Online Study Materials on
PEACE, GLOBAL WARS, CONFLICTS AND SECURITY

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International Peace and Security

One of the primary purposes for establishing the United Nations—and a central part of its mandate—is the maintenance of international peace and security. Since its creation, the United Nations has been called upon many times to prevent the threat of conflict escalating into war, to persuade opposing parties to use the conference table rather than force of arms, or to help restore peace when conflict does break out.

Over the decades, the United Nations has successfully helped to end numerous conflicts, often through actions of the Security Council—the primary organ for dealing with international peace and security issues. The end of the Cold War brought a time of hope and change and rising expectations for the United Nations, and Member States looked for ways to strengthen the Organisation's capacity for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peacekeeping.

To address a surge in intra-State conflicts, the Seecurity Council authorised innovative and complex peacekeeping operations. In El Salvador and Guatemala, in Cambodia and in Mozambique, the United Nations played a major role in ending civil war and bringing peace. But recent conflicts, many of which have been characterised by ethnic violence, such as in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, brought new challenges to the United Nations peacemaking role.

The United Nations system as a whole is focusing as never before on peace-building—action to support structures that will strengthen and consolidate peace. Experience has shown that keeping peace, in the sense of avoiding military conflict, is not sufficient for establishing a secure and lasting peace. Such security can only be achieved by helping countries to foster economic development, social justice,

protection of human rights, good governance and the democratic process. No other institution has the multilateral experience, competence, coordinating ability and impartiality that the United Nations brings to providing assistance in these tasks.

The Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretary-General all play major, complementary roles in fostering peace and security, described below. United Nations activities cover the principal areas *of peacemaking, peacekeeping, enforcement* and *peace-building*.

The Security Council

The Charter—an international treaty—obligates Member States to settle their disputes by peaceful means, in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. They are to refrain from the threat or use of force against any State, and may bring any dispute before the Security Council.

The Security Council is the United Nations organ primarily responsible for maintaining peace and security. Under the Charter, Member States are obliged to accept and carry out the Council's decisions. Recommendations of other United Nations bodies do not have the mandatory force the decisions of the Security Council have, but can influence situations as they express the opinion of the international community.

When a dispute is brought to its attention, the Council's first action is usually to recommend to the parties to reach agreement by peaceful means. In some cases, the Council itself undertakes investigation and mediation. It may set forth principles for a peaceful settlement. It may appoint special representatives or ask the Secretary-General to use his good offices.

When a dispute leads to fighting, the Council's first concern is to bring it to an end as quickly as possible. The Council may issue ceasefire directives that can be instrumental in preventing wider hostilities. In support of a peace process, the Council may deploy military observers or a peacekeeping force to an area of conflict.

The Charter, the Council is empowered to take measures to enforce its decisions. It can impose embargoes and economic sanctions, or it can authorise the use of force to ensure that mandates are fulfilled.

In some cases, the Council has authorised, the use of military force by a coalition of Member States or by a regional organisation or arrangement. But the Council takes such action only as a last resort, when peaceful means of settling a dispute have been exhausted, and

after determining that a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or act of aggression exists. The Council has established international criminal tribunals to prosecute persons accused of serious violations of international humanitarian law, including genocide.

The General Assembly

The United Nations Charter empowers the General Assembly to "consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security" and "make recommendations ... to the Members or to the Security Council or to both". The Assembly offers a means for finding consensus on difficult issues, providing a forum for the airing of grievances and diplomatic exchanges. To foster the maintenance of peace, it has held special or emergency special sessions on issues such as disarmament, the question of Palestine or the situation in Afghanistan.

The General Assembly considers peace and security issues in its First (Disarmament and International Security) Committee and in its Fourth (Special Political and Decolonisation) Committee. Over the years, the Assembly has helped promote peaceful relations among nations by adopting declarations on peace, the peaceful settlement of disputes and international cooperation.

The Assembly in 1980 approved the establishment in San Jose, Costa Rica, of the **University for Peace,** a specialised international institute for studies, research and dissemination of knowledge on peace-related issues.

The Assembly has designated the opening day of its regular annual session in September as International Day of Peace.

Peacemaking

Peacemaking refers to the use of diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and to negotiate a peaceful settlement of their dispute. The United Nations provides various means through which conflicts may be contained and resolved, and their root causes addressed. The Security Council may recommend ways to resolve a dispute or request the Secretary-General's mediation. The Secretary-General may take diplomatic initiatives to encourage and maintain the momentum of negotiations.

The **Secretary-General** plays a central role in peacemaking, both personally and by dispatching special envoys or missions for specific tasks, such as negotiation or fact-finding. Under the Charter, the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which appears to threaten international peace and security.

To help resolve disputes, the Secretary-General may use "good offices for mediating, or to exercise "preventive diplomacy". The impartiality of the Secretary-General is one of the United Nations' great assets. In many instances, the Secretary-General has been instrumental in averting a threat to peace or in securing a peace agreement.

Peacekeeping operations, which are authorised by the Security Council, are a crucial instrument at the disposal of the international community to advance international peace and security. The role of peacekeeping was recognised by the world in 1988, when the United Nations peacekeeping forces received the Nobel Peace Prize.

While not specifically envisaged in the Charter, peacekeeping was pioneered by the United Nations in 1948 with the establishment of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation in the Middle East. Peacekeeping operations are authorised to be deployed by the Security Council with the consent of the host Government, and usually of other parties involved. They may include military and police personnel, together with civilian staff. Operations may involve military observer missions, peacekeeping forces, or a combination of both. Military observer missions are made up of unarmed officers, typically to monitor an agreement or a ceasefire. The soldiers of the peacekeeping forces have weapons, but in most situations can use them only in self-defence.

The military personnel in United Nations peacekeeping operations are voluntarily provided by Member States and are financed by the international community. Participating States are compensated at a standard rate from a special peacekeeping budget.

Preventive Deployment

United Nations action in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is an example of successful "preventive deployment"—the fielding of peacekeepers to forestall probable conflict.

Concerned about being drawn into the Yugoslav conflict, the country in 1992 requested the deployment of United Nations observers. The Council agreed, and in 1992 dispatched a peacekeeping contingent to the country's borders with Yugoslavia and Albania. Since then, the 1,100-strong *United Nations Preventive Deployment Force* has been monitoring developments in the border areas that could threaten the country's territory or undermine its stability.

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has repeatedly requested the extension of the mission, which stands as a model for possible future preventive operations.

United Nations peacekeeping operations cost some $1.4 billion in 1996 and $1.02 billion in 1997—less than 0.2 per cent of world military spending.

Since 1948, over 750,000 military, police and civilian personnel from some 110 countries have served in these operations; more than 1,500 peacekeepers have lost their lives.

In recent years, certain prerequisites for the success of peacekeeping operations have become increasingly clear. These include a genuine desire on the part of combatants to resolve their differences peacefully; a clear mandate; strong political support by the international community; and the provision of the resources necessary to achieve the operation's objectives.

At the same time, the unacceptability of inaction has also become obvious. From Yugoslavia to Rwanda, the international community has seen the horrifying destructive effects of contemporary conflicts. In addition, conflicts have major implications beyond the borders of a particular country, and can generate instability through entire regions if they are unchecked. Even conflicts that are remote from the focus of major powers can foster problems which have global implications— such as illegal arms flows, terrorism, drug trafficking, refugee flows and environmental degradation.

United Nations operations, because of their universality, offer unique advantages as a means to address conflicts. Their universality adds to their legitimacy and limits the implications for the host country's sovereignty. Peacekeepers from outside a conflict can foster discussion among warring parties while focusing global attention upon local concerns, opening doors that would otherwise remain closed for collective efforts in peacemaking and in building a lasting peace.

Operations are financed through a United Nations budget and include troops from many countries: this "burden-sharing" can offer extraordinary efficiency in human, financial and political terms.

Operations can take many forms, and are constantly evolving in the light of changing circumstances. Among the tasks undertaken by peacekeeping operations over the years are:

- Maintenance of ceasefires and separation of forces. By providing "breathing space," an operation based on a limited agreement

between parties can foster an atmosphere conducive to negotiations;

- Preventive deployment. Deployed before conflict breaks out, an operation can provide a reassuring presence and a degree of transparency which favour political progress;

- Implementation of a comprehensive settlement. Complex, multidimensional operations, deployed on the basis of comprehensive peace agreements, can assist in such diverse tasks as monitoring human rights, providing electoral assistance, observing elections, furnishing humanitarian assistance and coordinating support for economic reconstruction;

- Protection of humanitarian operations during conflict. In many conflicts, civilian populations have been deliberately targeted as a means to gain political ends. In such situations, peacekeepers have been asked to provide protection and support for the delivery of humanitarian aid. However, such tasks can place peacekeepers in difficult political positions, and can lead to threats to their own security.

No catalogue of such roles can be exhaustive. Future conflicts are likely to continue to present complex challenges to the international community. An effective response will require courageous and imaginative use of the tools for peace.

Cooperating with Regional Organisations

In the search for peace, the United Nations is increasingly cooperating with regional organisations and other external actors and mechanisms provided for the Charter. It has worked closely with the Organisation of American States in Haiti, the Economic Community of West African States in Liberia, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in Somalia and Western Sahara, and the European Community in the former Yugoslavia.

In 1997, the United Nations and the OAU appointed for the first time a joint special representative to address the crises in the Great Lakes region—which includes Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In Liberia, Georgia and Tajikistan, United Nations military observers have been cooperating with peacekeeping forces of regional organisations. The observers in Tajikistan also cooperate with a civilian mission of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

In the former Yugoslavia, the United Nations has cooperated with OSCE and the Council of Europe in the areas of human rights, electoral assistance, peacemaking and economic development.

Who Commands Peacekeeping Operations?

Peacekeeping operations are established by the Security Council and directed by the Secretary-General, often through a special representative; depending on the mission, the Force Commander or the Chief Military Observer is responsible for the military aspects.

The United Nations has no military force of its own, and Member States provide, on a voluntary basis, the personnel, equipment and logistics required for an operation. Peacekeepers wear their country's uniform: they are identified as peacekeepers only by a United Nations blue helmet or beret and a badge. Military and civilian police personnel serve under the operational control of the United Nations, but remain members of their own national forces. They are expected to conduct themselves in accordance with the exclusively international character of their mission.

Strengthening Future Peacekeeping

The international community has drawn lessons from recent peacekeeping experience, and is working to strengthen the United Nations capacity in a number of areas. These include:

- *Enhancing capacity for rapid deployment.* After an operation has been created, its credibility and effectiveness are affected by the promptness with which it is deployed. Rapid deployment can prevent enormous suffering and can spare a country from a legacy of bitterness that can make political reconciliation impossible for years. Several initiatives have been taken to address this need:

  The United Nations *Standby Arrangements System* provides a framework to facilitate the timely planning and deployment of an operation. As of mid-1998, some 70 Member States had identified troops and equipment that were potentially available for service in operations, subject to approval by national authorities on a case-by-case basis.

  Within this system, certain groups of Member States are pursuing initiatives to enhance readiness by pooling their efforts to prepare peacekeepers. One particularly advanced example is the Standby Forces High-Readiness Brigade, whose core staff would be based in Denmark. Troops would remain based in

their parent countries and assemble for deployment as necessary. Their capacity for deployment would be enhanced by common procedures and standards for equipment.

In addition, the United Nations is working to create a rapidly deployable mission headquarters, which would constitute a core to be dispatched quickly to the field, around which a peacekeeping operation could be organised.

- *Enhancing ability to function in adversity.* Once deployed, many operations face a difficult or hostile environment. In some situations, an impressive show of force is the best way to avoid having to actually use it. This lesson was successfully applied by the United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia.

To enhance the influence of the peacekeepers with warring parties, it may be necessary to strengthen not only an operation's capacity to dissuade, but its capacity to persuade. This can be achieved through civic action programmes in which peacekeepers perform helpful tasks to gain people's goodwill and cooperation, or by reinforcing an operation's ability to provide benefits to those who cooperate and make political advances possible.

- *Acting comprehensively.* In assisting States in the aftermath of conflict, peacekeepers often confront problems of economic collapse, traditions of abusive use of the instruments of State to advance political power, and adherence to a system where the winner takes all. If restoring peace is to have any durability or meaning, it must pave the way to a comprehensive response to such problems. The institution-building role of peacekeeping operations has thus increased in importance, with mandates including such tasks as ensuring human rights observance, promoting the means to end impunity of human rights violators, and creating the institutions through which legitimate political differences can be expressed.

One response that offers considerable potential is the deployment of operations that are, built around a core of civilian police, rather than military peacekeepers. These operations can help reshape the dynamics of society after a conflict while strengthening the foundations for lasting peace. The United Nations has also responded by enhancing coordination within operations.

- *Mustering political will.* Ultimately, the success of peacekeeping operations depends on the political will of the warring parties to resolve their differences. It also depends on the political will of Member States to support such operations and ensure that they are provided with the human, material and financial resources necessary for carrying out their mandates. On this basis, peacekeeping can be an effective instrument for managing and resolving conflicts.

Enforcement

The United Nations Charter, the Security Council can take enforcement measures to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such measures range from economic sanctions to international military action.

Embargoes and Sanctions

The Council has resorted to economic sanctions and embargoes as an enforcement tool when peace was threatened and diplomatic efforts had failed. Sanctions were imposed, for instance, against South Africa's apartheid regime in 1977, and subsequently lifted with the end of apartheid in 1994. Recently, sanctions have been imposed against Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Libya, Haiti, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, UNITA forces in Angola, Sudan and Sierra Leone. Economic sanctions have taken many forms, ranging from specific trade bans to full embargoes.

The use of mandatory sanctions brings pressure on a target State or entity to comply with the objectives set by the Security Council without resorting to force. The universal character of the United Nations makes it an especially appropriate body to consider and monitor such measures.

At the same time, Member States have considered the problem of possible unintended consequences of sanctions at various United Nations fora—including the sub-group on sanctions of the General Assembly's Working Group on An Agenda for Peace, where countries have expressed humanitarian concerns on the possible adverse impact of sanctions on the most vulnerable segments of the population, and economic concerns on collateral effects of sanctions.

Authorising Military Action

When peacemaking efforts fail, stronger action by Member States may be authorised under the Charter. The Council has authorised

coalitions of Member States to use "all necessary means", including military action, to deal with a conflict—as it did to restore the sovereignty of Kuwait after its invasion by Iraq (1991); to permit humanitarian relief operations in the midst of civil war in Somalia (1992) and Rwanda (1994); to restore the democratically elected Government in Haiti (1994); and to protect humanitarian operations in Albania (1997).

These actions, though sanctioned by the Security Council, were entirely under the control of the participating States. They were not United Nations peacekeeping operations, which are established by the Security Council and directed by the Secretary-General.

Peace-Building

Today, peace and security are measured not only in terms of the absence of conflict. Lasting peace requires economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratisation, disarmament and respect for human rights. Peace can be durable only if economic and social development are guaranteed.

In the aftermath of a conflict, the United Nations system is thus often called upon to carry out peace-building—action to support structures that will strengthen and consolidate peace. Areas of activity include military security, civil law and order, human rights, elections, local administration, health, education and reconstruction.

Election Monitoring

The United Nations broke new ground in 1989, when it supervised the entire election process which led to the independence of Namibia. Since then, the United Nations has monitored, at Government request, elections in Nicaragua (1990), Haiti (1990), Angola (1992), Cambodia (1993), El Salvador (1994), South Africa (1994), Mozambique (1994), Eastern Slavonia (Croatia, 1997) and Liberia (1997), as well as the referendum on independence in Eritrea (1993).

The degree of United Nations involvement depends upon factors such as the requests received from Governments, peace agreements between previously warring parties, or mandates from the Security Council. The United Nations has played a variety of roles ranging from technical assistance to the actual conduct of the electoral process.

United Nations observers typically follow the electoral campaign, the registration of voters and the organisation of the polls. On election day, they are deployed to polling stations throughout the country,

observe voting and vote counting, and issue a final statement on the validity of the elections.

Since 1992, the United Nations *Electoral Assistance Division* in the *Department of Political Affairs,* working closely with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which coordinates United Nations electoral assistance in the field, and other offices and programmes, has provided technical assistance in the preparation and holding of elections to over 70 countries. Assistance may involve coordination and support, advisory services, logistics, training, computer applications and short-term observation.

The Fight against Landmines

Since the 1980s, the United Nations has been addressing the problems posed by the tens of millions of deadly landmines scattered in over 70 countries around the world. Each year around 30,000 people—most of them children, women and the elderly—are maimed or killed by these "silent killers". In addition to the existing mines and other unexploded ordinance, new landmines continue to be deployed in military actions in various parts of the world.

Since 1993, the General Assembly has called for a moratorium on the export of landmines, to which over 25 States have adhered. In 1996, the States parties to the United Nations-sponsored Inhumane Weapons Convention of 1980, adopted further restrictions to its Protocol dealing with landmines, agreeing that all mines must be detectable, and extending the Protocol to internal conflicts. An international convention banning the production, use and export of landmines, sponsored by Canada, Norway and other countries, was concluded in Ottawa in 1997.

Governments are increasingly asking the United Nations to operate mine clearance programmes, often as part of peacekeeping missions. The United Nations not only performs mine clearance, but also trains deminers, carries out public mine-awareness programmes, conducts mine surveys and provides funding for national programmes. Today, some 6,000 deminers are employed in United Nations-supported programmes.

Such programmes have been carried out in several of the countries most affected by the problem—Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mozambique, Rwanda and Yemen. The first UN programme started in 1988 in Afghanistan, a country infested with some 10 million mines.

As these programmes have shown, effective, cheap and vital action against landmines is possible. With the right mixture of skills, resources and commitment, the problem can be resolved in a matter of years, not decades.

United Nations assistance has often been instrumental in building and consolidating democracy. In Mozambique, El Salvador and Guatemala, the United Nations has helped armed opposition movements to transform themselves into political parties.

Building Peace Through Development

A central tool of United Nations action to consolidate peace is development assistance. Many United Nations organisations—including UNDP, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)—play roles in the recovery stage, which is crucial for providing opportunities for displaced persons and restoring confidence in national and local institutions.

The United Nations can help repatriate refugees, clear landmines, repair infrastructure and stimulate economic recovery; it can help strengthen institutions, monitor elections and promote human rights. This "peace-building" is the best prevention against the recurrence of war.

UNITED NATIONS ACTION FOR PEACE

The following section, structured by regions, offers a wide range of examples of United Nations action for peace.

Africa

In 1997, the Security Council held a special meeting at the ministerial level on Africa at which it expressed "grave concern" over the number and intensity of armed conflicts on the continent and called for an international effort to promote peace and security. Africa has faced a profound economic crisis for many years, and is a priority concern of the United Nations.

Africa was the scene of one of the earliest and largest peacekeeping operations, from 1960 to 1964, in what is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo. With a strength of nearly 20,000 military personnel, the *United Nations Operation in the Congo* helped the Government restore the country's independence and territorial integrity (threatened by the attempted secession of the Katanga province), helped maintain

law and order, and put into effect a wide programme of technical assistance.

From its earliest days, the United Nations was involved in the international struggle to bring the apartheid system in South Africa to an end, as well as in the efforts to achieve independence for Namibia.

More recently, the United Nations has been involved in peacekeeping operations to help resolve conflicts in many parts of the continent that have demonstrated clearly the link between war and dire poverty. Many of these operations have involved close cooperation with regional organisations, such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). At its 1997 meeting, the Security Council called for a further strengthening of such collaboration to enhance conflict prevention and resolution on the continent.

Ongoing Peacekeeping Operations*

- United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO, established 1948), in the Middle East;
- United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UN-MOGIP, 1949);
- United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP, 1964);
- United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF, 1974), in the Syrian Golan Heights;
- United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL, 1978);
- United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM, 1991);
- United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO, 1991);
- United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG, 1993);
- United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT, 1994);
- United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP, 1995), in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;
- United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH, 1995);
- United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP, 1996), in Croatia;

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*   As of mid-1998; for a full list of United Nations peacekeeping operations, see Part Three, pages 301 -304.

- United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA, 1997);
- United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH, 1997);
- United Nations Civilian Police Support Group (1998), in Croatia;
- United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA, 1998);
- United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL, July 1998 to present).

Southern Africa

At the end of the 1980s, with the Cold War waning, the United Nations was able to reap the fruits of many years of efforts aimed at ending wars that had plagued southern Africa. The decline of the apartheid regime in *South Africa,* whose influence extended to the bordering "frontline" States, and which had supported opposition forces in Angola and *Mozambique,* was a major factor in these efforts.

Peace efforts by the Secretary-General and his envoys, as well as the involvement of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, led to the historic agreements signed at United Nations Headquarters in 1988 under which Angola, Cuba and South Africa committed themselves to a series of measures to achieve peace in southern Africa. South Africa agreed to cooperate with the Secretary-General to ensure the independence of *Namibia* and Angola and Cuba signed an agreement on the withdrawal—under United Nations supervision—of Cuban forces from Angola. The agreements opened the way to a solution to the conflicts in the region.

Angola: Since 1988, the United Nations has been involved in efforts to bring peace and reconciliation between Angola's Government and the opposition force, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), engaged in an intermittent yet devastating civil war since the country's independence in 1975.

United Nations efforts have included mediation by the Secretary-General and his envoys, the organisation of peace talks, the imposition of a Security Council arms and oil embargo against UNITA forces, and the monitoring of national elections. Since 1988, the Security Council has established four successive peacekeeping missions. The first was in 1989, to monitor the withdrawal of pro-Government Cuban troops from Angola. The second, from 1991, sought to monitor a ceasefire,

verify demobilisation of combatants and observe elections in 1992—elections rejected by UNITA when the results were announced, which in turn led to another outbreak of fighting.

Mediation by the Secretary-General's special representative, Alioune Blondin Beye, brokered the 1994 Lusaka peace accord, which led to a fragile peace. The accord provided for a ceasefire and for UNITA's integration into the Government and into the armed forces. To back the accord and to help the parties to achieve peace and national reconciliation, a third mission was set up in 1995. In a peace-building effort, the Secretary-General himself visited Angola in early 1997 to promote reconciliation and the installation of a Government of national unity, which was inaugurated in April 1997. A fourth United Nations mission was established in 1997 to consolidate peace and assist in the transition. Providing humanitarian assistance, carrying out demining, helping to repatriate some 300,000 refugees and supporting the economic reconstruction of the country have also been continuous features of the United Nations involvement in Angola.

Mozambique: A few years later Mozambique gained independence from Portugal in 1975, the impoverished country was plunged into a long and debilitating civil war between the Government and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), supported by South Africa's apartheid regime. In 1992, after two years of negotiations in Rome, the two parties signed a General Peace Agreement. As part of the Agreement, the Security Council established the *United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)* to monitor and support a ceasefire, the demobilisation of forces and the holding of national elections.

In early 1993, some 6,500 troops and military observers, led by the Secretary-General's special representative, Nello Ajello, were deployed. To guarantee the implementation of the Agreement and settle disputes, a Supervisory and Monitoring Commission was established: it was chaired by the United Nations, and composed of the Government, RENAMO, Italy (mediator State), France, Germany, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States (observer States at the Rome talks), and the OAU.

In addition to overseeing the electoral process, ONUMOZ launched a humanitarian assistance programme to help the 3.7 million people displaced by war to resettle in their communities. For its part, UNHCR started in 1993 the repatriation of 1.3 million refugees. The three-year operation was the biggest ever undertaken by UNHCR in Africa. By

mid-1994, some 75 per cent of the people internally displaced had been resettled and most refugees had returned to Mozambique.

Demobilisation, started in 1994, eventually involved more than 76,000 soldiers from both sides, 10,000 of which ONUMOZ helped integrate into the new national army. ONUMOZ also recovered about 155,000 weapons.

Meanwhile, some 6.3 million voters were registered—81 per cent of the estimated eligible voters. ONUMOZ helped RENAMO and other opposition groups to transform themselves into political parties and contest the elections effectively. The country's first multi-party elections were held in October 1994, monitored by some 2,300 international observers. The Government's party, FRELIMO, won the parliamentary and presidential elections. The new Parliament and President were inaugurated in December. Its task successfully fulfilled, ONUMOZ left Mozambique in January 1995.

Central Africa

The Great Lakes region of Central Africa has been the focus of particular concern for the United Nations in recent years. Decades of ethnic tension, which culminated in the genocide in *Rwanda* in 1994, created a climate of instability affecting all States in the region. In a special initiative to help try and resolve the many areas of dispute, the United Nations and the OAU appointed for the first time in 1997 a joint special representative for the Great Lakes region, Mohamed Sahnoun, who has been deeply involved in international efforts to help resolve the crises. During 1997, the United Nations planned and prepared for possible missions in Zaire and the Republic of the Congo, in case the Security Council decided to deploy peacekeeping missions.

On the humanitarian front, United Nations agencies have sought to address the emergencies resulting from the mass movements of refugees and displaced people throughout the region. A $324 million appeal was launched in 1997 to provide humanitarian assistance to more than 1.4 million refugees, internally displaced and other war-affected people. A regional humanitarian coordinator, appointed in 1997, has worked to coordinate overall relief efforts.

Burundi: The United Nations Office in Burundi participated in international efforts to help resolve the crisis in that country, where a long-standing internal conflict led in 1993 to a coup attempt in which the first democratically elected President, a Hutu, and six ministers were killed. This ignited factional fighting in which at least 150,000

people died in the following three years. In 1996, the Government and President, who had been put in place in 1994 through an agreement between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority, were deposed by a Tutsi-led military coup. Neighbouring countries reacted by imposing sanctions against Burundi; the Security Council condemned the overthrow of the Government and urged the military leaders to restore constitutional order. Fighting between the largely Tutsi army and Hutu rebels followed, resulting in massive internal displacements of people. During 1996 and 1997, some 500,000 people were forcibly transferred to "regroupment camps" as a security measure, and an additional 300,000 people fled to Tanzania to escape the continuing violence.

Democratic Republic of the Congo: Following the massacres in Rwanda in 1994 and the establishment of a new government there, some 1.2 million Rwandese Hutu refugees fled to eastern Zaire, an area inhabited, among others, by ethnic Tutsi. There, a rebellion started in 1996, pitting the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Zaire/Congo (ADFL), led by Laurent Desire Kabila, against the government of President Mobutu Sese Seko. The ADFL, moving westwards, took the capital in May 1997, establishing the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The civil war resulted in more than 450,000 refugees and internally displaced people. A team of United Nations investigators was dispatched to the country to examine allegations of large-scale human rights abuses and massacres.

Republic of the Congo: In 1997, factional tension, heightened by an attempt by Government forces to disarm the militia of former President Denis Sassou-Nguesso ahead of the July presidential elections, escalated into full-scale fighting between Sassou-Nguesso's supporters and government forces and militia loyal to the incumbent President, Pascal Lissouba. The Security Council called for an immediate end to the violence and a negotiated solution to the crisis. During mediation efforts by President Omar Bongo of Gabon, assisted by the joint OAU/United Nations special representative, a request was made for establishing a peacekeeping operation in the country. The Secretary-General sent a mission to the country and to the region to assess the modalities of such an operation. After four months of fighting, Sassou-Nguesso seized power. Meanwhile, with 650,000 people displaced by the civil war, the United Nations launched a $17.7 million appeal to meet their needs.

Central African Republic: Following three mutinies in 1996 in the armed forces, several African countries formed an International

Mediation Committee which brokered peace agreements between the mutineers and the Government. In 1997, after the signature of the agreements, African States sent to the country an inter-African force to facilitate implementation of the agreements and assure security. A National Reconciliation Conference in February 1998 was attended by several African leaders and by a representative of the Secretary-General. The Security Council in August 1997 placed the inter-African force of the Charter, and in March 1998 established the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA), which has replaced the inter-African force and has assisted in maintaining security and stability.

Rwanda: The United Nations involvement in Rwanda started in 1993, when Rwanda and Uganda requested the deployment of military observers along their common border to prevent the military use of the area by the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). The Security Council in June 1993 established the *United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR)* on the Uganda side of the border to verify that no military assistance reached Rwanda.

Fighting had broken out in northern Rwanda in 1990 between the mainly Hutu Government and the Tutsi-led RPF operating from Uganda and areas in northern Rwanda. Peace talks, brokered by Tanzania and the OAU, led to a peace agreement in 1993, which provided for a transitional Government and for elections. At the request of Rwanda and the RPF, the Security Council in October 1993 established another international force, the *United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR),* to help the parties implement the agreement, monitor its implementation and support the transitional Government.

The United Nations solicited troop contributions, but initially only Belgium with half a battalion of 400 troops, and Bangladesh with a logistical element of 400 troops, offered personnel. It took five months to reach the authorised strength of 2,548. But because of many unresolved issues between the parties, implementation of the agreement was delayed. Consequently, the inauguration of the transitional Government never took place.

In April 1994, the Presidents of Rwanda and of Burundi were killed while returning from peace talks in Tanzania, when the Rwandese plane crashed, in circumstances that are still to be determined, as it was landing in Kigali, Rwanda's capital. This set off a tidal wave of political and ethnic killings: the Prime Minister, cabinet ministers and UNAMIR peacekeepers were among the first victims.

The killings, targeting Tutsi and moderate Hutus, were mainly carried out by the armed forces, the presidential guard and the ruling party's youth militia, as subsequently confirmed by the Special Rapporteur on Rwanda of the United Nations Human Rights Commission. The RPF resumed its advance from the north and the east of Rwanda, and government authority disintegrated.

An interim Government was formed, but failed to stop the massacres. With the RPF's southward push, the number of displaced persons and refugees increased tremendously. On 28 April alone, 280,000 people fled to Tanzania to escape the violence. Another wave of refugees went into Zaire. United Nations and other agencies provided emergency assistance on an unprecedented scale.

UNAMIR sought to arrange a ceasefire, without success, and its personnel came increasingly under attack. After some countries unilaterally withdrew their contingents, the Security Council in April reduced UNAMIR's strength from 2,548 to 270. Despite its reduced presence, UNAMIR troops managed to protect thousands of Rwandese who took shelter at sites under UNAMIR control.

The Security Council in May imposed an arms embargo against Rwanda, called for urgent international action and increased UNAMIR's strength to up to 5,500 troops. But it took nearly six months for Member States to provide the troops.

To contribute to the security of civilians, the Council in June authorised, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, a multinational humanitarian operation. French-led multinational forces carried out "Operation Turquoise", which established a humanitarian protection zone in south-western Rwanda. The operation ended in August and UNAMIR took over in the zone.

In July, RPF forces took control of Rwanda, ending the civil war, and established a broad-based Government. The new Government declared its commitment to the 1993 peace agreement and assured UNAMIR that it would cooperate on the return of refugees.

For their part, when the conflict broke out in April, UNOMUR observers had expanded their monitoring activities in Uganda to the entire border area. But the Security Council gradually scaled down the operation, and UNOMUR left Uganda in September.

By October 1994, estimates suggested that out of a population of 7.9 million, at least half a million people had been killed. Some 2 million had fled to other countries and as many as 2 million people

were internally displaced. A United Nations humanitarian appeal launched in July raised $762 million, making it possible to respond to the enormous humanitarian challenge.

A Commission of Experts established by the Security Council reported in September that "overwhelming evidence" proved that Hutu elements had perpetrated acts of genocide against the Tutsi group in a "concerted, planned, systematic and methodical way".

In November 1994, the Security Council established the International Tribunal for Rwanda to prosecute those responsible for genocide and war crimes. Located in Arusha, Tanzania, the Tribunal issued the first indictments in 1995 and held the first trials in 1997.

UNAMIR continued its efforts to ensure security and stability, support humanitarian assistance, clear landmines and help refugees to resettle. But Rwanda supported ending the mission, stating that UNAMIR did not respond to its priority needs. The Security Council heeded that request, and UNAMIR left in March 1996.

At a meeting organised by Rwanda and the United Nations Development Programme in 1996, international donors pledged over $617 million towards the reconstruction of the country. United Nations agencies have continued to provide humanitarian aid and to assist in the return of refugees.

Eritrea

Upon the collapse of the military Government in Ethiopia in 1991, the secessionist movement in Eritrea, led by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front, announced the formation of a provisional Government and the holding of a referendum to determine the wishes of the Eritrean people regarding their status in relation to Ethiopia.

The head of Eritrea's Referendum Commission in 1992 invited the United Nations to verify that the referendum process was free, fair and impartial. Endorsing a proposal by the Secretary-General, the General Assembly in December established the *United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Referendum in Eritrea (UNOVER).*

UNOVER observed all referendum activities, from voter registration to the announcement of the results. The observers maintained contact with community leaders and social organisations, visited municipalities throughout the country, made random visits to voter registration centres, observed rallies and verified compliance by all parties with the referendum's code of conduct. At the end of the process, about 1.1 million voters had been registered.

Voting took place in April 1993, with the overwhelming majority of voters in favour of independence. The head of UNOVER, Samir Sanbar, declared the referendum process free and fair. Eritrea was declared an independent on 24 May 1993, and joined the United Nations on 28 May.

Somalia

Following the downfall of President Siad Barre in 1991, a civil war broke out in Somalia between the faction supporting Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and that supporting General Mohamed Farah Aidid. The United Nations, in cooperation with the OAU and other organisations, sought to resolve the conflict. The Secretary-General in 1991 dispatched an envoy to whom all faction leaders expressed support for a United Nations peace role.

The United Nations also became engaged in providing humanitarian aid, in cooperation with relief organisations. The war had resulted in nearly 1 million refugees and almost 5 million people threatened by hunger and disease.

The Security Council in January 1992 imposed an arms embargo against Somalia. The Secretary-General organised talks between the parties, who agreed on a ceasefire, to be monitored by United Nations observers, and on the protection of humanitarian convoys by United Nations security personnel. In April, the Council established the *United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)*.

The relief effort was hampered by continued fighting and insecurity. The Security Council in August deployed some 3,000 additional troops to protect humanitarian aid. But the situation continued to worsen, with aid workers under attack as famine threatened 1.5 million people.

The United States in November 1992 offered to organise and lead an operation to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The Security Council accepted the offer and authorised the use of "all necessary means" to establish a secure environment for the relief effort.

The Unified Task Force (UNITAF), made up of contingents from 24 countries led by the United States, quickly secured all major relief centres, and by year's end humanitarian aid was again flowing. UNOSOM remained responsible for protecting the delivery of assistance and for political efforts to end the war.

At a meeting convened by the Secretary-General in early 1993, 14 Somali political movements agreed on a ceasefire and pledged to hand over all weapons to UNITAF and UNOSOM. In March, the United

Nations organised an aid conference at which donors pledged over $130 million. At a reconciliation conference organised by the Secretary-General and his special representative, the leaders of 15 political movements endorsed an accord on disarmament, reconstruction and the formation of a transitional Government.

The Security Council in March decided on a transition from *UNITAF to UNOSOM II,* authorising it to use force if necessary to ensure its mandate—securing a stable environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. UNOSOM was also mandated to assist in the reconstruction of economic, social and political life. But while UNITAF had patrolled less than half of the country with 37,000 well-equipped troops, the 22,000 United Nations peacekeepers were given the mandate to cover all of Somalia.

The factions, however, did not observe the ceasefires. In June, 24 UNOSOM II soldiers from Pakistan were killed in an attack in Mogadishu. Subsequently, clashes between UNOSOM and Somali militiamen in Mogadishu resulted in casualties among civilians and UNOSOM.

In October, 18 United States soldiers of the Quick Reaction Force—deployed in support but not part of UNOSOM—lost their lives in an operation in Mogadishu. The United States immediately reinforced its military presence, but later announced that it would withdraw by early 1994. Belgium, France and Sweden also decided to withdraw.

The Secretary-General in October held talks in Somalia, while UNOSOM and United Nations agencies continued their reconciliation and relief efforts. Somali elders held reconciliation meetings in various parts of the country, while over 100,000 refugees returned to relatively peaceful parts of Somalia.

The Security Council in early 1994 revised UNOSOM's mandate, stressing assistance for reconciliation and reconstruction, and setting a March 1995 deadline for the mission.

At talks brokered by a Secretary-General's envoy, the 15 major political movements in March 1994 signed a declaration on reconciliation: it provided for a ceasefire, the disarmament of militias and a conference to appoint a new Government. But preparations for the conference were repeatedly postponed.

The Secretary-General told the Security Council in September that UNOSOM's ability to provide security had been reduced by troop withdrawals, budget restrictions and military actions by the Somali

factions. Wider problems included the lack of commitment to peace by the factions and insufficient political will by Member States. The Council approved reductions in the force.

With faction leaders still not complying with the 1993 and 1994 agreements, the Security Council extended UNOSOM for a final period. It urged factions to enact a ceasefire and form a Government of national unity. As no further progress was made, UNOSOM withdrew in March 1995.

During the three-year effort, 154 United Nations peacekeeping personnel had died. But the United Nations had brought relief to millions facing starvation, helped to stop the large-scale killings, assisted in the return of refugees and provided massive humanitarian aid. Under difficult conditions, United Nations agencies have continued their humanitarian work.

Liberia

In Liberia, the United Nations supported the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a 16-country subregional organisation, in its efforts to end a civil war that had broken out in late 1989. These efforts included establishing, in 1990, an observer force, the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG). The Security Council in 1992 imposed an arms embargo on Liberia, and the Secretary-General appointed a special representative to assist in talks between ECOWAS and the waning parties.

After ECOWAS brokered a peace agreement in Cotonou, Benin, in 1993, the Security Council established the *United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL).* Its task was to support ECOMOG in implementing the Cotonou peace agreement—especially compliance with and impartial implementation of the agreement by all parties. UNOMIL was the first United Nations peacekeeping mission undertaken in cooperation with a peacekeeping operation already established by another organisation. With the ceasefire in force, the United Nations successfully observed the conduct of the 1997 elections. These led to the establishment of a democratically elected Government and the effective end of a war in which over 150,000 people—mostly civilians—were killed and more than 850,000 became refugees.

In November 1997, following the completion of UNOMIL's mandate, the United Nations established a post-conflict, peace-building support office. Headed by a Representative of the Secretary-General, the Office was intended to strengthen and harmonise United Nations peace-

building efforts, to help promote reconciliation and respect for human rights, and to help mobilise international support for reconstruction and recovery.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

In one of its most complex and successful interventions, the United Nations became directly involved in peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts in Central America in 1989, when Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua requested its assistance in their collective agreement (Esquipulas II agreement) to end the conflicts that were disrupting the entire region, promote democratic elections and pursue democratisation and dialogue.

The Security Council established the *United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA),* which was deployed in all five countries to verify that they cease assistance to irregular and insurrectionist forces, and not allow their territory to be used for attacks into other countries.

Nicaragua: The five countries also agreed to draw up a plan for demobilising the Nicaraguan resistance, also known as "contras". Nicaragua announced it would hold elections under international and United Nations monitoring. At Nicaragua's request, the *United Nations Observation Mission for the Verification of Elections in Nicaragua (ONUVEN)* was established in 1989. It observed the entire preparation and holding of the 1990 elections—the first United Nations-observed elections in an independent country.

The success of ONUVEN helped create conditions for the voluntary demobilisation of the "contras". ONUCA oversaw that demobilisation, as decided by the Security Council, at specific sites in Honduras and Nicaragua. By July 1990, some 22,000 resistance members had turned in their weapons to the United Nations observers. ONUCA remained in Central America, contributing to the peace efforts, until 1992.

El Salvador: Meanwhile, as requested by El Salvador and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), the Secretary-General began assisting in talks aimed at ending the civil war in that country. The first major accord was achieved in 1990, when the parties agreed to ensure respect for human rights. To verify this and future agreements, the Security Council established in 1991 the *United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL).*

Intense negotiations brokered by the Secretary-General and his personal representative culminated in the Chapultepec Peace Accords of January 1992, which put an end to a conflict that had claimed some 75,000 lives. The Security Council assigned to ONUSAL the mandate to monitor the Accords.

In one of the most comprehensive operations in United Nations history, ONUSAL monitored the accords and verified the demobilisation of combatants, their reintegration into society and the respect by both parties of their human rights commitments.

The formal end of the 12-year conflict was proclaimed in December 1992, as FMLN troops completed their demobilisation. This was followed by a 50 per cent reduction in the Salvadoran army and the departure of officers allegedly responsible for human rights violations.

ONUSAL also assisted in bringing about reforms needed to tackle the root causes of the civil war—such as judicial reforms, the phasing out of the national police, the training of the new civilian police, and the transfer of land to former combatants and landholders. At the request of the Government, ONUSAL observed the 1994 elections, won by the ruling party, the Republican National Alliance (ARENA), with FMLN emerging as the main opposition party. ONUSAL's mandate ended in 1995, and a small United Nations office remained in the country to provide good offices and verify implementation of the areas of the peace accord still outstanding.

Guatemala: At the request of Guatemala and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), the United Nations from 1991 observed talks between the parties aimed at ending the civil war, which had lasted over three decades and resulted in over 140,000 people killed or missing.

In 1994, the parties concluded accords providing for the United Nations to verify all agreements reached, as well as to establish a human rights mission. The General Assembly in 1994 established the *United Nations Human Rights Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA).*

The United Nations-moderated talks led to other agreements: on resettling war-displaced people and refugees (1994); on a commission to investigate past human rights violations (1994); on the rights of indigenous people (1995); on socio-economic aspects and the agrarian situation (1996); and on strengthening civilian power and the role of the army (1996).

The URNG announced the suspension of its military operations in early 1996; the Government responded by ordering the army to cease counter-insurgency operations. In December, agreements were concluded on a ceasefire, on constitutional and electoral reforms, and on the legal integration of URNG. Finally, on 29 December 1996, the parties signed in Guatemala City the Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace, which ended the war and brought all previously signed agreements into effect.

The last and longest of Central America's conflicts had ended, and the region was at peace for the first time in 36 years. In 1997, a military observer group attached to MINUGUA oversaw the disarmament and demobilisation of URNG forces. An expanded MINUGUA has remained in the country to verify compliance with the accords. United Nations agencies have continued to address the social and economic roots of conflict throughout the region.

Haiti

After the departure of "Life President" Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986, Haiti had a series of short-lived governments. In 1990, the country's provisional Government requested the United Nations to observe the December 1990 elections.

The United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH) observed the preparation and holding of the elections, which were termed as "highly successful" by the head of ONUVEH. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, of the National Front for Change and Democracy, was elected President.

But in 1991, a coup headed by Lieutenant-General Raoul Cedras ended democratic rule. The President went into exile. The Organisation of American States (OAS) and the United Nations condemned the coup and began diplomatic efforts for the return to democratic rule. The Secretary-General, at the request of the General Assembly, appointed a special envoy for Haiti, Dante Caputo, who was also appointed separately as special envoy by the OAS.

In response to the worsening situation, and on the request of Aristide, a joint United Nations/OAS mission—the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH)—was deployed in the country in 1993. Its task was to monitor the human rights situation and to investigate violations.

The special envoy sought to reach an agreement on the appointment of a Prime Minister at the head of a Government of national unity, an

amnesty for the coup leaders and the return of the President. But his proposals were not accepted.

In an effort to restore constitutional rule, the Security Council imposed an oil and arms embargo on Haiti in June 1993. General Cedras then agreed to hold talks. Such talks, conducted in New York by the special envoy, led in July to an agreement: Mr. Aristide would return to Haiti in October and appoint a new head of the armed forces.

As provided for by the agreement, the Security Council suspended the embargo following the approval by Parliament of a new cabinet, and established the *United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)* to assist in modernising the armed forces and in creating a new police force. But its mandate was undermined by the non-compliance of the military authorities with the agreement. After a series of incidents, UNMIH, MICIVIH and other international agencies left Haiti in October, and the Security Council resumed the embargo.

After further negotiations, MICIVIH returned to Haiti in 1994. The mission denounced the human rights violations taking place, and was met with harassment and obstruction. The Security Council added to the sanctions a trade embargo, with the exception of medical products and foodstuffs.

The de facto Government declared MICIVIH's international staff undesirable and gave them 48 hours to leave. The Secretary-General, concerned about their security, decided, in agreement with the OAS Secretary-General, to evacuate them.

The Security Council in July authorised Member States to form a multinational force and use "all necessary means" to facilitate the departure of the military leaders and the return to democratic rule. It also decided that a strengthened UNMIH would take over from the multinational force once a secure and stable environment was established.

The Secretary-General dispatched an envoy to seek arrangements for the President's return. But the military leaders declined to meet the envoy. Preparations for an operation to enforce the Council's decision began.

The United States and Haiti's military leaders reached in September an agreement aimed at avoiding further violence. The agreement, mediated by a delegation headed by former United States President Jimmy Carter, provided for the early retirement of various military leaders, the end of the embargo and free parliamentary elections.

The 20,000-strong multinational force, led by the United States, began deploying in Haiti, followed shortly thereafter by an UNMIH advance team.

General Cedras resigned and left Haiti, along with the Chief of Staff. On 15 October, President Aristide returned to Haiti, and the following day the embargo was lifted. MICIVIH also returned, resuming its monitoring and promotion of human rights, and providing assistance to institution-building.

As decided by the Security Council, UNMIH took over in 1995 from the multinational force to assist the Government to maintain the secure and stable environment established by the force. UNMIH helped to create, for the first time in the country's history, a national civil police. The United Nations and OAS oversaw the 1995 parliamentary and local elections, won by a coalition associated with President Aristide.

Its mission concluded, UNMIH was replaced in its functions by the *United Nations Support Mission in Haiti,* which was followed by other operations—the *Transition Mission in Haiti* and the *Civilian Police Mission in Haiti.* The current mission has continued to provide international support to the Government in upgrading the country's national police force. MICIVIH has continued to monitor and promote human rights, and to provide technical assistance in institution-building.

ASIA

Korean Peninsula

The question of Korea came before the General Assembly in 1947. United Nations efforts to re-establish a unified State through elections were unsuccessful, and two separate governments came into being in 1948. That year the General Assembly called for the withdrawal of occupying forces and created a United Nations Commission on Korea: its task was to lend its good offices to bring about unification, and to facilitate the removal of barriers to economic, social and other friendly relations caused by the division of the country.

In June 1950, the United States and the Commission on Korea informed the United Nations that the Republic of Korea had been attacked by forces from North Korea. The Security Council recommended that Member States furnish the necessary assistance to the Republic of Korea to repel the attack and restore peace and security

in the area. In July, the Council recommended that Member States providing military forces make them available to a unified command under the United States; 16 nations made troops available. This force, known as the United Nations Command and authorised by the Council to fly the United Nations flag, was not a United Nations peacekeeping operation placed under the command of the Secretary-General, but an international force acting under the unified command.

The Soviet Union, which had been absent from the Security Council in protest against the Chinese Nationalist government representing China at the United Nations, deemed the Council's decisions illegal as they were adopted in the absence of two permanent members (the Soviet Union and China). Fighting continued until July 1953, when an armistice agreement was signed.

The Middle East

The United Nations has been concerned with the question of the Middle East from its earliest days. It has outlined principles for a peaceful settlement and dispatched various peacekeeping missions, and continues to support initiatives towards a just solution to the underlying political problems.

The Middle East question has its origin in the issue of the status of Palestine. In 1947, Palestine was a Territory administered by the United Kingdom under a Mandate from the League of Nations: it had a population of some 2 million, two thirds Arabs and one third Jews. The General Assembly in 1947 endorsed a plan, prepared by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, for the partition of the Territory: it provided for the creation of an Arab and a Jewish State, with Jerusalem under international status. The plan was not accepted by the Palestinian Arabs or by the Arab States.

On 14 May 1948, the United Kingdom relinquished its Mandate over Palestine and the Jewish Agency proclaimed the State of Israel. The following day, the Palestinian Arabs, assisted by Arab States, opened hostilities against the new State. The hostilities were halted through a truce called for by the Security Council and supervised by a Mediator appointed by the General Assembly, assisted by a group of military observers which came to be known as the *United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation*—the first United Nations observer mission.

As a result of the conflict, some 750,000 Palestine Arabs lost their homes and livelihoods and became refugees. To assist them, the General

Assembly in 1949 established the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which has since been a major provider of assistance and a force for stability in the region.

Unresolved, Arab-Israeli hostilities led again to warfare in 1956, 1967 and 1973, each conflict leading Member States to call for United Nations mediation and peacekeeping forces. The 1956 conflict saw the deployment of the first full-fledged peacekeeping force—the *United Nations Emergency Force*—which oversaw troop withdrawals and contributed to peace and stability.

The June 1967 war involved fighting between Israel and Egypt, Jordan and Syria, during which Israel occupied the Sinai peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank of the Jordan River, including East Jerusalem, and part of Syria's Golan Heights. The Security Council called for a ceasefire and, as a result of subsequent negotiations, authorised the stationing of observers on the Golan Heights and Suez Canal sectors to supervise the ceasefire.

The Security Council, by resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, defined principles for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

These are:

- "withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict"; and
- "termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries, free from threats or acts of force". The resolution also affirmed the need to settle the refugee problem.

After the 1973 war among Israel, and Egypt and Syria, the Security Council adopted *resolution 338* of 22 October 1973, which reaffirms the principles of resolution 242 and calls for negotiations aimed at "a just and durable peace". These benchmark resolutions remain the basis for an overall settlement in the Middle East.

To monitor the 1973 ceasefire, the Security Council established two peacekeeping forces. The second *United Nations Emergency Force* was deployed in the Suez Canal sector in 1973; it remained until its mandate lapsed in 1979. The *United Nations Disengagement Observer Force,* established in accordance with the Disengagement Agreement between Israel and Syria, is still in place on the Golan Heights.

In the following years, the General Assembly repeatedly called for an international peace conference on the Middle East, under United Nations auspices, based on resolutions 242 and 338. The Assembly in 1974 invited the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) to participate in the work of the Assembly and in United Nations international conferences as an observer.

Direct negotiations between Egypt and Israel led to the Camp David accords of 1978, which in rum led to the Egypt-Israel peace treaty of 1979. Under that treaty, Israel withdrew from the Sinai, which was returned to Egypt. In 1994, a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan was also concluded.

Lebanon. Since 1972, southern Lebanon had been the theatre of hostilities between Palestinian groups on the one hand, and Israeli forces and its local Lebanese auxiliary on the other. After Israeli forces invaded southern Lebanon in 1978 following a Palestinian commando raid in Israel, the Security Council, by resolution 425, called for respect for the integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon, called upon Israel to withdraw, and established the *United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).* This Force was to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restore international peace and security, and assist Lebanon in re-establishing its authority in the area.

In 1982, after intense exchanges of fire in southern Lebanon and across the Israel-Lebanon border, Israeli forces moved into Lebanon, reaching and surrounding Beirut. Israel withdrew from most of the country in 1985, but retained control of a strip of land in southern Lebanon, where Israeli forces and its local Lebanese auxiliary remained, and which partly overlaps UNIFIL's area of deployment. Hostilities have continued between Israeli and auxiliary forces on the one hand, and Lebanese groups who proclaim their resistance against the Israeli occupation on the other.

The Security Council has maintained its commitment to Lebanon's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, while the Secretary-General has continued his efforts to persuade Israel to leave the security zone. Israel has maintained that the zone is a temporary arrangement governed by its security concerns. Lebanon has requested that Israel withdraw, viewing the occupation as illegal and contrary to United Nations resolutions. For its part, UNIFIL has sought to contain the conflict and protect the population.

During the period of widest conflict in Lebanon, a number of foreigners were taken hostage. "Quiet diplomacy" by the Secretary-

General and his envoy led in 1991 to the release of several hostages and prisoners. Overall, nine Western hostages held in Lebanon and 91 Lebanese prisoners held by Israel were released.

Intifada **and Self-government:** In 1987, the Palestinian uprising *(in-tifada)* began in the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in a call for Palestinian independence and statehood. The Palestine National Council—the legislative body of the PLO— proclaimed in November 1988 the establishment of the State of Palestine. The General Assembly in December acknowledged that proclamation and decided to designate the PLO as "Palestine".

The Security Council in 1990 reaffirmed its support for negotiations involving all parties, based on resolutions 242 and 338, which would take into account Israel's right to security as well as the rights of the Palestinian people.

In 1991, a Peace Conference on the Middle East opened in Madrid, co-sponsored by the Soviet Union and the United States. The United Nations was invited to participate in 1992, and the Secretary-General appointed a special representative. The General Assembly in 1991 reaffirmed the principles for a lasting peace, and revoked its 1975 determination that Zionism was a form of racism and racial discrimination.

Following Norwegian-mediated negotiations, Israel and the PLO established mutual recognition on 10 September 1993. The PLO recognised Israel's right to exist, and Israel recognised the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.

Three days later, Israel and the PLO signed in Washington, D.C., the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements. The landmark agreement opened the way to Palestinian self-rule, providing for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and for an interim Palestinian self-government, first in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank town of Jericho, and later in the rest of the West Bank.

Welcoming the agreement, the Secretary-General pledged the assistance of United Nations agencies and programmes. As requested by Israel and the PLO, the United Nations created a task force on the social and economic development of Gaza and Jericho, and appointed a special coordinator for United Nations assistance, who has been overseeing the development work of United Nations programmes and agencies.

The transfer of powers from Israel to the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip and Jericho began in 1994. In 1995, Israel and the PLO signed an agreement on Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank, providing for the withdrawal of Israeli troops and the handover of civil authority in the West Bank to an elected Palestinian Council.

Elections for the Council's 88-member Palestinian Executive Authority were held in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem in 1996. PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat was elected President of the Authority.

A number of issues, however, have continued to threaten the peace process. In 1997, the Secretary-General expressed his "shock and horror" at the suicide bombing attacks that killed scores of civilians in Israel. Also in 1997, the resumption of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories was condemned by the General Assembly at an emergency special session. The Assembly demanded that Israel stop building a new settlement near East Jerusalem as well as all other settlements in the occupied territories.

South Asia Subcontinent: India-Pakistan

The United Nations has continued to be concerned with the decades old dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. The issue dates back to the 1940s, when the State of Jammu and Kashmir was one of the princely states which became free, under the partition plan and the India Independence Act of 1947, to accede to India and Pakistan. The Security Council first discussed the issue in 1948, following India's complaint that tribesmen and others, with Pakistan's support and participation, were invading Kashmir and that fighting was taking place. Pakistan denied the charges and declared Kashmir's accession to India illegal. The Security Council recommended measures to stop the fighting, including the use of observers, and to create conditions for a plebiscite. It established a United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, which made proposals on a ceasefire and troop withdrawals, and proposed that the issue be decided by plebiscite. Both sides accepted the proposal, but could not reach on an agreement on the modalities for holding the plebiscite. Since 1949, the *United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)* has been observing the ceasefire line in Kashmir.

Following the 1972 Indo-Pak agreement defining a Line of Control in Kashmir, the two countries undertook to settle their difference peacefully and achieve a final settlement. After the agreement, India took the position that the mandate of UNMOGIP had lapsed—a position

not accepted by Pakistan. The Secretary-General, meanwhile, has maintained that only the Security Council can terminate the mission, and has consistently expressed his readiness to facilitate the search for a lasting solution to the overall dispute. Both sides resumed their bilateral dialogue in 1997, after a three-year impasse. They agreed on a comprehensive eight-point agenda for further talks which includes the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. The Secretary-General, welcoming the resumption of dialogue, encouraged the two sides to make progress towards a lasting solution.

Cambodia

In one of its most complex operations, the United Nations in Cambodia oversaw a transition that led to the restoration of civil rule after years of civil war and foreign intervention.

In 1992, as specified in the 1991 Paris Agreements painstakingly negotiated with the help of the Secretary-General, the *United Nations Transition Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)* assumed control of key sectors of the country's administrative structures—foreign affairs, defence, security, finance and communications—in order to build a stable environment conducive to national elections. At the same time, UNHCR oversaw the successful repatriation and resettlement of some 360,000 refugees and displaced persons. At its peak, UNTAC numbered over 21,000 military and civilian personnel from more than 100 countries.

