staffed by some 30 international civil servants, many of whom were recruited from human rights organisations for the ONUSAL mission.

Financial Aspects

The rough cost to the United Nations of ONUSAL in 1994 was approximately \$29.2 million. This cost is met by assessed contributions from United Nations Member States. As at 30 November 1994, total contributions outstanding to the ONUSAL Special Account (including ONUCA) for the period from the inception of the operation to 31 May 1994 amounted to approximately \$23.8 million.

41

Peace-Keeping in Cyprus

A. Background

The Constitution

The Republic of Cyprus became an independent State on 16 August 1960, and a Member of the United Nations one month later. The Constitution of the Republic, which came into effect on the day of independence, had its roots in agreements reached between the Heads of Government of Greece and Turkey at Zurich on 11 February 1959. These were incorporated in agreements reached between those Governments and the United Kingdom in London on 19 February. On the same day, the representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities accepted the documents concerned, and accompanying declarations by the three Governments, as "the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus". The agreements were embodied in treaties—the Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee, signed by Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, and the Treaty of Alliance, signed by Cyprus, Greece and Turkey—and the Constitution signed in Nicosia on 16 August 1960.

The settlement of 1959 envisaged Cyprus becoming a republic with a regime specially adapted both to the ethnic composition of its population (approximately 80 per cent Greek Cypriot and 18 per cent Turkish Cypriot) and to what were recognized as special relationships between the Republic and the three other States concerned in the agreements. Thus, the agreements recognized a distinction between the two communities and sought to maintain a certain balance between their respective rights and interests. Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom provided a multilateral guarantee of the basic articles of the Constitution. In the event of a breach of the Treaty of Guarantee, the three Powers undertook to consult on concerted action, and if this

proved impossible, each of them reserved the right to take action "with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs" set out in the Treaty. Both the union of Cyprus with any other State and the partitioning of the island were expressly forbidden. The settlement also permitted the United Kingdom to retain sovereignty over two areas to be maintained as military bases, these areas being in fact excluded from the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.

The Constitution assured the participation of each community in the exercise of the functions of the Government, while seeking in a number of matters to avoid supremacy on the part of the larger community and assuring also partial administrative autonomy to each community. Under the Constitution, the President, a Greek Cypriot, and the Vice-President, a Turkish Cypriot, were elected by their respective communities, and they designated separately the members of the Council of Ministers, comprising seven Greek Cypriots and three Turkish Cypriots. The agreement of the President and Vice-President was required for certain decisions and appointments, and they had veto rights, separately or jointly, in respect of certain types of legislation, including foreign affairs. Human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the supremacy of the Constitution, were guaranteed.

The application of the provisions of the Constitution encountered difficulties almost from the birth of the Republic and led to a succession of constitutional crises and to accumulating tension between the leaders of the two communities.

On 30 November 1963, the President of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios, publicly set forth 13 points on which he considered that the Constitution should be amended. He did so on the stated grounds that the existing Constitution created many difficulties in the smooth functioning of the State and the development and progress of the country, that its many *sui generis* provisions conflicted with internationally accepted democratic principles and created sources of friction between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and that its effects were causing the two communities to draw further apart rather than closer together.

The President's proposals would have, among other things, abolished the veto power of the President and the Vice-President, while having the latter deputize for the President in his absence. The Greek Cypriot President of the House of Representatives and the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President would have been elected by the House as a whole and not, as under the Constitution, separately by its Greek

and Turkish members, the constitutional provisions regarding separate majorities for enactment of certain laws by the House of Representatives would have been abolished, unified municipalities established, and the administration of justice and the security forces unified. The proportion of Turkish Cypriots in the public service and the military forces would have been reduced, and the Greek Cypriot Communal Chamber abolished, though the Turkish community would have been able to retain its Chamber.

No immediate response was forthcoming from the Vice-President to this proposed programme, but the Turkish Government, to which the President's proposals had been communicated "for information purposes", rejected them promptly and categorically. Subsequently, the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber described the President's claim that the Constitution had proved an obstacle to the smooth functioning of the Republic as "false propaganda" and contended that the Greek Cypriots had never attempted to implement the Constitution in good faith. The Turkish Cypriots maintained that the structure of the Republic rested on the existence of two communities and not of a majority and a minority. They refused to consider the amendments proposed by the other side, which were in their opinion designed to weaken those parts which recognized the existence of the Turkish Cypriot community as such.

Whatever possibility might have existed at the time for calm and rational discussion of the President's proposals between the two communities disappeared indefinitely with the outbreak of violent disturbances between them a few days later, on 21 December 1963.

In the afternoon of 24 December 1963, the Turkish national contingent, stationed in Cyprus under the Treaty of Alliance and numbering 650 officers and other ranks, left its camp and took up positions at the northern outskirts of Nicosia in the area where disturbances were taking place. On 25 December, the Cyprus Government charged that Turkish war-planes had flown at tree-level over Cyprus, and during the next several days there were persistent reports of military concentrations along the southern coast of Turkey and of Turkish naval movements off that coast.

Mission of the Personal Representative

In the face of the outbreak of intercommunal strife, the Governments of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, on 24 December 1963, offered their joint good offices to the Government of

Cyprus, and on 25 December they informed that Government, "including both the Greek and Turkish elements", of their readiness to assist, if invited to do so, in restoring peace and order by means of a joint peace-making force under British command, composed of forces of the three Governments already stationed in Cyprus under the Treaties of Alliance and Establishment. This offer having been accepted by the Cyprus Government, the joint force was established on 26 December, a ceasefire was arranged on 29 December, and on 30 December it was agreed to create a neutral zone along the ceasefire line ("green line") between the areas occupied by the two communities in Nicosia. That zone was to be patrolled by the joint peace-making force, but in practice the task was carried out almost exclusively by its British contingent. It was further agreed that a conference of representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey and of the two communities of Cyprus would be convened in London in January 1964. These arrangements were reported to the Security Council in a letter dated 8 January from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations.

Meanwhile, on 26 December 1963, the Permanent Representative of Cyprus requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider his Government's complaint against Turkey. The meeting was held on 27 December. The Secretary-General met with the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to explore the best way in which the United Nations could assist in restoring quiet in the country. The representative of Cyprus, as well as the representatives of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, requested the Secretary-General to appoint a personal representative to observe the peace-making operation in Cyprus.

After consultations, during which agreement was reached with all concerned regarding the functions of the representative, the Secretary-General, on 17 January 1964, appointed Lieutenant-General P.S. Gyani, of India, as his personal representative, and observer, to go to Cyprus initially until the end of February. The Secretary-General stated that his function would be to observe the progress of the peacemaking operation. General Gyani was to report to the Secretary-General on how the United Nations observer could function and be most effective in fulfilling the task as outlined in the request made by the Government of Cyprus and agreed to by the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Gyani's mandate was later extended until the end of March.

B. Establishment of the UN Operation

Creation of the Force

The London Conference, which met on 15 January 1964, failed to reach agreement, and proposals to strengthen the international peacemaking force were rejected by the Government of Cyprus, which insisted that any such force be placed under the United Nations. From Nicosia, General Gyani reported a rapid and grave deterioration of the situation, involving scattered intercommunal fighting with heavy casualties, kidnappings and the taking of hostages (many of whom were killed), unbridled activities by irregular forces, separation of the members of the two communities, and disintegration of the machinery of government, as well as fears of military intervention by Turkey or Greece. The British peace-making force was encountering increasing difficulties. While Gyani's presence had been helpful in a number of instances, attention was turning increasingly to the possibility of establishing a United Nations peace-keeping operation.

On 15 February, the representatives of the United Kingdom and of Cyprus requested urgent action by the Security Council. On the same day, the Secretary-General appealed to all concerned for restraint. He was already engaged in intensive consultations with all the parties about the functions and organisation of a United Nations force, and, on 4 March, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 186(1964), by which it noted that the situation in Cyprus was likely to threaten international peace and security, and recommended the creation of a United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), with the consent of the Government of Cyprus.

The Council also called on all Member States to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus or to endanger international peace, asked the Government of Cyprus, which had the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus, and called upon the communities in Cyprus and their leaders to act with the utmost restraint.

As for the Force, the Council said its composition and size were to be established by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The Commander of the Force was to be appointed by the Secretary-General and report to him. The Secretary-General, who was to keep the Governments providing the Force fully informed, was to report

periodically to the Security Council on its operation. The Force's function should be, in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. The Council recommended that the stationing of the Force should be for a period of three months, all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by the Governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus. The Secretary-General was also authorized to accept voluntary contributions for that purpose. By the resolution, the Council also recommended the designation of a Mediator to promote a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the Cyprus problem.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus promptly informed the Secretary-General that his Government consented to the establishment of the Force.

Operational Establishment of UNFICYP

On 6 March, the Secretary-General reported the appointment of General Gyani as Commander of UNFICYP, and referred to his approaches to several Governments about the provision of contingents. Negotiations with prospective troop-contributing Governments encountered certain delays, relating to political as well as financial aspects of the operation.

Meanwhile, as the situation in Cyprus deteriorated further, the Secretary-General on 9 March addressed messages to the President of Cyprus and to the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, appealing for restraint and a cessation of violence. The Government of Turkey sent messages to President Makarios on 12 March, and to the Secretary-General on 13 March, stating that unless assaults on the Turkish Cypriots ceased, Turkey would act unilaterally under the Treaty of Guarantee to send a Turkish force to Cyprus until the United Nations Force, which should include Turkish units, effectively performed its functions. The Secretary-General replied immediately that measures to establish the United Nations Force were under way and making progress, and he appealed to Turkey to refrain from action that would worsen the situation.

At the request of the representative of Cyprus, the Security Council held an emergency meeting on 13 March and adopted resolution 187(1964). The resolution noted the Secretary-General's assurances that the Force was about to be established, called on Member States to

refrain from action or threats likely to worsen the situation in Cyprus or endanger international peace, and requested the Secretary-General to press on with his efforts to implement resolution 186(1964).

Upon the arrival of troops of the Canadian contingent on 13 March, the Secretary-General reported that the Force was in being. However, it did not become established operationally until 27 March, when sufficient troops were available to it in Cyprus to enable it to discharge its functions effectively. The three-month duration of the mandate, as defined in resolution 186(1964), began as of that date. This development marked a new phase in the Cyprus situation. The Secretary-General noted that UNFICYP was a United Nations Force, operating exclusively under the mandate given to it by the Security Council and, within that mandate, under instructions given by the Secretary-General. It was an impartial, objective body which had no responsibility for political solutions and would not try to influence them one way or another.

By 17 March, sizeable elements of the Canadian contingent had arrived in Cyprus, and arrangements for incorporating within UNFICYP the British peace-making forces already in Cyprus were being negotiated with the British Government. As of the date of its establishment operationally on 27 March 1964, the Force consisted of the Canadian and British contingents, and advance parties of Swedish, Irish and Finnish contingents. The main bodies of the last-mentioned three contingents arrived in April. A Danish contingent of approximately 1,000 as well as an Austrian field hospital arrived in May, along with additional Swedish troops transferred from the United Nations Operation in the Congo.

UNFICYP was thus established in 1964, with military contingents from Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, and civilian police units from Australia, Austria, Denmark, New Zealand and Sweden. This national composition has remained virtually unchanged except for the reduction of the Irish and Finnish contingents to token units in 1973 and 1977 respectively, and the withdrawal of the New Zealand, Danish and Austrian police units in 1967, 1975 and 1977 respectively.

From a total of 6,369 on 30 April 1964, the strength of the Force increased to 6,411 on 8 June. As units of the new contingents arrived, certain units of the British contingent, which had formed part of the old peace-making force and had been taken into UNFICYP, were repatriated. This accounts for the reduction of the British contingent from 2,719 in April 1964 to 1,792 in June and 1,034 in August. The total strength of the Force on 14 August 1964 was 6,211.

Under the terms of the 1960 Treaty of Alliance, Greece was given the right to maintain an army contingent of 950 officers and men in the island, and Turkey a contingent of 650. When intercommunal strife broke out in December 1963, the Turkish national contingent left its camp and was deployed in tactical positions in the villages of Orta Keuy and Geunyeli, astride the Kyrenia road north of Nicosia, where it remained until 1974. The Government of Cyprus, contending that the Turkish move was a breach of the Treaty, unilaterally abrogated it on 4 April 1964. However, both contingents remained on the island.

During the early stages of the functioning of UNFICYP, the Secretary-General proposed that the Turkish Government should either order its contingent to retire to its barracks, or accept his offer to put both the Greek and Turkish national contingents under United Nations command, though not as contingents of UNFICYP. Greece accepted the latter suggestion. Turkey put forward the condition that the Force Commander, before issuing orders to the Turkish contingent for any task or movement requiring a change in its present position, must have the prior consent of the Turkish Government. As the Secretary-General considered this condition unacceptable, the two national contingents were not placed under United Nations command.

Deployment and Organisation

When UNFICYP was established in 1964, the contingents were deployed throughout the island and an effort was made as far as possible to match their areas of responsibility (zones or districts) with the island's administrative district boundaries. This was meant to facilitate a close working relationship with Cyprus Government District Officers, and with the local Turkish Cypriot leaders.

All districts were covered according to the intensity of the armed confrontation. The capital, Nicosia, initially was manned by two UNFICYP contingents (Canadian and Finnish), organized in a single Nicosia zone under Canadian command. The districts of Kyrenia and Lefka were manned by one contingent each. The remaining two contingents covered the districts of Larnaca, Limassol and Paphos.

Over the years, there have been numerous redeployments of UNFICYP contingents to secure better use of available troops in relation to the requirements of the mandate and to cover any new areas of tension.

In Nicosia, UNFICYP troops were positioned for an observation role along the length of the "green line". In two other districts, Kyrenia

and Lefka, United Nations posts were deployed between the two defence lines; observation and patrolling took place from those posts. On the rest of the island, UNFICYP troops were generally deployed in areas where confrontation situations were likely to arise, and they were so positioned as to enable them to interpose themselves between the opposing sides in areas of tension and wherever incidents might cause a recurrence of fighting. Observation squads, backed by mobile patrols, were regularly deployed into areas that were likely to be potential areas of trouble.

Force Commanders

Following the retirement of General Gyani in June 1964, General K.S. Thimayya, of India, was appointed Force Commander and remained in that post until his death in December 1965. Brigadier A.J. Wilson, of the United Kingdom, served as Acting Commander until May 1966 when Lieutenant-General I.A.E. Martola, of Finland, was appointed Commander. He was succeeded by Lieutenant-General Dewan Prem Chand, of India, in December 1969, Major-General J.J. Quinn, of Ireland, in December 1976 and Major-General Guenther G. Greindl, of Austria, in March 1981.

Special Representatives

In his report of 29 April 1964, the Secretary-General referred to the necessity of appointing a high-level political officer, and on 11 May he announced the appointment of Galo Plaza Lasso, of Ecuador, as his Special Representative in Cyprus. Plaza served until his appointment as Mediator in September.

The following have subsequently served as Special Representatives of the Secretary-General: Carlos A. Bernardes (1964-1967), P.P. Spinelli (Acting) (1967), Bibiano F. Osorio-Tafall (1967-1974), Luis Weckmann-Munoz (1974-1975), Javier Perez de Cuellar (1975-1977), Remy Gorge (Acting) (1977-1978), Reynaldo Galindo-Pohl (1978-1980), Hugo J. Gobbi (1980-1984) and James Holger (Acting) since 1984.

Guiding Principles for UNFICYP

On the basis of the experience gained during the first six months of operation of the Force, guiding principles, which remain in effect to this day, were summarized by the Secretary-General in his report of 10 September 1964," as follows:

The Force is under the exclusive control and command of the United Nations at all times. The Commander of the Force is appointed by and

responsible exclusively to the Secretary-General. The contingents comprising the Force are integral parts of it and take their orders exclusively from the Force Commander.

The Force undertakes no functions which are not consistent with the provisions of the Security Council's resolution of 4 March 1964. The troops of the Force carry arms which, however, are to be employed only for self-defence, should this become necessary in the discharge of its function, in the interest of preserving international peace and security, of seeking to prevent a recurrence of fighting and contributing to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. The personnel of the Force must act with restraint and with complete impartiality towards the members of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

As regards the principle of self-defence, it is explained that the expression "self defence" includes the defence of United Nations posts, premises and vehicles under armed attack, as well as the support of other personnel of UNFICYP under armed attack. When acting in self-defence, the principle of minimum force shall always be applied and armed force will be used only when all peaceful means of persuasion have failed. The decision as to when force may be used in these circumstances rests with the Commander on the spot. Examples in which troops may be authorized to use force include attempts by force to compel them to withdraw from a position which they occupy under orders from their commanders, attempts by force to disarm them, and attempts by force to prevent them from carrying out their responsibilities as ordered by their commanders.

In connection with the performance of its function and responsibilities, UNFICYP has maintained close contact with the appropriate officials in the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order and which had been asked by the Security Council in its resolution of 4 March to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus.

Deployed in sensitive areas throughout the country, the Force attempted to interpose itself between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot military positions, or if that was not possible, to set up its own posts near by so that its mere presence constituted an effective deterrent to a recurrence of fighting. If, despite its precautionary measures, shooting incidents occurred, the Force was to intervene immediately and endeavour to end the fighting by persuasion and negotiation. In each case it also carried out a thorough investigation of the incident. Frequent patrolling was organized whenever necessary to ensure safety on roads and in towns and villages in sensitive areas.

With further reference to the question of the use of force, the Secretary-General had reported to the Security Council on 29 April 1964 that the Force Commander was seeking to achieve the objectives

of UNFICYP by peaceful means and without resorting to armed force, the arms of the Force being carried only for self-defence. Despite these efforts and the Secretary-General's appeals, fighting continued. The Secretary-General emphasized that "the United Nations Force was dispatched to Cyprus to try to save lives by preventing a recurrence of fighting. It would be incongruous, even a little insane, for that Force to set about killing Cypriots, whether Greek or Turkish, to prevent them from killing each other". Yet this was the dilemma facing UNFICYP, which could not stand idly by and see an undeclared war deliberately pursued or innocent civilians struck down.

When the UNFICYP Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) became operational on 14 April 1964, the Secretary-General outlined the following duties for it: establishing liaison with the Cypriot police; accompanying Cypriot police patrols which were to check vehicles on the roads for various traffic and other offences; manning United Nations police posts in certain sensitive areas, namely, areas where tension existed and might be alleviated by the presence of UNFICYP police elements; observing searches of vehicles by local police at road-blocks; and investigating incidents where Greek or Turkish Cypriots were involved with the opposite' community, including searches for persons reported as missing.

C. Developments from 1964 to 1966

Extension of the Mandate

On 15 June 1964, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that it was clearly advisable, in the light of the demonstrated usefulness of the Force, to extend it for another three-month period as from 27 June 1964, and on 20 June 1964 the Security Council did so, unanimously.

Following the outbreak of fighting in the Tylliria area during the first week of August 1964 and the intervention of Turkish aircraft, the Security Council met again on the Cyprus question. On 9 August, it authorized its President to make an urgent appeal to the Government of Turkey to cease instantly the bombardment of and use of military force of any kind against Cyprus, and to the Government of Cyprus to order the armed forces under its control to cease firing immediately. The Council then adopted resolution 193(1964), which reaffirmed its preceding resolutions on Cyprus as well as the President's appeal, called for an immediate ceasefire, called upon all concerned to cooperate with UNFICYP in the restoration of peace and security and called upon all States to refrain from any action that might exacerbate the situation or contribute to the broadening of hostilities.

The Secretary-General informed the Council on 10 August 1964 that in view of positive replies of the President of Cyprus and the Prime Minister of Turkey, he would be making every effort towards constructive peace-keeping arrangements and had instructed the Force Commander to take every initiative towards that end. On 11 August, the Council approved a statement by the President as representing the consensus of its members, noting with satisfaction that the ceasefire was being observed throughout Cyprus and requesting the Force Commander to supervise the ceasefire and to reinforce its units in the zones which were the sphere of the recent military operations so as to ensure the safety of the inhabitants.

Further Extensions, September 1964 Onwards

In his report of 10 September 1964, covering the period 8 June to 8 September 1964, the Secretary-General observed that the United Nations Force was in an unhappy position, since a civil war was the worst possible situation in which a United Nations peace-keeping force could find itself. Strong reasons, other than financial, could be adduced against maintaining UNFICYP. But it was the position of those directly concerned and many others that to withdraw UNFICYP at this time could lead to danger and disaster. The four Governments mentioned in resolution 186(1964) all wished the Force to be continued. Turkey had made certain observations about the shortcomings of the Force and its inability, under its existing authority, to carry out the mandates given to it by the Security Council as interpreted by the Government of Turkey.

On 25 September 1964, the Security Council adopted resolution 194(1964), extending the stationing of UNFICYP for another three-month period ending 26 December of that year. Further three-month extensions followed, and later the Council began extending the mandate by six-month periods, with the Council in 1967 adopting the practice of expressing the hope that by the end of the period of extension, sufficient progress towards a solution would have been achieved so as to render possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force.

Liaison Arrangements

In view of the exceptionally comprehensive functions of UNFICYP as laid down by the Security Council in resolution 186(1964), the United Nations operation in Cyprus became involved, from its inception, in carrying out a vast array of activities that affected almost every conceivable aspect of life in Cyprus, often in extraordinarily difficult conditions. All of UNFICYP'S functions were of necessity carried out in

contact and consultation with the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot authorities, and also, on many occasions, with the Governments of Greece and Turkey, and depended for their success on the co-operation of all concerned.

The legal framework of relations with the host Government was provided on 31 March 1964, when the Secretary-General and the Foreign Minister of Cyprus concluded an exchange of letters constituting an agreement on the status of UNFICYP.

From the outset, UNFICYP made arrangements for close and continuous liaison with the Government of Cyprus and with the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Liaison was likewise maintained at various levels of the administrative and military establishments of both sides, including field military units in the areas of confrontation.

In situations of military confrontation, UNFICYP, not being empowered to impose its views on either party, of necessity negotiated with both, since the consent of both was and is required if peaceful solutions are to be found and violence averted. Time and again, communications, messages and appeals were sent to civilian leaders and military commanders of both sides in Cyprus, calling upon them to exercise restraint, refrain from provocative actions, observe the ceasefire, co-operate with the Force and contribute to a return to normal conditions. This was done either with regard to specific problems or, as in the case of aide-memoire of October and November 1964, in an effort to generate an across-the-board programme of action in pursuance of the mandate.

Freedom of Movement of UNFICYP

Article 32 of the agreement on the status of UNFICYP mentioned above provides for the freedom of movement of the Force throughout Cyprus, subject to a minor qualification relating to large troop movements. Article 33 entitles UNFICYP to use roads, bridges, airfields, etc. Freedom of movement has been regarded from the outset as an essential condition for the proper functioning of the Force; indeed, the function of preventing a recurrence of fighting depends entirely for its implementation on the freedom of movement of the military and police elements of UNFICYP. The Force has encountered many difficulties in this regard. On 6 August 1964, the President of Cyprus granted full freedom of movement for UNFICYP throughout the island, with the sole exception of certain localities connected with the defence of the State. However, the Government took the position that UNFICYP had no valid interest in its activities designed to meet a threat of

attack from the outside. UNFICYP patrols were frequently hindered or stopped by the Cyprus National Guard or police. On some occasions, Turkish Cypriots also obstructed UNFICYP patrols.

On 10 November 1964, the Force Commander reached an agreement with the Commander of the National Guard, declaring the whole island open to UNFICYP except for certain stipulated areas (covering about 1.65 per cent of the country) that were accessible only to the Force Commander or to senior officers of UNFICYP. Arrangements were also negotiated for UNFICYP access to Limassol docks, which were used by the Cyprus Government for the importation of military stores. Also in November 1964, it was agreed that the Cyprus security forces would henceforth refrain from searching UNFICYP personnel and vehicles.

During 1965, the Force Commander carried out a thorough review of UNFICYP's reconnaissance procedures, with a view to reducing friction to a minimum. Nevertheless, incidents of obstruction and harassment of UNFICYP continued. In certain cases, these involved even firing at UNFICYP soldiers, manhandling of senior UNFICYP officers and other unacceptable practices. Both the National Guard and Turkish Cypriot fighters were involved in incidents of this kind, especially during periods of tension.

UNFICYP Programme of Action

In view of the complexity of the situation in Cyprus in relation to the functions of the Force as laid down in resolution 186(1964), it was found necessary to formulate a programme on which to focus the efforts of UNFICYP. That programme, which would require the full cooperation of all those involved, could serve as a yardstick to assess the progress achieved towards the objectives outlined by the Security Council.

The Secretary-General reported on 15 June 1964 on the progress made in implementing the programme. The presence of the Force had clearly prevented a recurrence of open fighting, but hopes of achieving full freedom of movement on the roads or disarming of civilians had diminished after recent serious incidents, and the two communities were far from achieving peaceful coexistence. There had been no progress in having Turkish Cypriot officials or policemen return to their government posts. Suggestions for joint patrols had not received favourable consideration. In short, the Secretary-General felt that while UNFICYP had been able to move forward in certain aspects of its mandate, it was rapidly reaching the point where further progress could only be made if the two sides showed more political flexibility.

At the same time, the efforts of UNFICYP to carry out its mandate were impeded by the parties' conflicting interpretations of the duties of the Force under that mandate. To the Cyprus Government, UNFICYP's task was to assist it in ending the rebellion of the Turkish Cypriots and extending its authority over the entire territory of the Republic. To the Turkish Cypriots, a "return to normal conditions" meant having UNFICYP restore, by force if necessary, the status of the Turkish Cypriot community under the 1960 Constitution, while the Cyprus Government and its acts should not be taken as legal. The Secretary-General in his reports rejected both these interpretations, which if followed would have caused UNFICYP to affect basically the final settlement of the Cyprus problem. This he considered to be in the province of the Mediator, not of UNFICYP.

Supervision of the Ceasefire

UNFICYP's operating procedures to prevent a recurrence of fighting and to supervise the ceasefire were worked out pragmatically in the light of the fundamental impasse described above. The Force instituted a system of fixed posts and frequent patrols, intervention on the spot and interposition to prevent incidents from snowballing into serious fighting, demarcation of ceasefire lines where appropriate, and the submission of proposals or plans for remedying situations of military tension or conflict. Thus, UNFICYP endeavoured to secure the withdrawal or elimination of fortifications erected by the two sides, and submitted numerous proposals to that end, designed to reduce the armed confrontation in the island without prejudice to the security requirements of both sides. Wherever violent incidents broke out, UNFICYP made every effort, by persuasion, negotiation and interposition, to stop the fighting; it assisted civilians, evacuated the wounded and endeavoured to resolve the underlying security and other problems.

Despite the efforts of UNFICYP, sporadic violence continued in the island after the Force became operational, punctuated by outbreaks of severe fighting in which United Nations troops would find themselves at times fired upon by both sides, and forced to return the fire. Serious incidents occurred in the Tylliria area on 4 April 1964, at Ayios Theodoros on 22 April, and in the area north of Nicosia from 25 to 29 April. A number of UNFICYP soldiers were killed as they sought to carry out their duties during continued scattered fighting in May. A major outbreak of fighting occurred from 5 to 8 August in the Tylliria area, reducing the Turkish Cypriot bridgehead there to the village of Kokkina. This was followed by aerial attacks on Government forces by

Turkish fighter aircraft, and led to the 8 and 9 August meetings of the Security Council, which adopted resolution 193(1964) as well as the consensus of 11 August. The Governments of Cyprus and Turkey accepted the ceasefire without conditions.

In August and September 1964, the Secretary-General engaged in intensive negotiations with the parties on the explosive issue of the periodic partial rotation of the Turkish national contingent stationed in Cyprus under the Treaty of Alliance (which the Cyprus Government had abrogated, but which Turkey considered to continue to be valid). This was linked to the question of the reopening of the Nicosia-Kyrenia road, which the Turkish Cypriots had closed to Greek Cypriot traffic. On 25 September, U Thant announced in the Security Council that agreement had been reached for the reopening of the road under the exclusive control of UNFICYP, and for the unimpeded rotation of the Turkish national contingent.

The road was reopened on 26 October 1964, and UNFICYP continued until 1974 to supervise the movement of Greek Cypriot civilians on it and to ensure that no armed personnel except those of UNFICYP were allowed to use it. The first rotation of the Turkish national contingent under this agreement was carried out on the same day, with UNFICYP assistance and under UNFICYP observation. UNFICYP also performed observation functions in connection with checking the incoming Turkish troops and their stores by Cyprus Government officials at Famagusta harbour. These functions, too, continued to be carried out, twice a year, until 1974. It should be noted that the UNFICYP functions relating to the Turkish national contingent concerned relations between the Governments of Cyprus and Turkey and therefore did not fall strictly within the terms of UNFICYP's mandate; they were assumed at the request of all concerned, in the interest of maintaining the peace, reducing tension in the island, and creating favourable conditions for carrying out other aspects of UNFICYP's mandate.

As a result of this arrangement, the situation in the island improved somewhat, and in his report of December 1964, the Secretary-General reported that fighting had virtually ceased. However, the underlying tensions continued, and UNFICYP had little or no success in inducing the parties to scale down their military confrontation or dismantle their fortifications, which were the cause of recurrent incidents.

From the beginning of the Cyprus operation, the Secretary-General reported that the influx of arms and military equipment was a cause of concern for UNFICYP with regard to the discharge of its mandate.

UNFICYP kept a careful watch on all imports of such arms and equipment, but the question whether it could take any additional action in this regard under resolution 186(1964) remained a controversial one. An agreement was concluded on 10 September 1964 to have UNFICYP present at the unloading of military equipment at Famagusta and Limassol, but additional material was being imported at Boghaz, unobserved by UNFICYP

The issue came to a head when it became known in December 1966 that the Cyprus Government had imported a quantity of arms for distribution to the Cyprus police. On 12 January 1967, the Cyprus Government indicated to the Secretary-General that the imported arms would not be distributed for the time being, that the Secretary-General would be advised in due time if their distribution should become necessary, and that, in the mean time, the Force Commander could make periodic inspections. This function was carried out thereafter on a regular basis until 1974.

Return to Normal Conditions

UNFICYP normalisation efforts evolved on an *ad hoc* basis and employed persuasion and negotiation exclusively. The principal objective was to restore conditions that would enable the people of the island, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot alike, to go about their daily business without fear for their lives and without being victimised, and in this connection to restore governmental services and economic activities disrupted by the intercommunal strife. A significant aspect of UNFICYP's procedures under this heading concerned humanitarian and relief assistance. All of UNFICYP's efforts were so framed as to avoid prejudicing the positions and claims of the parties in respect of a final political settlement. However, its task was made difficult by the reluctance of the two communities to modify their positions in the absence of such a settlement.

From the beginning of the United Nations operation, UNFICYP undertook *ad hoc* measures designed to save lives, minimize suffering and, to the extent possible, restore essential civilian activities. These measures included:

- (a) Escorts for essential civilian movements, including persons, food and essential merchandise, on the roads of Cyprus, especially for members of the Turkish Cypriot community who feared abduction.
- (b) Harvest arrangements, including escorts and patrols, to enable farmers to till their lands in the vicinity of positions held by

members of the other community; agricultural arrangements, including grain deliveries by the Turkish Cypriots to the Cyprus Grain Commission; maintenance of abandoned citrus orchards, etc.

- (c) Arrangements for government property in Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas; water and electricity supplies to the Turkish Cypriot sectors; postal services; payment of social insurance benefits; efforts to normalize the public services, including arrangements to re-employ Turkish Cypriot civil servants, etc.;
- (d) Co-operation with the Red Cross and the Cyprus Joint Relief Commission in providing relief assistance for refugees (mainly Turkish Cypriots). UNFICYP also made intensive efforts to alleviate hardships resulting from the economic restrictions that had been imported on the Turkish Cypriot community.

In October and November 1964, UNFICYP initiated a major effort to persuade the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to drop most economic and security restrictions directed at members of the other community, to restore free movement and contacts for all, and to consider the return of displaced persons, with UNFICYP assistance. This comprehensive approach resulted in some improvement of the situation, but the basic political problem continued to limit the effectiveness of UNFICYP's normalisation efforts.

On 21 April 1965, President Makarios informed the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Force Commander that the Government planned a normalisation programme in three districts—Larnaca, Limassol and Ktima. This move came in response to UNFICYP's suggestions for a withdrawal of troops from fortified posts, elimination of road-blocks and the lifting of economic restrictions. However, the Turkish Cypriots, noting the limited geographical scope of the programme and the continuation of economic restrictions, declined to remove their defences.

Mediation Function

The Security Council, by resolution 186(1964), recommended that the Secretary-General, in agreement with the Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, designate a mediator for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and agreed settlement of the Cyprus problem. On 25 March 1964, the Secretary-General appointed Sakari S. Tuomioja, a Finnish diplomat, as Mediator. Tuomioja died on 9 September. One week later, the Secretary-General appointed Galo Plaza Lasso, of Ecuador, to succeed

him. After several rounds of consultations with all concerned, the Mediator in March 1965 submitted a report to the Secretary-General in which he analysed the situation in the island, the positions of the parties and the considerations that would have to be taken into account in devising a settlement. On that basis, the Mediator offered observations under three headings: independence, self-determination and international peace; the structure of the State; and the protection of individual and minority rights. The Mediator recommended that the parties concerned, and in the first instance the representatives of the two communities, should meet together for discussions on the basis of his observations.

The report was commented upon favourably by the Governments of Cyprus and Greece. Turkey, however, rejected the report in its entirety and considered that Plaza's functions as a Mediator had come to an end upon its publication. Plaza resigned in December 1965, and the Secretary-General's efforts to bring about a resumption of the mediation function did not meet with success.

In these circumstances, the Secretary-General, on 4 March 1966, instructed his Special Representative in Cyprus, Carlos A. Bernardes, to employ his good offices with the parties in and outside Cyprus with a view to discussions, at any level, of problems of a local or a broader nature. However, Bernardes's efforts did not succeed in bringing about serious talks between the parties concerning a political settlement.

D. Developments from 1967 to 1974

Incidents at Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou

In January 1967, General George Grivas, the Greek Commander of the Cyprus National Guard, deployed a battalion of troops in the Kophinou area. These remained in place despite an understanding reached by UNFICYP with the local Turkish Cypriot fighter commander to avoid incidents. As the National Guard unit was reinforced on 28 February, Turkish Cypriot fighters moved forward at nearby Ayios Theodoros, where they also manhandled senior UNFICYP officers. There was severe friction between UNFICYP and Turkish Cypriot fighters in Kophinou, and the situation also deteriorated in the Paphos and Lefka districts.

In September 1967, the Government announced a normalisation programme that included the unmanning of armed posts and fortifications and complete freedom of movement, initially in the Paphos and Limassol districts. The Turkish Cypriot side assured UNFICYP that it would not seek to occupy the vacated positions.

In November 1967, the Cyprus police sought to resume the practice of patrolling Ayios Theodoros, passing through the Turkish Cypriot quarter, and informed UNFICYP that the National Guard would if necessary escort the policemen. On 15 November, heavy fighting broke out, and the National Guard overran most of that village and part of Kophinou. The Turkish Government protested to the Secretary-General, who requested the Cyprus and Greek Governments to bring about a withdrawal of the National Guard from the areas it had occupied. The withdrawal was carried out on 16 November. On 18 and 19 November, there were several Turkish overflights of Cyprus, and armed clashes spread to the Kokkina and Kyrenia areas.

Non-Cypriot Forces

These events set off a severe political crisis. The Secretary-General appealed to the President of Cyprus and to the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey, on 22 and 24 November 1967, to avoid an outbreak of hostilities, and he sent a personal representative to the three capitals. In the second appeal, the Secretary-General urged the three parties to agree upon a staged reduction and ultimate withdrawal of non-Cypriot armed forces, other than those of the United Nations, and he offered the assistance of UNFICYP in working out a programme of phased withdrawals and helping to maintain quiet.

The Security Council met on 24 November and, after consultations with the representatives of the parties, unanimously approved a consensus statement noting with satisfaction the efforts of the Secretary-General and calling upon all the parties to assist and cooperate in keeping the peace.

On 3 December 1967, the Secretary-General addressed a third appeal to the President of Cyprus and to the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey, in which he called for Greece and Turkey to carry out an expeditious withdrawal of their forces in excess of their contingents in Cyprus. He added:

“With regard to any further role that it might be considered desirable for UNFICYP to undertake, I gather that this could involve, subject to the necessary action by the Security Council, enlarging the mandate of the Force so as to give it broader functions in regard to the realisation of quiet and peace in Cyprus, including supervision of disarmament and the devising of practical arrangements to safeguard internal security, embracing the safety of all the people of Cyprus. My good offices in connection with such matters would, of course, be available to the parties on request.”

All three Governments welcomed the Secretary-General's appeal, and Turkey supported the enlargement of the UNFICYP mandate to

include supervision of the disarmament in Cyprus of forces constituted after 1963. The Security Council, at a meeting on 22 December 1967, adopted resolution 244(1967), by which, among other things, it noted the Secretary-General's three appeals and the replies of the three Governments.

In response to the Secretary-General's appeals, Greece and Turkey reached an agreement under which Greek national troops were withdrawn from Cyprus between 8 December 1967 and 16 January 1968. However, as no agreement was reached by Greece and Turkey on the issue of reciprocity, UNFICYP did not take on the task of checking that no Greek or Turkish forces in excess of their respective contingents remained in Cyprus.

At the same time, a formula was devised for informal meetings between Glafcos Clerides and Rauf R. Denktash, representing the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, respectively. After an initial meeting in Beirut, Lebanon, on 2 June, they held meetings in Nicosia.

The intercommunal security situation in Cyprus improved during 1968, and in January 1969, President Makarios confirmed that he intended to extend normalisation measures, including freedom of movement for the Turkish Cypriots, throughout the island. The Secretary-General suggested that the Turkish Cypriot leadership should respond by allowing the free movement of Greek Cypriots through Turkish Cypriot areas, but this was not accepted.

Arms Importation

In March 1970, increasing tension within the Greek Cypriot community culminated in an attempt on the life of President Makarios and the subsequent killing of a former Minister of the Interior, Polycarpos Georghadjis.

Clandestine activity by *pro-enosis* (union with Greece) elements continued in 1971, and in view of that, the Government of Cyprus in January 1972 imported a large quantity of arms and ammunition. To minimize the resultant increase in tension, UNFICYP negotiated a provisional agreement on 10 March, whereby the Cyprus Government undertook to keep the imported arms in safe-keeping and open to inspection by the Force Commander. On 21 April, the Secretary-General reported that an improved arrangement had been agreed upon, under which the weapons and munitions, except for the high explosives, would be stored in a fenced area within the perimeter of an UNFICYP

camp. The fenced area would be in the charge of unarmed Cyprus police personnel, but control of the camp perimeter and access to it would be the responsibility of UNFICYP. The high-explosive munitions were stored at Cyprus police headquarters, but the fuses were removed and stored at the UNFICYP camp. A system of double locks and keys was devised for both storage areas.

UNFICYP continued to carry out its functions under these agreements until 1974. The weapons and arms are still stored in the UNFICYP camp, but the responsibility for their security now rests with UNFICYP alone. The Cyprus police have no involvement with them other than periodic verification carried out jointly with UNFICYP.

It should be noted that General Grivas, whom the Greek Government had summoned to Athens on 19 November 1967, returned to Cyprus secretly in January 1972. His actions were publicly criticized by President Makarios, who stressed the independence of Cyprus.

UNFICYP Reductions

The consolidation of the security situation that was achieved by the beginning of 1965, however limited and tenuous, made possible a gradual reduction of the strength of UNFICYP. From a total (military personnel and police) of 6,275 in December 1964, the Force was reduced one year later to 5,764, and to 4,610 by the end of 1966. The strength of the Force in December 1967 was 4,737.

The general lessening of tension throughout the island in 1968, in addition to creating a favourable atmosphere for the Clerides Denktash intercommunal talks, also led to a further significant reduction in the strength of the Force. Steps were taken, in co-operation with the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, to ensure that the effectiveness of the Force would not be adversely affected. Between April and December 1968, its strength was brought down to 3,708.

Further reductions took place gradually over the next two years; thereafter, the strength of UNFICYP from 1970 to 1972 remained stable at approximately 3,150. The strength of the Irish battalion was reduced from 420 to 150 during this period. In this connection, Austria, at the request of the Secretary-General, agreed in 1972 to augment its contingent, which had consisted of the UNFICYP field hospital and an UNCIVPOL unit, by providing also a battalion of 276 ground troops.

In October and November 1973, personnel of the Austrian, Finnish, Irish and Swedish contingents of UNFICYP were transferred to the

Middle East to form the advance elements of the United Nations Emergency Force. Replacements for the Austrian, Finnish and Swedish personnel were promptly sent to Cyprus by the Governments concerned; however, at the request of the Secretary-General, Ireland agreed to dispatch additional troops only to the Middle East, and the Irish contingent in Cyprus was reduced to a token detachment at UNFICYP headquarters.

A further reduction of 381 troops was made in the spring of 1974. However, this was soon overtaken by the events of July 1974 which resulted in increasing the strength of UNFICYP to some 4,335.

Intercommunal Talks

The intercommunal contacts between Clerides and Denktash that had begun in 1968 made little progress. After conversations between Greece and Turkey in June 1971, the Secretary-General suggested in October that his Special Representative, Bibiano F. Osorio-Tafall, of Mexico, should henceforth take part in the talks in the exercise of the Secretary-General's good offices, and that constitutional experts from Greece and Turkey should attend as advisers. This arrangement was accepted in May 1972. The Secretary-General made it clear that the reactivated talks would be based on the equal status of the representatives of the communities, be exploratory in nature and be limited to internal constitutional matters of an independent Cyprus.

President Makarios was re-elected in February 1973. At the same time, Rauf Denktash succeeded Dr. Fazil Kuchuk as Vice-President and leader of the Turkish Cypriot community. After a series of bombings and raids on police stations by *pro-enosis* Greek Cypriots, the Government set up an auxiliary police force in an attempt to improve security conditions. In view of the continued violence within the Greek Cypriot community, Clerides offered to resign as Greek Cypriot interlocutor in the intercommunal talks, but was dissuaded by Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim.

Early in 1974, it appeared that the parties at the talks had reached a measure of agreement on a "package deal" concerning the structure of the State and the degree of authority to be granted to the Turkish Cypriot community in exchange for its renunciation of certain provisions of the 1960 Constitution. However, political developments, including the reactions of Athens and Ankara, set back the prospects of agreement. On 2 April the intercommunal talks were suspended.

The intercommunal situation was generally quiet during May, June and early July 1974. However, tension within the Greek Cypriot

community, and between President Makarios and the Government of Greece, increased during June and early July.

E. Coup D'etat and Turkish Intervention of 1974

Events from the Coup D'etat of 15 July to 30 July

On 15 July 1974, the National Guard under the direction to Greek officers, staged a *coup d'etat* against the Cyprus Government headed by President Makarios. In view of the seriousness of the matter in relation to international peace and security and in view of the United Nations involvement in Cyprus, the Secretary-General requested the President of the Security Council on 16 July to convene a meeting of the Council. The Permanent Representative of Cyprus also requested a meeting. The Council met on 16 and 19 July.

On 20 July, the Turkish Government, invoking the 'Treaty of Guarantee of 1960', launched an extensive military operation on the north coast of Cyprus which resulted eventually in the occupation of the main Turkish Cypriot enclave north of Nicosia and areas to the north, east and west of the enclave, including Kyrenia. The Council met on the same day and adopted resolution 353(1974), by which it called upon all parties to cease firing and demanded an immediate end to foreign military intervention, requested the withdrawal of foreign military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of international agreements, and called on Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom to enter into negotiations without delay for the restoration of peace in the area and constitutional government in Cyprus. The Council also called on all parties to co-operate fully with UNFICYP to enable it to carry out its mandate—thus indicating that UNFICYP was expected to continue to function despite the radically changed circumstances. The ceasefire called for by the Council was announced for 1600 hours, local time, on 22 July.

The fighting resumed on 23 July, especially in the vicinity of Nicosia International Airport, which, with the agreement of the local military commanders of both sides, was declared a United Nations-protected area and was occupied by UNFICYP troops. The Secretary-General reported to the Council on the breakdown of the ceasefire, and sent messages to the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey and to the Acting President of Cyprus, expressing his great anxiety and requesting measures to ensure observance of the ceasefire. The Council on 23 July adopted resolution 354(1974), reaffirming the provisions of resolution 353(1974) and demanding that the parties comply immediately with paragraph 2 of that resolution, which called on them

to stop firing and refrain from action which might aggravate the situation.

UNFICYP Activities

As a consequence of these events, UNFICYP was faced with a situation that had not been foreseen in its mandate. As laid down by the Security Council in resolution 186(1964), the functions of UNFICYP were conceived in relation to the intercommunal conflict in Cyprus, not to large-scale hostilities arising from action by the armed forces of one of the guarantor Powers.

On 15 July, as soon as the *coup d'etat* was reported, UNFICYP was brought to a high state of readiness. Additional liaison officers were deployed at all levels, and increased observation was maintained throughout the island in all areas of likely intercommunal confrontation. Special measures were taken to ensure the security of the Turkish Cypriot community. A few cases of firing into the Turkish enclave north of Nicosia were reported; the firing was stopped through liaison with the National Guard.

On 20 July, the day of the Turkish landings, UNFICYP was placed on full alert. An increased level of observation was maintained throughout the entire island, and additional precautions were taken to safeguard isolated Turkish Cypriot villages. The National Guard reacted to the Turkish operations by strong simultaneous attacks in other parts of the island against most of the Turkish Cypriot quarters and villages. The best UNFICYP could achieve under the circumstances was to arrange local ceasefires to prevent further loss of life and damage to property, as the Turkish Cypriot fighters, who were mainly deployed to protect isolated villages and town sectors, were heavily outnumbered. When the war situation made it necessary on 21 July to evacuate foreign missions to the British Sovereign Base Area at Dhekelia, UNFICYP played a major part in the organisation and execution of that humanitarian operation. In all areas, including the Kyrenia sector, intensified United Nations patrolling was carried out, a close watch was maintained over the battle zone and all possible efforts were made to promote the safety of civilians.

The Secretary-General reported to the Security Council his understanding that UNFICYP should, and indeed must, use its best efforts to ensure, as far as its capabilities permitted, that the ceasefire called for by the Council was maintained. Obviously, a United Nations peacekeeping force, in a deeply serious situation such as the one prevailing in Cyprus, could not be expected to stand by and not make

the maximum effort to ensure that a resolution of the Security Council was put into effect. For this reason, the Special Representative, the Force Commander and all the personnel of UNFICYP made every effort to restore the ceasefire, to ensure that it was observed and to prevent any incidents from escalating into a full recurrence of fighting. In this connection, UNFICYP assisted in delineating the positions of the parties as at 1600 hours on 22 July. Additional United Nations observation posts were established in the confrontation areas, and extensive patrolling was carried out in order to maintain a United Nations presence throughout the island.

In addition, the Secretary-General requested reinforcements from the contributing countries; they arrived between 24 July and 14 August, increasing the total strength of the Force by 2,078 all ranks to a total of 4,444. UNFICYP was redeployed to meet the new situation, two new operational districts were established on both sides of the Turkish bridgehead, and the general level of surveillance throughout the island was increased accordingly. Because of the suffering caused by the hostilities, UNFICYP undertook an increasing number of humanitarian tasks to assist the afflicted population of both communities.

Tripartite Conference and the Geneva Declaration

As called for in Security Council resolution 353(1974), the Foreign Ministers of Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom began discussions in Geneva on 25 July, and on 30 July they agreed on the text of a declaration concerning the situation in Cyprus, which was immediately transmitted to the Secretary-General. By the Geneva Declaration, the Foreign Ministers agreed on certain measures that involved action by UNFICYP. Thus:

- (a) A security zone of a size to be determined by representatives of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, in consultation with UNFICYP, was to be established at the limit of the areas occupied by the Turkish armed forces. This zone was to be entered by no forces other than those of UNFICYP, which was to supervise the prohibition of entry. Pending the determination of the size and character of the security zone, the existing area between the two forces was not to be entered by any forces.
- (b) All the Turkish enclaves occupied by Greek or Greek Cypriot forces were to be immediately evacuated and would continue to be protected by UNFICYP. Other Turkish enclaves outside the area controlled by the Turkish armed forces would continue to be protected by an UNFICYP security zone and could, as before, maintain their own police and security forces.

- (c) In mixed villages, the functions of security and police were to be carried out by UNFICYP.
- (d) Military personnel and civilians detained as a result of the recent hostilities were to be either exchanged or released under the supervision of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) within the shortest time possible.

At the meeting of the Security Council held on 31 July, the Secretary-General made a statement referring to the above functions envisaged for UNFICYP. The Council, on 1 August, adopted resolution 355(1974), taking note of the Secretary-General's statement and requesting him "to take appropriate action in the light of his statement and to present a full report to the Council, taking into account that the ceasefire will be the first step in the full implementation of Security Council resolution 353(1974)"

Immediately after the adoption of resolution 355(1974), the Secretary-General instructed his Special Representative in Cyprus and the Commander of UNFICYP to proceed, in co-operation with the parties, with the full implementation of the role of UNFICYP as provided for in that resolution. UNFICYP promptly informed the parties that it stood ready to carry out all the functions devolving upon it under the resolution and it repeatedly appealed for observance of the ceasefire.

The Secretary-General's interim report of 10 August 1974 pursuant to resolution 355(1974) gave an account of the action taken to carry out the various provisions of the Geneva Declaration. The military representatives of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom had been meeting since 2 August together with a representative of UNFICYP, but they had not as yet determined the size of the security zone. Accordingly, UNFICYP action regarding that zone had been limited to participation in the deliberations.

Concerning the Turkish enclaves occupied by Greek or Greek Cypriot forces, UNFICYP stood ready to assume its protective functions as soon as they had been evacuated by those forces. In the mean time, UNFICYP's protective functions in respect of Turkish enclaves had continued, including regular patrols, assistance to the population, escorts and convoys for relief supplies (food, medicaments, etc.), and visits to detainees, together with the ICRC, to ensure that their treatment was satisfactory. These protective functions were also being carried out in the Turkish enclaves outside the area controlled by the Turkish forces mentioned in the Declaration, as well as in mixed

villages. On 12 August, the Secretary-General reported that the National Guard had evacuated a number of Turkish Cypriot villages, and UNFICYP had assumed the responsibility for the protection of those areas.

The Second Round of Fighting

Following the breakdown of the Geneva Conference on 14 August, fighting resumed in Cyprus. In the circumstances, UNFICYP resorted to *ad hoc* emergency operating procedures. Armoured reconnaissance units of UNFICYP maintained observation over the battle zone wherever possible. During the night of 14/15 August, and again on 15/16 August, UNFICYP achieved a partial ceasefire in Nicosia to allow all the non-combatants to be evacuated. It made major efforts throughout the country to put an end to the fighting, but was unable to do so in certain combat areas, where UNFICYP posts had to be withdrawn. In a few such areas, killing of civilians took place.