A major step towards normalisation occurred with the elections of May 1993. Twenty parties took part in the elections. UNTAC oversaw the electoral campaign and the registration of voters, as well as the elections. Over 4.2 million people—nearly 90 per cent of the registered voters—cast their ballots to elect a Constituent Assembly. The head of UNTAC declared the elections free and fair. In September, the Constitution was proclaimed and a new government, led by two prime ministers, was inaugurated.

Several United Nations agencies have remained in the country to support reconstruction and development. In 1993, in conformity with the Paris Agreements, the Secretary-General appointed a Special Representative for Human Rights to assist the Government in promoting and protecting, human rights. Working closely with the Special Representative, a Cambodia Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights seeks to strengthen civil society and build institutions and legal structures for human rights and democracy. In 1994, the Secretary-General appointed a Representative for

Cambodia to serve as a liaison with the Government, monitor the political situation and report on developments relating to peace and security.

Friction between the two prime ministers led in 1997 to fighting and the flight of one of the prime ministers, members of his political party and of other opposition groups. To help restore a democratic government, the United Nations sent monitors, with the consent of the authorities, in an initiative intended to assure politicians wanting to return that they would be allowed to resume political activities without harm or intimidation, in view of new elections to be held in 1998.

Cyprus

The *United Nations Peacekeeping Force* in Cyprus has been supervising a ceasefire and maintaining a buffer zone between the Greek Cypriot National Guard and Turkish Forces since 1974 when a *coup d'etat* by Greek Cypriot and Greek elements favouring union of the country with Greece was followed by military intervention by Turkey and the de facto division of the island. Since the events of 1974, the Secretary-General and his envoy have been seeking to resolve the decades-old dispute between the island's Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot communities. The Secretary-General has used his good offices to bring the two sides together in search of a comprehensive settlement, sanctioned by legal instruments. In 1997, the Secretary-General and his new special adviser on Cyprus initiated a process of fresh rounds of direct talks between the leaders of the two communities, with the strong support of the Security Council.

Iraq

The United Nations response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 illustrates the range of options it has at its disposal in the pursuit of restoring international peace and security. The Security Council immediately condemned the invasion, demanded the withdrawal of Iraqi forces and imposed comprehensive sanctions against Iraq. The Council subsequently banned air transport to and from Iraq and Kuwait, and endorsed a naval blockade to enforce the sanctions. At the 1990 session of the General Assembly, all Member States condemned Iraq's action.

At the same time, the United Nations undertook many initiatives to avert war. The Secretary-General met with Iraq's Foreign Minister in August 1990, and with the President of Iraq in Baghdad in January

1991. He was also in constant contact with the political leaders involved in the crisis.

The Security Council set 15 January 1991 as the deadline for Iraq's compliance with the Council's resolutions. The Council authorised Member States cooperating with Kuwait to use "all necessary means" to uphold and implement these resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area. Faced with Iraq's non-compliance, on 16 January coalition forces allied to restore Kuwait's sovereignty began attacks against Iraq. The coalition forces acted in accordance with the Council's authorisation, but not under the direction or control of the United Nations. Hostilities were suspended on 27 February after the Iraqi forces had left Kuwait.

By resolution 687 of 3 April 1991, the Security Council set terms for a ceasefire, demanded that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the border, called for plans for deploying United Nations observers, took action on compensation for war damages and decided that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction should be eliminated. The resolution also called for Iraq to cooperate with the International Committee of the Red Cross to facilitate the repatriation of Kuwaiti and third country nationals, and asked the Secretary-General to facilitate the return to Kuwait of all property seized by Iraq.

Observers deployed: The Security Council established a demilitarised zone along the Iraq-Kuwait border and set up an observer mission to monitor the zone. The *United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM)* monitored the withdrawal of the remaining armed forces. Following a series of incidents, the Council in 1993 expanded UNIKOM's mandate to include an armed force capable of preventing or redressing small-scale violations.

Border demarcation: As called for in resolution 687, the *Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission* was established in 1991. It included one representative from Iraq, one from Kuwait and three independent experts appointed by the Secretary-General. Iraq stopped participating in the work of the Commission in 1992. The Commission demarcated the boundary by Iraq and Kuwait in 1932 and again in 1963.

The Security Council demanded that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the boundary. Iraq informed the Secretary-General in November 1994 that it recognised Kuwait's sovereignty, territorial integrity and international boundaries.

Elimination of banned weapons: Resolution 687 also dealt with the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres, together with related items and facilities. To verify implementation of these provisions, the Security Council established the *United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM),* with powers of no-notice inspection. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was asked to undertake similar tasks in the nuclear area, with UNSCOM assistance.

UNSCOM and IAEA have uncovered and eliminated much of Iraq's banned weapons programmes and capabilities—including a nuclear weapons programme, major chemical weapons and biological warfare programmes, and scores of ballistic missiles. But despite the considerable progress made, UNSCOM and IAEA have been unable to determine that Iraq has fulfilled all the obligations it accepted. A monitoring and verification system has been put in place to detect and deter rearmament efforts.

Compensation for damages: Under resolution 687, the Security Council established a fund to compensate foreign Governments, nationals or corporations for any loss, damage or injury resulting from Iraq's invasion. Iraq was required to pay to the fund an amount not exceeding 30 per cent of the annual value of its oil exports. *A Compensation Commission,* made up of nine jurists and experts, has examined claims and recommended compensation.

In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf war, the Secretary-General launched in 1991 the *United Nations Humanitarian Programme for Iraq,* which has promoted the return of those displaced and provided humanitarian assistance to the population. He also appointed a coordinator of the humanitarian work of the United Nations system and other relief agencies. The humanitarian situation has remained critical. Economic sanctions, which have remained in place, have taken a severe toll on the most vulnerable people, especially children. In 1997, a UNICEF study estimated that chronic malnutrition affected nearly 1 million children.

Oil-for-food programme: In August 1991, the Security Council offered Iraq the opportunity to export limited amounts of oil, under specified conditions, to provide funds for purchasing humanitarian goods. Under *resolution 986(1995),* the Security Council authorised States to permit the import of up to $1 billion worth of Iraqi oil every 90 days, to generate resources for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. While sanctions have remained in place, in 1996 an "oil-for-

food" agreement between the United Nations and Iraq was concluded. A committee of the Security Council has been overseeing this matter and authorised the supply of food, medicine and other humanitarian items.

In February 1998, the Security Council expanded the "oil-for-food" agreement by authorising Iraq to sell $5.2 billion worth of oil over a six-month period. Also in February, a visit by the Secretary-General in Baghdad led to an agreement to resolve a peace-threatening standoff on UNSCOM inspections.

Tajikistan

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan became an independent republic in 1991. The country soon faced an acute social and economic crisis, and its stability was upset by regional and political tensions, further compounded by differences between secularists and pro-Islamic traditionalists. A civil war erupted in 1992, and the Tajik opposition—a coalition of Islamic and other groups—seized power. After suffering defeat in 1992, most of the opposition forces crossed the border into Afghanistan; from there, they carried out armed attacks into Tajikistan. The war resulted in an estimated 50,000 deaths, some 400,000 refugees and 600,000 internally displaced persons.

Since 1993, a special representative of the Secretary-General has been mediating between the Government and the opposition. Talks under his auspices led to a ceasefire agreement signed in Tehran in 1994. The Security Council in 1994 established the *United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT)* to assist the Joint Commission—composed of representatives of the Government and of the opposition—to monitor the ceasefire agreement.

After three years of United Nations-sponsored peace negotiations, a peace agreement was signed in Moscow in 1997: it provided for a transitional period during which all the provisions of the agreement were to be implemented, thus creating the political, legislative and security environment under which new parliamentary elections could be held.

The Security Council in 1997 strengthened the mandate of UNMOT to allow it to help promote peace and reconciliation and assist in implementing the peace agreement. UNMOT has cooperated closely with a peacekeeping force of the Commonwealth of Inde-pendent States (CIS) and a mission of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

An international donor conference organised by the United Nations in 1997 resulted in many pledges for activities related to the implementation of the peace agreement. In 1998, the United Nations launched a $34.5 million appeal to meet urgent humanitarian needs in the country.

EUROPE

Georgia

Georgia, one of the republics of the Soviet Union, became independent in 1991. Within Georgia, Abkhazia had been an autonomous republic since 1931. Attempts by Abkhazia's local authorities to separate from Georgia escalated into a series of armed confrontations in 1992. Hundreds of people died and some 30,000 fled to the Russian Federation. An envoy of the Secretary-General, appointed in 1993, began mediation among the parties. A ceasefire agreement was reached in 1993, and to verify compliance with it, the Security Council established the *United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG).*

But fighting resumed, turning into civil war in September 1993 and leading to the displacement of some 250,000 people. Another ceasefire was finally reached in Moscow in 1994. The parties agreed to the deployment of a peacekeeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to monitor compliance with the agreement, with UNOMIG monitoring implementation of the agreement and observing the operation of the CIS force. The Secretary-General's special representative has continued negotiations towards a lasting settlement, focusing on the question of the political status of Abkhazia and the return of refugees and displaced persons. A United Nations office for the protection and promotion of human rights in Abkhazia was established in 1996. As a meeting held under United Nations auspices in November 1997, both sides agreed to establish a Coordinating Council and, within its framework, three working groups to address the military, political and economic aspects of the peace process.

The Former Yugoslavia

A founding Member of the United Nations, the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia comprised six republics—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. At the end of the 1980s, in the midst of economic and political crisis, Slovenia and Croatia moved towards separation, both declaring

independence in June 1991. Serbs living in Croatia, supported by the Yugoslav National Army, opposed the move, and war between Croatia and Serbia broke out. The European Community sought to resolve the crisis, without success.

The United Nations became involved in September 1991, when the Security Council imposed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia. The Secretary-General appointed a personal envoy, Mr. Cyrus Vance (later replaced by Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg), to support the peace efforts of the European Community.

The Security Council in early 1992 established the *United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR),* to create the conditions for negotiating a settlement. UNPROFOR was deployed in Croatia in four "protected areas" in which Serbs were the majority or a large minority, to ensure the demilitarisation of such areas and to protect the population from attacks. But by October, Member States had provided less than 10 per cent of the 14,000 authorised troops.

Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence in March 1992—an act supported by Bosnian Croats and Muslims but opposed by Bosnian Serbs. The war had extended to that republic, with the Yugoslav and Croatian armies intervening. The Security Council in May imposed economic sanctions on rump Yugoslavia (consisting by then of Serbia and Montenegro). Also in May, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia became Members of the United Nations.

By mid-1992, there were widespread reports of "ethnic cleansing"—forcible removal or elimination by the ethnic group controlling an area of members of other ethnic groups—mostly conducted by Bosnian Serb forces. The United Nations sought to assist the 2.2 million refugees and displaced persons—the largest refugee crisis in Europe since the Second World War.

In the light of continued fighting in Bosnia, the Security Council in June 1992 authorised UNPROFOR to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid. The General Assembly suspended participation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the Assembly's work, and condemned the country for violating Bosnia's sovereignty.

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, concerned about being drawn into the war, requested the deployment of United Nations observers. The Security Council, in December 1992, dispatched an UNPROFOR contingent to the country's borders with Yugoslavia and

Albania. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia became a Member of the United Nations in 1993.

The United Nations created, for the first time, an international court to prosecute war crimes: the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, established by the Security Council in early 1993 to prosecute those responsible for grave violations of International Humanitarian Law.

The European Community mediator, Mr. David Owen, and the envoy of the Secretary-General continued intense peace efforts. But their settlement plan was rejected in April by the Bosnian Serbs.

The Security Council in May 1993 declared the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo, and other Bosnian towns as "safe areas" that should be free from attacks; in June it authorised UNPROFOR to use force in reply to attacks against the safe areas. The Secretary-General informed the Council that peacekeeping commanders needed 35,000 troops to deter attacks. Notwithstanding this recommendation, the Security Council authorised 7,600 troops. Member States made these personnel available only after considerable delay.

To deter continuing attacks against Sarajevo, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) decided in early 1994 to authorise air strikes at the request of the Secretary-General.

France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States formed in April a "Contact Group" in a further attempt to settle the Bosnian conflict. But the Bosnian Serbs refused to agree to the Contact Group's territorial proposals, and as a result the Security Council in September strengthened sanctions against them. Continuing his peace efforts, the Secretary-General in late 1994 went to Sarajevo.

United Nations agencies continued to provide relief aid: overall, they provided humanitarian assistance to some 4 million people in the former Yugoslavia. UNHCR alone delivered over 1.1 million tons of aid to over 3.5 million people.

The Security Council in early 1995 replaced UNPROFOR with three distinct operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Croatia and in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—as the three countries had requested.

In response to NATO air strikes, Bosnian Serb forces in May 1995 detained about 400 UNPROFOR observers, using some as "human

shields"—chained to military targets to deter further strikes. The Secretary-General stressed before the Security Council the contradictions of the Force's mandate: its original peacekeeping task had gradually been enlarged to include enforcement elements, thus causing UNPROFOR to be seen as a party to the war.

Fighting now intensified. Croatia launched in May and August major offensives against its Serb-populated areas, which forced some 200,000 Croatian Serbs to flee the country. The Bosnian Serbs in July took over the Srebrenica and Zepa "safe areas" in Bosnia, during which thousands of refugees disappeared. The Bosnian Serbs' constant shelling of Sarajevo left 33 civilians killed on 28 August alone. NATO responded with massive air strikes against military targets around Sarajevo.

Talks sponsored by the Contact Group led in September to an agreement between Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to end the Bosnian war. Under the agreement, Bosnia would continue to exist and consist of two entities—a Bosnian-Croat federation and a Serb republic.

A peace initiative led by the United States resulted in various agreements. The three countries concluded an agreement for elections in Bosnia; the Bosnian Serbs signed an agreement to end fighting in Sarajevo by November 1995; Croatia and the Croatian Serbs concluded an agreement on Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium—areas of Croatia with a mainly Serb population.

Peace talks in Dayton, Ohio, United States, culminated in the December 1995 peace agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: all pledged to respect each other's sovereignty and independence, refrain from using force, and settle disputes peacefully. The 42-month war had come to an end.

To help ensure compliance with the agreement, the Security Council authorised the deployment of a multinational Implementation Force (IFOR), mainly formed by NATO troops. In December, IFOR took over from UNPROFOR, whose mandate was terminated. Over 230 United Nations peacekeepers and other United Nations personnel had died in the war.

Whereas the Security Council had sent 30,000 lightly-equipped. United Nations peacekeepers to deal with all-out war in Bosnia, the NATO-led operation deployed 60,000 heavily armed and fully supported troops after the peace agreement was concluded.

The Security Council established in Bosnia and Herzegovina a *United Nations International Police Task Force,* which in 1996 became part of a larger *United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH).*

As requested by the parties to the 1995 agreement between Croatia and Croatian Serbs, the Security Council in early 1996 established the *United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES).* The mission supervised the demilitarisation of the region, assisted in the return of refugees and displaced persons, and organised and supervised elections, successfully held in 1997. The mission ended in January 1998.

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Since its foundation, the United Nations has made the goals of multilateral disarmament and arms limitation central issues in the maintenance of international peace and security. Highest priority has been given to the reduction and eventual elimination of the weapons of mass destruction, which have posed the greatest threat to humankind. While the objective of reducing the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons remained constant through the years, the scope of the deliberations and negotiations on disarmament has changed, reflecting the evolving political realities and international conditions. In the post-Cold War period, the international community has begun to consider more closely the threats related to the excessive and destabilising accumulation of conventional armaments, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and the humanitarian crisis caused by the massive deployment of landmines in conflict areas.

United Nations Role

The United Nations machinery for disarmament was established by the Charter and subsequent decisions of the General Assembly. The Charter has given the General Assembly the chief responsibility of considering "the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments" (article 11).

The Assembly has two subsidiary bodies dealing with disarmament issues, open to all Member States: the *Disarmament and International Security Committee* (the First Committee), which meets during the regular session and deals with all disarmament issues on the agenda of the Assembly; and the *United Nations Disarmament Commission,* a

specialised deliberative body that focuses on specific issues, such as the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and guidelines for international arms transfers. The General Assembly held special sessions on disarmament in 1978, 1982 and 1988 respectively.

The Conference on Disarmament is the international community's single multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament agreements. This body, working strictly on the basis of consensus in matters that touch the national security interests of States, has a limited membership, expanded in 1996 from 38 to 61, and a unique relationship with the General Assembly. It defines its own rules and develops its own agenda, but takes into account the recommendations of the Assembly and reports to it annually. Most recently, the Conference successfully negotiated both the *Chemical Weapons Convention* (1993) and the *Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty* (1996).

In the United Nations Secretariat, the *Department for Disarmament Affairs implements* the decisions of the Assembly in matters of disarmament. Its responsibilities include maintaining and operating the Register of Conventional Arms, exchanging information called for in various arms agreements, facilitating the discussion of disarmament issues in the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament, and supplying impartial information for educational purposes in pursuit of the goals of the Organisation in this field.

The *United Nations Institute on Disarmament Research (UNIDIR),* based in Geneva, undertakes research on disarmament and related problems, particularly international security.

Recent Highlights

The sweeping political changes of recent years have led to important achievements in multilateral disarmament, some of which had been sought for decades, such as the culmination of the 40-year effort to agree on the *Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.* The achievements highlight the prominent contribution that the United Nations, through persistent and long-term effort, can make to global stability and a safer and more secure world. The most prominent recent achievements have been:

- The signature in 1993 and entry into force in 1997 of the *Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),* which outlawed an entire class of weapons of mass destruction (such as those equipped with the chemical agents: mustard gas, soman, sarin and VX),

thus completing a process that started in 1925, when the Geneva Protocol prohibited the use of poison gas weapons.

- In 1995, the States Parties to the 1968 *Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)* decided to extend indefinitely its provisions. Under the Treaty, States parties undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on measures to end the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament, as well as on general and complete disarmament. The indefinite extension of the Treaty underscored the broad and growing consensus within the international community on the need for more systematic and progressive efforts toward nuclear disarmament, with the ultimate goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

- In 1996, an overwhelming majority of Members of the General Assembly adopted the *Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT),* which banned underground nuclear-test explosions— an objective originally proposed in 1954 and sought for nearly four decades. The Treaty thus extended the 1963 partial prohibition on nuclear test explosions to all physical environments. With nearly 150 signatory States participating in the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organisation, located in Vienna, preparations are under way in the Provisional Technical Secretariat, established in 1997, to ensure that an international monitoring system is operational by the time the Treaty enters into force.

- The signature by over 120 States of the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention)* in 1997 is a major step towards addressing the humanitarian crisis sparked by the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines. The Convention marks the first time that a multilateral disarmament agreement bans completely a weapon that is in widespread, active use in the military arsenals of many States. The Convention has spurred the campaign to reduce needless human suffering by increasing resources for mine clearance, mine awareness and mine assistance.

Containing Nuclear Weapons

During the Cold-War period, a variety of nuclear-disarmament initiatives were put forward, both in and outside the framework of the

United Nations, at the unilateral, bilateral, regional and international levels.

In January 1946, less than a year after the dawn of the nuclear age, the General Assembly adopted its very first resolution dealing with the issue of nuclear weapons. The *International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)* was established in 1957, to promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy under a system of IAEA safeguards Later, the Agency was given the task of verifying that nuclear material not be diverted for military purposes, as stipulated by the NPT.

Bilateral Agreements on Nuclear Weapons

While international efforts to contain nuclear weapons continued in different forums, it was generally understood that the nuclear-weapon powers held special responsibility for maintaining a stable and secure international security environment. During and after the Cold War, the two major powers arrived at agreements that have significantly reduced the threat of nuclear war. In the 1970s, the *Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I* and *II)* not only performed the vital confidence-building function of keeping the lines of communication open between the two powers, but also resulted in limiting and containing the nuclear arms race. Several bilateral treaties have proved to be an important step towards nuclear disarmament.

Bilateral Agreements

- The 1972 *Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty)* limits the number of anti-ballistic missile systems of the United States and the former Soviet Union to one each. A 1997 "demarcation" agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation distinguishes between "strategic", or long-range ABMs, which are still prohibited, and "non-strategic" or shorter-range ABMs, which are not.

- The 1987 United States-Soviet Union *Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty)* eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons, which includes all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 km. By the end of 1996, all the weapons slated for destruction under the provisions of the Treaty had been eliminated.

- The 1991 United States-Soviet Union *Strategic Arms Limitation and Reduction Treaty (START I)* places a ceiling of 6,000 warheads on 1,600 deployed long-range nuclear missiles for each side by the year 2001, thereby reducing the 1991 stockpile levels

by about 30 per cent.

- The 1992 *Lisbon Protocol to START I* committed the Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, as successor States to the Soviet Union, to abide by the START I Treaty; Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine were to adhere to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States. By 1996, these three States had removed all nuclear weapons from their territories.

- The 1993 *Strategic Arms Limitation and Reduction Treaty II (START II)* commits both parties to reduce the number of warheads on long-range nuclear missiles to 3,500 on each side by the year 2003, and eliminated MIRVed (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle) ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles). A 1997 agreement extends the deadline for destruction of the launching systems—missile silos, bombers and submarines—to the end of 2007.

- In 1997 in Helsinki, agreement was reached to begin START III negotiations on further reductions in nuclear weapons stocks, once START II has entered into force.

Multilateral Agreements

Commonly recognised as the cornerstone of international efforts to contain the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* has near universal membership, including the five States which acknowledged possession of nuclear weapons (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States.) The indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 made permanent the commitment of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties not to acquire nuclear weapons. It also legally extended the commitment of the nuclear-weapon States parties, under article VI of the Treaty, to pursue nuclear disarmament.

Agreements have been reached to limit the spread of nuclear weapons by prohibiting them from certain environments or geographic regions. For example, treaties have been concluded to prohibit the deployment and testing of nuclear weapons on Antarctica (1959), in outer space (1967) and on the ocean floor (1971).

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

In a development that was to herald a new movement in regional arms control, the signing of the 1967 *Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)* established for the first time a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in a populated area of the world.

Since that landmark agreement, three other NWFZs have been established: in the South Pacific *(Treaty of Rarotonga,* 1985), South east Asia *(Treaty of Bangkok,* 1995) and Africa *(Treaty of Pelindaba,* 1996). By virtue of such treaties, the whole of the populated southern hemisphere has nuclear-weapon-free status, greatly reducing the chance of nuclear proliferation. Proposals have been made for establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in Central Asia, Central Europe, the Middle East and South Asia.

Preventing Nuclear Proliferation

The *International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)* plays a prominent role in international efforts aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. IAEA serves as the world's international inspectorate for the application of nuclear safeguards and verification measures covering civilian nuclear programmes.

By the end of 1997, there were some 221 safeguards agreements in force in 137 member States (and in Taiwan, China). To verify their implementation, 200 IAEA experts conduct daily on-site inspections in every part of the world, for a total of some 2,500 safeguards inspections a year. Their aim is to ensure that the nuclear material held in 1,000 nuclear installations in some 70 countries is not diverted away from legitimate peaceful uses to military purposes. IAEA thus contributes to international security, and reinforces efforts to halt the spread of arms and move towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

Various types of safeguards agreements can be concluded with IAEA. Those in connection with the NPT, the Model Protocol Additional to Existing Safeguards Agreements, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Treaty of Pelindaba and the Treaty of Rarotonga require non-nuclear-weapon States to submit their entire nuclear-fuel-cycle activities to IAEA safeguards. Other types of agreement cover safeguards at single facilities. IAEA safeguards under the NPT are an integral part of the international regime for non-proliferation, and play an indispensable role in ensuring implementation of the Treaty.

Current Priorities

Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

Though the Cold War is over, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons remain the priority concerns in the area of multilateral disarmament. Many Governments, their militaries and the public are weighing the security benefits versus the security

risks of the remaining weapons of mass destruction that have not been prohibited by international agreement. There is a growing body of opinion, in nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike, that much more rapid progress towards total nuclear disarmament is needed in the years to come.

In response to a request by the General Assembly for an advisory opinion on the question of the legality of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the International Court of Justice in 1996 stated unanimously that States are under an obligation "to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects". The adoption of the CTBT in 1996 also added impetus to the momentum in that direction.

Many States feel that efforts should focus on the adoption of a time-bound phased programme of nuclear disarmament, while others stress that the States possessing nuclear weapons have made unprecedented progress through negotiations and can continue to do so. At the multilateral level, efforts will be pursued within the framework of the General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament and the annual preparatory meetings leading to the next review of the NPT in the year 2000.

Chemical and Biological Weapons

With the *Chemical Weapons Convention,* a stringent international verification regime to oversee the implementation of a treaty banning weapons was created for the first time. The Convention established for that purpose the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), located in The Hague, the Netherlands. The OPCW has initiated the international verification regime involving, among other things, the collection of information on chemical facilities on a worldwide basis and a routine global inspection system to verify that States parties are complying with the Treaty's terms.

The *Biological Weapons Convention (BWC),* which prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of such weapons, was concluded in 1972 and entered into force in 1975. To build confidence in the effectiveness of the prohibition, States parties exchange detailed information each year on such items as their high-risk biological research facilities. Since 1995, they have been striving, through the convening of expert groups, to find ways to strengthen the verification of compliance procedures of the Convention.

Conventional Weapons, Confidence-Building and Transparency

The geopolitical rivalries of the Cold War greatly influenced the entire range of disarmament initiatives. There was a tendency to highlight weapons of mass destruction to the exclusion of conventional weapons used in conflicts throughout the world, which are no less destructive to human life.

The growing proliferation of landmines around the world has been a particular focus of attention. In 1995, a review of the *Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons* (so-called *Inhumane Weapons Convention* or *CCW)* produced an *Amended Protocol II* strengthening restrictions on certain uses, types (self-destroying and detectable) and transfers of anti-personnel landmines.

Not satisfied with what they considered an inadequate response to a serious humanitarian crisis, a group of like-minded States negotiated an agreement on a total ban on all anti-personnel landmines—the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Landmines*—which opened for signature on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa. Further efforts are being undertaken to make universal adherence to the Convention. It has been proposed that the Conference on Disarmament conduct multilateral negotiations to seek an approach to the total ban acceptable to those States that have not adhered to the Ottawa Convention.

The CCW review also achieved a prohibition on the use and development of blinding laser weapons, thus precluding their ever being deployed as weapons of war.

Multilateral Disarmament and Arms Regulation Agreements

An abbreviated chronology of important international disarmament and arms regulation measures concluded through negotiations in multilateral and regional level includes:

- 1959 *Antarctic Treaty,* demilitarises the continent and bans the testing of any kind of weapon;
- 1963 *Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (Partial Test-Ban Treaty):* restricts nuclear testing to underground sites only;
- 1966 *Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty):* mandates that outer

space be used for peaceful purposes only and that nuclear weapons not be placed or tested in outer space;

- 1967 *Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco):* prohibits testing, use, manufacture, storage, or acquisition of nuclear weapons by the countries of the region. All five nuclear-weapon States are parties to it;

- 1968 *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT):* the non-nuclear-weapon States agree never to acquire nuclear weapons and, in exchange, are promised access to civilian nuclear power technologies; nuclear-weapon States pledge to seek to carry out negotiations relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament;

- 1971 *Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Sea-bed Treaty):* bans the emplacement of nuclear weapons, or any weapon of mass destruction, on the seabed or ocean floor;

- 1972 *Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons (BWC):* places a ban on the development, production, and stockpiling of biological and toxin agents, as well as providing for the destruction of such weapons and their means of delivery. A verification protocol, which could not be elaborated when the Convention was negotiated, is now being considered by the States parties;

- 1980 *Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW):* prohibits certain conventional weapons deemed excessively injurious or having indiscriminate effects. The Convention is considered an umbrella agreement, to which additional agreements can be added. As of 1997, it contains four Protocols.

- *Protocol I* bans weapons which explode fragments that are by X-ray undetectable within the human body; *Amended Protocol II* (agreed in 1995) limits the use of certain types of mines, booby-traps, and other devices; *Protocol III* bans incendiary weapons designed to set fire to targets; and *Protocol IV bans* the use of blinding laser weapons;

- 1985 *South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga):* bans the stationing, acquisition or testing of nuclear explosive devices and the dumping of nuclear waste within the prescribed zone. It has been signed by, among others, all five nuclear-weapon States;

- 1990 *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty):* limits the numbers of various conventional armaments in a zone stretching from the Atlantic ocean to the Ural mountains;

- 1993 *Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC):* prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons worldwide and requires their destruction;

- 1995 *Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok):* bans the development or stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of the States party to the treaty;

- 1996 *African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba):* bans the development or stationing of nuclear weapons on the African continent;

- 1996 *Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT):* places a worldwide ban on nuclear test explosions of any kind and in any environment;

- 1997 *Landmines Convention (Ottawa Convention):* prohibits the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and provides for their destruction.

Register of Conventional Arms

To provide greater transparency and confidence in the area of the transfer of advanced-conventional-weapon systems, the General Assembly agreed in 1992 to establish the Register of Conventional Arms. The arrangement allows for Governments to provide information on a voluntary basis on their transfers to other States of major weapons systems, such as aircraft, tanks, battleships and artillery. Such data are compiled and published annually by the United Nations as official United Nations documents, available to the general public.

Small Arms and Light Weapons

Efforts are also being made to promote at the global and regional levels the control and reduction of small arms and light weapons—the primary weapons used in contemporary conflicts. The General Assembly has called upon all States to implement the recommendations made by a 1997 United Nations study on small arms: these include aiding the improvement of internal security forces, strengthening international cooperation among police, intelligence, customs and border control services, and boosting both security and overall development.

Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

The United Nations works to ensure that outer space be used for peaceful purposes and that the benefits from space activities be shared by all nations. This concern in the peaceful uses of outer space began soon after the launch of the Sputnik, the first man-made satellite by the Soviet Union in 1957, and has kept in step with the subsequent advances in space technology.

The United Nations intergovernmental body active as the focal point in this area is the *Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,* set up by the General Assembly in 1959 and made up of 61 Member States. It reviews the scope of international cooperation in peaceful uses of outer space, devises programmes and directs United Nations technical cooperation in this field, encourages research and dissemination of information, and contributes to the development of international space law.

The Committee has two Subcommittees:

- The *Scientific and Technical Subcommittee* currently discusses matters such as remote sensing of the earth by satellite, the use of nuclear power sources in outer space, space debris, space transportation systems, space activities related to the earth's environment, astronomy and planetary exploration.

- The *Legal Subcommittee* currently addresses such items as the definition and delimitation of space, ways to ensure the rational and equitable use of the geostationary orbit, and review of the status of the five international legal instruments governing outer space.

The Committee and its two Subcommittees meet annually to consider questions put before them by the General Assembly, reports submitted to them and issues raised by Member States. Working on the basis of consensus, the Committee makes recommendations to the General Assembly.

Legal Instruments

The work of the Committee and its Legal Subcommittee has resulted in the adoption by the General Assembly of five legal instruments, all of which are in force:

- The 1966 *Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies* (commonly known as the *"Outer Space*

Treaty") provides that space exploration shall be carried out for the benefit of all countries, irrespective of their degree of development. It seeks to maintain outer space as the province of all humankind, free for exploration and use by all States, solely for peaceful purposes, and net subject to national appropriation;

- The 1967 *Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space* (the *"Rescue Agreement")* provides for aiding the crews of spacecraft in case of accident or emergency landing, and establishes procedures for returning to the launching authority a space object or its components found beyond the territory of that authority;

- The 1971 *Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects* (the *"Liability Convention ")* provides that the launching State is liable for damage caused by its space objects on the Earth's surface, to aircraft in flight and to space objects of another State or persons or property oh board such objects;

- The 1974 *Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space* (the *"Registration Convention")* provides that launching States shall maintain registries of space objects and provide information on objects launched to the United Nations. Under the 1974 Convention, the *Office for Outer Space Affairs* maintains a United Nations Registry on objects launched into outer space. Information has been provided by all launching States and by the European Space Agency (ESA);

- The 1979 *Agreement Governing Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies* (the *"Moon Agreement")* elaborates the principles relating to the Moon and other celestial bodies set out in the 1966 Treaty, and sets up the basis to regulate the future exploration and exploitation of natural resources on those bodies.

On the basis of the work of the Committee and its Legal Subcommittee, the General Assembly has also adopted the following set of principles on the conduct of space activities:

- The *Principles governing the use by States of artificial Earth satellites for international direct television broadcasting* (1982) recognise that such use has international political, economic, social and cultural implications. Such activities should respect the sovereign rights of States, including the principle of non-

intervention, should promote the dissemination and exchange of information and knowledge, and should foster development.

- The *Principles relating to remote sensing of the Earth from outer space* (1986) state that such activities are to be conducted for the benefit of all countries, respecting the sovereignty of all States and peoples over their natural resources, and for the rights and interests of other States. Remote sensing is to be used to preserve the environment and to reduce the impact of natural disasters.

- The *Principles on the use of nuclear power sources in outer space* (1992) recognise that such sources are essential for some missions, but that their use should be based on a thorough safety assessment. The Principles also provide guidelines for the safe use of nuclear power sources and for notification of a malfunction of a space object where there is a risk of re-entry of radioactive material to the Earth.

- The *Declaration on international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for the benefit and in the interest of all States, particularly developing countries* (1996) provides that States are free to determine all aspects of their participation in international cooperation in space activities on an equitable and mutually acceptable basis, and that such cooperation should be conducted in ways that are considered most effective and appropriate by the countries concerned.

Office for Outer Space Affairs

The Vienna-based *United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs* serves as the secretariat for the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and assists developing countries in using space technology for sustainable development.

The Office disseminates space-related information to Member States through its International Space Information System. Through its *United Nations Programme on Space Applications,* the Office provides technical advisory services to Member States in conducting pilot projects, and undertakes training and fellowship programmes in such areas as remote sensing, satellite communication, satellite meteorology and basic space science.

The Office provides technical assistance to Regional Centres for Space Science and Technology Education affiliated with the United Nations. The Centres help to develop skills and knowledge of scientists

and researchers in the aspects of space science and technology that can help to develop human resources for space technology applications and sustainable development. The Centre in Asia and the Pacific became operational in India in 1995; the Centres in Africa and in Latin America and the Caribbean are expected to be operational in 1998.

The Office works in close cooperation with organisations such as ESA, the International Astronautical Federation (IAF) and the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR).

In addition to the Office, other United Nations organisations are active in areas such as space communication, satellite meteorology, space science and remote sensing. To coordinate the space activities of the United Nations system, an *Inter-Agency Meeting on Outer Space Activities* convenes once a year.

UNISPACE Conferences

The United Nations has organised two major world conferences on outer space—the *First and Second United Nations Conferences on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,* held in Vienna in 1968 and 1982. The first conference examined the practical benefits deriving from space research and exploration, and the extent to which non-space countries, especially developing countries, might enjoy them.

The second conference (UNISPACE 82) reflected the growing involvement of all nations in outer space activities; assessed the state of space science and technology; considered the applications of space technology for development; and discussed international space cooperative programmes.

The third conference (UNISPACE III) will be convened as a special session of the Committee on Outer Space in Vienna in July 1999. Intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations with space activities as well as space-related industries will also participate in UNISPACE III, which will seek to promote the use of space technology to solve regional and global problems, and to strengthen the capability of Member States, particularly developing countries, to use space-research application in the service of development.

GUIDELINES ON CONFLICT, PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

To improve donors' development efforts, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) issued a policy statement in May 1997 to

provide "Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation on the threshold of the 21st Century".

The key points include basic principles:

- The basis for sustainable development must be to help a society strengthen its capacity to manage conflict without violence.

- Humanitarian assistance is not a substitute for sustained political commitment in support of peace. This commitment requires the application of all instruments open to the international community—economic, social, legal, environmental and military. Coordinated coherent responses between governments, inter- and non-governmental bodies are also necessary.

- Developing. countries, even in crisis, are responsible for their own development, and the task of international assistance is to strengthen indigenous capacities.

- Development cooperation should seek structural stability embracing social peace, human rights, accountable military forces and broadly shared social and economic development, supported by dynamic and representative political structures.

- Development assistance should seek to address the root causes of conflict.

- Development cooperation should recognise the important role played by women.

The primary objective of development cooperation is to enhance the rule of law and promote popular participation, but specific roles are assigned for different stages of a conflict:

- Before conflict flares, the emphasis is on promoting democratic stability, including attention to arms and military expenditure.

- In open conflict, development agencies should seize opportunities to contribute to. conflict resolution, and plan and prepare for post-conflict reconstruction as well as providing short-term emergency relief.

- In fragile transitional situations, the emphasis should be on saving livelihoods, increasing incentives for peace and promoting reconciliation.

- After conflict, restoring a sense of security is paramount, including restoring legitimate government institutions, encouraging sound macro-economic stabilisation plans and taking advantage of opportunities for reform—for instance for

participatory debate about the role of the military. The ten key actions for development cooperation are:

(i) To recognise structural stability as a foundation for sustainable development and advance public understanding of conflict prevention.

(ii) To strengthen analysis of risks and causes of violent conflict and opportunities for aid to address root causes.

(iii) To ensure that all policies, including security, political and economic relations, human rights, environment and development cooperation, are fostering structural stability, including support for ceasefires, UN arms embargoes, working to prevent illegal arms supplies and harmonised and responsible behaviour with respect to the supply of military goods, particularly small arms.

(iv) To strive for greater coherence and transparency by the international community: linking early warning to decision-making; coordinating actions; sharing analysis, and agreeing strategic frameworks and responsibility for leadership in coordination.

(v) To support regional initiatives for conflict prevention.

(vi) To reduce budgetary and functional barriers between relief, rehabilitation and development cooperation; reform of the social and economic sectors of the UN system to strengthen synergies in international responses.

(vii) To work for internationally agreed performance standards and principles to govern operational methods of all implementing agencies.

(viii) To set up responsive but accountable procedures for resource mobilisation, including capacity for crisis management, crisis resolution and ensuring that assistance does not prolong conflict.

(ix) To promote open and participatory dialogue and strengthened capacity to meet security needs at reduced levels of military expenditure and strengthened capacity for the exercise of civil authority over military forces.

(x) To monitor and evaluate performance in peace and conflict prevention and amplification of best practice.

2

Timely Decisions in the Field of Military and Strategic Security

"All Members [of the United Nations] shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered." (United Nations Charter, Article 2, paragraph 3) From the time that the principle of the peaceful settlement of international disputes was first formulated in the Paris Treaty for the Renunciation of War of 1928 to its latest reaffirmation in the documents of the Meeting of Heads of State or Government of European countries held in Paris in November 1990, more than six decades have passed. However, this period of history cannot possibly be called peaceful. In the Second World War alone, more than 50 million people lost their lives.

It would have been expected that after such a shock the efforts of States would have been directed towards the exclusion of war from international relations, towards disarmament. Unfortunately, that did not happen. A new stage of the arms race began, this time nuclear. As a result, humanity—as Mikhail S. Gorbachev put it—very quickly lost its immortality. The nuclear arsenals which have now been accumulated are sufficient to destroy many times over the civilisation built up over thousands of years. Yet the process of developing, improving and deploying nuclear weapons all over the planet continues.

Since 1945 when the United States used nuclear weapons against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons have not been used in war—but hardly anyone would venture to say that they will never be used. Such use could be touched off by some chance event, the unauthorised or provocative firing of a nuclear missile, a

technical failure in the means of detection, or a conflict of the kind that recently occurred in the area of the Persian Gulf. It is also disturbing that the number of States which are openly or secretly joining the nuclear club is growing. The increasing threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction in the course of military conflicts also gives impetus to this process.

It must therefore be recognised, without detracting from the importance of declarations on the peaceful resolution of inter-State disputes, that in order actually to exclude war from international relations, something more than declarations is required. What is needed are practical steps. They may be unilateral or taken as a result of international agreements. However, while the usefulness of unilateral declarations is recognised, it must nevertheless be seen that without negotiations and the specific measures agreed to in them it is impossible to implement the principle of a violence-free world.

For Europe, the first tangible steps in this direction were clearly the Treaty between the USSR and the United States on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) and the signing in Paris in November 1990 of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). But, in spite of this major achievement, differences between the approaches of the two sides to the problem of disarmament became apparent in their assessment of these Treaties.

For example, in the INF Treaty the USSR agreed, as we know, to eliminate twice as many missiles and almost four times as many warheads as did the United States. In the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces it also agreed to eliminate more weapons than any of the other States participating in the negotiations. In doing so, the USSR demonstrated that it firmly supported, not only in words but in deeds, the elimination of the physical basis for the threat hanging over the world and gave practical effect to the new political thinking it had proclaimed, at the root of which, so far as military security is concerned, is the idea of a non-violent, nuclear-free world.

The States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), however, did not see (or chose not to see) in these Soviet decisions the elements of a new approach to the solution of international problems. Clinging to the stereotypes of the past, they characterised the Soviet Union's agreement to these steps as a "victory", a "triumph", and even the result of the "positions of strength" of the United States and NATO. This is disquieting—not solely because the assessment by

the NATO countries is groundless. What is alarming is that the apparent emphasis laid on strength in international relations indicates that they have not yet fully grasped the dangers involved in the use of force as a method of solving international problems nor have they taken into account the developing world situation.

This conclusion is reinforced by NATO's attitude towards the events unfolding in Europe. It would be logical to expect, for example, that in the wake of the voluntary dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty military organisation, the NATO countries would likewise take steps in the same direction—but that has not happened. On the contrary, there have been declarations about the maintenance and even the extension of the bloc's functions. Nor are the NATO countries in any hurry to revise their military doctrine even to the extent of partial renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons.

Consequently, in spite of the first steps taken in the field of disarmament and even in spite of the first unanimous Security Council decision, taken in the case of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, the construction of a new, non-violent system of international security remains far distant.

Just as it is impossible to construct a building on the basis of two different designs, it is impossible to construct a new security system without agreeing on the basic principles of its construction. The aim of joint decisions should therefore be, not only declarations concerning the rules for mutual State relations, but practical steps leading to the elimination of the physical possibility of "blowing up the world".

The first and essential step towards creating the real conditions for a transition to a new system of international security must be a clear statement of the political will of States to renounce the use of force in international affairs. Further specific steps might then be taken along the lines suggested below.

- First, the opposing States and military alliances might agree to renounce attempts to maintain or achieve military superiority over the other side.
- Secondly, they might eliminate their available stocks of weapons of mass destruction. If it is impossible to agree on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, it might be possible to proceed to their reduction to the lowest level possible. (The opponents of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons consider their retention a guarantee against the possibility that one of the opposing sides might hide or secretly construct a number of

nuclear weapons which might be small but would be enough to change the balance of power to its advantage. The retention of a small stock of nuclear weapons, they say, would make such actions pointless. Moreover, nuclear weapons could be used to neutralise the possibility of nuclear blackmail by terrorists.)

- Thirdly, the opposing States might decide jointly, by successive agreed reductions in armed forces and armaments, on a basis of military and strategic parity at every stage, to reduce them to minimum agreed levels sufficient only for defence.

- Fourthly, while reducing armed forces, the opposing States might give them a non-offensive structure.

- Fifthly, the opposing States could work out and put into effect a broad network of confidence-building and verification measures. At the same time, measures would be taken for both the exchange of information and the limitation of the military activities of States.

- Sixthly, inter-State disputes would be resolved by international arbitration, as provided for also in the United Nations Charter.

All the elements of the United Nations machinery responsible for the security of States would be strengthened and, if necessary, new machinery could be created in order to ensure its ability to neutralise any possible attempt by individual States to resort to the use of force in the settlement of inter-State problems. Such machinery could be established under the United Nations and at the regional level—for example, in Europe, side by side with the institutions of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).

At the end of the process, States (and their allies) should be left with only such minimum armed forces as would enable them to retain adequate defensive capabilities while at the same time being unable to carry out large-scale offensive operations. These forces could be structured on the basis of three principles, which would seem in general to meet the needs of the armed forces of opposing States (and their allies) in a non-violent world: military and strategic parity; countering capacity (the renunciation of pre-emptive strikes); and reasonable defensive sufficiency.

The principle of military and strategic parity is traditionally regarded as the basis for strategic stability and international security. This principle is frequently taken to mean complete equality of military capacity between opposing sides. On that assumption, as has been rightly emphasised by many military and political analysts, the concern

for parity becomes one of the factors contributing to arms races to the extent that the opposing sides assess their military capacities differently. As a rule, each of the sides, for various reasons, including inadequate information, somewhat overestimates the potential military capacity of the opposing side and organises its own defences on the basis of that subjective evaluation. The other side judges such efforts as intended to gain a military advantage and takes corresponding measures, and so on. In order, therefore, to obviate such subjective perceptions of military parity and their concomitant stimulation of the arms race, it is reasonable to interpret military parity in a somewhat different way. That is possible to the extent that in present-day circumstances, and particularly given the existence of nuclear weapons, the spectrum of military and strategic parity covers a sufficiently wide range.

In actual fact, States adhering to the doctrine of defensive war and renouncing preventive military activities have no need to interpret military parity as strict equality of all military capacities, offensive as well as defensive, of their armed forces with the armed forces of the opposing side (or sides). It is enough to maintain a balance of military strength enabling a country's armed forces to be confident that they can defend it but not providing them with the physical means to begin large-scale offensive actions for the purpose of aggressive war or to gain political advantage by military pressure on the other side.

This interpretation of military parity makes it possible to renounce symmetrical responses to the activities of the other side with respect to armaments, to reduce suspicion that the other side is seeking a military advantage, and to reduce the incentives to over-armament.

There is certainly also a need to work out criteria which would make possible an objective assessment of the military strengths of the two sides and enable each side to convince itself that the other did not in fact possess the material means to begin large-scale offensive operations.

Measures should also be agreed on to ensure the stability of military parity—which is the most important condition for strategic stability. Such measures would include limiting not only quantitative levels but also the qualitative improvement of weapons and inhibiting the opening of new channels for the arms race. A necessary first step in this direction is the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and the renunciation of the concept of making up for quantitative reductions by the qualitative improvement of the remaining weapons as is done, for example, under the "competitive strategy" of the United States and NATO.

The principle of counteractive capacity implies that States must refrain from preventive military action and pre-emptive strikes of any kind and, of course, from planning for aggressive war. In the words of the Chief of the General Staff of the armed forces of the USSR, Mikhael A. Moiseev, at the Vienna Seminar on Military Doctrines held in January 1990, underlining this principle, a State should "never under any circumstances be the first to take military action against any other State, nor [should] it ever have recourse to such actions unless it is itself the victim of aggression, of an armed attack".

The principle of reasonable defensive sufficiency in the strict sense is hard to discuss without further clarification. Any non-aggressive State can rightly claim that nothing it does with regard to defence is above the level of reasonable sufficiency. Consequently, summarising the statements made on this score by Soviet officials and filling in the gaps in their statements, the following initial definition might be proposed: "Reasonable defensive sufficiency is a function of whatever problem is under consideration."

The principle of reasonable sufficiency should meet the following criteria:

- Reasonable defensive sufficiency, whether with regard to conventional forces or to strategic nuclear weapons, cannot be a fixed quantity or the total of the quantities established for various kinds of armed forces and weapons. Obviously, it must be a function of the ever changing real dangers being faced (including those in existence during the disarmament process) as well as the other factors determining the strategic situation.

- This principle should ensure a defence which, while remaining within the limits of military and strategic parity, would clearly demonstrate to the opposing side the futility of any attempt to settle inter-State questions by force of arms.

- A defence constructed on the basis of reasonable sufficiency should not be excessive. While ensuring adequate deterrence, it should at the same time be limited to the minimum level, including the renunciation of preventive military activities. The defence need not be overloaded with superfluous stocks of weapons and military technology.

- The military activity of such a defence, including its military presence on the territory of other States, would be essentially limited. Such a military presence would be permissible only when it was dictated by the need for a joint defence of the States

on whose territory the presence was maintained and in accordance with jointly agreed-to obligations. The activity of fleets on world oceans would be reduced. Ultimately, their functions would be limited to maintaining communications and action as part of a United Nations force.

• A defence based on the principle of reasonable sufficiency should not be provocative, that is, it should not lead neighbouring or other States to strengthen their defensive forces. In order to increase confidence, the transformation of armed forces along these lines should be carried out in conditions of openness and transparency and under the appropriate international supervisory machinery.

• The level of reasonable sufficiency for defence would certainly be dependent on international agreements concerning the limitation and reduction of arms and military activities by the States parties to such-agreements and on the near-term prospects for negotiations.

• Defence should—and this is very important—be as economical as possible, and should be constructed with due regard for material possibilities and human resources. It should not place too heavy a burden on a country's population.

These measures and principles governing armed forces are, for the moment, no more than proposals which might be utilised in the working out of agreements creating the international legal framework for a non-violent world. They could not, of course, be fully implemented before the questions of security on a regional level, such as European security, for example, are resolved.

Nevertheless, a new non-violent European security system is not only possible but necessary. No matter how it is approached, in the final analysis its construction will require the political will of States, the renunciation of military advantage and the maintenance of the three principles referred to above for the constitution of armed forces participating in the military and strategic equilibrium.

As long as the NATO bloc continues to exist, it will of course define the military and strategic situation in Europe. But not only there, for the United States and Canada are also members of that organisation, and they can certainly not be called European countries. On the other side, after the voluntary dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) as a military organisation, the second party to the military balance in Europe in the present circumstances is the Soviet Union.

Accordingly, everything that has been said about the new non-violent system of international security and its establishment on the regional level concerns NATO and the USSR, which for the time being constitute the opposing sides.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly expressed the wish to move from military confrontation towards European co-operation within "a common European home", and it has not only said this but has taken unilateral disarmament and other measures, and has taken bold decisions in the course of negotiations which in fact amounted to further acts of unilateral disarmament. The heads of the Western States constantly talk about their favourable attitude towards the idea of a peaceful Europe. It is impossible not to believe them, for who now considers war in Europe conceivable?

But if that is so, then it is necessary to negotiate on the basis of new approaches, abandoning the centuries-old argument about superior armed forces being the guarantee of security. Unfortunately, the old stereotypes seem to be very much alive. Examples are not far to seek. We need only refer to the negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe.

The West's intention to secure military advantage for itself through the negotiations was already evident in their proposal for the negotiations. The objective laid down for those negotiations at the Vienna CFE meeting on 9 March 1989—"the establishment of a secure and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels"—was replaced, at the West's desire, by a balance of land-based armed forces. Conventional naval forces, although they constitute an integral and important part of the military and strategic balance, were excluded from the negotiations. Thus, the as yet unborn agreement was already tipped in NATO's favour.

No special explanation is required for this. To the extent that NATO at present enjoys significant military superiority at sea, the reduction of land forces to equal levels will transform NATO's military superiority at sea into a general military superiority, which will be all the greater the more radical the land-based reductions are.

Consequently, the equalisation of the military power of the two sides on land alone will in no way lead to strengthening the security and stability of the balance of conventional forces. On the contrary, it will lead to the unbalancing of the military potential of the two sides to NATO's advantage—and to the detriment of stability.

The argument that naval forces are not the kind of forces that lend themselves to "surprise attack" or in general to use for action in connection with military operations on land does not withstand scrutiny. One need only recall the role played by naval forces in such land conflicts as in Korea (1950-1953), Vietnam (1964-1973) and the recent events in the Persian Gulf area. In all these cases the naval forces of the United States played a direct role in the land theatre of operations.

It is clear that if NATO continues to ignore the concern of the USSR at the steadily increasing capacity of naval weapons to be employed as well as land forces and land-based aviation for strikes against land targets, including those located far in the rear, further progress in the limitation of armed forces and armaments may be slowed down or even halted entirely. The refusal to negotiate on the reduction of naval armaments must therefore be regarded as an attempt on the part of the United States and NATO either to guarantee their own military superiority or to frustrate the disarmament process. No third possibility exists.

It is noteworthy also that the structure of the Agreement on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe does not reflect the current situation in Europe: NATO continues to exist and even to expand its functions, while the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, as a military and political organisation, has ceased to exist. Yet most of the articles of the Agreement were worked out when both alliances existed and the security of the USSR was ensured by the collective forces of all the WTO States. At present, in matters of defence, the Soviet Union can rely only on itself.

Should the Agreement be ratified, as seems likely, the real relationship of forces in Europe, that is, as between NATO and the USSR, will be as follows (to NATO's advantage):

Tanks and armoured combat vehicles 1.5:1
Artillery 1.3-1.5:1
Military aircraft and attack helicopters 1.3:1.

The conclusion is unavoidable: the follow-up negotiations on the strengthening of European security cannot be conducted on a bloc basis. At the same time, the Charter of Paris provides that after the Helsinki meeting scheduled for 1992, negotiations will be conducted among all the 34 States participating in the CSCE process. Those negotiations should become the appropriate forum for the creation of a balance of military power between NATO and the USSR with a view

to gradual movement towards a non-violent system of European security.

Two further comments should be made. No matter how perfect the limitation of conventional armed forces and armaments, as long as the two sides continue to possess nuclear weapons, basic security in Europe will be impossible. No equalisation of conventional armed forces and armaments can compensate for a surprise nuclear attack. Therefore, while negotiations on conventional armed forces go on, it is necessary to begin parallel negotiations on the elimination or, at the least, the radical reduction of tactical nuclear weapons. Similar consequences might ensue if the qualitative aspect of weapons is left out of account. If the improvement of conventional weapons and the creation of new categories and types of such weapons is left entirely unregulated, that might radically undermine a formal quantitative balancing of armed forces, with all the ensuing negative consequences. From that point of view, the qualitative aspect of armaments should also be included in negotiations.

It is evident that, as a result of the decrease in international tensions in recent years, the threat of large-scale war, of a nuclear catastrophe, has somehow receded in people's minds, and has become a secondary concern. But wrongly so. The physical basis for war has not been materially reduced. Military development continues. Further improvements continue to be made in all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons.

The recent conflict in the Persian Gulf area made it possible to test new kinds and categories of weapons in battle and even gave a new impetus to some programmes which had been slowed down. For example, the successful use of the Patriot anti-missile missile has encouraged the Pentagon to continue work on the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). But this means that if a large-scale anti-missile defence system is developed, the first thing to go by the board will be the idea of reductions in strategic and therefore all other types of nuclear weapons. Whatever its sponsors say about this programme, it can only be assessed by the other side as an effort to obtain a shield ensuring the safety of the United States from retaliation against nuclear missile aggression and by that very token freeing its own hands to impose its will with impunity on any State in the world. It is possible that no such intentions with regard to the SDI programme exist in Washington. But they might arise should the opportunity present itself, and for that reason the other side is obliged to base its own actions, not on words, but on possible practical consequences.

TABLE 1
Major Armed Conflicts in the World, 1989

Location	Year formed/ year joined[a]	Warring parties	No. of troops in 1989	Deaths[b] Total (incl. 1989)	During 1989	Change from 1988[c]
Europe						
Romania	1989/1989	Romania (Ceausescu) Govt/ Securitate	22 000-23 500[d]	1989: 750-1 100[f]	—	n.a.
		vs. National Salvation Front (National Armed Forces)	171 000[e]			

Comments: Nicolae Ceausescu succeeded Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej as Secretary General of the Romanian Communist Party in 1965. On 14 Dec. 1989 a small-scale protest by the Hungarian minority started in the city of Timisoara against the planned deportation of Laszlo Tokes, an ethnic Hungarian priest and human rights activist, for preaching democracy. Anti-Govt demonstrations jointly by Hungarians and Romanians, consisting of 5000-10 000 people, followed on 17 Dec. Police and military personnel opened fire against demonstrators, leading to 90 deaths, acc. to official (National Salvation Front) figures. Strikes and demonstrations against the Ceausescu Govt continued in Timisoara and occurred in several other cities on 18 Dec. and the following days, partly sparked by exaggerated casualty figures from Timisoara. By 18 Dec. Romania had closed its borders. Following anti-Ceausescu demonstrations in Bucharest on 21 Dec., a state of emergency was declared. On 22 Dec. President Ceausescu fled from Bucharest, the national armed forces turned against the Govt, and the National Salvation Front, consisting of former senior Communist Party officials, intellectuals and dissident artists, seized power. A provisional Govt under the leadership of former Foreign Minister Manescu was formed. The Front had reportedly been in existence (in name) for several months. Fighting erupted in Bucharest and other cities later the same day between security forces (Securitate) loyal to Ceausescu and the armed forces. On 22 Dec. Ceausescu and his wife were arrested. They were both executed on 25 Dec. after being found guilty in a secret trial by a military court. The most intensive fighting occurred during 22-25 Dec. but by 26 Dec. only sporadic resistance from Securitate remained. On 26 Dec. a new Govt was formed with P. Roman as Head of Govt and I. Iliescu as President. The Govt stated that it would serve during an interim period until free elections, to be held in Apr. 1990. On 27 Dec. the situation was reported to be normalized, and on 29 Dec. the armed forces started to pull out of Bucharest.

United Kingdom/ Northern Ireland	1969/1969	British Govt vs. IRA and others	16500	1969-89: >2700	70	0
	1986/1986	vs. UVF and others	200-500			
			—			

Comments: The present conflict originates from the division of Ireland in 1922. In 1969 civil rights issues were raised, and since 1970 the Provisional IRA (Irish Republican Army) has constituted the main armed actor on the republican side, demanding reunification under the Republic of Ireland. The British Govt sought to uphold existing ties between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, to protect the interest of the majority of unionist/loyalists. The 1985 agreement between the UK and Ireland, however, increased suspicion among Protestants towards the British Govt. The late 1980s saw the formation of militant Protestant groups, e.g. Ulster Freedom Fighters, Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Resistance, responsible for some attacks on IRA-related" targets. Arms imports to loyalist militants from S. Africa were reported. Attacks by different sides during 1989 included killing of a Sinn Fein politician (Feb.), bomb attacks on police stations and death of an IRA member (Apr.) and continued attacks on British soldiers in Northern Ireland (e.g. in Feb., Mar., May, Nov., Dec.). Also attacks were made by the IRA outside the area. Most severe was the bombing in Deal, UK, in Sep., when 11 members of an Army band were killed, and a bombing of military barracks in Colchester, UK (Nov.).

Middle East

Iran	Iranian Govt	305000[g,h]	1979-89: >17 000[i]
1972/1979	vs. KDPI	10 500	
../1979	vs. Komala	—	<50

Comments: Kurds (in particular the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, KDPI), seeking greater autonomy or independence in the north-west, became very active militarily following the overthrow of the Shah in 1979. The establishment of 'liberated zones' led to the 1983-84 campaign by Iranian forces to regain control. During the Iran-Iraq War, Kurdish groups were reported to be receiving aid from the Iraqi Govt. In 1989 the KDPI claimed it had taken control of Mahabad in north-western Iran (Sep.), and Komala (or the Kurdish Communist Party of Iran) claimed that it had attacked and destroyed an Iranian Army base in southwestern Kurdistan, killing or capturing all personnel (June). Since the revolution, the People's Mujahideen (Khalq) have sought to overthrow the Iranian Govt by force. Both members and sympathizers of the People's Mujahideen have since the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War been subject to a spate of summary executions.

Iraq	Iraqi Govt	955000[h,j]	1980-89:5000-6000[k]	<50 (mil.)
1961/1980	vs. KDP	5000-15000		
1975/1980	vs. PUK	4000	—	

Comments: An attempt at secession by the Kurdish minority in the north-east of Iraq led to general uprising in 1962. In spite of agreement with the Govt in 1970, sporadic clashes continued until 1974 when general hostilities broke out. In 1975 Iran and Iraq concluded an agreement which stopped support from Iran to the Iraqi Kurds, and the resistance declined. During the Iran-Iraq War the Kurdish parties, mainly the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), fought the Iraqi Govt with help from Iran. After the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq moved against the Kurds to drive them out of the country. There were reports of the

use of chemical gas by the Iraqi Govt, which Iraq denies. The main resistance apparently ceased, but sporadic actions by Kurdish groups were reported during 1989. In late Sep. 1989 the Iraqi Army launched an offensive, the first in a year, against remaining Kurdish bases near the Iranian border. The Socialist Party of Kurdistan (approx. 1500) also exists, but no clashes were reported between the Govt and SPK in 1989. The Iraqi Govt has proclaimed a 30-km 'security zone' along its borders, moved the Kurdish population to other parts of the country and razed Kurdish villages. The Govt also faces opposition from the Iraqi Communist Party and the Shi'ite organization Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, but no clashes were reported in 1989.

Israel/ Palestine	1964/1964	Israeli Govt	141000[h]	1948-89: >10 200	0
		vs. PLO (based in Lebanon)	9900	>350	
		vs. other Palestinian groups	...		

Comments: Present conflict formed in 1948 with the formation of the Israeli state. Interstate wars in 1948-49, 1956, 1967 and 1973. The 1967 war resulted in the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israeli invasions of Lebanon in 1978 and 1982, the latter forcing the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization, founded in 1964) HQ to be moved to Tunisia. PLO-related armed groups are based in Lebanon. Since Dec. 1987 a significant popular uprising, the intifada, has taken place in the occupied territories. During 1989 the two dominant groups in the occupied territories reportedly seem to be the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) and Hamas (or the Islamic Resistance Movement). PLO leader Arafat was elected President of the Palestinian State (proclaimed in Nov. 1988) by the PLO Central Committee in Apr. During 1989 attacks were made by Palestinian groups from Lebanon as well as Jordan and attacks by Israel on Palestinian targets in Lebanon. In the occupied territories the Palestinians continued throughout 1989 to use non-military means in attacks on Israeli soldiers. Israeli counteractions include military actions, arrests, curfews, expulsions and destruction of houses. 640 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli security forces during the intifada (approx. 250 in 1989) as well as over 40 Israelis. In addition, deaths in 1989 include intra-Palestinian killings following accusation of co-operation with Israelis, and killings by Israeli civilians. Several proposals were presented in 1989: by Prime Minister Shamir (Israel, Apr.), President Mubarak (Egypt, Sep.) and Secretary of State Baker (USA, Oct.). The Baker 5-point initiative is aimed at a preparatory dialogue between Israel and Palestinians to be held in Egypt. The initiative was accepted, with reservations by both Israel (Nov.) and Egypt (Dec.).

Lebanon	1975/1975	Lebanese Army (Aoun)	15000-20000	1975-89:131000	++
	1975/1975	Lebanese Forces	6000	> 1150	
	1975/1975	Druze militia (PSP)	(5000)		
	1979/1979	Amal	5000-6000		
	1975/1975	Hezbollah	3500		
	1975/1975	LCP	2000		
	1964/1964	PLO (Fatah)	4500-5000		

1968/1968	PFLP-GC	500
1978/1978	SLA	1200-2 500
1976/1976	Syrian Govt	40 000-50 000
1978/1982	Israeli Govt	1000
1982/1982	Iranian Govt (Revol. Guards)	2000

Comments: Civil war among Chjristian, Palestinian, Muslim and Druze gorups since 1975. Muslims are estimated to form the majority of the population. Christians dominate political and economic life. Syrian troops havke been present since 1976. Israeli invasions in 1978 and 1982. Israel keeps soldiers and the Israeli-armed South Lebanese Army (SLA) in the Israeli-proclaimed 'Security Zone.' The UN security force UNIFIL (5850 men in 1989) has ben deployed in Lebanon since 1978. Iranian Revolutionary Guards have reportedly bene in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley since 1982. Regular Iranian Army troops reportedly entered the Valley in 1989. Two rival Govts, Gen. Anoun (Maronite Christian) and Mr. Hoss (Sunnin Muslim), headed Lebanon in 1989. The Christian army faction of the national forces the Lebanese Army, is loyal to Gen. Anoun. Battles in Jan. 1989 between the two Shi'ite Muslim groups Amal (pro-Syrian) and Hezbollah (pro-Iranian). (50 dead). Heavy fighting in the Christian sector of Beirut between theLebanese Army and the Lebanese Forces (LF, Christian militia) in Feb. After Gen. Aoun's blockade of militia ports and declaration of Liberation War' against Syria (aiming to force Syrian out) in early Mar., the worst fighting since 1975 stated in Beirut. The LF appear to have joined forces with the Lebanese Army against Syrian troops and Druze militia (probably the Syrian-backed Progressive Socialist Party [PSP]). Approx. 900 kille,d mainly civilians during Mar. to late Sep., when a truce tok effect. Several Arab League cease-fire attempts and an Arab League peace-keeping force sent to Beirut. On 15 Aug. the UN Secretary-General called an emergency meeting of the Security Council. Over 60 members of the Lebanese Parliament met in Taif (Saudi Arabia) in early Oct. The Parliament metin northern Lebanon in early Nov., despite its dissolution by Ge. Auon, elected a new President, Rene Muawad, and approved the peace plan (aiming to share power more equally between Christians and Muslims) agreed upon in Oct. The peace polan was rejected by Gen. Aoun because it does not ensure Syrian withdrawal. President Muawad was killed (with 17 other people) on 22 Nov. New President Elias Hrawi (Christian, Syrian-backed) elected on 24 Nov., but was not accepted by Gen. Aoun. From mid-Dec. renewed fighting between Amal and Hezbollah (over 50 killed). During 1989 Israel made 18 air-raids, as well as ground attacks, agaisnt forces from Palestinian and Lebanese groups (e.gb the Popular Front for the Liberation of POalestine-General Command, PFLP-GC, Nov.), Hezbollah (Nov.), the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP, Dec.), also north of the 'Security Zone' (over 40 killed). In mid-Dec. PLO forces (mainly from the Fatah faction) attacked Syrian troops in southern Lebanon leaving at least 10 dead, reportedly the first such clash in 2 years.

Turkey	1974/1984	Turkish Govt	528 000[h]	1984-89: 1 500-3 000 > 150 +
		vs. PKK (Kurdish Workers' Party)	300-1 000	

Comments: The PKK, established in 1974, seeks independence from Turkey and has since 1984 escalated warfare against the Turkish Govt, mostly in south eastern Turkey. In 1987 the Govt claimed that PKK had some 1100 armed men operating from within Turkey and approx. 3400 men in the total force. Other sources give lower figures for PKK forces. The Turkish Army has deployed an est. 100 000 soldiers and para-military gendarmerie in the 8 south-eastern provinces. Many PKK members have been arrested and sentenced to death. During 1989 several clashes were reported between PKK members and members of the security force and police. In May PKK intensified its activities, and approx. 80 people were reported to have been killed in May-June. Fighting continued throughout 1989, with no signs of a peace process. Govt also faces opposition from other groups, e.g. the Turkish Workers' and Peasants' Liberation Army, which assumed responsibility for a raid on a gendarmerie post in Aug.

South Asa

Afghanistan	1978/1978	Afghan Govt,	55000[t]	1978-89:1000000[m]	>15000	0
		USSR	- (Feb.)		
		vs. Afghan Mujahideen,	...		
		based in Afghanistan			
		Pakistan (Peshawar)	40 000		
		Iran	...		

Comments: After the Apr. 1978 Govt take-over by PDPA (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan), a civil war began, with opposition formed along religious lines. In Dec. 1979 the conflict escalated with Soviet intervention. A plan for Soviet withdrawal was established by the 1988 Geneva Accords; UN-supervised withdrawal was completed on 15 Feb. 1989. Acc. to Soviet sources, the total no. of Soviet troops killed 1979-89 was 15 000. Tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan after Soviet-made Afghan missiles repeatedly fell on Pakistani territory in early 1989. Interim Govt formed by Pakistan-based Mujahideen in Feb. 1989, based in Peshawar. Forces of different Govt groups initiated an unsuccessful attack on Jalalabad (Mar.) which developed into continued siege of the city for months. Battles around Jalalabad continued throughout July and were renewed in Nov. Guerilla shelling of Kabul reported throughout 1989. Struggle around Khost in Aug., Sep., Dec., as well as around Kandahar and Shindand (Aug., Sep.). Continued armed supply for the Afghan Govt. by the USSR; to Mujahideen through Pakistan, by several countries incl. the USA and Saudi Arabia. Contact between the USSR and Mujahideen led to the release of 2 Soviet soldiers (Dec.). In Aug. battle reported between Mujahideen factions in Helmand Province. Heavy fighting was also reported between followers of Hekmatyar (Hezb-i Islami Party) and Massoud (Jamyat-i-Islami Party), for instance a meassacre in July of Massoud followers and fighting in Aug. On 1 Nov. a UN Genera Assembly resolution called upon the Secretary-General to facilitate the formation of a broad-based Govt in Afghanistan.

Bangladesh	1971/1981	Bangladesh Govt.	90,000[h]	1975-89:>1000	<50	0
		vs. JSS/SB	5,000		

Comments: The Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti (JSS, or the Chittagong Hill Tracts People's Coordiantion Association) and its military wing, the Shanti Bahini (SB, or Peace Force), were formed in 1971.Guerrilla warfare started in 1974-75 after demands for autonomy for the south-eastern Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), previously enjoyed under British rule, met no response from the Govt. Bengali (mainly Muslim) settlers, moving into the area have been attacked by the SB. Bengali settlers have attacked the tribal people of the CHT (inhabited mainly by the Buddhist Chakma tribe but also by Hindus and Christians), reportedly with the support of the Bangladesh Army on some occasions. Accusations of massacres form both sides; approx. 50000 in refugee camps in India. SB intensified operation in 1981, and in 1984 the Govt (which seized power in a military coup in 1982) sent the Army into the area. Since 1986 the violence increased, with an est. 100 killed by the SB in 1988.Since Oct. 1985 meetings have been held between the Govt and the JSS/SB but with little progress. In 1989 the Parliament passed four bills designed to provide limited autonomy to the region. JSS/SB reportedly does not think the provisions adequate, and SB stepped up violence in connection with elections (June) to the new district councils.

India

1947/1981	Indian Govt vs. KCF	1100000[h]	1983-89: >16 000	0
1988/1988	vs. All Bodo Students Union	>8000[n]	>2000	
1988/1988	vs. Muslim Liberation Front	…	…	
1947/1982	vs. Jammu and Kashmir	…	…	

Comments: Several Sikh groups, e.g. the Khalistan Commando Force (KCF), the Khalistan Liberation Force, the Council of Khalistan, the Bhindranwale Tiger Force and the Babbar Khalsa, have waged and armed struggle against the central Govt to crate an independent Khalistan. In June 1984 the Indian Army stormed the Golden Temple (the main Sikh shrine). Sikhs assassinated Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in Oct. 1984. In 1988 at least 2500 persons died in the Punjab conflict, the death-toll easing off somewhat after the Govt's 'Operation Black Thunder' (May 1988), ending an ocupation of the Golden Temple by Sikh groups, many of whom surrendered. In 1989 the Sikh groups continued their struggle for secession. In response to the hanging of 2 of Indira Gandhi's assassins on 6 Jan., sporadic incidents occurred in Amritsar and Delhi. Killings and acts of sabotage occurred in 1989, but according to Rajiv Gandhi, introducing his political reform programme for the Punjab (Mar.), only 1 active Sikh group with religious backing remains. Gandhi proposed measures to end president's (direct) rule and to hold local elections in the Punjab. Political violence in the Punjab remained on a stable high (2000 deaths) in 1989. After the election of pro-separatist candidates from the Punjab in Nov. general elections, the new Prime Minister V. P. Singh in a gesture of reconciliation, prayed at the Golden Temple. On 29 Dec. the Indian Lower House of Parliament voted to repeal the constitutional amendment which in 1987 suspended basic civil rights in Punjab. In Uttar Pradesh a new local authority introduced in early 1989 a law to make Urdu a second official language. This provoked the majority Hindus to rebellion. Cleavages over religious sites have also come to the fore. In 1989 over 600 deaths were recorded in Uttar Pradesh. In Bihar a similar inter-denominational conflict, provoked by election issues, resulted in up to 1000 deaths. Factional fighting between rival Muslim and rival Hindu groups, respectively, took place

in Gujarat and Tamil Nadu states, costing 33 lives. General elections (22-26 Nov.) resulted in a further 130 deaths, mainly in Gujarat and Tripura. In Assam, the Bodo people, mainly militia drawn from the All Bodo Students Union (with a few hundred fighters), continued their campaign for a separate state, which started in Mar. 1988. 500 deaths were reported during Jan. to Aug. 1989, when a truce was arranged. In Kashmir, where several groups (mainly the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front and the Muslim Liberation Front, with a few hundred men) demand that Kashmir is to become a Pakistani state, the violent struggle continued in 1989.

| India-Pakistan | 1947/1982 | Indian Govt vs. | 1100000^h | 1971:11000 | <50(mil.) |
| | | Pakistani Govt | 480000^h | 1981-89: >500 (mil.) | 0 |

Comments: Since independence in 1947 there have been several military engagements—first over partition (1947), then over Kashmir (1965) and East Pakistan/Bangladesh (1971). An agreement was signed in 1972 to observe the frontier in the Himalayas. Since 1981 renewed sporadic fighting has occurred on Siachen Glacier (Kashmir) over a 72-km-long border determination. Long-standing mistrust between the two countries has been increased by trouble in Punjab Province in India. India claims Pakistan supports Sikh groups. In mid-June 1989 a military experts' meeting of Indians and Pakistanis took place in Islamabad to discuss the situation in the Siachen Glacier area. It was decided to establish a no man's land zone on the glacier. Troops were to be redeployed in non-offensive strategies, force was to be avoided and precise determination of ground positions settled. The details of this latter point are not yet agreed. Routine cross-border exchanges of artillery fire occur in response to army movement of troops along the border (Apr., July, Sep.). In one such exchange of fire in mid-July, 15 soldiers died. Internal pressures on both sides complicate agreement on the crucial issue.

Myanmar	1948/1948	Myanmar Govt	182 000-200 000^h	1948-51:8 000	…	n.a
(formerly Burma)		vs. BCP (Jan.-Apr.)	10000-15000	1950:5000		
		vs. BCP (Apr-Dec.)	200-300	1981-84:400-600 yearly		
	1989/1989	vs. BNUP(Apr.-)	8000-12000	1985-87: >1000 yearly		
	1989/1989	vs. Noom Suk Harn		1988:500-3000		
	1989/1989	-vs. National Democratic Army				
	1948/1949	Vs.KNU	4000-8000			
	1948/1948	vs.KIA	8000-10000			
	1965/1965	vs. SSA				

Comments: More than 20 anti-Govt organizations have fought against the central Govt since 1948. The Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) came to power after a military coup in 1962. BSPP changed us name to the National Unity Party (NUP) in Sep. 1988 after pro-democracy demonstrations. These were quelled in Aug.-Sep. 1988 with up to 3000 reported killed (500 acc. to official sources). A military take-over followed. In late May 1989 the country's name was changed to the Union of Myanmar. In 1975 the National Democratic Front

(NDF) was formed, consisting of 11 non-communist anti-Govt resistance groups in 1989. On 11 Nov. 1988 the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB) was established, comprised of 23 ethnic resistance armies, underground student groups and other anti-Govt organizations. The Burma Communist Party (BCP) staged several campaigns against Govt troops after Sep. 1988, often in co-operation with forces from the Shan State Army (SSA) and Kachin Independence Army (KIA) of the NDF; over 100 soldiers reported killed in Dec. 1988. BCP split in 1989 after a mutiny into at least 4 groups. In mid-Mar, ethnic Kokang Chinese, Wa and Shan troops broke away from BCP and set up the Burma National Democratic Front (BNDF). On 14 Apr., BCP troops, dominated by-Wa hill tribesmen, stormed general HQ at Panghsang, and the communist leadership fled to China. Similar mutinies followed mother areas. The new groups, the Burma National United Party (BNUP, and its armed wing, the Burma National United Army; the bulk of the former BCP's 10 000-15 000 troops and primarily Wa hill tribesmen), Nom Suk Ham (the Young Brave Warriors. Shan-dominated), the National Democratic Army (former BCP s Mekong River Division, led by a Chinese volunteer) and the BNDF are organized along ethnic lines. Communist ideology has been discarded. Other BCP troops of Kachin origin joined the KIA, reportedly leaving only a few hundred rebels still regarding themselves as the BCP. A temporary cease-fire was reportedly agreed upon (Apr.) between the Govt and the Kokang group. The Govt also faces opposition from other ethnic groups seeking autonomy, such as the Karen National Union (KNU) which in Sep. 1988 launched an offensive against Govt forces and recaptured a base. Govt made counter-offensives and has seized several important KNU bases along the Thai-Myanmar border. KNU claims to have killed 2000 soldiers; Govt figures are lower. Reports that Govt troops entered Thai territory during its offensives. Thai Govt offer in Apr. to mediate peace talks between Myanmar Govt and ethnic groups (delegates from NDF and DAB met with Thai military representatives and agreed to set up a cease-fire negotiating team) was rejected by Myanmar Govt. Reports of troops shooting and killing 1 person during pro- demonstrations in June 1989 and the imprisonment of thousands of pro-democracy activists since mid-July. Approx. 10 000 additional troops were deployed in Yangon in July. Leaders of the main opposition movement, the National League for Democracy (NLD), were put under house arrest in July for up to a year. Members of NLD were arrested for a bomb attack on an oil refinery (July, killing 3 persons) and, are to military officials, admitted respoonsibility. The Govt set the date for a free and fair election at May 1990.

Sri Lanka		Sri Lankan Govt,	40000	1983-89: 14 000-	>5 150
	1987/1987	Indian Govt (IPKF)	47 000-50 000 (Jan.)	16 000	
			40 000 (Dec.)		
	1976/1983	vs. Tamil Tigers (LTTE)	2000		
	1976/1989	vs. EPRLF/TNA	1000		
	1969/1987	vs.JVP	1200		

Comments: Tamil groups, principally the Tamil Tigers (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elelam, LTTE), deamdn autonomy or secession for the northern parts of Sri Lanka. An agreement (July 1987) between Indian and Sri Lanka placed Indian toops (Indian Peace-Keeping Forces, IPKF) on the island. Since Oct. 1987 IPKF have been fighting against forces from Tamil Tigers. Over 1100 IPKF (approz. 600 in 1989)

have been killed. Acc. to Tamil sources, they have lost over 650 men in fighting with the IPKF. 5000 civilians have died since 1983 in theTamil conflict. The Sinhalese People's Liberation Front (JVP), which opposes the partial Tamil autonomy agreement between Sri Lanka and India, became a new party to the conflict in Nov. 1987. In 1989 pressure built up form both JVP and Tamil quarters for Inian toops to be withdrawn. President Premadasas first 100 days in office (Jan.-Mar.) were marked by some of the worst violence as of that date. Violence increase in conneciton with general elections held in Feb. A state of emergency was declared in June after several abortive truces in the JVP conflict. Military offensive against JVP and JVP threatened the families of police and security forces. Wholesale killing and arresting of Sinhalese civilians, suspected to by JVP supporters. At the beginning of Sep. a pro-Govt. vigilante group 'the Eagles of Central Hills,' took revenge on JVP supporters. The leader and vice-leader of the JVP were killed by the Sinhalese Army in Nov. The JVP conflict has cost over 5000 deaths in 2 years, over 4200 in 1989. Fighting continued in 1989 between IPKF and Tamil Tigers, but on a lower level than in 1988. At the end of June, the Tamil Tigers signed an agreement with the Govt which seems to indicate that the (EPRLF) Provincial Council would be dissolved upon Indian withdrawal and demand the prior withdrawal of IPKF before signing a general peace accord. on 18 Sep. India and Sri Lanka signed an agreement that all Indian troops would leave theisland by 31 Dec. 1989. India qualified this by making withdrawal conditional upn the guaranteed safety of the Tamil Comunity. On 19 Sep. the IPKF declared a unilateral cease-fire. The Tamil Tigers, who are still entrenched in Jaffna, the Sri Lankan traditional cultural centre, reciprocated but re-engaged on 29 Sep. At the end of Sep. after internecine fighting between Tamil gorups, the Tamil Tigers agreed to political participation conditional upon the evacuation of all Indian toops. towards the end of the year increased fighting occurred between Tamil Tigers and the Tamil National Army (TNA), the armed wing of EPRLF (Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front) (approx. 350 deaths in Sep.-Dec.), over differences about the conditions of IPKF withdrawal. On 27 Oct. a peace accord was agreed between the Govt, IPKF and EPRLF in which the Tamil Tigers refused to participate. Previously the EPRLF had begun co-operation with the Govt and had taken over some administrative posts in Tamil areas. The IPKF promoted the EPRLF (who were in conflict, in alliance with the Tamil Tigers, with the Govt in 1983-88) as the regional Govt in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, but TNA (armed by India) has subsequently been involved in open conflict also against the Sinhalese Army (Nov.). On 20 Dec. the Tamil Tigers' political wing was reported to have been accepted by the Govt as a legal party for the forthcoming elections. The new Indian Govt announced on 1 Dec. a speeding up of IPKF withdrawal from Sri Lanka, and on 28 Dec. the Indian Foreign Minister announced in Parliament that all Indian troops would be withdrawn from Sri Lanka by 31 Mar. 1990. Approx. 40 000 IPKF remained in Sri Lanka at the end of 1989.

Pacific Asia

Cambodia/					
Kampuchea	1977/1977	Cambodian Govt,	50000-70000	1979-89: >25 300[p]	+
		SRV Govt (Viet Nam)	50000-70000 (Jan.)		
			-(Oct)		
	1975/1979	vs. KR	25 000-40 000	...[p]	
	1975/1979	vs. KPNLF	10000-15000		
	1975/1979	vs. FUNCINPEC/ANS	10000-20000		

Comments: Wars, invasion and famines have resulted in 2-3 million deaths since 1970, most during the reign of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge (1975-78). Border clashes between Kampuchea and Viet Nam during 1977-78 ended with a Vietnamese invasion (Dec. 1978) which ousted the Khmer Rouge (KR) from power (Jan. 1979). Armed opposition is made up of a coalition of KR, Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and Front Uni pour un Cambodge Independant, Neutre, Pacific et Cooperatif/Armee Nationale Sihanoukiste (FUNCINPEC/ANS), forming the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. (CGDK) in 1982. In spring 1989 the country's name was changed from the People's Republic of Kampuchea to the State of Cambodia. After a lull in fighting during the first quarter of 1989, the level increased until July. Heavy fighting continued through Aug., in connection with the Cambodia Conference in Paris. Viet Nam began its final withdrawal from Cambodia on 21 Sep. (announced to be completed by 26 Sep.). After the Vietnamese withdrawal heavy fighting was reported from the western and north-western parts of Cambodia between the Govt and the KR as well as the ANS and KPNLF together against the Govt. All 3 groups also stepped up activities deeper inside the country. The Govt acknowledges that there has been an upsurge in the activities of the 3 opposition groups and admits that they have made some territorial gains in the north-west. Shelling by the Govt sometimes affects Thailand. CGDK forces get supplies from Thai territory. Alleged shelling of Cambodian territory by CGDK from the Thai side of the border has also been reported. The Govt accused Thailand of bombing the Cambodian island of Rung Sanlem (Nov.). Diplomatic activities concerning Cambodia were intensive: Cambodian Govt-Thailand (Jan., May, Sep.), Viet Nam-China (Jan., May), the Second Jakarta Informal Meeting (Feb.), Cambodian Govt-FUNCINPEC and KPNLF (May), China-USSR (May), Thai diplomatic initiative (Sep.) and Australian peace proposal (Nov.). In July the Cambodian parties held preparatory talks for the Paris Cambodia Conference in Aug. During the Conference no agreement was reached on the participation of the KR in a future provisional Govt to rule the country during a transition period prior to general elections. Furthermore no international control mechanism to monitor the Vietnamese withdrawal was created.

Indonesia/ East Timor	1975/1975	Indonesian Govt vs. Fretilin	14 000	1975-89: 15 000-16 000 (mil.)	<50

Comments: The Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin) proclaimed the independent state of the Democratic Republic of East Timor (a former Portuguese colony) in Nov. 1975. Indonesia invaded in Dec., and in July 1977 East Timor became Indonesia's 27th province. By late 1978 most of Fretilin's resistance was quelled. Govt offensives in 1981 and 1983 (after a brief cease-fire). Since the mid-1980s, low-level warfare. Human rights groups report up to 200 000 deaths 1975-89, most caused during the first years after the invasion. During 1989 few clashes reported but Fretilin (approx. 200-400 men) remains in the eastern part of East Timor. Attempts by the church to mediate apparently failed. 14 000 Indonesian troops deployed, acc. to official figures (others put the figure higher) in East Timor. Govt also faces opposition from the Free Papua Movement in Irian Jaya and from Muslim extremist groups on Sumatra.

Philippines	1968/1986 1981/1984	Philippine Govt vs. NPA vs. RAM	65 000-68 000 23 000-25 000 3 000	1972-89: >37 100	<600

Comments: Main conflict is between Govt and left-wing NPA (New People's Army). In spite of cease-fire and contacts after the formation of the Aquino Govt (Feb. 1986) the conflict has continued. New strategy announced by NPA 'sparrow units' in Mar. 1989, with 'selective' targeting on soldiers and policemen who committed 'serious crimes', following leadership changes. Bombings of US military communications station by opposition, and massacre of civilians by Govt Army unit, were reported in Apr. The same month NPA claimed responsibility for killing US officer Col. James Row. In May assassinations took place in Manila. A massacre by NPA of villages on Mindanao occurred June 1989. Total est. deaths around 500 in NPA-Govt conflict during 1989. Conflicts over regional autonomy have resulted in little violence in 1989. New autonomy laws were passed, providing self-rule for Muslims on Mindanao and for tribal minorities in the Cordillera region. In Apr. and May the largest Muslim armed forces, MNLF (Mindanao National Liberation Front, whose Bangsa Moro Army is est. at 15 000), criticized the laws on Mindanao and indicated possibility of resumption of guerrilla warfare. A truce has been in force between Govt and MNLF since 1986. Occasionally violence has flared up, e.g. in Feb. 1989, although unknown between which parties. MILF (Muslim Islamic Liberation Front, est 3000 men) has previously also been active in the region. Est 100 deaths in the region during 1989. Altogether 50 000 people were killed in the Mindanao conflict during 1972-86. Referendum on the autonomy acts on Mindanao in Nov. The 1 Dec. coup attempted by RAM (Reform Movement of the Armed Forces) led to fierce fighting in central Manila with approx. 100 killed, but was eventually repelled by the Aquino Govt.

Africa

Angola	1975/1975	Angolan Govt, Cuban Govt	100 000 0 50 000 (Jan.) 25 000 (Dec.) 65 000[s]	1975-89: >25 600
	1975/1975	vs. UNITA		>600
				—

Comments: The Govt faces armed opposition by UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) which has been supported by S. Africa and the USA. Angola is supported by Cuban troops, the USSR (arms and advisers) and the GDR (advisers). The Aug. 1988 cease-fire between Angola and S. Africa was followed by the signing in Dec. of the Brazzaville Protocol. UNITA started offensive in early Feb. 1989 after rejecting a Govt amnesty (not including UNITA leader Savimbi); however, the offensive was stopped after a request from Cote d'Ivoire Govt. In May the Angolan Govt for the first time announced its willingness to negotiate for peace. Meeting in Gbadolite, Zaire, between President dos Santos (Angola) and Savimbi as well as 18 African leaders resulted in the Gbadolite declaration (22 June), which included agreement on a cease-fire, entered into force on 24 June. However, both sides accused each other of violations, and the cease-fire was ultimately broken on 24 Aug. The fighting, which continued throughout 1989 (over 600 deaths), was reportedly the heaviest since 1988. Govt and UNITA also disagreed over the contents of the declaration. Several attempts, notably the Sep. meeting between 8 African leaders in Kinshasa, Zaire were held with the aim of renewing talks. In late Sep. Savimbi put forward a UNITA peace plan, rejected by the Angolan Govt. After further talks between Mobuto and Savimbi, the latter declared that he was prepared to sign a cease-fire agreement. The Cuban Govt withdrew half of its troops during 1989, acc. to a Cuban military spokesman (under the supervision of UN observer group UNAVEM). By the end of the year the Cuban troops were said (by UNITA) no longer to be involved in fighting. The remainder of Cuban troops are to be progressively withdrawn by mid-1991.

Chad	1982/1987	Chad (UNIR) Govt	17000	1965-89:28000	
		vs. Islamic Legion	>2 000	>800	
	1988/1989	vs. Military opposition	...		++

Comments: Different Chadian factions have been fighting each other since 1965 with French and Libyan military interventions. In June 1982 the Forces Armees du Nord led by Hissene Habre seized de facto power, and he became President in Oct. In 1987 the war became a struggle between the combined forces of the Habre Govt and previously Libyan-backed Goukouni Oueddai against Libya, with France giving active support to the Habre Govt. French forces (1700 men) remain in southern parts of Chad. Cease-fire agreed between Chad and Libya in Sep. 1987, and a peace accord was signed in Algeria on 31 Aug. 1989, allowing a 1-year period of negotiations to settle the Aozou Strip dispute. (If negotiations fail, the dispute will be settled by a ruling on the sovereignty issue by the International Court of Justice at the Hague.) The Strip has been occupied by Libya (still with 2000 troops) since 1973 and it has been fought over since 1979. In Feb. 1988,12 opposition factions joined the ruling UNIR (Union Nationale de 1'Independence et la Revolution) coalition. In Mar. 1988, 5 GUNT (Govt de l'Unie Nationale Tchadienne) opposition factions met under the chairmanship of Oueddai in Libya to form a new Govt-in-exile in opposition to UNIR. On 3 Mar. 1989, the opposition group Conseil Democratique de la Revolution (CDR, with approx. 1000 troops) joined UNIR. Tribal divisions in the army led to a coup attempt by members of the Habre Govt on 1 Apr. 1989. The leaders of the attempt were from the Ban people living near the border with Sudan, while the President is of the Dazu people in the north. On 16 Oct. 1989, Habre Govt forces launched a pre-emptive attack on a camp on the Sudanese border occupied by the Islamic Legion. In the ensuing 16-day battle over 800 troops were killed, incl. 200 from the Chadian Army. The Islamic Legion arose out of the remnants of the anti-Habre forces of Muslim (northern) Chad after their 1987 defeat. The Islamic Legion consists of Chadian Muslims, members originating in the Middle East (Arabic, probably Druze militia) and some defectors from the Habre' Govt (after the coup attempt); it is thought to be led by former officers of the Libyan Army. A French airliner was blown up shortly after leaving the capital city of N'djamena on 17 Sep.; a group calling itself the 'Underground Chadian Movement' was one of several organizations claiming responsibility.

Ethiopia		Ethiopian Govt	313000[h,i]	1962-89: >100 000	0
	1970/1971	vs. EPLF	30000		10000
	1976/1976	vs. TPLF	20000		
	1975/1980	vs. EPDM	...		
	1977/1977	vs. OLF	...		
	1975/1975	vs. ALF	...		
	1989/1989	vs. Military faction	...		

Comments: War between Ethiopian Govt and Eritreans has gone on since 1961, following the incorporation of Eritrea into the Ethiopian Empire. Main guerrilla movement fighting for Eritrea's independence is today EPLF (Eritrean People's Liberation Front). It has established de facto territorial control over some parts of Eritrea. Since 1974 TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front) has also waged a military

struggle against the Ethiopian Govt. It demands a change of Govt in all of Ethiopia. In the early 1980s EPDM (Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement), with similar demands, also began an armed struggle. In addition OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) initiated armed struggle demanding the creation of an Oromo state. TPLF and EPLF defeated the Ethiopian Army in Tigray province in early 1989. ALF (Afar Liberation Front) as well as OLF stepped up attacks at this time. The Ethiopian Army abandoned Ma'kale, capital of the province, without a fight in Feb.-Mar. Military faction within Ethiopian armed forces attempted coup against Mengistu Govt (May). 15 generals and 16 officers were killed in Addis Ababa and Asmara, according to official Ethiopian sources. On 5 June Mengistu announced peace initiative. This led to open negotiations with EPLF in Sep. in Atlanta, Ga., USA, with former US President Carter as a 'neutral observer'. Renewed meeting in Nairobi (Nov.) resulting in co-chairmanship by former Tanzanian President Nyerere. A common front, EPRDF, was formed by TPLF and EPDM in May. In Sep. and Oct. TPLF offensive through Wolo province surrounding province capital of Dese. Public discussions initiated between Ethiopian Govt and TPLF in Rome (Nov.) with Italian Govt as participant Counteroffensive by Govt's newly mobilized forces against TPLF/EPDM in Dec. seemed to have ended in failure. The remaining Cuban troops (in all 2000) left Ethiopia in Sep. 1989.

Location	Year	Parties	Troops	Deaths		
Morocco/ Western Sahara	1975/1976	Moroccan Govt vs. Polisario	125000-150000 3500-7000	1975-89: 10000- 13000	400 (mil.)	0

Comments: The former Spanish colony of Western Sahara was divided between Morocco and Mauritania in 1975. Morocco annexed Mauritanian half in 1979, following Mauritanian withdrawal and agreement with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario). Polisario (and its military wing, Sahrawi People's Liberation Army) is fighting for independence for the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic and is based mainly in Algeria. In Apr. 1987 Morocco completed construction of a wall to keep Polisario out. In Aug. 1988 Morocco and Polisario accepted a UN peace plan, including a referendum (to be supervised jointly by the UN and the Organization for African Unity) to decide upon the status of the territory (part of Morocco or independent state). Meeting between King Hassan of Morocco and leaders of Polisario in Jan. 1989 was followed by a truce. Several rounds of talks between UN Secretary-General de Cuellar and political leaders in Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania as well as with Polisario leaders during 1989. However, fighting was renewed in late Sep., with major battles in Oct. and Nov.

Location	Year	Parties	Troops	Deaths		
Mozambique	1975/1976	Mozambican Govt, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Malawi vs. MNR	37000 3000-12000 ... 600 10 000-20 000	1985-89: 7 000-9 000 (mil.) 100 000 (civ.)	300-400	—

Comments: The MNR (National Resistance Movement or RENAMO), which has been fighting the Mozambican Govt since 1976, receives e.g. weapons, training and logistics from S. Africa, and its apparent goal is to disrupt and destroy Govt infrastructure. The Mozambican (Frelimo) Govt has received military aid from the USSR, some military assistance from the UK and France, and economic help from the

USA. In addition, military co-operation takes place between Mozambican Govt and Zimbabwe, Nigeria and Malawi. Tanzanian troops sent to help the Govt in 1987 were withdrawn in Jan. 1989. In Sep. 1988 the presidents of Mozambique and S. Africa held talks on the reactivization of the 1984 Nkomati (non-aggression) accord. Sporadic clashes between Govt forces and MNR occurred throughout 1989 but with fewer lives lost than in 1988. The est. total number of war-related deaths in 1976-89 is 600 000-900 000, incl. massacres and famine deaths as well as battle deaths. During the past 3 years, the MNR made 80 raids on an oil pipeline, 270 attacks on the railway from Zimbabwe, as well as repeated raids on power cables. MNR raids into Zimbabwe are reported to have caused 360 Zimbabwean deaths in 2 years. Hundreds of MNR fighters have accepted the Govt's year-old amnesty, extended in Jan. for a further 12-month period. A large-scale Govt offensive against the MNR base in central Mozambique took place at the end of July. At S. Africa's request the US Govt offered to mediate in the conflict (Feb.). The presidents of Zimbabwe and Kenya agreed to try to negotiate a settlement to the conflict (July). Indirect peace talks were opened on 8 Aug. President Chissano has during the year been subjected to pressure from the USSR to negotiate with the MNR. The Mozambican Govt presented a 12-point document through Catholic and Anglican Church leaders, which indicated that Govt policy was now concentrated on national unity rather than ideological considerations. Talks bogged down in early Oct. over recognition of MNR. The Govt insisted that no change of power was possible. The MNR launched an offensive on 8 Oct., mainly directed against Mozambican Army logistical targets. A large quantity of military equipment was captured, and 93 soldiers and police were claimed to have been killed by MNR.

Somalia	Somalia Govt	61000	1988-89: >700 (mil.)[u]	0
1981/1981	vs. SNM	10000	>500(mil.)	
1989/1989	vs. SPM	3000		

Comments: The Somali National Movement (SNM) composed largely of the Isaaq clan in the north of the country, has waged an armed struggle against the Barre Govt since 1981. In 1988 fighting escalated, following the attempt by SNM to establish bases inside Somalia, to replace those previously held on Ethiopian territory. The Govt forces retaliated brutally. SNM claimed in Mar. to hold countryside areas in the north. Attacks were also reported in July in provinces adjoining Djibouti. Defectors from the Army apparently filled the ranks of the SNM. In Dec. SNM attacked Hargesia, the regional capital of northern Somalia. A military mutiny in the south was reported in Mar., and an anti-Govt organization called 'Abris' appeared. The revolt spread to other towns in the south throughout Apr., and in early Aug. opposition still seemed to hold the town of Kisimayu in the south. Opposition now operating under the name of SPM (Somali Patriotic Movement) based on the Ogadeni clan. President Barre comes from the smaller Marehan clan. In late Sep. fighting in the south spilled over into Kenya. In July a massacre took place in Mogadishu. Govt sources put the number of deaths at 24; other sources mentioned 450. In Aug. Govt announced the introduction of a multi-party system and elections in 1990. A total of 50 000 Somalis are estimated to have died from war and famine in May 1988-Dec. 1989.

South Africa	S. African Govt.	136000	1984-89: 4 750[w]	750[w]	0
1950/1984	vs. ANC	10000		

Comments: The conflict over the apartheid politics of the Nationalist Party (NP) forming Govt since 1948 has continued since 1950. Since early 1960s ANC (African Naional Contress) has been main armed opponent. Armed as well as unarmed struggle has inensified since 1984. In 1989 a shift to non-armed action was evident. In Jan. ANC announbced the closing of military bases in Angola and 1989 was declared 'the year of mas action.' S. African forces still reported stepped up ANC atacks on military targets during the first quarter of 1989, incl. an attack on an air force bease near the border with Botswana. In Feb. a bomb attack on a military hospital in Johannesbourg occurred as well as a bomb outside an army officers' club in Durban in Mar. Govt renewed emergencyin June. At least 30 deaths occurred in election-related protst in Aug.-Sep. against the exclusion of the majority form voting. The Mass Democratic Movement, a new antiapartheid coalition which appeared in Aug., evidently bringing together ANC, UDF (United Democratic Front, a broad grouping against apartheid) and trade unions, initiated non-violent opposition in Aug.-Sep. In. Oct. former ANC Secretary General Walter Sisulu was released form prison together was several other former ANC leaders. In Dec. President F.W. de Klerk held a short meting with jailed ANC leader Nelson Mandela. Most battle-related deaths in 1989 related to antagonism between UDF and Inkatha, a Zulu-based black orgnaisaton led by Kwa Zulu leader Chief Buthuelezi. Violence in Natal Province led to approx. 500 deaths Jann.-July. Negotiations between the 2 organisations resulted in some reduced violence. However, 1978 deaths were reported for Dec. A bomb attack on the governing NP in May was reportedly carried outby a white right-wing orgnaisaiton. In Nov. it ws revealed that S. Africa operated 'hit squads' attacking members of ANC.

| South Africa/ Namibia | 1966/1967 | S. African Govt vs. SWAPO (based in Angola) | 21 000 (Jan.) -(Dec.) 9 000 (Jan.) -(Dec.) | 1967-89: >12 800 | >300 (mil.) | — |

Comments: In 1996 the UN renounced S. Africa's mandate over South West Africa and renamed in Namibia. The national anti-colonial movement SWAPO (South West African People's Organisation and its military wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia, PLAN) has bene leading the war for indepoendence. The Brazzaville Protocol, sizned in Dec. 1988 by the Govts of Angola, Cuba and S. Africa, facilitates the independence process of Namibia. On 1 Apr. 1989, the day when UN Resolution 435 entered into force, approx. 1500 PLAN troops went into Namibia (Ovamboland) and clashed with the local police force. SWAPO did nto admit the intrusion, originally stating that there were no PLAN men in the area and that it was a provocation by S. Africa. However, SWAPO later claimed that PLAN troops had been in the area all along waiting for the UN troops which, acc. to SWAPO, would transport the PLAN troops back to their Angolan bases, and that the Plan troops were attacked by S. African troops. Following an ultimatum to the UN by S. Africa, which threatened to stop the whole independence process, S. Africa was allowed to use military force against PLA. 2600-4500 S. African troops and additional troops form SWATF (South West Africa Territory Forces) were used, causing over 300 deaths (the majority being PLAN troops), in fighting described as the fiercest during the entire conflict. On 9 Apr. an agreement was signed between S. Africa, Angola and Cuba on the withdrawal of PLAN troops. The majority of PLAN forces returned to Angola without help from the UN, although this had been stipulated in the agreement. By May they were all said to be out of Namibia. During a 3.5-month period, starting in early June, 41 000

Namibians returned with the help of the UN, incl. SWAPO leader Sam Nuoma. The election campaign, leading to election on 7-11 Nov. in which SWAPO gained the majority of votes (57%), was calm, although some clashes were reported between SWAPO and DTA (Democratic Turnhalle Alliance) members (reported to have occurred also after the election). By late Nov. all S. African troops were reported to have left Namibia and, acc. to SWAPO's Secretary General, the military command of PLAN had been disbanded. 4650 UN soldiers are deployed in Namibia. The Constituent Assembly is preparing the Constitution, to be implemented on 1 Apr. 1990, when independence is expected to be declared.

Sudan	Sudanese Govt	65000	1983-89: >32 000	0
1980/1983	vs. SPLA/SPLM	30000	(mil.)	...
1989/1989	vs. Military faction			

Comments: Since 1983 SPLA/SPLM (Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement) has been fighting the central Govt to increase autonomy of the southern region and to repeal the Islamic Law (Sharia) introduced for the entire country, in contradiction to the peace agreement of 1972, according to SPLA. The coalition Govt in Khartoum was dissolved in Dec. 1988 following disagreements over the peace accord signed in Nov. 1988 between one party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and SPLA. Violent clashes occurred in Dec. 1988 in Khartoum. In Jan. and Feb. 1989 SPLA made military gains in the south of Sudan. In Feb. 150 senior army officers sent a message to Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi calling for an end to the civil war. In Apr. SPLA conquered the town of Akobo and in early May controlled large areas in the south, including 9 major towns. In Apr. SPLA allowed deliveries of humanitarian aid to famine-stricken areas and announced a unilateral cease-fire. On 30 June the Armed Forces of Sudan took power in a bloodless coup, and a new Govt led by Brig.-Gen. el-Bashir was formed. Talks were initiated between SPLA and the new Govt in Addis Ababa in Aug. Acc. to the Govt (Oct.) 259 000 civilians were estimated to have died from the effects of 6 years of war. More than 32 000 soldiers from both sides were said to have been killed during the war. In Oct. relief operations were suspended as the war intensified. In Nov. the Govt made significant military gains. Talks between the parties in Nairobi, Kenya, chaired by former US President Carter, ended in early Dec. without agreement.

Uganda	Uganda (NRM) Govt	70 000ˣ	1981-89: >6 000	600-800 (mil.) ++
1988/1988	vs. UPDA	<1000	(mil.) 100 000 (civ.)	
1988/1988	vs. UPA	...		
1987/1989	vs. HSM (Kony)	200-800		

Comments: The NRM (National Resistance Movement) Govt, which previously fought guerrilla campaigns starting in 1981, seized power in Jan. 1986. The armed forces of the NRM Govt, who are drawn mainly from southern areas of the country, have been fighting forces in the northern and eastern regions, led by 3 previous leaders of Uganda: Amin (1971-79), Obote (1980-85) and Tito Okello (1985-86). The Govt's amnesty to resistance groups, offered in Aug. 1987, was extended to Apr. 1988. During this period most UPDA (Uganda People's Democratic Army, led by John Angelo Okello) forces surrendered. On 16 Apr. 1988, the UPA (Uganda People's Army, led by associates of

Obote) accepted a peace agreement, but a faction under the UPA chairman Otai decided to fight on. On 3 June a further agreement was signed by UPDA, and UPDA members were incorporated in the armed forces of NRM, but a faction of UPDA refused to recognize it Reduced guerrilla groups remained active throughout 1989. Out of the several spiritualist movements in Uganda, the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), under the leadership of Joseph Kony (formerly led by priestess Alice Lakwena) was militarily active in 1989. The HSM includes former UDPA troops. A Govt offensive in June 1989, against 2 basically rival groups, the UPA and the HSM (combined fighting force of an est. 1500), resulted in heavy losses on both sides (est over 600) and the capture of 1000 prisoners by the Govt Guerrilla use of facilities in Zaire and Kenya continued to create tension in these border areas.

Central and South America

Colombia	1949/1978	Colombian Govt	111000	1980-89: >7 500	<2000ʸ	+ +
		vs. FARC	5000			
	1965/1978	vs. ELN	2000			
	1968/1977	vs.EPL	800			
	...	vs. Quintin Lame	...			

Comments: Since the 1970s, bombings, kidnappings and armed attacks have been staged by a number of revolutionary groups. A peace accord in May 1984 between the Govt and 6 main groups gradually deteriorated, and in Oct. 1987, 5 groups, unified under the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Co-ordinating Committee, offered to renew talks with the Govt. Having released the kidnapped leader of the Conservative Party in July 1988, the M-19 (April 19 Movement), the then most heavily armed group, demanded a national dialogue. M-19 declared a unilateral cease-fire after the Govt announced a peace plan in Sep. 1988. Several rounds of talks in 1989 resulted in an agreement on a 6-month transition period during which M-19 is expected to lay down weapons and enter civil political life. No military activities were recorded between Govt and M-19 in 1989. The most active group during 1989 was the ELN (National Liberation Army), with repeated attacks on oil pipelines as well as on police stations and army groups. Another group, the EPL (Popular Liberation Army) ceased indirect contacts with the Govt, while the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the indigenist movement Quintin Lame, despite armed clashes with the Govt during 1989, made preparations for talks with the Govt.

El Salvador	1976/1979	Salvadorean Govt	57 000ʸ	1979-89:	4 750 (mil.)	+ +
		Vs.FMLN	7000ᶻ	>23250(mil.)		
				40 000-47 000 (civ.)		

Comments: FMLN (Farabundo Marti From for National Liberation) is a coalition of 5 armed opposition groups (People's Revolutionary Army, ERP; Popular Liberation Forces, FPL; Armed Forces of National Resistance, FARN; Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers, PRTC; Armed Forces of Liberation, FAL) fighting rightist Salvadorean Govt forces, supported by the USA. The FMLN controls significant portions of the countryside. In the wake of the Esquipulas II Accord some exiled members of the political opposition have returned,

creating the Democratic Alliance ('Convergencia'). The right-wing Arena Party's strengthened parliamentary position in Mar. 1988 elections was reinforced by the victory of the party's candidate, Alfredo Cristiani, in the Mar. 1989 presidential elections. On 23 Jan. 1989 the FMLN proposed a 5-month postponement of elections as a requirement for participation. Rejected by the then Christian Democrat President Duarte, the FMLN imposed a ban on highway traffic on election day. The FMLN and the Govt held talks on 13 Sep. in Mexico City. On 11 Nov. the FMLN until-then low-activity warfare changed to a major offensive in San Salvador. On 16 Nov., 6 Jesuit academics at Universidad Centroamericana, San Salvador, were murdered by an army-related group of soldiers, causing debate in the US Congress over military and economic support to the Salvadorean Govt. By the end of 1989 the FMLN offensive, the largest since 1981, gradually waned. In late Dec. President Cristiani removed the chief of the air force, following strong criticism of air force bombings of civilian areas in San Salvador during the FMLN offensive. Acc. to Govt figures, a total of 4750 army and FMLN soldiers were killed during 1989, of whom over 2300 died in the Nov. offensive.

Guatemala	1967/1968	Guatemalan Govt vs. URNG	40000*	1967-89: >2 500 (mil.)	>100
	1989/1989	vs. Military opposition	1500-2000	43 000 (civ.)	—
			..		

Comments: Armed opposition fighting right-wing military Govts dates back to the 1960s. In 1982 the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) was formed to co-ordinate the forces of 4 groups (Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres, EGP; Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo, PGT; Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes, FAR; and Organizacion del Pueblo en Armas, ORPA). In 1982-83 a massive counter-insurgency campaign by Govt forces cut the strength of the armed opposition. The election in late 1985 of the Christian Democrat President Cerczo changed the political situation: political activity by democratic parties was allowed and a reduction of political violence took place, but it rose again in 1988 and throughout 1989. Under the Esquipulas II process the National Commission for Reconciliation, including a Govt representative, met with URNG representatives in Sep. 1988 who proposed a 90-day armistice. The proposal was rejected by a military spokesman. On 1 Mar. 1989 the National Dialogue—another part of the Esquipulas II—was opened, but without participation of the URNG. The Govt requires the URNG to lay down weapons before dialogue. Low-level military and guerrilla activities throughout 1989. The human rights situation deteriorated (from May 1988 after an attempted coup of right-wing military origin) throughout 1989, with approx. 2000 civilians deaths during 1989. A similar, unsuccessful coup attempt was staged on 9 May 1989.

| Nicaragua | 1981/1981 | Nicaraguan Govt vs. Contras | 73500[h, aa] | 1981-89: >30 000 (mil.) | 600-1300 |
| | | | 12000 | | -- |

Comments: The largely Honduras-based right-wing Contras (counter-revolutionaries) are trying to overthrow the Sandinista Govt that came into power in 1979. Founded in 1981, the US-supported Contras staged major offensives against Nicaraguan Govt troops in 1983 and 1984. Attacks continued throughout 1985 and 1986 but diminished in 1987. In Nov. 1987 Nicaraguan President Ortega proposed direct talks with the Contras, following the Esquipulas II Agreement of Aug. 1987. In Feb. 1989 the 5 Central American presidents met in. La

Paz, El Salvador, as part of the Esquipulas process, and agreed that the Contras be disbanded in 90 days. The agreement included international observation of Nicaraguan elections scheduled for 25 Feb. 1990 and the release of some 1600 Somoza National Guardsmen. 1645 were released in Mar. 1989. A summit meeting in Tela, Honduras, on 5-8 Aug. agreed to set up a joint Organization of American States-UN Support and Verification Commission for the disbanding of Contra forces, scheduled for 5 Dec., but not carried out by 31 Dec. Approx. 4000 Contra rebels are estimated to roam Nicaragua's countryside after stepped-up infiltration from Honduras since early Oct. Continued attacks throughout 1989. The Govt's unilateral cease-fire, beginning in Mar. 1988, was ended on 1 Nov., followed by minor clashes.

Panama-USA		Panama (Noriega) Govt	4 400[bb]	1989:542-1000[cc]
	1988/1988	vs. USA Govt	26000	...
	1989/1989	vs. Military faction	...	n.a.