The resumption of heavy fighting on 14 August had placed UNFICYP units in an extremely difficult and dangerous position, resulting in severe casualties. The Security Council noted that development with concern in its resolution 359(1974) of 15 August; it recalled that UNFICYP was stationed in Cyprus with the full consent of the Governments of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece; it demanded that all parties concerned fully respect the international status of the United Nations Force and refrain from any action which might endanger the lives and safety of its members; it further demanded that all parties co-operate with the Force in carrying out its tasks, including humanitarian functions, in all areas of Cyprus and in regard to all sections of the population. After negotiations, the Turkish forces declared a ceasefire at 1800 hours, local time, on 16 August.

On the same day, the Council adopted resolution 360(1974), by which it recorded its "formal disapproval of the unilateral military actions undertaken against the Republic of Cyprus" and urged the parties to comply with its previous resolutions and to resume without delay the negotiations called for in resolution 353(1974).

Humanitarian Functions

During the events of July and August 1974, UNFICYP assumed important humanitarian functions, and the Security Council, in its resolution 359(1974), took notice of these tasks. On 22 July, a special humanitarian and economics branch had been set up at UNFICYP headquarters. Every effort was made to protect the civilian population

caught up in the hostilities—including both Cypriots and foreigners. In co-operation with the ICRC, a wide range of relief assistance was organized for Greek and Turkish Cypriots. However, it soon became evident that a more systematic and larger scale of operation was needed, since approximately one-third of the population of the island had become homeless or was otherwise in need. Accordingly, on 20 August, the Secretary-General designated the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Co-ordinator of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance for Cyprus. In resolution 361(1974) of 30 August, the Security Council, noting that a large number of people in Cyprus were in dire need, and “mindful of the fact that it is one of the foremost purposes of the United Nations to lend humanitarian assistance in situations such as the one currently prevailing in Cyprus”, requested the Secretary-General to continue to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to all parts of the island’s population in need of such assistance. UNFICYP assisted the Co-ordinator in carrying out his functions.

F. UNFICYP Since 1974

Since its establishment in 1964, the main objective of the United Nations operation in Cyprus, as of all other United Nations peacekeeping operations, has been to foster peaceful conditions in which the search for an agreed, just and lasting settlement of the problem could best be pursued. The main instrumentality for maintaining calm and preventing strife in the island has been and remains the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, which continues effectively to carry out its task of conflict control. Accordingly, the Secretary-General has reported to the Security Council, at the end of every six-month mandate period, that in the light of the situation on the ground and of political developments, the continued presence of UNFICYP remains indispensable, both in helping to maintain calm in the island and in creating the best conditions for his good offices efforts. For its part, the Security Council has regularly extended the mandate of the Force for six-month periods.

Until June 1983, the parties concerned consistently informed the Secretary-General of their concurrence in the proposed extension of the stationing of the Force in the island. Following the Turkish Cypriot action of 15 November 1983, the Government of Cyprus as well as the Governments of Greece and the United Kingdom have continued to indicate their concurrence, but Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community have indicated that they were not in a position to accept the resolutions extending the mandate. Despite their divergent

positions, all the parties have continued to maintain excellent co-operation with UNFICYP, both on the military and the civilian sides.

The function of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus was originally defined by the Security Council in its resolution 186(1964) of 4 March 1964 in the following terms "... in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions".

That mandate, which was conceived in the context of the confrontation between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and between the Cyprus National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot fighters, has been periodically extended by the Council. As a result of the events that have occurred since 15 July 1974, the Council adopted a number of resolutions which have affected the functioning of UNFICYP and have required UNFICYP to perform certain additional or modified functions. Accordingly, UNFICYP continues to supervise the ceasefire lines of the National Guard and of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces, which since August 1974 extend across the island from Kato Pyrgos in the west to Dherinia in the east, to a length of some 180 kilometres. The area between the lines, which is under exclusive UNFICYP control, varies in width from 20 metres to seven kilometres. Following the transfer of Turkish Cypriots to the north in 1975, UNFICYP, which had been stationed in sensitive areas throughout the island, was redeployed along the ceasefire lines. UNFICYP uses its best efforts to preserve the military *status quo* and to prevent the recurrence of fighting.

UNFICYP surveillance of the area between the ceasefire lines is carried out through a network of observation posts. Additional mobile and standing patrols to provide increased presence in sensitive areas are deployed as necessary.

Disputes have continued in a few areas concerning the delineation of the ceasefire lines. However, the UNFICYP policy that the forces of neither side should enter these areas has remained effective.

In addition to its military tasks, UNFICYP, under its mandate, performs a number of humanitarian and economic tasks in the area between the lines, as well as north and south of it, in its efforts to help bring about a return to normal conditions. Many of these tasks devolve on UNFICYP because personnel of the Cyprus Government and of the Turkish Cypriot community are not in a position to exercise their

normal functions in some areas. Accordingly, UNFICYP soldiers provide security coverage for agricultural and other civilian activities within the buffer zone, assist in the maintenance and improvement of water and power lines and sewage services that cross the area between the ceasefire line are engaged as necessary in fire-fighting and in the eradication of contagious diseases, provide transport and medical facilities across the lines evacuate by road transport or by helicopter civilian patients in need of medical care, make security arrangements for the performance of religious services in militarily sensitive areas and provide humanitarian assistance to Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north and Turkish Cypriots in the south. Another important continuing task of UNFICYP involves the support of the relief operations coordinated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. His programme for 1984 provided \$7.5 million to finance 22 projects.

The financial situation regarding UNFICYP has continued to worsen, with a deficit, by December 1984, of \$123.1 million, out of a total cost of some \$470.5 million since 1964. Nevertheless, this adverse financial situation has not prevented the Force from fulfilling its functions, mainly because troop-contributing countries have continued to carry a disproportionate burden in keeping UNFICYP in operation.

G. Search for a Negotiated Solution

Secretary-General's Mission of Good Offices

During September 1974, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Luis Weckmann Munoz, of Mexico, arranged for weekly meetings under his auspices between Clerides and Denktash to take up, in the first instance, humanitarian problems. These included the exchange and release of prisoners with the assistance of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

On 1 November, the General Assembly, by its resolution 3212(XXIX), unanimously called on all States to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and non-alignment of Cyprus. It urged the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Cyprus, a halt to foreign interference, and the safe return of all refugees to their homes. The Assembly considered that the constitutional issues were up to the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities to resolve by negotiations, with the help of the Secretary-General. On 13 December, the Security Council endorsed the Assembly's resolution and urged the parties concerned to implement it as soon as possible (resolution 365(1974)).

During December 1974 and January 1975, Clerides and Denktash met several times with the Special Representative and agreed to begin discussion on 14 January of the powers and functions of the central government in a federal State of Cyprus. On 10 February, Clerides submitted constitutional proposals for a "bicommunal multiregional federal State", the total areas under the administration of the respective communities to correspond approximately to the population ratio. Denktash also submitted proposals, along with a statement indicating that it had been concluded that it was not possible for the two communities to live together. The "autonomous Turkish Cypriot administration" would be restructured on the basis of a federated State.

After an announcement on 13 February 1975 of the establishment of the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus", the Security Council conducted lengthy consultations and on 12 March adopted resolution 367(1975), by which it expressed regret regarding that unilateral move and affirmed that that decision did not prejudice the final political settlement. It called for new efforts to assist the resumption of negotiations, asking the Secretary-General to undertake a new mission of good offices and to convene the representatives of the two communities under his auspices and with his direction as appropriate.

Vienna Rounds of Intercommunal Talks

The talks called for by the Security Council began on 28 April in Vienna under the personal auspices of Secretary-General Waldheim. Before ending the first round on 3 May, the negotiators decided to meet again in Vienna from 5 to 9 June. During the first two rounds, agreement was reached in principle on reopening Nicosia International Airport and on its repair by the United Nations. The repairs were carried out, but the Airport was not reopened as there were differences concerning implementation of the agreement.

At the third round of talks, held in Vienna from 31 July to 2 August 1975, it was agreed that the Turkish Cypriots in the south of the island would be allowed to proceed north with the assistance of UNFICYP and that a number of Greek Cypriots would be transferred to the north in order to be reunited with their families. Greek Cypriots in the north would be free to go south or to stay, and they would be helped to lead a normal life, including freedom of movement in the north. UNFICYP would have free and normal access to Greek Cypriot villages in that area. The Secretary-General subsequently informed the Council that the transfer of 8,033 Turkish Cypriots to the north

had been completed by 7 September 1975. However, other provisions of the 2 August 1975 agreement were implemented to a limited degree only. In particular, only 346 Greek Cypriots had been permitted to move to the north.

After a fourth round of talks in New York, the General Assembly, on 20 November 1975, demanded the withdrawal without further delay of all foreign armed forces from Cyprus and the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs. A further round of negotiations was held in February 1976, but wide differences persisted.

First High-Level Meeting

After a preliminary meeting held under the auspices of the Special Representative, Javier Perez de Cuellar, of Peru, on 27 January 1977, the leaders of the two communities, Archbishop Makarios and Rauf Denktash, met on 12 February in "Nicosia under the personal auspices of the Secretary-General and agreed on guidelines for the representatives of their communities in the intercommunal talks. Those guidelines included agreement to seek an independent, non-aligned, federal and bicomunal Republic of Cyprus, and agreement that the territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership. Questions of principle such as freedom of movement and settlement and the right of property would be open for discussion, taking into consideration certain practical difficulties that might arise for the Turkish Cypriot community. The powers and functions of the central government should safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to its bicomunal character.

Suspension of the Talks

On that basis, a new round of intercommunal talks was held in Vienna from 31 March to 7 April 1977 under the auspices of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative. The talks were resumed in Nicosia on 20 May but were not continued after 3 June 1977. President Makarios died on 3 August 1977 and was succeeded by Spyros Kyprianou. On 9 November, the General Assembly, by resolution 32/15, called for the urgent resumption of intercommunal negotiations.

The Secretary-General visited Turkey, Cyprus and Greece in January 1978 to determine the prospects for resuming the intercommunal talks in Vienna. On 13 April, he received in Vienna proposals from the Turkish Cypriot side on the territorial and

constitutional aspects. He went to Nicosia to present the proposals to President Kyprianou, who informed him that they were not acceptable as a basis for the resumption of the intercommunal talks.

Suggestions Concerning Varosha

In his report to the Security Council of 31 May 1978, the Secretary-General stated that the continued presence of UNFICYP remained indispensable for keeping the dangerous situation under control, supervising the ceasefire, maintaining the *status quo* in the area between the ceasefire lines and helping to resolve incidents and other problems arising between the parties. He gave an account of his good offices efforts and of the difficulties encountered, suggesting steps to deal with important aspects of the current stalemate on the ground so as to improve the situation in the island and create favourable condition for resuming effective negotiations on the broader issues. In particular, he suggested that certain steps be taken with UNFICYP's Assistance Concerning Varosha, a section of Famagusta that had been vacated by its Greek Cypriot inhabitants in 1974, as well as the Nicosia International Airport, which had remained closed to traffic.

On 20 July 1978, Denktash issued a proposal for the resettlement of Varosha by its Greek Cypriot inhabitants; he noted that about 35,000 could be accommodated. He also suggested that discussions be undertaken for setting up an interim administration for Varosha, under United Nations auspices and with United Nations technical assistance, to supervise essential municipal and police functions. This offer was contingent on agreement by the Greek Cypriots to reopen intercommunal talks.

This proposal was promptly and publicly rejected by President Kyprianou on the grounds that it was territorially inadequate and would prejudice moves towards a comprehensive settlement. On 25 July, the Cyprus Government issued its plan for the withdrawal of all Turkish troops from Famagusta and the return of all its inhabitants to the city, which would be placed for a period of time under United Nations police and security control.

Second High-Level Meeting

A high-level meeting between President Kyprianou and Rauf Denktash was held in Nicosia under the auspices of the Secretary-General on 18 and 19 May 1979. The parties issued a communique on 19 May agreeing to the resumption of intercommunal talks on the basis of the 12 February 1977 guidelines and the United Nations

resolutions relevant to the Cyprus question. The talks would cover all territorial and constitutional aspects. Priority would be given to reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under United Nations auspices, together with the resumption of intercommunal talks to discuss a comprehensive settlement. It was further agreed to abstain from any action which might jeopardize the outcome of the talks; special importance would be given to initial practical measures to promote goodwill, confidence and normalisation. The demilitarisation of the Republic of Cyprus was envisaged.

The intercommunal talks called for in the high-level agreement resumed on 15 June 1979, but were recessed on 22 June without achieving progress.

After a visit to Nicosia, Ankara and Athens by Perez de Cuellar in June 1980, agreement was reached by the parties to resume the talks formally in Nicosia on 9 August, at which time Hugo J. Gobbi, the new Special Representative, delivered an opening statement outlining the Secretary-General's understanding of the common ground that had been worked out. The intercommunal talks thereafter continued on a regular basis. While the atmosphere was constructive, progress was slow. At the same time, the Secretary-General and Gobbi explored with the parties the possible outlines of a partial interim agreement ("mini-package") to be negotiated by the interlocutors, involving the resettlement of Varosha and the reopening of Nicosia International Airport, both under United Nations interim administration.

After further consultations in April and May 1981, it was decided instead to move towards a comprehensive settlement of the conflict, and on 5 August the Turkish Cypriot interlocutor submitted comprehensive proposals, including for the first time maps showing the territorial arrangement favoured by his side.

The intercommunal talks continued for some two years without making any decisive progress. In December 1982, Perez de Cuellar, who had become Secretary-General the previous January, warned in his report to the Security Council that a major effort of synthesis was needed, since time appeared to be eroding the "window of opportunity" for the solution of the Cyprus problem. On 13 May 1983, the General Assembly adopted resolution 37/253, which was rejected by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. As a result, the Turkish Cypriot side decided not to attend the intercommunal talks on the grounds that the resolution tended to undermine the basis for the negotiations.

On 8 and 9 August 1983, the Secretary-General conveyed to both sides informal soundings designed to narrow the gap between their

positions. Denktash suggested that the Secretary-General convene a high-level meeting in order to clarify intentions concerning a federal solution and pave the way for a resumption of the intercommunal talks. In response, President Kyprianou signified his willingness to attend such a meeting if it was well prepared and both sides cooperated in ensuring its success. The Secretary-General thereupon dispatched Gobbi to Cyprus for consultations about the agenda for a high-level meeting.

Turkish Cypriot Action of 15 November 1983

When the Special Representative called on Denktash on 15 November 1983, the latter handed him a letter informing the Secretary-General of the proclamation by the Turkish Cypriot community of an independent "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". At the same time, he expressed his readiness to resume negotiations at any time.

At the request of the United Kingdom, Cyprus and Greece, the Security Council met on 17 and 18 November 1983. The Secretary-General stated that the Turkish Cypriot move was contrary to the Council's resolutions and at variance with the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979, but he voiced his determination to continue his efforts. On 18 November, the Council adopted resolution 541(1983), by which it deplored the Turkish Cypriot declaration of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus, considered that declaration as legally invalid and called for its withdrawal, requested the Secretary-General to pursue his mission of good offices, and called upon all States not to recognize any Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus.

Scenario of 16 March 1984

After meetings in January 1984 in Casablanca with Rauf Denktash and with President Kenan Evren of Turkey, and in February in New York with President Kyprianou, the Secretary-General, on 16 March, handed to Denktash a "scenario" designed to open the door to a high-level meeting. This provided that there would be no further step to internationalize the Cyprus problem, no follow-up to the Turkish Cypriot: declaration of 15 November 1983 and no increase of military forces in the island. The Turkish Cypriots would transfer Varosha, as delineated by them in 1981, to the Secretary-General as part of the UNFICYP-controlled buffer zone. The area would remain under United Nations administration pending an agreement on the settlement of the Cyprus problem, and no armed personnel other than UNFICYP would have access to it. The parties would accept a call by the Secretary-

General for holding a high-level meeting and reopening the inter-communal dialogue.

Denktash thereupon announced his intention to proceed to a constitutional referendum and elections and arranged for the submission of "credentials" for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Turkey. The Secretary-General publicly expressed regret over these developments, which jeopardized his current efforts. On 18 April, Denktash handed to Gobbi his side's response to the scenario. The impasse persisted.

On 11 May, the Security Council adopted resolution 550(1984), by which it condemned secessionist actions and declared them illegal and invalid, and asked the Secretary-General to undertake new efforts towards an overall solution in conformity with the United Nations Charter and the pertinent United Nations resolutions.

Proximity Talks and High-Level Meeting

In a new initiative, the Secretary-General met separately with Andreas Mavrommatis and Necati Ertekun, representing the Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides, in Vienna on 6 and 7 August 1984, and out-lined to them a number of working points with a view to ascertaining whether these might provide a basis for high-level proximity talks. On 31 August, both sides responded favourably. The Secretary-General then invited the leaders of the two communities to meet with him separately in New York.

Following three rounds of proximity talks with President Kyprianou and Rauf Denktash in September, October and November/December, the Secretary-General announced that he had reached the assessment that the documentation for a draft agreement was ready for submission to a joint high-level meeting, at which an agreement could be concluded containing the overall framework for a comprehensive solution aimed at establishing a Federal Republic of Cyprus.

The joint high-level meeting, convened under the auspices of the Secretary-General and attended by President Kyprianou and Rauf Denktash, was held in New York from 17 to 20 January 1985. It did not prove possible at the meeting to overcome the difficulties that had arisen. The Secretary-General, on 20 January, issued a statement in which he noted that the Turkish Cypriot side fully accepted the draft agreement and that the Greek Cypriot side had accepted the documentation as a basis for negotiations in accordance with the integrated-whole approach. The Secretary-General commented that

the gap in the search for a solution had never been so narrow, and appealed to both sides to ensure that the advances that had been made were preserved, and that nothing should be done, in the island or elsewhere, to make the search for a solution more difficult.

Following contacts with the two sides, the Secretary-General decided to concentrate his efforts on overcoming the obstacles which had stood in the way of the acceptance of the documentation by the Greek Cypriot side, while preserving its substance. Towards this end, he incorporated the components of the documentation into a single consolidated draft agreement. He also devised possible procedural arrangements for the follow-up action after agreement was reached by the two sides on the framework for an overall solution to the Cyprus question.

Following contacts with the Greek Cypriot side, including a meeting with President Kyprianou on 11 March 1985, the Secretary-General received an affirmative reply from the Greek Cypriot side in early April. He then informed the Turkish Cypriot side of the status of his efforts and sought its views. After receiving the views of the Turkish Cypriot side in August and after meeting with Rauf Denktash on 12 and 13 September, the Secretary-General concluded that it was now for him to assess the situation and to decide on the next step to be taken, which he would communicate to the both sides in the near future.

On 20 September, the Secretary-General informed the members of the Council on the current state of his efforts. In the light of that information, the President of the Security Council, on behalf of its members, issued a statement expressing the strong support of the member;; of the Council for the Secretary-General's efforts and called upon all parties to make a special effort in co-operation with the Secretary-General to reach an early agreement.

H. Missing Persons

At the high-level meeting of 12 February 1977, agreement in principle was reached to set up an investigatory body for the tracing of and accounting for missing persons of both communities. However, despite intensive consultations over the next months, it did not prove possible to reach agreement on the terms of reference of that body, particularly on the role and identity of its third member.

On 16 December 1977, the General Assembly adopted without a vote resolution 32/128, requesting the Secretary-General to provide

his good offices, through his Special Representative, to support the establishment of the investigatory body with the participation of the ICRC. Both sides publicly reiterated their support for such a joint body with ICRC participation, but the differences between them persisted.

On 22 April 1981, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Gobbi, announced that agreement had been reached by the two sides on the terms of reference for a Committee on Missing Persons to consist of three members: one person from each of the communities and the third member selected by the ICRC with the agreement of both sides, and appointed by the Secretary-General. Claude Pilloud was appointed as the third member. However, not until 14 March 1984 did the Committee reach agreement on its procedural rules. In May it began its practical work, including investigation of cases submitted by the parties. Progress has been slow. Pilloud died in November 1984. His successor, Paul Wurth, was appointed by the Secretary-General in April 1985.

I. Financial Aspects

The arrangements for the financing of UNFICYP were laid down by the Security Council in paragraph 6 of resolution 186(1964), by which the Council:

“Recommends that the stationing of the Force shall be for a period of three months, all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by the Governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus; the Secretary-General may also accept voluntary contributions for that purpose”.

In accordance with Council resolutions, the Secretary-General has issued regular and special appeals to all Member States or members of specialized agencies to make voluntary contributions to defray the costs of the Force. As of 15 December 1984, pledges of such contributions from 69 Member States and one non-member State, in addition to miscellaneous receipts, totalled \$347.4 million. The costs to be borne by the United Nations for the operation of UNFICYP since 1964 were estimated at \$470.5 million. Accordingly, the UNFICYP deficit stood at \$123.1 million.

In order to provide contingents for UNFICYP, the troop-contributing Governments divert from national duty troops and other resources at an ongoing cost to them currently estimated by them at \$36.2 million for each six-month period. This figure includes (a) the troops' regular pay and allowances and normal *materiel* expenses for which, under

existing arrangements, the United Nations is not required by the troop contributors to reimburse them; these therefore constitute costs of maintaining the Force which are being financed directly by the troop-contributing Governments, and (b) certain extra and extraordinary costs that troop contributors incur in respect of UNFICYP for which, under existing arrangements, they would be entitled to claim reimbursement from the United Nations, but which they have agreed to finance at their own expense as a further contribution to the United Nations operation in Cyprus.

In view of the nature of the financial arrangements, payments to troop-contributing Governments for costs for which they seek United Nations reimbursement can only be made as and when voluntary contributions or other income are received, and after the operational costs incurred directly by the United Nations have been met.

As a result of this situation, the United Nations has fallen more and more behind in meeting its obligations in respect of the reimbursement claims of the troop contributors. The last disbursement under this heading, made in January 1984, enabled the Organisation to meet those Governments' claims through June 1978. This means that the troop-contributing countries not only absorb at their own expense considerable costs incurred in maintaining their contingents but are, in effect, financing the deficit. Since the troop-contributing countries are also, in many cases, substantial voluntary contributors to the UNFICYP

Special Account, it will be realized that those Governments carry a disproportionate burden in keeping UNFICYP in operation.

The Secretary-General has repeatedly voiced his profound concern about the worsening financial situation confronting UNFICYP. The troop-contributing countries have likewise expressed their growing concern. However, despite the Secretary-General's repeated appeals, the deficit of the UNFICYP account continues to worsen.

42

United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)

LOCATION: Cyprus

HEADQUARTERS: Nicosia

DURATION: March 1964 to present

CURRENT STRENGTH: 1,171 troops and support personnel, and 35 civilian police

FATALITIES: 163

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND CHIEF OF MISSION: Joe Clark (Canada)

FORCE COMMANDER: Brigadier General Ahti Toimi Paavali Vartiainen (Finland)

Background

Cyprus became independent on 16 August 1960 with a Constitution that was intended to balance the interests of the island's Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. A treaty of August 1960, entered into by Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, guaranteed the basic provisions of the Constitution and the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus.

The application of the provisions of the Constitution, however, encountered difficulties from the very beginning and led to a succession of constitutional crises. The accumulated tension between the two communities resulted in the outbreak of violence on the island on 21 December 1963.

On 27 December, the United Nations Security Council met to consider a complaint by Cyprus charging intervention in its internal affairs and aggression by Turkey. Turkey maintained that Greek

Cypriot leaders had tried for more than two years to nullify the rights of the Turkish Cypriot community and denied all charges of aggression.

Establishment of UNFICYP

On 15 February 1964, after all attempts to restore peace on the island had failed, the representatives of the United Kingdom and of Cyprus requested urgent action by the Security Council. On 4 March 1964, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 186 (1964), by which it recommended the establishment of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) with a mandate to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting, and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. Since then, the Council has periodically extended UNFICYP's mandate, usually for periods of six months at a time.

Maintenance of Cease-Fire and Military Status Quo

In connection with the hostilities in July and August 1974, the Security Council adopted a number of resolutions which have affected the functioning of UNFICYP and have required the Force to perform certain additional functions relating, in particular, to the maintenance of the cease-fire.

Following a de facto cease-fire, which came into effect on 16 August 1974, UNFICYP inspected the deployment of the Cyprus National Guard and the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces, and cease-fire lines and a buffer zone were established between the areas controlled by the opposing forces. The cease-fire lines extend approximately 180 kilometres across the island. The buffer zone between the lines varies in width from less than 20 metres to some 7 kilometres, and it covers about 3 per cent of the island, including some of the most valuable agricultural land.

Strict adherence to the military status quo in the buffer zone, as recorded by UNFICYP at the time, has become a vital element in preventing a recurrence of fighting. UNFICYP maintains surveillance through a system of 151 observation posts, and through air, vehicle and foot patrols. The Force maintains a patrol track, which runs the length of the buffer zone and is used for surveillance, monitoring of agricultural activities, resupply of observation posts and rapid reaction to incidents.

The task of UNFICYP is significantly complicated by the absence of a formal cease-fire agreement. As a result, UNFICYP is confronted with hundreds of incidents each year. The most serious/incidents tend

to occur in areas where the cease-fire lines are in close proximity, particularly in Nicosia and its suburbs. The Force investigates and acts upon all violations of the cease-fire and the military status quo. Its reaction in each case depends on the nature of the incident and may include the deployment of troops, verbal and written protests and follow-up action to ensure that the violation has been rectified or will not recur. In addition to maintaining the military status quo, UNFICYP must also preserve the integrity of the buffer zone from unauthorized entry or activities by civilians. As a result, UNFICYP has from time to time become involved in crowd control.

Humanitarian Activities

Another major function entrusted to UNFICYP is to encourage the fullest possible resumption of normal civilian activity in the buffer zone. To this end, it facilitates the resumption of farming in the buffer zone; assists both communities on matters related to the supply of electricity and water across the lines; endeavours to facilitate normal contacts between Greek and Turkish Cypriots; facilitates provision of emergency medical services; and facilitates delivery of mail across the lines. UNFICYP visits Greek Cypriots and the small Maronite community living in the northern part of the island. It also visits Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part. UNFICYP also cooperates with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in providing relief assistance.

Restructuring of UNFICYP

Until recently, UNFICYP was the only United Nations peace-keeping operation not financed from assessed contributions by States Members of the Organisation. In accordance with Security Council resolution 186 (1964), the costs of the Force were met by the Governments providing the military contingents and by voluntary contributions received for this purpose by the United Nations. In addition, the Government of Cyprus provided, at no cost, areas for the headquarters, camps and other premises of UNFICYP.

Under those arrangements, the troop-contributing Governments made available to the United Nations troops whose regular pay and allowances and normal *materiel* expenses they had agreed to pay themselves. The United Nations was responsible for the operational costs for administrative and logistic support (e.g., rations, fuel, hire of vehicles, maintenance of premises, salaries and travel of non-military personnel) and for extra and extraordinary costs incurred by the troop-contributing Governments for which they sought reimbursement on

the basis of separate agreements concluded by the United Nations with each of those Governments. These costs could be paid only from the voluntary contributions received for this purpose. Voluntary contributions, however, had consistently fallen short of the required funds, leaving the Special Account for UNFICYP with a total deficit of approximately \$200 million for the period from the inception of the Force to June 1993. As a result, reimbursement claims from the troop-contributing countries were paid only up to December 1981.

The Secretary-General repeatedly voiced his profound concern about the worsening financial situation confronting UNFICYP. He suggested that the Force should be put on a sound and secure financial basis and that the best way to finance UNFICYP would be for its costs to be met from assessed contributions.

Due to the deteriorating financial situation of the Force and frustration over the lack of progress towards a lasting political solution to the Cyprus problem, a number of troop-contributing Governments decided, in 1992, to reconsider their participation in UNFICYP. In his May 1992 report on UNFICYP activities, the Secretary-General spoke of the need to consult with the troop-contributing countries on their intentions on participation in the Force, including the timing of any reductions or withdrawals of their contingents, and on the possible future options for UNFICYP. On 21 September, the Secretary-General informed the Council that the troop-contributing Governments had given firm indications of their intention to reduce "the operational commitment" of their contingents, and he outlined a plan for a possible restructuring of UNFICYP.

In December 1992, the size of the Force was significantly reduced by the withdrawal of the Danish battalion (323 personnel) and reductions in the British, Austrian and Canadian contingents of 198, 63 and 61 personnel, respectively. This reduced UNFICYP's strength by approximately 28 per cent.

In his 30 March 1993 report, the Secretary-General stated that these reductions necessitated a major restructuring and reorganisation of UNFICYP. The required operational and organisational adjustments had been put in place on 16 December 1992. He went on to say that further withdrawals announced by Canada and the United Kingdom would reduce the Force's strength from 1,513 to approximately 850 personnel and, unless the situation was redressed, UNFICYP would cease to be viable in June 1993. The Secretary-General presented his proposals for a further restructuring of the Force, stressing that they would be practical only if the Security Council changed the financing of UNFICYP from voluntary to assessed contributions.

In its resolution 831(1993) of 27 May 1993, the Security Council decided that those costs of the Force which were not covered by voluntary contributions should be treated as expenses of the Organisation, effective from the next extension of the Force's mandate on or before 15 June 1993.

The Council also decided that UNFICYP should be restructured to a strength of three infantry battalions of approximately 350 personnel each, the minimum number required to maintain effective control of the buffer zone. A limited number of military observers were recently added to UNFICYP for reconnaissance, liaison and humanitarian tasks.

As a result of reductions, the Force now covers the cease-fire lines more thinly than before. Its capacity to react to incidents and to prevent them from escalating has been affected. At the same time, the mandate of UNFICYP has remained unchanged, as essentially have the functions deriving from that mandate. The restructured UNFICYP continues to interpose itself between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot forces and to supervise the cease-fire lines that define the buffer zone, by observing and reporting any violations of the ceasefire and the military status quo.

For operational purposes, the Force is divided into three sectors and six line companies. In June 1993, the Canadian battalion was withdrawn, as scheduled. As a result, between June and September 1993, the Force's strength temporarily dipped below 1,000 and the Force Commander implemented an emergency contingency plan reorganising UNFICYP in two sectors, covered by the Austrian and United Kingdom battalions. However, this did not last long; the decision of the Security Council to change the system of financing of the Force was followed by an offer by the Government, of Argentina of a line battalion of some 350 personnel. The Force deployment was thus restored, as of 8 October 1993, to three line sectors/battalions as recommended by the Secretary-General and endorsed by Security Council resolution 831 (1993).

To offset the reductions in strength, the Force Commander has adjusted the organisation of UNFICYP by moving a greater portion of the battalions' strength into the buffer zone and reorganising the system of observation posts, relying more heavily on mobile patrolling. He also began a process of handing over certain humanitarian activities of the Force to the two sides.

In his 7 June 1994 report to the Security Council on the activities of UNFICYP, the Secretary-General stated that the continued presence

of the Force remained indispensable to maintain peace on the island and ensure a climate conducive to successful peacemaking. He recommended that the Council extend the mandate of UNFICYP until the end of 1994.

The Security Council, by its resolution 927 (1994) of 15 June 1994, decided to extend the mandate of the Force for a further period ending on 31 December 1994.

Composition of UNFICYP

The current strength of UNFICYP is 1,171 military personnel (compared with 2,040 in November 1992) and 35 civilian police. They are provided by the following countries (figures as at 30 November 1994):

<i>Country</i>	<i>Police</i>	<i>Troops</i>
Argentina		392
Australia	20	
Austria		346
Canada		10
Finland		2
Ireland	15	25
United Kingdom		396
Total	35	1.171

Figures may vary from month to month due to rotation. "Troops" include any infantry, logistics, engineering, medical, move-con, staff, etc.

There were also a 359 civilian staff, 41 of whom were internationally and 31 8 locally recruited.

Financial Aspects

By its resolution 47/236 of 14 September 1993, the United Nations General Assembly decided that for the period beginning 16 June 1993 the costs of the Force not covered by voluntary contributions should be treated as expenses of the Organisation to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17 of the United Nations Charter.

The rough cost of UNFICYP in 1994 was approximately \$43.9 million. With effect from 16 June 1993, the financing of the Force consists of voluntary contributions of \$6.5 million annually from the Government of Greece and one third of its cost from the Government of Cyprus. Thus, only some \$23 million a year is financed from contributions assessed on the entire membership of the United Nations.

By resolution 48/244 of 10 May 1994, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, requested the Secretary-General to continue his efforts in appealing for voluntary contributions to the account established for UNFICYP prior to 16 June 1993, when the Force was financed entirely by voluntary contributions. An accumulated shortfall of approximately \$200 million remains unreimbursed to troop contributors for that period.

Secretary-General's Mission of Good Office

The United Nations Secretary-General began his good offices functions in Cyprus in 1964. Since 1966, the Secretary-General's Special Representatives have been actively involved in promoting an agreed overall settlement. After the events of 1974, the Security Council, in its resolution 367 (1975) of 12 March 1975 requested the Secretary-General to undertake a new mission of good offices. Since then, the successive Secretaries-General and their Special Representatives have been trying to find a formula acceptable to both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots.

NOTE

1. In his further report on UNFICYP dated 12 December 1994, the Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Force for a further six-month period. He stated that UNFICYP had continued to carry out its functions in Cyprus effectively, with the cooperation of both sides, and the situation remained generally quiet, but subject to sudden tensions, generated by events outside as well as within Cyprus. He also stated that the excessive level of armaments and forces in Cyprus and the rate at which they were being strengthened were a cause of concern.

On 21 December, the Security Council, by Its resolution 969 (1994), extended the mandate of UNFICYP until 30 June 1995. The Council expressed its concern that there had been no progress towards a final political solution of the conflict in Cyprus, and urged the leaders of both communities to promote tolerance and reconciliation between the two communities.

43

United Nations Operation in Mozambique (Onumoz)

LOCATION: Mozambique

HEADQUARTERS: Maputo

DURATIONS: December 1992 to present

STRENGTH: 204 military observers, 3,941 troops and 918 police monitors

FATALITIES: 17

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL:
Aldo Ajello (Italy)

FORCE COMMANDERS: Major-General Mohammad Abdus Salam
(Bangladesh)

Background

On 4 October 1992, after 14 years of devastating civil war, Joaquim Alberto Chissano, President of the Republic of Mozambique, and Afonso Dhlakama, President of the Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (RENAMO), signed in Rome a General Peace Agreement establishing the principles and modalities for the achievement of peace in Mozambique. The Agreement called for United Nations participation in monitoring the implementation of the Agreement, in providing technical assistance for the general elections and in monitoring those elections.

Under the Agreement, negotiated with the help of a number of mediators and observers including United Nations representatives, a cease-fire was to come into effect not later than 15 October 1992, referred to as E-Day. The Agreement itself and its seven protocols called for the cease-fire to be followed rapidly by the separation of the

two sides' forces and their concentration in certain assembly areas. Demobilisation was to begin immediately thereafter of those troops who would not serve in the new Mozambican Defence Force (FADM). Demobilisation would have to be completed six months after E-Day. Meanwhile, new political parties would be formed and preparations would be made for elections, scheduled to take place not later than 15 October 1993. A 16 July 1992 Declaration by the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO on guiding principles for humanitarian assistance, a Joint Declaration signed in Rome on 7 August 1992, as well as a Joint Communique of 10 July 1990 and an Agreement of 1 December 1990, form integral parts of the General Peace Agreement.

The United Nations was requested to undertake a major role in monitoring the implementation of the Agreement and was asked to perform specific functions in relation to the cease-fire, the elections and humanitarian assistance. The implementation of the Agreement was to be supervised by a Supervisory and Monitoring Commission chaired by the United Nations.

On 9 October 1992, United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali submitted to the Security Council a report on the proposed United Nations role in Mozambique, in which he recommended an immediate plan of action and stated his intention, subject to the Council's approval, to appoint an interim Special Representative to oversee United Nations activities in that country.

On 13 October, the Security Council adopted resolution 782 (1992), by which it welcomed the signature of the General Peace Agreement between the Mozambican Government and RENAMO and approved the appointment by the Secretary-General of an interim Special Representative and the dispatch to Mozambique of a team of up to 25 military observers.

Agreement Enters into Force

On the same day, the Secretary-General appointed Aldo Ajello as his interim Special Representative for Mozambique,¹ and asked him to proceed to Mozambique to assist the parties in setting up the joint monitoring machinery, in finalising the modalities and conditions for the military arrangements and in carrying out the various other actions that were required of them at the very beginning of the peace process.

The interim Special Representative and the team of 21 military observers, drawn from existing United Nations peace-keeping missions, arrived in Mozambique on 15 October 1992, the day the General Peace Agreement entered into force. On 20 October, two teams of military

observers were also deployed to the provincial capitals of Nampula and Beira. Later, two additional outposts were established to verify the withdrawal of foreign troops from Mozambique,² which was an important element of the General Peace Agreement.

Both Mozambican parties committed themselves to undertake, immediately after, and in some instances before, the entry into effect of the Agreement, specific action to set in motion the joint mechanisms to monitor and verify its implementation. However, no such action had been initiated at the time the interim Special Representative arrived in Mozambique. Upon arrival, he started extensive discussions with the parties concerned in an effort to ensure the early start of implementation of the Agreement.

Meanwhile, major violations of the cease-fire were reported in various areas of the country, and the parties presented official complaints to the interim Special Representative. He urged the two parties to refrain from any type of military operation and to discuss and settle all disputes through negotiations.

The Secretary-General reported on the situation to the President of the Security Council on 23 October. The President, in a statement dated 27 October, expressed the Council's deep concern about the reports of major violations of the cease-fire, called upon the parties to halt such violations immediately and urged them to cooperate fully with the interim Special Representative.

Setting up of Monitoring Mechanism

In an attempt to avoid further escalation of hostilities, the interim Special Representative called for an early informal meeting of the Government and RENAMO. The initiative was successful, and both parties sent high-level delegations to attend their first meeting in Maputo, the capital of Mozambique. Thereafter, the two delegations met on numerous occasions, both bilaterally and together with the interim Special Representative. On 4 November 1992, the interim Special Representative appointed the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC). CSC was to guarantee the implementation of the Agreement, assume responsibility for authentic interpretation of it, settle any disputes that might arise between the parties and guide and coordinate the activities of the other Commissions. It was chaired by the United Nations and was initially composed of Government and RENAMO delegations, with representatives of Italy (the mediator State), France, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States (observer States at the Rome talks) and the Organisation of African

Unity (OAU). In December 1992, Germany also became a member of CSC.

CSC held its first meeting on 4 November 1992 and appointed the main subsidiary commissions: the Cease-fire Commission (CCF), the Commission for the Reintegration of Demobilized Military Personnel (CORE), as well as the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Forces (CCFADM).

Establishment on ONUMOZ

On 3 December 1992, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council his further report, in which he presented a detailed operational plan for the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). Describing the difficulties of the operation, he referred to the size of the country, the devastated state of its infrastructure, the disruption of its economy by war and drought, the limited capacity of the Government to cope with the new tasks arising from the General Peace Agreement and the complexity of the processes envisaged in the Agreement. He also referred to the breadth of responsibilities entrusted to the United Nations under the Agreement.

The Secretary-General expressed his conviction that it would not be possible to create the conditions for successful elections in Mozambique unless the military situation had been brought fully under control, and that the Agreement would not be implemented unless the Mozambican parties made a determined effort in good faith to honour their commitments.

In recommending to the Security Council the establishment and deployment of ONUMOZ, the Secretary-General stated that "in the light of recent experiences elsewhere, the recommendations in the present report may be thought to invite the international community to take a risk. I believe that the risk is worth taking; but I cannot disguise that it exists."

On 16 December 1992, the Security Council, by its resolution 797 (1992), approved the Secretary-General's report and decided to establish ONUMOZ until 31 October 1993. The Council endorsed the Secretary-General's recommendation that the elections not take place until the military aspects of the General Peace Agreement had been fully implemented. It called upon the Mozambican Government and RENAMO to cooperate fully with the United Nations and to respect scrupulously the cease-fire and their obligations under the Agreement.

ONUMOZ'S Mandate

In accordance with the General Peace Agreement, the mandate of ONUMOZ included four important elements: political, military, electoral and humanitarian. In his 3 December 1992 report, the Secretary-General stressed that the operational concept of ONUMOZ was based on the strong interrelationship between those four components, requiring a fully integrated approach and coordination by the interim Special Representative. Without sufficient humanitarian aid, and especially food supplies, the security situation in the country might deteriorate and the demobilisation process might stall. Without adequate military protection, the humanitarian aid would not reach its destination. Without sufficient progress in the political area, the confidence required for the disarmament and rehabilitation process would not exist. The electoral process, in turn, required prompt demobilisation and formation of the new armed forces, without which the conditions would not exist for successful elections.

Political Aspects

The Office of the Special Representative was to provide overall direction of United Nations activities in Mozambique and would be responsible for political guidance of the peace process, including facilitating the implementation of the General Peace Agreement, in particular by chairing the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission and its subsidiary joint commissions.

Military Aspects

ONUMOZ was to monitor and verify the cease-fire, the separation and concentration of forces of the two parties, their demobilisation and the collection, storage and destruction of weapons; monitor and verify the complete withdrawal of foreign forces, and provide security in the four transport corridors; monitor and verify the disbanding of private and irregular armed groups; authorize security arrangements for vital infrastructures; and provide security for United Nations and other international activities in support of the peace process.

ONUMOZ's verification of the arrangements for the cease-fire and other military aspects of the peace process in Mozambique was to be carried out mainly by teams of United Nations military observers at the 49 assembly areas in three military regions and elsewhere in the field. Teams were also to be deployed at airports, ports and other critical areas, including RENAMO headquarters.

The military aspects of the United Nations operation in Mozambique was to be closely linked with the humanitarian effort. The approximately 100,000 soldiers who were to come to the assembly areas were to be disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated into civil society. They would need food and other support as soon as the assembly areas were established. An ONUMOZ technical unit, staffed by civilian personnel, was to assist in implementing the demobilisation programme and to collaborate closely with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOHAC) on the programme's humanitarian aspects.

The General Peace Agreement provided for the withdrawal of foreign troops to be initiated following the entry into force of the cease-fire. Simultaneously, the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission, through the Cease-fire Commission, was to assume immediate responsibility "for verifying and ensuring security of strategic and trading routes", of which the most important were the four transport corridors. ONUMOZ was to assume transitional responsibility for the security of the corridors in order to protect humanitarian convoys using them, pending the formation of the new unified armed forces. Bearing this in mind, ONUMOZ infantry battalions were to be deployed in the corridors.

While the Agreement did not provide a specific role for United Nations civilian police in monitoring the neutrality of the Mozambican police, the Secretary-General proposed to leave open the possibility of introducing a police component into ONUMOZ, should both Mozambican parties so request.

Monitoring of Electoral Process

Under the terms of the Agreement, legislative and presidential elections were to be held simultaneously one year after the date of signature of the Agreement. This period might be extended if warranted by the prevailing circumstances.

ONUMOZ's Electoral Division was to monitor and verify all aspects and stages of the electoral process which would be organized by the National Elections Commission. The Division was to provide overall direction and maintain contacts with the Government of Mozambique, RENAMO, the National Elections Commission and the main political parties.

In addition, the Secretary-General's Special Representative was to coordinate technical assistance to the whole electoral process in Mozambique, which was to be provided through the United Nations

Development Programme, other existing mechanisms of the United Nations system and the bilateral channels.

Humanitarian Aspects

The 1992 peace accord set out two objectives for international humanitarian assistance to Mozambique: to serve as an instrument of reconciliation, and to assist the return of people displaced by war and hunger, whether they had taken refuge in neighbouring countries or in provincial and district centres within Mozambique. ONUMOZ's integral component for humanitarian operations—UNOHAC—was to be established in Maputo, with suboffices at the regional and provincial levels. It was to replace the office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Emergency Relief Operations, which had been responsible for humanitarian assistance programmes in Mozambique. Headed by the Humanitarian Affairs Coordinator, and under the overall authority of the Special Representative, it was to function as an integrated component of ONUMOZ. Operational agencies and the non-governmental aid community were asked to provide representatives to work within UNOHAC.

UNOHAC was also to make available food and other relief for distribution by a technical unit of ONUMOZ to the soldiers in the assembly areas. In order to achieve the successful reintegration of demobilized soldiers, UNOHAC proposed a three-pronged strategy centred on identification of training and employment opportunities, a vocational kits and credit scheme, and a counselling and referral service.

Early Difficulties

From the outset of ONUMOZ operations in Mozambique, various delays and difficulties of a political, administrative, as well as of a logistical nature seriously impeded the implementation of the General Peace Agreement. In his 2 April 1993 report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated that although the cease-fire had largely held, many of the timetables established in the Agreement "proved to be unrealistic." Continuing deep mistrust had resulted in reluctance to begin assembly and demobilisation of troops, and contributed to the delay in the deployment of United Nations military observers.

Another complication was RENAMO's insistence that 65 per cent of ONUMOZ troops be deployed before the assembly process began. There were administrative delays in the deployment of ONUMOZ formed military units. A number of logistical and legal problems arose

from the absence of a status-of-forces agreement with the Mozambican Government.

As to the elections, the Secretary-General stressed that the military situation in Mozambique must be fully under control for conditions to be created in which a successful election could take place. Having found it evident that the elections could not be held in October 1993 as originally scheduled, he indicated that he would continue discussions with the parties on new dates.

On 14 April, the Security Council, by adopting resolution 818(1993), stressed its concern about delays and difficulties impeding the peace process in Mozambique, and strongly urged the country's Government and RENAMO to finalize the precise timetable for the full implementation of the provisions of the General Peace Agreement, including the separation, concentration and demobilisation of forces, as well as for the elections. The Council also urged both sides urgently to comply with their commitments under the Agreement and to cooperate with the Secretary-General and his Special Representative in the full and timely implementation of the mandate of ONUMOZ.

New Timetable

In the following weeks, due to determined efforts undertaken by the United Nations, many of the difficulties were overcome and, by the beginning of May 1993, ONUMOZ was fully deployed and its military infrastructure established in all three operational regions.

On 30 June, the Secretary-General reported about this and a number of other positive developments which had resulted in forward movement of the peace process in Mozambique. Those included the establishment of the voluntary trust fund to assist RENAMO, the resumption of the work of the Joint Commissions, massive international effort in the humanitarian field, with a sharp increase in the return of refugees and displaced persons. The withdrawal of Zimbabwean and Malawian troops, as provided for in the General Peace Agreement, was successfully completed. Also, a status-of-forces agreement was signed between the Government and the United Nations, which facilitated the entire range of work of ONUMOZ.

However, the establishment of the National Elections Commission and the Commission of State Administration was still pending, cantonment and demobilisation of troops as well as the formation of the new army had not commenced. The Secretary-General stated that unless the major provisions of the General Peace Agreement were implemented, the future stability of the country would remain

uncertain. There should be no further delay in finalising a new and realistic timetable for the implementation of the Agreement. The cantonment and demobilisation of troops should start soon and be completed early in 1994, and the training of a new Mozambican army should be initiated as soon as possible. To assist in that process, the Secretary-General was willing to grant the request that ONUMOZ, with the consent of the Security Council, assume chairmanship of the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force on the understanding that it would not entail any obligation on the part of the United Nations for training or establishing new armed forces.

The revised timetable, presented by the Secretary-General at that time, took as its point of departure the resumption of the work of the Joint Commissions beginning on 3 June 1993 and concluding 16 months later with the holding of elections in October 1994. The concentration and demobilisation of Government and RENAMO troops, to be carried out in stages, was expected to take eight or nine months. The concentration of troops was scheduled to begin in September 1993 and would be followed a month later by the beginning of demobilisation. It was expected that 50 per cent of the soldiers should have been demobilized by January 1994, and the demobilisation of troops should be completed by May 1994.

It was expected that approximately, 30,000 soldiers would be absorbed into the new army and the rest were to return to civilian life. Half the new army was to be operational by May 1994 and formation of the new army was to be completed by September 1994. Home transportation of soldiers who would not be part of the new army was to start in October 1993, after demobilisation began, and was to be concluded by April 1994 in order to enable the demobilized soldiers to register for the elections. Voter registration was expected to take three months and was scheduled to be carried out from April to June 1994. The repatriation of refugees and displaced persons was expected to be largely completed by April 1994 so that the resettled population might register in time for the elections.

The Secretary-General stated that although the general parameters of the new timetable were thoroughly discussed, he was still awaiting final agreement from both parties.

By adopting resolution 850 (1993) of 9 July, the Security Council welcomed the progress made in the implementation of the General Peace Agreement but expressed concern over continuing delays, particularly in the assembly and demobilisation of forces, the formation

of the new unified armed forces, and the finalising of election arrangements. It approved the Secretary-General's recommendation that ONUMOZ should chair the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force. Further, the Council invited the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO to agree without delay to the revised timetable to implement the provisions of the General Peace Agreement based on the general parameters described by the Secretary-General.

Two Major Agreements Signed

In his progress report presented to the Security Council on 30 August 1993, the Secretary-General stated that the recent developments in the Mozambican peace process have been encouraging. The most significant development was the long overdue start of direct talks between the President of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, and the President of RENAMO, Afonso Dhlakama. The talks had begun on 23 August in Maputo. The Secretary-General strongly urged the parties to turn their dialogue into an ongoing and action-oriented process aimed at bringing the peace process to a successful conclusion. As to the revised timetable, the Secretary-General indicated that although it had not yet been formally approved by the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission, important progress had been made in key areas. The Government explicitly agreed to the October 1994 deadline for the holding of the elections, while RENAMO also expressed its implicit agreement. The Secretary-General reported that he had instructed his Special Representative to follow as closely as possible the revised timetable for assembly and demobilisation of forces and the formation of the unified armed forces.

On 10 September 1993, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that two major agreements had been signed between the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO on 3 September—the outcome of the first meeting between the President of Mozambique and the President of RENAMO after the signing of the General Peace Agreement in October 1992.

By the first agreement, the Government and RENAMO agreed to integrate into the state administration all areas that had been under RENAMO control. That agreement, the Secretary-General believed, would contribute to stability in the country and promote national reconciliation.

By the second agreement, concerning the impartiality of the national police, the parties agreed to request the United Nations to

monitor all police activities in the country, public or private, to monitor the rights and liberties of citizens and to provide technical support to the Police Commission (COMPOL) established under the Rome Agreement. The proposed United Nations police contingent would be responsible for verifying that all police activities in the country were consistent with the General Peace Agreement. The Secretary-General planned to send to Mozambique a small survey team of experts and, based on their findings, make recommendations concerning the size of the police component; while awaiting those recommendations, preparations would commence to deploy the 128 ONUMOZ police observers already authorized by resolution 797 (1992) of 16 December 1992.

Council Commends Agreements

On 13 September 1993, the Security Council, by resolution 863 (1993), strongly urged the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO "to apply, without further postponement" the revised timetable for implementing the General Peace Agreement, and encouraged the President of Mozambique and the President of RENAMO to continue their direct talks. Further, it urged RENAMO to join the Government in authorising immediate assembly of forces, and urged both parties to begin demobilising troops, in accordance with the revised timetable and without preconditions.

Deploring the lack of progress in the multiparty consultative conference, the Security Council urged RENAMO and other political parties to join with the Mozambican Government in quickly agreeing on an electoral law, which should include provision for an effective National Election Commission. The Council called on the Government and RENAMO to make operational, without further delay, the National Commission for Administration, the National Information Commission and the Police Affairs Commission. The Council requested the Secretary-General to examine expeditiously the proposal of the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO for United Nations monitoring of police activities in the country, and welcomed his intention to send a survey team of experts in that connection.