Comments: Manuel Noriega has been the de facto leader of Panama since 1983. Relations between the US Govt and Panama deteriorated from the mid-1980s. During 1986 the USA accused Noriega of drug trafficking and money laundering and in Feb. 1988 Noriega was indicted by a US court. The following period saw increased economic, political and diplomatic efforts by the US Govt to make him step down, e.g. economic sanctions and dropped drug charges in exchange for leaving the country. Due to cancellation of election results in the May 1989 presidential elections and the suppression of opposition the US Govt acted by e.g. increasing its military presence in the canal zone and endorsing diplomatic efforts by the OAS. In Sep. the US Govt froze its diplomatic relations in response to the inauguration of F. Rodrigues as Panamanian President. An attempt at a military coup in Oct. (approx. 80 deaths) caused further deterioration in relations between the US Govt and Noriega due to passive US support for the coup attempt. In mid-Dec, the Panamanian Parliament stated that their inter-state relations resembled a state of war, caused by what they considered as US subversive actions. On 16 Dec. a US soldier dressed in civilian clothes was killed by Panamanian soldiers, and a US couple who witnessed the event were harassed, leading to heightened military alert on both sides. On 18 Dec. a police officer was shot and wounded by a US soldier. On 20 Dec. G. Endara (winner of May elections) was sworn in as President and given support by the USA as US troops invaded Panama in operation 'Just Cause', using both troops stationed there (13 000) and additional troops (11 000). Armed attacks where launched against Panama military HQ in Panama City and other targets. The US Govt announced four reasons for the operation, among them, to protect US lives and seize and arrest an indicted drug trafficker. On 21 Dec. US troops controlled key points in Panama City, while the Panamanian troops reportedly still controlled the countryside. On 23 Dec. reinforcements (2000) where sent from the USA. On 24 Dec. Noriega and some of his associates entered the Vatican residency in Panama City and applied for political asylum. Resistance from troops loyal to Noriega decreased successively during the weekend, and on 26 Dec. resistance had almost ceased. Meanwhile, US troops beleaguered the Vatican residency, trying to have Noriega extradited. The Vatican residency rejected this, claiming the absence of an extradition treaty. By 31 Dec. Noriega was still inside the Vatican residency. Estimates of the number of deaths vary considerably.

Peru				
1980/1981	Peruvian Govt	80000[h]	1981-89:	
	vs. Sendero Luminoso	4000-5000	3 000-5 000 (mil.)	`>2300
1984/1986	vs. MRTA	500	5 000-10 000 (civ.)	0
1988/1989	vs. Rodrigo Franco	...		

Comments: The Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) describes itself as 'Maoist', with the goal of putting workers and peasants in power. The increased guerrilla activity in Dec. 1988 (after a period of low-intensity conflict) continued in 1989. The death-toll rose (over 2300 killed in 1989 compared with just under 2000 for 1988), especially in the ranks of Sendero Luminoso and the urban guerrilla group MRTA (Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement). In 1989 sendero Luminoso further extended its territorial occupation. One-third of the country is now subject to the Govt emergency law. Some evidence of an alliance, Luminoso with coca producers of Upper Huallaga; crop protection in exchange for sophisticated long-range weapons. Sendero Luminoso organized in Nov. 'armed strike' against (local) elections, objective being to provoke a military take-over, but 'peace march' in Lima demonstrated support for the Govt. On 4 Feb. an MRTA leader was captured by Govt troops. The right-wing death-squad Rodrigo Franco killed a left-wing trade union leader in Feb.

a. 'Year formed' is the year in which the two warring parties last formed their conflicting policies or the year in which a new party, state or alliance involved in the conflict came into being. 'Year joined' is the year in which the armed fighting last began or the year(s) in which armed fighting recommenced after a period for which no armed combat was recorded. For conflicts with very sporadic armed combat over a long period, the 'year joined' may also refer to the beginning of a period of sustained and/or exceptionally heavy combat.

b. The figures for deaths refer to total battle-related deaths during the conflict. The figures exclude, as far as data allow, civilian deaths owing to famine and disease. 'Mil.' and 'civ.' refer to estimates, where available, of military and civilian deaths; where there is no such indication, the figure refers to total military and civilian battle-related deaths in the period or year given. Information about the conflicts which covers a calendar year is by necessity more tentative for the last months of the year. Experience has also shown that the reliability of figures is improved over time; they are therefore revised each year.

c. The 'change from 1988' is measured as the increase or decrease in battle-related deaths in 1989 compared with deaths in 1988. Although based on data that cannot be considered totally reliable, the symbols represent the following changes:

+ + increase in battle deaths of more than 100%

+ increase in battle deaths of less than 100%

0 stable rate of battle deaths (+ or - 10%)

- decrease in battle deaths of less than 50%

- - decrease in battle deaths of more than 50%.

d. The figure includes Securitate (20 000 men), the 'Directorate 5 for the Protection of Dignitaries' (1000-1500 men) and a special anti-terrorist force (1000 men). The Border Guards (17000) reportedly did not participate in Securitate's fight against the National Salvation Front, supported by the national armed forces. The exact figure for those engaged in actual combat unknown.

e. Includes total armed forces. The exact figure in actual combat is unknown. Some civilians joined the military in the fighting.

f. Romanian hospitals counted 750-800 dead. The Army's losses are given as 196. Victims in Timisoara were 90, according to official figures. Over 40 soldiers were reportedly executed after refusing to shoot at demonstrators in Timisoara. The number of killed Securitate men is unknown.

g. In addition, Iran has 250 000 Revolutionary Guard Corps.

h. If nothing else is indicated, the figure shows regular army troops (not total armed forces). Not all these troops are necessarily engaged in actual combat.

i. Including the 2000 NLA (Iranian National Liberation Army) deaths (1988) in the Iran-Iraq War.

j. Iran has 955 000 men in the Army, including perhaps 480000 recalled reserves.

k. A major part is connected with the reported use of chemical weapons in 1988.

l. Total armed forces. In addition, para-military forces reach 200 000 or more.

m. The figure is likely to include all deaths in connection with the war, that is, not only battle-related deaths.

n. This is a provisional figure, based primarily on total Sikh strength for 1988 but allowing for the loss of an unprecedented 700 deaths of separatists during 1989.

o. An estimated death figure for 1989 is >1000. Exact figures are not available.

p. Battle-related deaths during 1975-78: total: 43 000. Vietnamese losses, according to Viet Nam, 30 000. Khmer Rouge Govt losses 13 000: number of deaths due to the activities of Vietnamese agents numbered 10 000, and 3000 were killed in connection with the Kampuchean authorities' campaigns against alleged Vietnamese agents. These figures were given by the KR in July 1987. (To these figures can be added over 20 000 people who died from illness and food shortage.) No precise figures regarding KR casualties in the fighting against Viet Nam have been given. Other estimates put the number of deaths above the expected normal death rate for the 1975-78 period at 750 000-1 000 000. The present Cambodian Govt official figure for the same period is 3314768 deaths. Battle-related deaths during 1979-89: the only figure available is from official Vietnamese sources, indicating that 25 300 Vietnamese soldiers died in Cambodia. An estimated figure for the period 1979-89, based on various sources, is >50 000, and for 1989, >1000. Exact figures are not available.

q. Total Philippine Armed Forces are 112 000, of which the Army is 68 000. In addition there is a Constabulary of 38 000 and Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGU) of 45 000.

r. Total armed forces.

s. Including 28 000 'regulars' (1-2 years of service) and 37 000 'militia'.

t. Including an estimated 150000 People's Militia.

u. Prior to the agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia in Apr. 1988, this conflict was regarded as pan of the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict

v. Including Army (77 500) and National Service (58 500). In addition the South African police number 55 000.

w. Including killings connected with the struggle between UDF and Inkatha supporters.

x. The National Resistance Army (NRA), the total armed forces of the Ugandan (NRM) Govt, numbers 70 000. NRA incorporates surrendered Uganda People's Democratic Army (UDPA and Uganda National Liberation Army (the former armies of Obote and Okello).

y. Politically related killings (i.e., excluding killings resulting from fighting between Govt and cocaine cartels).

z. One source reports that independent estimates suggest some 15 000 in the Nov. offensive.

aa. Including 41 500 active and 32 000 recalled reserves and militia.

bb. Includes total armed forces. The exact figure for those engaged in actual combat is unknown.

cc. Death figures vary considerably. According to official US figures, 542 persons were killed. Panorama Catolica (published by the Catholic Church of Panama) reports 655 deaths, based on figures from Panamanian hospitals and mortuaries. According to the Methodist Church of Panama, 1000 persons were killed. 204 persons are reported missing, according to the Panamanian Red Cross. There are also reports of mass graves. Furthermore, other independent sources give figures, partly based on an inventory of damage, of between 3000 and 5000 killed.

Sources: For additional information on these conflicts, see chapters in previous editions of the SIPRI Yearbooks—Lindgren, K., Wilson, G. K. and Wallensteen, P., 'Major armed conflicts in 1988', SIPRI, SIPRI "Yearbook 1989: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1989), chapter 9; Wilson, G. K. and Wallensteen, P., 'Major armed conflicts in 1987', SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 1988: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1988), chapter 9; and Goose, S., 'Armed conflicts in 1986, and the Iraq-Iran War', SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 1987: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1987), chapter 8.

The following other reference books were used: Brogan, P., World Conflicts (Bloomsbury: London, 1989); Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook (Copley: Washington, DC, 1976); Gantzel, K.-J. and Meyer-Stamer, J. (eds), Die Kriege nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg bis 1984 (Weltforum: Munich, 1986); International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1989-1990 (Brassey's: London, 1989); Janke, P., Guerrilla and Terrorist Organisations: A World Directory and Bibliography (Harvester Press: Hemel

Hempstead, 1983); Jongman, B., War, Armed Conflict and Political Violence (Polemological Institute, National University: Groningen, the Netherlands, 1982); Kaye, G. D., Grant, D. A. and Emond, E. J., Major Armed Conflict, A Compendium of Interstate and Intrastate Conflict 1720 to 1985, report R95 (Operational Research and Analysis Establishment [ORAE], Canadian Department of National Defence: Ottawa, 1985); Keesing's, Political Dissent (Longman: Harlow, Essex, 1983); Laffin, J., The World in Conflict 1989 (Brassey's: London, 1989); Minority Rights Group, World Directory of Minorities (Longman: Harlow, Essex, 1989); Sivard, R., World Military and Social Expenditures (World Priorities Inc.: Washington, DC, annual); The Statesman's Yearbook (Macmillan: London, annual); Small, M. and Singer, J. D.,Resort to Arms, International and Civil Wars 1816-1980 (Sage: Beverly Hills, Calif., 1982); Wallensteen, P. (ed.) States in Armed Conflict 1988 (Department of Peace and Conflict Research: Uppsala, Sweden, 1989); research reports on particular conflicts; the SIPRI Arms Trade Project data base; and information available at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, in the continuing research project on armed conflicts.

The following journals, newspapers and news agencies were consulted: Africa Confidential (London); African Defense (Paris); Armed Forces (London); Amnesty Press (Stockholm); Asian Defence Journal (Kuala Lumpur; Boston Globe (Boston, Mass.); BBC World Service News (London); Christian Science Monitor (Boston, Mass.); Dagens Nyheter (Stockholm); Defense and Foreign Affairs (Alexandria, Va.); The Economist (London); Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong); Financial Times (London and Frankfurt); The Guardian (London); Jane's Defence Weekly (Coulsdon, Surrey); IDSA Journal (New Delhi); Indian Express (New Delhi); The Independent(London); International Herald Tribune (Paris); Keesing's Contemporary Archives (Harlow, Essex); Latin America Weekly Report (London); Mexico and Central America Report (London); The Middle East (London); Nyheter fran Latinamerika (Stockholm); New Statesman & Society (London); Newsweek (New York); New York Times (New York); The Times (London); Der Spiegel (Hamburg); Svenska Dagbladet(Stockholm); Time (New York); Upsala Nya Tidning (Uppsala;) US News & World Report (Washington, DC); World Reporter (Datasolve: London); Washington Post (Washington, DC); Washington Times (Washington, DC); World Reporter (Datasolve: London).

The "efficiency" of cruise missiles has been proved. This once again underlines the need for the strictest limitation or, better still, the prohibition of such dangerous and provocative weapons (which could be armed with nuclear warheads). If before the events in the Persian Gulf some could still dismiss the role of naval armaments in land military operations, no doubt should remain in anyone's mind, after the battle testing of sea-based cruise missiles, carrier aircraft and even naval artillery against land targets, that their role is by no means that of least importance.

The world has witnessed a situation in the Persian Gulf area in which both sides were prepared for the use of weapons of mass destruction, and in consequence the likelihood of a world catastrophe is no longer so remote. All this is evidence that there is no reason for complacency as yet. The problem of the elimination of the threat of war remains as acute as ever and its solution just as urgent.

Only awareness of this danger and the political will of States to eliminate it and to eliminate the physical capacity to "blow up the world" can bring about a stable and secure world.

3

Preventing Conflicts

"There is near-universal agreement that prevention is preferable to cure, and that strategies of prevention must address the root causes of conflicts, not simply their violent symptoms."

—Secretary-General Kofi Annan in the Millennium Report

An ounce of prevention...

You usually would not think that controlling the trade in diamonds would help prevent armed conflict. Diamonds, are generally thought of as things of great beauty. For many people, they are symbols of love and devotion. We do not usually ask where they come from or who mined them. And we usually do not associate them with civil wars. Unfortunately, some diamonds—the so-called "bloody diamonds"—are mined illegally and used to buy small arms.

In Sierra Leone, a brutal struggle has taken thousands of lives. In breach of the peace agreement, rebels are continuing that struggle. These groups control the diamond mining areas of the country, and they use their illegal profits to finance their war. On 5 July 2000, in an effort to control this illicit traffic, the Security Council banned the import of unlicensed diamonds from Sierra Leone.

The ban is part of the Security Council's growing determination to prevent the illicit use of natural resources to fuel armed conflict. The diamond industry has also begun to play its part to ensure that the trade in "bloody diamonds" stops. The International Diamonds Manufacturers Association and the World Federation of Diamond Bourses have recently announced a system of certificates intended to prove the origin of diamonds.

... is worth a pound of cure

Conflict occurs normally and continually in human society. It is not always violent, and it may not even be a problem. It is one means through which we express our diversity or bring about change. When conflict in society is properly managed and transformed, it may even help produce growth. On the other hand, when opposing groups do not have the skills to keep the conflict in check, and where other factors such as injustice, inequality or unfilled aspirations are present, conflict can become violent and protracted.

Armed conflict can have terrible consequences. Some of us bear these consequences directly. We lose a family member or we must flee our home. We go through life with a mutilated arm or leg. Others among us witness the suffering of friends or acquaintances who bear these losses. Still others learn about these tragedies in the newspapers or from television.

Vitals Statistics

- The year 2000 marks 55 years without a conflict betwen the world's major Powers, the longest such period in the history of the modern system of States.

- The year 2000 also marks the end of a decade in which civil wars, ethnic cleansing and actions of genocide—fuelled by weapons widely available in the global arms bazaar—claimed more than 5 million lives, many or most of them civilians.

- Almost one-third of all countries in the world have experienced violent conflict in the past 10 years.

- In the 1990s, deadly conflict cost the international community an estimated $200 billion, not including the untold cost to the countries concerned, where economic development has been set back by decades.

- More than 40 eminent diplomats and senior United Nations officials are currently assigned by the Secretary-General as special representatives, special envoys or advisers to head peacekeeping or peace-building missions or to track evolving situations, provide good offices and act as mediators.

Statistics tell us a grim story. During the last century, wars between nations took the lives of some 100 million people, and political violence took 170 million more lives. Today, the number of inter-State armed conflicts seems to be on the wane. The main killers today are wars within nations—brought about by insurrection, ethnic cleansing and

greed. Five million people have died in armed struggles within national borders in the last 10 years. Many of these victims, in some cases as many as 90 per cent, were civilians. Today's wars have produced some 20 million refugees and another 24 million displaced persons.

These conflicts destroy the lives of their victims and the quality of life for the survivors. Their legacy is widespread social breakdown and lawlessness. They set back economic development by decades. And who can calculate the cost to society of the loss of doctors, teachers and other professionals when schools and infrastructure are destroyed? How does one measure the impact on a nation of a lost generation of its children?

Addressing the Root Causes

Natural disasters can be explained scientifically, but it is far more difficult to understand the causes of war. Social behaviour is not subject to physical laws in the same way as cyclones or earthquakes. People make their own history, sometimes violently and sometimes inexplicably. The forces at work can be very complex. And yet, if we are to be successful at preventing deadly conflicts, we must have a clearer understanding of what brings them about.

We are able to identify some conditions that increase the probability of war.

- **Poverty.** In recent years, for example, poor countries have been far more likely to engage in armed conflicts than rich ones. Poor countries have fewer economic and political resources with which to manage conflicts. Poverty itself, however, does not appear to be the decisive factor, and most poor countries live in peace most of the time.

- **Inequality.** Countries afflicted by war often suffer from inequality among domestic social groups. This inequality may be based on ethnicity, religion, national identity or economic and social class. Its effect is to block equal access to political power and close the road to peaceful change. Sometimes, violent conflict breaks out as the result of the deliberate mobilisation of grievances. "Identity politics"—the promotion of ethnic, religious or nationalist myths and dehumanising ideologies—provides political demagogues with easy targets of opportunity to mobilise support for chauvinist causes. This is particularly so since fewer than 20 per cent of all States are ethnically homogeneous.

- **Economic decline.** By their very nature, the politics of a shrinking economy are more conflict-prone than those of economic

growth. Furthermore, when economic reforms and structural adjustment are not accompanied with compensating social policies, stability can be undermined. In addition, a weak Government has little capacity to stop the eruption and spread of violence.

- **Greed.** Although war is costly for society as a whole, it nevertheless may be profitable for some. In these cases, the fight is over the control of natural resources, such as diamonds, timber or other commodities. Drugs are often involved as well. These conflicts are often kept alive by opportunistic individuals or interests in neighbouring States. International business interests might also be involved in buying the ill-gotten gains, helping to launder funds and feeding a steady flow of weapons into the conflict zone.

Prevention is Good, But...

Many organisations and individuals are working to prevent the outbreak of armed conflict, or to prevent it from spreading once it does breakout, or to ensure that it does not break out again. The United Nations was itself founded for the purpose of "saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war".

This general acknowledgement that prevention is good, however, does not necessarily translate into practical support for preventive measures. States do not always agree on how much "outside interference" they will allow in their internal struggles or if their national interests are served by preventing a conflict in another part of the world. Furthermore, it is easier to react when something happens than to act in order for something not to happen. For this reason, political leaders might find it hard to convince the public at home that prevention policies abroad are worth the investment. These policies might carry heavy costs, and the benefit—a tragic event that does not occur—is a vague concept when weighed against those costs. For this reason, Secretary-General Kofi Annan has noted that "prevention is first and foremost a challenge of political leadership".

Useful Tools

"For the United Nations, there is no goal more overriding, no commitment more compelling, no aspiration more profound than the prevention of armed conflict. Ensuring human security, in the broadest sense, is the United Nations cardinal mission. The means to achieve that mission lie in genuine and lasting prevention. Democratisation, the establishment of the rule of law, and respect for human rights are crucial ingredients."

—Secretary-General Kofi Annan

The Charter of the United Nations made the prevention as well as the removal of threats against international peace and security one of the priorities of the United Nations and a common responsibility of the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Secretary-General, the International Court of Justice and even the Economic and Social Council. The Security Council, in fact, has recently held a series of meetings specifically devoted to conflict prevention and has reaffirmed its role in taking appropriate steps aimed at the prevention of armed conflicts.

Among the tools available to these bodies are negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement. In terms of preventive action, the United Nations may use:

Preventive Diplomacy

We generally do not hear much about preventive diplomacy while it is in progress. Very often it is a confidential, behind-the-scenes series of high-level contacts. It might also take the form of mediation or negotiation, and it is most successful when it is applied early. At the end of the day, it is sometimes hard for observers to know if preventive diplomacy actually averted the deterioration of a situation or if the situation simply resolved itself. On the other hand, it is easy to see when preventive diplomacy fails.

The Security Council has primary responsibility for preventive diplomacy. The Council can undertake fact-finding and observation, it can impose sanctions or it can dispatch a peacekeeping mission. The Secretary-General also engages in preventive diplomacy, often directly through his "good offices" and sometimes through special representatives or special envoys. These skilled and trusted individuals act as heads of peacekeeping or peace-building missions; they represent the Secretary-General in protracted negotiating processes; they undertake special missions or help track developing situations.

Private individuals and civil society organisations can also play a role in conflict prevention, management and resolution through what is called "citizen diplomacy". In the Middle East peace process, for example, it was a small Norwegian research institute that played the critical initial role in paving the way for the 1993 Oslo Agreement.

Preventive Deployment

Preventive deployment is intended to provide a "thin blue line" to help build confidence in areas of tension or between highly polarised communities. So far, there has been only one instance of preventive

deployment. In 1992, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia requested the deployment of United Nations military observers to prevent the possible spillover onto its territory of a regional war. In doing so, the country showed that it was more concerned with peace and stability than with the possible perception of foreign interference. (See case studies, below.)

Preventive Disarmament

Preventive disarmament seeks to reduce the number of small arms and light weapons in conflict-prone regions. In Eastern Slavonia, for example, the UN peacekeeping mission undertook a "buy-back" programme among civilians. In Albania, a United Nations Development Programme initiative called "Arms for Development" provided support for community development projects in exchange for small arms and ammunition. In El Salvador, Mozambique and elsewhere the United Nations has helped demobilise combat forces and collect and destroy their weapons as part of the implementation of an overall peace agreement. Other UN efforts are being directed towards slowing small arms and light weapons trafficking, the only weapons used in most of today's armed conflicts. While these weapons do not cause war, they provide the means to wage war.

Preventive Peace-Building

Once the fighting stops, action is necessary to prevent it from starting again. In recent years, the United Nations has adopted a more comprehensive approach in creating conditions necessary for a sustainable peace. This process might include traditional peacekeeping, electoral assistance or setting up a peace-building support office to help establish good governance or rebuild respect for human rights and the rule of law. It may involve not only the United Nations but also a number of UN agencies and other participants.

In Guinea-Bissau, for example, the United Nations Peace-building Support Office is working to coordinate an integrated response to the challenges of peace-building. (See case studies, below.) In Liberia, the United Nations is supporting national reconciliation. In Guatemala, it is carrying out a range of post-conflict peace-building activities in addition to verifying the peace agreements, providing good offices and undertaking advisory and public information activities. In Cambodia, the United Nations is helping the Government in its nation-building efforts, including the strengthening of democratic institutions and assistance in the promotion and protection of human rights.

Other strategies include preventive humanitarian action and preventive development activities.

Can Sanctions be Smart?

"...allow me to suggest that it is not enough merely to make sanctions 'smarter'. The challenge is to achieve consensus about the precise and specific aims of the sanctions, adjust the instruments accordingly and then provide the necessary means. This requires, on the part of the Security Council and Member States, a willingness to tackle not only technical operational questions, but also the broader political questions of how best we ensure the fullest and broadest compliance with the will of the international community on the part of recalcitrant States."

—Secretary-General Kofi Annan

Sanctions offer the Security Council an important instrument to enforce its decisions. They show that the Council means business without using armed force. Sanctions might include a ban on arms sales or trade and financial restrictions. They might involve cutting off air travel or closing overseas missions. In general, the Council imposes sanctions to try to change the behaviour of a Government or regime which that a threat to international peace and security. In a conflict situation, the sanctions are designed to shorten the fight by blocking access to weapons or fuel. In the same way, sanctions can be effective tools to prevent armed conflict or to limit its spread.

While sanctions are supposed to bring about a good result, they can and do hurt large numbers of people who are not their primary targets. In the case of Iraq, for example, a sanctions regime which enjoyed considerable success in its disarmament mission has also been accused of worsening the humanitarian crisis. In other instances, those in power transfer the cost of the sanctions to the less privileged, and actually benefit from the sanctions by controlling distribution of limited resources and profiting from black-market activity. The existence of sanctions might transform a society for the worse, as sanctions evaders, smugglers and the like rise to the top of the economic ladder. In this way, innocent civilians might become victims not only of their own Government but of the actions of the international community as well.

Sanctions might also prove to be ineffective or difficult to enforce, inviting widespread evasion. Or they might not be sufficiently targeted. In the case of the Bosnian war, the arms embargo was seen by many States as favouring the aggressor and effectively denying a Member State its Charter right to self-defence. In some cases, the losses to neighbouring countries, which must bear significant losses due to their compliance, are not compensated.

Case Studies

Preventive Diplomacy and Peacekeeping: Tajikistan

In 1992, Tajikistan faced an acute social and economic crisis following the break-up of the Soviet Union. Its stability was further upset by clan, regional and political tensions, and by differences between secularists and pro-Islamic traditionalists. In May 1992, the Tajik opposition seized power de facto, but, defeated by government forces eight months later, fled to Afghanistan and continued a sporadic armed insurgency from across the border. By mid-1993, an estimated 50,000 people, mostly civilians, had been killed, some 600,000 had been displaced internally, and many thousands of others had fled to other countries.

In September 1992, the President of Uzbekistan invited the UN Secretary-General to dispatch a fact-finding mission to the area. This mission was followed in succession first by a "good offices" mission and then by a small group of political, military and humanitarian officers. In April 1993, the group warned of a possible escalation of the conflict. Acting urgently, the Secretary-General appointed, on 26 April, a Special Envoy for Tajikistan to help obtain agreement on a ceasefire and, among other things, make good offices available to help set up a process of negotiation.

These efforts began to bear fruit with the holding of a series of inter-Tajik talks and the signing, in September 1994, of a temporary ceasefire, the establishment of a monitoring mechanism and a request for UN military observers. The Secretary-General attached a small number of observers to the UN group pending a decision by the Security Council to establish an observer mission. That decision came in December 1994, when the Security Council set up the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT). UNMOT assisted Tajikistan until 15 May 2000.

Reflecting on these efforts and the overall positive outcome of the peace process, the Secretary-General noted the early engagement of the United Nations, sustained political support of the Security Council and regional States, cooperation with other organisations, effective crisis management and, above all, the clear will of the Tajik people to end the war and pursue a political solution.

Preventive Action: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

In mid-1991, the break-up of Yugoslavia resulted in armed conflict between, among and within its various parts. Although the fighting

had not spread to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the President of that republic requested the presence of UN observers. Their mandate would be essentially preventive, that is, they would monitor and report any developments that could undermine the stability of the republic and threaten its territory. Accordingly, UN troops, observers and civilian police monitors were deployed along the border areas and were successful in reducing tensions, facilitating the management of border areas and defusing border incidents.

By 1994, it was recognised that likely sources of instability included internal factors. The political situation in the country was extremely complex, in part because of the country's ethnic mix. Tensions were high between the Government and elements among the ethnic Albanian population, who were demanding improvements in their political, economic, social, cultural and educational status. There were also tensions between the Government and nationalist elements among the ethnic Macedonian majority. In addition, the economy was in decline and unemployment was high.

Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention

"We confront a real dilemma. Few would disagree that both the defence of humanity and the defence of sovereignty are principles that must be supported. Alas, that does not tell us which principle should prevail when they are in conflict."

—From the Millennium Report

In September 1999, the Secretary-General invited Member States to take a fresh look at what means, including intervention, the United Nations uses to respond to political, human rights and humanitarian crises. "From Sierra Leone to the Sudan," the Secretary-General said, "to Angola to the Balkans to Cambodia and to Afghanistan, there are a great number of peoples who need more than just words of sympathy from the international community. They need a real and sustained commitment to help end their cycles of violence ..."

The Secretary-General suggested that the concept of intervention should be defined broadly. It should include a range of actions, from those that are mostly symbolic to those designed to force the desired result. It should also go hand-in-hand with the commitment to apply the criteria for intervention fairly and consistently, irrespective of region or nation.

In some crises, no action is taken because States do not want any outside interference, or because it is not in their national interest to

act. The Secretary-General suggested that, in a new century, a new concept of national interest might "induce States to find far greater unity in the pursuit of such basic Charter values as democracy, pluralism, human rights, and the rule of law". We are all human, and in the defence of common humanity, UN Member States should be able to find common ground in upholding the principles of the Charter.

The unresolved debate on intervention is directly related to the unresolved question of how and when to act to prevent armed conflict. All States support conflict prevention in principle, but in practice such support is often qualified by restrictions, sometimes for financial reasons, sometimes for reasons related to preserving sovereignty. Some States express support for a proactive, prevention-oriented Security Council. They note that resistance to intervention might itself result in reduced sovereignty in the event armed conflict breaks out. Other States emphasise that any action by the Council to institute a "culture of prevention" must be examined carefully. In their view, intervention must not infringe on the territorial integrity of States. In the case of internal conflict, States may not wish to "internationalize" the situation or to accept that there are other solutions to the conflict in addition to the military option.

CASE STUDIES

Preventive Diplomacy and Peacekeeping: Tajikistan

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In this context, the Security Council encouraged the Secretary-General's Special Representative to use his good offices to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability. Accordingly, the UN mission began monitoring developments in the country, including possible areas of conflict, with a view to promoting reconciliation among the various groups. The mission also offered *ad hoc* community services and humanitarian assistance. The Security Council eventually expanded the mission's tasks to include monitoring and reporting on illicit arms flows and other prohibited activities.

At its height, the mission comprised some 1,050 troops, 35 observers, 26 police monitors and other civilians from 50 countries. In February 1999, the mandate of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) came to an end when the permanent members of the Security Council were unable to come to a unanimous decision to maintain the mission.

UNPREDEP was a comprehensive model of preventive action. In addition to the duties described above, UNPREDEP was also involved in a wide range of programmes related to good governance and the rule of law, strengthening of national capacity and infrastructure, institution-building and human resources development in the governmental and civil sectors. The mission worked with many groups in the society to encourage them to contribute to the country's development and to serve as agents of conflict prevention and promoters of democracy and human rights. It helped to obtain international expertise through long-term programmes and activities aimed at enhancing social peace and stability. It also worked in close cooperation with a number of international organisations.

Preventive Disarmament: Albania

In Albania, over half a million weapons, mainly semi-automatic guns, and several million hand grenades and landmines were in circulation among the civilian population. In 1999, the United Nations launched its Weapons Exchange for Development campaign. Within a few months, more than 5,770 weapons and more than 100 tones of ammunition were collected in Gramsh district alone. In return, some 100 villages in the district were connected by telephone, giving the villagers access to assistance from the police and the health-care system. Street lights have also been provided for the town of Gramsh as a result.

Peace-Building: Guinea-Bissau

On 7 June 1998, fighting broke out between forces loyal to the President and those loyal to the former Army Chief of Staff. The President had dismissed the Army Chief over allegations relating to the smuggling of arms to separatist rebels in a neighbouring country. Over the next few months, the two sides negotiated a series of agreements aimed at resolving the conflict. The UN Security Council welcomed the agreements and requested the Secretary-General to look into ways the United Nations could assist Guinea-Bissau in the process of national reconciliation.

By April 1999, the Secretary-General had appointed a Representative to head a Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau. The office became operational a short time thereafter and comprised political affairs and human rights officers, an electoral officer and a military adviser. One of its first tasks was to work towards creating conditions appropriate for holding orderly and peaceful legislative and presidential elections.

From the time it was set up until the present, the Secretary-General has fine-tuned the mandate of the office as events have altered the pace and the nature of the peace process. With the approval of the Security Council, the office will stay in Guinea-Bissau well into the year 2001. Its current duties are as follows:

- To support national efforts to consolidate and maintain peace, democracy and the rule of law, including the strengthening of democratic institutions;
- To support national efforts, including those of civil society, towards reconciliation, tolerance and peaceful management of difference;
- To encourage initiatives aimed at building confidence and maintaining friendly relations between Guinea-Bissau and its neighbours and its international partners;
- To seek the commitment of the Government and other parties to adopt a programme of voluntary arms collection, disposal and destruction;
- To provide the political framework and leadership for harmonising and integrating the activities of the UN system in the country;
- In close cooperation with the UN system, including the Bretton Woods institutions, to facilitate the mobilisation of international

political support and resources for the rehabilitation, reconstruction and development priorities of Guinea-Bissau.

SUGGESTED ACTIVITIES FOR STUDENTS

1. Choose an area in which, deadly conflict brokeout during the 1990s: Haiti, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, Liberia, Sudan, Iraq, Bosnia. Research to find out: Who was involved in the conflict? What issues fuelled the fighting? Under which category/-ies of root causes would you place them? What efforts have been made to end the fighting, or to negotiate a settlement? Who has been involved in these efforts? What factors are impeding/supporting progress towards a resolution?

2. Research the sanction process. You might wish to begin with an examination of sanctions used in the case of South Africa. For how long were these sanctions in effect? What kind of sanctions were imposed? Who cooperated with them? What was the result of the sanctions? In how many other situations have sanctions been used? By whom? Why? What has been the effect? Has the compliance with the sanctions had negative effects on parties not directly involved with the conflict? What was the result?

3. Has your country been involved in a conflict or in intervening in a conflict in another country? What are/were the issues defining that conflict? What actions were taken by your country? Who initiated the intervention? What was public opinion like surrounding that issue? Who were proponents/opponents of the intervention? What arguments were used by each side? Share the results of the study with the class and poll class feeling regarding intervention. What is the current status?

4. Select a conflict under current negotiation in the Security Council. Having different class members assuming the role of the Security Council members, research and present a simulation of a Security Council meeting in the classroom. UN Member missions are very helpful in supplying their views for such simulations. They may be accessed from the UN website: www.un.org. Look for Member States, then home pages of permanent missions to the United Nations.

5. Consider the following objectives of a foreign policy for a nation or for a group pursuing foreign policy interests: socio-psychological factors (desire for power or restoration of national pride); securing needed raw materials; securing markets; spreading an ideology; protecting national security from external threat; satisfying the need of additional land for overpopulation; advancing ethnocentrism; obtaining internal cohesion; pursuing self-determination; and supporting humanitarian efforts. Working in small groups, rank the three most important objectives. Share your findings with the class. Choose one of the selected areas in Activity 1 above. Rank those objectives you feel are operating in that particular conflict. Compare your findings. Consider the actions of your country with regard to that conflict. What appear to be the operating objectives? Do you agree or disagree?

6. Consider the tools of foreign policy available to a nation regarding its actions towards another nation: propaganda; diplomacy; trade relations; foreign aid; forming/maintaining alliances; efforts through an international organisation like the United Nations; boycotts, sanctions and other inducements; use of military force (list from *Educational Resources for Preventing Deadly Conflict* by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflicts). Find examples for the use of each tool. Use examples from your own country's experiences whenever possible. Which tools do you feel were particularly effective? Why? How do these tools compare with those available to the United Nations as listed in this paper? How would you like your tax money to be directed when it comes to foreign policy actions of your Government? Why?

7. Consider a current area of deadly conflict. What emotional reaction do you have to this situation? How might you feel if you were a person directly involved? Consider the viewpoint of each person directly affected. How might this situation influence you, your family, your friends, your community, your country and the world? Do you have a responsibility to do anything about this situation? Why? Why not? Who does? What would happen if everyone felt the way you do? If you wanted to do something, what are some actions you might take? How would those actions address the needs? What are some possible unanticipated results of each action? Which options seem most promising? Why? What steps must you take to implement your option? Take them!

8. The following efforts can help resolve root causes of violence. As a class project, research to find local efforts being made and write letters of commendation to those individuals or groups making them. Invite them to class and learn ways to support efforts to:

    •   Control, reduce and eventually eliminate weapons of mass destruction: nuclear, chemical and biological;

    •   Control the trade in conventional weapons;

    •   Promote the establishment of stable, democratic Governments;

    •   Encourage the rule of law and an honest, effective judiciary;

    •   Promote tolerance and peaceful coexistence of minorities;

    •   Assist in economic development;

    •   Manage resources and technologies to advance the development of a large middle class;

    •   Promote the development of conflict resolution strategies;

    •   Work to improve health standards and practices;

    •   Improve literacy,

(List from *Educational Resources for Preventing Deadly Conflict* by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflicts)

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4

Preventing, Controlling and Resolving Conflict

A. IMPLEMENTING "AN AGENDA FOR PEACE"

During its fiftieth session, the General Assembly continued to accord high priority to its deliberations on the recommendations contained in "An Agenda for Peace" (A/47/277-S/24 111) and, in particular, the "Supplement to 'An Agenda for Peace'" (A/50/60-S/1995/1). The Assembly's Informal Open-ended Working Group on an Agenda for Peace has continued its deliberations on the four key areas it had identified: preventive diplomacy and peacemaking; post-conflict peace-building; coordination; and the question of United Nations-imposed sanctions. To assist the efforts of the Working Group and its four subgroups, my senior staff have provided briefings on several occasions. The Working Group had held more than 82 meetings by the end of July 1996 and was expected to submit draft resolutions to the General Assembly by the end of its fiftieth session.

The active consideration by the Assembly of "An Agenda for Peace" and its "Supplement" was further testimony to the belief that the prevention of conflicts through early warning, quiet diplomacy and, in some cases, preventive deployment, is better than undertaking major politico-military efforts to resolve conflicts after they have broken out. If the United Nations is to play a timely and constructive role in averting or mitigating the destructive effects of complex crises, the various elements of the Organisation must have an early, common understanding of the nature of the problem and the options for preventive action. Therefore, and as I pointed out in the "Supplement",

it is crucial that the relevant departments in the Secretariat function as an integrated whole under the authority and control of the Secretary-General.

During the reporting period, the three departments of the Secretariat primarily concerned with the prevention, control and resolution of conflicts—the Departments of Political Affairs, Humanitarian Affairs and Peace-keeping Operations—have continued to maintain close coordination in carrying out their respective activities through the Framework for Coordination. As noted in my last report, this mechanism is a flow-chart of actions that range from routine monitoring and early analysis of developments worldwide to formulation of options for preventive action, fact-finding, planning and implementation of field operations, and conduct of evaluations or lessons-learned exercises. The forthcoming availability to the Departments of Political Affairs and Peace-keeping Operations of the Humanitarian Early Warning System database developed and maintained by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs will greatly facilitate this task.

To improve further, the Framework for Coordination, and in order to ensure that the actions described above are not left to chance or to individual initiative, a standing Oversight Group of senior officers was created in December 1995. This Group, which meets weekly, reviews potential and/or ongoing crisis situations on the basis of information provided by designated officers and determines whether a given situation warrants the interdepartmental consultations foreseen in the framework; if so, the Group ensures that such consultations are initiated promptly. The Oversight Group does not itself conduct early warning analysis or formulate policy options. Its primary objective is simply to ensure the timely commencement of consultations within the Framework.

Work has also begun on how to improve coordination at the country level, in pre-mission planning and in end-of-mission assessments and lessons-learned exercises.

To ensure continuous consultation between the Secretary-General and the Security Council and to assist the latter in staying abreast of the latest developments, particularly in the area of peace-keeping operations, one of my Special Advisers, Chinmaya Gharekhan, continues to serve as my personal representative to the Council. Troop-contributing Governments are also understandably anxious to be kept fully informed, and I continue to provide those Governments with

regular briefings and to engage in dialogue with them about the conduct of the operation in question. Members of the Security Council have been included in such meetings, which the Council has decided to formalize. This reform should not, however, lead to any blurring of the three distinct areas of authority: the overall political direction given by the Security Council; executive direction and command for which the Secretary-General is responsible; and command in the field, which I entrust to the chief of mission.

I have consistently encouraged closer cooperation and coordination between the United Nations and regional organisations, in particular with regard to preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. This type of cooperation has been welcomed by both the General Assembly and the Security Council. To explore and exploit the full potential of such cooperation, I convened at Headquarters on 1 August 1994, the first-ever high-level meeting between the United Nations and regional organisations and arrangements with which it had practical experience of cooperation in peacemaking and peace-keeping in the field. I convened a second such meeting on 15 and 16 February 1996, bringing together 13 regional organisations for fruitful discussions on new, practical and effective ways of working together.

B. PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AND PEACEMAKING

The primary responsibility for preventive action and peacemaking rests with the Department of Political Affairs, headed by Marrack Goulding.

Member States continue to attach importance to preventive diplomacy and peacemaking as the most cost-effective ways of preventing disputes from arising, stopping existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and controlling and resolving existing conflicts. I continue to receive mandates from the General Assembly and the Security Council to maintain existing efforts, and to undertake new ones, in this field. My special representatives, special envoys and other emissaries are actively engaged, on a resident or visiting basis, in helping me to implement these political mandates in Afghanistan, Burundi, Cambodia, Cyprus, East Timor, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, Haiti, Liberia, Myanmar, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tajikistan and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and soon, it is hoped, in Rwanda.

Preventive diplomacy is particularly favoured by Member States as a means of preventing human suffering and as an alternative to

costly politico-military operations to resolve conflicts after they have broken out. I have come to the conclusion, however, that the activity we call "preventive diplomacy" should be renamed "preventive action". Diplomacy is certainly a well-tried means of preventing conflict. The United Nations experience in recent years has shown, however, that there are several other forms of action that can have a useful preventive effect: preventive deployment; preventive disarmament; preventive humanitarian action; and preventive peace-building, which can involve, with the consent of the Government or Governments concerned, a wide range of actions in the fields of good governance, human rights and economic and social development.

"Peacemaking" is also a term that requires definition. As employed by the United Nations, it refers to the use of diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and to negotiate a peaceful settlement of their dispute. As with preventive action, the United Nations can play a role only if the parties to the dispute agree that it should do so peacemaking thus excludes the use of force against one of the parties to enforce an end to hostilities, an activity that in United Nations parlance is referred to as "peace enforcement".

The last year has witnessed abhorrent terrorist crimes; as a result, there is a greater sense of urgency in the international community about the need for more effective measures against the perpetrators of terrorism and their sponsors. The Summit of Peacemakers held at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, on 13 March 1996 to confront the acts of violence in the Middle East was the most significant demonstration of the international community's commitment to take action. The Summit stressed the need to promote coordination of efforts to stop acts of terror and to cut off the sources of financing for terrorist groups. At the Summit, I stressed the pioneering role of the General Assembly in adopting on 9 December 1994 the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, which it reaffirmed in its resolution 50/53 of 11 December 1995. The adoption of that resolution meant that the United Nations was the only global forum where countries had come together to work against terrorism and it was, therefore, through decisions taken by the Assembly that States could find the instruments to combat terrorism as a global threat. The United Nations is ready to serve as a mechanism for international mobilisation against terrorism.

C. PEACE-KEEPING

United Nations peace-keeping continued to be a dynamic and demanding activity, responding to continuing turbulence in relations

between States and to armed conflict within State borders. While the number of United Nations peace-keepers declined dramatically, from 67,269 in July 1995 to 24,657 in July 1996, the complexity of their tasks did not diminish. At the same time, the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, headed by Kofi Annan, has taken the closure or scaling down of some operations as an opportunity to take stock, consolidate and build upon the organisational achievements of the last few years.

TABLE 1

Peace-keeping Troops, Military Observers a Peace-keeping Operations as at 31 July 1996

	Troops	*Observers*	*Police*	*Total*
UNTSO	—	173	—	173
UNMOGIP	—	44	—	44
UNFICYP	1202	—	33	1235
UNDOF	1043	—	—	1043
UNIFIL	4489	—	—	4489
UNIKOM	936	238	—	1174
UNAVEM	6392	408	254	7054
MINURSO	47	212	26	285
UNPF	79	—	—	79
UNTAES	4636	100	441	5177
UNMIBH	3	50	1641	1694
UNPREDEP	1 044	36	26	1106
UNMOP	—	28	—	28
UNOMIG	—	122	—	122
UNSMIH	600	—	300	900
UNOMIL	1	9	—	10
UNMOT	—	44	—	44
Total	20472	1464	2721	24657

Of the 16 peace-keeping operations currently deployed, most are confronted with exceedingly difficult missions, reflecting the fact that most of today's conflicts are fought within States, not only by regular armies but also by militias and civilians with ill-defined chains of command. Such conflicts are sometimes marked by the collapse of State institutions and a breakdown of law and order. Ceasefire agreements, when achieved, are often fragile. Humanitarian

emergencies are commonplace, exacerbated by warring parties' often deliberate obstruction of relief efforts. Negotiated peace settlements, when accomplished, must cover a wide range of military, political, humanitarian and other civilian matters. Such agreements are not self-executing; rather, sustained and intensive efforts by United Nations peace-keeping missions are essential to ensure compliance. And for the settlements to endure, long-term programmes are required, with the contribution of many different parts of the United Nations system, to address the root causes of the conflict and to promote national reconciliation.

In such challenging and dangerous circumstances, a United Nations operation offers a stabilising element that can help to prevent a tense situation from escalating or exploding. I am grateful to the men and women who serve the international community in this way, often tipping the balance, quite literally, from war to peace (see figs. 18-20). I would like to acknowledge, especially, the debt owed to those who have given their lives.

Here at Headquarters, work has continued during the period under review to address some of peace-keeping's institutional shortcomings. The difficulties in deploying peace-keepers quickly continue to be a matter of great concern. The General Assembly has urged me to develop a rapidly deployable headquarters team composed of personnel skilled in military and civilian headquarters functions. In response, the Secretariat has worked closely with interested delegations in planning towards this end, and we hope that work in this area, already well advanced, will yield tangible results very shortly. Similarly, in response to the Assembly's recommendations, I have made proposals to enhance the preparedness for conflict prevention and peace-keeping in Africa. I count on the continuing support of Member States in the implementation of these proposals. On a related question, efforts to develop further the standby arrangement system have made significant progress. However, there is still considerable scope for improvement and I should like to encourage all Member States to participate.

Member States and the Secretariat have been working to devise means of coping with lower revenues in the support account for peace-keeping operations, which funds a large majority of the posts that enable the Secretariat to set up, manage and support operations. My proposals with respect to staffing and funding the account have found wide support from the Member States. While these proposals entailed painful cuts, they were designed to preserve the structural integrity of

the Department, which, with the active involvement of Member States, has been so carefully constructed over the last few years.

The financial crisis of the Organisation has hit troop contributors articularly hard, for it has not been possible to reimburse them in a timely manner. The result is absurd: our reward to countries, including some of the world's poorest, that send their sons and daughters into harm's way on behalf of the international community is to impose an added financial burden on them. Troop contributors are in effect financing the shortfalls that result when some Member States fail to pay their assessed contributions on time and in full.

The past year reaffirmed two key lessons derived from peace-keeping operations. Firstly, every operation, and especially an operation being sent into circumstances in which it is likely to face hostile action, should be deployed with the strength necessary to achieve the tasks entrusted to it and to protect itself. Otherwise, the credibility of the Organisation — especially of the Security Council — and the safety of its personnel will be jeopardised. Secondly, no instrument for peace and security can bring about a lasting peace without the will of the parties to the conflict to achieve peace. Such a peace is in sight only when the parties come to a good-faith agreement by which they are all willing to abide. In the effort of the international community to help the parties reach such an agreement, positive incentives are often more appropriate and ultimately more effective than coercion.

A United Nations peace-keeping operation provides one such incentive by contributing to a climate of confidence. In my view, to strengthen United Nations capacity in this respect, when a United Nations operation is deployed to an area devastated by conflict, the chief of mission (usually a special representative of the Secretary-General) should be given the capacity to provide some direct, albeit modest, development assistance to those affected. In the few cases in which United Nations operations have had resources for such a purpose, the assistance has proved valuable in its own right and has also served as an important element in the mission's overall success. In Mozambique, for example, a small trust fund utilised by my Special Representative made an enormous difference in helping the United Nations Operation in Mozambique bring its efforts to the successful conclusion that I reported last year. More recently, the absence of such a tool in post-genocide Rwanda hampered the effectiveness of my Special Representative in that country.

D. CURRENT ACTIVITIES IN PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY, PEACEMAKING AND PEACE-KEEPING

1. Afghanistan

The Special Mission, established by the General Assembly by its resolution 48/208, worked hard during the period under review to find a solution to this prolonged conflict. However, United Nations efforts have so far been hampered by the lack of political will among the Afghan factions to agree to a power-sharing accord and by a noticeable rise in interference by outside Powers in the internal matters of Afghanistan.

When the Head of the Special Mission, Mahmoud Mestiri, returned to the region in September 1995, the atmosphere in Afghanistan was one of war. In view of this alarming situation, I instructed Mestiri to do his utmost to pursue two objectives: *(a)* an agreement among the major warring factions for an immediate ceasefire, with each party maintaining its positions and territory occupied at the time of the ceasefire; and *(b)* immediately thereafter, the launching of serious negotiations among the parties for the transfer of power by President Burhanuddin Rabbani. In pursuit of those goals, Mestiri shuttled repeatedly between various cities in Afghanistan for meetings with Afghan leaders. He also travelled to the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan to consult senior government officials there. However, differences remained among the warring factions on the proposal for a ceasefire.

Following consultations with Mestiri, President Rabbani on 6 November 1995 announced publicly his willingness to transfer power to an individual or commission and proposed that the warring factions and a number of neutral personalities should sit together, under United Nations mediation, to agree on a suitable mechanism and date for the transfer of power. However, any progress in the peace talks was overtaken by the deterioration of the situation on the ground in late November, when intensive fighting broke out around Kabul between government forces and the Taliban. Mestiri departed from the region on 26 November to report to me in New York.

The Special Mission resumed its activities on 12 January 1996, when Mestiri arrived in the region with the renewed mandate of the General Assembly. While he undertook an extensive round of consultations with Afghan leaders and with Governments concerned, Kabul remained under siege by the Taliban. The forces of the Taliban

and the Government were in a military stalemate, punctuated by occasional outbursts of fierce fighting. Indiscriminate exchanges of missiles and aerial bombardment were reported on an almost daily basis. This situation considerably hindered the United Nations-led peace process. I made frequent appeals to the Afghan parties for the immediate cessation of hostilities and for unconditional recourse to peaceful dialogue.

During the period under review, I submitted two progress reports to the General Assembly, on 3 April and 16 July 1996, respectively. In the latter report, I observed that the objectives of a durable ceasefire and a peaceful transfer of power, mandated by the Assembly and vigorously sought by the Special Mission, were still far from being achieved. The warring parties' preference to pursue their objectives by military means rather than peaceful negotiation appeared deep and enduring. Although intra-Afghan talks were to be welcomed, they had not yet brought the principal warring parties and others to the negotiating table. Meanwhile, the people of Afghanistan, who had repeatedly demonstrated to the Special Mission their desire for peace, continued to suffer. Nor had there been any decline in foreign interference, which continued to hamper the search for a political settlement. I concluded that, in these circumstances, there was clearly a need for an impartial third party to help the Afghan leaders resolve their differences and to encourage the neighbouring countries and others to work together to support that effort. That was, and remains, the role of the United Nations and its Special Mission.

On 24 May 1996, Mestiri informed me that he was obliged to resign for health reasons. I accepted his resignation, effective at the end of May, with regret, while paying tribute to the manner in which he had carried out his difficult mandate. I subsequently appointed Norbert Heinrich Holl to head the Special Mission, with effect from 7 July. Holl is based in Jalalabad pending the return of the Special Mission to Kabul.

In order to strengthen the Special Mission and to rationalise the Organisation's political presence in Afghanistan, I decided that with effect from the end of June the Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan should cease to exist. All United Nations peacemaking activities in Afghanistan are now integrated into the Special Mission.

Afghanistan is one of the world's "forgotten" emergencies or "orphan" conflicts. In October 1995, I requested the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs to include Afghanistan in his visits

to a number of areas of humanitarian crisis. Upon his return, the United Nations launched a consolidated inter-agency appeal for emergency humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance to Afghanistan, requesting $124 million to cover the period from October 1995 to September 1996. The programme, coordinated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan, focuses on assistance for internally displaced persons, mine clearance, voluntary repatriation, food aid and emergency interventions in the fields of agriculture, health, human resource development and physical infrastructure.

In November 1995, restrictions were announced by the authorities in some parts of Afghanistan on the education of girls and the employment of women. United Nations agencies agreed that support for education programmes should be suspended in areas where girls were denied access.

The winter of 1995/96 was particularly difficult in Kabul. Harsh winter weather, rapid price increases, temporary blockades of the city and constant rocketing exacerbated already widespread suffering. United Nations agencies worked with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and non-governmental organisations to implement an emergency winter relief plan, under which over one-third of the city's population benefited from the distribution of emergency food aid and relief supplies. Conscious of the importance of promoting and strengthening the links between humanitarian assistance and longer-term rehabilitation activities, representatives of United Nations agencies, non-governmental organisations and donor Governments met at Islamabad on 26 June 1996. They reviewed coordination and collaboration mechanisms, developed strategies for resource mobilisation and discussed links between humanitarian and development assistance.

2. Angola

Despite numerous delays, some modest success has been achieved over the past year in the implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol. Provided that both the Government and the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) continue to show goodwill and refrain from engaging in any activities that may lead to further hostilities, the limited progress achieved may be consolidated further so that the Angolan people may at last enjoy the stable peace that is so badly needed to pursue the country's social and economic development.

My Special Representative, Alioune Blondin Beye, with the full support of the three observer States (Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America), continued his efforts to persuade the parries to implement the agreements they have entered into. On several occasions, I had direct contacts with the leaders of the Government and UNITA in order to keep the peace process from stalling. The United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), with an average of over 7,200 military and civilian personnel, is currently the Organisation's largest peace-keeping operation. Six infantry battalions from Brazil, India, Romania, Uruguay, Zambia and Zimbabwe are present in the country. In addition to the six regional headquarters, UNAVEM III military and police observers are deployed in some 60 sites throughout Angola.

The Joint Commission, the principal body charged with monitoring the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, has held regular and extraordinary sessions to review the various aspects of the peace process. It usually meets at Luanda, but it has also held sessions in several other Angolan cities. The Commission, which is chaired by my Special Representative, has established a number of *ad hoc* committees as well as a follow-up mechanism that meets on a daily basis at head-of-delegation level. An Armed Conflict Prevention Group including high-ranking military representatives of the two parties was also formed to prevent ceasefire violations or quickly control their consequences.

Since the Lusaka Protocol was signed on 20 November 1994, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and the UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, have met four times outside Angola. However, the expectations raised by the signing of the Protocol and the meetings between the two Angolan leaders remain largely unfulfilled. The Government of National unity and Reconciliation has not been formed. Designated UNITA officials have not joined the state administration at national, provincial and local levels, and most UNITA members of parliament have not resumed their functions in the National Assembly. Moreover, it is not yet clear whether Savimbi will respond positively to the formal invitation he received from President dos Santos at Libreville on 1 March 1996 to assume one of the two posts of Vice-President.

The military talks, which should have been completed-shortly after the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, continue to proceed at a very sluggish pace. It was not until the second half of September 1995 that UNITA sent a high-level military delegation led by its Chief of Staff to begin discussions with the Government on the incorporation of UNITA

troops into the Angolan Armed Forces. Despite several partial agreements and the adoption by the National Assembly of amendments to the amnesty law that would enable the return of UNITA generals to the Angolan Armed Forces, the negotiations on the incorporation of UNITA troops and on the creation of a "fourth branch" of the service, which would perform functions in support of rehabilitation of the national infrastructure, are yet to be successfully concluded.

Another crucial provision of the Lusaka Protocol that has not been fully implemented is the quartering of UNITA troops in some 15 sites throughout the country. During the summer and autumn of 1995, UNAVEM III began setting up the quartering areas. Several of them were ready by early November, allowing the quartering process to be launched officially on 20 November, the first anniversary of the signing of the Protocol. The quartering of UNITA troops started in Huambo province and was extended in December to three additional sites, but for some time the number of soldiers arriving at the quartering areas remained very low. The age of some UNITA soldiers was a further source of concern.

While the Security Council made several appeals for the Government and UNITA to expedite the resolution of these issues, a shooting incident in October at the Luanda residence of the UNITA Chief of Staff resulted in a serious setback. UNITA viewed the incident as an assassination attempt and withdrew its military delegation from the Angolan capital. In the meantime, the issue of the repatriation of mercenaries, that is, expatriate military and security personnel employed by the parties (in particular by the Government), continued to present an additional obstacle. Small-scale violations of the ceasefire persisted. There were also indications that the Government was preparing military operations, but these potentially destabilising actions were not carried out at that time.

The deployment of UNAVEM III was almost completed by the end of 1995, with the induction of approximately 7,000 troops and military observers, 240 police observers and various civilian staff stationed in some 60 locations throughout the country. The UNAVEM III presence and the good offices it provides to the parties, at both the local and high political levels, have helped to stabilise and improve the military situation and to achieve a measure of success in implementing the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol.

The role played by the United Nations civilian police observers has become increasingly important. This component facilitated the

start of the quartering of the Government's rapid reaction police by the end of 1995. The UNAVEM civilian police observers also prepared comprehensive proposals for the disarmament of the civilian population, which began in July 1996, and played an important role in monitoring security arrangements for UNITA leaders in Luanda.

The civilian police have been instrumental, together with the UNAVEM III human rights unit, in close monitoring and, as necessary, investigation of alleged human rights violations. This issue continued to be of particular concern to the United Nations, owing to widespread human rights abuses—including abductions, unlawful detentions and torture—perpetrated against civilians by armed elements of both sides. The human rights unit has launched a nationwide programme to disseminate basic information on human rights and has organised a series of training workshops and seminars in Luanda and in some provincial capitals.

In spite of all efforts to keep the peace process moving forward, another setback occurred towards the end of 1995 when the Angolan Armed Forces launched a military offensive, taking control of several locations near the oil-producing region of Soyo in the northern province of Zaire. In response to that offensive, UNITA announced the suspension of the quartering of its troops, although the process had barely started. It also imposed restrictions on the movement of United Nations and other international personnel in some areas. UNITA cooperation with UNAVEM III deteriorated markedly and in early January 1996 I telephoned Savimbi to express my strong concern over the unsatisfactory situation.

The lack of tangible progress in implementation of the Lusaka Protocol prompted the international community to increase pressure on the parties. A breakthrough was achieved when President dos Santos fulfilled pledges he had made during his visit to Washington, D.C., in December 1995, in particular to withdraw government troops from recently recaptured areas, to terminate contracts with the firm Executive Outcomes, which had been providing the Government with expatriate military and security support personnel, to start the quartering of the rapid reaction police and to undertake several other important tasks. As a result of the efforts of my Special Representative and representatives of the three observer States, the Angolan parties agreed at that time to a definitive cessation of all military activities, the conclusion of military talks, the release of prisoners, an end to hostile propaganda, the resumption of quartering of UNITA troops and the withdrawal of the Angolan Armed Forces to nearest barracks.

A new timetable for the implementation of these understandings was approved in January 1996. The Security Council, in letters addressed on 16 January to both Angolan leaders by its President, once again underscored the growing impatience of the international community. Also in January, the parties established an Armed Conflict Prevention Group, which has been operating in Luanda under United Nations auspices, and the UNITA delegation returned to the Angolan capital to resume negotiations on the integration of its troops into the Angolan Armed Forces. Several important decisions were reached in this regard, but crucial details could not be finalised.

On 19 January, more than one year after the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, Savimbi finally pledged that 16,500 troops out of the declared number of 62,500 UNITA military personnel would report to quartering. areas by 8 February. This goal was accomplished slightly later than the deadline, but immediately thereafter the process again halted. It then continued in fits and starts, mostly in response to pressure from the Security Council when renewal of the mandate of UNAVEM III was under review. Many aspects of the quartering process have continued to cause serious concern; reports were received of forced "recruitment" for quartering and the quality and quantity of weapons being surrendered by UNITA troops were not satisfactory. Despite extensive advance preparations, the cantonment process presented UNAVEM III with a major logistical challenge and required substantial assistance from the donor community. Although UNITA registered complaints, conditions in the camps were determined to be adequate and the security situation remained calm.

By February-March, the number of ceasefire violations had dropped considerably, with only minor incidents in diamond-producing areas where UNITA retained control over some mines and in the provinces of Benguela and Huila, where acts of banditry, cattle rustling and attacks against villages by elements of both UNITA and government forces persisted. During that period, several United Nations personnel, including unarmed military observers, were attacked, evoking strong condemnation by the Security Council.

At the fourth and most recent meeting between President dos Santos and Savimbi, held at Libreville on 1 March, the two leaders agreed on a number of measures, which, if implemented, could significantly advance the peace process. Among such measures were the completion of the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces by June and the establishment, by the following month, of a Government of National Unity and Reconciliation. To that end, President dos Santos

presented to Savimbi a formal invitation to assume one of the two posts of Vice-President, while the UNITA leader handed to the Head of State of Angola a list of the UNITA members expected to join the future Government. With regard to elections, Savimbi agreed with the understandings reached in 1995 according to which, after the formation of the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation, the National Assembly would extend its mandate.

By March and April 1996, the quartering of the Government's rapid reaction police had reached an advanced stage, and by the end of June it was completed, with over 5,500 men assembled in 13 locations. The process was closely monitored by UNAVEM III civilian police ob servers, who conducted regular roll-calls, verified stored weapons and provided the police with extensive training. At the same time, with drawal of the government troops from forward positions proceeded, albeit with some difficulties.

In mid-May, Savimbi pledged to my Special Representative that a total of 50,000 UNITA troops would be quartered by 15 June and that the entire process would be completed by the end of June. He also promised that UNITA troops would hand over "bigger and better" weapons to the United Nations. By the end of July, 57,000 UNITA troops had been quartered, although some 8,000 of these had subsequently deserted. Also by this time, UNITA began to hand over to UNAVEM large quantities of ammunition and heavy weapons stored in the northern and southern regions.

On 8 May, a new Amnesty Law was promulgated by President dos Santos. This removed one of the main obstacles to the conclusion of the talks on military matters. The pace of quartering of UNITA troops accelerated and the second phase of the withdrawal of government forces to barracks began. A revised and ambitious timetable for the incorporation of UNITA personnel into the Angolan Armed Forces was also approved, calling for the completion of all practical arrangements for incorporation (to be verified by the United Nations) by the end of July. Active preparations for the demobilisation of those UNITA and Angolan Armed Forces personnel who would not join the integrated armed forces and the disarmament of the civilian population are under way and troops of both parties have started joint patrolling of major roads to encourage the free circulation of persons and goods throughout the country. By July, the release of prisoners by both sides, with the assistance of ICRC, had been completed. Throughout the reporting period, the Security Council has played a vital role in sustaining and supporting the Angolan peace process, focusing the

two parties on the need to expedite the implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol and subsequent agreements and drawing their attention to the international community's impatience at the slow progress and constant delays in implementation of the agreements. In order to underline this message to the parties and to convince them that delaying tactics would not be tolerated, the Council extended the mandate of UNAVEM III for short periods only. On several occasions, I myself expressed in reports to the Council my strong dissatisfaction at the slow pace of the peace process and personally urged the leaders of the parties to accelerate it. This sustained pressure has helped to ensure the progress achieved, as described above, but all signs indicate that it will continue to be necessary during the coming months.

With the improvement of the military and political situation in the beginning of 1996, including the significant decrease in the number of ceasefire violations, mine clearance and the rehabilitation of roads and bridges intensified. This has enabled most humanitarian relief supplies to be transported by land and to reach many areas that were previously inaccessible. As the peace process advances, the focus of United Nations assistance is gradually shifting from emergency relief activities to rehabilitation of the country's war-damaged economic and social infrastructure and to long-term development. The focus of food aid, for example, is moving from general distribution to targeted assistance and food-for-work programmes. A successful seed and tool distribution programme was carried out during November 1995, but its impact will be diminished in some areas by insufficient rainfall.

Under the coordination of the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, humanitarian organisations have continued to provide assistance to a large number of displaced and other war-affected persons. UNAVEM III military contingents, on a voluntary basis, have undertaken a variety of humanitarian projects, such as the running of temporary clinics and primary schools. Vocational training schools have also been opened by some contingents to prepare young men to earn a livelihood.

Despite these improvements, humanitarian assistance will be required for many months to come. Some populations remain isolated because of local insecurity and logistical constraints; their condition is likely to be deteriorating and they will require emergency assistance once they are accessible. Moreover, flare-ups of fighting and difficult relations with local authorities have intermittently set back relief efforts.

In April, an updated inter-agency consolidated appeal for Angola was launched, calling for $187 million to meet the needs in 1996 of an estimated 2.7 million conflict-affected and internally displaced persons, 200,000 returning refugees, 100,000 former soldiers and other ex-combatants and up to 400,000 of their dependants.

The long-term prospects for peace in Angola depend in large part on the successful demobilisation and reintegration into civilian life of those combatants who are not retained in the Angolan Armed Forces. The first phase of the demobilisation programme, which started in November 1995, involved registration, food assistance, health care and basic education for UNITA soldiers. Assistance is also provided to the soldiers' families and communities near the quartering areas. This is a collaborative effort of United Nations agencies and international and local non-governmental organisations, with coordination provided by the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit. In order to deal with the related issues in a comprehensive manner, a special technical working group was set up under the aegis of the United Nations. My Special Representative focused particular attention on securing the necessary international assistance for this vital effort.

3. Nagorny Karabakh Region of Azerbaijan

The conflict over the Nagorny Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, which involves that country and Armenia, is the longest-lasting inter-ethnic dispute amongst the independent States of the former Soviet Union. Despite the efforts of the Minsk Group of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which was established by the OSCE summit at Budapest in December 1994 and which has the leading peacemaking role in the region, a comprehensive solution to the conflict has not yet been reached. Nevertheless, over the last year the Finnish and Russian Co-Chairmen of the Minsk Group have actively pursued measures to move the peace process forward. They have convened regular Minsk Group meetings with and without the parties to the conflict and have undertaken a number of missions to the region to conduct negotiations at the highest levels. In addition, the current Chairman-in-Office of OSCE, the Foreign Minister of Switzerland, visited Baku and Yerevan to discuss a "Framework of a Package Solution" proposal prepared by the Minsk Group Co-Chairmen.

The parties to the conflict have consistently reiterated that they remain committed to a peaceful solution. This commitment was confirmed at the beginning of May 1996, when the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Yevgeny Primakov, visited the region and

helped facilitate the exchange of all remaining prisoners of war. This important humanitarian step had been sought by the Minsk Group for some time and was regarded as a further confidence-building measure that should help overcome the stalled negotiations on the Framework of a Package Solution.

I welcome the fact that the ceasefire in the region, which came into effect on 12 May 1994 following mediation efforts by the Russian Federation in cooperation with the Minsk Group, has continued to be observed by all sides. However, in the absence of a political solution, large areas of Azerbaijan remain occupied by ethnic Armenian forces. In addition, hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons have not been able to return to their places of origin.

The Co-Chairmen of the OSCE Minsk process have kept the Security Council and me, through the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, regularly informed of progress in the peace process. In September 1995, in support of the OSCE efforts, I sent a goodwill mission to the region, headed by Under-Secretary-General Aldo Ajello. The four Co-Chairmen came to Headquarters on 16 April 1996 to brief the Security Council during informal consultations. On that occasion, the members of the Council strongly reiterated their support for the peace efforts of the Minsk Group. I, too, continue to support those efforts and remain prepared to provide technical assistance for the OSCE peace-keeping operation whose deployment is planned once a political agreement has been reached under OSCE auspices.

4. Burundi

The situation in Burundi has continued to be of major concern to me. My Special Representative, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, who had actively promoted national reconciliation since October 1993, concluded his term of office at the end of October 1995. On 22 December, I appointed Marc Faguy as his successor. Since assuming his responsibilities, Faguy has pursued efforts to bring about a dialogue among all political parties, in cooperation with the former President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Julius K. Nyerere, whose efforts are also supported by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the European Union (EU).

In my report to the General Assembly of 11 October 1995, I expressed the hope that a national debate, planned for November-December 1995, would help the parties move from confrontation and violence towards peace and reconciliation. Regrettably, the debate did not take place, though in April 1996 the Government initiated internal

discussions to prepare for it. Many in Burundi believed that it was the appropriate mechanism for a wide-ranging political dialogue. Others, however, considered it difficult to conduct such a debate in the dangerous security conditions that currently prevailed.

After early March 1996, developments took a turn for the worse and the influence of moderate political forces continued to diminish. Armed Hutu bands, led by the former Minister of the Interior, Leonard Nyangoma, President of the Conseil national pour la defense de la democratic, became increasingly active and Tutsi civilians were often victims of their attacks. In responding to those attacks the Army itself caused large numbers of Hutu civilian casualties. Political assassinations continued, including the murder of two Hutu Members of Parliament and two Governors of the northern Ngozi province. Members of the international relief community were also the targets of violence. As a result, ICRC, the World Food Programme (WFP) and other non-governmental organisations involved in humanitarian assistance either terminated or suspended their much-needed operations in northern Burundi. In that context, five days after the massacre on 20 July of over 300 displaced Burundians, the Army announced a military takeover and named the former President, Major Pierre Buyoya, as the new President of Burundi.

Throughout the period under review, the Security Council remained seized of the issue and was regularly briefed on developments. I repeatedly called on the Council and the international community to plan for the possibility that the threat of a humanitarian disaster might necessitate an emergency operation by the international community. On 29 December 1995,1 addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council, recalling the proposals for preventive action I had made on 19 August 1994 and repeated in my report of 11 October 1994. I asked the Council to give renewed consideration to my proposals to maintain a military presence in Zaire, subject to its Government's agreement, which would be capable of rapid intervention if the situation in Burundi suddenly deteriorated.

I also asked the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, to travel to Bujumbura as my Special Envoy to see what measures could be taken to address the issue of insecurity and allow humanitarian organisations to function effectively. Following her visit, from 7 to 9 January 1996, the situation eased and the humanitarian organisations, which had left Burundi for security reasons, returned to continue their work. However, the overall situation remained threatening.

Upon her return, my Special Envoy made recommendations concerning the security situation in Burundi. In my letter of 16 January to the President of the Security Council, I summarised her findings and recommendations, which included sending a technical mission to Burundi to review the possible role United Nations guards could play in providing enhanced security to the humanitarian community. Further to that letter and to the Council's endorsement of the Special Envoy's recommendations, I dispatched a technical mission to Bujumbura on 27 January.

As the situation remained serious, the Security Council in its resolution 1040 (1996) of 29 January requested me, in consultation with OAU and Member States concerned, to consider further preventive steps, to develop contingency plans as appropriate and to submit a full report on the results of the technical mission and on contingency planning. In my report of 15 February, I again called on the Council to take resolute action and again expressed my fear that the rekindled tensions in Burundi could escalate into full-scale war, ethnic violence and genocide.

Regarding the deployment of United Nations security guards, the technical mission concluded that, in the context of violence and instability prevailing at that time, they would not be able to guarantee the security of humanitarian personnel in Burundi. Accordingly, I saw little point in pursuing such an option at that time but decided to keep it open in the hope that the situation would improve.

As for contingency planning, I believed it useful at that stage to consider the possibility of establishing, of the Charter, a standby multinational force for humanitarian intervention. The proposed force, I suggested, could be led by one Member State and be given a mandate to deter massacres, to provide security to refugees, displaced persons and civilians at risk and to protect key economic installations. Consultations by a group of countries with a proven rapid deployment capacity, including some African countries, could be undertaken with a view to earmarking contingents for participation in such a force. Those contingents would remain in their respective countries but would be fully trained and equipped so as to be ready for deployment at very short notice.

I also saw some merit in deploying in advance in one of the neighbouring countries, as suggested in my letter to the Security Council of 29 December, a force that would strengthen the rapid deployment capability of a multinational force. Once the situation in

Burundi stabilised, the responsibility could be transferred to a United Nations peacekeeping operation established of the Charter, which would maintain the stability established by the multinational operation and would help reactivate the political reconciliation process.

On 14 February, I met with OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim, with whom I remained in close contact throughout the period under review, and outlined to him the proposals for preventive deployment that I later made to the Security Council. Salim believed that, while priority should be given to the political option, African countries would, in the event of a dramatic deterioration of the situation, support a humanitarian intervention aimed at preventing the type of disaster that had been experienced in Rwanda. In keeping with that approach, OAU on 13 April extended by three months the mandate of its observer mission, notwithstanding its financial difficulties and the restrictions placed by the Burundian authorities on the mission's freedom of movement.

The Security Council, in its resolution 1049 (1996) of 5 March, encouraged me to continue my consultations on contingency planning with Member States concerned and OAU, as appropriate. The Council requested that I intensify preparations for a regional conference for peace, security and development, to address the issue of political and economic stability in the countries of the Great Lakes region. I was fur ther requested to report to the Council on the possibility of establishing a United Nations radio station in Burundi in order to promote reconciliation and dialogue, to relay constructive information and to support the activities undertaken by United Nations agencies, in particular with regard to refugees and returnees.

Meanwhile, my Special Representative continued to send alarming information. In my letter to the Security Council of 12 April, I again drew the attention of the Council to the threatening developments in Burundi, including the differences of view between President Sylvestre Ntibantunganya and Prime Minister Antoine Nduwayo on the issue of negotiating with the Conseil national pour la defense de la democratic. While the President expressed his readiness to talk with Nyangoma on condition that his armed bands renounced violence, the Prime Minister still accused him of planning a genocide against the Tutsi population and refused to meet with him.

When I reported to the Council on 3 May, I stressed that the vicious circle of violence in Burundi could be broken only if moderates on both sides worked together to create a genuine and effective coalition

government. On my instructions, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, during a visit to Burundi on 24 and 25 April, had emphasised to all his interlocutors my support for President Nyerere and my conviction that there could be no military solution and that a political settlement had to be reached through negotiation. I also emphasised the need for urgent action if the country was not to be overwhelmed by uncontrolled violence. I had reaffirmed those points in personal letters to President Ntibantunganya and to Prime Minister Nduwayo, sent by hand of my Special Representative after my meeting with him at Nairobi on 30 April.

Pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 1049 (1996), I undertook wide-ranging and intensive consultations with interested Member States and with OAU on contingency planning. I remained convinced of the necessity for the international community to consider military intervention to save lives, should disaster strike Burundi and lead to large-scale killings of civilians. During his visit to Burundi, the Under-Secretary-General stressed that my plan was envisaged only in the event of a disaster situation and would be purely for humanitarian purposes. One measure that the Secretariat was urged to take, and which lay within its capacity, was to draw up plans for a possible peace-keeping operation of the Charter, to be deployed in the event that the parties reached political agreement and asked the United Nations to help them implement it. Meanwhile, the planning of such an operation was already under way.

The Member States consulted agreed that contingency planning for other eventualities, including a worst-case scenario, should also proceed. However, no country volunteered to take the lead in planning, deploying and commanding such a multinational operation. The need for further consultations to proceed in a discreet and confidential manner was stressed.

The Member States consulted believed that the idea of a regional conference on peace, security and development in the Great Lakes region should be retained. My own view was that all interested countries would have to agree to participate in the conference before concrete preparations for its convening could start; however, at that time, two countries of the region remained reluctant to participate.

As for the establishment of a United Nations radio station in Burundi, a technical mission of the Departments of Political Affairs, Public Information and Peace-keeping Operations visited Bujumbura from 15 to 21 April to explore this possibility. The mission concluded

that it might be technically possible but that the volatile situation in Burundi argued against such a highly visible and politically sensitive United Nations project.

While I continued consultations with OAU and Member States on contingency planning, former President Nyerere continued actively to promote a dialogue among all political parties. From 22 to 26 April, he organised a substantive meeting at Mwanza, United Republic of Tanzania, in which only he and the leaders of the majority party, the Front pour la democratic au Burundi, and the main opposition party, the Union pour le progres national, Jean Minani and Charles Mukasi, respectively, took part.

Prior to that meeting, 12 political parties that had signed the 1994 Convention of Government, together with the Parti pour le redressement national of former President Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, which had not signed the Convention, and a recently established party, the Alliance des Vaillants, accepted President Nyerere's invitation to meet on 21 April in an informal get-together. His invitation was not extended to the Conseil national pour la defense de la democratic, as the Government still refused to talk with Nyangoma. These talks ended inconclusively and the parties could not agree to sign a draft joint statement prepared by President Nyerere. It was agreed, however, to meet again at Mwanza on 22 May. My Special Representative, the Special Envoy of EU, Aldo Ajello, and the Representative of OAU in Burundi, Leandre Bassole, were invited to attend.

ICRC estimated that from February to May more than 100,000 people were displaced as a result of fighting. On 9 May, the number of newly registered Burundian refugees, forced to flee by new clashes between the Army and Hutu rebels in the north-west province of Cibitoke, rose to 13,000 despite the fact that the Burundi-Zaire border was closed. In late April, two massacres of some 200 civilians each were reported to have taken place in the central Burundian village of Buhoro and in Kivyuka, in the north-eastern province of Bubanza. The Buhoro incident was investigated by three United Nations human rights observers and by a commission of inquiry set up by the Burundi National Security Council on 9 May. On 15 May, the commission published a report, estimating that 118 people had been killed and that the killers were probably Hutu rebels or refugees.

Having considered my report of 3 May, the Security Council issued a presidential statement on 15 May strongly condemning any use of violence and emphasising its conviction that a lasting settlement could

be found only through peaceful means. The Council requested me and Member States concerned to continue to facilitate, as a matter of urgency, contingency planning for a rapid humanitarian response in the event of widespread violence or a serious deterioration in the humanitarian situation in Burundi. The Council also encouraged me further to pursue planning for steps that might be taken to support a possible political agreement.

I continued consultations regarding contingency planning with Member States. On 23 May, the Secretariat approached 86 Member States concerning their readiness to participate in a peace-keeping operation and by early August had received 14 positive and 6 negative replies. Twenty-two African States had been approached concerning their willingness to contribute troops to a multinational humanitarian intervention force to be authorised by the Security Council of which three had responded positively and four negatively. At the same time, 25 potential donor countries in Europe, Asia and North America had been approached for assistance in providing logistics, communications, transportation and equipment for a Chapter, VII operation; 7 had declined and 7 had offered assistance, excluding ground troops.

In May, the security situation continued to deteriorate steadily. On 4 June, three staff of ICRC were murdered in the province of Cibitoke. More massacres were reported throughout June and the first half of July, including the murder of 80 Tutsis at a tea factory in the north-west of the country.

Meanwhile, on 9 June, the Mwanza II meeting ended inconclusively. Determined to continue his efforts; President Nyerere scheduled Mwanza III for early July. He also scheduled, for 25 June, a regional summit at Arusha of the Heads of State of the region.

The regional summit took place as planned and was attended by the Presidents of the United Republic of Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda. Burundi was represented by the President and the Prime Minister, both of whom requested foreign security assistance. Their fragile alliance was broken after their return to Bujumbura, however, when, on 3 July, Prime Minister Nduwayo, in a letter, accused President Ntibantunganya of seeking to neutralise the Tutsi-dominated army and of having a hidden agenda with regard to the request for security assistance. Nevertheless, on 5 July, Burundi's National Security Council established a 21-member committee of military and civilian experts to discuss requirements for the implementation of the Arusha peace plan. The committee was to report to the international technical

committee established at Arusha on 25 June to work out the logistics of the regional peace plan, which envisaged the deployment of troops from Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania and Ethiopia.

On 10 July, the OAU summit at Yaounde expressed its support for the peace process initiated by President Nyerere at Mwanza and for the results of the Arusha regional summit of 25 June. However, some regional leaders questioned the usefulness of the plan and were worried by the persistent disagreement over it among the political parties in Burundi. The Conseil national pour la defense de la democratic rejected the plan from the beginning.

During the OAU summit, I met with the President and the Prime Minister of Burundi. Both admitted that the situation was no longer tolerable. I felt that there was still hope for a national debate that could lead to a peaceful settlement. However, the President explained that he could launch such a debate only once security was established.

The security situation took a further turn for the worse on 20 July, when a massacre of over 300 displaced Burundians occurred in the Bugendana camp, in Burundi's central Gitega province. While the Burundi authorities claimed that the dead were Tutsis killed by the Hutu' rebels of the armed wing of the Conseil national pour la defense de la democratic, the latter denied any role in the killings, claiming that the victims were Hutus killed by the soldiers of the Burundian army. No independent information was available on the identity of the perpetrators.

On 22 July, in a letter to the Security Council, I underlined, once again, the pressing need for the international community to take concrete and immediate action to halt the cycle of violence and to prevent another catastrophe from befalling the Great Lakes region of Central Africa. I had instructed the Department of Peace-keeping Operations to intensify its efforts with regard to contingency planning for humanitarian intervention by a multinational force.

In the wake of the massacre at Bugendana, the president of the Parti pour le redressement national, Bagaza, called for a two-day general strike in protest against the killings and the Arusha "security assistance" plan. As the Mwanza III talks began on 21 July, the main Opposition party, the Union pour le progres national, excused itself from the talks, saying that the Bugendana massacre did not allow its leaders to participate. On 24 July, the Union denounced the Convention on Governance of September 1994 and withdrew its support from the consensus built around President Ntibantunganya, accusing him of

treason. While the army denied that a *coup d 'etat* was in progress, the President took refuge at the United States Embassy.

Reacting to these events, the Security Council issued a presidential statement on 24 July, in which it strongly condemned any attempt to overthrow the legitimate Government by force. The Council took note of my letter, condemned the Bugendana massacre, urged all parties to exercise restraint and requested the Burundi authorities to conduct a proper investigation of the massacre. The Council stressed its full support for the efforts of former President Nyerere, including the agreements reached at the Arusha regional summit of 25 June, and encouraged all parties to work in a constructive manner with Nyerere. The Council emphasised the importance of the continued cooperation of the United Nations with OAU, EU, the United States and other interested countries and organisations in coordination with former President Nyerere, aimed at achieving a comprehensive political dialogue between the parties in Burundi. The Council requested me and Member States concerned to continue to facilitate contingency planning for a rapid humanitarian response in the event of widespread violence or a serious deterioration in the humanitarian situation in Burundi.

On 25 July, the army announced a military takeover, citing insecurity and the Government's inability to rule as reasons for this move, and named Major Buyoya as the new President. The Prime Minister resigned. The Minister of Defence announced the suspension of the National Assembly and of all political parties and political organisations, the prohibition of strikes and demonstrations and the closure of the country's borders and Bujumbura airport. On 26 July, Major Buyoya made public his intention to set up a transitional government that would reflect the reality in Burundi and urged the international community to refrain from military intervention in the country. Meanwhile President Ntibantunganya remained in the United States Ambassador's residence in Bujumbura.

Meanwhile, on 23 July the international commission of inquiry for Burundi completed its work and submitted its final report to me. I forwarded this report to the President of the Security Council so that the Council could consider what action to take on it.

In response to the Security Council's request to me in its presidential statement of 24 July to continue to facilitate contingency planning for a rapid humanitarian response in the event of widespread violence in Burundi, the Secretariat again approached some 30 potential

troop contributors. In view of the fact that no lead country had emerged to plan and organise a multinational force and that there appeared to be confusion over who would finance such an operation, these troop contributors were asked if they would be prepared to consider participating in a United Nations operation in Burundi mandated by the Security Council and funded through assessed contributions. The aim of such an operation would be, in general terms, to improve security, by all possible means to deter attacks on civilians, especially refugees and displaced persons, to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to provide time for negotiations to pursue a viable political settlement. As of early August, four replies had been received. All were negative.

The cycle of inter-ethnic violence and political instability has severely undermined the economy of Burundi and compromised the country's ability to emerge from its crisis. In the agricultural sector, which traditionally has accounted for 90 per cent of total national revenues, major food shortages are projected because of the disruptions associated with the displacement of large agrarian communities. The widespread insecurity has also become an impediment to the effective delivery of assistance and implementation of humanitarian programmes. As a result of the general deterioration in the security environment, non-essential travel for all United Nations personnel from Makamba in the south to Muyinga in the north of the country was curtailed.

In November 1995, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator designated a Humanitarian Coordinator for Burundi to coordinate emergency relief activities of United Nations agencies and humanitarian organisations. During 1996, widespread insecurity became an impediment to the effective delivery and implementation of humanitarian assistance and led to the displacement of some 100,000 of the local population. Most recently, the humanitarian situation has been seriously affected by renewed fighting in the north-western provinces of Bubanza and Cibitoke, the outbreak of new fighting in the south, an increase in massacres of the civilian population and by the efforts to repatriate by force large numbers of Rwandan refugees in the north-east.

The spreading conflict and increasing difficulty faced by the government authorities in providing adequate security guarantees for the safety of humanitarian workers has seriously impinged on the ability of aid agencies to gain access to the most vulnerable populations. Targeted threats against humanitarian personnel have occurred

regularly. In that context, ICRC was forced to suspend its activities and pull out of the country following the murder of three of its delegates in Cibitoke on 4 June and other threats to ICRC staff.

The prevailing insecurity has forced relief organisations to operate in a "stop and go" manner, which has militated against the adoption of a longer-term approach. Despite these constraints, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organisations have been largely successful in continuing to meet the most immediate relief needs of the victims of the conflict, albeit with great difficulty.

In that context, operational agencies of the United Nations system in Burundi have been engaged in an intense collaborative effort to develop contingency plans for emergency humanitarian operations in the country since the beginning of the year. The emergency operations plan for Burundi addresses a fundamental issue, namely, how United Nations agencies can function together to provide the maximum level of emergency assistance inside the country in the event of a serious escalation of the conflict.

In recognition of the country's growing humanitarian needs, a United Nations consolidated fund-raising appeal for the Great Lakes region was launched by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs in February. A total of $50.9 million was requested for United Nations programmes to assist Burundi in the coming year. Furthermore, a specific document on financial requirements for Department coordination was sent to donors in January, with a reminder in July, requesting their assistance in making up a shortfall in funds.

5. Cambodia

With the agreement of the Government of Cambodia, the mandate of my Representative in Cambodia was renewed for two further six-month periods in October 1995 and April 1996. He has continued to be assisted by a military adviser.

In accordance with his mandate, my Representative has maintained close liaison and dialogue with the Government and has worked in close contact with the various United Nations programmes and agencies operating in the country. Cooperation between the Government and the United Nations, along with the generous assistance of the international community, continues to reflect the spirit and principles of the Paris Agreements by helping the Government move towards greater prosperity and democratisation. The successful implementation of the agreement reached in May 1995 for improved communication

between the Government and the office of the United Nations Centre for Human Rights at Phnom Penh has been particularly welcome.

I have recently given a positive reply to a request by the Government of Cambodia that UNDP coordinate technical assistance for the forthcoming elections. These elections will be central to the strengthening of political pluralism in Cambodia.

6. Cameroon-Nigeria

The long-standing land and maritime border dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria over the Bakassi peninsula was exacerbated in December 1993 by the reported discovery of offshore oil deposits. In February 1994, after violent incidents in the region, the Government of Cameroon submitted the dispute to the ruling of the International Court of Justice.

Following mediation efforts initiated by President Gnassingbe Eyadema of the Togolese Republic, the Heads of State of the two countries met in Tunisia in June 1994. While tension was eased, the conflict remained unresolved, and on 3 and 4 February 1996 troops of the two sides clashed again. On 3 February, I called on both parties to show restraint and to withdraw their troops from the border areas to create the conditions necessary for a peaceful settlement of the dispute and to await the results of the deliberations by the International Court. On 17 February, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the two countries met at Kara, Togo, and agreed on a ceasefire.

In identical letters dated 29 February to the Heads of State of Cameroon and Nigeria, the President of the Security Council welcomed my proposal to send a fact-finding mission to the Bakassi peninsula and urged both Governments to cooperate fully with the proposed mission. The Council also called on Cameroon and Nigeria to respect the ceasefire they had agreed to at Kara, to refrain from further violence and to return their forces to the positions occupied in March 1994 before the dispute was referred to the International Court of Justice.

Under an interim ruling of 15 March, the Court ordered Cameroon and Nigeria to refrain from any military activity until it made a substantive ruling on the status of the peninsula. It ordered Cameroonian and Nigerian armed forces to withdraw to the positions they had occupied before the 3 February clashes and requested both parties to observe the agreement reached at Kara for the cessation of hostilities. The Court also called on both parties to provide full assistance to the proposed fact-finding mission.

On 24 March, the OAU Central Organ's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution called on both countries to exercise restraint and to take appropriate measures to restore confidence, including withdrawal of troops and continuation of a dialogue.

On 24 May, I reported to the Security Council about the results of the consultations undertaken by my Special Envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, on the proposed fact-finding mission to the Bakassi peninsula. The President of Cameroon informed Brahimi that his country would abide by any decision taken by the International Court of Justice and would welcome a fact-finding mission. The Head of State of Nigeria indicated his preference for a bilateral solution to the dispute and recognised that a United Nations fact-finding mission could help in that regard. Aware that the Court had urged the two countries to lend assistance to the proposed mission, he also accepted in principle the idea of such a mission and indicated that he would send his response to the Security Council and to me in writing.

In a letter dated 29 May, the President of the Council requested me to continue to keep the Council informed of the measures taken to monitor the situation in the Bakassi peninsula. I am now awaiting the formal approval of the Government of Nigeria to dispatch the fact-finding mission. In the meantime, the ceasefire seems to be holding, although some limited clashes have occurred.

7. Cyprus

During most of the past year, the impasse in the negotiating process continued to prevent my mission of good offices, carried out within the overall framework set by the Security Council in its resolution 939 (1994), from proceeding as I would have wished. Only in June/July 1996 did it become possible to resume work on both the substance of the Cyprus problem and the implementation of the package of confidence-building measures.

In an informal meeting held in mid-April, the permanent members of the Security Council underlined the importance they attached to a comprehensive approach to a settlement of the Cyprus problem, on the basis of Council resolutions, high-level agreements and efforts by the Secretary-General and his Representatives. On 1 May, the Council endorsed the appointment of Han Sung-Joo, former Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea, as my new Special Representative for Cyprus, replacing Joe Clark, who had served since 1993.

In June 1996, I met separately with each of the Cypriot leaders in the hope of being able to confirm that they were both ready to resume direct talks on the basis of mutual acknowledgement of each side's concerns and a mutual willingness to compromise. These meetings did not lead to agreement on the early convening of direct talks, but they provided a basis on which I could instruct my Special Representative to pursue contacts with the parties in order to achieve such an agreement, taking into account the implications of likely developments in relations between Cyprus and EU. To that end, Professor Han visited the region in late June and early July and met with the Cypriot parties and the Governments of Greece and Turkey. He also travelled to Moscow, Paris, London, Dublin and Brussels for consultations with the Governments concerned, the Presidency of EU and European Commission officials. His consultations confirmed an increased interest on the part of the international community in finding a settlement of the Cyprus issue, which has been on the United Nations agenda since December 1963.

The United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) continued to monitor the ceasefire, where the overall situation remained calm. The two sides generally exercised restraint in the past year, although tension increased following the fatal shooting of a National Guard soldier in June. In response to this and in accordance with Security Council resolution 1062 (1996), I instructed UNFICYP vigorously to renew its efforts to reach agreement with the parties to take reciprocal measures to lower the tension along the buffer zone, including mutual commitments, through UNFICYP, not to deploy along the ceasefire lines live ammunition or weapons other than those which are hand-held, to prohibit firing of weapons within sight or hearing of the buffer zone and to extend without delay the 1989 unmanning agreement to all parts of the buffer zone where their forces remain in close proximity to each other.

The excessive levels of military forces, armaments and expenditures on both sides in Cyprus and the rate at which they are being expanded, upgraded and modernised are matters for grave concern. This situation only increases tension and the risk of confrontation along the ceasefire lines, lending further urgency to the need for progress in the negotiations for a lasting solution to the Cyprus problem.

8. East Timor

The Foreign Ministers of Indonesia and Portugal have continued their talks under my auspices with the aim of finding a just,

comprehensive and internationally acceptable solution to the long-standing question of East Timor. At the seventh round of talks, held in London on 16 January 1996, the two sides resumed discussion of substantive issues that had been identified at the earlier round. At the eighth round, held at Geneva on 27 June, the substantive discussions were pursued in greater detail. Additional consultations at the diplomatic level are now being conducted with the aim of finding common ground to serve as the basis for a settlement of the issue. Despite differences of perspective and approach, the two Governments have been engaged in a serious and useful dialogue that has focused on short-term measures as well as on the longer-term issues.

I continue to consult a cross-section of East Timorese figures in the context of these talks. With the agreement of the two Governments, I facilitated a second meeting, from 19 to 22 March, of the All-inclusive Intra-East Timorese Dialogue, which, like the first meeting, was held at Burg Schlaining, Austria. Without addressing the issue of the status of East Timor, the 29 participants adopted a consensus declaration containing a number of practical ideas aimed at helping create an atmosphere conducive to a lasting solution. I am encouraged by the spirit of cooperation and compromise that the participants demonstrated and their interest in continuing this exercise. I am also encouraged by the desire of Indonesia and Portugal to implement proposals emerging from the Dialogue.

9. El Salvador

The peace process in El Salvador has continued its steady advance, despite the persistence of difficulties in implementation of some remaining items in the peace accords. The Mission of the United Nations in El Salvador (MINUSAL) continued to carry out its mandate of good offices and verification of compliance with the peace accords in accordance with a programme of work signed by the parties on 27 April 1995. The programme of work indicated that implementation of some elements of the accords had yet to be accomplished in the areas of public security, the land transfer programme, human settlements, reinsertion programme's, the Fund for the Protection of the War-Wounded and Disabled, and legal and constitutional reforms. Following the departure of my Special Representative, Enrique ter Horst (Venezuela), Ricardo Vigil was appointed my Representative and Director of MINUSAL on 1 October 1995.

On 6 October, I reported to the General Assembly that, although considerable advances had been made, a number of issues remained

outstanding. Accordingly, the Assembly on 31 October approved my proposal to extend the mandate of the Mission for a further period of six months, until 30 April 1996. I later submitted an informal report to the Security Council (25 January 1996) and, on several occasions, dispatched a high-level envoy from Headquarters to hold meetings with the President and members of the Government, the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberation Nacional (FMLN) and other key political actors, and to assist the Mission in the discharge of its responsibilities.

I reported to the General Assembly on 23 April that progress had been registered in a number of areas of the peace accords: the titling process in the land transfer programme had experienced significant advances (although not the process of title registration); the quantifiable targets of other reinsertion programmes had largely been reached; and the individual items identified by the programme of work in the area of public security were nearing completion. The establishment, in January 1996, of a National Council on Public Security, in accordance with a recommendation of MINUSAL, was another positive development.

Yet some important aspects of implementation remained: the constitutional and legal reforms identified by the programme of work were stalled at different stages of the legislative process; the filing of transferred land titles in the national register, necessary for the completion of the programme, lagged far behind the process of titling; reforms in the public security sector were still not consolidated in accordance with the public security model developed by the accords (a weakness under scored by the passage in March 1996 of a substantially flawed emergency law designed to combat the country's alarming level of crime); and the transfer of the rural human settlements was not expected to be finalised at least until the end of the year.

Accordingly, I stated that in order to fulfil the Organisation's responsibility under the peace accords to verify all aspects of their implementation, a continued presence in El Salvador was required, although not at the same level as MINUSAL, for a further period lasting until the end of 1996. I proposed, and the General Assembly subsequently approved, that the United Nations replace MINUSAL with a mechanism that would combine regular visits by a high-level envoy from Headquarters with the retention in the field of a small group of experts that would continue to work on matters of verification and good offices. The mechanism, the United Nations Office of Verification, began its operations on 1 May 1996.

In late July, I again submitted an informal report to the Security Council, noting progress in some elements of implementation of the peace accords and persistent delays in others. Particularly welcome developments were the approval by the Legislative Assembly both of a package of constitutional reforms recommended by the Commission on the Truth and of the Police Career Law. Advances had also been achieved in the land transfer programme, in particular with respect to the filing of titles in the national register.

However, there remained difficulties in the consolidation of the public security sector and I reported that the expectations raised by the establishment of the National Council on Public Security had so far not been met. Moreover, progress in the area of judicial reform had been minimal, further delays in the implementation of the programme to transfer the rural human settlements appeared likely and problems relating to the Fund for the Protection of the War-Wounded and Disabled persisted.

10. Eritrea-Yemen

The dispute between Eritrea and Yemen over the Hanish archipelago in the Red Sea, which began in November 1995, has been another source of concern to the international community. In late December, I had an opportunity to discuss the situation with both parties during a visit to Asmara and Sanaa. On my return to Headquarters, I informed the Security Council of my view that both parties possessed the political will to resolve their territorial dispute by peaceful means and that I had recommended to them mediation by a Member State. I had also assured the parties that the Secretariat would be at their disposal should they so wish. France took the lead in mediation, which culminated on 21 May in the signing by the two parties of an agreement to settle their dispute through arbitration. It is my hope that the process of arbitration will soon be started, leading to a solution of this potentially very dangerous dispute. I wish to pay tribute to France, as well as to Egypt and Ethiopia, which also played an important role in the mediation process.

11. Georgia/Abkhazia

My Special Envoy for Georgia, Edouard Brunner, supported by the Russian Federation as facilitator and OSCE as participant, has continued to pursue a comprehensive settlement of the conflict. In order to strengthen the efforts of the United Nations and to ensure a continuous presence at a senior political level in the region, I appointed

Liviu Bota as resident Deputy to my Special Envoy and as Head of Mission of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), effective 1 October 1995.

Since his arrival in Georgia, the Deputy to the Special Envoy has established contacts in Tbilisi and Sukhumi and has travelled to Moscow on several occasions. Following a series of bilateral meetings between my Special Envoy and representatives of the Russian Federation in Paris and in Moscow, my Special Adviser, Ismat Kittani, visited the region and Moscow for further consultations from 14 to 18 March 1996. The Russian Federation, as facilitator, continued to make intensive efforts to reach agreement on a draft protocol that might provide the basis for a Georgian-Abkhaz settlement. Under the auspices of the United Nations, with the Russian Federation as facilitator and in the presence of the representative of OSCE, a further round of consultations involving the parties to the conflict took place in Moscow from 16 to 19 July. Ambassador Brunner and his Deputy were present in Moscow for these discussions, which focused on the draft protocol. Regrettably, these efforts have not led to substantial progress and the peace process remains at a standstill.

The key issue in dispute is the future political status of Abkhazia. The Government of Georgia proposes to grant Abkhazia a wide degree of autonomy within a single federal State of Georgia. The Abkhaz side recognises that Abkhazia will be part of a single Georgian State within the boundaries of the former Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic as at 21 December 1991 and that the State should be "federative" in nature. However, it insists on describing the State as a "federative union", which will come about as the result of a treaty between two subjects of equal status under international law.

While a draft protocol may be signed in the near future, it seems unlikely that it will clearly define the political status of Abkhazia. However, it could serve as a framework for further negotiations and expert discussions not only on constitutional issues, but also in other areas such as economic matters, banking, finance, transport, communications, public policy (police, administration of justice and education), social affairs and military questions.

As part of my effort to find ways of improving the observance of human rights in the region, my Special Envoy and his Deputy initiated consultations with the Abkhaz authorities on a programme for the protection and promotion of human rights in Abkhazia. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights sent a mission to

Sukhumi from 21 to 24 February. The Abkhaz authorities have agreed to the proposed programme, which is to be carried out in cooperation with OSCE. As part of the programme, an office will be established at Sukhumi, which will be staffed by a limited number of United Nations and OSCE international officials, provided that a reliable means for funding it can be agreed.

The Mission's tasks are mandated by the Security Council under resolution 937 (1994) of 21 July 1994. It has continued to operate in the Kodori valley and in parts of the security and restricted weapons zones. The Chief Military Observer is based at Sukhumi. The Mission has a main headquarters at Sukhumi, administrative headquarters at Pitsunda and two sector headquarters (at Gali and Zugdidi).

Until recently, the Mission also had eight team bases—four in the Gali sector, three in the Zugdidi sector and one in the Kodori valley—to provide a constant presence in sensitive areas and to enable UNOMIG to cooperate closely with the peace-keeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). However, indiscriminate mine-laying by unknown individuals in the security and restricted weapons zones of the Gali sector—an activity that cost the life of one military observer earlier this year—has obliged UNOMIG to suspend its patrolling of the area and to withdraw all of its team bases there from the sector. As a result, the Mission is currently unable to operate in the region where it is most needed. It is also unable to implement fully two central aspects of its mandate; monitoring and verifying the implementation by the parties of the 1994 Moscow Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces and matters related thereto; and contributing, by its presence in the area, to the creation of conditions conducive to the safe and orderly return of refugees and displaced persons.

In view of the danger for the observers and in order to enable UNOMIG to resume its mandated activities, the Head of Mission has sought the assistance of the Georgian authorities and that of the Abkhaz side. He has also explored with the relevant authorities what measures the CIS peace-keeping force could undertake to improve the safety of the observers. On the basis of the recommendations made by a team of United Nations demining experts who visited the area earlier this year and in the light of the Head of Mission's discussions, it was decided to provide the Mission with mine-protected vehicles, demining equipment and some engineering support. This arrangement, when fully implemented, should enable UNOMIG to resume patrolling the

Gali sector at almost the same level of operational effectiveness as previously.

The situation in the security and restricted weapons zones of the Gali sector remains tense, with pervasive lawlessness and criminal acts against the local population being the main problem. The perpetrators of these acts are rarely caught and are often not even sought by the authorities, usually because of lack of resources. In the Zugdidi sector, the main issue is tension among the internally displaced persons who are anxious to return to their homes on the other bank of the Inguri river, but are unwilling to do so because of concerns about their security. The situation in the Kodori valley remains stable, but the inhabitants are still suspicious of the Abkhaz army.

To reduce ambiguity to the minimum, UNOMIG has taken the provision of the 1994 Moscow Agreement relating to the presence of armed forces in the security zone to mean that no member of the armed forces of either the Government of Georgia or the Abkhaz side, with or without a weapon and in or out of uniform, is authorised to be present in the security zone. During the reporting period violations of the agreement were reported on both sides of the Inguri river.

UNOMIG has reported that the CIS peace-keeping force has been conducting its operations within the framework of the Moscow Agreement. Cooperation between UNOMIG and the CIS peace-keeping force has been satisfactory. The Mission's cooperation with the Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities also continues to be good. It has also been cooperating with various non-governmental organisations and, through its office at Tbilisi, with OSCE.

On 17 May, the CIS Council of Heads of State extended the mandate of the CIS peace-keeping force until 19 July 1996. It instructed both the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and the Council of Ministers of Defence of the States members of Commonwealth to pursue their efforts, together with the parties, to amplify the mandate of the force. In addition, the Council decided that the force should be entrusted with the demarcation of minefields and mine clearance in the territory of Abkhazia, with the assistance of the United Nations and in cooperation with the local authorities. The Council further instructed the parties to the conflict, with the assistance of the CIS peace-keeping force, to take additional measures to ensure the safety of UNOMIG. Discussions are continuing in Moscow between the Russian Federation, the Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz side on the extension and possible expansion of the force's mandate.

During the past year, no significant advance has been made on the question of the return of refugees and displaced persons to Abkhazia. Voluntary repatriation as planned in the Quadripartite Agreement on Voluntary Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons to Abkhazia has been halted since November 1994. The Abkhaz side continues to object to the large-scale and speedy return of refugees and displaced persons and maintains its position of allowing only a limited number of persons per week to return, which is unacceptable to the Georgian side. About 30,000 persons have returned spontaneously to the Gali district, where the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees provides limited assistance as part of its special programme for displaced persons in Georgia. The continued delay in resettling internally displaced persons to Abkhazia has placed a heavy burden on the economy of Georgia, weakening its capacity to recover and exacerbating social and political tensions.

At independence, the people of Georgia had one of the highest standards of living among the republics of the former Soviet Union. Today, despite some positive signs, the economy faces difficult problems of unemployment and underemployment, an energy crisis and deterioration of public services. Emergency relief and humanitarian aid are being provided by the United Nations and donor States, while a wide range of development initiatives have been undertaken by various organisations and donors, including the Bretton Woods institutions, EU and UNDP.

12. Guatemala

Negotiations between the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) have continued under the auspices of the United Nations throughout the year to find a lasting settlement of the most protracted conflict in Central America. While advances have been uneven, the signing of seven agreements since January 1994 and the continued presence of the United Nations Mission for the Verification of Human Rights and of Compliant with the Commitments of the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala (MINUGUA) appear to confirm the irreversible nature of the peace process.

The last year has also seen the consolidation of democratic change in Guatemala, which has enhanced prospects for success in the negotiations. Among the positive developments were the strong appeal made by broad sectors of society (including, for the first time in many years, the leadership of the URNG) for people to vote in the presidential

elections; the arrival, following the elections, of new political forces in Congress; the commitment of the new Government to fight poverty and impunity; the unilateral cessation of hostilities by the URNG during the two rounds of the elections, their decision to cease offensive military action in March 1996 and, immediately thereafter, a similar commitment from the Government; and, finally, the announcement by the URNG that it would suspend its practice of exacting "war taxes" once agreement was reached on the socio-economic issues.

Negotiations on socio-economic issues and the agrarian situation began in May 1995 and proceeded at a slow pace until they were suspended in mid-December pending the election of a new Government. Following his victory in January 1996, President Alvaro Arzu reiterated his campaign pledge to continue the negotiating process and expressed his firm support for the continued presence of MINUGUA. The United Nations convened a new round of negotiations at Mexico City at the end of February 1996, and agreement was reached just over two months later on the socio-economic issues and the agrarian situation. The agreement took the form of a comprehensive package of commitments on items critical to the building of lasting peace in Guatemala, namely, an increase in government social spending, the promotion of a more efficient and equitable agrarian structure, the modernisation of public administration and a sustained increase in public revenue. The agreement, signed on 6 May, emphasised the need for democratisation, participation and consensus-building.

MINUGUA continued to fulfil the verification mandate entrusted to it in the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights and to carry out effective institution-building. The Mission's mandate was twice renewed by the General Assembly, first for six months on 4 September 1995 and then until the end of 1996 on 3 April 1996. In October 1995 and March 1996, I transmitted to the General Assembly the third and fourth reports of the Director of MINUGUA. Both documents confirmed that serious and repeated violations of human rights had continued to occur and that these had been neither clarified nor punished. While noting that some positive steps had been taken by the parties, MINUGUA observed that, overall, both the Government of Guatemala and the URNG were, by action or by omission, responsible for failure to comply with their commitments under the Comprehensive Agreement.

MINUGUA institution-building activities have become a fundamental instrument in improving respect for human rights. To that end, the MINUGUA/UNDP Joint Unit is implementing projects to

support the Judiciary, the offices of the Public Defender and the Public Prosecutor, the Ministry of the Interior's criminal investigation capacity, the Counsel for Human Rights, the Presidential Human Rights Committee and relevant non-governmental organisations. Central to this work are the funds generously provided by Member States to my trust fund for the Guatemalan peace process.

In May 1996, Leonardo Franco, who had headed MINUGUA most ably since its establishment, returned to his duty station at Geneva. I appointed David Stephen to succeed him.

Several items remain to be negotiated, namely, the strengthening of civilian power and the role of the army in a democratic society, the reintegration of the URNG into political life, a definitive ceasefire, constitutional reforms and the electoral regime and, lastly, a schedule for implementation, enforcement and verification. Both parties must press ahead towards the culmination of the peace process — the conclusion of the Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace. It is also essential that the broad international coalition that has emerged in support of the Guatemalan peace process redouble its efforts to assist in implementing the peace agreement. I will do everything in my power to ensure that MINUGUA and the relevant programmes, agencies and other bodies of the United Nations system continue to make their invaluable contribution.

13. Guyana-Venezuela

The Presidents of Guyana and Venezuela, in accordance with the Geneva Agreement of 17 February 1966, agreed in November 1989 to seek my "good offices" in the long-standing territorial dispute between their countries.

Sir Alister McIntyre, who was appointed in February 1990 as my Personal Representative for the Guyana-Venezuela controversy, has continued his efforts, meeting with facilitators from Guyana and Venezuela in New York in December 1995 and in April and June 1996. A further meeting is scheduled for October.

My Personal Representative has informed me that relations between the two countries are good and that consultations are proceeding well. He proposed that, as a result, his meetings with the facilitators be held more frequently and he expects to visit both capitals in the latter part of August.

I am encouraged that both Presidents have expressed their commitment to seek a peaceful and lasting settlement to the dispute

and that relations between the two countries continue to improve despite the setback caused by the environmental accident affecting parts of the area in dispute in August 1995. The efforts of my Personal Representative have also benefited from the support given by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Association of Caribbean States (ACS). Both Guyana and Venezuela are members of the latter organisation.

14. Haiti

During the past year, the international community intensified its efforts to help the Government of Haiti successfully to complete its transition to democracy, build the country's institutions and place it on the road to economic rehabilitation. The presence of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), succeeded by the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), as at 1 July 1996, contributed to the maintenance of a secure and stable environment conducive to the success of these efforts. During my third visit to Haiti, in October 1995, on the first anniversary of the return of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, I was able to witness this progress myself. On that occasion President Aristide praised the excellent cooperation between the Haitian authorities and UNMIH. On 16 November 1995, the Security Council commended UNMIH on the substantial progress it had made towards fulfilling its mandate as set out in resolution 940 (1994).

The 6,000-strong military component of UNMIH continued to carry out patrols, escort humanitarian relief convoys and provide logistical and security support for the presidential election and support for the Haitian authorities in the areas of law and order. UNMIH engineers undertook projects that also benefited the local population, thus enhancing the Mission's image among the Haitian people.

The training and monitoring of the Haitian National Police remained the priority task of the civilian police component of the Mission, which tailored its courses and training programmes to local requirements. A total of 847 United Nations civilian police in 19 locations provided on-the-job training and gave guidance to nearly 6,000 Haitian National Police personnel. As the development of a cadre of competent supervisors both in the field and in the administration lagged behind the training of basic-level policemen, the civilian police focused their efforts on the organisation of the managerial components of the Haitian National Police.

Mindful of the need for economy, I kept the force level of UNMIH under constant review to ensure that it continued to match the tasks

of the Mission. After a phased reduction of the military and civilian police personnel, 4,000 military and 300 civilian police personnel remained in the mission area by February 1996. At the meetings of the Trilateral Commission, special attention was paid to the planning of a smooth and orderly transfer to the Government of Haiti of the responsibilities and functions that had been carried out by UNMIH.

On 9 February, President Rene Preval asked me to take appropriate steps to bring about an extension of the mandate of UNMIH so that a gradual withdrawal might take place in the months ahead. Accordingly, on 14 February, I informed the Security Council of the Mission's achievements and recommended an extension of its mandate, as well as the reduction of both its military and civilian police components. The Council extended the mandate until 30 June with a military component reduced to 1,200 men, complemented by a 700-strong Canadian contingent funded by the Government of Canada and a civilian police component at the reduced level of 300 officers. On 5 March, Enrique ter Horst replaced Lakhdar Brahimi as my Special Representative for Haiti.

After receiving another official request from President Preval on 31 May, I recommended to the Security Council the establishment of a new mission to help professionalise the Haitian National Police in a climate of security. By its resolution 1063 (1996), the Council decided to establish UNSMIH, composed of 600 military and 300 civilian police personnel, for a period of five months. In addition, Canada and the United States agreed to finance voluntarily 700 additional military personnel. The Council also modified the previous mandate and gave priority to the continued training of the Haitian National Police under secure conditions. My Special Representative's role in the coordination of the activities of the United Nations system in the promotion of institution-building, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitation was underlined.

In spite of the gradual reduction of the United Nations presence in Haiti, public order has so far been maintained, thanks in part to the deployment of the new Haitian National Police at the end of February. However, the force remains a young and inexperienced institution that will continue to require support from the international community in the foreseeable future. Efforts are being made to help it acquire competent leadership and management, adequate premises and equipment and appropriate training.