Secretary-General Visits Mozambique

In an attempt to break the stalemate in the peace process, the Secretary-General visited Mozambique from 17 to 20 October 1993. He met with President Chissano and Dhlakama as well as with leaders of other political parties and representatives of the international community.

On 20 October, the Secretary-General announced a breakthrough in the peace process. Major agreements had been reached between the Government and RENAMO on, among other things, the assembly and demobilisation of RENAMO and Government troops as well as the simultaneous disarmament of paramilitary forces, militia and irregular troops; the composition of the National Elections Commission and the system and timetable for finalising the Electoral Law; and the creation of local National Police Affairs Commission subcommittees to monitor the activities of the Mozambican Police. Following those and other agreements, the revised timetable for the implementation of the Peace Agreement was approved by the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission on 22 October 1993.

On 29 October 1993, the Security Council, by its resolution 879 (1993), decided to extend ONUMOZ's mandate for an interim period terminating on 5 November 1993, pending examination of the Secretary-General's report due under resolution 863 (1993).

The Secretary-General submitted his further periodic report on 1 November 1993. On 5 November, the Security Council, by resolution 882 (1993), decided, *inter alia*, to renew ONUMOZ's mandate for a period of six months, subject to a proviso that the Council would review the status of the mandate within 90 days based on the further report of the Secretary-General. The Council requested the Secretary-General to report by 31 January 1994 and every three months thereafter on whether the parties had made sufficient and tangible progress towards implementing the General Peace Agreement and meeting the timetable.

ONUMOZ ACTIVITIES

Deployment of the Military Component

ONUMOZ carried out extensive operational activities throughout Mozambique. The security of corridors and main roads was ensured by regular road and aerial patrol as well as by vehicle and train escorts provided by United Nations forces. They also provided security to oil-pumping stations, airports, United Nations warehouses, ONUMOZ headquarters and to temporary and permanent arms depots collected from the troops of the both parties. ONUMOZ's military component also contributed to humanitarian activities in the country by providing engineering and medical assistance.

The military observers conducted inspections into allegations of cease-fire violations and assisted in the establishment and preparation

of assembly areas. The observers supervised the process of cantonment of troops since its inception.

Assembly and Demobilisation of Troops

Security Council Resolution 882 (1993) urged the parties to commence assembly of troops in November 1993 and to initiate demobilisation by January 1994 with a view to ensure the completion of the demobilisation process by May 1994, in accordance with the timetable signed by the two parties in October 1993.

On 30 November 1993, following a series of lengthy negotiations, troop cantonment formally commenced. The initial 20 of the total 49 assembly areas were opened (12 for the Government and 8 for RENAMO), and the assembly of troops started. Fifteen additional assembly areas were opened on 20 December. During the initial stages of cantonment, government troops assembled in much larger numbers than RENAMO forces. This trend, however, was reversed by mid-December 1993.

There were delays in the dismantling of government paramilitary forces and militia, which was scheduled to begin simultaneously with the assembly and demobilisation of regular troops. After several attempts to set a deadline for the beginning of this process, the dismantling of the troops of the paramilitary groups was initiated on 12 January 1994.

Cease-Fire

Notifications of alleged cease-fire violations were being dealt with by the Cease-fire Commission with the active participation of ONUMOZ. On the whole, formally confirmed cease-fire violations were relatively few and presented no serious threat to the peace process. Basically, they fell into three categories: illegal detention of individuals, alleged movement of troops and occupation of new positions.

Formation of Mozambican Defence Force

On 22 July 1993, the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force, under United Nations chairmanship, approved the Lisbon Declaration by which France, Portugal and the United Kingdom set out a programme aimed at assisting in the formation of the new unified army. The Commission decided to initiate the training of instructors for the new Mozambican army by sending 540 officers from the Government and RENAMO to a training facility at Nyanga (Zimbabwe). The training of the institutions was completed

by 20 December 1993, and these officers were then transported by ONUMOZ to Mozambique on 12 January 1994 to help in training infantry soldiers at the three Mozambican Defence Force training centres.

Meanwhile, the Joint Commission approved a total of 19 documents relating to the organisation, operating procedures, uniforms, ranking symbols and training of approved by the Mozambican National Assembly on the unified armed forces and other matters.

Electoral Process

On 26 March 1993, the Government of Mozambique prepared and distributed a draft electoral law to RENAMO and other political parties. A multiparty consultative conference to discuss this document was convened on 27 April 1993. However, RENAMO initially refused to attend the meeting on the grounds that it had not had sufficient time to study the text. Smaller parties did attend, but walked out after having presented a declaration demanding material and financial support and alleging that there had been insufficient time for them to analyse the draft.

Although the conference resumed its work on 2 August 1993, with the presence of all political parties, including RENAMO, it reached a deadlock over an article on the composition of the National Electoral Commission, meant to be the representative and impartial body responsible for organising the parliamentary and presidential elections. This led to a breakdown of discussions.

The deadlock was broken during the Secretary Humanitarian assistance committees convened General's visit to Mozambique from 17 to 20 October 1993 when agreements were reached between the Government and RENAMO on the issues of composition and chairmanship of the National Electoral Commission. Subsequent discussions, however, reached an impasse over four other questions: (a) voting rights for expatriate Mozambicans; (b) composition of the provincial and district elections commissions; (c) composition of the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration; and (d) establishment and composition of an electoral tribunal.

On 26 November 1993, a consensus on those questions was finally reached after a number of meetings were held between President Chissano and Dhlakama in consultation with the Secretary-General's Special Representative.

Following these agreements, the Electoral Law was approved by the Mozambican National Assembly on 9 December 1993, nine days

later than envisaged in the agreed timetable. It was promulgated by President Chissano shortly thereafter and entered into force on 12 January 1994. The members of the National Elections Commission were appointed on 21 January 1994.

Humanitarian Programme

A major goal of the ONUMOZ humanitarian assistance programme was to respond effectively to the reintegration needs of all Mozambicans, particularly those returning to resettle in their original communities. It had been projected that approximately 6 million Mozambicans would resettle during the following two years, including about 4.0 to 4.5 million internally displaced persons, 1.5 million refugees and 3,70,000 demobilized soldiers and their dependants. This situation necessitated the programme's shift in emphasis from emergency humanitarian relief towards reintegration and rehabilitation.

Providing humanitarian assistance in the environment created by the General Peace Agreement promoted communication needed to solidify the peace. Humanitarian assistance committees convened by UNOHAC's Field Officers in the provinces expanded contacts among all concerned parties. Support for the repatriation process, the demobilisation of armed forces, emergency relief and the, restoration of essential services, and mine clearance were the main components of the consolidated humanitarian assistance programme for 1993-1994. The implementation of this programme required some \$616 million for the twelve month period May 1993–April 1994.

Donor response to the updated humanitarian programme for 1993-1994 resulted in firm donor commitments of more than \$536 million towards the target of \$616 million. A consolidated humanitarian programme prepared by UNOHAC covering the period May-December 1994 summarized the outstanding resources needed for emergency relief aid, assistance to internal migration and demobilisation of former combatants. The humanitarian assistance programme for the last eight months of 1994 was intended to serve as a bridge from the emergency phase to longer-term, post-war reconstruction.

By the end of 1993, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that more than half of Mozambique's 1.5 million refugees had returned to the country. A further 350,000 were expected to return by the end of 1994, with the remaining 375,000 expected to repatriate during 1995. By October 1994, the international humanitarian assistance programme had also aided the resettlement and reintegration of some 3 million internally

displaced persons and 200,000 former combatants and their dependants.

With the demobilisation process well under way, UNOHAC focused particular attention on its programme for the reintegration of former combatants into civilian life. Through informal tripartite discussions within the Commission for Reintegration, it was to secure agreement on a three-pronged strategy to address the needs of ex-soldiers.

Although mine clearance programmes were slow to reach the implementation stage, major hurdles were overcome and a National Mine Clearance Plan began coordinating efforts to clear 4,000 km of roads in the initial phase, to develop mine awareness programmes and train Mozambican nationals in mine clearance and related technologies. In May 1994, UNOHAC assumed responsibility for assuring that the objectives of the ONUMOZ mandate for mine clearance were achieved expeditiously. The accelerated programme was aimed at creating and fostering a national capacity for mine clearance. It was hoped that by the end of 1994, 450 Mozambican demining technicians and supervisors would complete training.

Serious Problems Remain

In his report to the Security Council dated 28 January 1994, the Secretary-General noted that despite significant progress made in the implementation of the General Peace Agreement, several serious problems still remained to be resolved. These included the opening of the 14 remaining assembly sites, initiation and subsequent completion of the actual demobilisation, transfer of weapons from assembly areas to regional warehouses, dismantling of the paramilitary forces, provision of financial support for the transformation of RENAMO from a military movement into a political party, and formation of a well-functioning national defence force.

The Secretary-General stated that it was the Mozambicans themselves who bore the main responsibility for success in the implementation of the peace agreement. It was imperative that the two parties honour their commitments and cooperate closely with the United Nations in overcoming existing obstacles.

Large Police Component Authorised

In his 28 January 1994 report, the Secretary-General also stated that recent political developments in Mozambique had evolved in such a way as to allow an increasing shift of focus from monitoring cease-fire arrangements to general verification of police activities in the country and the respect of civil rights.

Therefore, the Secretary-General, in an addendum to his report, recommended the establishment of a 1,114-strong ONUMOZ civilian police component—inclusive of the 128 already authorized by the Council. Being aware of the additional costs associated with the establishment of a sizeable United Nations police presence in the country, he intended, following the expected completion of the demobilisation of troops in May 1994, to begin a gradual cut-back of the Mission's military elements.

The ONUMOZ civilian police component (CIVPOL) would be mandated to monitor all police activities in the country and verify that their actions were consistent with the General Peace Agreement; monitor respect of citizens' rights and civil liberties; provide technical support to the National Police Commission; verify that the activities of private protection and security agencies did not violate the General Peace Agreement; verify the strength and location of the government police forces and their *materiel*; and monitor and verify the process of reorganisation and retraining of the quick reaction police, including its activities, weapons and equipment. In addition, CIVPOL, together with other ONUMOZ components, would monitor the proper conduct of the electoral campaign and verify that political rights of individuals, groups and political organisations were respected.

CIVPOL would be a separate component of ONUMOZ under the command of a Chief Police Observer, who would report directly to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. It would also work closely with the existing electoral, military, humanitarian and administrative components of ONUMOZ. Appropriate liaison arrangements would be established with the national police at all levels, and CIVPOL would establish itself at all strategic locations throughout the country. It would have unrestricted access to the general public, conduct all its own investigations and, when necessary, recommend corrective action.

The Secretary-General recommended that CIVPOL be deployed progressively. The initial phase, during which the central headquarters and regional and provincial capital teams would be fully established, was to be completed by mid-March 1994. The second phase would coincide with the voter registration process from April to June, during which up to 70 per cent of CIVPOL posts and stations throughout the countryside would become operational. The remainder of the component would be deployed by no later than one month before the beginning of the electoral campaign, which was scheduled to begin on 1 September 1994.

On 23 February 1994, the Security Council, by its resolution 898 (1994), authorized the establishment of the police component, as recommended by the Secretary-General. At the same time, concerned with cost implications, it requested him to prepare immediately specific proposals for the drawdown of military personnel so as to ensure that there be no increase in the operation's costs. He was also requested to prepare a timetable for the completion of the ONUMOZ mandate, including withdrawal of its personnel by the end of November 1994 when the elected government should assume office.

Expressing concern at the continuing delays in the implementation of major aspects of the General Peace Agreement, the Council called upon both parties to comply fully with all the provisions of the Agreement, in particular those concerning the cease-fire and the cantonment and demobilisation of troops, as well as with the decisions of the Monitoring and Supervision Commission. It reiterated the vital importance of holding the general elections no later than October 1994 and urged parties to agree promptly on a specific election date.

Further Developments

In the course of March and April 1994, a number of important developments took place in Mozambique. During that period, there were no military activities in the country that posed a serious threat to the cease-fire or to the peace process as a whole. With the beginning of the demobilisation on 10 March, the implementation of the General Peace Agreement entered into another critical phase. The total planned number of 49 assembly areas were open and operational by 21 February. By mid-April, 55 per cent of Government and 81 per cent of RENAMO soldiers were cantoned. As of 18 April, a total of 12,756 troops (12,195 Government and 561 RENAMO) were demobilized and transported to the districts of their choice. This corresponded to 20 per cent of Government and 3 per cent of RENAMO soldiers. The training programme for the new Mozambican Armed Forces (FADM), inaugurated in March, provided training for some 2,000 soldiers. The leaders of the FADM, Generals Lagos Lidimo of the Government and Mateus Ngonhamo of RENAMO, were sworn into office on 6 April as joint commanders of the new army.

On 11 April, the President of Mozambique announced that the general elections would take place on 27 and 28 October 1994. The National Elections Commission had been inaugurated in February 1994, and its 10 provincial offices established by the end of March. The Technical Secretariat for Elections Administration had initiated its activities on 11 February. The Government decree that officially

established the Secretariat was promulgated on 13 April. As of 18 April, 278 members of the ONUMOZ police component, authorized by Security Council resolution 898 (1994) of 23 February, had already arrived in Mozambique and had been deployed throughout the country.

Considerable progress was made in resettling internally displaced persons and Mozambican refugees returning from neighbouring countries. The United Nations, in collaboration with other organisations concerned and bilateral donors, was pursuing programmes to assist the remaining 1 million internally displaced persons and 800,000 refugees to be resettled.

However, in his 28 April 1994 progress report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated that in spite of those positive developments, some serious difficulties continued to hinder the timely completion of the peace process. Especially worrying were the delays in the assembly of Government troops, the demobilisation of RENAMO troops and the training of the FADM. In addition, the National Elections Commission might face potential practical difficulties in the complex process of voter registration. A number of problems also persisted in the areas of logistics, finance, the identification of party representatives and free access by the political parties to all districts of Mozambique.

At the same time, the Secretary-General believed that the "major political conditions for the timely completion of this Mission are in place." Having said that ONUMOZ continued to play a vital role in the peace process, he recommended to the Security Council that it extend the existing mandate of ONUMOZ until 31 October 1994. He expected that liquidation of the Mission would be completed by 31 January 1995.

The Secretary-General was making every effort to ensure that the deployment of the civilian police component would not entail an overall increase in the costs of the Mission. As requested by Security Council resolution 898 (1994) of 23 February, he outlined his plans for the reduction of the military elements of ONUMOZ. Some redeployment of the military units was also recommended.

On 5 May 1994, the Security Council, by its resolution 916 (1994), renewed the mandate of ONUMOZ at a reduced strength for a final period until 15 November 1994, subject to the proviso that it would review the mandate by 15 July and 5 September based on progress reports by the Secretary-General.

Further Progress Reported

As requested, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on 7 July 1994. He stated that while significant progress had been made in many areas of the Mozambican peace process, and especially in the electoral sphere, serious problems still remained because of delays in the completion of the assembly and demobilisation of troops belonging to the Government and to RENAMO, and in the formation of the FADM. The Secretary-General stressed that it was imperative that the assembly and demobilisation of troops be accelerated dramatically if the established deadline was to be met. Referring to the problems encountered in the selection of the agreed number of 30,000 soldiers for the FADM, and the unlikelihood that all would be trained by October, he suggested that it would be preferable for 15,000 to be trained after the elections.

In a statement by its President issued on 19 July, the Security Council, while welcoming progress achieved, expressed concern at continuing delays in the implementation of the General Peace Agreement and decided to send a mission to Mozambique to discuss with the parties how best to ensure its full and timely implementation.

After visiting Mozambique from 7 to 13 August 1994, the nine-member Security Council mission concluded that despite the delays and difficulties experienced up to that point, the elections would be held on the dates agreed and under the conditions set out in the Agreement.

In his further progress report submitted to the Security Council on 26 August, the Secretary-General stated that several of the difficulties cited in his previous reports had been overcome. The process of assembly of Government and RENAMO soldiers was concluded and the demobilisation of those soldiers was almost complete. A number of decisions had been taken with regard to formation of a new army. The Secretary-General noted further that the cease-fire was remarkably well respected. ONUMOZ military personnel continued to verify the demobilisation process and monitor security along the corridors and main routes of the country. CIVPOL established itself in major cities and towns and in 44 field posts.

The electoral process was progressing well. Voter registration for elections began on 1 June and was extended until 2 September. As of 22 August, more than three quarters of the estimated eligible voter population of 7,894,850³ were already registered. The electoral campaign was scheduled to begin on 22 September. The trust fund

was fully established in order to assist the political parties to organize and prepare themselves for active participation in the forthcoming elections.

The Secretary-General also pointed to the considerable progress made in implementing humanitarian programmes in Mozambique, contributing to the overall efforts to achieve national reconciliation. About 75 per cent of those who were internally displaced at the time of signature of the General Peace Agreement had been resettled. There were still an estimated 342,000 refugees in neighbouring countries who were expected to return to Mozambique by the end of 1994. Some progress was also made in the de-mining programme.

The Secretary-General concluded that by all indications, the necessary conditions for holding the elections on 27 and 28 October, as scheduled, were in place.

At the same time, the Secretary-General was concerned about the deteriorating security situation in Mozambique. Rioting among soldiers, both inside and outside assembly areas, continued to escalate until early August, when most soldiers had been or were in the process of being demobilized. In addition, the crime level rose dramatically in both rural and urban areas. The increasing security problems necessitated ONUMOZ to step up its patrolling of the major routes and to reinforce guarding of United Nations properties and key locations.

The Secretary-General stated that ONUMOZ had an important role to play in assisting the Government in providing security to various activities in support of the peace process. He considered it important to step up all ONUMOZ operations aimed at maintaining security and public order, particularly in the crucial period surrounding the elections.

"As the peace process approaches its final leg, it will be incumbent upon all concerned in Mozambique to redouble their efforts to ensure that the elections are conducted in a free and fair manner and that the transitional period promotes national reconciliation and stability", the Secretary-General said in conclusion. He also reminded all parties of their obligation to respect the results of the elections.

On 7 September, the Security Council, through a statement by its President, expressed satisfaction with the pace of the peace process and a cautious optimism that Mozambicans would be able to fulfil the goals of the peace process, achieving democracy, lasting peace, and a responsible, representative government in their country. The Council restated its intention to endorse the results of the elections provided

the United Nations declared them as free and fair. It encouraged the parties to continue their efforts in good faith to ensure post-electoral harmony.

On the Eve of Elections

In his 21 October report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated that essential conditions existed for holding free and fair elections. There had been no violation of the cease-fire for many months; voter registration had concluded in an orderly manner; and the electoral campaign was in its active phase. More than 75,000 soldiers had been demobilized and a unified army comprising approximately 10,000 soldiers had been formed. The number of incidents of violent rioting in the country significantly decreased and the political situation was relatively calm.

On the negative side, the Secretary-General noted that the atmosphere during the electoral campaign was tense and armed banditry had become widespread. This situation was exacerbated by the continuing proliferation of weapons despite the fact that 111,539 weapons had been collected from troops of the two parties and 43,491 from the paramilitary forces. He also referred to some public pronouncements made by certain candidates which could cast doubt on their commitments to accept the results of the elections.

The Secretary-General further stated that there was an obvious risk that political temperatures would rise before and immediately after the poll and that particular caution and statesmanship would be required at that time. The future of Mozambique, he concluded, lay in the hands of its people and their leaders.

The Security Council, in a statement issued on 21 October, also expressed its belief that the necessary conditions had been established for holding free and fair elections on 27 and 28 October under effective national and international monitoring.

The Council appealed to all concerned to ensure that the election campaign and subsequent voting be calmly and responsibly conducted and that the elections be held freely and fairly. It also appealed that those in authority act with complete impartiality and that there be no violence or threat of violence during the election days and their aftermath. The Council reminded the parties of their obligation, under the General Peace Agreement, fully to abide by the results.

Elections

On the eve of the elections, the international community deployed approximately 2,300 electoral observers, including some 900 from the

United Nations, to observe and verify the polling and the counting of votes in all provinces of the country. Several organisations, including OAU, the European Union and the Association of European Parliamentarians for Southern Africa, sent teams of their own electoral observers.

As scheduled, the election polls opened on 27 October. However, the peace process was immediately threatened when the President of RENAMO, Afonso Dhlakama, after alleging that there had been certain irregularities in the election process, announced his decision to withdraw from the elections.

On the same day, the Security Council, through its President, sent a message to Dhlakama appealing to him to reconsider his decision and saying that appropriate procedures were in place through the National Elections Commission whereby any concern RENAMO might have could be addressed. The Secretary-General also issued a statement stating that the parties must fully honour their commitments and the elections must go ahead as planned and agreed by the parties.

Meanwhile, the Secretary-General's Special Representative was engaged in an intensive effort to resolve the situation and was in contact with Dhlakama. His efforts were fully supported by the ambassadors of States members of the Supervision and Control Commission and other ambassadors in Maputo. In addition, the Presidents of South Africa, Zimbabwe and several other countries of the region were active in assisting to resolve the situation.

Despite Dhlakama's call to boycott the elections, United Nations monitors reported large turnouts and no major irregularities at polling stations; more than half of the registered voters cast their ballots on the first day. RENAMO monitors were present at many stations, although some were said to have withdrawn.

On 28 October, Dhlakama reversed his position and decided to vote. The voting period was extended by one day to 29 October to allow a high turnout and the resolution of difficulties before the polls closed. Meanwhile, the National Elections Commission in close cooperation with ONUMOZ undertook to make every effort to ensure that the complaints about irregularities submitted by RENAMO and certain other opposition parties were fully investigated.

When the polls closed on 29 October, in some provinces more than 90 per cent of the registered electorate had voted. According to a preliminary statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the elections were conducted peacefully, in a well-organized

manner, and without any major irregularities or incidents. He stressed that United Nations observation could not support any claim of fraud or intimidation, or any other pattern of incidents that could affect the credibility of the elections. He said that the counting of ballots was under way, and that ONUMOZ would maintain its vigilance. Once the count was completed, he would be in a position to make an official pronouncement on the freedom and fairness of the entire electoral process.

ONUMOZ's Mandate Extended

In a letter dated 9 November to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General recalled that in his 26 August 1994 report, he had indicated that the withdrawal of ONUMOZ would begin after the elections and would be concluded by the end of January 1995. In that report, the Secretary-General mentioned that the presence of the United Nations in Mozambique would be required until such time as the new Government took office.

In the letter, the Secretary-General informed the Council that the installation of the new Government in Mozambique was expected to take place by 15 December 1994, following the publication of the final electoral results. He therefore recommended that the mandate of ONUMOZ be extended accordingly. During that period, ONUMOZ would continue its functions of good offices, as well as its verification and monitoring activities, as mandated by the relevant Security Council resolutions.

On 15 November, the Security Council, by its resolution 957 (1994), decided to extend the existing mandate of ONUMOZ until the new Government took office, but no later than 15 December, and authorized it to complete residual operations prior to its withdrawal on or before 31 January 1995.

The Council welcomed the elections held in Mozambique from 27 to 29 October. It reiterated its intention to endorse the results, should the United Nations declare the elections free and fair, and called on the parties to accept and fully abide by them.

Elections Were "Free and Fair"

In accordance with the Electoral Law, the results of the national count were to be announced within 15 days of the close of the polls. However, the counting process took longer than initially foreseen. This was mainly due to the need to ensure absolute accuracy and transparency under the scrutiny of political party monitors and United

Nations observers. In addition, mathematical errors complicated the computerisation of the data at the provincial level.

The results of the first multiparty elections in Mozambique were announced by the National Elections Commission on 19 November 1994. The incumbent President, Chissano, won the presidential election with 2,633,740 votes, amounting to 53.3 per cent of those cast in the election. The leader of RENAMO, Dhlakama, received 1,666,965 votes, or 33.7 per cent. The candidate receiving the third largest number of votes (2.9 per cent) was Wehia Ripua of the Partido Democratico de Mocambique (PADEMO). A total of 5,402,940 persons, representing 87.9 per cent of all registered voters, participated in the presidential election. Blank votes amounted to 5.8 per cent, while 2.8 per cent were considered invalid by the National Elections Commission. In the legislative election, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) received the largest share of the votes with 2,115,793 (44.3 per cent), followed by RENAMO with 1,803,506 votes (37.8 per cent) and the Uniao Democratica (UD) with 245,793 votes (5.2 per cent). Those three parties would have the following share of the new Parliament's 250 seats: FRELIMO—129, RENAMO—109 and UD—12.

On the same day, the Secretary-General's Special Representative stated that the electoral process was characterized by the impartiality, the dedication and the high degree of professionalism displayed by the electoral authorities. It was distinguished by the strong commitment of the political players to let the principles of democracy prevail, and it confirmed the will of Mozambican people to live in peace and harmony.

The Special Representative noted that although problems occurred, irregularities were recorded and disruption did take place, there was no event or series of events, throughout the entire process, which could affect the overall credibility of the elections.

On behalf of the United Nations, the Special Representative declared that the elections held in Mozambique from 27 to 29 October 1994 were free and fair.

The Secretary-General also issued a statement, in which he congratulated the people and the leaders of Mozambique on the successful outcome of the elections, and called on all Mozambicans to pursue the task of national reconciliation and to ensure that peace and stability prevailed in their country and region.

On 21 November, the Security Council, by its resolution 960 (1994), endorsed the results of the Mozambican elections, and called on all parties to stand by their obligation to accept and fully abide by the

results. It also called on them to continue the process of national reconciliation based on a system of multiparty democracy and the observance of democratic principles.⁴

Composition of ONUMOZ

The original authorized strength of ONUMOZ was between 7,000 and 8,000 military and civilian personnel. On 23 February 1994, the Security Council, by its resolution 898 (1994), authorized the establishment of a 1,114-strong civilian police component. The initial reduction of the military component of ONUMOZ, amounting to some 2,000 troops of all ranks, began in April and was completed in July 1994.

Following the election, the Mission started the major withdrawal of its personnel. As of 30 November 1994, the military component of ONUMOZ totalled 204 military observers and 3,941 infantry and military support personnel. There were also 918 police monitors. These personnel were provided by the following States:

<i>Country</i>	<i>Police</i>	<i>Troops</i>	<i>Observers</i>
Argentina		40	7
Australia	15	4	
Austria	20		
Bangladesh	96	1,028	25
Botswana	15	730	
Brazil	41	22	26
Canada			4
Cape Verde			10
China			10
Czech Republic			5
Egypt	70		6
Ghana	40		
Guinea Bissau	65		23
Guyana	1		
Hungary	18		22
India	75	86	2
Indonesia	15		
Italy		202	
Japan		53	
Jordan	80		
Malaysia	35		23
Nepal	50		
Netherlands		11	

New Zealand		9	
Nigeria	55		
Pakistan	62		
Portugal	58	152	1
Russian Federation			2
Spain	25		15
Sri Lanka	10		
Sweden	2		6
Togo	5		
United States		1	
Uruguay	15	827	17
Zambia	50	776	
Total	918	3,941	204

"Troops" include any infantry, logistics, engineering, air, medical, mov-con, staff, etc.

The Office of the Special Representative was comprised a small number of international professional and support staff as well as an adequate number of locally recruited personnel.

The ONUMOZ Electoral Division included some 148 international electoral officers. During the polling itself, ONUMOZ deployed approximately 900 electoral observers throughout the country. They were supported by some 1,400 various international observers assisting in the verification.

The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance had a small number of international professional staff to coordinate and monitor all humanitarian assistance in Mozambique; it was assisted by an ONUMOZ technical unit in the humanitarian aspects of the demobilisation process.

In addition, international professional and support staff and an adequate number of local staff provided secretariat functions and administrative support to the military, electoral and humanitarian components of ONUMOZ, as well as to the Commissions chaired by the United Nations.

Financial Aspects

The rough cost to the United Nations of ONUMOZ in 1994 was approximately \$294.8 million. The costs of the operation were met by assessed contributions from United Nations Member States. As at 30 November 1994, contributions outstanding to the ONUMOZ Special Account for the period from the inception of the operation to 15 November 1994 amounted to approximately \$105.9 million.

NOTES

1. Subsequently, in March 1993, Aldo Ajello was appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mozambique.
2. As the civil war intensified, Malawi and Zimbabwe, with the agreement of the Government of Mozambique, deployed troops in the transport corridors to assist the Government's forces in keeping them open. These corridors, which run across Mozambique from the Indian Ocean to land-locked countries to the north and west, are of critical importance for southern Africa.
3. The National Elections Commission lowered the initial estimate of 8.5 million eligible voters, which was based on the 1980 census and was considered inaccurate.
4. Mozambique's new Parliament was installed in Maputo on 8 December, and Chissano was inaugurated as President of Mozambique on 9 December 1994. Thus, the mandate of ONUMOZ formally came to an end at midnight on 9 December. However, ONUMOZ has been continuing to carry out residual functions until the Mission is fully liquidated at the end of January 1995.

44

United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia

LOCATION: Georgia

HEADQUARTERS: Sukhumi

DURATION: August 1993 to present

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: 136 military observers

SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: Edouard Brunner (Switzerland)

CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVER: Brigadier-General John Hvidegaard (Denmark)

Background

The conflict in Abkhazia, strategically located on the Black Sea in the northwestern region of the Republic of Georgia, began with social unrest and the attempts by the local authorities to separate from the Republic. It escalated into a series of armed confrontations in the summer of 1992 when the Government of Georgia, concluding that the railway and certain communication links had to be protected, deployed 2,000 Georgian troops in Abkhazia. Fierce fighting broke out on 14 August 1992 when the Georgian troops entered Abkhazia, resulting in some 200 dead and hundreds wounded. The Abkhaz leadership abandoned the Abkhaz capital of Sukhumi and retreated to the town of Gudauta.

The relations between the Abkhaz and the Georgians have been tense for decades. Historically, the Abkhaz attempted many times to separate from the Republic of Georgia. Most recently, in August 1990, the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet declared Abkhazia a sovereign republic of the Soviet Union independent of Georgia. This was immediately annulled by the Georgian Supreme Soviet. As a compromise for

remaining in the Republic of Georgia, the Abkhaz were given disproportionate representation in the Supreme Council of Abkhazia. At that time, of the total population in Abkhazia of 540,000, only about 18 per cent were Abkhaz. The majority was Georgian (about 47 per cent), and others included Armenians (about 18 per cent) and Russians (about 13 per cent). In December 1991, a new Supreme Council was elected, which allocated 28 seats to the Abkhaz, 26 seats to the Georgians and 11 seats to the remaining 35 per cent of the population. This did not ease the tension between the Abkhaz and Georgians. The Supreme Council split into two opposing factions, and for all intents and purposes, it ceased to function.

The 1992 Cease-Fire Agreement

A cease-fire agreement was reached on 3 September 1992 in Moscow by the Republic of Georgia, the leadership of Abkhazia and the Russian Federation. The agreement stipulated that "the territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia shall be ensured." It also set out, as the basis of the peace settlement, a cease-fire to take effect as of 5 September 1992; the establishment of a Monitoring and Inspection Commission composed of representatives of Georgia, Abkhazia and the Russian Federation to ensure compliance with the agreement; the disarming and withdrawal of all illegal armed formations that had come from outside Georgia; the reduction of the armed forces of Georgia in Abkhazia to an agreed number required to protect railway and certain other installations; the exchange of detainees, prisoners and hostages by 10 September 1992; the removal of all impediments to the free movement of goods and persons; the return of refugees to their homes; the search for missing persons; and the resumption of the normal functions by the legitimate authorities of Abkhazia by 15 September 1992. The agreement also included an appeal to the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to assist in the implementation of the peace settlement.

In a related development, on 10 September 1992, the Security Council asked the Secretary-General to inform the Council periodically of the developments in Abkhazia.

Situation Deteriorates

The agreement was never fully implemented. Both sides accused one another of continuing to violate the cease-fire. The situation remained very tense, as confirmed by the United Nations mission to the region from 12 to 20 September 1992. On 1 October 1992, the cease-fire collapsed, and the fighting resumed in all areas. The Abkhaz

forces, supported by fighters from the North Caucasus region, quickly captured the major towns, and threatened to bring nearly 80 per cent of Abkhazia, including the capital city of Sukhumi, under their control. The raging fighting forced some 30,000 civilians to flee across the border to the Russian Federation. The parties to the conflict accused one another of human rights violations committed against the civilian population.

By November 1992, the outbreak of inter-ethnic fighting in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation added another dimension to the already tense situation in the area.

United Nations Efforts

The United Nations sought to revive the peace process by diplomatic means. In carrying out peacemaking efforts, the United Nations consulted with the CSCE so as to ensure effective coordination of activities. The Secretary-General sent a second mission in mid-October 1992 to explore specific ways in which the United Nations could support the implementation of the 3 September agreement, including the possible deployment of civilian and/or military observers. Two United Nations civilian personnel remained on the spot to provide an initial United Nations presence.

In November 1992, an integrated United Nations office opened in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi, further strengthening the local United Nations presence. The office, which was initially composed of development and public information components, was to provide an integrated United Nations approach in the region and to assist in all aspects of the peacemaking efforts of the Secretary-General.

Furthermore, following a request from the Government of Georgia, a United Nations inter-agency humanitarian assessment mission visited Georgia from 30 January to 16 February 1993. The mission, which was coordinated by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, included representatives of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Based on the findings of the inter-agency mission, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs issued a consolidated appeal for emergency humanitarian assistance for Georgia with total requirements of \$20.9 million through December 1993.

On 11 May 1993, the Secretary-General stated that dispatching another United Nations mission at that time "would not be an adequate approach in attempting to revive the peace process" adding that "a

more concentrated effort is needed for the establishment of a lasting cease-fire and for the resumption of a process of political negotiation".

Special Envoy Appointed

On the same day, the Secretary-General appointed Edouard Brunner, a national of Switzerland, as his Special Envoy for Georgia for an initial period of three months. Brunner's tasks, based on the 1992 agreement, were to obtain agreement on a cease-fire; to assist the parties in reviving the process of negotiations to find a political solution to the conflict; and to enlist the support of neighbouring countries and others concerned in achieving the above objectives. The Special Envoy was to consult closely with the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE.

Deployment Recommended

The mission undertaken by the Special Envoy for Georgia, from 20 to 31 May 1993, reaffirmed that all parties supported an active role by the United Nations in reaching a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Abkhazia. The Secretary-General held the view, endorsed by the Security Council, that an integrated peace package should be implemented, which pursued a solution on three tracks: consolidation of the ceasefire; the launching of a political negotiating process; and support for these two processes by the neighbouring countries, particularly the Russian Federation, which had been active in mediating the conflict.

To this end, the Secretary-General proposed the deployment of United Nations military observers, as well as the holding of a peace conference under the auspices of the United Nations. When the Special Envoy presented the Secretary-General's approach during his mission, it was determined that the Republic of Georgia fully supported all aspects of the approach; the Abkhaz side favoured the conference but not, at the time, the deployment of military observers; and the Russian Federation favoured the deployment of United Nations military observers, but had reservations about the conference.

In his report to the Security Council on 1 July 1993, the Secretary-General, while acknowledging the risks "of dangers inherent in deploying United Nations personnel to an area where an agreed cease-fire is not being respected", asserted that such a move "is justified in the present case given the urgent need to get the conflict in Abkhazia under control", thereby seeking the authorisation of the Security Council to deploy United Nations military observers as soon as practicable.

Meanwhile, the situation on the ground deteriorated even further. A cease-fire had been agreed to on 14 May 1993 and came into effect on 20 May 1993, but it held for only two weeks. Between 2 and 7 July 1993, hospitals in the area of fighting reported that 77 Georgian soldiers were killed and 481 wounded; during the same period 6 civilians were killed and 43 wounded. Two hundred fifty wounded Abkhaz were reportedly counted in one hospital in Gudauta by an independent observer.

The Secretary-General informed the Security Council that "given this very serious deterioration in the military situation, I believe that it would not be wise to proceed with the actual deployment of 50 military observers, as proposed in my report, until the cease-fire has been re-established and is being respected".

On 9 July 1993, the Security Council adopted resolution 849 (1993), by which it approved the deployment of military observers as soon as the ceasefire was implemented. The Secretary-General, who was asked to make necessary preparations and to notify the Council when conditions permitted the deployment of the observers, announced, on 19 July, that he was sending a technical planning mission to the area.

Ceasefire Is Reached

On 27 July 1993, a new agreement was concluded, through the mediation efforts of the Russian Federation, between the Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities in Gudauta, which re-established a ceasefire as of 28 July. The agreement provided for the immediate commencement of phased demilitarisation of the conflict zone. To monitor this process, international observers were to be deployed within 10 to 15 days of the date of the cease-fire.

On 6 August, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that "conditions now prevail which permit the deployment of the proposed military observer mission". Based on the report of the technical planning team which had been in Georgia from 19 to 26 July, the Secretary-General concluded that an expanded mandate and additional military observers than had been previously envisaged "would strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations observation mission considerably", and recommended the deployment of 88 military observers and supporting staff without delay. On the same day, the Security Council, by resolution 854 (1993), unanimously authorized the Secretary-General's 4 August request to send an advance team of up to 10 observers to help verify compliance with the cease-fire.

Advance Team is Deployed

An advance team of 9 military observers and 8 civilian support staff arrived in Abkhazia on 8 August 1993 and established its headquarters in the city of Sukhumi. Soon after its arrival, and in agreement with both parties, the advance team initiated regular road patrols in the conflict area in order to monitor compliance with the cease-fire agreed upon on 27 July. As envisaged in the cease-fire agreement, the observers conducting these patrols established liaison with the tripartite Georgian-Abkhaz-Russian interim monitoring groups responsible for the supervision of the cease-fire on the ground. Following the establishment of the tripartite "Joint Commission" on 5 August, the leader of the team participated in its work on a regular basis in an observer capacity. The initial reports received from the team during the month of August confirmed that the cease-fire was holding.

Establishment of UNOMIG

On 24 August, the Security Council, by its resolution 858 (1993), decided to establish the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), comprising up to 88 military observers, plus minimal civilian staff necessary to support the Mission, with the following mandate: to verify compliance with the cease-fire agreement of 27 July with special attention to the situation in the city of Sukhumi; to investigate reports of cease-fire violations and to attempt to resolve such incidents with the parties involved; and to report to the Secretary-General on the implementation of its mandate, including, in particular, violations of the cease-fire agreement.

The Council also decided that UNOMIG was established for a period of six months subject to the proviso that it would be extended beyond the initial 90 days "only upon a review by the Council based on a report from the Secretary-General whether or not substantive progress had been made towards implementing measures aimed at establishing a lasting peace". It requested the Secretary-General, through his Special Envoy, to pursue efforts to facilitate the peace process and negotiations towards the achievement of a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict.

Cease-Fire Breakdown

While UNOMIG was still in the early stages of deployment, the cease-fire broke down on 16 September 1993, when Abkhaz forces, with armed support from outside Abkhazia, launched attacks on Sukhumi and Ochamchira. Notwithstanding the call by the President

of the Security Council in his statement of 17 September for the immediate cessation of hostilities and his condemnation of the violation of the cease-fire by the Abkhaz side, fighting continued. As a result of the intensity of the shelling and other hostilities, the UNOMIG observers were obliged to suspend all patrols as on 17 September.

In the next few days, the military situation developed rapidly, with loss of life among the local civilian population. The Georgian authorities made appeals for assistance to the Russian Federation, to the CSCE and to the United Nations Secretary-General. The Abkhaz side ignored all calls to halt the military action, and occupied the city of Sukhumi on 27 September.

Following the breakdown of the cease-fire, further deployment of UNOMIG was suspended. The strength of UNOMIG in Sukhumi was limited to four military observers, including the Chief Military Observer, and four civilians. Seven observers remained in Sochi, a city on the territory of the Russian Federation, where they were when the hostilities resumed. One observer remained in Tbilisi.

Secretary-General Reviews Situation

The Secretary-General, in his 7 October 1993 report to the Security Council, stated that UNOMIG's mandate had been invalidated as a result of the general breakdown of the cease-fire and the collapse of the tripartite machinery responsible for its implementation. He also reported that, as a matter of priority, he was exploring with the parties and with the Russian Federation the possible need for and usefulness of the continuing presence of UNOMIG with a "revised mandate adapted to the radically changed circumstances".

In the meantime, the Secretary-General proposed maintaining the present strength of UNOMIG in Sukhumi, where the Chief Military Observer had already established contact with Abkhaz military and civilian officials. He was assured of their cooperation and that UNOMIG would enjoy freedom of movement in monitoring the situation there.

The Secretary-General intended to consult with the parties and with the Russian Federation, and to present to the Security Council his recommendations relating both to the future of UNOMIG and to the political aspects of the United Nations role in trying to end the conflict in Abkhazia.

Security Council Acts

By its resolution 876 (1993) adopted on 19 October, the Security Council reaffirmed its condemnation of the violation by Abkhaz forces

of the cease-fire agreement, and their subsequent violations of international humanitarian law. It also condemned the killing of the Chairman of the Defence Council and Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, and demanded that all parties to the conflict refrain from the use of force and from any violations of international humanitarian law. The Council welcomed the Secretary-General's decision to send a fact-finding mission to Georgia, in particular to investigate reports of "ethnic cleansing".

The Council reiterated its support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Envoy, in cooperation with the CSCE Chairman-in-Office and with the assistance of the Government of the Russian Federation as a facilitator, to promote efforts to achieve an overall political settlement. While welcoming the humanitarian assistance already provided to victims of the conflict, the Council urged Member States to contribute to relief efforts being carried out by international aid agencies.

Fact-Finding Mission Visits Abkhazia

A fact-finding mission to investigate the situation of human rights in Abkhazia visited the area from 22 to 30 October 1993. In its report, which was submitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on 17 November, 1993, the mission noted "numerous and serious" human rights violations committed in Abkhazia since the outbreak of the armed conflict in August 1992. Civilians, including women, children and elderly persons, as well as combatants who were no longer actively participating in armed confrontations were victims of violations of the right to life and physical integrity, of the right to personal security and of property rights. The victims' included members of all ethnic groups inhabiting Abkhazia.

According to the report, both Georgian government forces and Abkhazian forces, as well as irregulars and civilians cooperating with them were responsible for such human rights violations. In addition to the loss of numerous lives, the conflict had led to the almost complete devastation of vast areas and the massive displacement of population.

In concluding its report, the fact-finding mission recommended a number of measures to be undertaken by the parties in order to restore human rights in the territory of Abkhazia.

Three-Month Extension Authorised

Meanwhile, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council on 27 October 1993 that his Special Envoy for Georgia had had

discussions in Geneva with Abkhaz and Georgian representatives. He had also been invited for discussions in early November with the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister. In view of those developments, the Secretary-General said that he was planning for his Special Envoy to hold a first round of discussions with both parties in late November 1993, under the auspices of the United Nations and with the Russian Federation present as facilitator. The CSCE would also be invited to attend as a participant. The discussions would focus on the question of a political settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia.

As for UNOMIG, the Secretary-General recommended that the Mission be continued at its present strength of four military observers with minimal support staff in Sukhumi for a further three months. A fifth military observer would continue to provide liaison services in Tbilisi. He observed that UNOMIG had established good relations with Abkhaz officials in Sukhumi and had been able to conduct patrols in the city. The Mission's continued presence in its present form and size would give the population visible evidence of international concern.

Since UNOMIG's original mandate had been invalidated by the fighting in Abkhazia in September, the Secretary-General recommended that the Mission have an interim mandate to maintain contacts with both sides to the conflict and with Russian military contingents, and to monitor and report on the situation, with particular reference to developments relevant to United Nations efforts to promote a comprehensive political settlement.

On 4 November 1993, the Security Council, by its resolution 881 (1993), welcomed the Secretary-General's report of 27 October 1993 and approved the continued presence of UNOMIG in Georgia until 31 January 1994. It also decided that UNOMIG would not be extended beyond that date unless the Secretary-General reported that substantive progress had been made towards implementing measures aimed at establishing a lasting peace or that the peace process would be served by the prolongation of its mandate.

Progress in Talks Reported

On 16 December 1993, the Secretary-General, in a letter to the President of the Security Council, informed the Council that a Memorandum of Understanding had been signed by the parties to the conflict on 1 December 1993 in Geneva in the presence of representatives of the United Nations, the Russian Federation and the CSCE. The Memorandum covered three vital areas—political, humanitarian and war damage issues—and included major commit-

ments towards the peaceful resolution of the conflict: not to use force or threat of force against each other for the period of continuing negotiations; to exchange prisoners of war and assist in finding those missing before 20 December 1993; and to return hundreds of thousands of refugees, as well as occupied homes and properties.

The Secretary-General believed that the signing of the Memorandum manifested encouraging progress towards lasting peace in the area. He therefore recommended that the Council authorize the deployment of up to 50 additional military observers, together with a minimal number of civilian support staff. A reinforced UNOMIG would be better placed to ascertain the actual conditions on the ground, and to plan and prepare for a further expansion beyond the 50, should the next round of negotiations scheduled in January 1994 warrant it.

By its resolution 892 (1993) of 22 December 1993, the Security Council welcomed the signature of the Memorandum of Understanding and authorized the phased deployment of additional military observers as recommended by the Secretary-General.

Negotiations Continue

A second round of negotiations, chaired by the Secretary-General's Special Envoy, took place in Geneva from 11 to 13 January 1994. On the last day of the talks, the representatives of the Abkhaz and Georgian sides signed a communique.

In the communique, the parties noted that the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding were, for the most part, being implemented. An exchange of prisoners had taken place on the principle of "all for all"; representatives of UNHCR had carried out a first preparatory visit; and on 15 and 16 December 1993 a group of experts had met in Moscow to prepare recommendations on the political status of Abkhazia. The two sides reaffirmed their commitment not to use force or the threat of force against each other. They agreed that the deployment of a full-scale peace-keeping operation in Abkhazia would contribute to the establishment of favourable conditions for further progress towards a political settlement and the practical implementation of agreements. They also made further statements on a number of military aspects. It was agreed that the third round of negotiations would be held on 22 February 1994.

Options Before the Security Council

The Secretary-General, in his 25 January 1994 report to the Security Council on the diplomatic efforts and the situation in

Abkhazia, recommended that the Council maintain UNOMIG with its existing mandate and strength of up to 55 military observers for a limited period to 15 March 1994. That would permit time for further consultations and, in particular, for the parties to demonstrate their willingness to make substantive progress on the political issues facing them.

The Secretary-General postponed making a substantive recommendation on an expanded international military presence in Abkhazia. However, he emphasized that should the Council decide, in the current circumstances, that an enlarged international military presence in Abkhazia was desirable both to consolidate the cease-fire and to create conditions for the return of refugees and displaced persons, that presence could take a number of possible forms. Two options, in particular, were discussed with the Secretary-General's Special Envoy and with the group of Member States that had constituted themselves as the "Friends of Georgia" (France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States).

Under the first option, the Council could establish a traditional United Nations peace-keeping force of some 2,500 troops, under United Nations command and control, to operate initially in the areas of the Gali region and the Inguri and Psou rivers. It would aim to carry out an effective separation of forces, monitor the disarmament and withdrawal of armed units, and help create conditions conducive to the return of refugees and displaced persons.

Under the second option, the Council could authorize a multinational force, not under United Nations command, consisting of contingents made available by interested Member States, including the Russian Federation, to carry out the same functions. UNOMIG would be entrusted with the tasks of monitoring the operations of the force, liaising with the local authorities in Abkhazia and observing developments on the ground. By a preliminary estimate, in this option UNOMIG would require up to 200 military observers, with the necessary civilian support.

On 31 January 1994, the Security Council, by its resolution 896 (1994), extended the mandate of UNOMIG until 7 March 1994 within the numbers authorized in resolution 892 (1993), which called for deployment of 50 additional observers. It urged the parties to demonstrate stronger willingness to achieve progress towards a comprehensive political settlement. Declaring its readiness to act before 7 March upon any recommendation to further increase the strength of UNOMIG, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report

immediately following the third round of negotiations on whatever progress had been made in the negotiations and on the situation on the ground, with special attention to circumstances which might warrant a peace-keeping force and on the modalities for such a force.

Further Political Efforts

The third round of negotiations, chaired by the Secretary-General's Special Envoy, took place in Geneva from 22 to 25 February 1994. By the final day of the negotiations, the Chairman put forward a draft political declaration, most of which was acceptable to both parties. There remained, however, a significant difference over the issue of the territorial integrity of Georgia and the relationship of Abkhazia to Georgia. The Abkhaz side declined to sign any document that included recognition of Georgia's territorial integrity.

In a separate working group, chaired by UNHCR, agreement was reached on all the text of the draft quadripartite agreement on the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons, except for one phrase referring to whether immunity should apply to persons who had taken part in hostilities and who continued to pose a real threat to security.

Despite every effort to find a compromise, neither of the two documents was signed and the Chairman suspended the third round of negotiations in order to give the parties time for reflection. It was decided that the session should be resumed at United Nations Headquarters in New York on 7 March 1994.

The Secretary-General, in his report submitted to the Security Council on 3 March 1994, stated that the Security Council's requirement for substantive progress in the political negotiations had not yet been met. Furthermore, he reported a new outbreak of hostilities in early February 1994 in the Gali district of Abkhazia.

Having said that the deployment of an international military presence could contribute to much needed stability in the area, the Secretary-General stated, however, that the conditions for making it possible did not exist at that time. He strongly urged the parties to make necessary compromises at the resumed negotiations on 7 March in order to avoid further fighting and to permit planning for a peace-keeping operation. In the meantime, the Secretary-General recommended a short extension of UNOMIG under the existing mandate. By its resolution 901 (1994) of 4 March, the Security Council decided to extend UNOMIG's mandate for an additional interim period terminating on 31 March 1994.

Differences Remain

The negotiations were resumed on 7 March in New York and lasted until 9 March. As it had been in previous sessions, representatives of the Russian Federation participated with the status of facilitator. The talks were also attended by representatives of the CSCE and of UNHCR.

Despite three days of intensive discussions, however, the parties to the conflict remained far apart on three major issues: recognition of the territorial integrity of Georgia, the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, and the role and area of deployment of a possible peace-keeping force.

On 18 March 1994, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that developments in the latest round of negotiations gave no reason to alter the judgement he had expressed earlier, namely that conditions that would make it possible to plan and deploy an international peace-keeping force with an achievable mandate did not exist.

He further stated that the negotiation process was greatly complicated by the absence of any spirit of reconciliation between the two sides. In addition, it had not been possible to identify measures that might create a "more propitious climate for efforts to resolve issues that at present seem intractable". The level of tension in the area remained high and there was an increasing risk of return to war.

The Secretary-General stressed that although conditions for the deployment of a peace-keeping force did not exist and negotiations were suspended, the international community should not abandon its efforts to assist the parties to find the road to peace. He informed the Council of his intention to ask his Special Envoy to resume contacts with the parties, as well as with the Russian Federation. The Secretary-General recommended that the mandate of UNOMIG should be extended for a further three months and that its strength of 22 military observers should be maintained.

On 25 March 1994, the Security Council, by its resolution 906 (1994), urged the parties to resume the negotiations as soon as possible and to achieve substantive progress towards a political settlement, including the political status of Abkhazia, respecting fully the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia. The Council extended the mandate of UNOMIG for an additional interim period terminating on 30 June 1994.

Two Documents Signed

On 4 April 1994, at resumed negotiations held in Moscow, the representatives of the Georgian and Abkhaz sides signed two documents: the "Declaration on measures for a political settlement of the, Georgian-Abkhaz conflict" and the "Quadripartite agreement on voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons".

By signing the Declaration, the parties committed themselves to a formal cease-fire and also reaffirmed their commitment to the non-use of force or threat of the use of force against each other. By other provisions of the document, the parties reaffirmed their request for the early deployment of a peace-keeping operation and for the participation of a Russian military contingent in the United Nations peace-keeping force. They also appealed to the Security Council to expand the mandate of UNOMIG.

In the Quadripartite Agreement, signed by the parties and by the Russian Federation and UNHCR, the parties agreed to "cooperate and interact in planning and conducting the activities aimed to safeguard and guarantee the safe, secure and dignified return of people who had fled from areas of the conflict zone to the areas of their previous permanent residence".

The Security Council, in a statement by its President on 8 April, considered the signing of the two documents as an encouraging event, laying the basis for further progress towards the settlement of the conflict. The Council supported a further increase in the deployed strength of UNOMIG up to the limit specified in resolution 892 (1993), if the Secretary-General considered that the conditions on the ground made that appropriate. It stressed the need for progress on a political settlement in the next round of talks between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides, so that it might consider establishing a peace-keeping force in Abkhazia, Georgia.

Cease-Fire and Separation of Force Agreement

Following the signature of the two documents, further negotiations were held in three areas: repatriation of refugees and displaced persons; the possible establishment of a peace-keeping force; and the achievement of a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict.

In his report of 3 May on a further round of negotiations, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) had expressed readiness to send a peacekeeping force to the region should the Security Council

decide not to send a comparable United Nations force. The Secretary-General noted that the necessary pre-conditions for the establishment of a United Nations presence had not been achieved as of the time of the report. In light of that fact, the Secretary-General proposed three broad options for the Council to consider, one of which included the acceptance of the CIS offer to deploy a peace-keeping force. He then recommended that, if the Council accepted the CIS offer, it should decide to continue the United Nations efforts towards a comprehensive political settlement, and have UNOMIG monitor the operation of the CIS force.

Following further talks, the Georgian and Abkhaz sides signed in Moscow on 14 May the Agreement on a Cease-fire and Separation of Forces. The parties agreed that a CIS peace-keeping force would be deployed to monitor compliance with the Agreement. They also appealed to the Security Council to expand the mandate of the United Nations military observers in order to provide for their participation in the operations envisaged under the Agreement. From 23 to 26 May 1994, the United Nations Secretariat held technical discussions with representatives of the Russian Federation for the purpose of clarifying the possible role of the United Nations observers and their relationship with the CIS peace-keeping force. In his 6 June report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General provided details of those discussions and sought an early indication of the views of the members of the Council. He also informed it of his intention, as a first step, to increase the number of military observers of UNOMIG to 55, as authorized by resolution 892 (1994).

In a letter dated 16 June, the President of the Council informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Council regarded the discussions with representatives of the Russian Federation as a positive step, that they noted his intention to increase the number of UNOMIG military observers, and that they stood ready to consider the Secretary-General's detailed recommendations on the expansion of UNOMIG, following his further consultations with the parties concerned.

On the same day, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that he was continuing his urgent consultations and recommended that the existing mandate of UNOMIG be extended for a period of one month. He also informed the Council on the preparations for the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons and on the further efforts to achieve a political settlement in Abkhazia. UNOMIG's mandate was extended until 21 July by Council resolution 934 (1994) of 30 June 1994.

UNOMIG's Mandate Expanded

In his 12 July report, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of the results of his consultations with the Georgian and Abkhaz authorities, representatives of the Russian Federation and the CIS peace-keeping force. On the basis of those consultations, he recommended that the Council expand UNOMIG and extend its mandate for a period of six months to 21 January 1995.

The tasks of the expanded UNOMIG would be as follows: (a) to monitor and verify the implementation of the Agreement on a Cease-fire and Separation of Forces; (b) to observe the operation of the CIS peacekeeping force; (c) to verify that troops do not remain in or re-enter the security zone and that heavy military equipment does not remain or is not reintroduced in the security zone or the restricted weapons zone; (d) to monitor the storage areas for heavy military equipment withdrawn from the security zone and restricted weapons zone; (e) to monitor the withdrawal of Georgian troops from the Kodori valley to places beyond the frontiers of Abkhazia; (f) to patrol regularly the Kodori valley; (g) to investigate reported or alleged violations of the Agreement and attempt to resolve such incidents.

According to the Secretary-General's recommendation, the expanded UNOMIG would maintain its headquarters in Sukhumi and would establish three sector headquarters—in Sukhumi, Gali and Zugdidi—and a liaison office in Tbilisi. To perform its monitoring functions effectively, UNOMIG would need a combination of static teams and mobile patrols. Helicopter patrols would be conducted of mountainous and less accessible areas.

The Secretary-General envisaged that UNOMIG would require a total strength of 136 military personnel, including the necessary medical personnel, supported by international and local civilian staff.

UNOMIG would operate independently of but in close cooperation and coordination with the CIS peace-keeping force. The Mission also would maintain close contacts with both parties and military contingents of the Russian Federation in the zone of conflict.

In summarising the latest developments in Abkhazia, the Secretary-General said that the situation on the ground was relatively calm and had improved with the arrival of the CIS peace-keeping force. The situation in the Kodori valley, however, remained tense. Preparations were proceeding for the start of the programme of the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons.

With regard to political aspects, the Secretary-General noted that his Special Envoy had visited the area for discussions with both sides. His visit was followed by a further round of political negotiations held in Sochi on 7 and 8 July 1994.

On 21 July, the Security Council, by its resolution 937 (1994), expanded the mandate of UNOMIG, as recommended by the Secretary-General, decided to increase the strength of the Mission to up to 136 military observers, and extended the period of the mandate until 13 January 1995.

By other provisions of the resolution, the Council, *inter alia*, welcomed the contribution made by the Russian Federation, and indications of further contributions from other members of the CIS, of a peace-keeping force, and requested the Secretary-General to establish an appropriate arrangement for delineating the respective rites and responsibilities of UNOMIG and the CIS peace-keeping force. It also called upon the parties to intensify their efforts to achieve an early and comprehensive political settlement.

Differences Remain

A further round of political negotiations between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides, convened by the Secretary-General's Special Envoy, took place at Geneva from 31 August to 2 September 1994. The discussions focused on refugee issues, military aspects concerning the Kodori valley and political matters.

Regarding refugee matters, a statement was signed recognising that returnees would be informed through UNHCR about the Abkhaz requirement to comply with the laws in force in Abkhazia. With regard to political questions, both sides were given a non-paper outlining political and legal elements for a comprehensive settlement of the conflict, which had been drafted by the Special Envoy in collaboration with the CSCE and the Russian Federation. Negotiations in the Quadripartite Commission, established on 1 June 1994 and comprised both parties to the conflict, the Russian Federation and UNHCR, proved difficult and progress was slow. Despite all efforts, organized return of refugees and displaced persons to Abkhazia had not yet commenced. Differences remained, particularly regarding conditions and the rhythm of repatriation. However, during the 8th meeting of the Commission, held at Sochi on 28 September, the parties reached a consensus on the need to restore the necessary security conditions in the area where refugees were to return and on the choice of adequate measures to do so. Following that meeting, the Abkhaz authorities accepted the first

group of 100 repatriation applications concerning 460 persons, out of total of approximately 7,000 applications concerning 26,000 persons.

The large number of mines remaining in the area was also hampering the return of refugees. After an assessment mission undertaken in August, UNHCR began preparation of a mine awareness education programme aimed at improving security conditions.

In his 14 October report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated that political progress had been slow. The Abkhaz unwillingness to accept an early return of refugees had created significant difficulties and contributed to holding up progress on other questions. He hoped that sufficient agreement had been reached to achieve progress on the refugee situation. If so, it would allow his Special Envoy to concentrate efforts on negotiating the political status of Abkhazia which is a core question of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict.

As to the situation on the ground, the Secretary-General reported that the Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities had largely complied with the 14 May Agreement. All armed forces and heavy military equipment were withdrawn from the security zone, and no heavy military equipment remained in the restricted weapons zone. All volunteer formations from outside the boundaries of Abkhazia were disbanded.

In the Kodori valley, in accordance with the Agreement, troops of the Republic of Georgia were withdrawn to their places of deployment beyond the boundaries of Abkhazia as confirmed by UNOMIG.

Referring to the activities of UNOMIG, the Secretary-General stated that it was operating in the security and restricted weapons zones and in the Kodori valley, and was monitoring the weapons storage sites. Patrols were being conducted either by UNOMIG observers or jointly with personnel from the CIS peace-keeping force. The Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities were cooperating with the Mission. As to the cooperation with the CIS peace-keeping, the Secretary-General noted that it was proceeding in a satisfactory manner.

Further Developments

A further round of talks between the Georgian and Abkhaz parties was held on 15-18 November 1994 in Geneva under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General's Special Envoy, but ended without any agreement on the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons as well as little substantive progress on political matters.¹

There were also plans to convene a larger meeting, under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General, involving the Chairman of the Parliament, the Head of State of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, the Abkhaz leader, Vladislav Ardzinba, the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Andrei Kozyrev, and the Chairman of the CSCE, Foreign Minister of Italy, Antonio Martino.

The political process, however, suffered a setback when on 26 November a new constitution of Abkhazia was adopted declaring it to be a sovereign republic and a subject of international law. The Head of State of Georgia requested the President of the Security Council to convene urgently a meeting of the Council "since recent events in the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic" might have "unforeseeable consequences and lead to further escalation of the conflict". He stated that he expected that "swift and dramatic measures" would be taken by the Council to curb the aggressive separatism".²

Composition of UNOMIG

The current authorized strength of UNOMIG is 136 military observers. As of 30 November 1994, the strength of the mission was 126 observers from the following countries:

<i>Country</i>	<i>Observes</i>
Albania	1
Austria	2
Bangladesh	11
Czech Republic	5
Denmark	6
Egypt	5
France	5
Germany	10
Greece	4
Hungary	8
Indonesia	6
Jordan	8
Pakistan	8
Poland	5
Republic of Korea	6
Russian Federation	3
Sweden	8
Switzerland	4

Turkey	5
United Kingdom	10
United States	2
Uruguay	4
<hr/>	
Total	126

Figures may vary from month to month due to rotation.

Financial Aspects

The rough cost to the United Nations of UNOMIG in 1994 was approximately \$ 10.8 million. The costs of the observer mission are met by assessed contributions from United Nations Member States. As at 30 November 1994, total contributions outstanding to the UNOMIG Special Account for the period from the inception of the operation to 21 September 1994 amounted to approximately \$0.5 million.

Humanitarian Situation

The fighting in Abkhazia resulted in a massive displacement of civilians. According to inter-agency estimates, some 400,000 persons fled from Abkhazia and either became displaced persons in other regions of Georgia or sought refuge in other countries. The Georgian authorities issued an urgent appeal to Governments for humanitarian assistance. The United Nations Representative in Tbilisi convened a meeting of representatives of the United Nations system, diplomatic community and non-governmental organisations to review the situation and arrange assistance. On 1 October 1993, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs made an emergency appeal, calling particular attention to the need for food, warm clothing, medical supplies and logistic support for the transport of relief supplies. A United Nations relief flight was then organized. The head of the United Nations interim office and a second United Nations official maintained a United Nations presence in Tbilisi to monitor the delivery of humanitarian relief.

A full scale inter-agency needs assessment mission organized by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs visited Georgia in February-March 1994. Representatives of UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, the World Health Organisation, the United Nations Volunteers and International Organisation for Migration participated. The number of displaced persons was estimated at 270,000. In Abkhazia there was extensive

destruction of homes and infrastructure and it was estimated that 75 per cent of the inhabitants had departed. Following the assessment, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs launched an Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in a total amount of \$ 100 million for all three countries. The principal sectors of assistance were food aid, logistics, health and shelter.

As a result of the signing on 4 April 1994 by Georgian, Abkhazian, Russian and UNHCR representatives of a "Quadripartite agreement on voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons", and after further inter-agency consultation, an addendum to the appeal for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia was issued. In the addendum, \$31 million was requested for food, logistics, shelter and domestic needs in order to promote voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons to the Abkhaz region of Georgia.³

NOTES

1. While the parties had agreed to consider a draft political paper outlining possible political and legal components of the future status of Abkhazia within a union State as a basis for further discussion, the Georgian side withdrew its acceptance on 12 December 1994.
2. After a meeting convened on 2 December 1994, the Security Council, in a statement by its President, said that any unilateral act purporting to establish "a sovereign Abkhaz entity" would violate the commitments assumed by the Abkhaz side in the search for a comprehensive political settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. The Council reaffirmed its commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia, and called upon all parties, in particular the Abkhaz side, to reach substantive progress in the negotiations aimed at achieving a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict, including on the political status of Abkhazia, respecting fully the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia.
3. An inter-agency assessment mission to the Caucasus will be undertaken in mid-January 1995. The mission will evaluate the needs of Georgia and other countries in the region for the coming year, for the purpose of preparing the next Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal for the Caucasus (April 1995-March 1996). The current Appeal for Georgia, which is aimed at bringing emergency relief to people displaced by the fighting in Abkhazia, and expires in March 1995, has a 52 per cent shortfall in contributions.

45

United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

LOCATION: Western Sahara

HEADQUARTERS: Laayoune

DURATION: September 1991 to present

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: Approximately 1,700 military observers and troops, 300 police officers and about 800 to 1,000 civilian personnel

CURRENT STRENGTH: 237 military observers, 48 military support personnel, 49 police officers and approximately 180 international and local civilian staff members

FATALITIES: 4

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: Sahabzada Yaqub Khan (Pakistan)

FORCE COMMANDER: Brigadier-General Andre Van Baelen (Belgium)

Background

In 1985, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in cooperation with the Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity, initiated a joint mission of good offices in the search for a solution of the question of Western Sahara. On 11 August 1988, the Secretary-General and the Special Envoy of the Chairman presented, in separate meetings, to the parties to the conflict in Western Sahara, namely Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro (Frente POLISARIO), a document referred to as "the settlement proposals."

The document contained proposals for a just and definitive solution of the question of Western Sahara in conformity with 1960 General

Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). This would be accomplished by means of a cease-fire and the holding of a referendum without military or administrative constraints, to enable the people of Western Sahara, in the exercise of their right to self-determination, to choose between independence and integration with Morocco.

On 27 June 1990, the Security Council, in its resolution 658 (1990), approved a report of the Secretary-General, which contained the full text of the settlement proposals as accepted by the two parties on 30 August 1988, as well as an outline of the Secretary-General's plan for implementing those proposals.

Implementation Plan

The implementation plan provided for a transitional period during which the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, acting under the authority of the Secretary-General, would have sole and exclusive responsibility over all matters relating to the referendum, including its organisation and conduct. The Special Representative would be assisted in his tasks by a deputy special representative and by an integrated group of United Nations civilian, military and civilian police personnel. This group would be known as the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).

According to the plan, the transitional period would begin with the coming into effect of a cease-fire and end with the proclamation of the results of the referendum. Following the announcement of a cease-fire, MINURSO would verify the reduction of Moroccan troops in the Territory; monitor the confinement of Moroccan and the Frente POLISARIO troops to designated locations; take steps with the parties to ensure the release of all Western Saharan political prisoners or detainees; oversee the exchange of prisoners of war (International Committee of the Red Cross); implement the repatriation programme (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees); identify and register qualified voters; organize and ensure a free referendum; and proclaim the results.

The plan stipulated that MINURSO would consist of the Special Representative and his office, and civilian, military and security units. The civilian component would range in size from about 800 to 1,000 personnel, depending on the requirements of the various phases of the transitional period. At full strength, the military component would consist of approximately 1,700 personnel, and the Security Unit of about 300 police officers.

Establishment of MINURSO

On 29 April 1991, the Security Council, in its resolution 690 (1991), decided to establish MINURSO, in accordance with a report of the Secretary-General which further detailed the implementation plan. In approving the plan, the Security Council also accepted the timetable proposed in the Secretary-General's report. It was envisaged that the transitional period would begin no later than 16 weeks after the General Assembly approved the MINURSO budget and would last for 20 weeks. MINURSO would remain in the Territory for up to 26 weeks from the coming into effect of the cease-fire. The Secretary-General indicated, however, that the periods of time allowed for the various processes were estimates that could require adjustment.

The budget for MINURSO was approved by the General Assembly on 17 May 1991.

Cease-Fire

On 24 May 1991, in accordance with the plan, the Secretary-General proposed that the cease-fire should enter into effect on 6 September. Both parties accepted that date. During the following three months, however, it became clear that it would not be possible to complete before 6 September a number of tasks that were to be completed before the cease-fire. It also became clear that, notwithstanding the parties' earlier acceptance of the settlement plan, substantial areas of difference between them remained. One party therefore was not able to agree that the transition period should begin on 6 September 1991.

Meanwhile, hostilities had broken out in the Territory, interrupting an informal cease-fire that had been in effect for over two years. In these circumstances, the Secretary-General decided that the formal cease-fire should come into effect on 6 September as initially agreed, on the understanding that the transition period would begin as soon as the outstanding tasks had been completed. The Security Council supported his proposal that, during this delay, 100 military observers should be deployed in the Territory to verify the ceasefire and the cessation of hostilities in certain areas. The number of military observers was subsequently increased to 228 and certain logistics and administrative support staff were also sent to the field.

The primary function of MINURSO was restricted to verifying the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities. This was done by direct observation of military forces and activities carried out by either party and verifying complaints of alleged cease-fire violations. United Nations

military observers were deployed to ten team sites/observation posts in the northern and southern sectors of the Territory. The team sites, covering the main points of concern in the Territory, were the key element in monitoring the cease-fire. United Nations military observers operated in mobile patrols. Helicopter-borne patrols were also conducted to enhance MINURSO monitoring capability and react at short notice to complaints and violations.

The headquarters of the Mission was established in the capital, Laayoune, with two regional headquarters in the northern and southern sectors of the Territory. A liaison office was also established in Tindouf to maintain contact with the Algerian authorities and the Frente POLISARIO.

Differences Remain

According to the settlement plan, the referendum in Western Sahara should have taken place in January 1992. However, it was not possible to proceed in conformity with the original timetable. While both parties—the Government of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO—have reiterated their confidence in the United Nations, their commitment to the settlement plan and their willingness to restore the momentum of the peace process, they continue to have divergent views and different interpretations of some of the key elements contained in the plan, including those with regard to the question of criteria for eligibility to vote in the referendum.

Criteria for voter eligibility were enunciated by former Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar on 19 December 1991. While considering them to be unduly restrictive, Morocco nevertheless accepted them. For its part, the Frente POLISARIO maintained that, in the initial agreement, the two parties had agreed that the list of Saharans counted in the census conducted by the Spanish administration in the Territory in 1974 would be the exclusive basis of the electorate. In its view, the criteria of 19 December 1991 would unduly expand the electorate beyond the 1974 census list and were incompatible therefore with the relevant provisions of the settlement plan.

In the hope to break this deadlock, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, held in August and September 1992, a series of separate talks with the two parties on the interpretation and application of the criteria. The purpose of such talks was to find ways of ensuring that both parties arrived at the same interpretation of the criteria.

In spite of intensive efforts by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and his Special Representative to find mutually acceptable solutions, it has not so far been possible to put the implementation plan back on track. Moreover, an attempt to organize a meeting of 38 Western Saharan tribal chiefs in Geneva, at the end of November 1992, had to be cancelled because of the differences relating to the powers of some participants designated by the Moroccan party.

In his 26 January 1993 report to the Security Council on the situation in Western Sahara, the Secretary-General stated that the cancellation of the meeting in Geneva demonstrated the futility of the efforts undertaken "with vigour and resource" by his Special Representative over the preceding eight months to seek a way out of the existing deadlock. He suggested three possible options available under the circumstances.

A first option suggested the continuation and, if possible, intensification of talks. The Secretary-General believed, however, that the chances for success under this option were very slim.

A second option required the immediate implementation of the settlement plan on the basis of the instructions for the review of applications for participation in the referendum, appearing in the annex to the 19 December 1991 report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council. This could mean, the Secretary-General pointed out, that the implementation would have to proceed without the cooperation of one of the parties.

A third option was to adopt an alternative approach not based on the settlement plan. Requesting guidance from the Security Council on how best to proceed, the Secretary-General stated that, depending on the Council's decision, the role and strength of MINURSO might have to be adjusted.

On 2 March, the Security Council, by its resolution 809 (1993), invited the Secretary-General to intensify efforts in order to resolve outstanding issues, and to make the necessary preparations for the referendum and to consult accordingly with the parties for the purpose of commencing voter registration starting with the updated lists of the 1974 census. The Secretary-General was requested to report to the Council on the prospects and modalities for holding the referendum by the end 1993 at the latest. He was also requested to include proposals for the necessary adjustments to the role and strength of MINURSO. The Council urged the two parties to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in implementing the settlement plan for Western Sahara and to resolve their differences regarding the criteria for voter eligibility.

On 21 May, the Secretary-General, in an interim report, informed the Council about the consultations his Special Representative had initiated with the parties on a possible compromise regarding the interpretation and application of the voter eligibility criteria, and about his decision to visit the region in the first week of June to make one more effort "to seek a compromise solution".

The Secretary-General also reported that discussions had been held with the parties on a number of issues relating to an early registration of voters. After both sides confirmed their desire to proceed promptly with the registration of voters and to cooperate with MINURSO in this regard, it was decided to establish an Identification Commission for the Referendum in Western Sahara. On 23 April 1993, the Secretary-General appointed Erik Jensen (Malaysia) as Chairman of the Commission. On 15 March 1994, the Secretary-General appointed Jensen as his Deputy Special Representative for Western Sahara, in addition to his responsibility as Chairman of the Identification Commission.

Compromise Proposal

The parties continued to have fundamentally divergent positions on the establishment of the electorate, one party (Morocco) wanting to make all Saharans eligible to participate in the referendum, while the other (the Frente POLISARIO) wanting to limit participation, so far as possible, to those counted in the Territory in the 1974 census, in order to avoid including those it regarded as foreign to the Territory.

During a visit to the area from 31 May to 4 June 1993, the Secretary-General presented to the parties a comprehensive text outlining a compromise solution with regard to the interpretation and application of the criteria for voter eligibility. The compromise proposal represented a practical and valid, although imperfect, basis for a preliminary selection of potential voters. The formula took due account of the fact that the applicant belonged to a Saharan tribe. It was based solely on the 1974 census which, while imperfect itself, provided the only demographic and tribal data about the Territory. Applicants would still have to meet the criteria for voter eligibility before being registered on the final electoral roll. The compromise text could not be expected to meet all the concerns of the parties or conform entirely to their views. Nevertheless, the Secretary-General believed that the interpretation of the criteria and the procedures for verification represented a compromise between conflicting positions that was even-handed and fair.

Another round of meetings was held by the Secretary-General's Special Representative from 5 to 20 June 1993. During these and subsequent consultations, both parties reaffirmed their commitment to the implementation of the peace plan in its entirety and their determination to move towards an early referendum. Both sides stressed that they did not reject the proposed compromise but expressed reservations on certain provisions of the text.

In spite of its reservations, Morocco has since acquiesced in the compromise in its present form. While conveying its acceptance of all the eligibility criteria of 19 December 1991, the Frente POLISARIO expressed substantial reservations on the proposed compromise concerning their interpretation and application and requested several amendments to the text.

On 28 July 1993, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that shortly after his visit to the area, the two parties agreed to initiate direct talks and to ask for the assistance of the United Nations in holding this meeting. The delegations of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO met from 17 to 19 July 1993 at Laayoune, in the presence of the Special Representative as United Nations observer. The Secretary-General described this event as an encouraging sign and expressed his hope that such talks would be resumed soon.

The Secretary-General also informed the Council that, in the meantime, the Chairman of the Identification Commission had travelled to the region in order to prepare for the initiation of the process of identification and registration of voters.

In the letter addressed to the Secretary-General by the President of the Security Council dated 4 August 1993, the Council fully supported efforts to make early progress on the preparations for holding the referendum in accordance with resolution 809 (1993) and welcomed the reaffirmation by the two parties of their commitment to the implementation of the settlement plan in its entirety.

Secretary-General Remains Hopeful

The direct talks between the Government of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO, initiated in July 1993 at Laayoune, were scheduled to resume on 25 October 1993 in New York. While ground rules laid down for the resumption of talks gave to each party the right to choose the composition of its delegation, the POLISARIO delegation "found it impossible" to meet with the other party because of the presence of former POLISARIO officials in the Moroccan delegation. Despite efforts

by the Secretary-General's Special Representative to find ways of overcoming the procedural difficulties, the talks did not take place.

On 27 October, the Secretary-General issued a statement in which he deeply regretted the failure of the parties to meet. At the same time, he remained hopeful that a dialogue between the two parties "may be resumed in due course". In the meantime, the Secretary-General was determined to continue efforts for the implementation of the settlement plan and to proceed with the identification and registration of potential voters in the referendum.

Referendum Rescheduled

On 24 November 1993, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that, in view of the remaining difficulties in the implementation of the settlement plan, it would not be possible to fulfil the goal of holding a free and fair referendum by the end of 1993. However, on the assumption that those difficulties were settled and progress made in the initial stages of the voter registration process, the Secretary-General hoped to be able to propose to the Council early in 1994 a detailed timetable for holding the referendum in mid-1994. He further proposed to maintain the existing military and civilian strength of MINURSO until his next report to the Council.

In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 6 December 1993 from the President of the Security Council, the Council agreed that the Secretary-General's compromise proposal was a sound framework for determining potential participation in the referendum in Western Sahara as foreseen in the settlement plan, and expected that any difficulties with the compromise would be resolved by early 1994. The Council also welcomed the Secretary-General's determination to move ahead and proceed with voter registration and identification.

Voter Registration

After the Chairman of the Identification Commission had arrived in the mission area towards the end of May 1993, he assembled the members of the Commission and a team of registration officers. The former group arrived in Laayoune in June. The Chairman and his team held intensive discussions with the authorities of both parties on modalities which would enable identification and registration to proceed in a thorough and judicious manner. They also made essential arrangements for voter registration both in Western Sahara and in the Tindouf area (Algeria).

On 3 November 1993, after several rounds of discussions with both parties, the Chairman of the Commission officially announced the launching of the process leading to identification and registration. He then held a further series of discussions with both the Government of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO urging them to adhere as far as possible to the timetable agreed upon by the parties in October 1993. During these consultations, both sides confirmed their intention to proceed expeditiously with the initial stage of the registration process in cooperation with MINURSO.

In late November 1993, the revised lists of the 1974 census, together with the supplement listing the names of additional persons expected to reach 18 years of age by 31 December 1993, were made accessible in Laayoune and in the EI-Aiun refugee camp in the Tindouf area. Since December 1993, application forms have been supplied and distributed, initially through centres in Laayoune and in the Tindouf area. Additional registration offices were opened in the other population centres in the Territory as well as in a few locations outside the Territory where numbers of Western Saharans were known to be living.

The Special Representative visited the mission area from 2 to 13 January 1994 for consultations with the parties and the neighbouring countries on the situation and ways of resolving the remaining difficulties. He provided assurances to allay the concerns of the Frente POLISARIO that, on the basis of the compromise, thousands of individuals foreign to the Territory might be included in the electorate. These assurances were confirmed and further elaborated in a letter dated 4 February 1994 from the Special Representative to the representative of the Frente POLISARIO in New York.

Options Before Security Council

In his 10 March 1994 report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General noted that although the preliminary registration of applicants for participation in the referendum had proceeded in Laayoune and the Tindouf area, the completion of the identification and final registration of all eligible voters remained uncertain in the absence of agreement by the Frente POLISARIO to the compromise as a whole. He further pointed out that, following protracted delays since the inception of MINURSO, every possible avenue had been explored by himself and his Special Representative to break the deadlock over the criteria and their interpretation so that the plan could be implemented. The fact that these efforts had not succeeded confronted the Security Council with a difficult choice. The Secretary-General continued by presenting three options facing the Council.

Under option A, the Council would decide that the United Nations should proceed to hold the referendum regardless of the cooperation of either party. Registration and identification of eligible voters would proceed based on the compromise, the terms of reference of the Identification Commission and the relevant provisions of the settlement plan. The transitional period would commence on 1 August 1994. The Identification Commission would analyse voter applications from March to May 1994 and would begin registration in June, at which time it would also announce the arrangements for the appeals process. By September, voter registration would be completed and the final list of voters would be published.

The United Nations would also undertake other activities called for in the original settlement plan. From 7 to 15 December 1994, the referendum would be held, the results would be proclaimed, and the withdrawal of MINURSO personnel would commence. MINURSO's monitoring responsibilities would end by 31 December 1994.

Option B, would have the Council decide that the Identification Commission should continue its work while the United Nations continued its efforts to obtain the cooperation of both parties based on the compromise proposal put forward by the Secretary-General. At the end of a prescribed period, the Council would review progress achieved and would decide on its next course of action. Until that time, the Identification Commission would be expected to complete its analysis of voter applications and begin registration of potential voters.

Under option C, the Council would conclude that the cooperation of the parties in completing the registration process could not be obtained at present and would decide either that the whole MINURSO operation should be phased out within a given time-frame or that the registration and identification process should be suspended, but that a reduced United Nations military presence should be retained in order to encourage respect for the cease-fire.

The Secretary-General noted that either option A or option B would require Member States to be willing to provide military personnel. Even maintenance of MINURSO at its present strength would require urgent action to obtain replacements for the contingents whose withdrawal had already been announced by their Governments.

On 29 March 1994, the Security Council, by its resolution 907 (1994), agreed to the course of action as outlined in option B of the Secretary-General's report and requested him to report no later than 15 July 1994 on progress achieved in the Identification Commission's

work as well as on other aspects of the settlement plan. It also decided that, in the event the Secretary-General reported that the referendum could not be held by the end of 1994, it would consider MINURSO's future, including an examination of options regarding its mandate and continued operations.

Identification and Registration

Following the adoption of resolution 907 (1994), the Identification Commission focused its efforts on achieving the agreement and cooperation of both parties in order to proceed with the identification of potential voters. As a result, the Commission succeeded in completing all the necessary groundwork for launching the process. The identification operation was to have been launched on 8 June 1994 with the assistance of the tribal chiefs and in the presence of observers of both parties and OAU. However, it could not start as scheduled, because of Morocco's reservations over the designation of OAU observers.

As requested, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on 12 July 1994. He noted the progress made towards the implementation of the settlement plan for Western Sahara and pointed to the remaining difficulties. In light of delays in the identification and registration process, the Secretary-General intended to propose that the transitional period in Western Sahara should start on 1 October 1994 and that the referendum should take place on 14 February 1995.

On 29 July 1994, the Security Council issued a statement in which it welcomed the progress made, took note of the proposed revised timetable and urged the parties to continue to cooperate with the Secretary-General and MINURSO to ensure the earliest possible implementation of the settlement plan. As a result of the Secretary-General's extensive discussions with the leaders of OAU and other interested parties, the question of OAU observers was resolved. The identification and registration operation was finally launched on 28 August 1994, with opening ceremonies held simultaneously at Laayoune and the El-Aiun camp in the Tindouf area. At the same time, the United Nations intensified work on other political and military aspects relevant to the fulfilment of the settlement plan.

Timetable to be Revised

On 4 November 1994, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that the identification and registration operation

proved to be far more complex than was expected, as members of the same tribal subgroups, who must be identified individually with the assistance of their respective sheikhs, were dispersed in different locations and means of communication were limited. By the end of October, only some 4,000 potential voters from five Saharan tribal subfractions had been interviewed, equivalent to less than 2 per cent of the total number of application forms.

The Secretary-General noted that he had indicated in his 12 July 1994 report his intention to recommend that the transitional period should start on 1 October 1994 and that the referendum should take place on 14 February 1995. However, it had become clear that many months would be required to make sufficient progress in the identification process to be close to determining a date for the referendum and a revised timetable for the steps still to be taken to implement the settlement plan. The Secretary-General stated that he would report further to the Council on the organisation and timing of the referendum after the consultations he intended to hold during his visit to the area in November 1994.

In the meantime, the Secretary-General decided to dispatch a technical team to the field to reassess the logistical and other requirements for the possible deployment of MINURSO at full strength.

On 15 November, the Security Council, in a Presidential statement, expressed concern over the slow speed of the identification process, urged the two parties to exert all possible efforts to facilitate MINURSO's work, and urged the earliest possible deployment of the Identification Commission staff in order to accelerate the process. It welcomed the Secretary-General's decision to visit the region, and looked forward to receiving his report and the report of the technical team charged with reassessing requirements for the deployment of MINURSO at full strength. The Council strongly believed that there must be no further undue delay in the holding of a free, fair and impartial referendum for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in accordance with the settlement plan.

The Secretary-General travelled to the region on 25-29 November 1994. During the visit, he held discussions on the question of Western Sahara with Algerian authorities in Algiers, the representatives of POLISARIO in Tindouf and Wilaya de Smara, and Moroccan authorities in Laayoune and Rabat. On the basis of those discussions, the Secretary-General was to submit a report to the Security Council.¹

Composition of MINURSO

The foreseen full strength of MINURSO is approximately 1,700 military observers and troops, 300 police officers and 800 to 1,000 civilian personnel. The current strength of the Mission, in its limited deployment, includes 237 military observers and 48 military support personnel. Originally, the military personnel were provided by Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Russian Federation, Switzerland, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States and Venezuela. In October 1993, the Government of the United Kingdom withdrew its military observers. Australia withdrew its signals contingent in May 1994. Its communications duties have been taken over by military observers. The Canadian movement control was withdrawn in June 1994; it was replaced by civilian staff. In August 1994, a medical unit from the Republic of South Korea replaced the Swiss medical contingent.

MINURSO also includes 49 civilian police officers, led by the Police Commissioner, Colonel Jurgen Friedrich Reimann (Germany). Currently, their primary responsibility is to monitor local police and to ensure security and order at identification and registration sites.

On 30 November 1994, military and civilian police personnel were provided by the following countries:

<i>Country</i>	<i>Police</i>	<i>Troops</i>	<i>Observers</i>
Argentina			7
Austria	10		4
Bangladesh			7
Belgium			1
China			20
Egypt			9
France			30
Germany	5		
Ghana		8	6
Greece			1
Guinea			1
Honduras			14
Ireland			9
Italy			6
Kenya			10
Malaysia	15		15

Nigeria	5		4
Norway	5		
Pakistan			4
Poland			2
Republic of Korea		40	2
Russian Federation			30
Togo	5		
Tunisia			9
United States			30
Uruguay	4		15
Venezuela			1
Total	49	48	237

Figures may vary from month to month due to rotation. "Troops" include any infantry, logistics, engineering, air, medical, mov-con. staff, etc.

In addition, some 180 international and local civilian staff members are assigned to MINURSO in support of its mandate.

Financial Aspects

The rough cost to the United Nations of MINURSO in 1994 was approximately \$40.5 million. The operation is funded by assessed contributions of United Nations Member States. As at 30 November 1994, total contributions outstanding to the MINURSO Special Account for the period from the inception of the operation amounted to approximately \$20.4 million.

NOTE

1. The Secretary-General submitted his report on 14 December 1994. He stated that his consultations with the parties indicated that, despite the difficulties encountered and the delays experienced, the political will existed to move the process forward. The Secretary-General hoped that by 31 March 1995 progress achieved in the identification and registration process would reach a level that would enable him to recommend 1 June 1995 as the date (D-day) for the start of the transitional period. In mid-August, the identification and registration of voters should be completed and the final list of voters published. The repatriation programme should be completed by the end of September. That date would coincide with the start of the referendum campaign in time to permit the referendum to take place in October 1995.

46

United Nations Operation in Somalia II

LOCATION: Somalia

HEADQUARTERS: Mogadishu

DURATION: April 1992 to present

STRENGTH: Approximately 15,000 military and police personnel and over 2,500 International and locally recruited staff

FATALITIES: 133

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: James Victor Gbeho (Ghana)

FORCE COMMANDED: Lieutenant-General Aboo Samah Bin Aboo Bakar (Malaysia)

Background

The downfall of President Siad Barre in January 1991 resulted in a power struggle and clan, clashes in many parts of Somalia. In November, the most intense fighting since January broke out in the capital, Mogadishu, between two factions—one supporting Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and the other supporting the Chairman of the United Somali Congress, General Mohamed Farah Aidid. Since then, fighting persisted in Mogadishu and spread throughout Somalia, with heavily armed elements controlling various parts of the country. Some declared alliance with one or the other of the two factions, while others did not. Numerous marauding groups of bandits added to the problem.

The hostilities resulted in widespread death and destruction, forcing hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee their homes and causing a dire need for emergency humanitarian assistance. Almost 4.5 million people in Somalia—over half of the estimated population—were threatened by severe malnutrition and malnutrition-related disease,

with the most affected living in the countryside. It was estimated that perhaps 300,000 people died since November 1991, and at least 1.5 million lives were at immediate risk. Almost one million Somalis sought refuge in neighbouring countries and elsewhere.

The political chaos, deteriorating security situation, widespread banditry and looting, and extent of physical destruction compounded the problem and severely constrained the delivery of humanitarian supplies. Furthermore, the conflict threatened stability in the Horn of Africa region, and its continuation occasioned threats to international peace and security in the area.

Early United Nations Efforts

Despite the turmoil that ensued after the overthrow of President Siad Barre, the United Nations continued its humanitarian efforts in Somalia and, by March 1991, was fully engaged in that country. Over the following months, the volatile security situation forced the United Nations on several occasions to temporarily withdraw its personnel from Somalia, but it continued its humanitarian activities to the fullest extent possible, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

The deteriorating and appalling situation in Somalia led the United Nations Secretary-General, in cooperation with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), to become actively involved with the political aspects of the crisis and to press for a peaceful solution to the conflict.

On 27 December 1991, then Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar informed the President of the Security Council that he intended to take an initiative in an attempt to restore peace in Somalia. Accordingly, after consulting incoming Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, he asked then Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs James O.C. Jonah to visit the area.

In early January 1992, despite continued fighting in Mogadishu, Jonah led a team of senior United Nations officials into Somalia for talks aimed at bringing about a cessation of hostilities and securing access by the international relief community to civilians caught in the conflict. During that visit, support for a cease-fire in Mogadishu was expressed by all faction leaders, except General Aidid. Unanimous support was expressed, however, for a United Nations role in bringing about national reconciliation.

The results of the visit were reported to Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who then consulted with the members of the Security Council on the appropriate course of action. On 23 January, by its resolution 733 (1992), the Security Council urged all parties to the conflict to cease hostilities, and decided that all States should immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia. The Council requested the Secretary-General to increase humanitarian assistance to the affected population and to contact all parties involved in the conflict to seek their commitment to the cessation of hostilities, to promote a cease-fire and to assist in the process of a political settlement of the conflict.

On 31 January, the Secretary-General invited LAS, OAU and OIC, as well as Interim President Ali Mahdi and General Aidid, to send their representatives to participate in consultations at United Nations Headquarters from 12 to 14 February. The talks succeeded in getting the two factions in Mogadishu to agree to an immediate cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of the cease-fire, and to a visit to Mogadishu by a joint high-level delegation composed of representatives of the United Nations and the three regional organisations to conclude a cease-fire agreement.

The joint delegation arrived in Mogadishu on 29 February 1992. On 3 March, after four days of intensive negotiations, Interim President Ali Mahdi and General Aidid signed an "Agreement on the Implementation of a Cease-fire". This Agreement also included the acceptance of a United Nations security component for convoys of humanitarian assistance, and the deployment of 20 military observers on each side of Mogadishu to monitor the cease-fire. At the same time, the joint delegation undertook consultations regarding a national reconciliation conference to which all Somali groups would be invited.

On 17 March, the Security Council adopted its resolution 746 (1992), supporting the Secretary-General's decision to dispatch to Somalia a technical team to prepare a plan for a cease-fire monitoring mechanism. The Council also requested that the team develop a high-priority plan to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The team visited Somalia from 23 March to 1 April. Following discussions with the team, Interim President Ali Mahdi and General Aidid signed on 28 and 27 March 1992, respectively, Letters of Agreement on the mechanisms for monitoring the cease-fire and on arrangements for equitable and effective distribution of humanitarian assistance.

Establishment of UNOSOM

On 24 April 1992, in response to a recommendation of the Secretary-General, the Security Council adopted resolution 751 (1992), by which it decided to establish a United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). The Council also asked the Secretary-General, in cooperation with LAS, OAU and OIC, to pursue consultations with all Somali parties towards convening a conference on national reconciliation and unity. It also called on the international community for financial and other support for the Secretary-General's 90-day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia.

The Council welcomed the Secretary-General's intention to appoint a Special Representative for Somalia to provide overall direction of United Nations activities in that country. Mohammed Sahnoun of Algeria was appointed Special Representative on 28 April 1992 and left for the area on 1 May.

Original Concept of Operations

In accordance with the agreements reached with the two main Somali factions in Mogadishu, the cease-fire in the capital was to be monitored by a group of 50 unarmed uniformed United Nations military observers. As regards humanitarian assistance, the security personnel envisaged in the agreements were to provide protection and security for United Nations personnel, equipment and supplies at the seaports and airports in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies from there to distribution centres in the city and its immediate environs.

In its resolution 751 (1992), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to deploy immediately 50 observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu. It also agreed, in principle, to establish a security force to be deployed as soon as possible, and requested the Secretary-General to continue his consultations with the parties in Mogadishu in this regard.

On 23 June, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that Both principal factions in Mogadishu had agreed to the immediate deployment of the unarmed observers. The observers would be drawn from Austria, Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco and Zimbabwe. The Chief Military Observer, Brigadier-General Imtiaz Shaheen of Pakistan, and the advance party of UNOSOM observers arrived in Mogadishu in early July 1992. On 12 August, the Secretary-General informed the Security

Council that, after considerable delays and difficulties, agreement had been reached with the principal faction leaders in Mogadishu to deploy 500 United Nations security personnel in the capital as part of UNOSOM. The Government of Pakistan had agreed to contribute a unit for the purpose. The first group of security personnel arrived in Mogadishu on 14 September 1992.

Further Developments

Between 4 May and 19 July 1992, the Secretary-General's Special Representative undertook extensive consultations with various Somali leaders and Elders and other personalities throughout the country. On 22 July, the Secretary-General reported to the Council on the complex political and security situation in Somalia, as well as the desperate situation the country faced in terms of needs for humanitarian assistance, recovery programmes and institution-building. The Secretary-General concluded that the United Nations must "adapt" its involvement in Somalia and that its efforts needed to be enlarged in order to bring about an effective cease-fire throughout the country, while at the same time promoting national reconciliation.

On 27 July, the Security Council approved the Secretary-General's report and urged all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to facilitate United Nations efforts to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected population. The Council strongly supported the Secretary-General's decision to dispatch another technical team to Somalia.

Enlargement of UNOSOM

Following the technical team's visit to Somalia from 6 to 15 August 1992, the Secretary-General submitted his further report, dated 24 August, to the Security Council, in which he described a number of urgent steps, being planned or already taken, to mitigate the widespread starvation in the areas of Somalia most seriously affected by the civil war and drought and to prevent the incidence of hunger escalating in other parts of the country. Noting that the United Nations and its partners were ready and had the capacity to provide substantially increased assistance, the Secretary-General stated that they were prevented from doing so by the lawlessness and lack of security prevailing throughout Somalia. Looting, by heavily armed gangs, of supplies from delivery and distribution points, as well as attacks on incoming and docked ships and on airports and airstrips, prevented the assured delivery of humanitarian assistance by overland transport.

Given the difficulties, the Secretary-General concluded that the airlift operations—already being carried out by the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), as well as by ICRC—needed to be enhanced substantially, with priority given to central and southern Somalia. In addition, a “preventive zone” on the Kenya-Somali border should be established for special deliveries of food and seed, in an attempt to reduce famine-induced population movements.

The Secretary-General recommended the deployment of four additional United Nations security units, each with a strength of up to 750, to protect the humanitarian convoys and distribution centres throughout Somalia. Also, in accordance with his earlier proposal, the Secretary-General recommended the establishment of four zone headquarters of UNOSOM. Each would be headed by a civilian official who would assist the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in all aspects of his duties.

On 28 August, the Security Council, by its resolution 775 (1992), approved the Secretary-General’s report and authorized the increase in strength of UNOSOM. The Council requested the Secretary-General to continue, in close cooperation with LAS, OAU and OIC, his efforts to seek a comprehensive solution to the crisis in Somalia.

On 8 September, the Security Council also approved the Secretary-General’s plan to deploy three logistic units totalling up to 719 personnel to support the enhanced UNOSOM operation. Consequently, the total strength of UNOSOM was to be 4,219 all ranks, including the unit of 500 authorized in Mogadishu and 719 for logistic units.

100-Day Action Programme

There have been six main United Nations organisations at work in Somalia “coordinating overall humanitarian efforts: the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), WFP and the World Health Organisation (WHO). In addition, more than 30 NGOs were working in Somalia as “implementing partners” of the United Nations. Moreover, ICRC has continued to provide assistance under the most difficult situations. There are also many local NGOs that work with the United Nations and the international NGOs.

Between 10 and 12 September 1992, as part of the overall effort to accelerate humanitarian relief activities, the then United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Eliasson, led

a high-level inter-agency mission to Somalia. A major outcome of the mission was the decision to develop a 100-Day Action Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance, for the period until the end of 1992. The 100-Day Programme was reviewed at the First Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, held in Geneva on 12 and 13 October 1992 under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Somalia.

The Programme sought to highlight priority actions which were needed to prevent famine and the unacceptably high levels of death and deprivation in Somalia. The emphasis was placed on those areas and populations of the country needing priority attention. The Programme also identified the additional resources required to meet its eight main objectives: massive infusion of food aid; aggressive expansion of supplementary feeding; provision of basic health services and mass measles immunisation campaign; urgent provision of clean water, sanitation and hygiene; provision of shelter materials, including blankets and clothes; simultaneous delivery of seeds, tools and animal vaccines with food rations; prevention of further refugee outflows and promoting returnee programmes; building institutions and civil society rehabilitation and recovery. Donor response to the Programme was generally prompt and generous. Of the \$82.7 million requested for the implementation of the Programme, \$67.3 million was received.

From 3 to 5 December 1992, the Secretary-General convened the Second Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, at the Conference Centre of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Meeting was attended by representatives of donor countries and other Governments, Somali political and community leaders, and Somali NGOs, as well as regional and subregional organisations, United Nations agencies and international NGOs.

The Meeting provided an opportunity to review the progress achieved in the implementation of the 100-Day Action Programme, the obstacles encountered and the work that remained to be done. The discussion also went beyond the scope of the Action Programme to address further relief activities, as well as the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Somalia. One of the conclusions of the meeting was that the 100-Day Programme should be followed by a new plan for 1993. Subsequently, it was decided that a United Nations Conference on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia would be held in Addis Ababa in March 1993 to review the Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for 1993 and receive pledges from donors.

Situation Deteriorates

In October and November 1992, despite all efforts by the international community, the United Nations Secretary-General and his new Special Representative for Somalia, Ismat Kittani¹ the situation in Somalia continued to deteriorate. Somalia remained without a central government with which to negotiate. Mogadishu was divided by rival militias. Throughout the country, a dozen or more factions—some torn by internal divisions—were active. The resulting political chaos and the extensive physical destruction severely constrained the delivery of humanitarian supplies. Widespread looting of aid supplies, robbery, armed banditry and general lawlessness compounded the situation.

Several of the Somali *de facto* authorities refused to agree to the deployment of United Nations troops to secure delivery of aid in areas of greatest need. UNOSOM troops in Mogadishu were fired upon and their vehicles and arms taken. Relief ships were prevented from docking, threatened and even shelled. Airports and seaports came under fire. Large sums of cash and relief aid were being extorted from donor agencies and organisations, and the lives of their personnel attempting to distribute supplies to starving people were being put in danger.

The net result was that, while relief supplies were ready and in the pipeline, only a trickle was reaching those in need. According to some estimates, as many as 3,000 persons a day were dying of starvation in Somalia, while warehouses remained stocked. Unless the problems relating to security and protection of relief supplies were resolved, it was believed that United Nations agencies and NGOs would be unable to provide the assistance in the amounts and on the urgent basis needed.

Secretary-General Suggests Options

In a letter to the Security Council on 24 November 1992, the Secretary-General reported on the deteriorating situation in Somalia, with particular reference to the factors preventing UNOSOM from implementing its mandate. The Secretary-General stated that he did not exclude the possibility that it might become necessary to review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort there. He cited the lack of government in Somalia, the failure of various factions to cooperate with UNOSOM, the extortion, blackmail and robbery to which the international relief effort was subjected and the repeated attacks on the personnel and equipment of the United Nations and other relief agencies.

The members of the Council discussed the Secretary-General's letter during informal consultations on 25 November. They expressed the view that the situation in Somalia was intolerable and asked the Secretary-General to present specific recommendations on how the United Nations could remedy the situation.

In response, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a further letter, dated 29 November, in which he outlined, for the Council's consideration, five options for creating conditions for the uninterrupted delivery of supplies to the starving people of Somalia. The Secretary-General also informed the Council of a visit he received on 25 November from Lawrence Eagleburger, then Acting Secretary of State of the United States, who indicated that, should the Security Council decide to authorize Member States to ensure the delivery of relief supplies, the United States would be ready to take the lead in organising and commanding such an operation, in which a number of other Member States would also participate.

According to the Secretary-General's letter the first option would be to continue and intensify efforts to deploy UNOSOM in accordance with its existing mandate. The second option suggested that the idea of using international military personnel to protect relief activities be abandoned, and that humanitarian agencies make the best arrangements they could with the various faction and clan leaders. However, the Secretary-General considered neither of these two options to be an adequate response to the crisis.

As to the other three options, the Secretary-General stated that their purpose would be to ensure, on a lasting basis, that the current violence against the international relief effort was brought to an end.

The first of those three options would be for UNOSOM troops to undertake a show of force in Mogadishu in an attempt to discourage those abusing the relief efforts. However, the Secretary-General contended that a countrywide operation would be required to have the desired deterrent effect.

The next option would entail a countrywide action by a group of Member States authorized to do so by the Security Council. The Secretary-General mentioned in this connection the offer by the United States to organize and lead such an operation. In such a case, the Secretary-General would advise the Council and those Members taking part in the operation that they find a way to recognize the Security Council's legitimate interest in the manner in which it was carried out.

The remaining option was also for a countrywide enforcement action, but one carried out under United Nations command and control. This would be consistent, the Secretary-General stated, with the recent enlargement of the Organisation's role in the maintenance of international peace and security, and would strengthen its long-term evolution as an effective system of collective security. However, the United Nations Secretariat did not currently have the capability to command and control an enforcement operation of the size required. He concluded that there was no alternative but to resort to the enforcement provisions of the United Nations Charter.

The Secretary-General stressed that whether an action was taken under United Nations command, or by Member States with Security Council authorisation, it should be precisely defined and limited in time, "in order to prepare the way for a return to peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building".