The electoral process continued to unfold throughout 1995. Following the first round of legislative and local elections on 25 June,

reruns and run-offs took place peacefully, but with a low voter turn-out, on 13 August, 17 September and 8 October. Virtually all non-Lavalas political parties decided not to participate in these latter elections, which, they claimed, were controlled by the ruling Lavalas Movement. The degree to which the boycott contributed to low voter participation is difficult to assess, since other factors may also have played a role, including economic frustrations, voter fatigue, lack of civic education and low-key campaigning. The polls resulted in a clear victory of the Lavalas Movement. The new parliament convened on 18 October in special session and started its work under very difficult conditions, lacking adequate premises and a qualified secretariat. Its first decision was to ratify the choice of Claudette Werleigh as Prime Minister in succession to Smarck Michel, who tendered his resignation on 10 October amid increasing controversy regarding proposals for the privatisation of State-owned companies.

Although many supporters of President Aristide wished that he would remain in office for three more years to make up for the time he had spent in exile, the presidential election was held without major incident on 17 December 1995. Again, the main non-Lavalas parties, with the exception of the Parti du Congres des mouvements democratique (KONAKOM), boycotted the election and voter turn-out was very low, at only 28 per cent of registered voters. Rene Preval won 87.9 per cent of the votes cast and was inaugurated President, in accordance with the Constitution, on 7 February. The fact that a democratically elected. President succeeded another democratically elected President is to be welcomed as a significant step in the consolidation of democracy in Haiti.

On 3 April, at President Preval's request, the General Assembly extended the mandate of the United Nations component of the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) until 31 August 1996. In view of the improvement in the human rights situation, the mandate of the Mission was modified and its staff reduced to about one-third of its previous strength (32 observers each from the United Nations and the Organisation of American States (OAS)).

MICIVIH continues to monitor human rights, to inquire about possible human rights violations and, when necessary, to transmit its reports and recommendations to the authorities concerned. It has assisted the Commission for Truth and Justice in its work and cooperates with the UNMIH civilian police and the Haitian National Police in their investigations. The Mission is now focusing on the strengthening of key institutions for the protection of human rights —

the police, the penitentiary and the justice systems—and on the promotion of human rights through the development of a much needed civic education programme.

Democracy will not take root in Haiti and stability will be jeopardised if the new regime cannot improve the living conditions of the population. Unfortunately, development has been lagging behind, mainly because of administrative inertia. Financial resources are available: the international community remains committed for more than $1 billion over the next three years, part of which is not conditioned on the adoption of the structural adjustment programme. What is sorely lacking is absorptive capacity, as the ministries are ill-equipped to formulate and execute economic and social programmes.

As lead agency for governance, UNDP is providing technical assistance in this field. Progress has been made and it is hoped that projects will be implemented at a quicker pace during the remainder of the year. This would restore confidence and hope among the population. It is worth noting that many agencies of the United Nations system have included institution-building in their programmes, including the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) in the agricultural sector, the World Health Organisation (WHO) in the decentralisation of health services and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) in the field of education.

The disbursements projected by the programmes, specialised agencies and financial institutions of the United Nations system are of the order of $118 million in 1996 and $157 million in 1997. More than half of these amounts will come from the World Bank ($67 million in 1996 and $80.5 million in 1997). Other United Nations donors include the International Monetary Fund (IMF) ($18 million in 1996 and $36 million in 1997), UNDP (about $30 million in 1996-1997, Capital Development Fund included), UNICEF ($15 million in 1996-1997), WFP ($5 million in 1996 and $6.5 million in 1997), FAO, the Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO)/WHO, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and UNESCO. Although foreign investment has been encouraged, investors are still maintaining a cautious attitude.

15. India-Pakistan

The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) continued to monitor the ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir. It remains my view that the search for a political solution to this issue through a meaningful dialogue is a matter of urgency. Reports

of incidents of violence have increased considerably in recent years and the number of casualties along the line of control remained high. Both countries have affirmed their commitment to respect the ceasefire line and to resolve the issue peacefully in accordance with the Simla Agreement of 1972. I welcome the readiness recently expressed by both Governments to resume official bilateral talks and hope the positive atmosphere will facilitate an early and peaceful resolution of differences between them, including Kashmir. I remain ready to render whatever assistance may be needed in this regard, should both countries find it useful.

16. Iraq-Kuwait

As we enter the seventh year of sanctions against Iraq, I deplore the fact that their easing or lifting is blocked by Iraq's continuing failure to comply with a number of obligations in the relevant Security Council resolutions. I am pleased to be able to report, however, that over the last year the situation in the demilitarised zone between Iraq and Kuwait has been calm. The United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) has contributed to this situation through its patrolling and liaison activities. Both Iraq and Kuwait have continued to cooperate with UNIKOM, an operation that underlines the indispensable role that the United Nations continues to play in restoring security to this sensitive area.

The period under review has been marked by major development relating to the work of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), headed by Rolf Ekeus, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Action Team, with respect both to the Commission's relations with the Government of Iraq and to progress made in obtaining information regarding Iraq's proscribed nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and long-range missiles and in the disposal of those items. Despite progress in the implementation of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), significant problems remain.

A great deal of information was made available to UNSCOM and the Action Team following the departure from Iraq of General Hussein Kamel Hassan, a former head of Iraq's Military Industrialisation Corporation, which is responsible for the country's weapons programmes. In August 1995, Iraq formally acknowledged that, since the initiation of implementation of resolution 687 (1991) in April 1991, it had been withholding important information from UNSCOM and IAEA with regard to the prohibited weapons of mass destruction and

related items. Iraq undertook to cooperate fully with the Commission and IAEA to clear up outstanding issues and has since repeated this assurance. Iraq also finally admitted what the Commission had known for some time, namely, that Iraq had acquired a full-scale biological weapons programme that had included the weaponisation of biological agents and their deployment to field units just before the outbreak of the Gulf conflict. Iraq also acknowledged a much larger and more advanced chemical weapons programme than previously admitted, as well as having carried out flight tests of long-range missiles with chemical warheads.

In August 1995, the Commission obtained in Iraq more than 1 million pages of documents, photographs and other materials containing detailed information on the proscribed weapons programmes. Since then, a considerable number of additional documents have been handed over by Iraq. The Commission has focused substantial efforts and resources on the processing and analysis of these materials, work that has yielded important results and avenues for further investigation. The Commission is also continuing its investigation into Iraq's activity, particularly in the proscribed missile area, where serious concerns remain.

UNSCOM and the Action Team have continued their inspections of declared and non-declared facilities and installations in Iraq. UNSCOM has held a large number of meetings and seminars with the Government of Iraq and other States, with a view to clearing up the outstanding questions relating to Iraq's proscribed weapons programmes. Iraq has provided final declarations on these programmes. The Commission and the Action Team are in the process of verifying those declarations. This forms part of a joint programme of action the Commission has agreed upon with Iraq for resolving remaining issues under the mandate.

In March, June and July 1996, Iraq refused to grant UNSCOM inspection teams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to sites designated for inspection by the Commission under its mandate. In a statement of 19 March 1996, the Security Council termed Iraq's actions a clear violation of the Council's resolutions and demanded that the Government of Iraq act in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the Council. The repetition of the problems resulted in the Council's adoption of resolution 1060 (1996) on 12 June and a further presidential statement on 14 June. The latter considered that the actions by Iraq constituted a clear and flagrant violation of the Council's resolutions. It also requested the Executive Chairman of

UNSCOM to visit Baghdad with a view to securing immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to sites that the Commission wished to inspect as well as to engage in a forward-looking dialogue on other issues.

The visit to Baghdad resulted in a joint statement signed by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Tariq Aziz, and the Executive Chairman. The statement includes an undertaking by Iraq to secure immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to all sites the Commission wishes to inspect and an undertaking by UNSCOM that it will operate with full respect for the legitimate security concerns of Iraq. A joint programme of action aimed at resolving outstanding issues was also agreed upon. Despite these agreements, UNSCOM encountered serious problems in July when Iraq's actions made it impossible to conduct inspections in accordance with the Commission's mandate. Problems also surfaced in connection with UNSCOM efforts to verify Iraq's declarations through interviews with personnel whom Iraq had declared as having been involved in its proscribed weapons programmes. Iraq refused to grant access to certain personnel whom UNSCOM wished to interview and attempted to impose conditions on the conduct of the interviews, which, in the view of UNSCOM, would render them of little value in the verification process.

The operations of the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre continue to be successful in the implementation of the plans approved under resolution 715 (1991) for monitoring and verification and in support of the inspection activities of UNSCOM and the Action Team under resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991). The technical quality of the Centre has been improved through the installation of a chemical laboratory and a biology room. Security has been strengthened. International monitoring teams covering all weapons categories and aerial surveillance, supported by advanced sensors and communications systems, are now in place and working at full capacity. The quality of the work has been assured because of the consistently high quality of the support provided by Member States.

With the unanimous adoption on 27 March of resolution 1051 (1996) — the export/import monitoring mechanism—an important step has been taken towards the full realisation of the system for ongoing monitoring and verification to ensure that Iraq does not reacquire items and capabilities proscribed to it. The implementation of the resolution and the mechanism is well under way. Iraq is already required to notify the acquisition of dual-use items.

The Government of Germany has continued to provide the Commission and IAEA with invaluable air support for the conduct of their operations by providing both fixed-wing and rotary aircraft. This high-quality support represents one of the largest elements of assistance provided to the Commission and IAEA and remains essential to the implementation of their mandates. However, the Government of Germany has indicated its wish to terminate its support and the Commission is therefore looking to other Governments for replacements. The Commission expects, in the very near future, to complete new arrangements with the Government of Chile for the provision of the helicopter support required for operations of the Commission and IAEA in Iraq. It is expected to deploy this support in the course of August 1996. The Government of Bahrain's support for the Commission's Field Office has been outstanding and remains essential to the continued logistics lifeline to activities of the Commission and IAEA in Iraq. I wish to express the Organisation's gratitude to these and other Member States that have contributed to UNSCOM operations through the provision of specialist personnel, equipment and financial resources. Over 50 Governments have now contributed voluntarily to this important operation. At the same time, the financial situation of the Special Commission, which is also responsible for financing the personnel and operation of the Action Team, remains a source of concern.

I have long been concerned over the plight of the Iraqi civilian population affected by the sanctions regimes and have taken every opportunity to urge Iraq to accept the temporary humanitarian measure of selling oil to purchase humanitarian goods contained initially in Security Council resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991) and subsequently in resolution 986 (1995). I began consultations with the Government of Iraq in June 1995 and was very encouraged when, in January 1996, I obtained its agreement to conduct formal negotiations on the implementation of resolution 986 (1995). I then requested Hans Correll, Under-Secretary-General and United Nations Legal Counsel, to lead talks with Iraqi officials, which began in New York on 6 February 1996. Abdul-Amir Al-Anbari, Ambassador of Iraq to UNESCO, headed the Iraqi side.

On 20 May, an important step was taken when a Memorandum of Understanding on the implementation of the resolution was concluded between the Secretariat of the United Nations and the Government of Iraq. The President of the Security Council informed me that the members welcomed the conclusion of the Memorandum of

Understanding and extended their congratulations on its achievement. On 15 July, the Government of Iraq submitted a Distribution Plan, as required by the resolution, which I approved on 18 July, subject to the condition that its implementation would be governed by resolution 986 (1995) and the Memorandum of Understanding and would be without. prejudice to the procedures employed by the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990). On 8 August, after several weeks of intensive deliberations, that Committee adopted the procedures to be employed by it in the discharge of its responsibilities under paragraph 12 of resolution 986 (1995).

In its resolution 986 (1995), the Security Council stipulates that the United Nations Inter-agency Humanitarian Programme, taking into account the exceptional circumstances prevailing in the three northern governorates, be provided an allocation of between $130 million and $150 million every 90 days to complement the distribution by the Government of Iraq of goods imported under the resolution. Accordingly, the Inter-agency Humanitarian Programme, in close consultation with local authorities, undertook to identify the humanitarian requirements in those governorates.

In southern and central Iraq, the distribution of humanitarian supplies is the responsibility of the Government of Iraq, while the United Nations Inter-agency Humanitarian Programme, based on relevant provisions of resolution 986 (1995) and those related to the Memorandum of Understanding, will verify and report on the volume and cash value of the humanitarian supplies arriving for distribution in Iraq; assure that these supplies are distributed equitably; and assess the adequacy of distributed humanitarian supplies in relation to the welfare and needs of the Iraqi population.

Major efforts have been made by the United Nations and other humanitarian organisations to assist the most vulnerable groups of the population of Iraq in meeting their basic needs in the areas of food and nutrition, health, water and sanitation, agriculture and shelter. However, the response to the April 1995-March 1996 consolidated inter-agency appeal remained significantly below the requirements resulting from the difficulties faced by children, women, elderly people and an increasing number of indigent families in Iraq. Several United Nations agencies operating in the field reported a continued deterioration of health and nutritional conditions, with an estimated 4 million people, the majority of them children under five, being in danger of severe physical and mental damage as a result of malnutrition.

In October 1995, to ensure a better response to the worsening nutrition situation in the country, WFP undertook a review of the people in need of assistance, which resulted in an increase of the number of people eligible for food aid to 2.15 million. Total deliveries of food assistance during 1995 were estimated at only 53 per cent of the quantities distributed during 1994. As a result, critical shortages of food stocks necessitated severe cuts in the ration scale and the number of beneficiaries countrywide.

UNICEF-supported immunisation programmes have been suecessful. With the involvement of UNICEF and WHO, some 3.5 million children under the age of five were immunised against polio and 2.5 million against measles, countrywide. The two-round campaign against neonatal tetanus in high-risk areas covered approximately 1 million women of childbearing age. Significant responses were made towards controlling diarrhoeal and respiratory infection diseases and vitamin A deficiencies.

Limited assistance went to the education sector. Support to the rehabitation of water supply and sanitation facilities and the provision of school supplies, stationery and kerosene heaters have been important components in improving the learning environment. UN1CEF has continued to assist in teacher-training programmes. UNESCO has been manufacturing and distributing desks, and repairing classrooms in the most affected governorates.

UNDP assisted in rehabilitating part of the water supply and sewage treatment facilities in Baghdad and in rural areas. UNDP also sup ported activities related to disabled persons and women. An important achievement during 1995 was the preparation of Iraq's first ever Human Development Report, which contains up-to-date economic development indicators. UNDP also launched a rehabilitation project to produce locally, in cooperation with the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, chlorine gas for the purification of drinking water.

Resettlement activities continued under the coordination of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs. With the support of some 30 non-governmental organisations and bilateral programmes, approximately 17,000 families received help in resettling in their villages of origin during 1995.

The security environment in the three northern governorates continued to affect humanitarian activities in the border areas north

of Dohuk and in areas of local conflicts in northern parts of Irbil. In December 1995, two United Nations guards were killed by an explosive device while on duty in the governorate of Irbil. The guard contingent in Iraq has been providing security and communication services to United Nations agencies and non-governmental organisations working within the framework of the Inter-agency Humanitarian Programme in Iraq. The contingent, at a manpower level of 150 at the end of 1995, provides advisory services to relief personnel, escorts humanitarian convoys and services United Nations communications in the northern governorates.

In a letter dated 31 May 1996 to the humanitarian community and Member States, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs called for continued funding support to cover substantive aspects of the Humanitarian Programme, in particular in the sector of food assistance and nutrition, basic health, agriculture, water and sanitation, as well as education and resettlement. A consolidated inter-agency humanitarian programme document covering humanitarian activities during the period from April 1996 to March 1997 was attached to the letter. Priority requirements for the period from 1 June to 31 August 1996 were estimated at $80.5 million.

It is a matter of great concern to me that more than 600 Kuwaiti and third-country nationals are still missing in Iraq, and I once again call upon Iraq to comply fully with its obligations in this regard. I commend the concerted efforts made by ICRC, which was given the mandate to facilitate the resolution of this important humanitarian issue, and note with satisfaction that the United Nations has been able to contribute to the effort by providing security and logistical support at UNIKOM headquarters on the Iraq-Kuwait border for the holding of a number of meetings, chaired by ICRC, of the Tripartite Commission's technical subcommittee on the military and civilian missing and mortal remains.

The return of property seized by Iraq to Kuwait is another of Iraq's obligations. Since my last report, however, only a few additional items have been returned. Of particular concern to me are those items which are irreplaceable, including archives belonging to the Offices of the Amir, the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the Foreign Ministry. Other missing items of particular significance are properties belonging to Kuwait's Ministry of Defence, including 8 Mirage F Is, 200 BMB2 carriers, 6 M84 tanks, 90 MI 13 carriers, a Hawk missile battery, 483 Strila 3 missile batteries, 206 Osa missile batteries and 5 Amon anti-aircraft batteries. My Coordinator for the return of property from Iraq

to Kuwait will continue to be available to the parties to arrange the return of these and any other items.

The United Nations Compensation Commission, which was established to administer the United Nations compensation fund provided for in paragraph 18 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), continued its efforts to resolve more than 2.6 million claims for compensation filed by 90 Governments and three international organisations representing stateless individuals.

As of August 1996, all but 150,000 of the 957,902 category "A" departure claims had been resolved. The sixth and final instalment of category "A" claims will be reviewed by the Commission's Governing Council in October 1996. The total amount of compensation awarded to successful category "A" claimants is $2.9 billion. All 6,011 category "B" serious personal injury and death claims have been resolved and the Commission's programme for such claims was concluded in December 1995. The Panel of Commissioners resolving 426,000 category "C" claims (individual losses up to $100,000) has so far issued three instalment reports covering 130,000 claims worth nearly $1 billion. In total, nearly $4 billion in compensation has so far been awarded to more than 1 million claimants.

A separate commissioner panel is resolving 1.24 million category "C" claims filed in a consolidated fashion by the Egyptian Central Bank on behalf of former workers in Iraq claiming for the non-transference of bank remittances. During the last year, the Commission also began the process of evaluating 10,204 category "D" claims (individual losses above $ 100,000), 6,150 category "E" corporate claims and 256 category "F" government claims. One corporate claims panel is addressing the claim of the Kuwait Oil Company for the cost of extinguishing the oil well fires in Kuwait following the conclusion of the Gulf War.

Unfortunately, only the 4,000 successful category "B" claimants (serious personal injury and death) have had their compensation awards paid in full. These payments, amounting $ 13.4 million, were possible only through savings made in the Commission's operating budget. The remaining $4 billion in compensation awards has remained unpaid because of the continuing lack of sufficient resources in the compensation fund.

17. Korean Peninsula

I continued to follow developments on the Korean peninsula closely and visited the Republic of Korea in March 1996. As in previous years,

my position remains that all parties concerned should continue to observe the provisions of the 1953 Armistice Agreement until a permanent peace agreement is negotiated to ensure peace and security in the peninsula. I welcome current efforts and proposals to initiate a process towards that end. I am also pleased to note that progress continues to be made in the implementation of the 1994 Framework Agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America. Hopefully, achievements in these areas will result in the early resumption of North-South dialogue that will eventually lead to a peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula. I remain ready to provide any good offices that the parties might find useful in facilitating the process.

18. Liberia

The United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was established under Security Council resolution 856 (1993) of 10 August 1993 to work with the Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the implementation of the Cotonou Peace Agreement signed between the Liberian parties on 25 July 1993. The Cotonou Agreement was supplemented the following year by the Akosombo Agreement and by the Accra Agreement. This framework was replaced on 19 August 1995 by the Abuja Agreement, which provided for a new Council of State to head a Liberian National Transitional Government and for a ceasefire, disarmament and elections within 12 months. In accordance with the Abuja Agreement, a ceasefire came into effect on 26 August 1995 and the newly composed Council of State, made up of the heads of the main factions and representatives of civilian groups, was installed at Monrovia on 1 September.

In its resolution 1014 (1995) of 15 September 1995, the Security Council extended the mandate of UNOMIL until 31 January 1996. Under resolution 1020 (1995) of 10 November, the Council endorsed the proposals contained in my report of 23 October to adjust the mandate of UNOMIL in the light of the Abuja Agreement and of the lessons learned since the Mission was first established. Accordingly, UNOMIL was mandated to exercise its good offices to support the efforts of ECOWAS and the Liberian National Transitional Government in the implementation of the Abuja Agreement; to investigate violations of the ceasefire and monitor compliance with the other military provisions of the peace agreements, including disengagement of forces, disarmament and observance of the arms embargo; to assist in the

implementation of a programme for demobilisation of combatants; to support humanitarian activities; to investigate and report on violations of human rights; and to observe and verify free and fair elections scheduled to be held in August 1996. UNOMIL was authorised to deploy 160 military observers, who were to be co-located with ECOMOG, which continues to play the lead role in assisting the implementation of the military provisions of the peace process.

Despite the hopes raised by the installation of the Council of State on 1 September 1995, the peace process in Liberia soon encountered renewed difficulties. In accordance with the Abuja Agreement, the factions were to disengage by 26 September and assemble in encampment sites in preparation for the commencement of disarmament and demobilisation by 1 December 1995. These deadlines were never met. In addition, owing to a chronic lack of logistic and financial resources, ECOMOG was not able to deploy throughout the country in accordance with its concept of operations.

In my fifteenth progress report to the Security Council on UNOMIL, dated 23 January 1996, I expressed concern over these and other delays in the implementation of the Abuja Agreement. In its resolution 1041 (1996) of 29 January, the Council extended the mandate of UNOMIL until 31 May 1996, and called upon the Liberian parties fully to respect and implement the Abuja Agreement, in particular those provisions relating to the maintenance of the ceasefire, disarmament and demobilisation of combatants and national reconciliation.

During the first few months of this year, however, the peace process in Liberia continued to deteriorate. Ongoing skirmishes between and among the various factions escalated. On 1 March, ECOMOG withdrew from Tumanburg following continued heavy fighting between it and troops of General Roosevelt Johnson's wing of the United Liberation Movement for Democracy (ULIMO-J). Internal conflicts within ULIMO-J and fighting between and among the various other factions created growing discord among members of the Council of State. In addition, the Council itself began to operate increasingly in ways that caused concern that some Liberian leaders were sidestepping the transitional arrangements and processes provided for under the Abuja Agreement.

The attempted arrest by the Council of State of General Roosevelt Johnson led on 6 April to a serious outbreak of factional fighting in Monrovia between Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and Alhaji Kromah's ULIMO-K on the one hand, and the

mainly Krahn forces of Johnson's ULIMO-J, the Liberia Peace Council (LPC) and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) on the other. Widespread looting and the complete breakdown of law and order in the capital ensued. The resulting hostilities led to the deaths of many innocent civilians, the destruction of large parts of Monrovia and large numbers of refugees and displaced persons. In addition, most of the UNOMIL civilian and military personnel, as well as the personnel of the United Nations agencies and non-governmental organisations, were forced to evacuate. Their offices and warehouses, and most of Monrovia, were thoroughly looted by the fighters. Even so, UNOMIL has maintained a staff of 25 essential personnel in Liberia to assist in restoring the peace process.

On 9 April, the Security Council issued a presidential statement ex pressing grave concern at the outbreak of fighting in Monrovia and at the rapidly deteriorating situation throughout the country. On 18 April, my Special Envoy, James O. C. Jonah, arrived in Monrovia to assist the United Nations/ECOWAS mediation team in its efforts to find a peaceful resolution of the crisis and to assess the future prospects of the peace process and the role the United Nations could play in that regard. Jonah reported that the restoration of the Abuja Agreement would be a difficult process, given the deep mistrust that had developed between the factions. He also emphasised the need for Monrovia to be restored as a safe haven and for the Council of State to work within the spirit of the transitional arrangements envisaged under the Abuja Agreement.

As diplomatic efforts to deal with the crisis in Liberia intensified, the first meeting of the International Contact Group on Liberia was held on 26 April at Geneva. The meeting, which was organised at the initiative of the United States, was intended to bring together key donor Governments, the United Nations, ECOWAS, OAU and international agencies concerned with Liberia.

On 29 April, after a brief lull in the conflict, an attempted meeting of the Council of State was cut short when fighting erupted between ULIMO-J and NPFL/ULIMO-K forces near the Executive Mansion. Intense hostilities resumed in Monrovia. Fighters who had withdrawn to outlying areas returned to the city in large numbers, forcing ECOMOG to withdraw from the city centre. At the initiative of President Jerry Rawlings of the Republic of Ghana, Chairman of ECOWAS, a summit meeting of the ECOWAS Committee of Nine was called for 7 and 8 May at Accra. However, the summit had to be

postponed following the failure of seven of the nine Heads of State to attend and the refusal of Councilman Taylor and Councilman Kromah to travel to Accra for the meeting.

In the absence of a summit meeting, the ECOWAS Foreign Ministers adopted a Mechanism for Returning Liberia to the Abuja Agreement, under which they reaffirmed the Abuja Agreement as the basis for achieving peace in Liberia and agreed on a number of conditions to be fulfilled by the Liberian factions. The strategy that emerged from Accra was that ECOWAS would give the Liberian faction leaders two months to meet certain basic conditions, including the withdrawal of fighters from Monrovia and the redeployment of ECOMOG in the city; the return of weapons taken from ECOMOG and vehicles and other equipment looted from UNOMIL, the United Nations agencies and non-governmental organisations; respect for Monrovia as a safe haven; and a return to the Abuja peace process. Unless the Liberian faction leaders demonstrated the will to meet those requirements, ECOWAS would have to re-examine its role and presence in Liberia at its forthcoming summit in July/August.

On 21 May, I submitted a further report to the Security Council on the situation in Liberia, recommending an extension of UNOMIL for an additional three months at its already reduced level, full support for the recommendations made by the Council of Ministers in Accra and enhanced logistical and financial support from the international community for ECOMOG. I noted that the role foreseen for UNOMIL in Liberia had been predicated upon the assumption that ECOMOG would be in a position to perform the wide-ranging tasks entrusted to it. Unfortunately, ECOMOG had never received the manpower and resources necessary to enable it to carry out its responsibilities effectively. I also noted that, should ECOWAS be compelled to withdraw ECOMOG from Liberia, UNOMIL would have no choice but to withdraw also.

The summit meeting of ECOWAS was held at Abuja on 26 and 27 July and was preceded by a meeting of ECOWAS Foreign Ministers. I was represented by my Special Envoy, accompanied by my Special Representative for Liberia, Anthony Nyakyi, and an expert on electoral matters. Questions considered there included the possibility of holding the elections before disarmament and demobilisation; conducting the elections on the basis of proportional representation; the imposition of sanctions on recalcitrant factions and their leaders; enhancing the role of ECOWAS; strengthening the capabilities of ECOMOG; and

reviewing the role of the United Nations. Some of the Liberian faction leaders who attended the summit expressed a readiness to cooperate, in order to ensure that the elections were free and fair. They seemed to have realised that the international community no longer trusted their statements and that they must translate them into actions, in particular total respect for the ceasefire, disarmament and demobilisation, the return of refugees and enabling ECOMOG and UNOMIL to discharge their mandates.

The ECOWAS summit also instructed its Committee of Nine on Liberia to convene a meeting not later than 18 August to resume discussion of the following outstanding issues: *(a)* the reconstitution of the Council of State, whose inadequate performance was criticised by a number of ECOWAS leaders; (b) the signing of the long-pending agreement on the status of ECOMOG in Liberia; *(c)* the revision and re-validation of the Abuja Agreement with a new schedule of implementation; *(d)* the imposition of sanctions on recalcitrant faction leaders; and *(e)* the conditions, timing and modalities of the elections.

As of early July 1996, the fighting in Liberia had left 150,000 people dead, more than 500,000 internally displaced and nearly 800,000 as refugees in neighbouring countries. When the Abuja Agreement was signed in August 1995, the international relief community presumed that the peace would require an intense humanitarian assistance effort for at least a year as refugees and internally displaced persons began to consider. returning home. This planning parameter was reflected in the United Nations inter-agency consolidated appeal for Liberia, launched by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs in October 1995, which sought $110 million for humanitarian assistance activities. The peace agreement also brought demobilisation to the top of the planning agenda. Successful demobilisation, in many ways the programmatic centrepiece of the peace agreement, would require the concerted and coordinated efforts of the whole relief community if peace was to hold.

In October 1995,1 requested the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs to visit Liberia in an attempt to increase international attention to this forgotten emergency. One month later, a United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Liberia took up his duties in Monrovia as head of the United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Office.

Also in October, to support the peace process and capitalise on the optimism it had generated in the international community, I decided

to convene a donors' conference, which would provide an opportunity to support three areas critical to the peace process: support for ECOMOG, demobilisation and humanitarian programmes. On 27 October, Member States assembled to address those issues under my joint chairmanship with President Rawlings of Ghana and Wilton Sankawolo, Chairman of the Liberian Council of State. While the meeting was deemed a success, it did not result in the pledges required.

The renewed outbreak of hostilities in Monrovia in April 1996 forced the evacuation from Monrovia of nearly all international relief personnel. Only 15 international United Nations humanitarian staff members were able to remain, including the Humanitarian Coordinator and several of his staff. The Coordinator and his staff worked closely with United Nations agency colleagues from WFP, other United Nations agencies and a small number of international and local nongovernmental organisations to assess the impact of the fighting on civilian populations and then deliver aid to the needy.

The challenges for the relief community in the days ahead include completing a full assessment of the impact of the fighting, restarting op erations up-country and revising plans for demobilisation and reintegration. Those challenges are being met in a working environment where security is minimal at best and where agencies and donors, having seen their humanitarian equipment completely looted by factions two and sometimes three times, are very concerned about the future of relief efforts in Liberia. United Nations agencies and international non governmental organisations have decided to provide only essential services on a targeted basis until better operating conditions are ensured.

19. Middle East

The period covered by this report was marked by a series of developments underlining the existing difficulties but also demonstrating the parties' determination to proceed on the road to peace. The concentrated efforts of the United Nations have been aimed at supporting the peace process, politically and economically, in order to reinforce what has been achieved in the course of negotiations and to help build the foundations for a lasting peace in the Middle East.

Following the signing of the Interim Agreement by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) on 28 September 1995, the re-deployment of Israeli military forces began in November and was completed, in some cases ahead of schedule, in a number of major cities in the West Bank and in many towns and villages. Authority

was transferred to the Palestinians in varying degrees in additional areas, such as local government and commercial activities, and the arrival of Palestinian police was carried out smoothly. A particularly outstanding achievement was the holding of the first Palestinian elections on 20 January 1996. I warmly welcomed this decisive development, which constituted an important step towards the achievement of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and provided a solid basis towards their self-determination.

The Israeli-Palestinian peace talks have been accompanied by tragic events, however, first and foremost the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin at a peace rally in Tel Aviv on 4 November 1995. I represented the United Nations at his funeral. The world was further dismayed by four suicide bombings in Israel in February and March, which caused 60 deaths and hundreds of injuries. I condemned this upsurge of terrorism in the strongest terms and called on the world community to unite in action against such despicable acts of violence. Following these events, I attended the Summit of Peacemakers in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, at the invitation of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and United States President Bill Clinton. Fully supporting the Summit's decisions, I expressed the readiness of the United Nations to assist in implementing them in the legal and practical fields.

At the same time, the prolonged closure of the West Bank and Gaza, which was intended by Israel to prevent further terrorist attacks, became the focus of international attention because of its drastic effect on the Palestinian economy. In a letter dated 28 March, I urged Prime Minister Shimon Peres to consider lifting the closure, at least gradually, in order to allow the normal provision of services by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to Palestinian refugees. The subject was taken up by the Security Council at a formal meeting on 15 April 1996.

The United Nations system of programmes and agencies, under the general guidance of the Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories, Terje Rod Larsen, has continued to provide assistance to the Palestinian people. A coordination mechanism has been established on the ground to ensure effective disbursement of donor funds. A measure of progress has been achieved in job creation, institution-building, infrastructure development and police training. However, some momentum was lost because of Israel's closure of the West Bank and Gaza, and it took more effort to sustain these improvements.

In late March, the Special Coordinator, in cooperation with the Palestinian Authority, the Government of Israel and key donors, developed an emergency humanitarian plan in an effort to ease the social and economic dislocation of the Palestinians. Immediately put into effect, the plan has attempted to alleviate closure-related hardships and losses by creating job opportunities, project development and the mobilisation of necessary resources.

On 15 July, UNRWA headquarters were transferred from Vienna to Gaza City. The move will allow much closer coordination between headquarters and field operations and better contact between UNRWA and the beneficiaries of its services, the Palestinian refugees.

The situation in southern Lebanon, where Israel has continued to occupy Lebanese territory, remained tense and volatile. Hostilities continued between the Israel Defence Forces and armed elements, mainly the Islamic Resistance, who have proclaimed their determination to resist the Israeli occupation. On several occasions, civilian targets on both sides came under attack. I urged the parties to exercise restraint, bearing in mind the risk of escalation, which remains high in a situation where the actions of the parties on the ground are influenced by both local dynamics and strategic considerations. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) continued to do its best to limit the conflict and to protect inhabitants from its effects.

In February and March, there was a steady escalation of tension along the Israel-Lebanon border. The fighting in Lebanon intensified and the number of military casualties, in particular on the Israeli side, increased. In one incident, on 4 March, four Israel Defence Force soldiers were killed and nine others were wounded by a roadside bomb. In another incident, on 20 March, a suicide bomber hurled himself at an Israeli convoy in south Lebanon, killing one Israeli officer and wounding five others. These incidents coincided with suicide bomb attacks in Israel, responsibility for which was claimed by the Palestinian faction Hamas. On 30 March, armed elements in Lebanon fired rockets towards Israel after two civilians in Lebanon had been killed by Israeli missile fire. On 9 April, armed elements again fired rockets towards Israel after a south Lebanese youth was killed in the explosion of an anti-personnel device. The rockets caused damage and mostly light casualties among Israeli citizens.

A particularly grave escalation of hostilities occurred in April. From 11 to 26 April, the Israel Defence Forces launched massive artillery strikes against southern Lebanon and air raids inside Lebanon,

including Beirut and the Beka'a valley. Israeli aircraft carried out attacks on villages in and around the UNIFIL area of operation. In response, armed elements fired more than 1,000 rockets at targets in Israel and at Israeli positions in Lebanon, causing injuries and damage. Concerned about the dangerous flare-up of fighting, I urged the parties to exercise restraint and to implement all relevant Security Council resolutions. The Council addressed the situation in Lebanon during a formal meeting on 15 April.

The hostilities resulted in hundreds of casualties among Lebanese civilians and caused the re-location of hundreds of thousands of people. Dozens of Lebanese villages were destroyed or damaged. Roads, bridges and elements of infrastructure were targeted and put out of order or demolished. More than 5,000 people sought refuge with UNIFIL. In one incident on 18 April, more than 100 people were killed and hundreds wounded when Israeli shells hit the UNIFIL position (the headquarters of the Fijian battalion) in the village of Qana at a time when hundreds of civilians had sought refuge there.

I viewed with utmost gravity the shelling of the Fijian position, as I would hostilities directed against any United Nations peace-keeping position. In view of the seriousness of the events at Qana, I immediately dispatched my Military Adviser, Major-General Franklin van Kappen, to Lebanon to conduct an investigation into the shelling and submitted his findings and Israel's comments to the Security Council.

At another formal meeting on 18 April, the Security Council adopted resolution 1052 (1996), in which it called for an immediate cessation of hostilities by all parties and supported the ongoing diplomatic efforts to that end. It also called upon all concerned to respect the safety, security and freedom of movement of UNIFIL and to allow it to fulfil its mandate without any obstacle or interference. Subsequently, the General Assembly, during its resumed fiftieth session and at the request of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, adopted resolution 50/22 C entitled "The Israeli military attacks against Lebanon and their consequences", under the agenda item on the situation in the Middle East.

The fighting stopped after the announcement of a ceasefire agreement on 26 April, which was the result of intensive diplomatic efforts by the United States and France in particular. Armed groups in Lebanon committed themselves not to carry out attacks into Israel and Israel undertook not to fire at civilian targets in Lebanon. The understanding provides for a monitoring group consisting of France,

Israel, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and the United States. This agreement has the potential to contribute to the protection of civilians and to restrain the parties, and I have instructed UNIFIL to provide assistance to the monitoring group, which has requested facilities for its meetings at the UNIFIL headquarters compound at Naqoura. I welcomed the agreement and expressed my earnest hope that the restoration of calm in the area would enhance the prospects for negotiations leading to a comprehensive peace settlement that would preclude further tragic events. Since the end of April, the situation in southern Lebanon has been relatively calm, allowing the return of displaced people to their home areas. However, hostilities between armed elements and Israeli forces have continued as before.

Throughout the violence, UNIFIL continued to do its best to protect the civilian population and to provide humanitarian assistance. Despite the Israeli bombardment and harassment by both sides, UNIFIL continued to patrol its area actively. It organised convoys for the villagers who wished to leave and brought supplies for those who chose to remain. It also provided shelter, food and medicine to the civilians who had sought protection at its camps and positions.

On 13 April, the Government of Lebanon requested the United Nations to prepare and launch an international appeal for assistance. One week later, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs launched a flash appeal seeking $8.6 million for emergency relief for the 20,000 most affected families, representing 100,000 to 120,000 of the 400,000 persons displaced by the hostilities. The overall response of the international community has been positive, with donors committing approximately $ 13 million. On 20 and 21 April, the Department dispatched two aircraft to Beirut with relief supplies made available by the Government of Italy with a total value of $250,000. Commodities included blankets, emergency health kits, jerry cans, kitchen sets, water tanks, water pumps and generators, most of which were transferred to the UNIFIL logistics base at Tyre for distribution in the affected areas.

In its resolution 1068 (1996) of 30 July, the Security Council reaffirmed the mandate of UNIFIL as defined in its resolution 425 (1978) and subsequent resolutions, namely, to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, to restore international peace and security and to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. Pursuant to Council resolution 1006 (1995), the operation's administrative and support services have been streamlined,

an exercise completed in May 1996 that should achieve direct savings, in personnel costs of approximately $ 10 million per year. The year's events have high lighted the obstacles that have for so long prevented UNIFIL from implementing its mandate. As in the past, the parties have not cooperated with the Force to the extent required and there has been no active political pressure on them to do so. In the circumstances, UNIFIL has done its best to limit violence and to protect the civilian population. However, as a peace-keeping force, it is powerless when either party is bent on confrontation.

The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) continued to supervise the separation between Israeli and Syrian forces and the. limitation of armaments and forces provided for in the disengagement agreement of 1974. With the cooperation of both sides, UNDOF has discharged its tasks effectively and its area of operation has been quiet. In my report of 28 May, I noted that the enduring scarcity of resources available to the Organisation had compelled me to seek ways to reduce expenditures in UNDOF and other peace-keeping operations. Since 1992, UNDOF has implemented two streamlining exercises, which have reduced its size and budget by more than 20 per cent, leaving it a very lean and cost-effective operation. That this had been possible is due in large part to the very good cooperation extended to the Force by both Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. UNDOF will be kept under close scrutiny with a view to using every opportunity for further economies.

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), which was the first United Nations peace-keeping operation and is thus the oldest, having been in existence for over 48 years, has continued to assist UNDOF and UNIFIL in carrying out their tasks and has maintained its small presence in Egypt. A gradual streamlining undertaken by UNTSO is nearing completion. This exercise will result in a reduction in strength and corresponding savings in its annual budget of over 20 per cent.

Multilateral negotiations on Middle East regional issues such as economic cooperation, environment, refugees and water resources have continued, creating a network of common projects among countries in the region. The United Nations is actively engaged as a full extraregional participant in these proceedings.

20. Myanmar

In keeping with the good offices mandate I received from the General Assembly and from the Commission on Human Rights, I

continued my dialogue with the Government of Myanmar in order to address the various issues of concern to the international community, in particular the process of democratisation and national reconciliation in that country. During the period under review, my Representatives held talks in New York in April and in Bangkok in June with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but the Government did not accede to my request for discussions to be held in Yangon.

While welcoming the willingness expressed by the Government to continue a dialogue with me and my Representatives, I note with disappointment the lack of progress in addressing the concerns reflected in General Assembly resolutions. I look forward to further contacts in Myanmar prior to the submission of my report on this subject to the Assembly at its fifty-first session.

21. Nigeria

The annulment of the results of the 1993 presidential election in Nigeria witnessed the beginning of political tension and confrontation between the Government of Nigeria and its opponents. In 1995, a number of military officers and civilians were sentenced for involvement in what the Government described as an attempted coup. I sent a Special Envoy to appeal to the Government to commute the sentences, which it agreed to do. In the meantime, a number of Nigerians from the Ogoni area were submitted to trial under the Civil Disturbance (Special Tribunal) Act. Nine of them, including the writer and human rights activist Ken SaroWiwa, were subsequently sentenced to death and executed, despite worldwide demand that the sentences be commuted. These executions led to international condemnation and to the adoption of General Assembly resolution 50/199.

Pursuant to that resolution and taking into consideration the request made by the Government of Nigeria, I dispatched a mission, led by Justice Atsu-Koffi Amega, former President of the Supreme Court and former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Togo. The other members of the mission were Justice V. A. Malimath, member of the National Human Rights Commission of India, and John P. Pace, Chief of the Legislation and Prevention of. Discrimination Branch of the Centre for Human Rights of the Secretariat. The mission visited Nigeria from 28 March to 13 April 1996. Its report, submitted on 23 April, dealt with the two main issues under its terms of reference: the trials and the programme of transition to a civilian and democratic rule.

With respect to the trials, which were carried out under the Civil Disturbance (Special Tribunal) Act, the mission recommended the

repeal of the Act, or failing that, that it be amended to ensure: *(a)* the deletion of its provisions appointing a serving member of the armed forces to the Special Tribunal and excluding the jurisdiction of the courts of law to review the decisions of the Special Tribunal; and (b) the addition of provisions appointing the members of the Special Tribunal on the recommendation of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria, confirming the order of conviction and sentence by the Nigerian Court of Appeal instead of the Provisional Ruling Council and appealing to the Supreme Court against the decision of the Special Tribunal.

As for the transition programme, the mission recommended the release of all political detainees under Decree No. 2 of 1984 and the granting of amnesty to persons convicted of political offences. It also recommended that the present committees and commissions under the programme be strengthened by inviting persons holding different shades of opinion to participate; that an international team of observers monitor the implementation of the programme; that all decrees promulgated by the military Government be reviewed with a view to repealing those which encroached on the human rights provisions of the constitution; that orders and judgements by the courts be carried out promptly by the Government; that restrictions on political and professional organisations be lifted; and that restrictions on the freedom of expression be removed.

I sent my Special Envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, to Abuja from 10 to 14 April. He presented the report of the fact-finding mission to the Head of State of Nigeria, General Sani Abacha, and urged him to implement the mission's recommendations. In a letter to me dated 21 May, the Special Adviser to the Head of State indicated the steps the Government was taking to implement some of the recommendations. I sent Assistant Secretary-General Lansana Kouyate as my Special Envoy to Abuja from 26 to 28 June and again from 9 to 10 August for follow-up consultations with the Government. I am convinced that implementation of the report's recommendations, in particular those relating to the release of political prisoners and detainees and respect for human rights and political freedoms, will promote national reconciliation and encourage Nigerians of different political affiliations to take part in the transition programme and democratic process of their country.

22. The Papua New Guinea Island of Bougainville

I welcomed the All-Bougainville Leaders' Talks, held at Cairns from 14 to 18 December 1995, which were attended by major

Bougainville political figures. At the request of the Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, and with the agreement of both sides to the conflict, my Representative, as well as the Representative of the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, assisted in facilitating the talks. In a joint communique and an agenda adopted at the meeting, the two delegations agreed to an agenda and a process of dialogue, subject to the agreement of the Government of Papua New Guinea, which would lead to a new round of talks in 1996 inside Bougainville. The Bougainvillian delegations also agreed to facilitate the implementation of a reconstruction and rehabilitation programme by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and an immunisation programme by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).

Unfortunately, there has been no follow-up to the Cairns talks, the outcome of which did not receive the ratification of the Government of Papua New Guinea. Since the beginning of the year, the situation on the ground has been marred by a series of incidents, leading eventually to the Government's announcement that, owing to the increase in attacks by the Bougainville Revolutionary Army, it was lifting the ceasefire which had been technically in place since September 1994. The deteriorating situation on the island has, in turn, had spill-over effects on the Solomon Islands. I take this opportunity to reiterate my conviction that only a political solution can bring the conflict in Bougainville to an end. For my part, I remain ready to assist in facilitating the resumption of the peace process.

23. Rwanda

During the past year, relative calm and stability have prevailed in Rwanda. The country has made significant progress since the genocide and the end of the civil war in July 1994. By the beginning of 1996, child immunisation, sanitation, urban water supply and health care were at 80 per cent of their pre-war level; industrial production was at 75 per cent; and public transport, primary schools and university education were functioning at 60 per cent. Agricultural production had recovered to approximately 80 per cent of pre-1994 levels, although a WFP/FAO assessment mission conducted in June 1996 identified the need for additional food aid for some 576,000 persons during the remainder of the year. The Government, despite a significant lack of human and material resources, has taken important steps concerning human settlements and housing, infrastructure rehabilitation, assistance to vulnerable population groups and improvement of general living conditions, especially in the communes where most Rwandans lived and from which most refugees had fled.

Major challenges remain, however, for which the assistance of the international community is vital. These include the return, resettlement and reintegration of 1.7 million refugees; progress towards national reconciliation; the revival of the national judicial process; the improvement of prison conditions; effective measures to curb destabilisation activities; and the equitable disbursement of aid.

Pursuant to the request of the Government and Security Council resolution 1029 (1995) of 12 December, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAM1R) was reduced and then withdrew from the country following the expiry of its mandate on 8 March 1996. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 50/58 L of 22 December 1995, I began consultations with the Government and relevant United Nations agencies on the nature and role of a continued United Nations presence in Rwanda in the post-UNAMIR period.

Occasional differences cropped up between UNAMIR and the Government, although relations continued to be generally good during the final -three months of the mandate. The disposition of UNAMIR equipment and assets was a case in point; so was the Government's insistence that contractors providing goods and services for the exclusive use of UNAMIR should pay various types of taxes. The Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs visited Kigali from 19 to 24 April 1996 to help conclude negotiations on these issues which had been initiated by my Special Representative for Rwanda, Shaharyar Khan. With regard to the disposition of UNAMIR equipment, the Government, after inspecting the various items, decided to accept them. However, the tax dispute could not be resolved.

In his consultations with the Rwandan authorities, the Under-Secretary-General recalled that the Security Council had welcomed the letter from the Foreign Minister of Rwanda of 1 March, which described the functions the Government wished the United Nations to perform following the departure of UNAMIR and recorded its acceptance of the maintenance of a United Nations office in Rwanda. It was on that basis that in its resolution 1050 (1996) on 8 March, the Security Council had encouraged me to maintain such an office for the purpose of supporting the Government's efforts to promote national reconciliation, strengthen the judicial system, facilitate the return of refugees and rehabilitate the country's infrastructure, and of coordinating the United Nations efforts to that end.

At the Government's request, the Under-Secretary-General provided clarification about the modalities for such an office, including

the duration of its mandate, its size and resources and the functions to be performed by its head, as outlined in the addendum to my report on the implementation of resolution 1050 (1996). On 23 April, the Government decided to confirm its acceptance of a United Nations office for an initial period of six months. However, the Government was not willing to approve the proposal to continue the operation of the United Nations radio station, which had been a very successful element of UNAMIR. Instead, it offered three hours of air time daily on the national radio station. The Secretariat is examining such an alternative. I regret that despite continuing consultations with the Government conditions do not yet exist for the opening of the United Nations office.

I have repeatedly drawn the Security Council's attention to the negative impact of insurgent activities by elements of the former Rwandese Government Forces and *interahamwe* militia, which undermine the Government's efforts to normalise the internal political and security situation and its relations with neighbouring countries. The border areas with Zaire are the most affected by the destabilisation attempts and by government countermeasures. They contribute to the prevailing tensions in western Rwanda, where, according to the Government, a large number of infiltrators coordinate insurgent activities and where acts of sabotage and the use of landmines have increased.

In particular, attacks on survivors of the genocide have increased markedly during the first half of 1996, with at least 98 cases of attacks, including at least 85 killings. In several of the incidents, perpetrators at tacked in large groups and systematically targeted communities of genocide survivors and old case-load refugees. The United Nations Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda reports that in the vast majority of cases the perpetrators were elements of the former Rwandese Government Forces, *interahamwe* militias or insurgents opposed to the Government of Rwanda.

Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1013(1995) of 7 September, I established an international commission of inquiry to investigate reports of military training and arms transfers to the former Rwandese Government Forces. The six-member Commission, based at Nairobi, has visited Burundi, Rwanda, Seychelles and Zaire in the course of its work. In an interim report dated 29 January 1996, the Commission concluded that Rwandan men were receiving military training to conduct destabilising raids into Rwanda. In a second report, dated 14 March, the Commission concluded that it was highly probable that a

violation of the United Nations arms embargo had taken place involving the supply of more than 80 tones of rifles, grenades and ammunition in two consignments flown to Goma airport, Zaire, on 17 and 19 June 1994 and subsequently transferred to the Rwandan government forces then in Gisenyi, Rwanda. If that was the case, the Commission believed that the Government of Zaire or elements within it, in at least that one case, had aided and abetted violation of the embargo.

On the basis of its findings, the Commission proposed a number of specific measures to deter possible attempts to sell or supply arms to the former Rwandese Government Forces in the future, and to encourage further investigation of violations believed to have taken place in the past. In its resolution 1053 (1996) of 23 April, the Security Council requested me to maintain the Commission of Inquiry as an interim measure, as an element of deterrence and oversight until a longer-term solution could be found, to maintain contacts with the Governments of the Great Lakes region, to follow up its investigations, to respond to any further allegations of violations and to make periodic reports to me on the evolution of the situation with regard to compliance with the relevant Council resolutions.

The Security Council also requested me to consult with States neighbouring Rwanda, in particular Zaire, on the possible deployment of United Nations observers on the airfields and border crossing points for the better implementation of the arms embargo and to deter the shipment of arms to the former Rwandese Government Forces in violation of the arms embargo. I wrote to the Government of Zaire drawing its attention to this provision and requesting its consent for the stationing of observers. I also wrote to the Governments of Zaire, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania, requesting them to receive the Commission and to assist it in its investigations.

The Council called upon States that had not yet done so to cooperate fully with the Commission, to investigate the apparent complicity of their nationals in suspected violations of the embargo and to make available to the Commission the results of their investigations. The Commission has returned to the Great Lakes region to pursue its investigations in accordance with resolution 1053 (1996) and is to submit its findings in time for me to complete my report to the Council, as requested, by 1 October.

In a letter addressed to me on 29 May, President Mobutu Sese Seko requested that United Nations observers be deployed to North and South Kivu for the purpose of exercising surveillance over the

flow of goods through the airports of Goma and Bukavu, and of monitoring the movement of persons along the common borders of Zaire with Rwanda and Burundi. I notified the President of the Security Council of this development on 4 June, and informed him that, in view of the position adopted by the President of Zaire and as requested by the Council, I was also consulting other States neighbouring Rwanda about these measures and would inform the Council of their reaction. I also announced my intention of dispatching a technical mission to the area to collect information and prepare a report, on the basis of which I would submit appropriate recommendations to the Council for the eventual deployment of United Nations observers. I pointed out that such deployment would be possible only if the required financial resources were made available.

The Secretariat assembled a 10-person technical mission, which would visit the airports of Goma and Bukavu, as well as the Zairian border areas mentioned in President Mobutu's letter, to examine the modalities of deployment of United Nations observers in pursuance of resolution 1053 (1996), including the number of observers needed, their location and the logistic support they would require.

On 13 June, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior of Zaire, while reaffirming the agreement in principle of President Mobutu to the deployment of United Nations observers in Zaire, requested, through the UNDP Resident Representative at Kinshasa, that the departure of the technical team be deferred until the Government of Zaire had received more detailed terms of reference and had obtained clarification on a number of points, including whether other countries in the region had also accepted the deployment of United Nations observers. On the following day, the Secretariat, while pointing out that the decision of the Secretary-General to send a technical team was a direct response to the request contained in President Mobutu's letter of 29 May, transmitted detailed terms of reference to the Zairian authorities, as well as replies to all the points raised by them. On 9 July, the Minister of the Interior of Zaire wrote to the UNDP Resident Representative at Kinshasa to communicate the decision of his Government to receive the technical mission at Kinshasa to discuss its terms of reference, as well as related questions concerning the deployment of military observers.

The Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations replied on 10 July, pointing out that the mission's terms of reference were contained in paragraph 7 of resolution 1053 (1996), and recalling that

detailed terms of reference had already been sent to the Government of Zaire, as well as the additional information the Government had requested. The Under-Secretary-General requested the Minister to confirm that the Government was prepared to receive the technical mission on that basis, so that the Secretariat could propose a specific date for the visit.

The safe, organised and voluntary repatriation of Rwandan refugees has remained a priority. The efficient manner in which the Government of Rwanda handled the forcible repatriation by Zaire of some 13,000 refugees in August 1995 attested to the progress made in stabilising Rwanda. Despite the unexpected expulsion, the Government, with the assistance of UNAMIR, United Nations agencies and nongovernmental organisations, received and resettled its nationals in a generally humane and orderly manner. Rwandan officials have reaffirmed their desire to see refugees return and promised to do everything in their power to facilitate voluntary return in conditions of safety and dignity.

In July 1996, some 15,000 Rwandan refugees were forcibly repatriated from Burundi. Most of the refugees have been transported to their home communities with the assistance of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). The Government of Burundi had announced the closure of all Rwandan refugee camps after the sixth meeting of the Tripartite Commission (UNHCR/Rwanda/ Burundi), held at Bujumbura on 17 July. Since the coup, however, the authorities suspended repatriation programmes for the Rwandan refugees.

In September 1995, the two Tripartite Commissions, involving Rwanda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zaire and UNHCR, took practical measures for large-scale repatriation. Rwanda agreed to strengthen reception facilities, reduce border controls and provide security and protection to returnees in collaboration with UNHCR and other human rights organisations. Zaire agreed to reduce all forms of intimidation in the camps within its borders. In response to the anticipated increase in the rate of returns to Rwanda, UNHCR expanded its information campaign to promote refugee return and augmented its facilities at official border entry points to ensure proper reception of all. Activities were also expanded, with the cooperation of UNDP, in the communes of origin, to commence the rehabilitation of returnees.

Although UNHCR, Rwanda and the host countries have made concerted efforts to accelerate voluntary return, its pace has not been

uniform. From an average of 5,000 a month through much of 1995, the number of returnees increased to more than 14,000 in January 1996 and 23,000 in February, before reverting to its earlier average of around 5,000 a month. However, an estimated 1.1 million Rwandan refugees remain in Zaire, 511,000 in the United Republic of Tanzania and 97,000 in Burundi. Despite sustained efforts, many difficult issues involving repatriation remain unresolved and the number of returnees is unlikely to increase significantly. In the Masisi region of Zaire, the situation is aggravated by civil strife. Deprived of their Zairian nationality in 1981, more than 16,000 Banyarwanda of Tutsi origin fled from that region and crossed the border to Rwanda in April. These expulsions, and the killings that accompanied them, have had grave humanitarian consequences and created additional problems between the Governments of Rwanda and Zaire.

In July, approximately 15,000 refugees living in Burundi were forcibly repatriated to Rwanda. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees wrote to the Heads of State of Burundi and Rwanda protesting at this forced repatriation, which was carried out in contravention of the relevant Tripartite Commission and in collusion between the armed forces of the countries concerned. Fortunately, the operation was sus pended before even larger numbers were forcibly repatriated.

The main obstacles to voluntary refugee return continue to be fear of oppression, intimidation, misinformation and political dissuasion by former Rwandese Government Forces and their leaders in the camps. The problem is compounded by misperception that living conditions in the camps are relatively better than those expected back home. Refugees also fear that their suspected role in the 1994 genocide will expose them to reprisal, denunciation or imprisonment on return. The Government has consistently affirmed that although all returnees are welcome, those who planned or carried out the genocide would face imprisonment. Another deterrent has been the shortage of adequate housing. In the event of large-scale repatriation, conflicts over housing and property will inevitably occur. Repatriation remains, however, the only durable solution to the refugee problem and efforts to that end should be pursued and accelerated. National reconciliation will depend not only on the safe repatriation and reintegration of refugees but also on an effective and credible national judicial system to ensure justice and equal treatment for all Rwandans.

Because of constitutional, administrative and human resource constraints, restoration of the national judicial system has been

considerably delayed, causing frustration both within Rwanda and in the international community. Emergency measures to alleviate appalling prison conditions could not keep up with the ever-increasing number of detainees, now estimated at 76,000. More than 25,000 are held in local detention centres *(cachots),* where overcrowding increased and conditions deteriorated sharply in the first half of 1996. Cases of disease and death in local detention centres, some of them resulting from suffocation due to extreme overcrowding, also increased. Rwandan central prisons remain grossly overcrowded, even though the high mortality rate of 1995 has fallen substantially. Since 1995, however, prison capacity has increased by 25,000 to around 40,000. Arrests continue to be carried out, in most cases outside legal procedures, while progress in establishing and preparing case files remains slow. Triage committees have met in only a few prefectures and, as a result, very few detainees have been released. The Minister of Justice has sought international assistance to establish such committees in all 147 communes.

In late 1995, the newly established Supreme Court of Rwanda began reviewing the judicial system to ensure that it became operational and that those responsible for the genocide were brought to justice. Arrest and detention procedures were also reviewed. On 13 January 1996, the National Assembly announced amendments to the Constitution that would allow suspects to be brought to trial, although genocide is not mentioned in the Rwandan Criminal Code. No trial has yet taken place, however.

The United Nations Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda continued to visit prisons and detention centres on a regular basis and to provide assistance to the judicial system and to the promotion of human rights. Its focus is on confidence-building and on human rights monitoring among returnees. In seeking to redress violations and improve conditions of detention in accordance with international human rights standards, the Field Operation coordinates with ICRC.

However, the Operation has-been plagued by a lack of secure and predictable sources of funding, While the Government made it clear that it wanted the number of human rights monitors to be increased to 300, the actual number of monitors was 116 in June 1996. In addition, the withdrawal of UNAMIR has taken away an important support base for the Operation. I continue to believe that the Field Operation is an important element of the United Nations presence in Rwanda. Unfortunately, the persistent lack of financial resources jeopardises its continued existence.

On 12 December 1995, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda issued its first indictment. On 8 January 1996, its second plenary session was held at Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, and on 19 February two additional indictments were announced. Arrest warrants were issued and temporary arrangements made for detainees awaiting trial pending the construction of permanent facilities at Arusha. It is anticipated that the Tribunal will hold 12 trials during 1996.

On 29 February, the Security Council appointed Justice Louise Arbour (Canada) as Prosecutor of the International Tribunal, to succeed Justice Richard Goldstone (South Africa), whose resignation will take effect on 1 October.

In April, the Tribunal and the Government of Rwanda reached agreement on the rental of the Amahoro Hotel at Kigali, previously occupied by UNAMIR. Agreement was also reached on the protection of personnel, premises and investigation teams of the Tribunal, the security and protection of which rest primarily with the Government of Rwanda.

As the humanitarian situation in Rwanda continued to improve, the transition from emergency relief progressed steadily to rehabilitation, reconstruction and development. In this connection, I wish to recall the efforts and assistance rendered by UNAMIR to the start-up of rehabilitation and reconstruction in the country in addition to its mandated tasks. It rebuilt 14 bridges and repaired 13 roads. It made Kigali airport operational again and provided solar panels, antennas, repeaters and other equipment to restore telephone communications. Its medical personnel treated 1,600 people daily and vaccinated 62,000. In addition to providing medical supplies and training for local hospital staff throughout the country, UNAMIR helped transport 1 million refugees and displaced persons and assisted in their resettlement with the distribution of food, seeds, agricultural tools and even cattle. It also helped to relieve prison overcrowding by creating new space for about 20,000 inmates and relocated an estimated 10,000. Finally, it cleared over 1,400 mines and disposed of over 1,500 pieces of unexploded ordnance.

In recognition of the country's transition from emergency operational assistance requirements to longer-term rehabilitation and devel opmental needs, the functions of the United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office were assumed by the Resident Coordinator, who was also appointed as Humanitarian Coordinator, as at 31 October

1995. By mid- 1995, all camps for internally displaced persons in Rwanda had been closed and the majority of the displaced had returned to their home communes.

In 1995, the United Nations consolidated inter-agency appeal for persons affected by the crisis in Rwanda identified requirements for Rwanda and the subregion totalling $668,214,031. As at February 1996, when the appeal expired, a total of $535,412,857 had been received in contributions and pledges for the assistance programmes of the United Nations system and its humanitarian partners. The Government of Rwanda rejected plans for the issue of a separate appeal for emergency relief in Rwanda in 1996. Instead, Rwanda was covered under the United Nations consolidated fund-raising document for the Great Lakes region (1 January—31 December 1996) issued in February. In a separate initiative by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, the Integrated Regional Information Network was established at Nairobi in November 1995 to facilitate the dissemination of information to humanitarian partners on developments in the Great Lakes region from a regional perspective. At the Rwanda round-table conference, held at Geneva on 20 and 21 June 1996, donors pledged over $627 million to the Government's medium-term plan for 1996-1998.

There are many lessons to be learned from the United Nations operation in Rwanda, whose mandate was adjusted a number of times as events rapidly unfolded. Perhaps one of the most important of these is the need for flexibility in matching the Mission's mandate to the needs of the moment.

In its final phase, after the war, the United Nations came under great pressure from the Government of Rwanda to provide practical assistance in the provision of resources that were available to UNAMIR but which the Government and the country as a whole sorely lacked. UNAMIR was not mandated to provide such assistance and thus lost an opportunity to regain some of the credibility it had lost in the eyes of the Government with the sudden withdrawal of much of its personnel in the immediate wake of the genocide.

This experience in Rwanda has shown that there is a period after a conflict but before peace-building has begun when United Nations peacekeeping can play a unique role in basic rehabilitation. Acting under the overall authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, engineering and logistical units, working in close cooperation with the Government and with United Nations agencies, can assist in the reopening of airports, the restoration of essential

services such as water, power and telecommunications, the restoration of essential buildings and the resumption of civic services, including hospitals and schools. The lesson to be learned from Rwanda is that a more comprehensive and flexible approach, based on assessment of the host country's real needs and a peace-keeping mission with a mandate, composition and budget that enable it to render this kind of assistance, could help to eliminate stresses of the kind experienced by UNAMIR throughout its time in Rwanda.

While the situation in Rwanda normalises further, tension and instability continue to pervade. the Great Lakes region. Relations between Rwanda and Zaire and Kenya have deteriorated. The threat of yet an other violent conflict in the region persists. To help address the problems involved, I dispatched a Special Envoy, Jose Luis Jesus, to the region to examine with the Governments concerned how progress could be made towards a regional conference, which would address peace, security and development issues. The results of his mission were conveyed to the Security Council in my letter of 30 October. In the absence of consensus among the Governments concerned, the idea of convening a regional conference had to be put on hold and the mission of my Special Envoy ended. Although the Council has encouraged me on several occasions to pursue this question, prospects for the regional conference have not improved because of the continuing reluctance of two countries in the region.

However, on 28 November 1995, the Heads of State of Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Zaire and a representative of the United Republic of Tanzania met at Cairo in a conference organised by former United States President Jimmy Carter, the objectives of which were similar to those envisaged by the Security Council for a regional conference. A declaration was issued on 29 November, in which the parties pledged to take concrete measures to advance peace, justice, reconciliation, stability and development in the region. A second such conference was held at Tunis from 16 to 18 March 1996. Meanwhile, the former Heads of State of the Republic of Mali and the United Republic of Tanzania, General Amadou Toumani Toure and Julius Nyerere, respectively,. facilitators of the Cairo summit, visited Rwanda and other countries in the region to monitor steps taken in pursuance of those meetings recommendations.

24. Sierra Leone

In response to a request from the Government of Sierra Leone to exercise my good offices to facilitate negotiations between it and the

Revolutionary United Front (RUF), I decided to appoint Berhanu Dinka as my Special Envoy for Sierra Leone in February 1995. Since then, the Special Envoy has worked in close collaboration with OAU, the Commonwealth Secretariat and other organisations supporting negotiations in Sierra Leone. In his efforts to establish contact with the RUF leadership, he has sought and received assistance from official bodies, private individuals and non-governmental organisations in Sierra Leone and throughout the subregion. In addition to those efforts, he has encouraged and assisted the Government in its democratisation of the political process, including the transition to an elected civilian government.

In April 1995, the Government of Sierra Leone reaffirmed its commitment to a transition programme with the goal of holding elections by early 1996. It followed up by taking a number of important steps in support of civic organisations, such as the establishment of the Interim National Electoral Commission and the National Commission for Democracy, to promote civic and voter education in the country and to prepare for the elections. A National Consultative Conference on Elections held in August 1995 adopted the necessary rules and procedures and decided that the elections would be held on 26 February 1996.

In my report of 21 November 1995 to the Security Council, I outlined the efforts made by the Government and my Special Envoy in pursuit of negotiations with the RUF and in the areas of democratisation, security, the socio-economic costs of the war and the humanitarian needs of the country. I informed the Council that despite all efforts to contact the RUF for a meeting or negotiations, the group's leadership had remained elusive and unresponsive. I also noted that a postponement of the elections could result in violence and halt the process of democratisation altogether. I drew attention to the fact that there were some elements in Sierra Leone that were seeking to derail the electoral process, as attested by the attempted coup of 2 October.

In view of the conditions prevailing in the country, I instructed my Special Envoy to encourage the Government and leaders of political parties to safeguard the integrity of the process, ensuring that the elections were free and fair and that their outcome would not be contested. In a presidential statement of 27 November, the Security Council supported my efforts and those of my Special Envoy, called for an immediate end to the fighting and expressed strong support for the work of the Interim National Electoral Commission.

In order to encourage the Government further in its efforts towards reaching a negotiated settlement with the RUF and democratisation of the political process, and in the context of the international community's renewed interest in the twin processes under way in Sierra Leone, I visited Freetown on 29 November. I was reassured by the Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council, Captain Valentine Strasser, that the elections would be held on 26 February 1996, that the people of Sierra Leone supported democratisation and that all arrangements were being made for the holding of the elections.

My Special Envoy was able to meet with RUF representatives for the first time in early December at Abidjan and Accra. He underlined to them that the international community was strongly in favour of peace talks and the elections. The RUF representatives stated their organisation's readiness to enter into negotiations with the National Provisional Ruling Council under the auspices of the United Nations and to participate in elections. They also requested humanitarian assistance for people living in areas under RUF control and financial and technical assistance to help it participate in negotiations.

However, during December 1995, the National Provisional Ruling Council issued several decrees regulating the forthcoming elections that seemed to reduce the authority of the Interim National Electoral Commission and to favour certain political parties at the expense of others. These moves were interpreted as signalling that the Council had become less committed to the holding of free and fair elections.

On 16 January 1996, Brigadier-General Julius Maada Bio ousted Captain Strasser in a military coup and replaced him as Head of State and as Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council. Although he reassured the country of the Council's commitment to the democratic process, it became clear that elements within the Council were in favour of postponing the elections for the ostensible reason that an initiative for "peace before elections" be given a chance. On 9 February, I sent a message to Chairman Bio through my Special Envoy expressing concern that recent developments appeared to be threatening the electoral time table.

However, at the insistence of the Chairman of the Interim National Electoral Commission that any postponement of the elections by the National Provisional Ruling Council be decided upon by the National Consultative Conference on Elections, Chairman Bio agreed that the latter should be convened on 12 February. Despite being advised to

the contrary by the National Provisional Ruling Council and military repre sentatives, the Consultative Conference overwhelmingly decided to retain 26 February as the election date. On 13 February, I issued a press statement in New York commending the Conference and the National Provisional Ruling Council for their commitment to continue the democratic process and called upon the RUF to refrain from disrupting the elections. In a presidential statement adopted on 15 February, the Security Council welcomed the Conference's decision, as well as the renewed promise of the National Provisional Ruling Council to abide by it, and took note that the Interim National Electoral Commission had confirmed that all necessary technical arrangements were in place for the elections to proceed.

At the request of the Government, the Electoral Assistance Division of the Secretariat and UNDP worked closely with the Interim National Electoral Commission to identify the technical requirements for organising the electoral process and established a project at Freetown that was designed to coordinate international financial and technical assistance in support of the electoral process and to facilitate the activities of international observer groups. A donors' conference was held on 30 November 1995 at United Nations Headquarters. UNDP provided a Chief Technical Adviser to the Interim National Electoral Commission, two consultants and four United Nations Volunteers, who established a small secretariat to coordinate the activities of international electoral observers.

Parliamentary and presidential elections were duly held on 26 February 1996, followed by a second round of presidential elections on 15 March. The Joint International Observer Group, coordinated by the United Nations electoral assistance secretariat, stated that despite some intimidation by armed elements, the elections had been conducted in a correct and transparent manner. The Sierra Leone People's Party won the largest number of seats in the legislature, and its leader, Al Haji Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, won the presidency in the second round. The Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council announced that it would hand over the Government to the newly elected Parliament and President within two weeks. President Kabbah was inaugurated on 29 March.

The Security Council welcomed the elections in a presidential statement adopted on 19 March and called on the RUF to accept their outcome, maintain the ceasefire and enter into a full dialogue for peace, without any conditions. Following initial contacts, representatives of the National Provisional Ruling Council and the

RUF met at Abidjan at the end of February. The talks were hosted by the Government of Cote d'Ivoire, with my Special Envoy and representatives of OAU and the Commonwealth participating as facilitators. A meeting between the Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council, Brigadier Bio, and the RUF leader, Corporal Foday Sankoh, took place at Yamoussoukrou on 25 and 26 March, under the chairmanship of President Henri Konan Bedie of Cote d'Ivoire. In a joint communique, the two sides agreed that the talks should continue after the new Government took over.

In his inaugural address, President Kabbah expressed appreciation for the efforts made by the United Nations in support of the processes of democratisation and peace in Sierra Leone. He stated that the pursuit of lasting peace would be his Government's first priority and that he would meet with Corporal Sankoh at the earliest opportunity. President Kabbah and Corporal Sankoh met at Yamoussoukrou on 23 April and agreed to a continued cessation of hostilities. They also agreed that three joint working parties would work on agreements on a peace accord, the encampment and disarmament and the demobilisation and resettlement of combatants.

The three joint working parties held discussions from 6 to 27 May at Abidjan under the chairmanship of the Foreign Minister of Cote d'Ivoire, with my Special Envoy and the representatives of OAU and the Commonwealth again serving as facilitators. Agreement was reached on almost all articles of the draft peace accord. However, the talks reached an impasse owing to disagreement between the two sides on the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Sierra Leone and the encampment, disarmament and demobilisation of RUF combatants on a simultaneous and equal basis.

Despite the concerted efforts of my Special Envoy and the Governments of neighbouring (and other) countries, the talks have remained stalled for several weeks. The RUF has also insisted on negotiating a power-sharing arrangement within the framework of the peace agreement with the Government, which maintained that it was unable to accommodate the RUF demands because of constitutional constraints.

An inter-agency mission to Sierra Leone led by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs in August 1995 called for the United Nations to play a greater role in assuring the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance in providing greater support to the National Relief and Rehabilitation Committee of the Government of Sierra Leone. I sent

Peter Hansen, then Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, to Sierra Leone in October 1995 to draw attention to the needs of the country and to review the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In November 1995, the Emergency Relief Coordinator appointed a Humanitarian Coordinator and deployed a Department of Humanitarian Affairs support team to bolster the coordination arrangements.

The United Nations consolidated inter-agency appeal for Sierra Leone was launched on 28 March at Freetown. The appeal sought $57 million in humanitarian assistance from donors to address the serious humanitarian crisis facing the country, and focused on four priority areas: providing life-saving assistance; facilitating returns to home areas wherever security allows; ensuring complementarity of relief and rehabilitation activities; and strengthening coordination, in particular as regards supporting the Government's emergency management capacity. As of July 1996, donors had pledged $8.9 million. The UNDP Resident Representative serves as Humanitarian Coordinator for Sierra Leone and heads the United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit, which includes a number of Sierra Leonean specialists.

The successful completion of parliamentary and presidential elections in February 1996 has changed the focus of humanitarian assistance. With peace talks on track, there is a growing possibility that the more than two million Sierra Leonean refugees and internally displaced persons may be returning home. As a result, relief programmes must emphasise those elements which support return. Progress in the peace process will also lead to greater access to communities in need. A coordinated approach to these new beneficiaries is essential if resources are to be used efficiently. In addition, progress in the peace process requires that demobilisation activities be accelerated in earnest.

25. Somalia

Since my last report, the political impasse in Somalia has persisted, although all-out civil war has not resumed. The United Nations has been providing humanitarian assistance through its agencies and organisations, and has remained ready to assist with a political settlement by maintaining a political Office for Somalia, which has been located at Nairobi for security reasons. An unsettled situation has also continued in the north-west of the country, with sporadic fighting between the Egal administration and opposition forces.

In August 1995, a wide range of Somali factions, with the exception of supporters of General Mohamed Aidid and Mohamed Egal, held consultations at Nairobi and agreed to workout a common political platform on the basis of which a preparatory meeting for a national reconciliation conference would be held. The conference would result in a transitional mechanism that would function as a governing authority for Somalia. General Aidid and Egal would be welcome to join in the undertaking. Further consultations among the Somali factions were held in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, in September 1995 at the invitation of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

General Aidid, for his part, rejected all calls for consultations on national reconciliation, insisting that a Government had already been formed under him and that, therefore, there was no longer need for such consultations. However, his "Government" was not recognised by any Member State. In August 1995, the "disarmament" campaign of his "Government" led to intense fighting between his militia and that of Ali Mahdi, Chairman of the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA), in Mogadishu, breaking the relative calm that had prevailed in the capital since the withdrawal of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II in March 1995.

In September 1995, the forces of General Aidid occupied Baidoa. His militia looted relief supplies and equipment, as well as the grain that had been produced by the people of that region. A number of international aid workers were detained for several days and their communications equipment was looted. Ali Mahdi demanded that General Aidid withdraw from Baidoa and threatened an all-out war. No military action ensued, however, and General Aidid subsequently occupied Baidoa and Hoddur.

On 19 January 1996, I reported to the Security Council that the political situation in Somalia had been dominated by a debilitating stale mate for almost two years owing to the failure of the Somali faction leaders to honour the commitments made in the Nairobi Declaration of 24 March 1994. I reiterated my conviction that durable peace could not be achieved in Somalia without a process of sufficiently broad-based consultations among the Somalis themselves. I noted that it was nevertheless heartening that Member States and regional organisations had not lost interest in developments in Somalia, despite many disappointments.

In response to repeated requests from many Somali leaders for United Nations support for their peace initiatives, I pointed out that it

was necessary for them to realise the profound sense of disappointment and even doubts about the sincerity of their desire for peace that some of their past actions had caused. Also, in view of the current financial crisis of the Organisation, I counselled that their best hope of attracting such support would be to give some signs of concrete progress towards peace and reconciliation. I then informed the Council of my intention to maintain the United Nations Political Office for Somalia at Nairobi for the time being.

In response to my report, the Security Council, in a presidential statement of 24 January, called upon all Somali political leaders and parties to return to an inclusive process of consultation and negotiation aimed at national reconciliation leading to the establishment of a broad-based national government. The Council commended the valiant efforts of the United Nations and international humanitarian agencies and Somali personnel for their courage and determination in rendering assistance to Somalia in the face of harassment, beating, abduction and killings. The Council also reminded all States of their obligation to implement fully the general and complete arms embargo it had instituted earlier.

SSA factions and the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) led by Osman Atto welcomed my report and the statement of the Security Council and expressed support for a national reconciliation conference. They also appealed for resumption of an active United Nations political role. The League of Arab States (LAS) offered to provide financial assistance for a reconciliation conference. A spokesman for General Aidid, however, indicated that his "Government" would attend only if he was invited as Head of Government; the other Somali leaders rejected such a condition.

By mid-March, the animosity between Atto and General Aidid led to military confrontations between their forces in the Merca area. Their militias also engaged in heavy fighting in April in south Mogadishu. Meanwhile, in early April, the SSA appealed for a national reconciliation conference in order to establish a government of national unity and called on General Aidid and Egal to participate in it. However, neither of them responded positively.

On 15 March, the Security Council held a public debate on Somalia in which a number of ideas were advanced for possible action. In a letter dated 11 April, I informed the Council that I was exploring the feasibility of a joint United Nations/OAU mission, since it might have a relatively better chance of being accepted if it were sent at the

express request of the Council. On 17 April, the members of the Council generally supported my views and indicated that LAS and OIC might also join such a mission.

On 30 April, I met at Nairobi with a number of Somali leaders representing a wide spectrum of factions and clans, except those of General Aidid and Egal. I assured them that the United Nations would remain committed to the search for a solution to the problem in Somalia. I also referred to the Council's continued interest in Somalia and asked the Somali leaders to come up with new proposals on how the United Nations could help the reconciliation process.

However, a new round of three-pronged fighting broke out in Mogadishu in June and again in July, pitting General Aidid against Muse Sudi, commander of the Abgal militia in the Medina district of Mogadishu and an ally of Mahdi in that area; against Atto elsewhere in south Mogadishu; and against Mahdi on the "green line" separating north and south Mogadishu. By mid-July, the fighting had turned into sporadic exchanges of fire. However, a massive build-up of militias on all fronts was being reported, with the ever-present threat of resumed fighting. During the sporadic fighting, General Aidid was reported to have been wounded in late July and his death from his wounds was announced subsequently.

Messrs. Mahdi and Atto immediately declared a unilateral ceasefire and called on all Somali clans to pursue a peaceful path. They appealed to General Aidid's supporters to renounce the position that they had already established a "Government" and asked them to participate in the peaceful reunification of Somalia. However, Hussein Mohamed Aidid, the son of General Aidid who was reportedly sworn in as his father's successor, declared that he would pursue General Aidid's policies and would eliminate internal and external enemies. These developments could have important implications for the Somali political process and for national reconciliation. I have instructed the United Nations Political Office for Somalia to work with OAU, OIC, LAS and EU to develop a coordinated approach to the situation.

Although much progress has been made on the humanitarian front in Somalia since the acute emergency of 1991-1992, the humanitarian needs vary greatly from region to region. Where appropriate, United Nations agencies continue to undertake the delivery of humanitarian assistance, while efforts are focused upon rehabilitation and reconstruction in areas where conditions are conducive to such

activities. Nevertheless, insecurity continues to hinder the pace of recovery, especially in the southern and central regions.

The withdrawal of United Nations military contingents from Somalia in early 1995 prompted the temporary evacuation of international personnel from Mogadishu and a number of other areas for security reasons. International agency personnel soon found conditions secure enough to return to most areas. Nevertheless, their lives have often been at risk as a result of banditry and clan-based conflict. In 1995, several humanitarian aid workers fell victim to the violence, again forcing the evacuation of international personnel and necessitating the temporary suspension of non-emergency activities in those areas until local communities could provide assurances of safety for staff and property. The fluidity of the situation in Somalia has compelled the United Nations agencies to adopt flexible approaches in their interactions with local administrations.

Although the situation in Somalia cannot currently be characterised as an acute emergency, the potential for a worsening humanitarian situation increased during the second half of 1995 and early 1996. Lack of access to food, or in some cases to currency required to purchase food, emerged as a major problem in some areas. Even without the resurgence of large-scale fighting, the mediocre results of the main harvest in 1995 and the disruption of commerce as a result of insecurity in southern and central Somalia presaged a decline in household resources and hence in the nutritional status of Somali children and other vulnerable groups.

The closure of the Mogadishu port has hindered the import of food, medicine and other relief assistance, resulting in a sharp increase in costs as agencies have found it necessary, in areas such as Mogadishu, Lower Shabelle and the Juba valley, to rely increasingly upon air transport rather than ship or road. The-convergence of all of these factors, together with marked insecurity, has meant that malnutrition and disease have re-emerged in areas that had shown significant improvements in the past.

Moreover, while needs are rising steadily, programmes are receiving less funding from donors. The response to the December 1994 United Nations consolidated inter-agency appeal for $70.3 million (later revised upwards to $93.2 million) for the six-month period from January to June 1995 has not been encouraging. Rather than launching another appeal, it was agreed that donors could, in the interim, continue to contribute to the January to June 1995 appeal. As of March 1996,

donor contributions to the appeal totalled $28.6 million, or 30.7 per cent of the revised requirements.

As Somalia is a composite of differing environments, with relatively stable areas existing alongside areas of great insecurity, the development of a uniform humanitarian strategy for Somalia as a whole is not possible. While a flexible strategy is being formulated, United Nations agencies and organisations are attempting to engage in contingency planning, including rapid needs assessments, and, where funds permit, stockpiling of food and medical supplies. All of these efforts, it is hoped, will help to prevent the recurrence of a crisis on the scale of 1991-1992, and will protect the gains made over the past three years.

26. Sudan

On 31 January 1996, following its consideration of a letter from the Government of Ethiopia dated 9 January, the Security Council adopted resolution 1044 (1996), which addressed the assassination attempt on President Hosni Mubarak of the Arab Republic of Egypt in Addis Ababa on 26 June 1995. As requested by the Council, I endeavoured to seek, in consultation with OAU, the cooperation of the Government of the Sudan in the implementation of that resolution. On 6 February, I informed the Council of my decision to send my Special Adviser, Under-Secretary-General Chinmaya R. Gharekhan, as my Special Envoy to the area to conduct the requisite consultations and to gather relevant information so as to carry out the mandate entrusted to me. In a letter addressed to me dated 8 February, the President of the Council indicated that the Council welcomed and supported my decision.

In the course of his mission, which lasted from 18 February to 2 March, my Special Envoy held consultations with the Secretary-General of OAU at Addis Ababa and met with the authorities in Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Sudan, Tunisia and Uganda. My Special Envoy has continued his contacts with the Secretary-General of OAU and has been in formed that the question of what further action the latter might take was under consideration.

In my report of 11 March pursuant to resolution 1044 (1996), I observed that in view of the situation as ascertained during the trip of my Special Envoy, it was obvious that the Sudan had not yet complied with the demands of the Security Council and that all the neighbouring countries visited by my Special Envoy had accused the Sudan of supporting terrorist activities within their territories.

Following the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1054 (1996), I transmitted the text on 29 April to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of all Member States. On 15 May, I addressed a note verbale to all Member States drawing particular attention to paragraphs 3, 5 and 6 of the resolution. The Secretariat also made contact, as appropriate, with Member States directly concerned with this matter.

In a report to the Security Council dated 10 July, I presented information submitted by the Member States. From the information reviewed in that report it could be seen that (a) while the Council had determined that the three suspects involved were sheltered in the Sudan and had called on the Government of the Sudan to ensure their extradition, the Government claimed that its investigations concerning two of the suspects had produced no trace of their presence in the Sudan and that the identity of the third suspect was unknown; and *(b)* while the Council had demanded that the Sudan desist from engaging in activities of assisting, supporting and facilitating terrorist activities and from giving shelter and sanctuary to terrorist elements, the Government had asserted that it condemned terrorism and did not condone terrorist activities.

I intend to keep in close contact with all parties concerned and with the Secretary-General of OAU on all aspects of resolutions 1044 (1996) and 1054 (1996). I shall also keep the Security Council informed of all relevant developments relating to this difficult situation.

27. Tajikistan

The situation in Tajikistan has remained unstable and the agreement on a temporary ceasefire, which was concluded in Tehran in September 1994 and has been extended several times, was frequently violated by both sides. Indeed, the opposition carried its fight with the government forces into the centre of the country and established control over parts of Tavildara. The Joint Commission established to ensure the implementation of the Tehran agreement did not function for four months, following the abduction, on 24 February 1996, of its Co-Chairman, a representative of the opposition. In addition to the conflict between the Government and the opposition, there was also unrest in several cities in the west and north of the country over economic and political issues.

The small United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) continued its best efforts to maintain the ceasefire. It carried out investigations, either on its own or in cooperation with the Joint

Commission, and provided administrative support to the Commission. Operating from field stations in the centre and south of the country, UNMOT teams maintained an active schedule of patrols and contacts with government officials and opposition representatives with the objective of helping to reduce friction and, where possible, to resolve local problems.

My Special Envoy, Ramiro Piriz-Ballon, pursued efforts to mediate in the political dialogue between the Government of Tajikistan and the opposition to achieve progress towards national reconciliation. In early August he conducted indirect talks between President Emomali Rakhmonov and the opposition leader, Abdullo Nuri, shuttling between Dushanbe and Kabul. The negotiations concluded with the signing by the two leaders, at Dushanbe and Kabul, respectively, of a protocol on the fundamental principles for establishing peace and national accord in Tajikistan. The two sides agreed to work for a comprehensive political solution of the conflict and concluded that further negotiations should result in the signing of a general agreement.

The two sides also agreed to extend the Agreement on a Temporary Ceasefire and the Cessation of Other Hostile Acts on the Tajik-Afghan Border and within the country for another six months, until 26 February 1996. Concurring with my Special Envoy's proposal to modify the format of the inter-Tajik negotiations, they agreed to resume the talks in a continuous round beginning 18 September 1995. In a presidential statement, the Security Council welcomed the signing of the protocol and the extension of the ceasefire.

The first phase of the continuous round of inter-Tajik negotiations took place at Ashgabat from 30 November to 22 December 1995. The delay in their resumption was caused by differences between the two Tajik parties on the issue of venue. At the beginning of the talks, the two sides adopted a joint statement reaffirming their commitment to the ceasefire. However, fighting escalated in the Tavildara region and my Special Envoy interrupted the talks to visit Moscow for consultations with officials of the Russian Federation in order to facilitate the cessation of fighting. After the restoration of the truce and the resumption of the talks, political problems were discussed in detail. However, the inflexible positions of the two sides prevented real progress. In its resolution 1030 (1995) of 14 December, the Security Council extended the mandate of UNMOT for another six months, until 15 June 1996, and emphasised the need for the Tajik parties to take the opportunity of the continuous round of talks at Ashgabat to

reach a general agreement that would restore peace and national accord in Tajikistan.

Despite the agreement reached at Ashgabat to resume the next phase of negotiations on 15 January 1996, the negotiating process stalled once again. My Special Envoy undertook consultations in Moscow from 17 to 24 January with President Rakhmonov, Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov of the Russian Federation and Foreign Minister Boris Shikhmuradov of Turkmenistan during the CIS summit, in an attempt to revitalise the process. Agreement was reached to resume the talks on 26 January.

The second phase of the continuous round of inter-Tajik talks at Ashgabat took place from 26 January to 18 February. As I reported to the Security Council on 22 March, the two parties continued difficult discussions on the core political problems and on compromise proposals presented by my Special Envoy. The delegation of the Government endorsed the proposals as a basis for future talks, although the opposition delegation had a number of substantive reservations. As a result of the negotiations, the Ashgabat Declaration was signed and included an important agreement on holding a special session of the Parliament with the participation of opposition leaders.

The peace process faced another serious challenge after the opposition Co-Chairman of the Joint Commission was abducted in Dushanbe on 24 February. The ceasefire agreement expired two days later. Under the circumstances, I requested my Special Adviser, Ismat Kittani, to undertake consultations with the opposition leaders and the Government. As a result of his talks at Tehran and Dushanbe, the ceasefire agreement was unconditionally extended until 26 May 1996. The Parliament of Tajikistan, during its special session on 11 March, confirmed the commitment of the Government to seek a solution to the conflict through political dialogue with the opposition. Regrettably, the opposition declined to participate in the special session because of security concerns arising from the Co-Chairman's abduction. In its presidential statement of 29 March, the Security Council expressed regret at the insufficient progress achieved during the continuous round of inter-Tajik talks at Ashgabat and called upon the Tajik parties to comply strictly with the ceasefire agreement.

Following the return of my Special Envoy to his country's diplomatic service, I appointed Gerd Merrem as my Special Representative, residing in Dushanbe. Merrem undertook his first mission to the region, including Moscow, Ashgabat, Dushanbe and Tehran, from 7 to 20

May. He had talks with President Rakhmonov and the opposition leader Nuri, and with the Foreign Ministers of the countries serving as observers to the inter-Tajik talks. The ceasefire agreement was extended for another three months, until 26 August.

Merrem's mission coincided with the beginning of a large-scale offensive undertaken by the opposition forces in the Tavildara region. In a presidential statement on 21 May, the Security Council condemned the violations of the ceasefire, in particular by the opposition. The Council also expressed concern about restrictions being placed on UNMOT's freedom of movement, in particular by the Government, and called for the earliest possible resumption of the inter-Tajik talks.

With the situation in Tavildara a continuing cause for concern, another round of inter-Tajik talks opened at Ashgabat on 8 July under the auspices of my Special Representative. On 19 July, the leaders of the two Tajik delegations signed a joint statement on the restoration of an effective ceasefire and the extension of the Tehran Agreement until 31 December. In accordance with the Agreement, which was to come into effect at 0600 GMT on 20 July, the sides were to remain in the positions they had occupied at the time of the signing and UNMOT was to verify the positions of the two sides in the Tavildara area. On 21 July, the two sides also signed an agreement on prisoner exchanges, which were to take place by 20 August. In a joint communique, there was also agreement on an intensified schedule for future meetings and consultations in order to reach agreements on key interrelated political and military issues. The two sides also agreed to resume the negotiations in the near future in order to discuss the main political issues.

I should like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Government of Turkmenistan for the outstanding assistance it has provided to this effort through its hosting of the latest rounds of inter-Tajik talks. I should also like to express my satisfaction at the cooperation between UNMOT and the peace-keeping forces of the CIS, both at headquarters level and in the field.

Regrettably, the agreements concluded in July have not been implemented so far. At the time of reporting, fighting continued in the Tavildara area, confirming that there is now a continuing, and almost chronic, emergency situation in Tajikistan, which requires intervention by the international community. The country faces massive unemployment, accompanied by poverty and starvation. Malaria, tuberculosis and diphtheria pose a serious threat to health, and lack

of fuel and energy has led to serious health and hygiene risks. Since gas supplies are irregular during the harsh winter months, homes and public buildings are often unheated. Water is untreated and contaminated by various pathogens. Deteriorating public services, such as transport, electricity generation and communications, have also contributed to the rapidly declining standards of living, and the average per capita income in 1995 was by far the lowest in the newly independent States of the former Soviet Union.

Humanitarian assistance efforts in Tajikistan have been carried out by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO and WFP. Aid was provided in the form of food, agricultural inputs, clothing, shelter, educational materials, medicines, vaccines and expert services in various areas. Other important areas of assistance have been water and sanitation, public transport, public administration and governance, small enterprise development and energy.

The former Yugoslavia

Since my last annual report to the General Assembly, the political situation in the former Yugoslavia has changed dramatically; many of these changes are for the better. The United Nations, in conjunction with other interested parties, remains committed to finding a long-term solution to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. However, political realities on the ground have warranted a departure from the past approach to peacekeeping in the area and new strategics have been adopted, as necessary. These have included the restructuring of the components of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the umbrella mission in the theatre, whose elements were either made independent or closed down.

In the late summer and autumn of 1995, the apparent determination of the parties to achieve a military solution to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, following the expiration of the December 1994 cessation-of-hostilities agreement, created an unprecedented level of military activity, as mentioned in my last annual report. This resulted in large-scale movements of refugees and displaced persons and in widespread violations of international humanitarian law by all forces, but in particular by the Bosnian Serbs. UNPROFOR faced serious impediments in implementing its mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Following the mortar attack on Sarajevo's Markale market place on 28 August 1995, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), at the request of and in agreement with the Force Commander of the

United Nations Peace Forces (UNPF), conducted air strikes against Bosnian Serb anti-aircraft systems and heavy weapons in the vicinity of Sarajevo, as well as against ammunition supply depots and other military facilities throughout eastern Bosnia. The air strikes aimed at restoring the heavy weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo and deterring any further attacks on safe areas. During the operation, mortars and artillery of the UNPROFOR rapid reaction force engaged Bosnian Serb targets in the area of Sarajevo. These actions, prefigured in the London Conference of July 1995, had become possible as a result of the withdrawal of United Nations peace-keepers from the Serb-surrounded enclaves of Srebrenica, Zepa and Goradze, which had rendered the United Nations force less vulnerable to hostage taking.

Soon after NATO began air operations in eastern Bosnia, Bosnian government and Bosnian Croat forces began to advance in the western part of the country, capturing areas traditionally populated by Bosnian Serbs. As a result of this and the fighting around Sarajevo, the Muslim-Croat Federation increased its holding of land from 30 per cent to just over 50 per cent of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This also led to another major flow of displaced persons. As fighting was raging, the United States actively pursued a peace initiative it had begun during the summer.

On 5 October 1995, the United States delegation secured a country-wide ceasefire agreement that included non-military provisions, such as humane treatment for detained persons, freedom of movement and the right of displaced persons to return to their homes. UNPROFOR military and civilian personnel immediately undertook various measures to ensure the successful implementation of the ceasefire agreement, including demining activities necessary for the repair and reopening of Sarajevo's utilities. The Chief of Mission of UNPROFOR conducted the negotiations that led to the entry into force of the ceasefire on 12 October.

The revitalisation of the peace process, coupled with Bosnian Serb military reverses, brought about enhanced compliance by the parties with the ceasefire and allowed UNPROFOR to carry out its mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina far more effectively. Other developments that enhanced the Mission's ability to operate were President Slobodan Milosevic's assumption of authority to conduct negotiations on behalf of the Republika Srpska and the deterrent effect of the use of NATO air power and the rapid reaction force in August and September.

The political situation improved with the conclusion of a series of agreements, most notably the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, at Dayton, Ohio, on 21 November 1995. The Peace Agreement was initialled by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. While the talks were under way, a number of non-NATO countries, including the Russian Federation, agreed to participate in the implementation of the Bosnian peace plan. The United Nations, it should be noted, was not represented at Dayton.

On 8 and 9 December, I attended the Peace Implementation Conference held at Lancaster House, London, aimed at mobilising the international community in support of a new start for the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Conference, which preceded the signing of the Peace Agreement in Paris on 14 December, reached several conclusions on, *inter alia,* the establishment of a Peace Implementation Council and its Steering Board, assignment of responsibility for the various aspects of implementation and the appointment of Carl Bildt as High Representative. Issues of regional stabilisation, humanitarian assistance, refugees and prisoners, protection of human rights, elections, reconstruction, relations between the States of the former Yugoslavia and the rest of the international community and the question of Eastern Slavonia were also addressed. The Conference also decided that the Peace Implementation Council would subsume the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, which was dissolved on 31 January 1996.

Other steps forward were the signing, on 13 September 1995, of the Interim Accord between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the signing on 12 November 1995 of the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium. The latter agreement sought the peaceful reintegration of that Serb-held territory into the Republic of Croatia.

Following the conclusion of the above-mentioned agreements, the United Nations presence in the former Yugoslavia was altered considerably. United Nations operations in the former Yugoslavia now consist of four separate missions: the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) and the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as well as two liaison offices at Belgrade and Zagreb.

To coordinate the complex activities associated with winding up the old missions and establishing three new ones, and to ensure a smooth transfer of responsibilities from the United Nations to the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I appointed Kofi Annan, Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, on a temporary basis as my Special Representative in the Former Yugoslavia on 1 November 1995. He established his headquarters at Zagreb, alongside the United Nations Peace Forces (UNPF) headquarters. Upon his departure on 29 February 1996, a small Transition Office for the Former Yugosla *via* took over responsibility for the liquidation of the former UNPF mission and for the continued provision of common support services to the four successor operations.

Shared Responsibilities

28. Bosnia and Herzegovina

With the signing of the Peace Agreement, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina entered into a new phase of shared responsibilities between the United Nations and other segments of the international community. By its resolution 1031 (1995) of 15 December 1995, the Security Council authorised the establishment of an Implementation Force (I FOR) with responsibility for ensuring compliance with the military aspects of the Peace Agreement; decided to terminate the mandate of UNPROFOR and to transfer its authority to IFOR; and endorsed the appointment of a High Representative. Consequently, in keeping with provisions of the Peace Agreement, the United Nations role in the new configuration was limited to two key tasks: the International Police Task Force and the return of refugees and displaced persons.

The transfer of authority between UNPF and IFOR took place on 20 December 1995. The UNPF Force Commander became the Deputy Commander of IFOR, but retained his UNPF authority during the transitional period. The arrangement of having the UNPF Force Commander serve simultaneously as Deputy Commander of IFOR facilitated the coordination of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR contingents with the arrival of IFOR elements. By the date of the transfer of authority, a number of UNPROFOR troops had already left the theatre as part of a restructuring exercise and, of the approximately 21,000 UNPROFOR troops that remained, about 18,500 were designated to stay on as part of IFOR.

To provide policy direction, a Steering Committee on Transition of Responsibilities in the Former Yugoslavia was established. Composed

of United Nations civilian and military personnel and the NATO Liaison Officer to UNPF, it assisted the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in matters pertaining to United Nations agencies and programmes involved in implementing the Dayton Agreement, as well as the transition of responsibilities from UNPROFOR to IFOR. UNPROFOR also supported IFOR by transferring most of its infrastructure, equipment and assets. The success of the entire process, which could serve as a model for United Nations cooperation with regional organisations elsewhere, reflected good preparatory work at every level of command and the willingness of both the United Nations and NATO to ensure a smooth transfer of authority.

Antonio Pedauye was appointed Interim United Nations Coordinator from 5 to 31 January 1996. He was replaced by Iqbal Riza, who was appointed my Special Representative and Coordinator of the United Nations Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 1 February. Riza's task is to exercise authority over the International Police Task Force and United Nations civilian office and to coordinate other United Nations activities, including those relating to humanitarian relief and refugees, demining, human rights and economic rehabilitation. He also coordinates with the High Representative and with other international organisations on the ground.

The mandate of the International Police Task Force is to monitor law enforcement activities and facilities; to advise and train law enforcement personnel and forces; and to advise the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the organisation of effective law enforcement agencies. The Task Force is not mandated to engage in enforcement activities, and it is for this reason that the police are unarmed, as is customary in other United Nations civilian police missions.

The Commissioner of the Task Force, Peter Fitzgerald, arrived in theatre on 29 January. He established his headquarters at Sarajevo, with regional headquarters at Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Tuzla. The Security Council authorised the deployment of 1,721 civilian police officers, to be fully deployed by the end of April. Some 2,000 officers were offered by Member States, but few were able to respond quickly to the request for immediate deployment because most had to be released from ordinary duty in their home countries. As at 31 July, the International Police Task Force had 1,676 police officers deployed or awaiting deployment in 52 locations. Because the officers are

unarmed and spread throughout the country, they must rely on IFOR and the local authorities for security.

In addition to monitoring, observing and inspecting the law enforcement activities of local authorities, a major responsibility of the International Police Task Force is to assist the parties in planning the reduction, restructuring and training of their own police forces. Agreement on the reduction of the Federation Police from 20,000 to 11,500 and its reorganisation was reached on 26 April and the process has proceeded generally on schedule. A parallel reduction is under discussion with the Republika Srpska authorities.

The civil affairs component of UNMIBH follows that of UNPROFOR. Forty-four civil affairs officers are in the field, stationed in offices co-located with the International Police Task Force. The officers are engaged in supporting the Force, reporting on and assessing political and human rights developments, and using their good offices to promote confidence between the entities and to resolve problems between the parties. In addition, civil affairs officers work in close coordination with the Office of the High Representative and with other international organisations, especially UNHCR, IFOR and OSCE. They provide those organisations with information and assessments related to key areas of implementation, especially on political trends affecting such issues as freedom of movement, respect for human rights and repatriation of refugees and displaced persons.

At the beginning of January, tension increased in the divided city of Mostar. Hostile actions by both ethnic communities resulted in a number of casualties among the local population. Concerted efforts by EU, the international community and my representatives calmed the situation and municipal elections were held on 30 June. The Bosnian Croat community did not accept the results of the elections and as a result the future of Mostar was uncertain, with wider implications for the future of the Muslim-Croat Federation. This uncertainty threw into doubt the continued presence of the EU and the Western European Union police monitors in Mostar. The International Police Task Force, therefore, prepared to assume civilian police responsibilities in the city in the event of an EU withdrawal.

UNHCR, as the lead agency for the coordination of humanitarian relief and the return of refugees and displaced persons, has planned a voluntary and phased return of displaced persons and refugees. So far, some 70,000 people have returned to their homes. Voluntary return depends on security conditions, however, which are in turn contingent

upon implementation of the military aspects of the Dayton Agreement, and on economic factors such as the availability of shelter, schools, water and other infrastructure. In May, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that only a quarter of the 2 million refugees and displaced persons would be able to return by the end of the year. In order to facilitate the process, UNHCR has organised bus services between the entities (i.e. the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska) to provide an opportunity for refugees to visit their homes. This endeavour still faces serious difficulties, however, owing to lack of cooperation from the parties.

The return of refugees and displaced persons is closely linked to the issue of elections, the organisation and supervision of which, under the Dayton Agreement, are the responsibility of OSCE. The elections are due to take place on 14 September. A seven-member OSCE Provisional Electoral Commission, comprising also representatives of the three sides, was appointed on 30 January. Although conditions on the ground are far from perfect, the electoral campaign in all parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina has commenced. Local elections were held at Mostar on 30 June under the supervision of the EU Administrator. The resignation of Radovan Karadzic from the posts of President of the Republika Srpska and Chairman of the Serbian Democratic Party as a result of efforts by the High Representative, OSCE and the United States removed a major obstacle to the 14 September polls.

Participants in the Florence meeting of the Peace Implementation Council, held on 13 and 14 June, conducted a mid-term review of progress in the implementation of the Peace Agreement. The Council focused on its civilian aspects, calling upon the parties to work for genuine fulfilment of all its provisions and for the international community to assist them in that endeavour.

On 16 November 1995, the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia issued indictments against Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic for their direct and individual responsibilities for the atrocities committed against the Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica in July 1995 after the fall of the enclave to Bosnian Serb forces. On 11 July 1996, the International Tribunal issued international warrants for Radovan Karadzic and General Mladic. It is imperative that the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal be provided with the ability and powers to gather the necessary evidence effectively and swiftly in a form that can be

presented in court. Moreover, States have an obligation to take the actions needed to create the conditions essential for the Tribunal to perform the task for which it has been created and to bring all indicted criminals to justice.

The strengthening of the Federation is the cornerstone of the Peace Agreement. In that regard, I have welcomed agreements, reached in Washington on 14 May 1996, relating to the basic governance of the Federation, including such fundamental questions as the defence law, economic and political structure, media freedom and preparations for upcoming elections. However, while there appears to be full support at the intergovernmental level, the Federation will require constant commitment at the local level if it is to function as one of the two pillars of the Peace Agreement.

Meanwhile, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina still provokes serious concern. Despite encouraging results in the implementation of the military aspects of the Agreement, serious efforts are required to achieve progress in other areas. Restrictions on freedom of movement and the intolerance demonstrated by all parties remain serious obstacles to the process of reconciliation and reconstruction. The peace process has not yet become irreversible. A real danger remains that the country will be partitioned along ethnic lines and that this could lead to resumption of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Joint efforts by the international community and the genuine cooperation of all parties are required to restore the multi-ethnic character of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to overcome the pain and hatred built up over the past four years.

After more than three years' experience of international efforts to control and resolve this conflict, it would be wrong to underestimate the difficulties that still lie ahead in the negotiation of the further arrangements envisaged in the Peace Agreement. But I believe that today there may be credible prospects for a viable and lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, provided that all parties are at last ready to cooperate in its implementation.

29. Croatia

On 12 November 1995, the Government of Croatia and the local Serb authorities in the former Sector East signed the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, which assigned the prominent role of governing the region to the United Nations. By its resolution 1025 (1995) of 30 November, the Security Council decided that the mandate of the United Nations Confidence

Restoration Operation in Croatia, to be known as UNCRO, would terminate by 15 January 1996 or when the Council decided on the deployment of UNTAES. As part of the restructuring of the United Nations presence in the former Yugoslavia, the command and control of UNCRO military operations in Sector East was transferred on 1 December 1995 from UNCRO to UNPF headquarters. UNCRO was subsequently terminated by the Security Council as at 15 January.

As a result of that decision, all United Nations military units and their accompanying civilian components, including UNCRO political and humanitarian officers and United Nations civilian police, departed from the former Sectors West, North and South in Croatia. The international community's ability to monitor the human rights and humanitarian situation in those areas has accordingly been drastically reduced. United Nations personnel responsible for that task are currently limited to a small team of officers from UNHCR and two human rights officers from the Centre for Human Rights, working in support of the Special Rapporteur and the Expert on Missing Persons. The last civil affairs personnel were withdrawn from the former sectors on 17 January.

Notwithstanding the United Nations diminished capacity to monitor the human rights situation in Croatia, I submitted, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1019 (1995) of 9 November, two reports to the Council on this matter in February and June. In keeping with the request by the Council in its presidential statement of 23 February, information for the reports was compiled by the field operation of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and other sources, including the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), UNHCR, ICRC and independent human rights organisations. The general thrust of my assessment of the situation of human rights in Croatia is that all evidence indicates that the Croatian authorities have so far failed to implement effective measures to safeguard the rights of the local Serb population and to ensure their well-being.

30. United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES)

On 15 January, the Security Council, by its resolution 1037 (1996), authorised the creation of the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), for an initial period of 12 months, with the overall responsibility of helping the parties implement the Basic Agreement. The Council also urged Member States, acting nationally or in concert

with regional organisations, to take all the necessary measures, including close air support, to defend UNTAES or help it withdraw if necessary, and requested UNTAES on its part to cooperate with IFOR and the High Representative, Carl Bildt. The Council also decided that the military component of UNTAES would consist of a force with an initial deployment of up to 5,000 troops.

UNTAES has responsibility for supervising and assisting the demilitarisation of the region as provided for in the Basic Agreement; overseeing the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes; establishing and training a temporary police force to build professionalism among the police and confidence among all ethnic communities; monitoring treatment of offenders and the prison system; organising elections for all local government bodies; maintaining international monitors along the international borders of the region to facilitate the free movement of persons across existing borders; restoring the normal functioning of public services in the region; monitoring the parties' commitment to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms; cooperating with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the task of investigating and prosecuting war crimes; and promoting the realisation of the commitment made in the Basic Agreement between Croatia and the local Serb authorities to the overall maintenance of peace and security.

The Security Council agreed, on 17 January, to the appointment of Jacques Klein as the Transitional Administrator in Eastern Slavonia with overall responsibility and authority for the civilian and military components of the Mission. On 13 February, the Security Council agreed to my appointment of Major-General Jozef Schoups as the Force Commander.

Implementation of the UNTAES mandate is progressing, albeit after a somewhat slow start. The parties to the Basic Agreement continue to stress their willingness to cooperate with UNTAES, even though at the outset they seemed to vary their interpretation of the Agreement to suit their own needs and expectations. The general destruction of infrastructure, coupled with the lack of a budget and slow deployment of troops and police, also hampered progress and made setting up the Mission more difficult than anticipated.

The deployment of the military component of UNTAES was completed on 5 May, the total military strength having almost reached its authorised strength of 5,000 combat troops and support units. As authorised by the Security Council in its resolution 1037 (1996),

arrangements were made with NATO and IFOR to provide UNTAES with close air support, should it be required.

Despite the administrative and logistical problems, the Transitional Administrator, in consultation with both parties, was able to establish on schedule the Joint Implementation Committees called for in the Basic Agreement. Those Committees, which include representatives from international agencies, address a range of concerns: police, civil administration, restoration of public services, education and culture, return of refugees and displaced persons, human rights, elections and records.

UNTAES has an authorised strength of 600 United Nations civilian police, of whom 442 were in the mission area as at 31 July. Progress has been made in the training of a temporary police force consisting of Croatian and local Serb police officers. The local Transitional Police Force was established on 1 July 1996 and will have an estimated strength of 1,300 personnel. Selected officers from both sides are being trained at the International Law Enforcement Academy at Budapest, with the assistance of United Nations civilian police monitors and the United States International Crime Investigation and Training Assistance Project. The Transitional Police Force now has primary responsibility for the maintenance of law and order, operating under the authority of the Transitional Administrator and monitored by United Nations civilian police.

With regard to the restoration of public services, the Belgrade Zagreb highway and the Adriatic pipeline were reopened on 7 May and mail service between areas under UNTAES administration and the rest of Croatia resumed on 14 May after a four-year disruption.

To facilitate the work of the civil affairs component of UNTAES, which has responsibility for the Joint Implementation Committees and contact with local officials and the general public, five regional offices were established, in Beli Monastir, Osijek, Vukovar(city), Vinkovci and Ilok. The civil affairs component now consists of 44 civil affairs officers, 17 of whom operate from headquarters at Vukovar, while the remaining 27 operate from the field offices. Civil affairs has responsibility for staffing, chairing and coordinating the 15 operational Joint Implementation Committees and subcommittees in the areas of public service, education and culture, civil administration and human rights. The Schedule and Procedures for the Demilitarisation of the Region of Eastern Slavonia were signed on 15 April.

This process, which was to last no more than 30 days, entailed the disarmament and demobilisation of all military, paramilitary and police forces, units and personnel, as well as the elimination of all their command structures. It was completed on 20 June, by which date all heavy weapons belonging to the local Serbs had either been removed from the region or handed over to UNTAES. An international inspection team was formed by UNTAES headquarters, including a representative from Headquarters in New York, to confirm that the demilitarisation had been carried out. Comprehensive inspections of all known and suspected military/police locations took place between 24 and 27 June 1996. On 27 June a Certificate of Demilitarisation was signed at UNTAES headquarters at Vukovar between Major-General Schoups, UNTAES Force Commander, and General Loncar, Commander of the Baranja-Eastern Slavonia Corps.

However, there has been little handing over of small arms or ammunition. While many of these may have been removed from the region, it is likely that considerable quantities have stayed in private hands. As a result of the anxiety felt by some residents of the region about long-term security, UNTAES has developed a procedure for registering non-military weapons of persons entitled to hold them.

The UNTAES military component established observation posts in the zone of separation between the Croatian and Serb forces prior to and during the process of demilitarisation and monitored demining efforts by the parties. UNTAES soldiers have also provided support in preventing the illegal removal of resources from the region, such as cut timber, and on 14 May, they assumed control of the strategic Djeletovci oilfield.

An electoral survey mission was undertaken by the Electoral Assistance Division in April and a needs assessment mission went to the region from 13 to 21 July. The purpose of the needs assessment mission was, *inter alia,* to discuss and assess the conditions for the organisation of elections with the Transitional Administrator of UNTAES and relevant Croatian and Serb authorities; to assess the overall framework for the organisation of elections and to prepare a detailed timetable for the elections; to review the existing legal framework and assess the potential need to revise the legislation; to prepare the overall budget; and to design the composition of the electoral component of the operation.

In a period of less than 12 months, UNTAES has achieved significant progress in the implementation of its mandate. This progress

has not been without pitfalls and difficulties. Since the closure of the Djeletovci oilfield on 16 April, lack of revenue has confronted public services with a critical shortage of funds. This problem was further compounded by delays in reaching an agreement with the Croatian authorities on the identification of funding for the local administration and public services, as requested by the Security Council.