Council Authorises Use of Force

On 3 December, the Security Council adopted, unanimously, its resolution 794 (1992), authorising the use of "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia". The Council authorized the Secretary-General and the participating Member States to make arrangements for "the unified command and control" of the military forces that would be involved. It called on all Member States that were in a position to do so to provide military forces and to make contributions in cash or in kind, and requested the Secretary-General to establish a fund through which the contributions could be appropriately channelled to the States or operations concerned.

The Security Council requested the Secretary-General and Member States contributing troops to establish appropriate mechanisms for coordination between the United Nations and their military forces, and invited the Secretary-General to attach a small liaison staff of UNOSOM to the field headquarters of the unified command. Further, the Council requested the Secretary-General and the States concerned to report regularly to it on the progress in establishing a secure environment in Somalia. It requested the Secretary-General to submit a plan to ensure that UNOSOM would be able to fulfil its mandate upon the withdrawal of the unified command.

As to the United Nations peace-keeping operation in Somalia, the Security Council decided that the operations and the further deployment of the 3,500 personnel of UNOSOM, authorized by

resolution 775 (1992) of 28 August, should proceed at the discretion of the Secretary-General in the light of his assessment of conditions on the ground.

Unified Task Force Deployed

The first elements of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), spearheaded by the United States, were deployed in Mogadishu on 9 December 1992. In the following weeks UNITAF forces² expanded their operations to major relief centres in Somalia. UNITAF's principal goal was to establish in Somalia a secure environment for urgent humanitarian assistance. Once that was accomplished, the military command would then be turned over to the United Nations. In the meantime, UNOSOM remained fully responsible for the political aspects and for humanitarian assistance to Somalia. Good coordination on the ground and at United Nations headquarters was established between UNITAF and the United Nations. UNOSOM remained in the capital and continued to liaise with UNITAF and plan for the position to normal peace-keeping functions.

On 19 December, the Secretary-General presented to the Security Council a report in which described actions taken to implement resolution 794 (1992) and set out his thinking on a new mandate for UNOSOM and the transition from UNITAF to continued peace-keeping operations. The Secretary-General recommended that the Council defer its decision on such a transition until it became clear whether UNITAF had achieved its goal. He suggested that it should await the establishment of a cease-fire, the control of heavy weapons, the disarming of lawless gangs and the creation of a new police force.

In his further report to the Council, dated 26 January 1993, the Secretary-General congratulated UNITAF for rapidly and successfully securing major population centres and ensuring that humanitarian assistance was delivered and distributed without impediment. As to UNOSOM, he indicated that its major preoccupation at that juncture was the planning for the transition from the operations of UNITAF to UNOSOM II. The planning exercise, the Secretary-General pointed out, was proceeding smoothly in close cooperation and consultation with the Command of UNITAF.

Peace Agreements

In the meantime, the Secretary-General convened an informal preparatory meeting at ECA headquarters in Addis Ababa from 4 to 15 January 1993, for a national reconciliation conference envisaged

under United Nations auspices. A total of 14 Somali political movements took part in the meeting, along with the Secretaries-General of LAS, OAU and OIC and the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn, as well as the representatives of the current Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

The following three agreements were concluded and signed at the meeting: (a) General Agreement of 8 January 1993; (b) Agreement on implementing the cease-fire and on modalities of disarmament; and (c) Agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee to help resolve the criteria for participation at, and the agenda for, the conference on national reconciliation as well as any other issues pending from the informal meeting. Among other things, the informal meeting agreed on the convening of a conference on national reconciliation in Addis Ababa on 15 March 1993. The Somali parties requested the United Nations, in consultation with the relevant regional and subregional organisations, to provide logistic support both prior to and during the conference.

Transition to UNOSOM II Proposed

On 3 March 1993, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a report containing his recommendations for effecting the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. He indicated that since the adoption of Council resolution 794 (1992) in December 1992, UNITAF had deployed approximately 37,000 troops in southern and central Somalia, covering approximately 40 per cent of the country's territory. The presence and operations of UNITAF had a positive impact on the security situation in Somalia and on the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. He pointed out, however, that despite the improvement, a secure environment had not yet been established in Somalia and incidents of violence continued to occur. There was still no effective functioning government in the country, no organized civilian police force and no disciplined national armed force. The security threat to personnel of the United Nations and its agencies, UNITAF, ICRC and NGOs was still high in some areas of Mogadishu and other places in Somalia. Moreover, there was no deployment of UNITAF or UNOSOM troops to the north-east and north-west, or along the Kenyan-Somali border, where security continued to be a matter of grave concern.

The Secretary-General concluded, therefore, that, should the Security Council determine that the time had come for the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, the latter should be endowed with enforcement powers United Nations Charter so as to be able to establish

a secure environment throughout Somalia. To that end, UNOSOM II, under the mandate recommended by the Secretary-General, would seek to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. The mandate would also empower UNOSOM II to provide assistance to the Somali people in rebuilding their economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country's institutional structure, achieving national political reconciliation, recreating a Somali State based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country's economy and infrastructure.

The mandate of UNOSOM II, covering the whole territory of Somalia, would include the following military tasks: (a) monitoring that all factions continued to respect the cessation of hostilities and other agreements to which they had consented; (b) preventing any resumption of violence and, if necessary, taking appropriate action against any faction that violated or threatened to violate the cessation of hostilities; (c) maintaining control of the heavy weapons of the organized factions which would have been brought under international control pending their eventual destruction or transfer to a newly constituted national army; (d) seizing the small arms of all unauthorized armed elements and assisting in the registration and security of such arms; (e) securing or maintaining security at all ports, airports and lines of communications required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; (f) protecting the personnel, installations and equipment of the United Nations and its agencies, ICRC as well as NGOs, and taking such forceful action as might be required to neutralize armed elements that attacked, or threatened to attack, such facilities and personnel, pending the establishment of a new Somali police force which could assume this responsibility; (g) continuing the programme for mine-clearing in the most afflicted areas; (h) assisting in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons within Somalia; (i) carrying out such other functions as might be authorized by the Security Council.

Concerning disarmament, the Secretary-General stated that on the basis of the Addis Ababa agreements, a planning committee composed of senior officers from both UNITAF and UNOSOM developed a "Somalia ceasefire disarmament concept". This concept would require the establishment of cantonment, for storage of heavy weapons, as well as transition sites for temporary accommodation of factional forces while they turned in their small arms, registered for future governmental and non-governmental support and received training

for eventual reintegration into civilian life. Cantonment and transition sites would be separated from each other to prevent any possibility of factions or groups seizing the heavy weapons. Those failing to comply with timetables or other modalities of the disarmament process would have their weapons and equipment confiscated and/or destroyed.

According to the Secretary-General, UNOSOM II military operations would be conducted in four phases. Phase I would concentrate on the transition of operational control from UNITAF. Military support to relief activities and the disarming of factions would continue throughout the transition. Phase II would be designed to consolidate United Nations operational control and would conclude when UNOSOM II was deployed and operating effectively throughout Somalia and the border regions. In phase III, major efforts would be made to reduce UNOSOM II's military activity and assist civil authorities in exercising greater responsibility. That phase would end when a Somali national police force became operational and major United Nations military operations were no longer required. Phase IV would concern redeployment or reduction of the UNOSOM II forces. The exact timing of transition from phase to phase would be determined to a large extent by political reconciliation efforts and rehabilitation programmes.

The deployment of UNOSOM II would be at the discretion of the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and the Force Commander acting under the authority of the Security Council; the deployment would not be subject to the agreement of any local faction leaders.

The Secretary-General estimated that it would be necessary to deploy a military component of 20,000 all ranks to carry out the assigned tasks and an additional 8,000 personnel to provide the logistic support. In addition, the United States Government agreed in principle to provide a tactical quick reaction force in support of the Force Commander of UNOSOM II. UNOSOM II would also include civilian staff of approximately 2,800 individuals.

The Secretary-General suggested 1 May 1993 as the date of transfer of budgetary and administrative control from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. It was subsequently decided that the transfer of the military command would take place on 4 May.

On 5 March 1993, the Secretary-General appointed Admiral Jonathan T. Howe (Ret.) of the United States as his new Special Representative for Somalia for an initial period of three months,

effective 9 March 1993. He was asked to oversee the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, in addition to continuing the tasks of “promoting political reconciliation, coordinating humanitarian assistance and paving the way for rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country”. Earlier, the Secretary-General had appointed Lieutenant-General Cevik Bir of Turkey as Force Commander of UNOSOM II.³

Security Council Acts

On 26 March, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, adopted resolution 814(1993), by which it decided to expand the size and mandate of UNOSOM in accordance with the Secretary-General’s recommendations. It authorized the mandate for the expanded UNOSOM for an initial period through 31 October 1993. The Council demanded that all Somali parties comply fully with the commitments they had undertaken, and in particular with the Agreement on Implementing the Cease-fire and on Modalities of Disarmament, and that they ensure the safety of the personnel of all organisations engaged in humanitarian and other assistance to Somalia. All States, in particular neighbouring ones, were called upon to cooperate in the implementation of the arms embargo established under resolution 733 (1992).

In other provisions of the resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, and with assistance from all relevant United Nations entities, offices and specialized agencies, to provide humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation. Such assistance should include economic relief and rehabilitation of Somalia, the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons within Somalia, the re-establishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration in the entire country, the re-establishment of Somali police, mine-clearance and public information activities in support of the United Nations activities in Somalia.

Humanitarian Assistance Conference

As noted above, the deployment of UNITAF forces improved the security situation and facilitated the flow of food and other emergency relief supplies into the neediest areas of Somalia. The level of malnutrition and death from starvation fell dramatically in many areas. In spite of the improvements, however, the humanitarian and political situation in many parts of the country remained complex and tense.

In the southern and central parts of Somalia, large numbers of people remained destitute and totally dependent on relief food assistance. Measles, diarrhoea and other infections continued to take a heavy toll, particularly on small children. Lack of access to clean water sources and poor sanitation continued to present major health threats.

In his 3 March 1993 report the Secretary-General pointed out that a secure environment remained essential for the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance and for the reconstruction of Somalia. He identified three major challenges facing the United Nations in 1993: facilitating the voluntary return of approximately 300,000 refugees and internally displaced persons; providing jobs and work for the many millions of unemployed Somalis, including members of armed gangs, militias and various private armies; and helping the Somalis in rebuilding their society and rehabilitating the decayed infrastructure.

To achieve these objectives, the United Nations, with the active participation of the Somalis, United Nations agencies, ICRC and NGOs, put together a new Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for the war- and drought-ravaged country. The Programme was adopted at the United Nations Conference on Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia, held from 11 to 13 March 1993 in Addis Ababa under the chairmanship of the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs. The Conference was attended by some 190 Somali representatives, as well as senior representatives of donor Governments, international agencies, regional organisations and NGOs.

The Programme, covering the period from March to December 1993, included activities in 10 priority areas: re-establishment of local administrative capacity; re-establishment of national and local police forces; support services for women, particularly those victimized by violence and trauma; return of some 300,000 refugees and over 1 million displaced persons within Somalia; development of a food security system; establishment of a basic healthcare system; increasing the availability of potable water and of sanitation; expansion of agriculture and enhancement of livestock; work opportunities for the unemployed; and re-establishment of primary education and vocational training.

At the Addis Ababa Conference, over \$130 million was pledged by international donors towards the implementation of the Programme, which was estimated to cost some \$166.5 million. It was anticipated that further resources would be forthcoming as the implementation of the various projects gained momentum.

National Reconciliation Conference

As the Secretary-General indicated in his 3 March report, ultimately all the efforts undertaken by the United Nations in Somalia were directed towards one central goal: to assist the people of Somalia to create and maintain order and new institutions for their own governance.

The Secretary-General and his Special Representative continued to give high priority to national reconciliation in Somalia. As agreed at the January 1993 informal meeting and following considerable preparatory work, the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia was convened on 15 March 1993 in Addis Ababa. The Conference was chaired by the Secretary-General's Deputy Special Representative for Somalia, Ambassador Lansana Kouyate of Guinea, and attended by the leaders of 15 Somali political movements, as well as the representatives of LAS, OAU, OIC, the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn and the Non-Aligned Movement.

After almost two weeks of intensive negotiations, the leaders of all 15 Somali political movements signed on 27 March 1993, an Agreement of the First Session of the Conference of National Reconciliation in Somalia. At the closing session of the Conference on 28 March, the agreement was unanimously endorsed by all the participants, including representatives of women's and community organisations, as well as elders and scholars. The Agreement comprised four parts: disarmament and security, rehabilitation and reconstruction, restoration of property and settlement of disputes, and transitional mechanisms.

In the agreement, the Somali parties resolved to put an end to armed conflict and to reconcile their differences through peaceful means. They also agreed to consolidate and carry forward advances in peace, security and dialogue made since the beginning of 1993. They reaffirmed their commitment to comply fully with the cease-fire agreement signed in Addis Ababa in January 1993, including the handing over of all weapons and ammunition to UNITAF and UNOSOM II.

The agreement provided for a transitional period of two years, effective 27 March 1993. The transitional mechanism was to consist of the following four basic organs of authority:

Transitional National Council (TNC), to act as the repository of Somali sovereignty and serve as the prime political authority having legislative functions during the transitional period. To consist of 74 members—three (two men and one woman) from each of the 18 regions

of the country, one from each of the 15 political movements, and five from Mogadishu;

Control administrative departments, to be responsible for the re-establishment and operation of departments of civil administration and social, economic and humanitarian affairs, thus preparing for the restoration of a formal Government;

Regional councils, to be established in all 18 existing regions of Somalia, comprising 3 representatives from each district council in the region;

District councils, to be established in the existing districts in every region. Members to be appointed through election or through consensus-based selection in accordance with Somali traditions.

The agreement also provided for the appointment by TNC of a Transitional Charter Drafting Committee, to draft a transitional charter, guided by the basic principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Somalia's traditional ethics.

In the agreement, the Somali parties invited the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to extend all necessary assistance to the people of Somalia for its implementation.

The Secretary-General welcomed the agreement as an important achievement of the Somali people and noted that it represented the first positive step following the adoption by the Security Council on 26 March of resolution 814 (1993). He urged the Somali leaders to proceed without any delay to work out the practical arrangements for implementing the Agreement.

UNOSOM II ACTIVITIES

The 5 June 1993 Incident

As required under the Addis Ababa agreement and mandated by the Security Council, one of the crucial tasks that fell to UNOSOM II after it took over from UNITAF on 4 May 1993 was the disarmament of all Somali factions and armed groups who terrorized the people and obstructed humanitarian activities. The priority that UNOSOM II gave to disarmament generated the hostility of a few clan leaders, fearful of losing their power, towards UNOSOM. They had not only refused to disarm, but they had resorted to violence in order to frustrate efforts of UNOSOM II to bring relief, peace and development to Somalia. On 5 June, 25 Pakistani soldiers were killed, 10 were missing and 54 were wounded in a series of ambushes and armed attacks against

UNOSOM II troops throughout south Mogadishu by Somali militiamen, apparently belonging to the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) led by General Mohamed Farah Aidid. The bodies of the victims were mutilated and subjected to other forms of degrading treatment.

The Secretary-General, on 6 June, strongly condemned this "treacherous act" against peace-keepers "who were on a mission of peace, reconciliation and reconstruction", and urged "prompt and firm action" against "the perpetrators of this crime". The Secretary-General's Special Representative stated that the soldiers were "murdered as they sought to serve the neediest people in the city". He said that 12 of the soldiers were helping unload food at a feeding station "when they were foully attacked by cowards who placed women and children in front of armed men".

The Security Council, having heard the Secretary-General report on the incident, adopted its resolution 837(1993) on 6 June. By that resolution, the Council strongly condemned the unprovoked armed attacks against UNOSOM II which "appear to have been part of a calculated and premeditated series of cease-fire violations to prevent by intimidation UNOSOM II from carrying out its mandate". It reaffirmed that the Secretary-General was authorized under resolution 814 (1993) to take all necessary measures against those responsible for the armed attacks and for publicly inciting them, including their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment. The Council requested him to investigate the incident, particularly on the role of the factional leaders involved.

The Council demanded that all Somali parties comply fully with their commitments regarding political reconciliation, cease-fire and disarmament. It re-emphasized the crucial importance of the early implementation of the disarmament of all Somali parties and of neutralising radio broadcasting systems that contributed to the violence and attacks against UNOSOM II.

On 8 June, 11 Somali parties condemned the attacks against UNOSOM II personnel and expressed support for Security Council resolution 837 (1993).

UNOSOM II Acts

Immediately following the adoption of resolution 837 (1993), UNOSOM II began preparations for its implementation. On 12 June 1993, UNOSOM II initiated decisive military action in south Mogadishu. In a series of air and ground military actions, UNOSOM

II removed Radio Mogadishu from control of USC/SNA, and disabled or destroyed militia weapons and equipment in a number of storage sites and clandestine military facilities. The Secretary-General, in a statement released on the same day, said that the objective of the action was to restore peace to Mogadishu "so that the political reconciliation, rehabilitation and disarmament process can continue to move forward throughout Somalia". He stated that this should be seen in the context of the international community's commitment to the national disarmament programme endorsed by all Somali parties at Addis Ababa on 27 March 1993.

The actions undertaken by UNOSOM II were strongly supported by the Security Council in a Presidential statement issued on 14 June. At the same time, the Council expressed deep regret at any civilian casualties caused, adding that an investigation was under way into the incident on 13 June which had involved such casualties among the Somalis. Preliminary reports indicated that General Aidid and his supporters had used civilians, including women and children, as human shields for attacks on UNOSOM II.

On 18 June, the Security Council condemned the practice of "some Somali factions and movements in using women and children as human shields to perpetrate their attacks against UNOSOM", and deplored the civilian deaths that had resulted "despite the timely measures adopted to prevent this from happening".

In parallel with its disarmament operations, UNOSOM II instituted an investigation of the 5 June incident, as requested by Security Council resolution 837 (1993). On 17 June, with mounting evidence implicating SNA militia in the attack, the Secretary-General's Special Representative called on General Aidid to surrender peacefully to UNOSOM II and to urge his followers to surrender their arms. He directed the UNOSOM Force Commander to detain General Aidid for investigation of the 5 June attack, and of the public incitement of such attacks. General Aidid would be treated "decently, fairly and with justice", the Special Representative said. However, attacks on UNOSOM II by General Aidid's militia continued.

In his 17 August 1993 report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General pointed out that the short-sighted attitude of leaders of a few factions aggravated the already difficult situation. The ambushing of UNOSOM personnel on 5 June and on subsequent occasions left UNOSOM II with no choice but to take forceful action to effect the disarming required by all Somali factions under the Addis Ababa agreement.

The Secretary-General again pointed out that effective disarmament of all the factions and warlords was a pre-condition for implementing other aspects of UNOSOM's mandate, be they political, civil, humanitarian, rehabilitation or reconstruction. He also added that Somalia would not enjoy stability unless and until the criminal elements were apprehended and brought to justice as demanded by Security Council resolution 837(1993).

Resolution 865

On 22 September 1993, the Security Council, in resolution 865 (1993), reaffirmed the importance it attached to the successful fulfilment, on an urgent and accelerated basis, of UNOSOM II's objectives—facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the restoration of law and order and of national reconciliation in a free, democratic and sovereign Somalia—so that the mission could be completed by March 1995. In that context, the Council requested the Secretary-General to direct urgent preparation of a detailed concerted strategy with regard to UNOSOM II's humanitarian, political and security activities. The Security Council also approved the Secretary-General's recommendations relating to the re-establishment of the Somali police, judicial and penal systems.

The 3 October 1993 Incident

Following the June 1993 events and as mandated by Security Council resolutions, UNOSOM II pursued a coercive disarmament programme in south Mogadishu. Active patrolling, weapons confiscations, and operations against USC/SNA militia depots were undertaken, together with a public information campaign to ensure that the population understood UNOSOM activities. Concurrently, UNOSOM II encouraged "cooperative" or voluntary disarmament by the Somali factions. UNOSOM II also continued its efforts to apprehend those responsible for instigating and committing armed attacks against United Nations personnel.

On 3 October 1993, United States Rangers launched an operation in south Mogadishu aimed at capturing a number of key aides of General Aidid who were suspected of complicity in the 5 June attack, as well as subsequent attacks on United Nations personnel and facilities. The operation succeeded in apprehending 24 suspects, including two key aides to General Aidid. During the course of the operation, two United States helicopters were shot down by Somali militiamen using automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades. While evacuating the 24 USC/SNA detainees, the Rangers came under

concentrated fire. Eighteen United States soldiers lost their lives and 75 were wounded. One United States helicopter pilot was captured and subsequently released on 14 October 1993. The bodies of the United States soldiers were subject to humiliating treatment.

Following the events of 3 October 1993, the United States reinforced its Quick Reaction Force with a joint task force consisting of air, naval and ground forces equipped with M I A1 tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles. At the same time, President Clinton announced the intention of the United States to withdraw its forces from Somalia by 31 March 1994.

On 9 October 1993, USC/SNA declared a unilateral cessation of hostilities against UNOSOM II forces. After this declaration the situation was generally quiet, but Mogadishu remained tense and, in the capital and elsewhere, major factions were reportedly rearming, apparently in anticipation of renewed fighting.

Secretary-General Visits the Region

In October 1993, the Secretary-General travelled to the Horn of Africa region to consult with the leaders of the region on UNOSOM II's future concerted strategy for humanitarian, political and security activities, as requested by the Security Council in its resolution 865 (1993). He discussed the situation in and relating to Somalia with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, President Hassan Gouled of Djibouti, President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya and President Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia. The Secretary-General also visited Baidoa and Mogadishu, where he held talks with military and civilian officials of UNOSOM II as well as with Somali elders.

During his visit to Africa, the Secretary-General attended a meeting convened in Cairo by President Hosni Mubarak, then OAU Chairman, with the participation of the Secretaries-General of OAU, LAS and OIC, in an effort to help promote peace and reconciliation in Somalia and to by the groundwork for its continued reconstruction and development.

Interim Extension of UNOSOM II Mandate

In a letter to the Security Council, dated 28 October 1993, the Secretary-General requested the interim extension of the UNOSOM II mandate, which was to expire on 31 October, to allow time for the preparation of an in-depth report and for "other related consultations."

The Security Council, by its resolution 878 (1993) of 29 October extended the UNOSOM II mandate until 18 November 1993 and asked

the Secretary-General to report before that date on recent developments in Somalia, so that it could decide on a further extension of the mandate. The Council reiterated its commitment to a future concerted strategy for UNOSOM II and to undertake "in-depth consideration" of the mission's humanitarian, political and security activities on the basis of the Secretary-General's specific suggestions.

Secretary-General Reviews Situation

The primary responsibility of UNOSOM II was to ensure the safe distribution of humanitarian assistance, and to carry out an extensive programme for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Somalia. Despite the deliberate attempts to prevent UNOSOM II from performing its tasks, the overall situation in Somalia underwent a major transformation: humanitarian assistance was reaching its destinations protected from attacks and banditry; starvation was largely eradicated; nutrition and immunisation programmes were successful in significantly reducing the number of deaths from preventable diseases; return and repatriation programmes for refugees were initiated; schools, closed for three or four years, were reopening. Staff attached to the Humanitarian Division of UNOSOM II were deployed in all the regions of Somalia and were working together with Somalis, United Nations agencies and NGOs in expanding rehabilitation schemes.

On 12 November 1993, the Secretary-General, in his report to the Security Council, described the situation in Somalia and set forth his observations and recommendations. Stating that the situation in Somalia had changed in some important aspects, he pointed to the most dramatic and visible success in reducing starvation deaths and conditions of famine in the country. Significant improvements had been made also in the fields of public health, education, agriculture and other areas.

Humanitarian and Economic Programmes

Education. In the field of education, the Secretary-General reported that United Nations agencies, UNOSOM II and NGOs provided substantial assistance in rehabilitating the education sector. A large number of schools were rehabilitated. United Nations agencies and NGOs were assisting in reopening schools, supplying school lunches, providing education kits, textbooks and incentives to teachers.

Health. By November 1993, some 32 hospitals were operating throughout the country as well as 81 maternal and child health centres. One hundred and three mobile vaccination teams were covering the

country, working towards sustainable immunisation coverage. It was estimated that about 75 per cent of children under 5 years of age received vaccination against measles. Medicines, supplies, and other equipment were being made available to hospitals, health centres and pharmacies through United Nations agencies and NGOs.

City water supply systems in a number of cities, including Mogadishu, were rehabilitated. United Nations agencies and NGOs were continuing to pursue sanitation and employment projects with food-for-work programmes. In Mogadishu alone, there were 120 such projects that provided food for teachers and hospitals. Similar projects were supported throughout Somalia.

Agriculture. According to the Secretary-General's report, in agriculture—which, historically, had been responsible for two thirds of Somalia's employment and nearly three quarters of the country's foreign exchange earnings—a good measure of success was achieved in reactivating food production and the livestock sector. The provision of seeds and agricultural tools, together with good precipitation, resulted in a substantial increase in the rainy season harvest. The delivery of relief food aid was adjusted to take into account the availability of local food supplies. In the livestock sector, the supply of veterinary drugs and the vaccination of animals facilitated the resuscitation of exports. An estimated quarter of a million head of livestock were exported since April 1993.

Commerce. Commercial and trading activities were also showing encouraging signs of recovery. Commercial traffic at Somalia's ports increased dramatically since December 1992. Civilian ship movements at Mogadishu port increased tenfold in the first half of 1993. Joint ventures between Somali and foreign investors were on the rise. Telecommunication services became available in parts of Mogadishu. Local companies were also providing fuel throughout the country.

Reconstruction and recovery. A draft framework for planning of long-term reconstruction and recovery was prepared, at the request of UNOSOM II, by a task force comprising donors, United Nations agencies and NGOs, under the coordination of the World Bank. The objectives of the framework were: (a) to establish a common vision of the economic and social reconstruction, rehabilitation and development of Somalia; (b) to identify criteria and establish priorities for reconstruction and rehabilitation; (c) to construct a mechanism for coordinated action in an environment of constrained human and capital resources. The third informal meeting of donors, United Nations

agencies and NGOs, organized by the World Bank, was held in Paris on 22 October 1993. Participants reviewed the draft framework and discussed the next steps.

Refugees and resettlement. By November 1993, of some 1.7 million people displaced as a result of the turmoil and the famine in Somalia, more than 1 million crossed into Kenya and Ethiopia. Over 250,000 persons moved to Mogadishu, and about 60,000 persons to Kismayo and Baidoa. The northern regions were supporting at least 250,000 refugees and internally displaced persons.

The number of refugees returning from camps in Kenya was increasing. It was estimated that about 70,000 refugees in the Mombasa area had returned by boat to Kismayo, Mogadishu and Bossasso. Assistance was being provided to approximately 800 refugees a week returning to the Gedo region and to those spontaneously moving into the Lower and Middle Juba areas.

Political Aspects

Speaking of political aspects, the Secretary-General reported that his Special Representative and his staff continued their efforts to rebuild political institutions in Somalia. Thirty-nine district councils—considered to be a foundation for civil government—were established out of a total of 73 districts, excluding the districts in the north-west and Mogadishu. In Mogadishu, consultations began on the establishment of district councils. Efforts were continuing to expedite the formation of regional councils—the next layer of political reconstruction. By November 1993, regional councils were established in six areas.

National reconciliation. UNOSOM II continued to attach high priority to the national reconciliation process in Somalia. In this regard, it undertook to resolve conflicts at the regional level and to assist in reconciliation among the Somali people. A regional peace conference—convened in Kismayo, one of the most conflict-ridden areas of the country—brought together 152 elders from throughout the Juba region; on 6 August 1993, the conference participants signed the Jubaland peace agreement in which they committed themselves, on behalf of their clans, to end all hostilities among the more than 20 clans that inhabit the region. A series of similar reconciliation meetings were held in other regions of Somalia.

In the north-east and central regions—from Bossasso to Galkayo—the Deputy Special Representative and UNOSOM II political affairs officers facilitated the reconciliation of two competing wings of the

Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) leadership in the area. Similar efforts by UNOSOM II included the reconciliation of clans in the north-west in Erigavo, and in the Gedo region. In Mogadishu, several meetings were held between UNOSOM II officials and a 47-member supreme committee of the Hawiye sub-clan. From 30 September to 1 October 1993, an all-Somali conference attended by 600 delegates was supported by UNOSOM II. Another pan-Hawiye conference took place in Mogadishu from 14 to 16 October 1993 with the participation of Habr Gedir sub-clan.

Re-establishment of Somali police. With regard to the re-establishment of a neutral and professional Somali police force, as well as judicial and penal systems, the Secretary-General stated that UNOSOM II continued to support small locally-based police forces in its areas of operation. Since May 1993, 5,000 former Somali policemen were hired to assist in the performance of police functions. UNOSOM II was finalising a basic police training programme for Somali policemen. The United States announced a \$6 million grant for the re-establishment of the Somali judicial and penal systems, as well as a \$2 million assistance programme for the police force and up to \$25 million-worth of equipment. Norway contributed \$1 million. Cash contributions were also pledged by Japan (\$10 million), Italy (\$4.5 million), Germany (1.5 million), Denmark (\$0.5 million), the Netherlands (\$0.5 million) and Sweden (\$1.6 million). A number of countries provided police advisers or trainers.

In order to investigate violations of international humanitarian law, UNOSOM II was planning to establish an Office of Human Rights. A team of international specialists, in cooperation with Somali police, were to investigate violations such as mass murder of Somali citizens and attacks and threats made against international assistance workers and UNOSOM II personnel.

Three Options Presented

Despite the progress achieved in many areas, however, the Secretary-General stressed that UNOSOM II was at a critical juncture, as the situation in Somalia was continuously evolving. There was still no effectively functioning government in the country, no disciplined national armed force, and no organized civilian police force or judiciary, although impressive progress had been achieved in initiating the recreation of the police and judiciary.

UNOSOM II's record of general progress throughout most of Somalia was seriously marred by the incidents that had taken place

between 5 June and 3 October 1993. Those incidents challenged the cause of disarmament and reconciliation in Somalia, created a situation of instability in south Mogadishu, and stimulated factional elements elsewhere to prepare for a future of renewed fighting.

The Secretary-General reiterated his firm belief that “without effective disarmament of all the factions and warlords in Somalia, it would not be possible for the country to enjoy lasting peace and stability”. He stated that comprehensive disarmament would require the cooperation of the Somali people and of neighbouring countries, and would have to be conducted in phases, beginning with the demobilisation and rehabilitation of the heavily armed militias. At the same time, disarmament must not destabilize the security balance and must equitably reduce the threat to all segments of the population.

The Secretary-General noted that voluntary disarmament did succeed to some extent both during UNITAF and in the early weeks of UNOSOM II. It was only after 5 June 1993 that it became necessary for UNOSOM II to resort to coercive methods to enforce disarmament in south Mogadishu. In this connection, he welcomed the unilateral declaration of cessation of hostilities by USC/SNA with effect from 9 October 1993 and invited USC/SNA to join the other factions in a meaningful dialogue.

The situation in Somalia, the Secretary-General observed, would continue to remain complex and complicated for the foreseeable future, and the Security Council would have to display flexibility as well as firmness in any decision that it would take while renewing the mandate of UNOSOM II.

Before presenting his recommendations on a renewed mandate for UNOSOM II, the Secretary-General pointed out that, following the events of 3 October 1993, the United States had announced its intention to withdraw all its combat troops and the bulk of its logistics support troops by 31 March 1994. He stressed that the troop-contributing countries could not be expected to maintain their generosity forever, nor could Member States be expected to maintain funding on the present scale. The Governments of Belgium, France and Sweden had earlier announced their decisions to withdraw their contingents from UNOSOM II. The Secretary-General wrote to 42 Member States inviting them to contribute, or to increase their contribution, in terms of troops and logistics support.

In light of the changing circumstances, the Secretary-General went on to present three options for the Security Council to consider in re-examining the mandate of UNOSOM II. Although it was not necessary

for the Council to choose one of the options at the present stage, the time might soon come for the Council to respond to prevailing conditions and choose an appropriate course of action.

In the first option, the present mandate of UNOSOM II would remain essentially unchanged as laid down by the Security Council in its resolutions 814 (1993), 837 (1993), 865 (1993) and 878 (1993). UNOSOM II would not take the initiative to resort systematically to coercive methods to enforce disarmament. It was hoped that all factions, including USC/SNA, would cooperate to ensure peaceful conditions in the country. In Mogadishu, USC/SNA would have to remove its roadblocks and strong points throughout the city so that UNOSOM II could escort humanitarian convoys from and into the city. Should these expectations not be met, UNOSOM II must retain the capability for coercive disarmament and retaliation against attacks on its personnel. UNOSOM II would also pursue its present plans to re-establish an impartial and professional Somali police force and judicial system. The objective would be to create and maintain secure conditions for humanitarian assistance, foster national reconciliation, and implement other elements of the existing mandate.

Under this option, UNOSOM II would need the reauthorisation of its present troop strength, as well as the deployment of an additional brigade. In addition, the Member States must fulfil their financial obligations, promptly and in full, of approximately \$ 1 billion for one year.

In the second option, the Security Council would decide that UNOSOM II would not use coercive methods anywhere in the country, rely on the cooperation of the Somali parties in discharging its mandate, and use force only in self-defence. Disarmament would be entirely voluntary. Under this option, UNOSOM II would have to retain some capability to defend its personnel should inter-clan fighting resume. The emphasis would be on ensuring the unimpeded flow of humanitarian assistance, the rehabilitation of the Somali infrastructure, the repatriation of refugees, political reconciliation, the reorganisation of the Somali police and judicial system and keeping secure the main supply routes between Mogadishu and outside areas.

The troop requirement under this option would be approximately 16,000 all ranks, with one brigade deployed in Mogadishu, one assigned to convoy duty and one for the security of refugees and of critical areas in need of assistance. A Force Logistics Supply Command of about 2,500 all ranks would also be needed. The financial requirements for this option would be considerably less than the first option.

Under the third option, UNOSOM II would be limited to keeping secure the airport and port in Mogadishu, as well as important ports and airports in other parts of the country, to maintain open supply routes for humanitarian purposes. It would assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid, help development agencies and programmes, and continue training a Somali police force. That option would presuppose cooperation of local authorities and would focus on the regions, rather than on Mogadishu. It would call for the deployment of about 5,000 all ranks and a financial requirement substantially less than the other two options.

The Secretary-General further noted that, in the meantime, UNOSOM II troop strength was adequate for the present purpose. UNOSOM II would not use coercive methods to ensure a secure environment which by and large, was lacking mainly in south Mogadishu. UNOSOM II would continue its efforts to initiate a political dialogue with all the factions, including USC/SNA. In this, UNOSOM II would seek and welcome support from Somalia's neighbours, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, and from OAU, LAS and OIC. The same time, UNOSOM II would stand ready to protect its own personnel as well as the personnel of other inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations. UNOSOM II might also have to be prepared to use force to keep open the lines of communication and supply routes in Mogadishu and elsewhere.

On 16 November 1993, the Security Council adopted resolution 885 (1993). The resolution authorized the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry, in further implementation of its resolutions 814(1993) and 837 (1993) to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel which led to casualties among them. The resolution also requested the Secretary-General to appoint the Commission at the earliest possible time.

Soon thereafter, the Security Council, based on the recommendations of the Secretary-General, established a three-member Commission of Inquiry. The Commission comprised The Honourable Matthew S.W. Ngulube, the Chief Justice of Zambia, as Chairman; General Emmanuel Erskine (Ret.) of Ghana; and General Gustav Hagglund of Finland. Winston Tub-man of the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs and former Minister of Justice of Liberia was designated as Executive Secretary of the Commission's secretariat. In accordance with the decision of the Council, pending the completion of the report of the Commission, UNOSOM II suspended arrest actions against those suspected, and, by the end of November 1993, all but eight detainees of General Aidid's faction had been released.

On 17 January 1994, the Secretary-General gave instructions to his Special Representative for Somalia to release the remaining eight detainees. He ordered their release in view of the Hirab peace agreement, reached on 16 January in Mogadishu between the Habr Gedir and Abgal sub-clans, as well as the written and oral report he received from Enoch Dumbutshena, the independent jurist and former Chief Justice of Zimbabwe, who had been asked to review the cases of detainees. The agreement emerged from the four-day Hirab Peace Conference which brought together 176 delegates, including chiefs, community and religious leaders, politicians, scholars and representatives of the Hirab sub-clans. Neither Ali Mahdi Mohamed nor General Aidid attended the Conference.

UNOSOM II's Mandate Extended

On 18 November 1993, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, renewed the mandate of UNOSOM II for a period of six months, expiring on 31 May 1994. By adopting resolution 886 (1993), the Council decided fundamentally to review that mandate by 1 February 1994 in light of a report to be submitted by the Secretary-General on or before 15 January, on the progress made by the Somali people towards national reconciliation. The Council further requested the Secretary-General to supply, as part of his report, an updated plan for UNOSOM II's future humanitarian, political and security strategies.

Affirming that the Addis Ababa agreements of 8 January and 27 March 1993 established a sound basis for resolving the problems in Somalia, the Council urged all parties, including movements and factions, to accelerate political reconciliation and immediately to abide by the cease-fire and disarmament agreements, particularly the cantonment of heavy weapons. It also reminded all the parties that continued United Nations involvement in Somalia depended on their active cooperation and tangible progress towards a political settlement.

The Council underscored the importance of the early and effective functioning of all district and regional councils and an interim national authority. It also stressed the importance attached to the provisions in resolution 865 (1993) regarding the establishment of an operational police, penal and judiciary system at the regional and district level as soon as feasible.

Emphasising the relationship between rehabilitation and progress in national reconciliation, the Council encouraged donor countries to make contributions particularly to rehabilitation projects in those

regions where progress on political reconciliation and security had been made. Member States were also urged to make funds available directly or through the Somalia Trust Fund for priority projects, including the re-establishment of the Somali police and removal of land mines. The Council welcomed the forthcoming convening of the Fourth Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia in Addis Ababa from 29 November to 1 December 1993.

The Council called on all Member States that had not yet done so to contribute troops and financial support to UNOSOM II on an urgent basis. It also called on donor nations to contribute to short-term, high impact development projects to establish links between political progress and reconstruction assistance.

Expressing concern at the destabilising effects of cross-border arms flows in the region, the Council called for the cessation of such flows and reaffirmed the obligation of all States to fully implement the embargo on weapons and military equipment to Somalia.

In addition, the Council condemned the continued armed attacks against persons engaged in humanitarian and peace-keeping efforts and paid tribute to those troops and humanitarian personnel who had been killed or injured while serving in Somalia.

Also by the text, the Council welcomed and supported the ongoing diplomatic efforts made by Member States and regional organisations in bringing all parties in Somalia to the negotiating table.

Further Developments

As requested by Security Council resolution 886 (1993) of 18 November 1993, the Secretary-General submitted a further report on 6 January 1994, in which he described the results achieved by UNOSOM II in fulfilling its mandate in the three interrelated fields—political, humanitarian and security.

Political Aspects

National reconciliation. Having said that progress in political reconciliation and reconstruction was central to the success of development efforts and the securing of international assistance to Somalia, the Secretary-General pointed to two primary obstacles on the political level: (a) deep divisions between the two main factional alliances, the Group of 12 supporting Ali Mahdi Mohamed and USC/SNA led by General Mohamed Farah Aidid; and (b) the continued rejection by USC/SNA of all political initiatives undertaken by UNOSOM II.

A further attempt to stimulate Somali national reconciliation was made at a political meeting following the Fourth Humanitarian Conference convened by the United Nations at Addis Ababa. From 2 to 11 December 1993, at the invitation of the Ethiopian Government and with the support of UNOSOM II, representatives of the two main alliances, the Group of 12 and USC/SNA, met to discuss outstanding matters and disputes between them. Despite warnings from the international community that failure to achieve progress on the political front could drive away the needed international assistance, the factional representatives failed to agree on a structure for face-to-face talks between their leaders.

There were also sharp differences of opinion between the Group of 12 and USC/SNA on a number of other key issues, including the status of the district and regional councils, and USC/SNA's suggestion that the Addis Ababa agreement be revised. Moreover, USC/SNA continued to insist that the United Nations had no role to play in political reconciliation in Somalia, preferring this to be done by regional Powers, while the Group of 12 held the view that UNOSOM II should remain in Somalia and that the United Nations must play a key role in the Somali political process.

In his report, the Secretary-General stated that a key task of UNOSOM II would be to try to assist in efforts to facilitate the national reconciliation process among the Somali factions. Simultaneously, UNOSOM II would continue to convey the message to Somali factional leaders that the international community was not prepared to wait indefinitely for an improved security environment in which to work on behalf of the Somali people.

District councils. The Secretary-General reported progress in the establishment of district councils throughout the country. Fourteen additional councils were certified during November and December 1993, bringing the total to 53 out of 81 districts (excluding the north-west). In addition to establishing new district councils, efforts continued in strengthening those councils already established. A team of UNOSOM II staff paid visits to each district to assess the particular support needed by local governments.

According to the Secretary-General, one of the primary obstacles to the effective establishment of district councils in Somalia had been the opposition of USC/SNA, which had refused to participate in the process and which had in some instances attempted to block the formation of councils through intimidation or the creation of shadow, USC/SNA district councils.

Regional councils. Since the Secretary-General's 12 November 1993 report, two additional regional councils had been formed, bringing the total number of regional councils to 8 out of the 13 in Somalia, excluding the north-west. Three more regional councils were expected to be inaugurated in the near future. In accordance with the Addis Ababa agreement, the primary task of the regional councils was to implement humanitarian, social and economic programmes in coordination with TNC and to assist in the conduct of the internationally supervised census.

Transitional National Council. The Secretary-General reported that, with the exception of the USC/SNA faction, participants in the Addis Ababa political meetings expressed a strong intention to work towards the rapid establishment of TNC. So far UNOSOM II had received nine nominations for representatives from the 15 political factions, each of which might nominate one representative to TNC. In addition, regional councils, to nominate three representatives each, began deliberations for the selection of their representatives to TNC.

Police and Justice. Progress was made in the re-establishment of police forces and justice systems in Somalia. This was particularly important in the northeast, where no United Nations military forces had been deployed. UNITAF/UNOSOM II had reestablished 107 police stations in Somalia's districts. Nationally, there were 6,737 policemen at the regional and district levels, 311 judicial personnel in 8 regions and 26 districts, and over 700 prison officers in two regions. It was also planned to put in place a Somali police rapid deployment force, known as Darawishta, by March 1994.

Humanitarian Situation

In the humanitarian field, the Secretary-General stated that UNOSOM II had renewed its effort to place humanitarian programmes at the forefront of its work in Somalia. However, despite successful efforts to end famine in the country, there were indications that malnutrition levels were on the rise again in parts of Somalia, including Mogadishu and the Juba valley, two areas of ongoing conflict and insecurity. Consequently, the Division for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of UNOSOM II, United Nations agencies and NGOs had stepped up efforts to provide emergency food relief and medical treatment to the affected population.

Although insecurity in parts of Somalia slowed and complicated resettlement programmes, the Secretary-General pointed out, UNOSOM II continued to cooperate with UNHCR and other agencies

to facilitate the safe and orderly return of Somali refugees and internally displaced persons. Particularly successful resettlement projects were undertaken in the Juba valley, where, since October 1993, over 3,000 persons had returned from camps in Kenya, and from those in Kismayo and Mogadishu.

At the Fourth Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, held at Addis Ababa from 29 November to 1 December 1993, representatives from Somali regions, political movements and the international donor community reaffirmed their commitment to accelerate Somali control of the rehabilitation and development process. In the Declaration of the meeting, the participants reaffirmed the commitment of the international community to provide unconditionally essential emergency assistance to vulnerable groups. They also stated their agreement that the Somali people should be fully involved in the rehabilitation and development process and must bear responsibility for ensuring an environment conducive to it. Assistance would be provided in those areas where stability and security had been attained. According to the Declaration, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts should be sustainable and should contribute to enhancing efficient operations of the private sector in a free and open market system.

The Declaration called for Somali initiatives in establishing viable civil institutions and appropriate mechanisms to facilitate the reconstruction and recovery of Somalia. The Somali representatives committed themselves to establish preconditions to end insecurity; to establish regional development committees to prioritize regional development activities and mobilize resources; to establish a development council, composed of representatives of those committees; to accept the principle of the right of voluntary return of all displaced persons and refugees and establish inter-party committees to solve issues relating to returning refugees; and to establish mechanisms at the district level to ensure effective delivery of services.

The donor community, while regretting the absence from the meeting of important elements of Somali political leadership, recognized the readiness of many regions to create conditions necessary for rehabilitation. The donors agreed to support fully mechanisms established to determine rehabilitation priorities, funding modalities and implementation, and to develop a common approach among themselves for the allocation of resources.

They also agreed, among other things, to identify common security and institutional criteria for providing assistance to the regions; to provide assistance to prioritize development activities; to establish

mechanisms for channelling recurrent cost funding in a sustainable manner, and to coordinate donor strategies for supporting Somali institutions of management and economic governance.

For its part, UNOSOM committed itself to work with all concerned agencies and organisations to strengthen coordination of all aspects of the United Nations efforts throughout Somalia—humanitarian, political and peace-keeping.

The Declaration called for an aid coordination body composed of representatives of donors, United Nations agencies and programmes, NGOs and other multilateral and regional institutions and organisations. Technical support for the regional committees would be provided by the United Nations Office of Development, under the umbrella of the Humanitarian Division of UNOSOM II. The Office would also serve as secretariat for the development council and for the aid coordinating body. The participants agreed that the Declaration should be translated into a plan of action.

Security Issues

In his January 1994 report, the Secretary-General expressed his concern about the security situation in many parts of Somalia. Banditry continued to plague parts of the countryside. There were outbreaks of localized inter-clan fighting. A number of incidents involving threats and actual attacks against international agencies in outlying regions forced several NGOs to temporarily suspend their operations.

In Mogadishu itself, while direct armed confrontation between USC/SNA and UNOSOM II forces was avoided, armed banditry grew considerably, making movement for Somali commercial traffic, UNOSOM personnel and international humanitarian relief supplies increasingly dangerous. Security for international staff remained a troublesome issue. In a number of separate incidents, casualties were suffered by UNOSOM civilian and NGO staff, both international and local, on the streets of Mogadishu. As a result, there was a significant reduction in the presence of international NGOs willing to work in such an environment.

Disarmament and demobilisation. The Secretary-General reaffirmed that general disarmament was a prerequisite for the establishment of the peaceful and secure environment required for national reconciliation, rehabilitation and economic reconstruction. However, despite UNOSOM II efforts to promote voluntary disarmament by the Somali parties, there were growing indications that the major factions were actively rearming in anticipation of

renewed hostilities in the coming months. The Secretary-General appealed to the parties to commit themselves once again to the disarmament process agreed upon at Addis Ababa and to work constructively with UNOSOM II in order to determine how to implement these commitments.

Deployment. With regard to the deployment of UNOSOM II, the Secretary-General recalled having indicated in his 12 November 1993 report that UNOSOM II would require an additional brigade to accomplish the tasks entrusted to it by the Security Council. This would have brought the authorized troop strength of UNOSOM II to over 32,000 all ranks. However, over the preceding few months, a number of Governments had informed the Secretary-General of their intention to withdraw their contingents from UNOSOM II. Consequently, the strength of UNOSOM II at the end of March 1994 was anticipated at 19,700 (see *Composition of UNOSOM II*, below).

Options Before the Security Council

In concluding his report, the Secretary-General stated that progress in various fields notwithstanding, the mandate of UNOSOM II was far from being fully accomplished. He would consider UNOSOM II's mandate completed only when the Addis Ababa agreement of March 1993 was fully implemented, culminating in the holding of general elections and the installation of a popularly-elected Government. Needed towards that end were the creation of a spirit of cooperation, compromise and commitment on the part of the Somali people and the continued involvement of the international community.

Assessing the situation in Somalia, the Secretary-General stated that without the continued stabilising presence of an adequate United Nations force, there would be an early resumption of civil strife and an unravelling of all that had been achieved. The peace-building process, therefore, would depend on the willingness of United Nations Member States to see the Somalia operation to its successful conclusion.

The Secretary-General, however, expressed doubt that UNOSOM II would have the required level of resources after 31 March 1994, when the military strength would be reduced to 19,700. Although the Secretary-General had approached a large number of United Nations Member States for contributions to UNOSOM II's military component, not a single positive response had been received. Another important question was the availability of timely and adequate financing for UNOSOM II operations.

The Secretary-General recalled that in his 12 November 1993 report, he had outlined three options relating to the mandate and functioning of UNOSOM II as regards security. He had indicated at the same time that whatever option was selected, the United Nations would continue its efforts to promote national reconciliation and institution-building.

The first option, preferred by the Secretary-General, had to be excluded, however, due to inadequate human, material and financial resources. He therefore recommended the second option for consideration by the Security Council.

Under that option, UNOSOM II would not use coercive methods but would rely on the cooperation of the Somali parties. In the event that inter-clan fighting resumed in different parts of the country, UNOSOM II, while not becoming involved in the fighting, would retain some capability to defend its personnel. UNOSOM II would protect the important ports and airports in the country as well as the essential infrastructure of Somalia; keep open the main supply routes between Mogadishu and outlying areas; pursue as a matter of utmost priority the reorganisation of the Somali police and judicial systems; and help with the repatriation of refugees. UNOSOM II would also continue its efforts to provide emergency humanitarian relief supplies to all in need throughout the country.

With respect to rehabilitation and development, UNOSOM II would coordinate its activities in such a manner that programmes of assistance of the international community were supported in areas of their choice. In this regard, the Secretary-General recalled that the donor community had made it clear at the Fourth Humanitarian Conference in Addis Ababa that aid would go only to those regions where security prevailed and where counterpart Somali institutions were available. As for the political processes in Somalia, UNOSOM II would continue to play a role as desired by the Somali people.

In recommending this option, the Secretary-General stressed that the success of UNOSOM II would depend on the cooperation of the Somali parties. It was "indispensable" for all concerned to promote national reconciliation in parallel with the re-establishment and strengthening of the Somali institutions of police and justice. "Should these efforts fail, we might witness renewed fighting and civil war in Somalia", the Secretary-General concluded.

Security Council Revises Mandate

On 4 February, 1994, the Security Council, by its resolution 897 (1994) approved the Secretary-General's recommendation for the

continuation of UNOSOM II, with a revised mandate for the following: assisting the Somali parties in implementing the Addis Ababa Agreements, particularly in their cooperative disarmament and cease-fire efforts; protecting major ports, airports and essential infrastructure; provide humanitarian relief to all in need throughout the country; assisting in the reorganisation of the Somali police and judicial system; helping with the repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons; assisting in the political process in Somalia; and providing protection for the personnel, installations and equipment of the United Nations and its agencies as well as of NGOs providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.

The Council authorized a gradual reduction of UNOSOM II to a force level of up to 22,000. In that context, it underlined the vital importance of providing UNOSOM II with the material means and military assets needed for discharging its responsibilities and defending its personnel. It encouraged Member States to contribute urgently troops, civilian personnel, equipment, financial and logistical support to the Operation.

Expressing serious concern at reports of a rearming and troop build-up by Somali factions the Council called upon all parties, to cooperate fully with UNOSOM II and respect all cease-fire arrangements and other commitments. It demanded that the parties refrain from acts of intimidation or violence against humanitarian or peace-keeping personnel.

Recognising "that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for setting up viable institutions and reconstructing their country, the Council approved that international reconstruction resources should be directed first to those regions of the country where security was being re-established. Resources would also be directed to local Somali institutions ready to cooperate with the international community in setting development priorities as contained in the Declaration of the Fourth Humanitarian Conference in Addis Ababa.

The Council requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with OAU and LAS, to consider establishing contacts with Somali parties to agree on a timetable for implementing the Addis Ababa Agreements. The objective would be to complete the process by March 1995.

The Secretary-General was further requested to report, as soon as the situation warranted, and in any case before 31 May 1994, on the situation in Somalia and the implementation of the resolution.

Somalia and Coordination

The inaugural meeting of the Somali Aid Coordination Body (SACB), whose membership includes major bilateral and multilateral donors, United Nations agencies and non-governmental groups was held in Nairobi on 1 and 2 February 1994. SACB was formed in response to the Declaration of the Fourth Humanitarian Conference on Somalia, which called for the creation of a new coordinating mechanism for rehabilitation activities. SACB is mandated to identify means of involving Somalis and their organisations in its efforts.

At the meeting, SACB endorsed the Plan of Action, prepared as a follow-up to the Conference, which reconfirmed that international rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance would be provided to areas of Somalia able to achieve sufficient levels of peace and security to allow long-term donor involvement. Participants discussed plans for donor missions to those regions. They also agreed to prepare a schedule for donor involvement and to plan for future emergency needs.

In view of the long-term nature of reconstruction and development programmes, the Secretary-General approved the transfer of the Development Office from UNOSOM II to a UNDP project on 15 March 1994. The Development Office would function as an integral component of United Nations activities in Somalia and in that context would cooperate closely with UNOSOM II.

Nairobi Declaration

In February 1994, Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Lansana Kouyate,⁶ launched an initiative to normalize the relationship between UNOSOM II and SNA, and to assist the Somali faction leaders in restoring dialogue and personal relationships among themselves. To this end, the Acting Special Representative held a series of informal consultations on the overall political and security situation in Somalia with leaders of Somali political factions.

The informal consultations in Nairobi that the Acting Special Representative succeeded in convening in March to deal with the situation in Kismoyo, where inter-clan fighting had continued since early February 1994, also provided an opportunity to reactivate the political process in Somalia. On 17 March 1994, Ali Mahdi Mohamed of the Group of 12 Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) and General Mohamed Farah Aidid, leader of SNA, met in Nairobi, under the auspices of the Acting Special Representative. It was the first meeting of the two political 'leaders' since December 1992.

On 24 March, after a series of intensive consultations in Nairobi, Ali Mahdi and General Aidid signed, respectively for the Group of 12 and SNA, the Declaration of National Reconciliation. In this Declaration, the Somali faction leaders, *inter alia*, repudiated "any form of violence as a means of resolving conflicts and committed themselves to implement "ceasefire and voluntary disarmament throughout Somalia. They also agreed to "restore peace throughout Somalia, giving priority wherever conflicts exist."

It was agreed that in order to restore the sovereignty of the Somali State, a National Reconciliation Conference would be convened on 15 May 1994 to elect a President and Vice-Presidents, and to appoint a Prime Minister, and that the Somali factions which had signed the March 1993 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement and the Somali National Movement (SNM) would meet on 15 April 1994 in Mogadishu to prepare for the Conference. They would also discuss the establishment of a Legislative Assembly after the formation of a national Government.

In addition, on 27 March, the parties directly involved in the conflict in Kismayo—the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and SNA—signed an agreement calling for a cease-fire as of 27 March and a Lower Juba Reconciliation Conference to be convened on 8 April 1994, in Kismayo. The parties also agreed to appoint a committee to work out the details of its agenda.

The Secretary-General welcomed the signing of the Nairobi Declaration and congratulated Somali political leaders for showing wisdom and political maturity during the negotiations. He urged the leaders to implement fully the commitments undertaken in the Declaration and pledged the full support of the United Nations in helping the Somali people achieve peace and stability.

However, the ongoing factional disputes and conflicts and disagreements concerning modalities led to repeated postponements of the preparatory meeting for the National Reconciliation Conference.

As to the Lower Juba Reconciliation Conference, after considerable delays, it was held from 24 May to 19 June 1994 at Kismayo. The Conference resulted in the signing of a nine-point agreement including a general cease-fire to take effect in the region on 24 June 1994. On 19 June, General Mohamed Said Hersi 'Morgan' (SPM) and Osman Atto (SNA)—the leaders of the two dominant factions in the area—signed a statement pledging the support of their factions for implementation of the Agreement.

UNOSOM's Mandate Further Extended

The Secretary-General further reported to the Security Council on the situation in Somalia on 24 May 1994. He informed the Council of the difficulties encountered in convening the preparatory meeting and the National Reconciliation Conference. The security situation in Somalia was deteriorating; inter-clan fighting and banditry were on the rise, and various factions were making an effort to rearm. Personnel from UNOSOM, as well as those from humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organisations, were threatened, attacked and sometimes kidnapped by uncontrolled armed elements.

In reviewing the humanitarian situation, the Secretary-General stated that despite the progress made in 1993, the emergency situation continued and the welfare of large numbers of Somalis remained at risk. Security problems still plagued relief efforts, affecting both the safety of humanitarian personnel and the regularity and efficiency of delivering assistance. While the repatriation of the Somali refugees continued, security problems and shortfalls in resources slowed the programme, forcing UNHCR to issue an urgent appeal for additional funds.

The Secretary-General noted further that the outbreak of a cholera epidemic in February 1994 had created an unexpected health emergency. Under the auspices of UNOSOM, a Cholera Task Force had quickly been established to coordinate the efforts to contain the epidemic. Responses to new outbreaks had been prompt, resulting in a low fatality rate. The epidemic, however, was not expected to be fully under control before the end of June.

In the report, the Secretary-General also described the police and justice programme, as well as programmes relating to disarmament and demobilisation, and demining.

In concluding, the Secretary-General stated that, despite his negative assessment of the political and security situations, he believed that "the Somali people deserve a last chance". But this must be firmly tied to evidence of serious and productive pursuit of the reconciliation process, strict observance of the cease-fire and cooperation with UNOSOM II in preventing the recurrence of clashes and resolving local clan and factional conflicts. He recommended that the Security Council extend UNOSOM II's mandate for a six-month period.

The Secretary-General noted that his recommendation was based on the assumption that the Somali leaders would prove able and willing to pursue the path to political reconciliation. Should that not be the

case, he stated that he would not rule out recommending that the Council consider the withdrawal of UNOSOM II in part or in full.

The Security Council, by its resolution 923 (1994) of 31 May 1994, renewed the mandate of UNOSOM II until 30 September 1994, subject to a review no later than 29 July, after which the Council might request the Secretary-General to prepare options regarding UNOSOM's mandate and future operations.

The Council demanded that all parties in Somalia refrain from any acts of intimidation or violence against personnel engaged in humanitarian or peace-keeping work in the country. The parties were strongly urged to cooperate fully with UNOSOM II, carry out their commitments and implement the agreements which they had signed, including those relating to voluntary disarmament, and to pursue without delay the negotiations aimed at achieving national reconciliation.

Little Progress Reported

As requested by the Security Council, the Secretary-General submitted his report on 18 July 1994. In that document he reviewed the humanitarian, political and security situation in Somalia. He stated that UNOSOM II continued efforts to improve the overall situation in the country, which was significantly better than when UNOSOM had first been deployed but worse than at the time of his 24 May 1994 report.

In the humanitarian field, the Secretary-General reported some progress in overcoming the emergency situation and moving into the recovery phase by improving the situation of the most vulnerable, particularly women and children, and finding lasting solutions to the plight of the refugees and internally displaced persons. In many regions daily life was returning to normal and agricultural production was recovering. The potentially catastrophic cholera outbreak had been contained. The Division for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of UNOSOM II continued its efforts to coordinate the provision of humanitarian assistance throughout the country. There had been, at the same time, several important setbacks, which included the interruption, for security reasons, of the activities of WFP in Kismayo as well as those of UNHCR in Afmadu and Buale and the Save the Children Fund (United Kingdom) in Mogadishu.

Analysing the security situation, the Secretary-General noted that it had been marred by clashes among clans and sub-clans, especially in Mogadishu, and by a further increase in banditry. The recurring

outbreaks of inter-clan fighting had brought, for several weeks, all humanitarian activities in Mogadishu and its immediate vicinity to a near-standstill. In addition to the deterioration in the security situation, there had been attacks against UNOSOM II personnel resulting in a number of fatal casualties.

In accordance with its concept of operations, UNOSOM II had focused on consolidating activities both inside Mogadishu and in outlying areas by securing key installations and facilities, maintaining presence along key routes and within areas of responsibility through patrolling, and providing security for humanitarian aid convoys. In addition, UNOSOM II had intensified its work related to the training of local police personnel. As of 8 July 1994, police recruits totalled 7,869, and 96 of the 125 police stations had become operational. The mission also continued its work in the judicial, correctional, juvenile justice, crime prevention and human rights fields. As at 10 July, the force strength of UNOSOM II was 18,790.

As to the national reconciliation process, the Secretary-General stated that no progress had been achieved in this regard, and that the repeated postponements of the National Reconciliation Conference and its preparatory meeting, the emergence of new subgroups and the lack of a clear reconciliation process had created the impression that the talks between Somali leaders could continue indefinitely. Some of them still seemed not ready to subordinate their personal ambitions for power to the cause of peace and stability in Somalia.

The Secretary-General indicated that the national reconciliation process was advancing at so slow a pace that there was "little or no reason" to believe that the target of completing the process by March 1995 could be achieved. He stressed to the Somali leaders that the international commitment to assist Somalia could not continue indefinitely and that it was essential that they redouble their efforts to reach agreement on the basis of pluralism and mutual tolerance.

The Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he had asked his newly appointed Special Representative, James Victor Gbeho,⁷ to prepare an in-depth assessment of the prospects for national reconciliation in Somalia and that he had decided to undertake a comprehensive review of the current troop strength of UNOSOM II. He observed that any success of UNOSOM II in improving security conditions had been achieved by diplomatic rather than military means. Accordingly, he intended to dispatch a special mission to discuss with the Special Representative and the Force Commander the feasibility of a reduction in the troop level currently assigned to UNOSOM II,

taking into account the views of the humanitarian agencies and the non-governmental organisations.

On 28 July, the Council, in a letter to the Secretary-General, expressed concern at the very little forward movement in the Somali national reconciliation process and at the deterioration in the security situation in the country. It welcomed the Secretary-General's initiative and requested him to present recommendations on the future size of UNOSOM II as soon as possible.

National Reconciliation Proposed

On 17 August, the Secretary-General presented to the Security Council a report containing an assessment of the prospects for national reconciliation in Somalia.

According to the report, it was generally acknowledged that conflicts within the dominant Hawiye clan, to which both Ali Mahdi and General Farah Aidid belonged, constituted the major obstacle to national reconciliation. It was equally recognized that no meaningful progress could be made in the political process without first finding a solution to the conflict in Mogadishu, and in particular the conflict among the Hawiye sub-clans (Habr Gedir, Abgal, Hawadle and Murosade). The root causes of dissension and tension among the 15 factions were also by and large attributable to rivalries within the Hawiye clan. After all, it was the intra-Hawiye feud that had started the crisis in Mogadishu and its environs in 1991 and was the main cause of the resumption of fighting since June 1994.

It was the view of the Secretary-General's Special Representative that if Hawiye reconciliation could be attained and the differences between Ali Mahdi and General Aidid resolved, the prospects for national reconciliation and the establishment of a national government would be significantly improved. Both General Aidid and Ali Mahdi had expressed their willingness to participate in a Hawiye reconciliation conference with the cooperation of other concerned factions and political leaders.

The Special Representative believed that with the cooperation of the parties concerned and the support of the international community, the reconciliation of the Hawiye should be achieved in good time to create a favourable climate for the convening of a conference on national reconciliation and the establishment of an interim government in the last quarter of 1994. This would leave three months for consolidating agreed transitional arrangements for the interim government before the scheduled completion of the mission of UNOSOM II at the end of March 1995.

The Secretary-General said that he was inclined to agree with the Special Representative's assessment that the successful conclusion of the Hawiye conference would greatly facilitate the political reconciliation process. Although there were no clear signs that the parties were preparing for a Hawiye conference, he nevertheless instructed the Special Representative to provide all possible support to the efforts deployed by the parties concerned to convene such a conference.

Reduction in Strength Proposed

In his 17 August report, the Secretary-General also informed the Council on the results of the special mission dispatched to Somalia to discuss the feasibility of a reduction in the UNOSOM II troop level. The mission had visited the country from 28 July to 4 August 1994.

In the mission's discussions with the Special Representative and the Force Commander, a consensus had been reached to reduce the UNOSOM II force to about 17,200 all ranks by the end of September 1994. The authorized strength of the Force was then 22,000 all ranks and the actual strength as of 2 August was 18,761. The Force would continue to perform the tasks assigned to it under Security Council resolution 897 (1994) of 4 February 1994.

The special mission recommended that any further reductions should be carefully decided and take into account evolving circumstances. UNOSOM II stressed that a troop level of approximately 15,000 represented the critical minimum below which the mandated tasks could not be implemented. The gradual reduction to the level of 15,000 could be achieved by the end of October or during November 1994.

Council Expresses Grave Concern

On 25 August, the Security Council, in a Presidential statement, expressed grave concern regarding the deteriorating security situation in Somalia and deplored attacks and harassment directed against UNOSOM II and other international personnel. The Council was also concerned by the lack of progress toward reconciliation among Somali factions, and attached great importance to an accelerated inter-clan reconciliation, in particular, among the Hawiye sub-clans, with the involvement of all concerned.

The Council believed that the Secretary-General's proposed initial reduction of the UNOSOM II Force was appropriate, and stressed that priority attention should be given to ensuring the security of UNOSOM

II and other international personnel, including the staff of NGOs. It invited the Secretary-General to submit, well before 30 September 1994, a report on prospects for national reconciliation in Somalia and on the possible options for the future of UNOSOM II.

In the following weeks, the Secretary-General's Special Representative conducted intensive consultations with Ali Mahdi, General Aidid and the Imam of Hirab, Imam Mahamoud Imam Omar, concerning arrangements for convening the Hawiye peace conference and the national reconciliation conference.

The Imam of Hirab advised the Special Representative that it would be necessary to arrange separate meetings between the Habr Gedir and the other sub-clans before proceeding to a plenary session of the Hawiye peace conference. Several such meetings were convened with some positive results.

As requested by the Security Council, the Secretary-General reported to it on 17 September. That report described the efforts aimed at convening the Hawiye peace conference and other efforts to further the national reconciliation process.

The Secretary-General also referred to the deteriorating security situation which had forced the UNOSOM Force Commander to begin concentrating his troops in four key areas. The purpose of concentration was to avoid the repetition of the kind of incident that occurred in Belet Weyne on 29 July 1994 when a small UNOSOM contingent was overrun by a strong militia force. As a result of the concentration of forces and the reduction process, troops had been withdrawn from Bardera, Hoddur, Wajid and Balad. It was expected that by the end of October, UNOSOM II would be concentrated mainly in three locations: Mogadishu area, Baidoa and Kisnayo.

In concluding his report, the Secretary-General indicated that the end of September would be a crucial period for both the national reconciliation process and the continued involvement of the United Nations in Somalia. In view of the current developments, as well as the assessment of the situation on the ground that was being undertaken by the Secretariat, the Secretary-General expected to be in a position by mid-October to submit to the Council his assessment of the prospects for national reconciliation and recommendations for the future of the United Nations operation in Somalia. In the meantime, he recommended that the Council consider extending the mandate of UNOSOM II for a period of one month.

On 30 September, the Security Council, by its resolution 946 (1994), extended the mandate of UNOSOM II until 31 October 1994. It also encouraged the Secretary-General to continue with and intensify preparations for possible contingency arrangements, including the withdrawal of UNOSOM II within a specified time-frame.

Secretary-General Assesses Situation

The Secretary-General submitted his further report on 14 October. The report also reflected upon the results of the visit to Somalia by Kofi A. Annan, Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations.

In the report, the Secretary-General reiterated his view that the process of national reconciliation had not kept pace with achievements in the humanitarian area and that security had been progressively deteriorating, especially in Mogadishu. The Somali leaders still had not carried out commitments entered into under the Addis Ababa Agreement and the Nairobi Declaration. UNOSOM's goal of assisting the process of political reconciliation was becoming ever more elusive, while the burden and cost of maintaining a high troop level was proving increasingly difficult for Member States to justify.

The protracted political impasse, the Secretary-General continued, had created a vacuum of civil authority and of governmental structure in Somalia, leaving the United Nations with no function to build on. The presence of UNOSOM II troops had had limited impact on the peace process and on security in the face of continuing inter-clan fighting and banditry. If the Council maintained its previous decision to end the Mission in March 1995 and to withdraw all UNOSOM II forces and assets, time would be required to ensure that the withdrawal took place in a secure, orderly and expeditious manner. This might take as long as 120 days. Extensive air and sea support from Member States might also be required.

In the light of those considerations, the Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council extend the Mission's mandate until 31 March 1995. He believed that the five-month extension would give the Somali leaders time to begin consolidating any positive achievements which might arise from the ongoing process of political reconciliation. Accordingly, the Secretary-General instructed his Special Representative to maintain his efforts to help the Somali leaders achieve national reconciliation.

The Secretary-General noted that the humanitarian organisations were committed to continuing their work in Somalia, but they could only go on doing so in a secure environment. Somali leaders would

bear the ultimate responsibility for the safety of international and national relief personnel and their assets.

In concluding his report, the Secretary-General stated that the establishment of a viable and acceptable peace could only come from the Somalis themselves. The international community could not impose peace on the people of Somalia; it could only assist in the process of re-establishing peace and security there. Such assistance, however, could not be sustained indefinitely. But the withdrawal of UNOSOM II would not mean United Nations abandonment of Somalia. Should the Somali leaders succeed in creating and maintaining favourable security conditions, the United Nations and the international community could continue to play a role in the country's rehabilitation and reconstruction. The United Nations could also retain a certain presence after the withdrawal of UNOSOM II, to continue assisting the Somali political organisations and factions in the process of national reconciliation. However, the Secretary-General warned that the feasibility of international assistance of this kind would be very much dependent on the degree of security prevailing in the country.

Security Council Mission to Somalia

In its resolution 946 (1994), the Security Council declared its readiness to consider sending a mission to Somalia to convey directly to the Somali political parties the Council's views on the situation in that country, and on the future of the United Nations involvement there. At its consultations held on 20 October, the Council decided to send such a mission to Somalia.

The seven-member mission, which was headed by Ambassador Colin Keating, Permanent Representative of New Zealand, left for Somalia on 24 October and returned on 29 October. Its programme of work included meetings with the leaders of the Somali factions, briefings from the Special Representative and the UNOSOM II Force Commander. The mission also had a meeting with representatives of United Nations agencies and NGOs operating in Somalia.

The mission concluded that 31 March 1995 was the appropriate date for the end of the mandate of UNOSOM II. None of the Somali factions had requested a longer extension; nor did the humanitarian agencies or NGOs.

On 31 October, the Security Council extended the mandate of UNOSOM II, which was expiring on that day, for an interim period until 4 November 1994, to allow time to consider the report of its mission to Somalia before completing the review of the mandate of the Operation and deciding on its future.

Future of UNOSOM II Decided

On 4 November 1994, after having considered the Secretary-General's reports dated 17 September and 14 October and the oral report of its mission to Somalia given on 31 October, the Security Council, by its resolution 954 (1994), decided to extend the mandate of UNOSOM II for a final period until 31 March 1995. It affirmed that the primary purpose of UNOSOM II until its termination was to facilitate political reconciliation in Somalia.

The Council decided that every effort should be made to withdraw the UNOSOM II military force and assets from Somalia in a secure and orderly manner. To that end it authorized UNOSOM II to take the actions necessary to protect the withdrawal. It also requested Member States to assist with the withdrawal of the Operation.

The Council demanded that the Somali parties refrain from any acts of intimidation or violence against UNOSOM II and other personnel engaged in humanitarian activities. It also urged them to negotiate an effective cease-fire and the formation of a transitional government of national unity.

Inter-Agency Standing Committee

In a letter dated 10 November 1994 to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General drew the Council's attention to a statement on Somalia by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC).⁸

The statement reaffirmed the commitment of the humanitarian agencies to continue emergency and rehabilitation activities in Somalia to the maximum extent possible after expiration of the UNOSOM II mandate on 31 March 1995. In light of the UNOSOM II military withdrawal, the agencies agreed to adopt a common and coordinated approach to retain or replace the essential programme support and operational services formerly provided by UNOSOM II, and to develop a common framework for action with the full support of all operational partners. The IASC proposed establishment of a United Nations Coordination Team of senior representatives of United Nations organisations active in Somalia, chaired by the Resident Representative of UNDP in Somalia, serving also as Humanitarian Coordinator.

The IASC statement urged the Security Council to support the process of transition from UNOSOM-protected humanitarian operations to those following UNOSOM II's departure by: considering possible arrangements for the establishment of protected humanitarian

operational bases at essential ports and airports; authorising the transfer of UNOSOM II equipment and assets to operational United Nations organisations and international non-governmental organisations; making UNOSOM II humanitarian and security staff available to the new coordination arrangement. United Nations organisations also urged that positive consideration be given to funding security requirements through a special allocation so that voluntary funds for humanitarian activities not be diverted.

The statement called for the continued support of the international donor community but noted, however, that international assistance to Somalia would be contingent upon the Somali people ensuring that conditions existed for the effective implementation of emergency and rehabilitation programmes.⁹

Composition of UNOSOM II

The original authorized strength of UNOSOM II was approximately 28,000 military personnel and some 2,800 civilian staff. Military personnel were provided by the following countries: Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United States and Zimbabwe. The civilian component of UNOSOM II consisted of staff members of the United Nations and of personnel seconded from Member States.

In addition, there were approximately 17,700 troops in the United States Joint Task Force in Somalia, which did not form part of UNOSOM II and were not under the operational command of the UNOSOM II Force Commander. This number included the Quick Reaction Force, deployed in support of UNOSOM II.

In the course of 1993, a number of Member States, including Belgium, France and Sweden, informed the Secretary-General of their intention to withdraw their contingents from UNOSOM II by the end of December 1993. In addition, the United States announced in October 1993, that it would withdraw its troops from Somalia by the end of March 1994. Accordingly, the French contingent (1,100 all ranks), the Belgian contingent (950 all ranks) and the Swedish Field Hospital (150 all ranks) were withdrawn from Somalia in December 1993. The United States also withdrew 1,400 military logistics personnel at the end of December. As a result, the strength of UNOSOM II on 1 January 1994 was 25,945.

In its resolution 897 (1994), the Security Council revised the mandate of UNOSOM II and authorized the gradual reduction of the UNOSOM force level to 22,000, including 2,500 logistics and support elements.

Four other Member States decided to withdraw their contingents before the end of March 1994: Italy (2,300), Germany (1,350), Turkey (320) and Norway (140). The United States withdrew the rest of its military logistics personnel (1,400) also by the end of March 1994. The United States Quick Reaction Force (1,350) was also withdrawn at that time. Subsequently, Greece, Kuwait, Morocco, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates also withdrew their contingents. At the same time, a number of other contributing countries increased their contingent strength. The troop strength available to UNOSOM II at the end of July 1994 was 18,775.

In August 1994, the Security Council agreed with the Secretary-General's recommendation to reduce further the troop level of UNOSOM II to 15,000 all ranks. On 30 November 1994, military and police personnel were provided by the following countries:

<i>Country</i>	<i>Police</i>	<i>Troops</i>
Australia	1	
Bangladesh	1	939
Egypt	1	1,176
Ghana	6	
India		4,689
Indonesia		6
Ireland		3
Italy		4
Malaysia		1,135
Nepal		2
Netherlands	1	
Nigeria	5	57
Pakistan		5,988
Philippines	1	
Republic of Korea		3
Zambia	6	
Zimbabwe	5	939
Total	27	14,941

Figures may vary from month to month due to rotation. "Troops" include any infantry, logistics, engineering, air, medical, mov-con, staff, etc.

UNOSOM II also included a large civilian component, consisting of approximately 800 international and some 1,800 locally recruited staff.

Financial Aspects

The rough cost to the United Nations of UNOSOM II in 1994 was approximately \$862.2 million. The costs of the operation are met by assessed contributions from United Nations Member States. As at 30 November 1994, contributions outstanding to the UNOSOM Special Account (UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II) for the period from the inception of the operation to 31 July 1994 amounted to approximately \$216.7 million.

The Security Council, by resolution 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992, requested the Secretary-General to establish a fund through which contributions could be channelled to States or operations involved in establishing a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. The total contributions to the Fund established as "The Trust Fund for Somalia—Unified Command", were \$105 million. In its resolution 814 (1993), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to maintain the Fund for the additional purpose of receiving contributions for the maintenance of UNOSOM II forces following the departure of UNITAF forces in early May 1993 and for the establishment of a Somali police force.

NOTES

1. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali appointed Ismat Kittani (Iraq) as his Special Representative for Somalia on 3 November 1992, to replace Mohammed Sahnoun who had resigned.
2. In addition to the United States forces, UNITAF included military units from Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and Zimbabwe.
3. On 18 January 1994, General Bir was succeeded by Lieutenant-General Aboo Samah Bin Aboo Bakar of Malaysia as Force Commander of UNOSOM II.
4. United States forces (United States Rangers and the Quick Reaction Force) were deployed in Mogadishu in support of the UNOSOM II mandate, but were not under United Nations command or control.
5. The legal status of several districts was still the subject of discussions between UNOSOM II and local Somali communities. As a result, the total number of districts said to exist in Somalia might vary.
6. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, Admiral Jonathan T. Howe (Ret.), completed his year-long assignment in early February

1994. His Deputy, Ambassador Lansana Kouyate, was appointed as the Acting Special Representative.

7. Effective 1 July 1994, the Secretary-General appointed James Victor Gbeho, Principal Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ghana, to serve as his Special Representative for Somalia. Ambassador Lansana Kouyate (Guinea), who had been Acting Special Representative since February 1994, assumed his functions as Assistant Secretary-General in the Department of Political Affairs at United Nations Headquarters in New York.
8. The IASC, established under General Assembly resolution 46/182, is comprised the heads of operational United Nations agencies, ICRC, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) and representatives of 3 international NGOs.
9. In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 7 December 1994, the President of the Security Council, on behalf of the Council's members, took note of the IASC statement and welcomed the commitment of the agencies to continue emergency and rehabilitation activities in post UNOSOM Somalia. The Council also encouraged the Secretary-General to play a facilitating or mediating political role in Somalia after March 1995 if the parties to the conflict in Somalia are willing to cooperate with the United Nations and if this was the wish of the Somali people.

47

United Nations Protection Force¹

LOCATION: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

HEADQUARTERS: Zagreb, Croatia

DURATION: March 1992 to present

STRENGTH: 38,130 troops and support personnel, 680 military observers, 727 civilian police, 1,870 international civilian staff and 2,188 local staff

FATALITIES: 129

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND CHIEF OF MISSION: Yasushi Akashi (Japan)

FORCE COMMANDER: General Bertrand de Saville de La Presto (France)

Background

Serious fighting in Croatia began in June 1991 when that Republic and its northern neighbour, Slovenia, declared themselves independent from Yugoslavia,² and Serbs living in Croatia, supported by the Yugoslav People's Army, opposed this move. Efforts by the European Community to stop the hostilities in mid-1991 and to resolve the crisis in the framework of the Conference on Yugoslavia had proved unsuccessful.

The United Nations became actively involved in the situation in Yugoslavia on 25 September 1991 when the Security Council, meeting at the ministerial level, unanimously adopted its resolution 713 (1991) expressing deep concern at the fighting in that country and calling on all States to implement immediately a "general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia".

The Council commended and fully supported the efforts already undertaken by the European Community and its member states, with the support of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), to restore peace and dialogue in Yugoslavia. By its resolution, the Council invited the Secretary-General to offer his assistance in consultation with the Government of Yugoslavia and all those promoting the peace efforts.

On 8 October 1991, then Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar appointed Cyrus Vance, former United States Secretary of State, as his Personal Envoy for Yugoslavia. Thereafter, the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy maintained constant contact with all the parties to the conflict, with the Presidency of the European Community, with the Chairman of the CSCE-participating States, with Lord Carrington, then Chairman of the European Community's Conference on Yugoslavia, and with other interested parties in their efforts to find a solution to the crisis. It soon became clear that the most valuable contribution the United Nations could make at that stage was a peace-keeping operation to create the necessary conditions for the pursuit of political negotiations for a peaceful settlement.

As part of the collective effort to stop the fighting and to find a peaceful solution to the conflict, the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy undertook several missions to Yugoslavia and discussed with all parties concerned, among other things, the feasibility of deploying a United Nations peace-keeping operation. On 23 November, the Personal Envoy convened in Geneva a meeting which was attended by the Presidents of Serbia and of Croatia and the Secretary of State for National Defence of Yugoslavia, as well as Lord Carrington. During the meeting, the Yugoslav parties reached agreement on an immediate cease-fire and on a number of other issues. Each of the Yugoslav parties expressed the wish to see the speedy establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation. However, while progress was made on the other issues, the cease-fire broke down almost immediately.

On 27 November, the Security Council, by its resolution 721 (1991), approved the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy, and endorsed the statement made by the Personal Envoy to the parties that the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia could not be envisaged without full compliance by, all parties with the Geneva agreement. During subsequent weeks of intensive negotiations with the parties concerned, the implementation of the Geneva agreement was pursued and the general principles were defined for a United Nations peace-keeping operation. On 15 December, the

Security Council, by its resolution 724 (1991), approved the Secretary-General's report which contained a plan for a possible peace-keeping operation. A small group of military officers, civilian police and United Nations Secretariat staff travelled to Yugoslavia to prepare for the implementation of this plan.

Thereafter, the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy focused their efforts on consolidating the ceasefire and on securing unconditional acceptance of the United Nations plan by all parties to the conflict, including assurances of their readiness to cooperate fully in its implementation. Keeping the Security Council informed of these efforts and the developments in the country, the Secretary-General reported on several occasions that, despite widespread support in Yugoslavia for a United Nations peace-keeping operation, the necessary conditions for its establishment still did not exist.

On 2 January 1992, as part of his attempts to remove the remaining obstacles, the Personal Envoy convened in Sarajevo a meeting between military representatives of the Republic of Croatia and representatives of the JNA, at which the Implementing Accord on the unconditional cease-fire was signed. With the Security Council's concurrence, the newly elected Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then sent to Yugoslavia a group of 50 military liaison officers, with the task of using their good offices to promote maintenance of the cease-fire by facilitating communication between the two sides and by helping them to resolve difficulties that might arise. In the meantime, the Personal Envoy, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and their team continued their efforts to secure the cooperation of all Yugoslav parties in implementing the United Nations plan for a peacekeeping operation.

On 15 February 1992, notwithstanding the fact that certain political groups in Yugoslavia were still expressing objections to the United Nations plan, the Secretary-General recommended to the Security Council the establishment of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). In making this recommendation, he stressed that, in his view, the danger that a United Nations peace-keeping operation would fail for lack of cooperation from the parties was less grievous than the danger that delay in its dispatch would lead to a breakdown of the cease-fire and to a new conflagration.

On 21 February, the Security Council, by its resolution 743 (1992), approved the report and established UNPROFOR for an initial period of 12 months. The Council confirmed that the Force should be an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security

required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis within the framework of the European Community's Conference on Yugoslavia. It requested the Secretary-General to deploy immediately those elements of UNPROFOR which could, assist in developing an implementation plan for the earliest possible full deployment of the Force.

On 7 April, after receiving a report from the Secretary-General on 2 April that all the Force Commander's interlocutors had emphasized the need for the earliest possible deployment of UNPROFOR, the Security Council, by its resolution 749 (1992), authorized the full deployment of the Force.

UNPROFOR: February 1992—February 1993

The operational mandate of UNPROFOR extends to five Republics of the former Yugoslavia—Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia,³ Montenegro and Serbia—and it has a liaison presence in the sixth, Slovenia.

Croatia United Nations Protected Areas

UNPROFOR is deployed in certain areas in Croatia, designated as United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs), in which the United Nations Security Council judged that special interim arrangements were required to ensure that a lasting cease-fire was maintained. The UNPAs are areas in which Serbs constitute the majority or a substantial minority of the population and where inter-communal tensions have led to armed conflict. There are three UNPAs: Eastern Slavonic, Western Slavonic and Krajina. For United Nations purposes, they have been divided into four sectors: East, North, South and West.

The original United Nations plan in Croatia rests on two central elements: (a) the withdrawal of the JNA from all of Croatia and the demilitarisation of the UNPAs; and (b) the continuing functioning, on an interim basis, of the existing local authorities and police, under United Nations supervision, pending the achievement of an overall political solution to the crisis.

UNPROFOR's mandate is to ensure that the UNPAs are demilitarized, through the withdrawal or disbandment of all armed forces in them, and that all persons residing in them are protected from fear of armed attack. To this end, UNPROFOR is authorized to control access to the UNPAs, to ensure that the UNPAs remain demilitarized, and to monitor the functioning of the local police there to help ensure non-discrimination and the protection of human rights.

Outside the UNPAs, UNPROFOR military observers are to verify the withdrawal of all the JNA and irregular forces from Croatia, other than those disbanded and demobilized there. In support of the work of the humanitarian agencies of the United Nations, UNPROFOR is also to facilitate the return, in conditions of safety and security, of civilian displaced persons to their homes in the UNPAs.

UNPROFOR initially established its headquarters in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina; it is now headquartered in Zagreb, the capital of Croatia.

Enlargements of Mandate

Since the establishment of UNPROFOR, there have been several enlargements of its mandate in Croatia. On 30 June 1992, the Security Council, by its resolution 762 (1992), authorized UNPROFOR to undertake monitoring functions in the “pink zones”—certain areas of Croatia controlled by the JNA and populated by then largely by Serbs, but which were outside the agreed UNPA boundaries. It also recommended the establishment of a Joint Commission chaired by UNPROFOR and consisting of representatives of the Government of Croatia and of the local authorities in the region, with the participation of the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), to oversee and monitor the restoration of authority by the Croatian Government in the “pink zones”.

On 7 August 1992, the Security Council, by its resolution 769 (1992), authorized the enlargement of UNPROFOR's strength and mandate to enable the Force to control the entry of civilians into the UNPAs and to perform immigration and customs functions at the UNPA borders at international frontiers.

The third enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia came about on 6 October 1992, when the Security Council adopted its resolution 779 (1992), authorising UNPROFOR to assume responsibility for monitoring of the demilitarisation of the Prevlaka Peninsula near Dubrovnik. By the same resolution, the Council approved the Secretary-General's action to ensure the control by UNPROFOR of the vitally important Peruca dam, situated in one of the “pink zones” in Croatia.

Renewed Hostilities

On 22 January 1993, the Croatian Army launched an offensive in a number of locations in the southern part of UNPROFOR's Sector South and the adjacent “pink zones”. The Croatian Government stated that it took this action out of impatience with the slow progress of

negotiations in respect of various economic facilities in and adjacent to the UNPAs and "pink zones." On 27 January, the Croatian Army attacked and captured the Peruca dam. The Serbs responded to the Croatian offensive by breaking into a number of storage areas, which were under joint control under a double-lock system in the UNPAs, and by removing their weapons, including heavy weapons.

UNPROFOR warned both the Croatian Government and the Serb authorities not to attempt further incursions into the UNPAs. The Force also sought to limit the damage caused by the fighting, and made repeated representations to the parties concerned with a view to preventing escalation and bringing about a cease-fire.

On 25 January, the Security Council adopted its resolution 802 (1993), in which it demanded an immediate cessation of hostile activities by Croatian armed forces within or adjacent to the UNPAs and their withdrawal from these areas, an end to attacks against UNPROFOR personnel, return of all heavy weapons seized from UNPROFOR-controlled storage areas, and strict compliance by all parties with the terms of ceasefire arrangements. It called upon all parties to cooperate fully with the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and to refrain from any actions which might undermine efforts aimed at reaching a political settlement.

As to the implementation of this resolution, the Croatian Government on 26 January informed the Force Commander of UNPROFOR that, upon compliance by the Serb side with the various provisions of the resolution, they would remove their military, but not their police, from the areas they had taken. For its part, the Serb side stated that Croatia must return to its pre-22 January positions before the implementation of the remainder of the resolution could be considered.

Eventually, after several rounds of talks held under the auspices of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, the Government of Croatia and the Serb local authorities signed an agreement regarding the implementation of resolution 802 (1993).

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Although the mandate of UNPROFOR originally related only to Croatia, it was envisaged that after the demilitarisation of the UNPAs, 100 UNPROFOR military observers would be redeployed from Croatia to certain parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, in light of the deteriorating situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Secretary-

General decided to accelerate this deployment by sending 40 military observers to the Mostar region of that Republic on 30 April 1992. In May, despite all diplomatic efforts by the European Community, the Secretary-General's representatives and UNPROFOR to negotiate a lasting cease-fire, the conflict—between the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats on the one side and the Bosnian Serbs on the other—intensified. On 14 May, when risks to their lives reached an unacceptable level, the observers were withdrawn from the area and redeployed in the UNPAs in Croatia. About two thirds of UNPROFOR headquarters personnel also withdrew from Sarajevo on 16 and 17 May, leaving behind some 100 military personnel and civilian staff who lent their good offices to promote local cease-fires and humanitarian activities. In a series of resolutions and statements, the Security Council appealed to all parties to bring about a cease-fire and a negotiated political solution, and demanded, *inter alia*, that all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, including by JNA, as well as by the Croatian Army, cease immediately and that all local irregular forces be disbanded and disarmed.

On 30 May, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council, in its resolution 757 (1992), imposed wide-ranging sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (which by then consisted of Serbia and Montenegro), in order to help achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict. It also demanded that all parties create the conditions necessary for unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo and other destinations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the establishment of a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its airport. The Council requested the Secretary-General to continue using his good offices to achieve this objective.

Security at Sarajevo Airport

In keeping with the Council's request, UNPROFOR pursued negotiations with the parties to the conflict aimed at stopping the fighting around the airport and reopening it for humanitarian purposes. On 6 June 1992, the Secretary-General reported to the Council that UNPROFOR had negotiated, on 5 June, an agreement for the handing over to the Force of the Sarajevo airport. On 8 June, the Security Council, by its resolution 758 (1992), approved the enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate and strength and authorized the Secretary-General to deploy military observers and related personnel and equipment to Sarajevo to supervise the withdrawal of anti-aircraft weapons and the concentration of heavy weapons at agreed locations in the city.

Following intensive work by UNPROFOR to establish modalities of implementation of the 5 June agreement, and a visit to Sarajevo by President Francois Mitterrand of France on 28 June, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council, on 29 June, that Bosnian Serb forces had been withdrawing from the Sarajevo airport, and both sides—the Serb and the Bosnia Presidential forces—had begun to concentrate their heavy weapons in locations to be supervised by UNPROFOR. On the same day, the Council, by resolution 761 (1992), authorized deployment of additional elements of UNPROFOR to ensure the security and functioning of the airport. By 3 July, despite continued fighting in the area, United Nations observers and troops were deployed at the airport and at other locations in Sarajevo, and the airport was reopened for the humanitarian airlift.

Protection of Humanitarian Convoys

On 13 August 1992, the Security Council, disturbed by the situation prevailing in Sarajevo, which severely complicated UNPROFOR's efforts to ensure the security and functioning of Sarajevo airport and the delivery of humanitarian assistance, adopted resolution 770 (1992). The Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, called on States to "take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary" to facilitate, in coordination with the United Nations, the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In further discussions, however, it was decided that that task should be entrusted to UNPROFOR. On 10 September, following consultations with a number of Governments, the Secretary-General submitted a further report to the Security Council recommending the expansion of UNPROFOR's mandate and strength in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He proposed that UNPROFOR's task, under its enlarged mandate, would be to support efforts by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in particular to provide protection, at UNHCR's request, where and when UNHCR considered such protection necessary. In addition, UNPROFOR could be used to protect convoys of released civilian detainees if the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) so requested and if the Force Commander agreed that the request was practicable. UNPROFOR would be deployed in four or five new zones. In each zone there would be an infantry battalion group, whose headquarters would also include civilian staff to undertake political and information functions and liaison with UNHCR.

UNPROFOR troops would follow normal peace-keeping rules of engagement, which authorize them to use force in self-defence, including situations in which armed persons attempt by force to prevent them from carrying out their mandate.

In resolution 776 (1992), which was adopted on 14 September 1992 and which made no reference to Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council approved the Secretary-General's report and authorized the enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate and strength in Bosnia and Herzegovina for these purposes. A separate Bosnia and Herzegovina Command was established within UNPROFOR to implement resolution 776 (1992), in addition to Sector Sarajevo.

"No-Fly Zone"

In a further development, the Security Council, on 9 October 1992, adopted its resolution 781 (1992) banning all military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina, except for those of UNPROFOR and other flights in support of United Nations operations, including humanitarian assistance. The Council requested UNPROFOR to monitor compliance with the ban, and that it place observers, where necessary, at airfields in the former Yugoslavia. The Council also requested that the Force employ "an appropriate mechanism for approval and inspection" to ensure that the purpose of other flights to and from Bosnia and Herzegovina was consistent with its resolutions. It also called on States to provide technical assistance to UNPROFOR in its monitoring efforts. On 10 November, the Security Council adopted its resolution 786 (1992) authorising the expansion of UNPROFOR's strength by 75 military observers to enable it to monitor airfields in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

Border Control

On 16 November 1992, the Security Council adopted its resolution 787 (1992), in which, among other things, it considered that, in order to facilitate the implementation of the relevant Council resolutions, observers should be deployed on the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and requested the Secretary-General to present his recommendations on this matter. The resolutions in question were: resolution 713 (1991), which, *inter alia*, established a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia; resolution 752 (1992), which, *inter alia*, demanded that all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, including by units of the JNA as well as elements of the Croatian Army, cease immediately; resolution

757 (1992), which imposed comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); and resolution 787 (1992), which, *inter alia*, demanded that all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, including infiltration into the country of irregular units and personnel, cease immediately.

On 21 December, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council his recommendations. In the report, he indicated that in order to ensure compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions, it would be necessary to give UNPROFOR a mandate which would include the right not only to search but also to turn back or confiscate military personnel, weapons, or sanctioned goods whose passage into or out of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be contrary to the decisions of the Council. He pointed out that a symbolic presence at selected crossing points would "not only fail to fulfil the Council's requirements, but would also undermine the already strained credibility of UNPROFOR". He proposed, therefore, an enlargement of UNPROFOR with some 10,000 additional troops to provide for a 24-hour observation and search operation at 123 crossing points on Bosnia and Herzegovina's border with neighbouring countries.

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

On 11 November 1992, the President of Macedonia conveyed to the Secretary-General a request for the deployment of United Nations observers in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in view of his concern about the possible impact on it of fighting elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. Such deployment was also recommended by Vance and Lord Owen, Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. With the Security Council's approval, the Secretary-General sent to Macedonia from 28 November to 3 December a group of military, police and civilian personnel to assess the situation and prepare a report concerning a possible deployment of UNPROFOR in that Republic.

On 9 December, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council a report in which he recommended an expansion of the mandate and strength of UNPROFOR to establish a United Nations presence on Macedonia's borders with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). He indicated that the Force's mandate would be essentially preventive, to monitor and report any developments in the border areas which could undermine confidence and stability in Macedonia and threaten its territory. The Secretary-

General recommended that the enlargement of UNPROFOR comprise an estimated battalion of up to 700 all ranks, 35 military observers, 26 civilian police monitors, 10 civil affairs staff, 45 administrative staff and local interpreters. This contingent would operate under UNPROFOR's "Macedonia Command" with headquarters in Skopje, the capital of Macedonia. The Security Council, by its resolution 795 (1992) of 11 December, approved the Secretary-General's report and authorized the establishment of UNPROFOR's presence in Macedonia.

Subsequently, on 18 June 1993, the Security Council welcomed the United States offer to provide about 300 troops to reinforce UNPROFOR's presence in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In adopting resolution 842 (1993), the Council authorized the deployment of the additional personnel.

Review of UNPROFOR Activities

As already noted, UNPROFOR was established on 21 February 1992 by Security Council resolution 743 (1992) for an initial period of 12 months. On 10 February 1993, before the mandate of the Force expired, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council a report in which he summarized the activities of UNPROFOR and presented his recommendations on its future.

Croatia

In analysing the situation in Croatia, the Secretary-General described UNPROFOR's experience there as a mixed one. Its principal success had been in ensuring the complete withdrawal of the JNA from the territory of Croatia, including the Prevlaka Peninsula. Until the fourth week of January 1993, UNPROFOR's presence had also helped to prevent a recurrence of hostilities in the UNPAs and "pink zones". However, non-cooperation by the local Serb authorities had prevented UNPROFOR from achieving the demilitarisation of the UNPAs and the disarming of the Serb Territorial Defence and irregular forces in these areas and in the "pink zones". As a result, UNPROFOR had not been able to establish the conditions of peace and security that would have permitted the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in these areas. Nor had it been able to establish the border controls called for in resolution 769 (1992).

The civilian aspects of UNPROFOR's activities, notably the efforts of United Nations civilian police to prevent discrimination and abuse of the human rights of residents in the UNPAs, had not proved fully successful despite UNPROFOR's best efforts. An atmosphere of terror

and intimidation existed in many parts of the four sectors through much of the first ten months of the mandate period. However, since November 1992, the situation had shown improvement in all but a few areas. The maintenance of law and order was gradually enhanced through the reorganisation and redeployment of the local police.

However, while the non-cooperation of the local Serb authorities had seriously impeded implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan, the Croatian offensive on and after 22 January 1993, referred to above, had significantly altered the situation on the ground. The President of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, declared that the willingness of his Government to agree to an extension of UNPROFOR's mandate was dependent on progress in a number of areas. He also urged the Council to grant UNPROFOR an enforcement mandate. For its part, the Serb leadership in the UNPAs had rearmed and remobilized its forces in response to the Croatian offensive and had received substantial reinforcements of Serb fighters from elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. Serb militias had broken into storage depots holding heavy weapons placed there under the peace-keeping plan. The Serb side had also refused to enter into negotiations with the Croat side, or to return the heavy weapons taken from storage, unless the Croatian armed forces withdrew to the positions they occupied before the offensive. Such a withdrawal, in turn, was categorically rejected by the Croatian authorities.

In addition, the Secretary-General continued, the circumstances in which the peace-keeping plan was drafted and agreed in late 1991 and early 1992 had themselves changed. The plan was envisaged as an interim arrangement pending an overall political solution to the Yugoslav crisis. The Government of Croatia claimed there was no longer any "overall political solution" to negotiate. The only issue was the return of the UNPAs and the "pink zones" to Croatian control. The Serb leadership in the UNPAs, however, refused to consider these territories to be a part of Croatia and rejected talks on this basis, recalling that the plan was explicitly not intended to prejudge a political solution to the Yugoslav crisis. Further, the Serbs argued that two parties to the original plan, the President of Serbia and the Federal Yugoslav military authorities in Belgrade, no longer had recognized legal status in the areas where UNPROFOR was deployed. Therefore, the mandate and deployment of UNPROFOR now needed to be discussed anew with the Serbs representing the so-called "Republic of Serb Krajina".

In these circumstances, the Secretary-General saw three options with regard to UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia: (1) to renew the

mandate entrusted to UNPROFOR by resolution 743 (1992), with no change; (2) to modify that mandate; and (3) to give UNPROFOR no mandate in Croatia and confine its operations to Bosnia and Herzegovina and to Macedonia.

Referring to option one, the Secretary-General stated that the Government of Croatia made it clear that it could agree to a renewal of UNPROFOR's existing mandate only if certain conditions were met, including the complete disarmament of all paramilitary forces and militia in the UNPAs and the "pink zones" with a destruction of their heavy weapons, voluntary and unconditional return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in the UNPAs, maintenance of tight controls by the Force in those border areas where the boundaries of the UNPAs coincide with internationally recognized frontiers of Croatia; and restoration of Croatian authority in the "pink zones". The Government's position, in effect, required UNPROFOR either to negotiate results which—as a peace-keeping force relying on the cooperation of the parties—it had no power to compel the other side to accept, or to risk unilateral military action by the Government. In addition, the Croatian offensive had had a devastating effect on cooperation between UNPROFOR and the local Serb authorities, who felt "betrayed" by what they saw as UNPROFOR's failure to protect them, and had put in doubt the feasibility of a return to the original plan.

On the second option, the Secretary-General warned against any modification resulting in enforcement action, saying that such action would involve the danger of placing UNPROFOR in direct conflict with the Serbs. Enforcement would also require additional military forces and equipment which could not be deployed immediately upon the passage of an enforcement resolution by the Security Council. The mere passage of an enforcement resolution risked threatening the safety and security of United Nations peace-keeping personnel deployed in the UNPAs and some, perhaps most, troop-contributing countries might in these circumstances review their participation in UNPROFOR. Enforcement, the Secretary-General stated, "would be a fundamental contradiction of the nature and purpose of UNPROFOR's deployment in Croatia, as a peace-keeping force entrusted with the implementation of a plan agreed by all parties. As to an alternative modification of the mandate which would convert UNPROFOR into a buffer force deployed along the existing front lines in order to prevent a recurrence of hostilities, the Secretary-General did not believe that such an approach would receive the consent of the Government of Croatia.

Speaking of option three, the Secretary-General believed that the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from the UNPAs would almost certainly result in the resumption of large-scale hostilities in the areas of its deployment, nullifying the political effort and the material resources invested in ending the conflict that had raged for nearly a year before the deployment of UNPROFOR.

In the Secretary-General's judgement, the difficulties which UNPROFOR and the Security Council faced with regard to the Force's mandate in Croatia could be attributed to two principal factors: the inability to implement the peace-keeping plan; and the lack of an agreed settlement to the conflict between the Republic of Croatia and the Serb populations living in the UNPAs and the "pink zones". Unless these two factors were addressed, the Secretary-General concluded, a sound basis would not exist for renewing UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia. Urgent efforts needed to be made to resolve the problems arising from the Croatian offensive, to establish a basis for completing the implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan and to agree on a framework for negotiating, within the principles of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia, a settlement of the underlying dispute. The Secretary-General added that he had asked the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference to address these questions urgently with a view to establishing as soon as possible a basis on which a substantive recommendation could be made for an extension of UNPROFOR's mandate.

In the meantime, the Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council decide to extend UNPROFOR's existing mandate for an interim period up to 31 March 1993, in order to give the Co-Chairmen the necessary time.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Speaking of UNPROFOR activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where it had a more limited mandate, the Secretary-General noted in his February 1993 report that the Force had succeeded in keeping Sarajevo airport open, despite interruptions as a result of hostile military action against humanitarian aircraft. In the period from 3 July 1992 to 31 January 1993, the humanitarian airlift organized by UNHCR under UNPROFOR protection brought in 2,476 aircraft carrying 27,460 tons of food, medicines and other relief goods.

The operation to protect humanitarian convoys throughout the Republic had been persistently thwarted by obstruction, mines, hostile

fire and the refusal of the parties on the ground, particularly, but not exclusively, the Bosnian Serb party, to cooperate with UNPROFOR. None the less, from the deployment of additional UNPROFOR battalions for this purpose in November 1992 until January 1993, a total of some 34,600 tons of relief supplies had been delivered to an estimated 800,000 beneficiaries in 110 locations throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Although the ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been violated by all three parties on nearly 400 occasions since its imposition, it had achieved its principal purpose of preventing the use of air power in military combat in the Republic. UNPROFOR observers, using AWACS information made available by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), had found no evidence to suggest that any party had flown combat air missions, or conducted hostilities from the air, since the interdiction regime was established by the Council.

UNPROFOR's efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Secretary-General pointed out, had been characterized by a regrettable tendency on the part of the host Government to blame if for a variety of shortcomings, whether real or imagined. Criticism of UNPROFOR's performance in the Republic had largely been directed at its failure to fulfil tasks that the Force had not been mandated, authorized, equipped, staffed or financed to fulfil. There had been a number of attacks on the Force by the Government and by elements answerable to it, both in public statements and declarations and, more seriously, through violence, resulting in several UNPROFOR fatalities.

As to UNPROFOR's mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Secretary-General stated that it might need to be altered significantly when the outcome was known of the ongoing talks led by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Referring to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Secretary-General considered it premature to draw conclusions about the practicability of the mandate and the effectiveness of the UNPROFOR Macedonia Command in this first preventive deployment operation in the history of United Nations peace-keeping.

Interim Extension of Mandate

On 19 February 1993, having considered the Secretary-General's report, the Security Council adopted resolution 807 (1993), by which it

extended UNPROFOR's mandate for an interim period until 31 March 1993. The Council demanded, *inter alia*, that the parties and others concerned comply fully with the United Nations peace-keeping plan in Croatia and their other commitments and refrain from positioning their forces near the UNPAs and in the "pink zones". It invited the Secretary-General to take all appropriate measures to strengthen the security of the Force, in particular by providing it with the necessary defensive means.

The Council urged the parties and others concerned to cooperate fully with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in the discussions under their auspices in order to ensure full implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping mandate in Croatia. It also demanded the full and strict observance of all relevant Security Council resolutions relating to the mandate and operations of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

UNPROFOR: MARCH 1993–FEBRUARY 1994

Croatia: Mandate Renewed

In accordance with Security Council resolution 807 (1993) mentioned earlier, the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia held several rounds of talks in New York and Geneva with representatives of the Government of Croatia and the Serb populations living in the UNPAs and the "pink zones". In his 25 March 1993 report to the Council, the Secretary-General stated that while some progress had been made in these talks, fundamental differences remained between the two sides. Having said that more time would be needed to bring the negotiations to a meaningful conclusion, he recommended the extension of UNPROFOR's mandate for a further interim period of three months. He urged the parties to cooperate in implementing UNPROFOR's existing mandate, and to resolve any remaining differences in a spirit of compromise and cooperation.

On 30 March, the Security Council, by adopting its resolution 815 (1993), extended the mandate of UNPROFOR for an additional interim period until 30 June 1993. It also decided to reconsider within one month, or at any time at the request of the Secretary-General; UNPROFOR's mandate in light of developments of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and the situation on the ground. The Council requested the Secretary-General to report to it on how

the United Nations peace plan for Croatia could be effectively implemented.

On 25 June, the Secretary-General submitted his further report on the situation in Croatia, in which he drew attention to the failure of the parties to permit implementation of the United Nations plan and to cooperate in establishing a political process leading to an early settlement. He noted, nevertheless, that the presence of UNPROFOR was indispensable for controlling the conflict, fostering a climate in which negotiations between the parties could be promoted, preventing the resumption or escalation of conflict, providing a breathing-space for the continued efforts of the peacemakers and for supporting the provision of essential humanitarian assistance. He also informed the Council that the termination of UNPROFOR's mandate at that point, in the judgement of his Special Representative, would risk the resumption of a major conflict in the region and cause severe adverse consequences for humanitarian relief operations. The Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Force by a further three months, to 30 September 1993.

In its resolution 847 (1993) of 30 June 1993, the Security Council decided to extend UNPROFOR's mandate for an additional interim period terminating on 30 September 1993, and requested the Secretary-General to report after one month on progress towards implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for Croatia and all relevant Security Council resolutions.

On 16 August, the Secretary-General reported to the Council on this matter. He recommended that no action be taken at that stage and said that he would submit a further recommendation to the Council in the latter half of September 1993.

Implementation of Resolution 802

Following the renewed outbreak of hostilities in Croatia, precipitated by the Croatian incursion into the UNPAs and "pink zones" on 22 January 1993, intensive efforts were made within the framework of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and by UNPROFOR to bring about a cease-fire and a restoration of the prior status in accordance with Security Council resolution 802 (1993) of 25 January 1993.

On 8 April 1993, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that representatives of the Government of Croatia and the Serb local authorities had signed on 6 April, an agreement regarding the implementation of this resolution.

The agreement was to enter into force when the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia received from both parties assurances regarding the stationing of police in the areas from which the Croatian Government's armed forces were withdrawn, and their agreement that UNPROFOR should exclusively fulfil all police functions in those areas during an interim period. The Croats orally gave that assurance at the time of signature; the Serb assurance required the approval of their Assembly. That approval was not forthcoming and the agreement therefore did not enter into force.

The parties also agreed to begin talks, under the auspices of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee, within 15 days of implementation of the agreement in order to resolve outstanding obstacles to the full implementation of the United Nations plan for Croatia.

The UNPROFOR Force Commander assessed the additional resources required to implement the agreement and recommended that UNPROFOR be augmented by two mechanized infantry battalions of some 900 all ranks each, one engineer company of up to 150 troops all ranks, and 50 additional military observers. The Secretary-General recommended that, once the agreement entered into force, the Security Council approve the recommended changes to UNPROFOR's strength and mandate.

However, on 6 July 1993, new tensions arose following the decision of the Croatian Government to take unilateral actions aimed at rebuilding and reopening the Maslenica bridge on 18 July. Though, in pursuance of the Erdut/Zagreb agreement concluded on 15/16 July 1993, which required the withdrawal of Croatian armed forces and police from the area of the Maslenica bridge by 31 July 1993, UNPROFOR had moved 2,000 troops into the areas adjacent to those from which the Croatian forces were to withdraw, these troops could not be deployed because the Croatian military authorities would not allow UNPROFOR full access to the areas concerned.

On 2 August 1993, following Croatia's failure to withdraw from the area and Serb shelling thereof, one of the pontoons of the Maslenica bridge sank. However, the Co-Chairmen concluded that there was still enough common ground to continue negotiations. Accepting the invitation of the Co-Chairmen, the parties began negotiations in Geneva on 12 August 1993, on a cease-fire which would include the elements of the original Erdut/Zagreb agreement. Despite intensive discussions in Geneva, Zagreb and Knin between the representatives both of the

Co-Chairmen and of the parties, an overall cease-fire agreement could not be achieved.

On 9 September, after several days of grave incidents in the UNPAs and "pink zones", and rising tensions, shelling intensified on both sides of the confrontation line, and the Croatian Army once again carried out a military incursion in the area of Medak, where three Serb villages were seized. The hostilities worsened on 10 and 11 September. Following the intervention of the Secretary-General's Special Representative and the UNPROFOR Force Commander, and a call from the Security Council, the parties finally agreed to a cease-fire on 15 September. UNPROFOR moved some 500 to 600 troops into the area to replace the Croatian armed forces which eventually withdrew to positions occupied before the incursion began. When UNPROFOR gained access to the area it found that most houses had been deliberately destroyed during the withdrawal. Eighteen corpses were recovered, most of them riddled with multiple bullet wounds or incinerated.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

"No-Fly Zone" Enforcement

On 16 March 1993, the Secretary-General reported that three aircraft dropped bombs on two villages east of Srebrenica on 13 March, before leaving in the direction of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). It was the first time since the Security Council instituted the "no-fly zone" in Bosnia and Herzegovina that aircraft were used in combat activity in that country. UNPROFOR was not able to determine to whom the aircraft belonged.

On 17 March, the Security Council, in a statement by its President, strongly condemned all violations of its relevant resolutions and underlined the fact that since the beginning of the monitoring operations in early November 1992, the United Nations had reported 465 violations of the "no-fly zone". The Council demanded from the Bosnian Serbs an immediate explanation of the violations and particularly of the aerial bombardment of the two villages, and requested the Secretary-General to ensure that an investigation was made of the reported possible use of the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to launch air strikes against Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 27 April, the Secretary-General reported to the Council that on 24 March the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) had been requested to provide any information relevant to the incidents. The only response received was a note verbale

conveying a statement by the Government of that country, in which it stated that "airplanes and helicopters of the Air Forces of the Army of Yugoslavia have not violated the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina since the no-fly zone came into effect".

On 31 March, the Security Council adopted its resolution 816 (1993), by which it extended the ban on military flights to cover flights by all fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council authorized Member States, seven days after the adoption of the resolution, acting nationally or through regional arrangements, to take, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, "all necessary measures" in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure compliance with the ban on flights, and proportionate to the specific circumstances and the nature of flights. It also requested the Member States concerned, the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR to coordinate closely on those measures and on the starting date of the implementation, which was to be no later than 14 days from the date of the resolution, and to report on the starting date to the Council.

On 9 April, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council a letter from the Secretary General of NATO, Dr. Manfred Worner, informing him that the North Atlantic Council had adopted the "necessary arrangements" to ensure compliance with the ban on military flights and that it was prepared to begin the operation at noon GMT on 12 April 1993. Dr. Worner also reported that France, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States had offered to make aircraft available for the operation. In order to commence the enforcement on time, aircraft from France, the Netherlands and the United States were initially deployed in the region and liaison cells were established at UNPROFOR's headquarters in Zagreb and in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Kiseljak). In addition, UNPROFOR would send a liaison team to the command headquarters of the NATO countries concerned.

The operations authorized by resolution 816(1993) started, as scheduled, on 12 April at 12.00 GMT. Subsequently, the Secretary-General was informed by NATO that all the countries offering to make aircraft available for the operation would participate fully in it.

Since the establishment of the "no-fly zone" in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina through 1 December 1994, the total number of flights assessed as apparent violations of the ban was 3,317. The most serious incident took place on 28 February 1994, when NATO

fighters, acting in accordance with the established procedure, shot down four of six jets in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina which had defied the international ban on military flights and ignored two warnings by the NATO fighters.

“Safe Areas”

In March 1993, fighting intensified in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina, with Bosnian Serb paramilitary units attacking several cities in the area, including Srebrenica. The military attacks resulted in a heavy loss of life among the civilian population and severely impeded United Nations humanitarian relief efforts in the area. In mid-March, UNHCR reported that thousands of Muslims were seeking refuge in Srebrenica from surrounding areas which were being attacked and occupied by Serb forces, and that 30 or 40 persons were dying daily from military action, starvation, exposure to cold or lack of medical treatment. In April, despite strong political pressure from the international community and the Security Council, and the efforts by UNPROFOR and UNHCR in the field, the fighting persisted and the humanitarian situation in the area continued to deteriorate.

On 16 April, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, adopted resolution 819 (1993), in which it demanded that all parties treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a “safe area” which should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act. It demanded the immediate withdrawal of Bosnian Serb paramilitary units from areas surrounding Srebrenica and the cessation of armed attacks against that town. The Council requested the Secretary-General to take steps to increase the presence of UNPROFOR in Srebrenica and to arrange for the safe transfer of the ill and wounded, and demanded the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular to the civilian population of Srebrenica.

By other provisions of the resolution, the Council condemned and rejected the deliberate actions of the Bosnian Serb party to force the evacuation of civilians from Srebrenica and other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina in its campaign of “ethnic cleansing”. It also decided to send a mission of Council members to ascertain, firsthand, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Following the adoption of the resolution, UNPROFOR’s Force Commander, the Commander of the Serb forces and the Commander of the Bosnian Muslim forces signed, on 17 April, an agreement for the demilitarisation of Srebrenica. On 21 April, UNPROFOR’s Force

Commander reported that 170 UNPROFOR troops, civilian police and military observers had been deployed in Srebrenica to collect weapons, ammunition, mines, explosives and combat supplies and that by noon on 21 April they had successfully demilitarized the town.

As requested in resolution 819(1993), the Security Council's fact-finding mission, composed of representatives of France, Hungary, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Russian Federation and Venezuela, visited the region from 22 to 27 April. Having considered the mission's report and recommendations, the Security Council adopted resolution 824 (1993) of 6 May, in which it declared that, in addition to Srebrenica, Sarajevo and other such threatened areas, in particular the towns of Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac and their surroundings, should be treated as safe areas by all the parties concerned. The Council further declared that in those areas armed attacks must cease, all Bosnian Serb military or paramilitary units must withdraw and all parties must allow UNPROFOR and the international humanitarian agencies free and unimpeded access to all safe areas. It authorized the strengthening of UNPROFOR's mandate by an additional 50 military observers to monitor the humanitarian situation in those areas.

On 4 June, the Security Council, by its resolution 836 (1993), acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, further expanded the mandate of UNPROFOR to enable it to protect the safe areas, including to deter attacks against them, to monitor the ceasefire, to promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than those of the Bosnian Government and to occupy some key points on the ground. The Council authorized UNPROFOR, acting in self-defence, to take necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas or to armed incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate obstruction to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys. The Council also decided that Member States, acting nationally or through regional arrangements, might take, under its authority, all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas, to support UNPROFOR.

In response to the Council's invitation to report to it on the requirements for implementing the resolution, the Secretary-General, in his report dated 14 June, indicated that it would be necessary to deploy additional troops on the ground and to provide air support. While the UNPROFOR Force Commander had estimated an additional troop requirement of approximately 34,000 to obtain deterrence through strength, the Secretary-General stated that it was possible to start

implementing the resolution under a “light option”, with a minimal troop reinforcement of around 7,600. That option represented an initial approach and had limited objectives. It assumed the consent and cooperation of the parties and provided a basic level of deterrence.

As to the air support, the Secretary-General reported that he had initiated contacts with Member States and had invited NATO to coordinate with him the use of air power in support of UNPROFOR. The Secretary-General pointed out that the first decision to initiate the use of air resources in this context would be taken by him in consultation with the members of the Security Council.

In adopting resolution 844 (1993) of 18 June, the Security Council authorized an additional reinforcement of UNPROFOR initially by 7,600 troops and reaffirmed the use of air power, in and around the declared safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to support the Force.

On 18 August, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that following the necessary training exercises in coordination with NATO, the United Nations had the operational capability for the use of air power in support of UNPROFOR.

Hostilities in Central Bosnia

The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was further aggravated when, in May 1993, intense fighting between the Muslim and Bosnian Croat forces erupted in central Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite the calls by the Security Council, efforts of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee and UNPROFOR, hostilities between the two former allies continued. The fighting intermittently blocked the main supply routes for humanitarian assistance into northern Bosnia, and further restricted the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR and UNHCR in the area. In this connection, UNPROFOR and UNHCR initiated a humanitarian “Operation Lifeline” to keep the main routes open to help ensure the survival of up to 2.7 million people in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the winter.

Border Control

On 10 June 1993, the Security Council, by its resolution 838(1993), requested the Secretary-General to submit a further report on options for the deployment of international observers on the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with priority being given to its borders with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), to monitor the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions. The Council called for international observers to be drawn from the United Nations and, if appropriate, from Member States.

The Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on 1 July. He presented two options and their respective requirements in terms of human and other resources.

On option one, the Secretary-General said that it would be unrealistic for the Security Council to authorize international observers to establish full control over the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina as world-wide resources for additional peace-keeping troops were becoming increasingly stretched. Full border control would require a capability to deny passage and to act where borders had already been crossed. It would also mean that UNPROFOR would supersede the national authorities in respect of certain border-control functions.

Border monitoring was another option identified by the Secretary-General. Observers would only observe and report on Bosnia and Herzegovina's borders, and would not be in a position to check the nature of goods coming into and out of the Republic. Even this more limited option would require substantial additional resources, and the necessary personnel and financing might not be available, he said.

The Secretary-General went on to point out that outstanding contributions to United Nations peacekeeping accounts totalled \$1.26 billion in mid-June 1993, while unpaid assessments amounted to \$2.236 billion. He said it was "highly probable that in the coming months the Organisation will not be able to meet its day-to-day obligations".

On 7 July, the President of the Security Council addressed a letter to the Secretary-General informing him that the members of the Council had considered his report and continued to believe that international observers should be deployed on the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They invited the Secretary-General, bearing in mind the observations in his report, to contact Member States in order to establish whether they were ready, individually or through regional organisations or arrangements, to make qualified personnel available to act as observers along the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and to continue to explore all possibilities for implementation of the border monitors concept.

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

As to UNPROFOR's activities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on 13 July 1993. A Nordic battalion was deployed at Kjojila, east of Skopje, the capital of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and a United States contingent of 315 troops arrived in Skopje in early July, deploying to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia side of the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and

Montenegro) on 20 August 1993. United Nations military observers, civilian police and civil affairs officers had also been deployed. UNPROFOR maintained close cooperation with the CSCE monitor mission and enjoyed an excellent cooperative relationship with the host Government. In his report, the Secretary-General concluded that the Force had so far been successful in its preventive mandate in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Mandate Further Extended

On 20 September 1993, the Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council renew the mandate of UNPROFOR for a period of six months (as is usual with most United Nations peace-keeping operations). In a report dealing primarily with Croatia, the Secretary-General said that he had been "sorely tempted" to recommend the withdrawal of the Force altogether because of the criticism of UNPROFOR by both sides and the dangers and abuse to which its personnel were exposed, but that such a step could only result in further conflict.

The Secretary-General pointed out that key parts of the original United Nations peace-keeping plan for Croatia had been difficult, if not impossible, to implement, and had become more so since the resumption of hostilities following the Croatian incursion of 22 January 1993. He stressed that the fundamental solution to the problem had to be sought through political dialogue, that the parties themselves had to seek such a solution and take steps towards reconciliation. In this process, the principal objective of UNPROFOR could only be to keep the peace, thereby permitting negotiations to take place on overall political settlement. To enhance the security of the Force, he requested the extension of close air support to the territory of Croatia.

While recommending the extension of UNPROFOR's mandate, the Secretary-General suggested that the Council demand that the parties in Croatia conclude an immediate cease-fire and cooperate with UNPROFOR, which must be allowed to fulfil the peace-keeping aspects of its mandate. The Secretary-General intended to report to the Council by 30 November 1993 on the progress made by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and by UNPROFOR, and might at that time make further recommendations, on the basis of developments during the two months and on the course of negotiations undertaken between the parties.

The Secretary-General also stated that should UNPROFOR's mandate be extended, he would give "favourable consideration" to a

suggestion by the President of Croatia that the Force be divided into three parts—UNPROFOR (Croatia), UNPROFOR (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and UNPROFOR (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)—while retaining its integrated military, logistical and administrative structure under the command of one Special Representative of the Secretary-General and one theatre Force Commander.

In the meantime, on 24 September, the Security Council was informed by the Croatian Government that if the mandate of UNPROFOR was not amended to promote energetic implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, Croatia would be forced to request UNPROFOR to leave the country not later than 30 November 1993.

On 4 October 1993, after intensive consultations and two interim extensions of UNPROFOR's mandate—for a 24-hour period on 30 September, and for another four days on 1 October—the Security Council, by its resolution 871 (1993), extended the mandate of the Force for a period of six months, through 31 March 1994. The Council took this action under Chapter VII of the Charter reiterating its determination to ensure the security of UNPROFOR and its freedom of movement.

The Council reaffirmed the crucial importance of the full and prompt implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for Croatia and called upon the signatories of the plan and all others concerned, in particular the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), to cooperate in its full implementation. Declaring that continued non-cooperation in the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Council would have serious consequences, the Council affirmed that full normalisation of the international community's position towards those concerned would take into account their actions in implementing those resolutions, including those relating to the United Nations peacekeeping plan for Croatia.

The Council called for an immediate cease-fire agreement between the Croatian Government and the local Serb authorities in the UNPAs, mediated under the auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. It urged all parties to cooperate with UNPROFOR in reaching and implementing an agreement on confidence-building measures, including the restoration of electricity, water and communications in all regions of Croatia. Stressing the importance of restoring Croatian authority in the "pink zones", the Council called for

the revival of the Joint Commission established under the chairmanship of UNPROFOR.

In addition, the Council took note of the Secretary-General's intention to establish three subordinate commands within UNPROFOR—in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—while retaining all other existing dispositions for the direction and conduct of the United Nations operation in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

The Council decided to continue to review urgently the extension of close air support to UNPROFOR in the territory of Croatia as recommended by the Secretary-General. It authorized UNPROFOR, in carrying out its mandate in Croatia, acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, to ensure its security and its freedom of movement.

It requested the Secretary-General to report within two months on progress towards the implementation of the United Nations peacekeeping plan for Croatia and of all relevant Council resolutions, taking into account the position of the Croatian Government, as well as on the outcome of the International Conference negotiations. In light of that report, the Council would reconsider UNPROFOR's mandate.

Mandate in Croatia Unchanged

As requested by Security Council resolution 871 (1993), the Secretary-General submitted his further report on 1 December 1993. He stated that various initiatives were under way, with the cooperation of the two sides in the Croatian conflict, which could lead to implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for the Republic. Therefore, he would not recommend that the Council reconsider the mandate of UNPROFOR in Croatia at that stage. However, he strongly urged the two sides to intensify their efforts for achieving a cease-fire agreement, for instituting practical measures of economic cooperation and for negotiating a lasting political settlement. He also appealed to them to extend their cooperation to UNPROFOR as if sought to improve conditions in the UNPAs.

The Secretary-General also reported that talks aimed at achieving a comprehensive cease-fire in and around the UNPAs in Croatia and initiating discussions on economic confidence-building steps were continuing within the framework of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.

In a letter dated 17 December 1993, the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Council agreed with the observations contained in his 1 December report regarding the mandate of UNPROFOR in Croatia.

On 17 December 1993, Croat representatives and local Serb authorities in Croatia signed a Christmas Truce Agreement, mediated by UNPROFOR. The two parties undertook to cease all armed hostilities along all existing confrontation lines from midnight on 23 December until midnight on 15 January 1994. They also agreed to implement certain confidence-building measures, and to open negotiations as soon as the truce took effect on a "general and lasting" cease-fire, with the separation of forces on both sides. Subsequently, the truce was extended beyond 15 January and has generally held since then.

Cease-fires in Bosnia not Respected

In the meantime, the military and humanitarian situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to worsen. On 9 November 1993, the Security Council, in a statement by its President, expressed deep concern at the reported deterioration of the situation in central Bosnia and Herzegovina where increased military activities posed a serious threat to the security of the civilian population. The Council was equally concerned at the overall humanitarian situation in that Republic and demanded again that all parties concerned guarantee unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance.

In a separate statement issued on the same day, the Council condemned all attacks and hostile acts against UNPROFOR by all parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in Croatia, "which have become more frequent over the last weeks", and demanded that "they cease forthwith".

Although numerous cease-fire agreements were signed by the warring parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, practically none of them were implemented and the military situation remained grave. Notwithstanding the joint Declarations on the delivery of humanitarian assistance, signed by the three sides at Geneva on 18 and 29 November, 1993, the level of violence, the imposition of bureaucratic procedures hindering the transport of relief goods or the denial of clearance for the passage of UNHCR convoys reduced deliveries of humanitarian assistance to half the amount required. Furthermore, elements of all three sides deliberately fired upon relief convoys and United Nations personnel.

On 7 January 1994, the Security Council, in a Presidential statement, condemned any hostilities in United Nations-designated "safe areas", particularly the relentless bombardment of Sarajevo by Bosnian Serb forces, and demanded an immediate end to attacks against Sarajevo, which had resulted in a large number of civilian casualties, disrupted essential services, and aggravated an already severe humanitarian situation. The Council reaffirmed its commitment to implement all its relevant resolutions, in particular resolution 836 (1993), by which it had authorized UNPROFOR to use force to protect Sarajevo and five towns previously declared "safe areas" in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and expressed its readiness to consider further measures to ensure that all parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina abided by their commitments.

Strongly deploring the deliberate obstruction of humanitarian relief convoys by any party, the Council reiterated its demand for unimpeded access for humanitarian relief assistance, and condemned attacks against personnel of the United Nations and of humanitarian organisations. It also deplored the failure of the parties to honour the cease-fire agreement, condemned the flagrant violations of international humanitarian law and held the perpetrators personally responsible.

Security Council Condemns Croatian Interference in Bosnia

On 28 January 1994, in a letter to the President of the Security Council, the Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina reported that military formations of the regular armed forces of Croatia, supplemented by heavy artillery, armoured vehicles and other war materials, were involved in military actions on his country's territory.

At informal consultations on the same day, the Council asked UNPROFOR to submit an urgent report on the letter. On 1 February, the Secretary-General reported that the Croatian Army (HV) had been directly supporting the Bosnian Croat Army (HVO) with manpower, equipment and weapons for sometime. The number of Croatian soldiers had apparently increased following successful offensives of Bosnian Government forces against the HVO. It was assessed that in total there were approximately 3,000 to 5,000 Croatian regular army personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Secretary-General emphasized, however, that this was an estimation, as it was impossible with UNPROFOR's assets to obtain required information for a more accurate account. The Secretary-General also reported on cross-border movement of military equipment.

In a Presidential statement issued on 3 February, the Security Council strongly condemned Croatia for deploying elements of its Army

and heavy military equipment in the central and southern parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and demanded that they be withdrawn. The Council stated that it would consider "other serious measures", if Croatia failed to put an immediate end to "all forms of interference" in that Republic. The Council requested the Secretary-General to monitor the situation and report within two weeks on progress towards complete and full withdrawal. The Council again condemned the acquisition of territory by force as well as the "practice of 'ethnic cleansing' by whomsoever committed", and reaffirmed the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Secretary-General informed the Council, in a letter dated 18 February 1994, that despite its demand for non-interference in Bosnia and Herzegovina, some 5,000 Croatian Army troops were still believed to remain in that country. Also, no action had been taken regarding the proposed establishment of a monitoring mechanism to verify troop withdrawals.

The Secretary-General also stated that, while no HV command posts nor any full HV brigades operating as formed units had been identified, it appeared that HV troops might be removing their insignia while in Bosnia and Herzegovina. UNPROFOR believed that HV insignia on a number of vehicles had also been erased or repainted. The Secretary-General stated that UNPROFOR would continue to monitor developments to the extent possible.

Question of Air Strikes Arises

In a separate development, the Heads of State and Government participating in the summit meeting of NATO, held in Brussels on 10 and 11 January 1994, issued a Declaration by which, *inter alia*, they deplored, the continuing conflict in the former Yugoslavia. They expressed their continued belief that the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina must be settled at the negotiating table and not on the battlefield, and supported the efforts of the United Nations and the European Union to secure a negotiated settlement in that Republic. They were determined to "eliminate obstacles to the accomplishment of the UNPROFOR mandate" and called for the full implementation of Security Council resolutions regarding the reinforcement of UNPROFOR.

They reaffirmed their readiness under the authority of the Security Council "to carry out air strikes in order to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas and other threatened areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina". In this context, they urged UNPROFOR "to draw up

urgently plans to ensure that the blocked rotation of the UNPROFOR contingent in Srebrenica can take place and to examine how the airport at Tuzla can be opened for humanitarian relief purposes".⁵

On 12 January, the Secretary-General instructed his new Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia, Yasushi Akashi,⁶ to undertake an urgent preparatory study of the proposal. In his report to the Secretary-General on 17 January, the Special Representative reaffirmed the urgent necessity of rotating the contingent in Srebrenica. As to Tuzla, it was concluded that the opening of the main airfield there would improve the flow of humanitarian supplies to the Tuzla safe area. In both cases, it was confirmed that the use of air power could make an important contribution if a military operation by UNPROFOR was needed for those purposes.

On 18 January, the Secretary-General sent a letter to the President of the Security Council, conveying those conclusions. He indicated, however, that in both cases the use of air power to attain proposed objectives would require military assets in excess of what was available to UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Secretary-General also stated that the new proposal to use air power implied that UNPROFOR could launch offensive action against Bosnian Serb elements which obstructed—or threatened to obstruct—its operations. UNPROFOR had previously been allowed to use air support only in defence of United Nations personnel.

The Secretary-General instructed Akashi, with the assistance of the UNPROFOR Force Commander, to prepare detailed plans for military operations, including the use of air power as required, to ensure the rotation of the contingent in Srebrenica and the opening of the main airfield at Tuzla in close coordination with NATO's Southern Command. The Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Marrack Goulding, was sent to Brussels to brief the Secretary-General of NATO on the matter.

On 28 January, the Secretary-General submitted a letter to the President of the Council, containing three scenarios envisaged under the plans prepared under Akashi's direction by the UNPROFOR Force Commander. In the first scenario, troops in Srebrenica and Zepa could be rotated and the Tuzla airport opened through negotiations and with the consent of the parties. In the second, if the parties did not consent, but were judged unlikely to use military force, existing UNPROFOR military assets would be used with the support, if necessary, of NATO air power. In the third scenario, if the parties resorted to military force, UNPROFOR would use available assets,

reinforced with additional troops and equipment contributed by United Nations Member States, and supported, if necessary, by NATO air power.

The first two scenarios, the Secretary-General pointed out, represented "a measured step-by-step approach geared to the attitude of the parties", while the third scenario would imply "a different level of military action" and could not be implemented without Security Council authorisation and the deployment of additional troops in the area.

The Secretary-General stated that he would not hesitate to initiate the use of close air support if UNPROFOR were attacked while implementing plans to rotate peace-keepers in Srebrenica and Zepa and to open Tuzla airport. At the same time, he distinguished between close air support involving the use of air power for self-defence, which had already been authorized by NATO, and air strikes for pre-emptive or punitive purposes. NATO forces were not authorized to launch the latter types of air strikes without a decision of the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

The Secretary-General said he hoped that the troops could be rotated and the airport opened in accordance with the first scenario, namely, by mutual agreement. However, he noted that UNPROFOR's mandate regarding safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina had been adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and the Force did not have to seek the consent of the parties for operations falling within its mandate.

The Secretary-General warned that "any resort to the second scenario, and *a fortiori* to the third scenario" would entail considerable risk for UNPROFOR's operations and for the troops involved in its implementation, as well as for the humanitarian assistance operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nevertheless, he instructed the Special Representative to "pursue actively", in direct contact with the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs, the implementation of the two plans. In the specific circumstances of UNPROFOR operations in Srebrenica and Tuzla, the Secretary-General delegated to his Special Representative the authority to approve a request for close air support from the Force Commander.

In concluding his letter to the Council's President, the Secretary-General pointed to the fact that all parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina were trying to take tactical advantage of UNPROFOR's presence and were increasingly questioning its impartiality. He believed that the time had come to reflect on the role of UNPROFOR, and he would

undertake a comprehensive review of its functions and responsibilities prior to the Council's consideration of the renewal of the mandate in March 1994.

On 1 March 1994, the Bosnian Serbs, following talks with high-ranking officials of the Russian Federation in Moscow, agreed to open the Tuzla airport for humanitarian purposes. Deployment of UNPROFOR troops around the airport began in early March in preparation for an airlift that was expected to bring relief supplies to hundreds of thousands of people in the area. The first UNPROFOR flight landed in Tuzla on 22 March 1994.

The rotation of troops in Srebrenica, after protracted negotiations with the Bosnian Serb side, was completed on 10 March 1994, with the Dutch troops replacing the Canadian contingent.

Air Strikes Authorisation Sought

Meanwhile, fighting in and around Sarajevo continued unabated, including lethal mortar attacks against civilian targets. On 5 February 1994, a 120-mm mortar round fired at the central market killed at least 58 civilians and wounded 142 others in the worst single incident of the 22-month war. This followed a similar attack on one of the suburbs of Sarajevo on 4 February 1994 in which 10 civilians were killed and 18 injured.

These acts were strongly condemned by the international community. The Secretary-General immediately instructed his Special Representative and the Force Commander of UNPROFOR to proceed to Sarajevo in order to supervise the investigation of the incidents and to prevent further atrocities.

After initial investigation, UNPROFOR established that the round fired on 4 February had come from a Bosnian Serb position, but it had not been possible to locate the source of the attack against the central market on 5 February.⁷ In a letter dated 6 February to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated that those two incidents made it necessary, in accordance with resolution 836 (1993),⁸ to prepare urgently for the use of air strikes to deter further such attacks. The Secretary-General also informed the Council that he had requested the Secretary General of NATO to obtain "a decision by the North Atlantic Council to authorize the Commander-in-Chief of NATO's Southern Command to launch air strikes, at the request of the United Nations, against artillery or mortar positions in and around Sarajevo which are determined by UNPROFOR to be responsible for attacks against civilian targets in that city".

Ten-Day Deadline is Set

On 9 February, moving to end the strangulation of Sarajevo, the NAC issued a statement calling "for the withdrawal, or regrouping and placing under UNPROFOR control, within ten days, of heavy weapons (including tanks, artillery pieces, mortars, multiple rocket launchers, missiles and anti-aircraft weapons) of the Bosnian Serb forces located in the area within 20 kilometres (about 12.4 miles) of the centre of Sarajevo, and excluding the area within 2 kilometres (about 1.2 miles) of the centre of Pale".⁹ It also called upon the Muslim-led Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, within the same period, "to place the heavy weapons in its possession within the Sarajevo exclusion zone described above under UNPROFOR control, and to refrain from attacks launched from within the current confrontation lines in the city".

The NAC decided that, ten days from 2400 GMT 10 February 1994, heavy weapons of any of the parties found within the Sarajevo exclusion zone, unless controlled by UNPROFOR, would, along with their direct and essential military support facilities, be subject to NATO air strikes. The strikes would be conducted in close coordination with the United Nations Secretary-General. The NAC accepted the 6 February 1994 request of the United Nations Secretary-General and authorized the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, to launch air strikes, at the request of the United Nations, against artillery or mortar positions in or around Sarajevo, including any outside the exclusion zone, which were determined by UNPROFOR to be responsible for attacks against civilian targets in that city.

In a parallel development, a few hours prior to the announcement of the NATO decision of 9 February, a cease-fire agreement had been reached between the warring parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina regarding the area in and around Sarajevo. The agreement followed intensive discussions at the political and military levels brokered by the Secretary-General's Special Representative, the Force Commander of UNPROFOR and UNPROFOR's Sector Commander for Sarajevo. The agreement involved the positioning of UNPROFOR troops in sensitive areas, monitoring, and the placing of all heavy weapons under UNPROFOR's control.

Preparations for Air Strikes

Immediately following the decision by NATO, the United Nations Secretary-General instructed his Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia to finalize, with the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces

Southern Europe, detailed procedures for the initiation and conduct of air strikes. He delegated to the Special Representative the authority to approve a request from the UNPROFOR Force Commander for close air support for the defence of United Nations personnel anywhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Secretary-General also instructed him and UNPROFOR military authorities to negotiate arrangements under which: (a) there would be an effective cease-fire in and around Sarajevo; (b) the heavy weapons of the Bosnian Serb forces would be withdrawn or regrouped and placed under UNPROFOR control; and (c) the heavy weapons of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be placed under UNPROFOR control.

Council Considers Situation in Bosnia

On 10 February 1994, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation stated that NATO's call for the parties—both the Serbs and the Muslims—to place the heavy weapons deployed in the Sarajevo area under United Nations control or to withdraw them from the area was close to the Russian position. At the same time, however, the Russian Federation could not agree with the position of a number of NATO members which interpreted the NATO decision as “a one-sided ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs, who are being threatened by air strikes”. It requested an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council, open to all countries concerned, to consider practical ways to demilitarize Sarajevo and to introduce a United Nations administration there. A Security Council meeting to discuss the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was also requested by the Government of that country and Pakistan.

The Council met on 14-15 February 1994. Over the course of four meetings, it heard from a total of 58 speakers. Member States generally welcomed the decision by NATO and the steps taken by the Secretary-General to prepare for the use of force, adding that those actions had been fully authorized by existing Council resolutions. They emphasized that force was designed to underpin efforts by the United Nations and the European Union to achieve a negotiated settlement of the conflict, and that air strikes had to be carried out with caution and precision. Although the NATO ultimatum was widely supported, several Member States either opposed it or expressed concern that, as a result of air strikes, UNPROFOR might become a target for retaliatory measures. No Security Council resolution or statement was put forward during the meetings.

Heavy Weapons Withdrawn

On 17 February 1994, following a meeting with Russian officials in Bosnia, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to withdraw within two days all their heavy weapons to the distance set by NATO. On 18 February, after discussions in Sarajevo with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, and later in Zagreb with the Commander-in-Chief of NATO Southern Command, the Secretary-General's Special Representative reported that progress was being made towards achieving a durable ceasefire, disarmament and disengagement, with a clear-cut role for UNPROFOR.

There was agreement with the Bosnian Serb leader on having extensive and unhindered UNPROFOR patrolling within the weapons exclusion zone covering the 20-kilometre radius from the centre of Sarajevo. Heavy weapons not withdrawn from the exclusion zone would be grouped and placed in seven different sites, under the control of armed UNPROFOR elements. An agreement had also been reached with regard to communications, with the full assurance that hot-lines would be established between UNPROFOR and the Bosnian Serb and Muslim sides.

On 20 February 1994, the Security Council met in informal consultations at the request of the Russian Federation, with the NATO deadline for withdrawal of heavy weapons scheduled for midnight that night. The Council was briefed by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, Kofi Annan, who reported that according to the Secretary-General's Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia, the UNPROFOR Force Commander and NATO, Serbian compliance with the ultimatum had been effective. Certain weapons on both the Serb and Muslim sides, which had not been removed from the exclusion zone, would be monitored in place by UNPROFOR. As a result, the Council decided, in coordination with NATO, not to recommend that air strikes be carried out at that time.

The Under-Secretary-General also urged Member States to contribute additional troops with equipment to facilitate the monitoring of the weapons withdrawal and the cease-fire in and around Sarajevo. United Nations troops had been temporarily redeployed for that purpose from other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and from Croatia, but they were still needed in those areas.

Agreement on Cease-fire

In another positive development, military representatives of the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Croat sides signed, on 23

February 1994, a cease-fire agreement. Under this agreement, reached at a meeting hosted by UNPROFOR in Zagreb, Croatia, the two parties agreed to the immediate and total cessation of hostilities with effect from noon on Friday, 25 February 1994, a halt to all forms of propaganda against one another, and a fixing of lines of contact and positions as of the time of the cease-fire. UNPROFOR forces were to be positioned at key points; heavy weapons were to be withdrawn or put under UNPROFOR control, and a Joint Commission was to be established, with representatives of both sides and chaired by UNPROFOR.

UNPROFOR: MARCH 1994–NOVEMBER 1994

Increase in Strength Requested

On 4 March 1994, the Security Council adopted its resolution 900 (1994). The Council called on all parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina to cooperate with UNPROFOR in the consolidation of the cease-fire in and around Sarajevo; to achieve complete freedom of movement for the civilian population and humanitarian goods to, from and within Sarajevo; and to help restore normal life to the city.

The Council requested the Secretary-General to appoint a senior civilian official to draw up an overall assessment and plan of action for the restoration of essential public services in the various opstinas of Sarajevo, other than the city of Pale; and invited him to establish a voluntary trust fund for that purpose.

The Council further requested the Secretary-General to present a report on the feasibility and modalities for the application of protection, defined in resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993), to Maglaj, Mostar and Vitez, taking into account all developments both on the ground and in the negotiations between the parties.

The Secretary-General submitted his report on 11 March 1994. He estimated that the implementation of resolution 900 (1994) would require an increase of the authorized strength of UNPROFOR by a total of 8,250 additional troops, 150 military observers and 275 civilian police monitors. Of these additional troops, 2,200 would be required for the operation in and around Sarajevo and 6,050 for operations in central Bosnia, including Mostar and Vitez. A further 1,500 troops would be needed if the Council were to extend the safe area concept to Maglaj.

The Secretary-General noted that recent developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina had created a new situation, which "should provide

numerous opportunities for UNPROFOR to make substantial progress" in the implementation of its mandate. UNPROFOR's ability to achieve those objectives, however, was severely limited by the lack of military resources. If Member States did not provide the necessary personnel, its mandate would have to be modified. "It would be a tragedy for the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina if the present opportunity were lost for lack of resources," he concluded.

As to the restoration of the essential services in Sarajevo, the Secretary-General reported that on 1 March 1994, UNPROFOR had established an Interim Coordination Board to act as a temporary focal point for the various organisations operating in that city. The Board would prepare a comprehensive status report, which would provide the basis for the plan requested by Security Council resolution 900 (1994). The Secretary-General also stated that he would shortly announce the appointment of a senior civilian official, with the title of Special Coordinator, who would coordinate the initial efforts under the overall authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. On 21 March 1994, the Secretary-General established a voluntary trust fund for the restoration of essential public services in and around Sarajevo. On 30 March 1994, the Secretary-General appointed William L. Eagleton, a United States national, as the Special Coordinator for Sarajevo.

Extension of Mandate Recommended

In a separate report submitted to the Security Council on 16 March 1994, the Secretary-General recommended the renewal of the Force's mandate for a further 12 months beyond 31 March 1994. The report contained the outcome of a thorough review of the role and functioning of the Force. The Secretary-General stated that the continuing conflict in UNPROFOR's area of operations since its mandate was last renewed had led to considerable, but unjustified, criticism of the effectiveness of the Force. Those, together with mounting threats to the safety and security of United Nations personnel and the continuing failure of Member States to honour their financial obligations to UNPROFOR in full and on time, had led him to consider seriously whether the continuation of the Force constituted a worthwhile use of the limited peace-keeping resources of the United Nations.

The diversity and scope of the problems in the former Yugoslavia, the Secretary-General continued, required the deployment of more military forces than troop-contributing nations appeared to be prepared, at that time, to make available. The encouraging developments around

Sarajevo at the end of February 1994, however, provided reason for hope that an overall political settlement might at last be within reach. Since UNPROFOR's deployment embodied the will of the international community to help the parties to arrive at such a settlement, "I believe I must recommend its prolongation", said the Secretary-General. He added that, in turn, it was the responsibility of the parties to seize the opportunity provided by UNPROFOR's continuation to demonstrate by their conduct—on the ground and at the negotiating table—that they were seriously committed to pursuing the path of peace. "If they are, the United Nations stands ready, as always, to help them", he said.

Reopening of Tuzla Airport

In yet another report submitted to the Security Council on 24 March 1994, the Secretary-General outlined his plans for the reopening of Tuzla airport, under UNPROFOR's exclusive authority, for the delivery of humanitarian supplies and related purposes. It was estimated that approximately 800,000 people lived in the Tuzla region, 240,000 of them being refugees and displaced persons and another 200,000 being considered cases in need of assistance. Because of the fighting in central Bosnia, the region had been effectively cut off from normal commercial traffic for almost one year, which had made almost the entire population dependent on humanitarian assistance for its survival.

Tuzla airport would be opened for UNPROFOR and humanitarian use only, and restricted to UNPROFOR and humanitarian airlift coordinated by UNHCR. The Secretary-General stated that, in addition to the Nordic battalion already deployed at the airfield, operating the airport would require a number of support staff to carry out various communications, administrative, transportation, engineer and logistics support tasks. Apart from those functions, UNPROFOR identified a need for some 120 specialist personnel, 20 military observers and 20 United Nations civilian police monitors.

Cease-Fire Agreement in Croatia

On 29 March 1994, in Zagreb, representatives of the Government of Croatia and the local Serb authorities in UNPAs concluded a cease-fire agreement aiming to achieve a lasting cessation of hostilities. The agreement was concluded in the presence of the representatives of the Russian Federation and of the United States, and witnessed by the representatives of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and the Force Commander of UNPROFOR.

In his 30 March 1994 letter to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General reported that the implementation of this cease-fire agreement would involve, *inter alia*, the interpositioning of UNPROFOR forces in a zone of separation of varying width, the establishment of additional control points, observation posts and patrols, as well as the monitoring of the withdrawal of heavy weapons out of range of the contact line. In order to enable UNPROFOR to perform the functions called for in the agreement, the Secretary-General recommended that the Council increase the authorized strength of the Force by four mechanized infantry companies (one mechanized infantry battalion of 1,000 all ranks) and four engineer companies (600 all ranks). In addition, a helicopter squadron of at least six helicopters with 200 all ranks would be needed for effective monitoring of the cease-fire agreement.

UNPROFOR Mandate Extended

On 31 March 1994, the Security Council, by its resolution 908 (1994), extended the mandate of UNPROFOR for an additional six-month period terminating on 30 September 1994 and decided, as an initial step, to increase the Force's strength by an additional 3,500 troops. It also decided to take action by 30 April 1994 at the latest on further troop requirements recommended by the Secretary-General in his reports of 11 March and of 16 March 1994 and his letter of 30 March 1994.

The Council approved UNPROFOR's plans for the reopening of Tuzla airport for humanitarian purposes and authorized additional resources recommended by the Secretary-General for that purpose. It called on Member States to contribute personnel, equipment and training in support of those activities.

By other terms of the resolution, the Council decided that Member States might take all necessary measures to extend close air support to the territory of Croatia in defence of UNPROFOR personnel in the performance of its mandate, under the authority of the Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR. It further authorized the Force to carry out tasks relating to the cease-fire entered into by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Croat party.

The Council urged the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb authorities in the UNPAs to comply with the cease-fire agreement signed on 29 March 1994, and welcomed the efforts undertaken by UNPROFOR towards implementing this agreement.

The Council also welcomed the appointment of the Special Coordinator for Sarajevo and the establishment of a voluntary trust fund for the restoration of essential public services in and around that city.

By the same resolution, the Council demanded that the Bosnian Serb party cease all military operations against the town of Maglaj and requested the Secretary-General to keep the situation there under review and to report to the Council as appropriate.

On 27 April 1994, the Security Council, by its resolution 914(1994), authorized, as recommended by the Secretary-General, an increase in the strength of UNPROFOR of up to 6,550 additional troops, 150 military observers and 275 civilian police monitors, in addition to the reinforcement already approved in resolution 908 (1994).

SITUATION IN GORAZDE

Offensive Against Safe Area

At the end of March 1994, the Bosnian Serb forces launched an infantry and artillery offensive against the United Nations safe area of Gorazde. The indiscriminate shelling of the city and of the outlying villages led to considerable casualties among the civilian population.

On 6 April 1994, the Security Council, in a statement by its President, strongly condemned the shelling and infantry and artillery attacks against the safe area of Gorazde and demanded the immediate cessation of further attacks against the city. The Council called on all concerned fully to respect safe areas, in accordance with its resolution 824 (1993). It also welcomed measures being taken by UNPROFOR to strengthen its presence in Gorazde.

Despite the Council's demand and UNPROFOR's efforts to arrange for a cease-fire, attacks against Gorazde continued unabated. After United Nations military observers in the city were endangered by Serb shelling, UNPROFOR Command requested NATO to use close air support for self-defence of United Nations personnel. Consequently, on 10 and 11 April 1994, aircraft belonging to NATO bombed Bosnian Serb positions.

Notwithstanding Bosnian Serbs repeated commitments to a cease-fire, however, the heavy shelling of the city did not cease. On 18 April, after the situation in and around Gorazde became extremely dire, the Secretary-General asked NATO to authorize the use of air strikes, at the request of the United Nations, against artillery, mortar positions

or tanks attacking civilians in Gorazde, as well as in four other safe areas, namely the towns of Tuzla, Zepa, Bihac and Srebrenica. In a letter to the NATO Secretary-General, he noted that permission for such air-strikes had already been given regarding Sarajevo and said that the tragic events in Gorazde demonstrated the need for the NATO Council to take similar decisions on the other safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

NATO Authorises Use of Air Strikes

On 22 April 1994, the NAC authorized the use of air strikes against Bosnian Serb military targets around Gorazde if the Bosnian Serbs did not end their attacks against the safe area immediately, pull their forces back three kilometres from the city centre by 0001 GMT on 24 April 1994, and allow United Nations forces and humanitarian relief convoys freedom of movement there. The NAC agreed that a "military exclusion zone" (within the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina) be established for 20 kilometres around Gorazde, which called for all Bosnian Serb heavy weapons (including tanks, artillery pieces, mortars, multiple rocket launchers, missiles and anti-aircraft weapons) to be withdrawn by 0001 GMT on 27 April 1994. The NAC also agreed on similar arrangements for four other safe areas if they were attacked by heavy weapons from any range or if there was a concentration or movement of heavy weapons within a radius of 20 kilometres of these areas.

NATO reaffirmed its readiness to provide close air support should the Bosnian Serbs attack UNPROFOR or other United Nations personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or forcibly interfere with the implementation of their mandate. It also called on the Bosnian Government not to undertake offensive action from within Gorazde.

Security Council Demands Withdrawal

On the same day, the Security Council, by its resolution 913 (1994), condemned the shelling and attacks by Bosnian Serb forces against the safe area of Gorazde and demanded the withdrawal of those forces and their weapons to a distance from which they would cease to threaten the safe area. It demanded the immediate conclusion of a cease-fire agreement in Gorazde and throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, under the auspices of UNPROFOR. The Council also demanded an end to any provocative action in and around the safe areas, the immediate release of all United Nations personnel held by Bosnian Serb forces and unimpeded freedom of movement for UNPROFOR. Underlying the urgent need to intensify efforts towards

an overall political settlement, the Council called for the intensification of close consultation between the United States and the Russian Federation and the United Nations and the European Union with the aim of bringing together diplomatic initiatives.

By other terms of the resolution, the Council also invited the Secretary-General to take necessary steps to ensure that UNPROFOR was able to monitor the situation in Gorazde and to ensure respect for any cease-fire and disengagement of military forces, including measures to put heavy weapons under United Nations control.

Deadline is Met

On 23 April, an agreement was reached between UNPROFOR and the Bosnian Serb civilian and military authorities. It called for an immediate and total ceasefire in and around Gorazde from 1000 hours GMT on 23 April and the urgent deployment of an UNPROFOR battalion in an area within a three-kilometre radius from the centre of the city. It was also agreed that heavy weapons would be withdrawn, not later than 2200 hours GMT on 26 April, out of an area within a 20-kilometre radius from the centre of Gorazde.

Although the Bosnian Serbs had not yet fully complied when the 24 April deadline expired, the Force Commander of UNPROFOR decided against the immediate use of air strikes. UNPROFOR felt that significant progress was being made and that the Serbs would soon comply with the ultimatum. In addition, it was important to get United Nations troops and medical units into Gorazde as quickly as possible and the air strikes might have jeopardized that operation.

On 26 April 1994, the United Nations Secretary-General announced that Bosnian Serb forces had complied with the demand that they cease their attacks on Gorazde and pulled their forces and heavy weapons out of the 20-kilometre exclusion zone around the city. He noted that the United Nations had some 500 personnel in Gorazde, and was evacuating the most seriously wounded, and bringing in relief supplies.

The Secretary-General stated that the Security Council, with the support of NATO, had taken a clear position that there must be no further threats to any of the safe areas, United Nations humanitarian efforts must continue unimpeded, and all sides must commit to a meaningful cease-fire and negotiate in good faith a political solution.

On 19 May, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on the situation in Gorazde. The situation had remained tense although

the cease-fire within the 3-km total exclusion zone, as well as the 20-km heavy weapon exclusion zone, had been largely respected.

Refining of Safe-Area Concept Needed

In his 9 May 1994 report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General shared his thoughts with regard to the concept of United Nations safe areas. After analysing the results achieved and lessons learned in establishing the safe areas in Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac, he suggested that the successful implementation of that concept required the acceptance of three overriding principles:

- (a) That the intention of safe areas is primarily to protect people and not to defend territory and that UNPROFOR'S protection of these areas is not intended to make it a party to the conflict;
- (b) That the method of execution of the safe-area task should not, if possible, detract from, but rather enhance, UNPROFOR's original mandates in Bosnia and Herzegovina, namely supporting humanitarian assistance operations and contributing to the overall peace process through the implementation of ceasefires and local disengagements;
- (c) That the mandate must take into account UNPROFOR's resource limitations and the conflicting priorities that inevitably arise from unfolding events.

According to the Secretary-General's report, in addition to the arrangements already in place for protection of the safe areas, it was necessary: (a) that the UNPROFOR mission in relation to the safe areas be clearly defined; (b) that the safe areas be delineated, as proposed by UNPROFOR; (c) that they be respected; (d) that complete freedom of movement, on a "notification" (as opposed to "clearance") basis, be ensured for the provision of humanitarian aid to the safe areas, as a prelude to further normalisation, including the resumption of commercial traffic.

The Secretary-General believed that safe areas could be made somewhat more effective and manageable. On the other hand, because of difficulties in their implementation as well as their limited effect, it must be recognized that safe areas did not in themselves represent a long-term solution to the fundamental conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which required a political and territorial solution. The Secretary-General therefore viewed the safe-area concept as a temporary mechanism by which some vulnerable populations could be

protected pending a comprehensive negotiated political settlement. In this respect, UNPROFOR's protection of the civilian population in safe areas must be implemented so as to provide a positive contribution to the peace process, and not to detract from it.

Cease-fire Agreement Lapses

On 1 June, the Security Council issued a statement by its President in which it reiterated the urgent need for a comprehensive cessation of hostilities throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and called upon parties to resume, without preconditions, serious efforts to reach a political settlement. In that regard, it fully supported efforts by the Secretary-General's Special Representative and the UNPROFOR Force Commander to negotiate such a cessation of hostilities. The Council welcomed the decision to convene in Geneva a meeting with the delegations of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the Bosnian Serb side.

The meeting was held from 6 to 8 June. On 8 June, after three rounds of discussions held with both sides, the parties signed an agreement according to which they would not engage in any offensive military operations or provocative actions for one month. The agreement came into effect from 1200 hours GMT on 10 June 1994. The agreement also provided for the immediate release, under the auspices of the ICRC, of prisoners-of-war and detainees and the exchange of information on persons whose whereabouts were unknown.

While that agreement was still in effect, Government forces attempted to capture dominating terrain or to secure routes in the areas of Ozren and Travnik. At the same time, Bosnian Serb elements continued to expel Muslim civilians from the Banja Luka and Bijeljina areas and imposed new restrictions on the movement of UNHCR convoys. The agreement, which was renewed for an additional month in July, lapsed on 8 August 1994.

Another Peace Plan Rejected

Successive blueprints for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been drawn up with the parties and then subsequently repudiated by one side or the other: the Carrington-Cutiliero plan, the Vance-Owen plan, the "HMS Invincible" package, the European Union Action Plan. In January-February 1994, the parties, in talks held under the auspices of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, reiterated their acceptance of a constitutional framework

and modalities for the implementation and monitoring of a cessation of hostilities and on the greater part of a map for the allocation of the territory. However, disagreement remained on, at most, 2 per cent of the territory.

In an effort to overcome the impasse, consultations took place involving the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee, and interested Governments. Following the introduction of a heavy-weapon exclusion zone, the involvement of NATO and the redeployment of a Russian UNPROFOR contingent from Sector East to Sarajevo, it became necessary for the Governments of France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to become more deeply involved in the peace process.

The United States took the lead in establishing a Bosniac-Croat Federation and a confederation between Croatia and the federation. The signing of the Framework Agreements, which took place in Washington on 1 March was followed on 10 May by the signature of the Washington accords for the creation of the Bosniac-Croat Federation. Meanwhile on 25 April, a Contact Group was established involving, at ministerial level, the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and the two Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee.

The Contact Group drew up a map for the allocation of territory between the Bosniac-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb entity (the so-called "Republic Srpska") and submitted it to the two sides on 6 July. The map allocated 51 per cent to the Bosniac-Croat Federation and 49 per cent to the Bosnian Serbs. The Contact Group, supported by the Security Council and the Council of Ministers of the European Union, as well as by Governments and organisations world-wide, informed the parties that the proposed map would have to be accepted as presented, unless the parties could agree between themselves on changes. At the end of July, the Bosniac-Croat Federation accepted the map. The Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) also accepted the map. Leaders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) urged the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept the map. The Bosnian Serb side, however, rejected it.

Border Closed

In early August, in an effort to persuade the Bosnian Serb authorities to accept the map, the authorities of the Federal Republic

of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) severed economic and political relations with the Bosnian Serb leaders and took measures to cut off telecommunications between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Bosnian Serb-controlled territory, to deny visits to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) by Bosnian Serb officials and to close the 300-mile border to all traffic except for food, clothing and medical assistance.

In September, after detailed discussions with the Co-Chairmen and the staff of the International Conference, the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) agreed that the Conference would send a mission which would control the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance at designated crossing-points and would have freedom of access elsewhere in the country. The Mission would report to the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee and, through them, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Presidency of the European Union, on the implementation of the border closure. It would consist of international civilian staff made available to the International Conference.

The initial party of the Mission arrived in Belgrade on 14 September, and on 16 September it sent out its first reconnaissance team to visit a number of border crossings. As of 20 September, the Mission had 52 international staff. On 19 September, the Co-Chairmen informed the Secretary-General that the Mission had reported that the Federal Government and the federal authorities had fully cooperated with the Mission. The Mission's first impressions from the border areas seemed to verify that the Federal Government was taking "every action to seal off the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Bosnia and Herzegovina effectively".

On 23 September, the Security Council, by its resolution 943 (1994), welcomed the decision by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to close the international border with Bosnia and Herzegovina. It decided to suspend several economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for an initial period of 100 days following the receipt by the Secretary-General of a certification that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) were effectively implementing their decision to close the border. It would suspend restrictions on air travel for civilian passengers and personal effects; suspend the impoundment of vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft; suspend restrictions on maritime traffic, particularly the

ferry service between Bar in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Bari in Italy carrying only passengers and personal effects; and suspend restrictions on sporting events and cultural exchanges.

The Council also requested that every thirty days the Secretary-General submit to it a report as on certification by the Co-Chairmen that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) were effectively implementing their decision to close the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Since the adoption of resolution 943 (1994), the Co-Chairmen have submitted two reports on 3 October and 2 November, certifying that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) was meeting its commitment to close the border between that country and the areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces. As of 2 November 1994, the Mission of the International Conference had 118 international personnel from Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, the European Union, Finland, France, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Sanctions Strengthened

On 23 September, the Security Council, by its resolution 942(1994), welcomed the territorial settlement for Bosnia and Herzegovina proposed by the Contact Group, strongly condemned the Bosnian Serb party for their refusal to accept it, and decided to strengthen the sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs. The sanctions, which apply to "all activities of an economic nature, including commercial, financial and industrial activities and transactions", would be reconsidered if the Bosnian Serbs unconditionally accepted the proposed territorial settlement.

The text of the two-part 22-paragraph resolution referred in particular to all economic activities involving property—funds, financial, tangible and intangible assets, property rights, and publicly and privately traded securities and debt instruments and any other financial and economic resources.

The Council also decided that States should freeze financial assets held in their countries by Bosnian Serbs or entities under their control and take steps to prevent the diversion of benefits to areas controlled by the Bosnian Serbs. States should also prevent any economic activities carried on with any entity directly or indirectly controlled by persons

or entities resident or incorporated in areas controlled by Bosnian Serbs, or with those acting on behalf of such persons or entities.

By the terms of the resolution, all commercial riverine traffic was prohibited from entering the ports in areas under Bosnian Serb control.

Excepted from the sanctions were medical supplies, foodstuffs and goods for essential humanitarian needs. In addition, States might authorize economic activities to be carried on within their territories when they were satisfied that such activities did not result in the transfer of assets to areas controlled by the Bosnian Serbs.

The Council decided that States should prevent from entering their territory Bosnian Serbian authorities and persons who violated this and other relevant Council resolutions. The Council also decided to review the sanctions whenever appropriate and in any event, every four months.

Further Developments in Former Yugoslavia

In mid-September 1994, in view of the expiration of UNPROFOR mandate by the end of the month, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a further report providing an account of the developments in the former Yugoslavia since March 1994.

Croatia

Analysing the situation in Croatia, the Secretary-General stated that UNPROFOR's activities in that country were focusing on the monitoring of the general ceasefire agreement signed in Zagreb on 29 March 1994 by the Government of Croatia and the local Serb authorities in the UNPAs. The agreement constituted a major achievement that had significantly reduced active hostilities between the conflicting sides in Croatia. By the end of May, UNPROFOR reported almost total compliance, characterized by a general cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of forces beyond fixed lines of separation and the placement of heavy weapons in agreed storage sites. UNPROFOR assumed exclusive control over the zone of separation, covering an area of over 1,300 square kilometres.

In the following months, UNPROFOR focused on strengthening compliance with the cease-fire agreement. These efforts, however, faced several setbacks involving a number of violations by both sides of the cease-fire agreement in the UNPAs.

In addition, the Association of Displaced Persons of Croatia in early July imposed a blockade on all the crossing-points into or within

the UNPAs, in order to draw attention to their plight and apply pressure on UNPROFOR to expedite their return to their homes in the Protected Areas. After a series of high-level discussions between UNPROFOR and Croatian authorities and following the Security Council's presidential statement of 11 August 1994, the blockade was eventually lifted on 19 August. Although 17 of the 19 crossing-points were reopened, tensions persisted on this issue.

Despite these setbacks and violations, both sides continued to express support for the cease-fire agreement, and UNPROFOR intensified its efforts to restore full compliance with its provisions.

It was hoped, the Secretary-General said, that after the cease-fire agreement, the parties would begin comprehensive discussions on issues of mutual economic benefit, followed by talks on a final political settlement, under the auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. However, during the months of April and May, local Serb authorities in Knin issued a number of statements that appeared to close the door on political reconciliation. They announced their intention to pursue full integration with other Serb areas in the former Yugoslavia and stipulated unrealistic preconditions for talks. It proved impossible to open negotiations at that stage.

In August, following renewed mediation efforts by the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, senior officials from the Croatian Government and local Serb authorities were brought together for discussions in Knin. Committing themselves to continuing the negotiating process, they agreed to establish eight expert groups to prepare for future negotiation on specific economic issues.

The Secretary-General also recalled (not by its resolution 908 (1994), the Security Council had authorized the extension of close air support to the territory of Croatia. Discussions between NATO and UNPROFOR were continuing on technical aspects of this issue.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Describing the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Secretary-General noted that following the signature on 23 February 1994 of a cease-fire agreement between the Bosnian Government army and the Bosnian Croat forces, as well as the agreement subsequently reached in Washington on 10 May 1994 on the creation of the Bosniac-Croat Federation, UNPROFOR was closely involved in the implementation of all its military aspects, bringing a large degree of stability and peace to central Bosnia and western Herzegovina. UNPROFOR was instrumental in achieving a breakthrough in an agreement on freedom

of movement in the Mostar area, which was implemented on 23 May, and resulted in a rapid improvement in the quality of life for residents on the eastern bank of the Neretva River. UNPROFOR also played an important role in monitoring the demilitarisation of Mostar, a pre-condition for the establishment of the European Union administration in that city on 23 July 1994. In central Bosnia, UNPROFOR was also involved in negotiations on freedom of movement both for the population and for commercial traffic. While freedom of movement was not yet complete, some commercial convoys, under the security provided by UNPROFOR's presence, were able to move from the coast to southern, central and northern Bosnia.

Also, on the positive side, the Secretary-General referred to the establishment of the cease-fire in Gorazde in April 1994, which was largely respected since then, and of the exclusion zone around that city. Also, in late April, tensions mounted in and around the strategically important Posavina corridor, with frequent artillery, mortar and rocket exchanges affecting the Brcko, Tuzla and Orasje areas. In response, UNPROFOR mediated between the parties and eventually deployed United Nations military observers in and around Brcko. That deployment significantly contributed to reducing tension and making an offensive by either side less likely.

The Secretary-General referred further to the signing on 17 March 1994 of an agreement between the Government and the Bosnian Serb party on freedom of movement in the Sarajevo area, an anti-sniping agreement negotiated by UNPROFOR in Sarajevo on 14 August, a similar anti-sniping agreement concluded in Gorazde on 28 August, as well as the activities of the Special Coordinator for Sarajevo.

At the same time, the Secretary-General stated that despite the progress made in many areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, hostilities had erupted along many parts of the confrontation line between Government and Bosnian Serb forces after an initial period of calm following the Gorazde crisis.

In western Bosnia, Government forces launched an offensive and defeated the forces of the self-declared "Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia" [with its stronghold at Velika Kladusa and headed by the breakaway Muslim leader, Fikret Abdic] in the Bihac area, resulting in an exodus of an estimated 35,000 mostly Muslim refugees to the UNPA of Sector North in Croatia. Meanwhile, Government forces also resumed operations in the Ozren and Travnik areas and advanced south from the areas of Breza and Dastansko. All these activities were met by heavy Bosnian Serb shelling and local counter-

attacks at many points along the confrontation line. UNPROFOR made several unavailing attempts to persuade both sides to seek a negotiated rather than a military solution.

The Secretary-General also reported that serious violations of human rights persisted. UNPROFOR continued to highlight and condemn strongly the incidence of torture, killings and expulsions of minorities within Bosnia and Herzegovina. UNPROFOR persisted in its attempts to visit and establish a presence in Bosnian Serb-controlled areas, particularly in Banja Luka and Bijeljina, which were the scene of continued "ethnic cleansing".

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

The Secretary-General reported that although the military situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia remained relatively calm and stable, since April there had been a rise in the frequency of encounters between patrols from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia along their common border. UNPROFOR successfully mediated several tense border encounters, achieving the withdrawal of soldiers on both sides. In those activities, UNPROFOR maintained close coordination with other international bodies, including the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and the CSCE.

The Secretary-General noted further that the most serious difficulties experienced by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia were economic. Social stability was endangered by rising unemployment and a declining economy resulting, among other things, from the effects of the economic blockade imposed by Greece on 17 February 1994 and of the United Nations sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), formerly the country's primary trading partners. Internal political tensions between Macedonians and ethnic Albanians had also increased. Given the complex interrelation of external and internal factors contributing to economic and political uncertainty, and rising social tensions, the Security Council, in resolution 908 (1994) of 31 March 1994, encouraged the Secretary-General's Special Representative, in cooperation with the authorities of the former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia, to use his good offices as appropriate to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in that Republic.

UNPROFOR's Mandate Further Extended

Also in his 17 September report, the Secretary-General noted that the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia were closely interrelated and

had had a direct impact on UNPROFOR's operations in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In this context, the work of the Contact Group, which had emerged in April 1994 and involved five major Powers working with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, could be of great significance for UNPROFOR's future.

Speaking of Croatia, the Secretary-General outlined four problem areas in UNPROFOR's mandate in that Republic: the demilitarisation of the UNPAs; the restoration of Croatian authority in the "pink zones"; the establishment of border controls; and assistance for the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes. All four required either enforcement or the consent of both parties for their implementation. UNPROFOR had neither the means nor the mandate for enforcement action of this nature, and the cooperation of the parties was elusive.

Despite the inability of UNPROFOR to achieve important parts of its mandate in Croatia, the Secretary-General continued, the successful implementation of the cease-fire agreement had opened the possibility for some progress. It had reduced dramatically the number of war casualties and allowed for increasing normalisation of life, including improved economic prospects, particularly for tourism. However, despite this success, UNPROFOR continued to be criticized by the Croatian Government and media for its inability to fulfil its entire mandate, and to be threatened with unrealistic deadlines to fulfil tasks which, without the political will of both sides, could not contribute to long-term stability. While the recriminations directed against UNPROFOR might be partly related to the Croatian political process, they also reflected certain incompatibilities in the Force's mandate, which made it impossible to achieve the implementation of various tasks within a limited time-frame. The resultant gap between Croatian expectations of what the United Nations presence could deliver, and what UNPROFOR was actually capable of achieving under the circumstances, became increasingly difficult to bridge.

In considering the various options for UNPROFOR's presence in Croatia, the Secretary-General stated that he remained alert to the possibility that the situation on the ground could be frozen in a stalemate in which UNPROFOR's continued presence contributed only to the maintenance of an unsatisfactory *status quo*. However, in the present circumstances it was of the greatest importance to secure continued respect for the ceasefire agreement. At the same time, further efforts would have to be made in order to create a basis for the reopening

of negotiations. These were tasks which required the continued presence of UNPROFOR in Croatia.

With regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Secretary-General pointed out that the possibility of a further exacerbation and intensification of the conflict in that Republic had highlighted UNPROFOR's limitations, and underlined a number of areas of concern. First, the significant constraints on UNPROFOR's ability to perform its responsibilities in the safe areas, outlined in the Secretary-General's report of 9 May 1994, remained largely unchanged. Secondly, the exclusion zones around Sarajevo and Gorazde, although highly successful in protecting the civilian population from mortar, artillery and tank fire, were expensive in manpower and difficult to enforce and could not be maintained indefinitely in the absence of a comprehensive cessation of hostilities or, as a minimum, the demilitarisation of those areas. It was possible for any side to hide weapons, and UNPROFOR personnel, who were widely dispersed at weapons collection points, were vulnerable to any determined effort to remove weapons or take hostages. Thirdly, the supervision and enforcement of weapons exclusion zones placed additional strains on UNPROFOR as an impartial force. All these difficulties were inherent in UNPROFOR's nature as a highly dispersed and lightly armed peace-keeping force that was not mandated, equipped, trained or deployed to be a combatant.

In addition, the Secretary-General noted, UNPROFOR continued to experience serious restrictions on its freedom of movement imposed by all sides, and especially by the Bosnian Serbs. Particularly serious were actions by both sides that had led to the repeated closure of the Sarajevo airport. In the absence of improved relations between the Government and the Bosnian Serb party, these difficulties would continue and might intensify.

The Secretary-General was conscious that in the circumstances, some Member States might have come to believe that the strategy so far pursued by the international community, involving the deployment of a peace-keeping force dependent upon the active cooperation of the parties, was no longer adequate to serve the objectives proclaimed in the resolutions of the Security Council. However, the use of "disincentives" such as the general imposition and stricter enforcement of exclusion zones around the safe areas in order to influence the outcome of the conflict, or the lifting of the arms embargo in favour of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, would change the nature of the United Nations presence in the area and imply unacceptable

risks to UNPROFOR. The former action would place UNPROFOR unambiguously on one side of an ongoing conflict. The latter step would be tantamount to fanning the flames that the United Nations was deployed to extinguish. In both cases the result would be a fundamental shift from the logic of peace-keeping to the logic of war and would require the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Secretary-General also pointed out that the decisions of Member States to provide troops to UNPROFOR were based on the existing Security Council resolutions and on the assumption that the mandate of the Force would be implemented as a peace-keeping operation. Any attempt to redefine radically the conditions in which UNPROFOR's mandate was implemented and which could have implications for the security of its personnel might, therefore, lead the contributing States to exercise their sovereign right to terminate their contribution to the Force.

The Secretary-General, therefore, instructed UNPROFOR to finalize plans for a withdrawal at short notice. It was judged that, should this withdrawal become necessary, it would take place under extremely difficult conditions and might therefore require an early decision by the Security Council. A 60-day period of preparation would be the minimum necessary in order to arrange for the withdrawing troops to be adequately protected. In a number of foreseeable circumstances, this could be achieved only by the temporary introduction of a significant number of highly combat-capable ground forces provided by Member States outside the United Nations framework. Any decision that would necessitate the withdrawal of UNPROFOR would have immediate implications for the Force's ability to implement its existing mandates.

The Secretary-General suggested, however, that any consideration of decisions leading to the withdrawal of UNPROFOR had to be weighed against the tasks that were being implemented successfully by UNPROFOR. In the absence of an overall political settlement acceptable to all of the parties, UNPROFOR's presence and activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina remained invaluable. The Force continued to play an essential and effective role as an impartial force, and represented, in a society faced with the challenges of reconciliation and restoration, the principles and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations. Its usefulness in supporting humanitarian activities, facilitating local cease-fires and disengagements and fostering reconciliation and cooperation between communities argued in favour

of a further renewal of its mandate. Therefore, the Secretary-General did not recommend the withdrawal of the Force at that stage.

Speaking of humanitarian activities, the Secretary-General noted that although increasingly secure movement of humanitarian relief convoys was possible throughout the contiguous territory controlled by the Bosniac-Croat Federation, security problems remained in relation to land access to Sarajevo and other safe areas, and UNPROFOR's assistance was essential for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to those enclaves. If land access to the safe areas was denied by the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs, some assistance could continue to be delivered by air drops. However, this would not be adequate for Sarajevo, where the airlift could effectively be halted by a single shell or even a single armed individual. As to the human rights situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Secretary-General stated that the continued harassment of minorities, particularly by the Bosnian Serbs, had underlined the need for a more comprehensive mandate for UNCIVPOL. At that time, civilian police had a limited mandate to operate in Srebrenica, Tuzla and Mostar, an unofficial agreement to operate in Sarajevo and Gorazde, and no formal mandate to operate in other areas, including Velika Kladusa. The Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council consider providing UNPROFOR with a uniform UNCIVPOL mandate for the whole mission area, similar to that already mandated for Croatia in resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992. It was his hope that UNPROFOR could promote the protection of human rights in the difficult period ahead, not least in the transitional phase leading to the consolidation of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Secretary-General went on, UNPROFOR's presence had demonstrated the value of preventive deployment. But its mission could be judged effective only if it ends successfully. The success of the mission, however, would depend on external developments. In this context, the Secretary-General cited the unresolved disputes between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia over its name, state symbols, and constitution, and external threats to its economic stability and border security because of the continuing economic blockade by Greece and non-recognition by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's international borders. The Secretary-General appealed to the Governments of Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to resume urgently their negotiations under the auspices of his Special

Representative, Cyrus Vance, in order to reach agreement on issues of dispute.

In concluding his report, the Secretary-General recommended to the Security Council the renewal of UNPROFOR's mandate for a period of six months, and proposed to report further to the Council as necessary on progress towards implementation of the mandate, in the light of developments on the ground and other circumstances affecting the mandate of UNPROFOR. The Secretary-General also recommended a number of specific activities in the areas of mine clearance and public information, including the establishment of an independent UNPROFOR radio station.

On 30 September 1994, the Security Council, by its resolution 947 (1994), extended UNPROFOR's mandate for an additional period terminating on 31 March 1995, and approved the Secretary-General's proposals relating to civilian police, mine-clearance and public information. It called on all parties and others concerned to fully comply with all Security Council resolutions regarding the situation in the former Yugoslavia, and concerning in particular UNPROFOR in Croatia to create the conditions that would facilitate the full implementation of its mandate.

Security Situation Deteriorates

In August and September 1994, the security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina deteriorated. Continued fighting persisted in several regions of the Republic. In the safe area of Sarajevo, attacks, especially by snipers (despite the anti-sniping agreement), escalated in frequency and deadly effect. The extent of heavy weapons attacks also increased. Attacks occurred in both the city centre and the suburbs and on many occasions were directed at residences, pedestrians and moving vehicles, such as trams packed with people. United Nations personnel were also targeted and suffered fatalities. Twice, in August and September, UNPROFOR called in NATO warplanes to hit Serbian heavy weapons violating the exclusion zone around Sarajevo.

There were numerous interferences with humanitarian aid. A key humanitarian route in Sarajevo was closed by Bosnian Serb forces, thus greatly impeding the delivery of aid not only to the city, but also to many points in northern and eastern Bosnia. Attacks both by Bosnian Serbs and Government forces on Sarajevo airport resulted in its frequent closure.

Attacks and interference with humanitarian aid were also reported in other areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including Gorazde, Maglaj,

Travnik, Bugojno, Srebrenica and Tuzla. In a number of other locations, the situation remained tense, and widespread violations of human rights in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina persisted.

In a Presidential statement, issued on 30 September 1994, the Council expressed concern at the deteriorating security situation in the safe area of Sarajevo and elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which included increased levels of armed violence, deliberate attacks on UNPROFOR troops and on humanitarian flights, severe restrictions on public utilities, and continued restrictions on the flow of transport and communications. It noted that normal life had not been fully restored in Sarajevo, as called for in resolution 900 (1994). The Council encouraged the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR to explore as a matter of priority proposals for the demilitarisation of Sarajevo.

In resolution 941 (1994) adopted on 23 September, the Council demanded that Bosnian Serb authorities immediately cease their campaign of ethnic cleansing in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and authorize immediate and unimpeded access for representatives of the United Nations and of the ICRC to Banja Luka, Bijeljina and other areas of concern.

The Council also requested the Secretary-General to arrange the deployment of UNPROFOR troops and United Nations Monitors to those areas. It strongly condemned violations of international humanitarian law, particularly ethnic cleansing, and reaffirmed that those committing or ordering such acts would be held individually responsible; and that parties to the conflict were bound to comply with international humanitarian law, in particular the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.

Fighting Erupts in Bihac Pocket

In October, after defeating the forces of Fikret Abdic in western Bosnia during the summer, the Bosnian Government army, acting in cooperation with Bosnian Croat units, mounted a large and, initially, successful offensive operation against Bosnian Serb forces in and around the Bihac pocket.

In early November, however, after regrouping, Bosnian Serb forces launched a major counteroffensive. They were supported by the so-called Krajina Serb forces acting from across the border with Croatia and Muslim forces loyal to Fikret Abdic. By mid-November, the Bosnian Serbs had regained most of the territory lost during the earlier Bosnian

Government offensive and advanced on the United Nations-designated safe area of Bihac. Both the offensive by the Bosnian Government army and the Bosnian Serb counteroffensive resulted in civilian casualties and a new flow of refugees and displaced persons in the region.

On 13 November, the Security Council expressed alarm at the escalation in the fighting in the Bihac area and strongly urged all parties, and others concerned to refrain from all hostile actions and to exercise the utmost restraint. It condemned any violation of the international border between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and demanded that all parties and others concerned, in particular the so called Krajina Serb forces, fully respect that border and refrain from hostile acts across it.

The Council emphasized the significance of its resolutions on safe areas and demanded that all concerned facilitate implementation of those resolutions. It also demanded that all parties ensure, in cooperation with UNPROFOR, unimpeded access for humanitarian supplies, expressed full support for the efforts of UNPROFOR, and called on the parties to respect UNPROFOR's safety and security, unimpeded access to supplies, and its freedom of movement.¹⁰

Bihac Safe Area Under Attack

All diplomatic efforts and the activities of UNPROFOR on the ground, however, failed to stop the attack on Bihac, Velika Kladusa and other areas in the pocket. Moreover, on 18 November, in a clear violation of Bihac's status as a safe area, aircraft belonging to the so-called Krajina Serb forces flying from Udbina airstrip in the UNPA Sector. South in Croatia crossed the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina and dropped napalm and cluster bombs in southwest Bihac. Those attacks endangered civilians and UNPROFOR personnel. On 19 November, aircraft belonging to the so-called Krajina Serb forces bombed the town of Cazin, about 10 miles north of Bihac. One of the aircraft crashed into an apartment block housing displaced people who had fled the war in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Several people were killed or wounded in the incident.

On 18 November, the Security Council, in a Presidential statement, strongly condemned the attack on the safe area of Bihac by aircraft belonging to the so-called Krajina Serb forces. It demanded that all parties, in particular the so-called Krajina Serb forces, cease immediately all hostile actions across the international border between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

On 19 November, the Security Council, by its resolution 958 (1994), decided that the authorisation given to Member States under resolution 836 (1993)—to take under its authority and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate—also applied to such measures taken in the Republic of Croatia.

On the same day, the Council adopted resolution 959 (1994), in which it condemned violations of the international border between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and demanded that all parties, in particular the so-called Krajina Serbs, fully respect the border and refrain from hostile acts across it. The Council expressed full support for the efforts of UNPROFOR to ensure implementation of its resolutions on the safe areas and demanded that all parties end hostile actions in and around those areas. Also by the resolution, the Secretary-General was requested to update his recommendations on implementing the concept of safe areas and to encourage UNPROFOR to achieve agreements on their strengthening.

On 21 November, in accordance with resolution 958 (1994), NATO bunched an air strike on the Udbina airstrip located in the UNPA Sector South in Croatia. The raid came after the aircraft of the so-called Krajina Serbs attacked targets in the Bihac enclave on 18 and 19 November. A total of 39 warplanes from France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States took part in the attack on the Udbina airfield in close cooperation with UNPROFOR.

The Secretary-General's Special Representative described that action as a necessary and proportionate response to the continued use of the airstrip for air raids against the Bihac safe area. He noted that NATO had targeted the airstrip at Udbina, and not the aircraft operating from it, in order to limit collateral damage and casualties. He appealed to the local Serb authorities in Croatia to respect the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina and allow unimpeded passage for humanitarian aid convoys into Bihac.

On 23 November, after the Bosnian Serb forces fired missiles at two British Harrier jets patrolling the Bihac area and locked their radar on NATO reconnaissance aircraft, NATO conducted air strikes against surface-to-air missile sites in the area.

On 25 November, after Bosnian Serb forces began shelling the town of Bihac, NATO planes were again called in by UNPROFOR to

protect United Nations troops. The planes flew for 60 minutes but could not initiate any attack without endangering both UNPROFOR troops and civilians.

Despite all efforts and warnings, the Bosnian Serbs continued their attack eventually capturing some high ground within the Bihac safe area but did not move into the town of Bihac itself. Also, in an apparent retaliation for NATO air strikes, throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Bosnian Serbs detained a number of United Nations personnel, restricted their movement, subjected some to humiliation, and stopped most humanitarian and supply convoys in territories under Bosnian Serb control.

On 26 November, the Security Council, in a statement by its President, demanded the withdrawal of all Bosnian Serb forces from the Bihac safe area and condemned in the strongest possible terms all violations, in particular, the "flagrant and blatant" entry of Bosnian Serb forces into the safe area. It demanded that all parties agree to an immediate and unconditional ceasefire in the Bihac region, particularly in and around the safe area.

The Council also demanded that all hostile acts across the border between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina cease immediately and that the so-called Krajina Serb forces withdraw immediately from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It called for an end to hostilities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina in pursuit of the territorial settlement proposed by the Contact Group, reiterated its full support for the settlement, and demanded that the Bosnian Serb party accept it unconditionally and in full.

Finally, the Council expressed full support for UNPROFOR in implementing its mandate to deter attacks against safe areas. The Council called upon parties to ensure freedom of movement for UNPROFOR and UNHCR, and for necessary supplies for UNPROFOR and for the civilian population throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.

Cease-Fire Proposal Not Accepted

Meanwhile, UNPROFOR continued its efforts to negotiate and use every means at its disposal to obtain a cease-fire. It proposed a three-point plan for an immediate and unconditional cease-fire for the Bihac safe area, involving the demilitarisation of the safe area, turning it over to UNPROFOR, and interposition of peace-keepers in the sensitive areas. The proposal, which had been delivered to both parties on 27

November, was accepted in principle by the Bosnian Government. The Bosnian Serb side indicated that it needed more time to review the proposal.

The efforts of UNPROFOR were actively supported by the Contact Group and the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General had extensive telephone conversations with various leaders regarding developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He spoke on several occasions with the new Secretary-General of NATO, Willy Claes, and with Bosnian leaders, including President Alija Izetbegovic, and the Vice-President of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ejup Ganic. He also announced his decision to travel to Sarajevo to hold discussions with President Izetbegovic and with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic.

On 29 November, the Security Council reiterated its concern over the continuing conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including in the Bihac region and in particular in and around the safe area of Bihac. It expressed its full support for the efforts of United Nations officials to stabilize the situation in and around Bihac, and for the cease-fire proposal in the Bihac region to be followed by a cease-fire throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Council welcomed the acceptance by the Bosnian Government of that proposal and called on the Bosnian Serb party also to accept it. The Council also welcomed the impending visit of the Secretary-General to Bosnia and Herzegovina and demanded that all parties cooperate fully with his efforts.

The Secretary-General visited Sarajevo on 30 November. He first met with President Izetbegovic to discuss the effectiveness of United Nations operations and specific action to reach agreement on immediate measures to bring the military situation under control and create conditions in which negotiations for a political settlement could reach a successful conclusion.

After the meeting at the Presidency, the Secretary-General invited Dr. Karadzic to meet him at the Sarajevo airport to have a similar discussion. But Dr. Karadzic declined the invitation.

In a statement issued on the same day, the Secretary-General expressed his disappointment and surprise at Dr. Karadzic's declining his invitation. He stated that the purpose of his visit to Sarajevo was to convey a simple message to both sides. If they wanted to retain the assistance and support of the United Nations in ending the war, they must first show a readiness to negotiate and work in good faith to find common ground. Secondly, they must cooperate with UNPROFOR and UNHCR. The Secretary-General warned that unless they did this, it

would become impossible for him to persuade the Security Council to keep UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Because of Dr. Karadzic's failure to meet with him, the Secretary-General said he had been unable to press the Bosnian Serb leader to lift the "unacceptable restrictions" being placed on the movement of United Nations personnel and convoys, including the resupply of the Bangladeshi battalion in Bihac. Another concern was the Bosnian Serb deployment of anti-aircraft systems which were impeding the humanitarian airlift. He noted that his Special Representative, Akashi, would be pursuing those matters with Dr. Karadzic.

Concluding his statement, the Secretary-General called on the Bosnian leaders to live up to their responsibilities and make it possible for the international community to help them bring peace to their peoples.

Humanitarian Relief

The United Nations has been providing humanitarian relief assistance to refugees, and displaced persons since the beginning of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The United Nations relief effort is coordinated by UNHCR, which at the beginning of the emergency operation was designated as lead humanitarian agency for the former Yugoslavia. In December 1991, it was estimated that there were approximately 500,000 refugees, displaced persons and other victims of the conflict requiring assistance and protection. As the conflict intensified and extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the humanitarian problems increased dramatically with the growing number of refugees and displaced persons, widespread violations of basic human rights and international humanitarian law. Under such difficult circumstances, UNHCR, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organisation (WHO), the World Food Programme (WFP), other United Nations agencies concerned, ICRC as well as many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) continue to do their utmost to address the humanitarian needs of the conflict affected population.

The international community responded generously to appeals bunched in December 1991 and May 1992 by UNHCR and on behalf of UNICEF and WHO. However, in view of the continued and alarming deterioration of the humanitarian situation, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it became evident that further assistance was required. Consequently, the International Meeting on Humanitarian Aid to the Victims of Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, held on 29 July 1992 in Geneva, endorsed a seven-point humanitarian response

plan proposed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs. Sadako Ogata. The elements of the plan were: respect for human rights and humanitarian law, preventive protection, humanitarian access to those in need, measures to meet special humanitarian needs, temporary protection measures, material assistance, and return and rehabilitation.

Following the International Meeting and a subsequent-related meeting of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, an Inter-Agency Assessment Mission, coordinated by UNHCR with the assistance of the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, visited the Republics of the former Yugoslavia from 9 to 16 August 1992, to reassess the emergency humanitarian requirements. According to the findings of the Mission, over 2.7 million people were directly affected by the crisis and were in need of emergency humanitarian assistance—particularly in the areas of food, shelter and healthcare. On the basis of those findings, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, in close collaboration with UNHCR, other concerned United Nations agencies and NGOs, formulated a Consolidated Inter Agency Programme of Action and Appeal for the period September 1992 to March 1993. The overall requirements identified by the Assessment Mission amounted to over \$1 billion. Subsequently, it was established that \$434 million would be required for addressing life-threatening priority needs to be channelled through the United Nations system. The areas targeted for immediate relief were food, health services and shelter.

The Appeal by the Secretary-General was launched on 4 September 1992, simultaneously, through then Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Eliasson, in New York, and through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs. Ogata, in Geneva. The Secretary-General said in the Appeal that one “particularly unconscionable” aspect of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was the deliberate attempt to prevent much needed relief assistance from reaching the affected population.

After the launching of the Programme of Action and Appeal, the number of affected persons in need of humanitarian assistance increased significantly. On 11 March 1993, Mrs. Ogata reported to the Security Council that 3.8 million people were receiving assistance in the whole of the former Yugoslavia. In Bosnia and Herzegovina alone, some 2.28 million people, or half of the original population, were beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance from UNHCR, and the situation there was still deteriorating. Mrs. Ogata told Council members that UNHCR’s biggest concern remained gaining humanitarian access

to the victims, especially to those in the Government-held enclaves in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina where access had in many instances been denied altogether. She said the enormous suffering and devastation in the former Yugoslavia underscored the critical importance of an immediate cessation of hostilities.

On 17 March 1993, the United Nations issued a revised Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for the period from 1 April to 31 December 1993. The Appeal called for \$840 million as new funding requirements in addition to the nearly \$496 million already spent or committed by seven United Nations and associated agencies in the former Yugoslavia since the beginning of the emergency operation in November 1991.

On 25 March 1993, Mrs. Ogata, in her capacity as the Chairperson of the Working Group on Humanitarian Issues of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, convened a high-level inter-governmental meeting in Geneva to discuss needs in the war-torn region. More than 55 nations and international organisations participated in the meeting.

The implementation of the international humanitarian assistance programme was further reviewed at a meeting of the Working Group on Humanitarian Issues held in Geneva on 16 July 1993. At a similar meeting held on 8 October 1993, a new Consolidated Appeal was launched, seeking some \$696.5 million to cover the urgent humanitarian needs of almost 4.26 million affected people. This amount included revised winter requirements for the period October to December 1993 amounting to \$173.9 million over and above the amount previously budgeted in the 17 March 1993 Appeal covering April to December 1993, and new requirements amounting to \$522.6 million for humanitarian programmes for the period January to June 1994. Several States announced new contributions, at a time when international relief effort was threatened by insufficient funding. Under the Appeal, the planned beneficiary population in the former Yugoslavia totalling 4,259,000 persons included some 2.74 million people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 800,000 in Croatia, 647,000 in Serbia and Montenegro, 27,000 in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 45,000 in Slovenia.

The humanitarian operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to be seriously obstructed. Access to populations in need was repeatedly denied or sabotaged for political or military purposes, especially by the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat sides. Moreover, all three sides frequently threatened the security of the personnel of UNPROFOR,

UNHCR and other organisations. As a result, the international airlift to Sarajevo had to be interrupted several times for security reasons. Convoy operations were also suspended on a number of occasions.

In view of the deteriorating situation on the ground and the prospect of still greater humanitarian disasters during the winter, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees met with the political leadership of the Bosnian parties on 18 November 1993 in Geneva. This meeting was held because on 25 October 1993 following the killing of a Danish UNHCR driver, the Secretary-General had decided to suspend all humanitarian convoys in central Bosnia. In a Joint Declaration the parties agreed to suspend fighting along the major supply routes to allow passage of international humanitarian convoys, in order to ensure complete and secure freedom of movement for the United Nations and international humanitarian organisations; to prevent diversion of humanitarian assistance to the military and to release all civilian detainees in accordance with the principles of and arrangements by ICRC. The parties also committed themselves to allow UNHCR and ICRC to determine the nature of humanitarian assistance, including priority winterisation needs and all materials, supplies, gas and other fuel necessary for the survival of the civilian population.

On 19 November 1993, the Working Group on Humanitarian Issues held a meeting in Geneva with the donor community and other interested States, UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, WHO, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and ICRC to review the state of preparations for the relief effort during the winter period. On 29 November, Mrs. Ogata, in her capacity as the Chairperson of the Working Group on Humanitarian Issues, addressed a meeting convened by the European Union in Geneva, and attended by the Bosnian parties, at the end of which a Declaration was signed by the military leaders of those parties, reiterating the commitments of 18 November 1993.

Despite reports, following the November Joint Declarations, of some initial improvement in relief distribution in some areas, serious problems of access persisted: only 50 per cent of humanitarian assistance was getting through.

On 19 January 1994, the High Commissioner for Refugees expressed fears for the fate of tens of thousands of civilians in Bosnia and Herzegovina deprived of basic humanitarian assistance, despite repeated assurances by all Bosnian sides to let the aid through. In conveying her concern to the representatives of the warring parties attending the Geneva peace talks, she made particular mention of the

civilian population in Maglaj, Tesanj, east Mostar, Gorazde and parts of central Bosnia.

In terms of food aid, WFP reported on 3 February 1994 that, although refugee needs in the former Yugoslavia were covered for the winter, there would be shortages in the spring, since only 67 per cent of the food requirements had been met until the end of June 1994, leaving a shortfall of 145,000 tons, valued at \$86 million. For the whole of 1994, nearly 750,000 metric tons of food aid, valued at some \$500 million, was required for the former Yugoslavia.

As to Bosnia and Herzegovina, WFP reported that despite low levels of deliveries to central Bosnia at the end of 1993, average monthly deliveries to that Republic had actually increased in the last six months of 1993, reflecting the international community's resolve to get aid through, despite the obstacles, as well as the increased availability of food aid in the latter part of 1993, and the increased amounts moved by airlift through the Sarajevo airport. The airlift, begun on 3 July 1992, has been providing most of the food needs of Sarajevo, and it has provided assistance to the besieged populations in Maglaj, Tesanj and Mostar. As at the end of December 1994, the airlift to Sarajevo had surpassed the 140,000-metric-ton mark.

Since February 1993, humanitarian relief to certain inaccessible areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina has also been provided by means of airdrops—an operation initiated by the United States in collaboration with several other countries. The capacity of this operation undertaken by a number of countries has increased substantially with the addition of twelve American, three German and one French aircraft.

In February and March 1994, cease-fire arrangements in Sarajevo, in central Bosnia and around Mostar alleviated suffering and deprivation and brought considerable relief to the populations in these areas. In addition, political developments leading to accords on new constitutional arrangements for the Bosnian Muslim and the Bosnian Croat communities as well as an agreement on a proposed confederation between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia gave a new impetus to the peace process and facilitated access for humanitarian convoys through routes hitherto closed or very difficult to use.

An inter-agency assessment mission composed of representatives of humanitarian agencies participating in the relief operation in the former Yugoslavia visited the area between 18 and 25 March 1994. On the basis of the mission's findings, a revised United Nations inter-agency consolidated appeal was issued jointly on 11 May 1994 by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and by UNHCR.

The revised appeal—the eighth United Nations appeal since the beginning of the crisis in former Yugoslavia—covered humanitarian needs for the period 1 July until 31 December 1994. The appeal addressed emergency needs for a revised beneficiary population of 41,21,500 persons with programmes amounting to \$5,32,070,211.

Since then, developments in the former Yugoslavia continued to unfold with disconcerting speed, often changing the focus of humanitarian needs and the required response. Within Bosnia and Herzegovina, and particularly in the Federation area, the situation somewhat stabilized and commercial and agricultural activities resumed. However, a sizeable proportion of the population was still without resources or living in areas where their security was very much at risk. Violations of cease-fire arrangements were frequent; in areas of confrontation freedom of movement was again impaired; military fighting increased; and sniping and shelling again claimed lives in Sarajevo. There were also regular suspensions of the airlift, and serious delays and obstruction of humanitarian convoys.

On the other hand, in other republics of the former Yugoslavia, the situation stabilized to some extent and there was a notable decrease in the number of beneficiaries, particularly in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and in Croatia.

Accordingly, on 1 September 1994, an updated appeal was issued by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and UNHCR. The updated appeal incorporated changes calculated for a revised target population of 2,274,500 for the remainder of 1994. That reduction resulted in revised budgets for 1994, principally for UNHCR, WFP, IOM and UNV, but not the other United Nations agencies whose programmes were not directly linked to a specific number of beneficiaries. The total revised inter-agency financial budget for 1994 reflected in the updated September appeal was \$721,169,025 (in the May appeal, the total budget for 1994 had been \$974,014,176).

The inter-agency appeal was further revised on 9 November 1994. The United Nations asked donors to provide funding for humanitarian assistance costing \$241,731,697 for the first six months of 1995. It was pointed out that the number of beneficiaries had decreased only marginally since the September revised appeal, from 2,274,500 to 2,244,400 persons. The difference was in the figure for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) where refugees had returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina or departed for other destinations.

The appeal document further stated that “as no overall peace settlement has been reached in Bosnia and Herzegovina, nor in the

United Nations Protected Areas of Croatia (UNPAs), a repatriation operation cannot as yet be implemented". It added that the continuing unrest and ethnic conflict in and around the Bihac pocket in the north-western Bosnia and Herzegovina had resulted in further outflows of refugees and that the unsettled situation in eastern Bosnia might give rise to some contingency planning in 1995 in the event of an exodus from that region.

UNPROFOR Structure and Composition

UNPROFOR is headed by the Secretary-General's Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia and includes military, civil affairs (including civilian police), public information and administrative components, with overall headquarters in Zagreb, Croatia. As of 30 November 1994, the strength of the military personnel actually deployed in theatre, led by the Force Commander, amounted to 38,810, including 680 United Nations military observers. There were also 727 civilian police, 1,870 international civilian staff (including 1,353 contractual personnel who are not members of the international civil service) and 2,188 local staff. UNPROFOR is thus the largest peace-keeping operation in the history of the United Nations.

Four military officers have served as UNPROFOR Force Commander: Lieutenant-General Satish Nambiar (India), from March 1992 to March 1993; Lieutenant-General Lars-Eric Wahlgren (Sweden), from March 1993 to June 1993; Lieutenant-General Jean Cot (France), from June 1993 to March 1994; and, currently, General Bertrand de Sauville de La Presle (France) who took up his duties in mid-March 1994.

Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 871 (1993), the military structure of UNPROFOR has been reorganized under three subordinate commands: UNPROFOR Croatia, under Major General A. Tayyeb (Jordan), headquartered in Zagreb; UNPROFOR Bosnia and Herzegovina, under Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Rose (United Kingdom), headquartered in Kiseljak; and UNPROFOR former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, under Brigadier-General Tryggve Tellefsen (Norway), headquartered in Skopje. The three commanders report to the Force Commander who, together with the civilian, logistical and administrative components, acts under the overall direction of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

As of 30 November 1994, military and civilian police personnel of UNPROFOR were provided by the following countries:

<i>Country</i>	<i>Police</i>	<i>Troops</i>	<i>Observers</i>
Argentina	23	854	5
Bangladesh	40	1,235	43
Belgium		1,038	6
Brazil	6		34
Canada	45	2,091	15
Colombia	12		
Czech Republic		971	37
Denmark	45	1,230	14
Egypt		427	27
Finland	10	463	12
France	41	4,493	11
Ghana			32
Indonesia	15	220	29
Ireland	20		9
Jordan	71	3,367	48
Kenya	50	967	47
Lithuania		32	
Malaysia	26	1,550	27
Nepal	49	899	5
Netherlands	10	1,803	48
New Zealand		249	9
Nigeria	48		10
Norway	31	826	39
Pakistan	19	3,017	34
Poland	29	1,109	30
Portugal	39		12
Russian Federation	36	1,464	22
Slovak Republic		582	
Spain		1,267	19
Sweden	35	1,212	19
Switzerland	6		6
Tunisia	12		
Turkey		1,464	
Ukraine	9	1,147	10
United Kingdom		3,405	19
United States		748	
Venezuela			2
Total	727	38,130	680

Note: Figures may vary from month to month due to rotation. "Troops" include any infantry, logistics, engineering, medical, mov-con, staff, etc.

Financial Aspects of UNPROFOR

The rough cost to the United Nations of UNPROFOR in 1994 was about \$1.6 billion. The costs are met by assessed contributions from Member States. As at 30 November 1994, contributions outstanding to the UNPROFOR Special Account for the period from the inception of the operation to 30 November 1994 amounted to about \$698 million.

NOTES

1. For more information on other aspects of the United Nations involvement, please see United Nations Department of Public Information Reference Paper "The United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia", DPI/1312/Rev.2 (Reprint) and Add.I -January 1995.
2. A term which, for the purposes of this publication, is used to signify the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its Republics.
3. A term which, throughout this publication, refers to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
4. Since August 1992, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia has provided a permanent negotiating forum for seeking a political solution to all the problems of the former Yugoslavia. The Conference has a Steering Committee, now co-chaired by Lord Owen, representing the European Union, and Thorvald Stoltenberg, who in May 1993 replaced the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy, Cyrus Vance, and who also served, until December 1993, as the Secretary-General's Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia.
5. Since early December 1993, UNPROFOR had faced Bosnian Serb opposition to the replacement of Canadian troops in Srebrenica and of Ukrainian troops in Zepa by elements of the incoming Netherlands battalion. As regards Tuzla, UNPROFOR had been engaged in efforts to open the airport for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Tuzla safe area.
6. Yasushi Akashi (Japan), who had served as the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Cambodia, succeeded on 3 January 1994 Thorvald Stoltenberg (Norway) as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the former Yugoslavia and Chief of Mission of UNPROFOR. Stoltenberg continues his duties as Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.
7. Following initial investigation of the incident, a team was established by UNPROFOR to conduct a comprehensive follow-up investigation. The team also reported the lack of physical evidence to determine which side—the forces of the Bosnian Government or the Bosnian Serbs—had fired the mortar bomb on 5 February 1993.
8. In paragraph 9 of resolution 836 (1993), the Security Council authorized UNPROFOR, "...acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas by any of the parties..." In paragraph 10 of the same resolution, the Council decided that "...Member States, acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements, may take, under the authority of the Security

Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate..."

9. The city of Pale, to the east of Sarajevo, is the headquarters of the Bosnian Serbs.
10. UNHCR reported that since May 1994, only 12 aid convoys carrying less than 2,000 metric tons of food had reached the 400,000 people besieged in the Bihac enclave. Another 131 UNHCR convoys loaded with humanitarian aid had been denied access, despite repeated promises from Croatia-based Serbs to allow them to pass. Re-supply convoys for the UNPROFOR's Bangladeshi battalion stationed in Bihac had also not been allowed.

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CONTENTS

25.	United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation	753
26.	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force	757
27.	United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission	761
28.	Peace-Keeping and Indo-Pak Conflict	767
29.	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	783
30.	United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan	787
31.	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda	789
32.	UN Observation Group in Lebanon	836
33.	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon	857
34.	Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic	861
35.	United Nations Mission in Haiti	874
36.	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia	905
37.	Peace-Keeping in West New Guinea (West Irian)	928
38.	United Nations Angola Verification Mission II	943
39.	Peace-Keeping in Congo	971
40.	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador	1014
41.	Peace-Keeping in Cyprus	1040
42.	United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (Unficyp)	1080
43.	United Nations Operation in Mozambique (Onumoz)	1087
44.	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia	1115
45.	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	1136
46.	United Nations Operation in Somalia II	1150
47.	United Nations Protection Force	1203