31. United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP)

On 30 September 1992, the Presidents of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia signed a joint declaration reaffirming their agreement to the demilitarisation of the Prevlaka peninsula. Since the completion of the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from the area in October 1992, United Nations military observers (then under UNPROFOR) have been stationed in the area.

In my report to the Security Council of 23 November 1995, I observed that the situation around the Prevlaka peninsula had remained stable, although there had been provocations on both sides, and I noted that the presence of United Nations military observers in both the Prevlaka and Dubrovnik areas had contributed to controlling tensions. I also noted that the Government of Croatia had not agreed to the continuation of UNCRO functions in Croatia, except perhaps in the monitoring of the demilitarisation of the Prevlaka peninsula as a confidence-building measure.

By its resolution 1038 (1996) of 15 January 1996, the Security Council authorised United Nations military observers to continue monitoring the demilitarisation of the area for a period of three months, to be extended for an additional period of three months upon a report by the Secretary-General that such an extension would continue to contribute to the decrease of tension there.

In my report of 6 February, I informed the Security Council of my intention to maintain 28 United Nations military observers in the Prevlaka area, under the command and direction of a Chief Military Observer, reporting directly to United Nations Headquarters in New York. Subsequently, on 12 March, I reported that the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) had become a separate mission. By a letter of 14 March, the President of the Council informed me of the latter's concurrence that the mandate of UNMOP should continue in accordance with paragraph 1 of resolution 1038 (1996), and of the request by the Council that I submit a further report to it,

pursuant to paragraph 2 of the resolution, before the expiration of the current mandate.

In my report of 27 June, I noted that the situation in the Prevlaka area had improved. The assessment was made in view of the withdrawal of Croatian military personnel and the partial removal of mines in the United Nations-controlled zone on the Croatian side of the border, together with the withdrawal of heavy weapons and easing of restrictions of movement on both sides of the border. While recognising that the UNMOP presence in the Prevlaka peninsula could not continue indefinitely, I expressed the view that if it were to be removed prematurely, one or the other party could seek to fill the vacuum. Military tension created by its departure would be prejudicial to political negotiations by both sides. Bearing this in mind, as well as the request by both Governments for the continuation of the mandate of UNMOP, I recommended that the mandate be extended for a period of three months, until 15 October 1996, pending the outcome of the negotiations between the parties. By its resolution 1066 (1996) of 15 July, the Security Council authorised the United Nations military observers to continue monitoring the demilitarisation of the Prevlaka peninsula until 15 January 1997.

32. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Since my last report to the Assembly, continued peace and stability in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have confirmed the important role being played by the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). That role has been complemented by the Interim Accord, which was signed between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia under the good offices of my Personal Envoy, Cyrus Vance, on 13 September 1995. Since then, both countries have continued to exchange views in the context of article 5 of the Interim Accord, and have agreed to continue their direct discussions under Vance's good offices at mutually convenient dates pursuant to Security Council resolution 845 (1993). Representatives of the two countries last met on 11 July 1996.

After considering my report of 23 November 1995, the Security Council, by its resolution 1027 (1995) of 30 November, decided to extend the mandate of UNPREDEP for a period of six months, terminating on 30 May 1996. In so doing, the Council, while acknowledging the positive role being played by UNPREDEP, was mindful of its concern about possible developments that could undermine confidence and stability in the former Yugoslav Republic

of Macedonia. An assassination attempt on President Kiro Gligorov on 3 October 1995 had underlined the country's political fragility. As requested by the Security Council in its resolution 1027 (1995), I submitted a further report on 30 January 1996, in which I detailed developments on the ground and other circumstances affecting the mandate of the mission, as well as pertinent developments in the region.

Based on that report and on my letter of 6 February to the President of the Security Council, the Council adopted resolution 1046 (1996) of 13 February, authorising an increase in the strength of UNPREDEP by 50 military personnel in order to provide a continued engineering capability to support its operations. The Council also approved the establishment of the position of Force Commander of UNPREDEP and requested that I submit a further report with recommendations on the composition, strength and mandate of the Mission.

On 1 February, the Security Council concurred in principle with my recommendation that UNPREDEP become an independent mission without change to its mandate, strength or composition of forces. Consequently, I redesignated the Chief of Mission, Henryk J. Sokalski, as my Special Representative for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and appointed Brigadier-General Bo Wranker (Sweden) as the Force Commander.

UNPREDEP, pursuant to its mandate, continues to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Its tasks include preventive deployment, good offices, measures to build confidence, early warning, fact-finding, monitoring and reporting, as well as selected social and developmental projects. Since the termination of the activities of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, UNPREDEP undertakes tasks in areas where it once cooperated with the Conference and its various working groups.

The Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia holds that the continued presence of the mission is required to maintain its country's stability. On 8 April, the Government put forward arguments for an extension of the mission in a letter to me outlining the sensitive phase of implementation of the Dayton Agreement; the potential regional threats, especially Kosovo, in the immediate proximity of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the non-demarcation of the border line with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; inadequate defensive capabilities while the country's efforts to join

collective security arrangements remained ongoing; and the role of UNPREDEP in the process of establishing democratic structures and policies of good neighbourliness.

In my report of 23 May pursuant to resolution 1046 (1996), I informed the Security Council of the positive role being played by UNPREDEP. I noted, however, that its role, like that of all peace-keeping operations at this time of financial crisis, must be rigorously examined with a view to determining whether its mandate was still required and, if so, whether that mandate could be executed with fewer resources. I also noted that while there might still exist some threats to the stability of the country, such threats had diminished and were certainly much less than they had been in November 1992, when I had recommended a preventive deployment. Nevertheless I took the view that it would be imprudent to withdraw UNPREDEP and 1 recommended to the Security Council that the mandate of the force, and its configuration, be extended for a further six months. The Council, by its resolution 1058 (1996) of 30 May, decided to extend the mandate for a period terminating on 30 November, with the proviso that I keep it regularly informed of any developments on the ground and other circumstances affecting the mandate. The Council further requested that I review the composition, strength and mandate of UNPREDEP and report to the Council by 30 September.

Peacemaking (International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia)

The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, which was held in August 1992, was to remain in being until a settlement of the problems of the former Yugoslavia had been achieved. However, after the signing of the Peace Agreement, it was decided that the responsibilities of the International Conference should be transferred to the appropriate organ emanating from the Agreement. Pursuant to the decisions adopted at the Peace Implementation Conference (8 and 9 December 1995) and as indicated in my report to the Security Council, the Conference ceased to exist on 31 January 1996.

Until the termination of its activities, the Steering Committee of the International Conference remained under the co-chairmanship of Thorvald Stoltenberg, representing the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and Carl Bildt, representing EU, with its seat at the United Nations Office at Geneva. In the period between the issuing of my last report on the work of the Organisation and the winding-up of the Conference, the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee submitted

three reports concerning the International Conference's Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was established in September 1994. Each report contained certification that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia continued to meet its commitment to close the border between it and areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces. The Co-Chairmen also submitted the final biannual report on the activities of the Conference.

33. Western Sahara

Pursuant to my predecessor's plan for the settlement of the conflict in Western Sahara, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established by the Security Council in its resolution 690 (1991) of 29 April 1991 to organise and conduct, in cooperation with OAU, a referendum of self-determination by which the people of Western Sahara would choose between independence from and integration with Morocco.

As a main element of the plan, the ceasefire monitored by MINURSO has been holding since it came into effect on 6 September 1991. According to the initial timetable, the transitional period should have started on the same day and the referendum should have taken place in January 1992. However, the identification of those eligible to vote has suffered considerable delays as a result of the widely divergent positions of the two parties, the Government of Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberation de Saguia el-Hamra y del Rio de Oro (Frente POLISARIO), on the question of tribal affiliation to the Territory and of the applicants' eligibility to vote. This has further delayed work on other aspects of the plan and has made it impossible for the United Nations to commence the transitional period, which will culminate in the referendum.

In a report dated 8 September 1995, I informed the Security Council that I could not confirm 15 November as the start of the transitional period, as the Council had asked me to do in its resolution 1002 (1995) of 30 June. As continuing difficulties could not be overcome, there had not been enough progress in the identification operation. Nor had the benchmarks I had identified been met by that date. Despite repeated calls by the Security Council and myself to the parties to permit the process to advance more rapidly, both were reluctant to compromise on any issue they believed could weaken their own position. Making one more appeal to the parties to permit the expeditious implementation of the Plan, I proposed an extension of the mandate of MINURSO until 31 January 1996. If by that time the conditions necessary for the

start of the transitional period were not in place, I intended to present the Council with alternative options for its consideration, including the possibility of the withdrawal of MINURSO.

In its resolution 1017(1995) of 22 September, the Security Council endorsed my recommendation to extend the mandate of the Mission until 31 January 1996, taking note of my intention as stated above. The Council asked me, in close consultation with the parties, to produce specific and detailed proposals to resolve the problems hindering the completion of the identification process and to report on the outcome of my efforts in that regard by 15 November 1995. The Council also asked me to report by 15 January 1996 on progress achieved towards the implementation of the plan and to state in that report whether or not the transitional period could begin by 31 May.

In a letter dated 27 October 1995 to the President of the Security Council, I proposed simplified procedures for carrying out the identification operation, without prejudice to its reliability and to recourse procedures provided for in the terms of reference of the Identification Commission. On 6 November, the Security Council acknowledged my letter and asked me to continue my contacts with the parties on the matter and to report there on by 15 November.

On 24 November, I reported to the Security Council that the Government of Morocco considered my suggested simplified procedure to be a radical departure from the plan. I therefore suggested another procedure, which, however, neither party found satisfactory. In view of the continuing difficulties, I proposed, during my oral briefing to the Council on 15 December, to send a Special Envoy to the region in an attempt to break the deadlock in the identification process. In its resolution 1033 (1995) of 19 December, the Security Council welcomed my decision, and requested me to report on an urgent basis on the results of my Special Envoy's consultations.

By that time, the Identification Commission had interviewed and identified some 61,000 applicants out of a total of 234,000 (180,000 from the Moroccan side, with 90,000 in the Territory and 90,000 in Morocco; 40,000 from the POLISARIO side, in the refugee camps near the Tindouf area of Algeria; and 14,000 in Mauritania). This process, started on 28 August 1994, was brought to a complete halt on 22 December 1995, when agreement could not be reached on procedures for the identification of a large number of remaining applicants who were members of Saharan tribal groupings that the Frente POLISARIO did not consider to belong to the Territory.

My report on the consultations of my Special Envoy, Chinmaya R. Gharekhan, was submitted to the Security Council on 19 January. As a result of his efforts, the Frente POLISARIO had agreed to resume the identification of applicants who were members of tribal subgroups (sub-fractions) represented in the 1974 census of the Territory. However, it would not participate in the processing of applicants from three tribal groupings not represented by subfraction in the 1974 census, as it would not be able to present sheikhs or alternates to assist in the identification of those applicants. Furthermore, it would strongly oppose any attempt to identify such applicants with the participation of a Sheikh from one side only. Morocco, on the other hand, maintained that all applicants had to be processed without discrimination between different tribal groups.

My Special Envoy noted that the plan made it incumbent on the Identification Commission to process all applications submitted on time. Following the Frente POLISARIO's insistence on more transparency in the work of the Commission, he agreed that it would share with both parties, in a suitable format, the list of applicants identified so far as eligible to vote, as well as a list of applicants still to be identified.

In the light of the results of my Special Envoy's mission, I suggested that the Security Council extend the mandate of MINURSO for four months, until 31 May 1996. I stressed, however, that stalemate would in all probability confront us again a few months after the Identification Commission had completed the processing of applicants in accordance with the agreement reached by my Special Envoy. As a second possible option, I suggested that the Council decide that it could not justify a further extension of the mandate of the Mission and that plans for a phased withdrawal should be prepared. On 31 January, the Council adopted resolution 1042 (1996), by which it extended the mandate until 31 May and invited me, in the absence of meaningful progress towards the completion of the settlement plan at that time, to submit for consideration a detailed programme for a phased withdrawal of MINURSO.

On 8 May, I reported to the Council that as a result of the positions of the parties all efforts to resume the identification process had thus far been frustrated. While both parties remained committed to the plan, the impasse reached at the end of 1995 continued. For the Frente POLISARIO, "subfractions included in the 1974 census" did not include the three contested tribal groupings. In those groupings, it would agree

to identify only those individuals counted in the census and members of their immediate families. At the same time, it insisted on receiving the lists of persons already processed and found eligible to vote. Morocco, on the other hand, rejected the issuance of the lists prior to the completion of identification, on the grounds that this would be contrary to the plan and had not been endorsed by the Security Council.

I was compelled to conclude that the required willingness did not exist to give MINURSO the cooperation needed for it to resume and complete the process within a reasonable period of time. In those circumstances, I felt obliged to recommend the suspension of the process until such time as both parties provided convincing evidence that they were committed to resuming and completing it without further obstacles, in accordance with the plan, as mandated by the Security Council.

The suspension of the identification operation meant that the members of the Identification Commission would be withdrawn, with the exception of a few who would ensure the orderly closing of the identification centres and the storage of identification data. The suspension also entailed the withdrawal of the civilian police component, which had worked closely with the identification staff, except for a small number of officers who would maintain contacts with both sides and plan for the eventual resumption of the identification process. The records of the Identification Commission would be transferred to the United Nations Office at Geneva for safe-keeping.

I also proposed a 20 per cent reduction of the military component of MINURSO, which would not impair its operational effectiveness in monitoring observance of the ceasefire. I further proposed to maintain a small political office, headed by my Acting Special Representative, Erik Jensen, with a liaison office at Tindouf, to pursue a dialogue with the parties and the two neighbouring countries, Algeria and Mauritania, and to facilitate any other effort that could help resolve the parties' differences. In that regard, I instructed my Acting Special Representative to continue to explore with the parties and the neighbouring countries confidence-building measures that might allow the resumption of contacts among all concerned. In the meantime, I recommended the extension of the mandate of the Mission for a period of six months at the reduced strength outlined above.

In its resolution 1056 (1996) of 29 May, the Security Council supported my proposals and decided to extend the mandate of

MINURSO until 30 November 1996. The Council recalled that the parties had accepted that sole and exclusive responsibility for the organisation and conduct of the referendum was vested in the United Nations. It urged them to demonstrate the political will, cooperation and flexibility necessary to permit the resumption and early completion of the identification process and the implementation of the plan. It also called upon them to cooperate with the United Nations in the release of Saharan political prisoners and the exchange of prisoners of war on humanitarian grounds, as soon as possible, to accelerate implementation of the plan in its entirety. I was requested to continue my efforts with the parties to break the impasse and to submit a report to the Council by 31 August on the outcome of my efforts, and also to keep it closely informed of all significant developments and to submit a report on the implementation of the resolution by 10 November.

After the adoption of resolution 1056 (1996), my Acting Special Representative met with representatives of both parties to suggest a course of action with respect to the main issues of the resolution. On 1 July, the Independent Jurist, accompanied by the Acting Special Representative, met with Moroccan government officials to follow up on a preliminary list of presumed political prisoners, which had already been provided to the Government of Morocco. On 2 July, the Independent Jurist, accompanied by the Acting Special Representative, met with senior Frente POLISARIO officials on the same issue. It was agreed that the Independent Jurist would visit the region again in August. At the same meeting, my Acting Special Representative discussed other issues at length with the Frente POLISARIO, including the resumption of the identification process. The Frente POLISARIO firmly rejected any notion of identifying the groups it did not consider as "subfractions" included in the Spanish census.

Subsequently, my Acting Special Representative travelled to Algeria, where he met with the Foreign Minister, and to Mauritania, where he met with the President, to consult about the reactivation of the political process in Western Sahara. Meanwhile, the downsizing of MINURSO proceeded as scheduled.

On 16 July, I briefed the Security Council about my meetings at Yaounde with the Presidents of Algeria and Mauritania and with the Secretary-General of the Frente POLISARIO. I informed the Council of the concern expressed by both Presidents about the United Nations disengagement from Western Sahara and their preoccupation about a

possible deterioration of the situation if no solution was found. I had informed my two interlocutors of my continuing efforts and those of my Acting Special Representative to reactivate the political process. Stressing the urgency of the situation, I asked the Members of the Council to assist in finding a solution to the problem through their own contacts and bilateral consultations with the parties.

By the end of September, the number of military observers will have been reduced from 288 to 232. The final reduction to 230 personnel, the number mandated by the Security Council in resolution 1056 (1996), will be effected by the end of October. At the same time, since the suspension of the identification process, the number of civilian police officers has been reduced from 44 to 9.

E. COOPERATION WITH REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS

Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations defines the role that regional arrangements and organisations can play in the maintenance of international peace and security. The need for international action to maintain international peace and security has not abated, resulting in increased demands being placed upon the United Nations. The financial crisis afflicting the Organisation has made it even more difficult to respond adequately, making it more important than ever that the capacities and experience of both the United Nations and regional organisations be utilised in the most effective manner possible. As a result of these trends, cooperation between the United Nations and regional organisations has continued to grow and in some cases has reached considerably higher levels. In February 1996, I convened the second meeting of the executive heads of regional organisations that have cooperated in the field with the United Nations peacemaking and peace-keeping endeavours.

1. Cooperation with the Organisation of American States (OAS)

Since my last report, cooperation between the United Nations and the Organisation of American States (OAS) has continued to increase. The Secretary-General of OAS has visited the United Nations on several occasions since the signing of an agreement of cooperation between the two secretariats in April 1995. Representatives of the two Organisations have continued to exchange information and attend each other's meetings. For example, the Director of the Americas Division of the Department of Political Affairs represented the United

Nations at the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth regular sessions of the General Assembly of OAS (in 1995 and 1996, respectively).

On 3 April 1996, the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 50/86 B, further extending the mandate of the Joint United Nations/OAS International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH). The Executive Director of MICIVIH continues to be responsible to both myself and the Secretary-General of OAS, Cesar Gaviria. OAS and the United Nations also collaborated in the observation of the elections in Haiti in December 1995.

Another significant area of cooperation between the two Organisations occurs within the framework of the tripartite committee established by the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the President of the Inter-American Development Bank and the Secretary-General of OAS to coordinate selected activities in the economic and social fields and in the implementation of the Plan of Action adopted by the Summit of the Americas in December 1994. Recent consultations between representatives of the Department of Political Affairs and OAS have resulted in the establishment of a mechanism for cooperation and coordination between the two secretariats that would permit greater flexibility in these areas.

2. Cooperation with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)

Progress continues to be made in the efforts of the United Nations to strengthen and broaden its programme of cooperation with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in the political, economic and social areas. I have been in constant contact with the current Chairman and with the Secretary-General of OAU and consulted with them on various African issue's of common concern and interest with a view to coordinating our efforts and cooperating on initiatives to help prevent and resolve conflicts in the continent. This has been the case in particular with respect to Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda and Western Sahara, as well as Sierra Leone and Somalia. My Special Envoys and Representatives and those of the Secretary-General of OAU have also consulted closely and coordinated their activities.

In the context of the United Nations System-wide Special Initiative for Africa, I had occasion to discuss with various African leaders the continent's development needs and objectives and the specific ways in which the courageous and determined efforts of African countries for peace, development, democracy and respect for human rights could

receive the support they deserve. I will continue to call upon the international community to stand together with Africa, its leaders and its people and to forge a new partnership.

At the tenth annual meeting on cooperation between the secretariats of the United Nations system and OAU, held at Addis Ababa in November 1995, the two sides assessed the implementation of their multifaceted programme of cooperation and agreed on new measures to strengthen and broaden it. In the areas of peace, security and democracy, as well as on economic and social questions, the two Organisations have elaborated and defined modalities for implementing the agreed programme of cooperation. They are expected to meet again later this year to assess the feasibility of the framework and the progress achieved in the implementation of the specific programmes and to agree on new areas of cooperation.

I attended the thirty-third ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU, held at Yaounde in July 1996. In my address to the Assembly, I emphasised in particular the cooperation between the United Nations and OAU in the field of preventive diplomacy and the participation of OAU member States in peace-keeping operations. The two Organisations had also achieved much progress in the establishment of the African Economic Community, in the development of human resources and training, culture, literacy, assistance to refugees and democratisation. Furthermore, I stressed that it was in the same spirit that I launched on 15 March 1996 a United Nations System-wide Special Initiative for Africa, the most extensive operation ever coordinated by the United Nations, to promote an active partnership between donor countries and African Governments and institutions in support of Africa's development.

3. Cooperation with the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)

Cooperation with the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has increased steadily since its admission as an observer to the General Assembly in 1992 and the adoption of resolution 49/141 on 20 December 1994. In my last report, I expressed appreciation for the special role played by the Community in the restoration of democracy in Haiti and, in particular, for the participation of the CARICOM contingent in UNMIH, the first time that the Community had participated in a United Nations peace-keeping operation. As a result of that involvement, I was pleased to invite the Secretary-General of CARICOM to attend the February 1996 meeting between the United Nations and regional organisations on peacemaking and peace-keeping.

Collaboration with CARICOM will benefit from the establishment of a more flexible mechanism, following a review of cooperation between the United Nations and regional organisations. I welcomed the decision by CARICOM Foreign Ministers at their twenty-second meeting, held in Jamaica in May 1996, to identify possible areas in which to move ahead in this direction, including peace-keeping, peacemaking and activities in the economic and social fields. In the interim, CARICOM continued to be represented at United Nations conferences and in their preparatory and follow-up meetings. For example, a senior official of CARICOM attended the meeting of the Commission on Sustainable Development on progress in the implementation of the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States, held at the United Nations on 24 April. In reciprocal fashion, I continue to be represented at the highest level at CARICOM summits and to be guided by their deliberations.

4. Cooperation in the European Area

The European continent is home to a large number of regional organisations with which the United Nations has been increasing and enhancing its cooperation over the past several years. The United Nations and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have previously agreed upon a practical division of labour concerning activities in Europe, and under this framework each Organisation has provided support to the efforts of the other. The two Organisations work closely together in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, within the framework of the Dayton Agreement, which has assigned distinct yet complementary responsibilities to the United Nations and OSCE. The United Nations has also maintained close contact with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in the context of the IFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and UNTAES in Croatia.

Regarding the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, OSCE has participated in and provided support to the peacemaking efforts of my Special Envoy for Georgia, and cooperation between the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peace-keeping force and UNOMIG remains highly effective. The Minsk Group of OSCE has the lead role in efforts to settle the dispute over the Nagorny-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, to which the United Nations has lent support and assistance. In addition, the United Nations and OSCE have worked together in Tajikistan and in a number of other fields, of which election monitoring deserves special mention. Other European organisations with which the United Nations has cooperated in the period under review include

the European Union, the Council of Europe and the Western European Union. In May 1996,1 had the honour of addressing the Council of Heads of State of CIS in Moscow.

5. Cooperation with the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC)

Regular consultations were held with the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) on issues of mutual interest, in particular the situations in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia and Tajikistan. In response to General Assembly resolution 49/15, a high-level meeting was held between senior officials of the secretariats of the two Organisations in October 1995 to discuss ways to strengthen cooperation between the United Nations and OIC in the political field, and it was agreed that consultations on defining the mechanisms of such cooperation would continue. In June 1996, a general meeting was held at Geneva between senior representatives of the secretariats of the two Organisations and their respective specialised agencies to review progress achieved in the nine existing priority areas of cooperation (in the economic, social and technical fields) and to identify ways and means of further consolidating and rationalising cooperation in those areas. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 50/17, during the general meeting at Geneva senior officials of the political departments of the United Nations and OIC secretariats also reviewed proposals for strengthening cooperation in the political field put forward by the two secretariats. The two sides identified a number of modalities for enhancing United Nations/OIC information exchange, consultations and coordination, and agreed to hold further high-level consultations in that regard.

6. Cooperation with the League of Arab States (LAS)

Cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States (LAS) has strengthened as the two organisations have pursued the implementation of proposals adopted at the general meetings between them, the latest of which was held at Vienna in 1995. The joint projects in the economic and social fields have proved to be beneficial for the development of the Arab States. Regular consultations on matters of mutual concern between officials at all levels addressed patterns of coordination and cooperation in actions related to preventive diplomacy and peace-building. In order to improve relations further and to continue overall consultations, in January 1996 I made the first visit of a United Nations Secretary-.General to the headquarters of LAS at Cairo.

F. DISARMAMENT

We are at a historic moment. On 10 September, the General Assembly adopted the text of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and requested me, as depositary of the treaty, to open it for signature, at United Nations Headquarters, at the earliest possible date. The international political consensus in favour of permanently ending nuclear-weapon testing enjoys enormous support. It is now my intention as expeditiously as possible to open the treaty for signature by all Governments.

The adoption of the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty marks over a quarter of a century of concerted effort by the international community. It is a supplement to and expands the corpus of international disarmament and arms control law. It has powerful symbolic value for concrete commitment by both the nuclear-weapon and the non-nuclear-weapon-States towards achieving the ultimate goal of a totally denuclearised world. It is a central element for the consolidation of the 1995 decision of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to extend that Treaty indefinitely and for the success of the parties' efforts to pursue clearly defined objectives and principles of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. It is critical to the success of the strengthened review process of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which will start in 1997.

The extensive and rigorous verification arrangements envisaged by the negotiators greatly increase the level of international cooperation in the nuclear field. The process of negotiating the treaty has already extended the capacity of Governments that participated in the testing and evaluation of the international monitoring system to communicate rapidly and accurately among themselves.

Primary responsibility for the fulfilment of the future treaty's twin objectives of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation lies, first and foremost, with the nuclear-weapon States. I call on them to pursue in good faith further negotiations among themselves and in international forums to deepen their commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free world by further reducing their nuclear-weapon arsenals and their reliance on them for security.

Universal adherence to the future treaty will ensure a more effective test-ban regime. I appeal to all nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States to sign the treaty and to take the necessary national measures to ratify it as early as possible so as to allow its swift entry into force.

The comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is not, however, an end in itself. All States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should redouble their efforts to press for further substantive measures of nuclear disarmament, which would bring the international community closer to the realisation of its goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

The institutional role of the Organisation as the impartial repository of international legal instruments has been recognised by the treaty's negotiators with the designation of the Secretary-General as the future treaty's depositary. I pledge, on behalf of the Organisation, to fulfil the duties of promoting and monitoring adherence to the treaty, of disseminating its achievements and of supporting the parties in the initial stages of the establishment of the organisation that will implement it.

Two other major long-term multilateral efforts in the nuclear field have strengthened and reinforced the broad consensus in favour of nuclear disarmament and the global nuclear non-proliferation regime: the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (the Pelindaba Treaty) which were signed on 15 December 1995 and 11 April 1996, respectively. Added to these positive developments was the signature on 25 March 1996 by France, the United Kingdom and the United States of the Protocols to the 1986 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), making all five nuclear-weapon States parties thereto.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones are steps towards the goal of a nuclear-free world. The signing of these two treaties has rendered two great parts of the Earth's surface free of the development, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer or use of nuclear weapons. They constitute the third and fourth nuclear-weapon-free zones with high population densities, after the South Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean. With Antarctica included, the entire southern hemisphere is now nuclear-free.

The race for nuclear arms is clearly in a downward spiral. In parallel with the successes at the multilateral level, the Russian Federation and the United States have been reducing their strategic nuclear arms, on a daily basis and as prescribed by START I. The ratification of START II by the United States in January 1996 should encourage the Russian Federation to follow suit so that the two Powers may proceed to reducing their nuclear weapons to the agreed limits of 3,000 to 3,500 by the year 2003. In February 1996, France announced reductions in its nuclear forces, closed a weapons-grade uranium facility and ceased production of that fissile material.

Nevertheless, stockpiles containing thousands of nuclear weapons still exist. In addition, vast stocks of weapons-grade fissile material still pose great risks to the world's people and environment. The threat of nuclear-weapon-related accidents, the smuggling of weapons-grade nuclear material and diverse forms of nuclear terrorism have not been banished. The 10-year commemoration in April 1996 of the disaster at Chernobyl was a sobering reminder of the long-lasting effects of a nuclear accident involving a peaceful nuclear facility and of the terror and destruction that could be unleashed by further such events. The agreements reached among the leading Powers at the Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security in April 1996 to better control, manage and secure the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade material were a welcome step in the right direction.

Efforts towards the ultimate goal of total nuclear disarmament go hand in hand with efforts to ensure the non-proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction. It is now almost four years since the signing of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Its entry into force is overdue. The provisions for transparency, consultation and cooperation through exchange of information and notifications with respect to existing stocks; the detailed and time-bound plans for their destruction; and the rigorous verification arrangements provided for by the Convention cannot enter into force on their own. I have written twice to Member States, urging those which have not yet done so to ratify the Convention as soon as possible.

To strengthen further the regime for non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction, experts have been progressing steadily towards effective, reliable and equitable international verification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

Transparency in armaments has become an accepted and effective method for building regional and international confidence. Since its establishment in 1992, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms has proved itself a useful tool in that process. A significant level of participation by Member States in the Register has been sustained. Information on the major weapons systems transferred and their most important suppliers and recipients has been a matter of public record for three years running. Procedures have been simplified for the many States that have nothing to report. Yet participation is still not

universal. Efforts by Governments and by the Secretariat have been made in various regions to foster greater participation in the Register. Different regional forums have continued to discuss the establishment of arms registers that would deal with weapons of immediate concern to them.

There has been an upsurge of innovative and creative activity to meet the challenges in the field of conventional weapons known as "micro-disarmament". I have used this term frequently over the last year to distinguish it from the traditional disarmament items that accounted for most of the United Nations agenda during the cold war, dominated as that period was by weapons of mass destruction and major conventional weapons systems. Small arms and light weapons, including landmines, are today's instruments of choice in conflicts within States, civil strife, insurgencies, rebellions and the like. The end of the cold war is an unprecedented opportunity for United Nations intervention on this front to control the production, trade, accumulation and use of small arms and light weapons.

A symbolic display of disarmament and peacemaking was enacted in the city of Timbuktu, Mali, in March 1996. A stack of some 3,000 small arms, comprising rifles, grenade-launchers and machine-guns that had been handed in by ex-combatants in the northern part of that country, was doused in gasoline and torched in a dramatic "Flame of Peace" ceremony. The action implemented part of the peace agreement reached in 1995 between the Government of Mali and the Mouvement et Fronts Unis de 1'Azawad, and was jointly organised by the United Nations and UNDP. The ceremony was a hopeful sign of what can be achieved when the various agents and components of the peace process come together.

UNDP has focused its efforts on restoring and further developing the economy of Mali, especially the less developed regions where economic marginalisation has contributed to violent political unrest. The cantonment of demobilised soldiers was organised and opportunities for gainful employment made available to young ex-soldiers, who might not have known anything but war in their short lives. The United Nations helped by identifying the sources of the proliferation of small arms in Mali, by suggesting how they could be collected and by identifying ways of strengthening security in the country.

For micro-disarmament to be relevant, it must deal with security concerns that are of direct and practical interest to States within a

specific region. In July, 11 Central African States signed a non-aggression pact. The signing of the pact, at a ceremony I attended during my visit to Yaounde for the annual Summit Meeting of OAU, was in itself an expression of confidence among the members of a tense and unstable region. The United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa was pivotal in the process that led to the Pact's conclusion and signature. The Committee has promoted among its members a dialogue on regional issues, exchanges of information, meetings of security and defence-related government officials, and other concrete measures. It should continue to be encouraged and supported.

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons, especially the clandestine trade in them, can undermine the stability and security of States, most acutely of small States, and as a consequence even destabilise an entire region. In May 1996, a three-year effort by the United Nations Disarmament Commission resulted in a recommended set of guidelines for controlling international arms transfers and eradicating illicit arms trafficking. In June 1996, a group of governmental experts began an in-depth study on the nature and causes of excessive accumulations and transfers of small arms and light weapons, and ways and means to reduce them. The group's work has the potential to serve as a call to action to reduce and control this new arms race.

The distressing humanitarian issues related to the excessive and indiscriminate use of landmines are addressed in detail elsewhere in this report. A solution to the problem will continue to receive the Organisation's priority attention. A permanent ban of this weapon of mass destruction in slow motion is the only option. The number of States that have instituted permanent bans on the transfer of anti-personnel landmines continued to grow over the year. A number of States have gone further and committed themselves to banning all production, development, stockpiling and use of anti-personnel landmines and to destroying all existing stockpiles.

The Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects has finalised its work. Protocol II on Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Such Devices was revised to include internal conflicts, provisions on the transfer of landmines and further restrictions on the use of mines, some of which set precedents in the

field of international disarmament law. It is a matter of special importance to the Organisation that the provisions governing the protection of United Nations peace and humanitarian forces from the effects of the massive emplacement of mines are respected to the fullest.

At the same time, I have made clear my disappointment at the results of the Review Conference: the revised provisions fell far short of a total ban, a position supported by the United Nations, its agencies, non-governmental organisations and the ICRC, together with 34 Member States. My hope is that the annual conferences agreed to by the States parties will maintain momentum towards a more thorough strengthening of Protocol II.

The Review Conference was able to achieve success in another less publicised area. The States parties adopted a new Additional Protocol IV to the Convention in which they agreed to ban the use and transfer of anti-personnel blinding laser weapons. To its credit, the new instrument has outlawed a weapon before its deployment. It is a small yet significant advance in humanitarian/disarmament law. It should be followed closely by stronger restrictions on the use of lasers for weapons purposes.

Discussions surrounding the convening of the next special session on disarmament began in the United Nations Disarmament Commission in April and continued in my Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters in July this year. Such a meeting could focus world attention on the changing and evolving face of multilateral disarmament, arms control and international security at the macro and micro levels. There appears to be a general wish to convene this type of meeting, though the time-frame is still under discussion. A propitious global political environment would be important for its success and the course of the substantive preparations might be the best indicator of when would be the most favourable time to hold it. The main objective should be to ensure that the effort, which will require a mobilisation of resources, will not only make a constructive contribution to international discourse in this field but will mark an advance in multilateral cooperation for disarmament.

G. POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING

Strategies

The primary goal of post-conflict peace-building is to avert the revival of a conflict that has been brought under control. It attempts

to address the root causes, be they political, economic, social or humanitarian, that underlie the dispute that caused the armed conflict and thus consolidate the peace. It is a long-term activity that goes beyond the immediate imperative of stopping the guns and tries gradually to create conditions that will ensure that there is no reason for them ever to start again.

Post-conflict peace-building is a complex process. The role of the Secretary-General is to provide the guidance that will ensure that the resources of the whole United Nations system contribute in an integrated way to the achievement of a defined political goal.

As with the Organisation's peacemaking and peace-keeping activities, peace-building is not a therapy that the United Nations can attempt to impose on an unwilling patient. The issues concerned are often very sensitive, especially in internal conflicts. The United Nations can only get involved if the Government or Governments concerned want it to. Although there may be occasions when the Secretary-General can legitimately suggest to Governments that certain measures may be helpful, post-conflict peace-building is not a service that can or should be imposed on Member States.

The United Nations has in recent years acquired considerable experience in working with Governments to design and execute post-conflict peace-building activities. This experience identified four roles that can be played by the United Nations in this area.

The first role, in the general context of early warning, is to identify situations where it appears that the United Nations could usefully help the parties to a past conflict to take measures to reduce the chances of it reigniting. The second role is to develop ideas about what form those measures might take and to discuss them with the Government(s) concerned. The third role, assuming government consent, is to energize the programmes, funds, offices and agencies of the United Nations system and to persuade them that the proposed activities are worthwhile and fall within their mandates. The fourth role is to monitor the extent to which the agreed peace-building activities are achieving the political purpose of reducing the risk of revived conflict.

Preventive diplomacy has its limits; too often disputes are resurrected and develop into conflicts before effective action can be taken to control them. In these circumstances, there must be no relaxation of the United Nations efforts to build a lasting peace. Recent experience has underlined the importance of the contribution made to

those efforts by two specific activities: electoral assistance and mine clearance.

Electoral Assistance

In the period between August 1995 and July 1996, the United Nations received 25 new requests for electoral assistance, including from Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Bangladesh, Benin, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Chad, the Comoros (two requests), the Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea (two requests), Guyana, Kyrgyzstan, Nicaragua, the Niger, Romania, Sao Tome and Principe (two requests), the Sudan, Uganda, Yemen and Zaire and the Palestinian Authority. In addition, UNTAES, established on 15 January 1996 by the Security Council (resolution 1037 (1996)), was given a mandate to organise elections, assist in their conduct and certify the results.

In addition, based on requests received before August 1995, assistance was provided to Azerbaijan, Brazil, Cote d'Ivoire, Fiji, Gabon, the Gambia, Haiti, Liberia, Mexico, Mozambique, Panama, Peru, Sierra Leone, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania, as well as to the United Nations missions in Guatemala and Western Sahara. Assistance could not be provided in nine cases: Albania, Benin, Cape Verde, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea (one request), Romania, Sao Tome and Principe, the Sudan and the Palestinian Authority. The requests from Armenia, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Yemen and Zaire were under consideration when this report was finalised.

The type of electoral assistance provided varies according to the requests received and the resources available. Following the guidelines provided to Member States, the "coordination and support" approach was used in the cases of Azerbaijan, Chad, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Kyrgyzstan, Sierra Leone and the United Republic of Tanzania. Technical assistance was given to Bangladesh, Brazil, Chad, the Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, the Gambia, Guyana, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Mexico, Mozambique, the Niger, Panama, Peru, Uganda and Sierra Leone. "Follow and report" (short-term observation) was provided to Algeria and Uganda. "Verification" is planned for Liberia (currently in abeyance) and "organisation and conduct" is under preparation in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium.

The cases described below —Azerbaijan, Haiti and Sierra Leone— are intended to illustrate the different types of electoral assistance provided by the United Nations during the past year.

1. Azerbaijan

In June 1995, Azerbaijan requested assistance from the United Nations 1103 and OSCE for the parliamentary elections scheduled for 12 November 1995. A joint United Nations/OSCE needs assessment mission visited Azerbaijan later that same month. Based on the cooperation first established for the observation of elections for an Armenian National Assembly on 5 July 1995, the United Nations and OSCE established a Joint Electoral Observation Mission in Azerbaijan to observe the electoral process and to coordinate and support the activities of international observers.

The mission set up its headquarters at Baku, with regional offices at Ganja and Nakhichevan, and dispatched observers to cities and villages throughout the country to follow the electoral process, including the registration of candidates, the electoral campaign and poll preparations. On polling day, the Mission deployed over 100 international observers from 25 countries; over 20 international observers were fielded for the 26 November run-off elections in 20 districts. The Mission issued two press statements, the first prior to polling day and the second after the outcome of the first round.

2. Haiti

In response to a request from the Government of Haiti, the United Nations established a technical team as part of UNMIH to provide technical assistance to the Provisional Electoral Council. The assistance included, *inter alia,* the preparation of an electoral budget and coordination of financial support through a United Nations trust fund established for that purpose; preparation of an operational and logistical plan and assistance in its implementation; support in the design of a communication plan and a deployment plan for registration and voting periods. The technical team also coordinated a large civic education programme, which was conducted by several organisations. Legislative elections were held in June, August and September 1995 and the presidential elections in December 1995.

3. Sierra Leone

United Nations electoral assistance for Sierra Leone culminated in presidential and parliamentary elections on 26 February 1996. A second round of presidential elections took place on 15 March 1996. The initial request for electoral assistance was received in 1994 and, following a needs assessment mission, a UNDP project was elaborated in order to provide technical assistance to the Electoral Commission of

Sierra Leone. During 1995, two donor conferences were organised in New York by the Electoral Assistance Division, and experts in various fields, such as electoral systems and election administration, were sent to the country. Following a decision by the Government of Sierra Leone to invite international observers for the election, the United Nations established a small secretariat at Freetown in order to provide coordination and support for the work of international observers who were present for the final phase of the electoral process.

Mine Clearance

The international landmine crisis has reached enormous proportions. To date, the United Nations estimates that approximately 80 to 100 million landmines are currently in the ground, with an equal number stockpiled around the world. In the past year alone, the number of affected countries and territories has increased from 65 to 69. Every month, 2,000 landmine accidents cripple or maim people during the course of their everyday lives.

In response to this emergency, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs continued to exercise its role as the focal point for mine clearance in the United Nations by providing funding, coordination, programme oversight and development of new initiatives. The Department worked closely with the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, other concerned United Nations departments and agencies, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations and national Governments to enhance demining capacity and to create sustainable national programmes. The Department of Peace-keeping Operations is facing the mine problem both as a mandated objective and as a question of safety for peace-keeping troops. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs has also played a significant advocacy role in supporting my call for a ban on the manufacture, stockpiling, transfer or use of landmines, in order to stop the problem at its source.

Funding was provided to support programmes through the assessed budgets of peace-keeping operations and through a variety of trust funds, including the Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, which was established to support demining activities that might otherwise, experience shortfalls. During the reporting period, six programmes were supplied with resources from the Voluntary Trust Fund, totalling $6 million. The creation of the United Nations Demining Standby Capacity began in 1995; over 13 Member States pledged services and equipment.

The Departments of Humanitarian Affairs and Peace-keeping Operations continued to develop the different aspects of the United Nations Central Landmine Database, to further disseminate information on minefields and mine incidents reported around the world. A common computerised mapping system is being created and, to ensure the widest target audience for this vital resource, parts of the database were placed on the Internet through the World Wide Web.

The Inter-agency Standing Committee decided to develop a comprehensive list of mine producers and their subsidiary companies in order to identify those corporations that are in the business of profiting from the trade and sale of landmines.

During the reporting period, the Departments of Humanitarian Affairs and Peace-keeping Operations were responsible for programmes in Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia (one programme) and Eastern Slavonia (one programme), Mozambique and Rwanda, with continuing input into the programmes in Cambodia and the Lao People's Democratic Republic. A one-year programme was completed in Yemen. The requirements vary in structure, size, local arrangements, source of funding and implementation of the actual field operations.

The Mine Clearance Programme within the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan, which began in 1989, is the longest-running international demining programme supported by the United Nations. The programme has matured to the point where 2,925 workers are primarily employed by six Afghan non-governmental organisations, one international non-governmental organisation and a relief agency from the Islamic Republic of Iran. During the period under review, 109,754 mines were cleared, 215,764 unexploded ordnance devices were destroyed and approximately 2.5 million citizens received mine-awareness education.

Angola is possibly the most mine-polluted country in the world. When the United Nations started demining activities in several provinces, the Angolan parties showed reluctance to begin similar activities themselves and their troops reportedly resorted to renewed laying of mines. As the military and political climate improved in the course of 1996, however, extensive mine clearance and rehabilitation of roads and bridges were carried out by UNAVEM III engineering and bridging units, MECHEM, a South African-based company contracted by the United Nations, and international non-governmental

organisations. By the end of July, more than 80,000 mines had been cleared, 4,150 kilometres of road had been cleared and rehabilitated and another 4,100 kilometres of road had been verified as being free of mines or other ordnance. Surveying is being carried out nationwide to locate hazardous areas and demarcate them as accurately as possible. These activities have become crucial elements in support of the overall peace process, promoting, *inter alia,* the free circulation of the population in Angola.

Angola also made great strides in creating indigenous mine-clearance and mine-awareness structures. The Government has established the National Institute for the Removal of Explosive Ordnance, which will in due course assume control of mine programmes from the United Nations and other international organisations. Meanwhile, the Central Mine Action Office, established by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs in 1994, works closely with the Institute to coordinate the national mine-action programme. In cooperation with the Institute, the Central Mine Action Office developed a national plan calling for 18 demining brigades covering four regions within Angola, with a national headquarters at Luanda. By December 1996, 550 deminers and support staff will have been trained and the Office hopes to train a further 700 in 1997. The Central Mine Action Training School established by UNAVEM III opened at Luanda and has provided instruction to several groups of Angolan specialists who, under United Nations auspices, have started operations in various parts of the country. This programme will continue to operate under the authority of the Force Commander of UNAVEM III until early 1997, when it will be gradually taken over by the National Institute for the Removal of Explosive Ordnance.

As the mandate for the peace-keeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina ended, the Departments of Peace-keeping Operations and Humanitarian Affairs coordinated with other key actors, including the World Bank, the Department of State of the United States, EU, the Office of the High Representative, IFOR and UNHCR to establish a mine action centre under the auspices of the United Nations, in order to maintain the momentum until a national programme could be established to remove the estimated 3 million landmines in the country. The Centre was set up in March 1996 by the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, with the responsibility to advise and assist the Government in formulating and establishing a national mine-clearance programme, to coordinate mine clearance and to function as the central repository for landmine information; on 1 June, programme

control of the Centre was transferred to the Department of Humanitarian Affairs. A training school at Brus is being used for the training of operational teams to work with regional offices of the Centre in both the Federation and the Republika Srpska. The aim of the United Nations is to transfer full demining responsibilities to the Bosnian authorities as early as feasible.

The Cambodian Mine Action Centre, a national government entity since September 1993, continued to make progress on all levels, with financial support through a voluntary trust fund from the United Nations and the international community. As of June 1996, the Centre employed 1,800 Cambodian nationals in 48 demining platoons, 18 mine-marking teams, 15 explosive ordnance disposal teams and 2 mobile mine-awareness teams.

National mine-awareness activities included a National Mine-Awareness Day, conducted in Phnom Penh and three other provinces, mine-awareness billboards displayed throughout the country, and mine-awareness spots on national television and radio. Minefield verification proceeded well, with 355 suspected areas inspected in the provinces of Siem Reap, Kampot, Takeo, Kampong Speu, Kampong Chang and Sihanoukville. Within the past four months, the Cambodian Mine Action Centre cleared 2.8 square kilometres and destroyed 2,315 mines and 5,628 unexploded ordnance devices. Following detailed surveys carried out in the last two years, estimates of the number of mines in Cambodia have decreased from 10 million to between 4 and 6 million. None the less, landmines affect approximately 50 per cent of the country and have placed a terrible burden on its agricultural and medical infrastructures.

An estimated 3 million landmines have been planted in Croatia as a result of the extended conflict in the former Yugoslavia. On 1 June, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs assumed responsibility for the Mine Action Centre at Zagreb, which has the mission to collect, collate and disseminate minefield information and provide mine-awareness training. The Centre also supports the Government's efforts to establish a comprehensive national mine-clearance programme. It is estimated that there are 60,000 landmines in Eastern Slavonia. A Centre has been established within the office of the Force Engineer of UNTAES in order to coordinate the mine-clearance programme.

Following a serious increase in the use of landmines and in the number of mine accidents, one of which killed a United Nations military observer in Georgia, two technical experts from the Department of

Peace-keeping Operations were sent to train the military observers in the use of mine-detection, mine-awareness and protection equipment.

The Government of the Lao People's Democratic Republic requested assistance from UNDP to clear the millions of pieces of unexploded ordnance delivered within its borders during the 1960s and 1970s. The Departments of Humanitarian Affairs and Peace-keeping Operations sent an expert team to Vientiane in December 1995 to assess the situation. The Lao National UXO Programme, overseen by UNDP and currently in the initial stage, is in the process of establishing a national capability, including the creation of a trust fund to cover expenses.

Mine clearance in Mozambique, under the United Nations Accelerated Demining Programme, continued to expand steadily. The Mozambican programme trained and fielded 10 mine-clearance platoons, with a field headquarters for mine-clearance operations in the southern provinces of Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane. The Government of Mozambique is developing a national non-governmental organisation that will oversee the demining functions, including the accountability and operational efficiency of the programme.

At the conclusion of its mandate, UNAMIR announced that it had cleared over 1,400 mines and disposed of over 1,500 pieces of unexploded ordnance. The Department of Peace-keeping Operations continued to collect information on the landmine situation in Western Sahara, in the event the mandate of MINURSO is expanded. This information will be made available to any future humanitarian mine-clearance programme that may be established.

At the request of the Government of Yemen, between April 1995 and March 1996 the United Nations furnished a small-scale programme to provide advice to the Government on the clearance of an estimated 30,000 landmines. The programme established a database for the collection and collation of minefield data. The landmine information specialist acted as a technical adviser on-safe and reliable methods required to remove and destroy munitions and provided training on specialised demining. equipment.

The Department of Humanitarian Affairs continued to work co-operatively with ICRC and other non-governmental organisations to further the visibility of the landmine issue within the international community. As part of a mine-awareness campaign, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs presented a multimedia exhibition on the landmine situation at the Palais des Nations, at the United Nations

Office at Vienna and at Headquarters. In late 1995, the Department published the first issue of a newsletter entitled *Landmines.* Issued on a quarterly basis, the newsletter provides information on mine-related activities from within and outside the United Nations system.

The Government of Denmark hosted the International Conference on Mine-clearance Technology, with technical and substantive support from the United Nations, at the Scanticon Conference Centre near Copenhagen in July 1996. The Conference examined ways to improve mine-clearance technology for mine-affected developing countries and developed international humanitarian standards for demining. The primary focus was on new technology developments, rather than the political, social or economic impact of landmines.

5

The Cambodian Conflict: Prospects for a Negotiated Settlement

Introduction

The Cambodian conflict has been the focal point of international politics in South-East Asia since December 1978. The escalating conflict between the radical-nationalist Khmer Rouge and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam during the period 1975-1978 became enmeshed in the concurrently escalating Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Soviet conflicts culminating in the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 and the punitive Chinese attack on Vietnam in February/March 1979. China continued to maintain political and military pressure on Vietnam, with the latter receiving massive political, economic and military support from the Soviet Union. Soviet acquisition of military facilities in Vietnam and American concern for the security of Thailand added a Soviet-American dimension to the conflict.

Vietnamese domination of Indochina, viewed by Thailand as an unprecedented violation of its strategic environment, resulted in reinvigoration of Thai-American security relations and, what is more significant, in Sino-Thai military alignment. American military presence in the region acquired greater acceptance by the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a counterbalance to the growing Soviet military power. Out of concern for the security of a member State but also because Vietnamese action violated a cardinal principle of the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Co-operation, ASEAN became politically engaged in the conflict. The organisation of a loose three-party resistance Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) against the Hanoi-backed People's Republic of Kampuchea

(PRK) also spawned an intra-Khmer dimension. The conflicting goals and vested interests and linkages of these numerous actors at the global, regional and local levels resulted in a complex conflict structure and a stalemated situation.

Several developments—principally improvement in Sino-Soviet relations but also the willingness of Norodom Sihanouk and Hun Sen to enter into dialogue and the policy of Thai Premier Chatichai Choonhavan—made for flexibility in hitherto entrenched positions and began a peace process which culminated in the Paris Conference in August 1989. Despite the lack of pre-Conference progress in resolving the so-called "internal dimension" of the conflict, it was widely anticipated that the concerns and interests of the principal external actors would prevail in Paris and make for a settlement. In retrospect it is clear that this expectation was not well founded. Following the failure in Paris, attention has shifted to the military conflict among the Khmer factions, which has intensified in the wake of the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia late in September 1989.

Concurrently Thailand, the United States and Australia have taken initiatives or advanced proposals concerning resumption of the peace process with a view to achieving a negotiated settlement as soon as possible. This article examines the continuing obstacles and the prospects for a negotiated settlement through a discussion of the following matters: the impact of recent developments, principally Sino-Soviet normalisation, the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and the change in Thai policy, on the structure of the conflict; the possible outcomes of the military contest and their consequences; and the likelihood of success of the continuing and new diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict.

Major Developments and their Impact on the Structure of the Conflict

Sino-Soviet Normalisation

Sino-Soviet *rapprochement* appears to have had more limited impact on the resolution of the Cambodian conflict than anticipated. While both China and the Soviet Union became more flexible, the concessions made were the minimum necessary to facilitate normalisation of bilateral relations without jeopardising long-term interests and their commitments to allies in the region. Normalisation, while ending the Sino-Soviet conflict, does not terminate the geopolitical rivalry between these two countries, which seek to consolidate and enhance their major-

Power status and role in the Asia-Pacific region. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, alliance with Vietnam would continue to make strategic sense, albeit the urgency may be reduced. This relationship also continues to make the USSR a relevant player in South-East Asia and cannot be matched or replaced by the expected improvement in Soviet relations with the ASEAN countries, which for political and economic reasons would continue to be limited. Thus it is not in the Soviet interest to "ditch" Vietnam. Such action would also undermine the credibility of the Soviet Union as an ally. The Soviet strategy has therefore been concurrently to improve relations with China and at the same time restructure and consolidate relations with Vietnam. In line with this strategy, the Soviet Union was instrumental in bringing about an early Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, but it has been unable or unwilling to pressure Hanoi to make concessions on the internal dimension of the conflict.

For China, the Cambodian conflict signifies much more than just an obstacle in its relations with the Soviet Union. The Chinese view of the conflict is grounded in considerations of security, international status and prestige, and its future role in South-East Asia. Indochina has been the locale where both the United States and the USSR have attempted to contain China in the post-war period. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the attempt by Vietnam to establish special relations with Laos and Cambodia as well as Soviet inroads into South-East Asia were viewed as inimical to Chinese security. The Vietnamese invasion was also perceived as a blow to Chinese prestige and credibility for which Hanoi had to be "punished". Thus while Vietnamese withdrawal in conjunction with Sino-Soviet normalisation eases China's security concern on the southern flank, it appears inadequate to satisfy concerns of prestige and credibility. Moreover, the form and content of a settlement in Cambodia will, in the Chinese view, affect South-East Asian perceptions of China, and thus affect China's future role and influence in the region. Consequently, acceptance of the *fait accompli* in Cambodia does not appear to be in the Chinese interest. While the certainty of Vietnamese withdrawal appears to have been adequate to meet the Chinese condition *vis-a-vis* the Soviets in the light of broader strategic considerations, it is clearly perceived as inadequate for normalisation of Sino-Vietnamese relations or for resolution of the Cambodian problem.

In the light of the foregoing, the USSR and China appear unlikely to exert pressure on their client State/faction to make concessions in order to arrive at a negotiated political settlement. Normalisation of

bilateral relations further reduces the urgency. To gain further acceptance among the ASEAN countries and in keeping with "new thinking", Moscow would continue to be positively disposed towards attempts to resolve the conflict. It will, however, look for reciprocal compromises rather than urge what it perceives as unilateral concessions on the part of its allies. Similarly, while Beijing has demonstrated some flexibility in relation to Khmer Rouge participation in an interim government, it is unlikely to terminate its support for that faction. Termination of support at this juncture would also be unpalatable to Beijing at a time when its international prestige is at a low level following the events of the spring of 1989. It is likely to be viewed as a sign of weakness and of succumbing to international pressure.

Sino-Soviet normalisation, however, decouples the conflict from the broader strategic calculations of the major Powers, and highlights the local and regional dimensions, which have been overshadowed by the conflict between the two major Powers. Specifically, it draws attention to the Sino-Vietnamese dimension, which continues to be a key structural element of the Cambodian conflict. While Soviet support for Vietnam is not in question, Sino-Soviet *rapprochement* has made it much more circumscribed and conditional, setting quite clear limits on Vietnamese ambitions and behaviour. With conflict escalation no longer an option, Vietnam has to come to terms with China. Similarly, it becomes incumbent upon China to reassess its relations with Vietnam quite independently of, although not in isolation from, its relations with the Soviet Union.

The long-term interests of China and Vietnam would argue for normalisation of bilateral relations. For China, a friendly Vietnam minimises the opportunities for hostile coalitions on its southern flank. Vietnam by itself should not be a security threat to China. Despite this interest, Chinese policy thus far has driven Vietnam into the embrace of the Soviet Union. Beijing now has an opportunity to develop a suitable and mutually beneficial basis for long-term relations with Vietnam. It is even more in the interest of Vietnam to mend its relations with China. While it may not be completely free of the Chinese threat and hence an alliance relationship with the USSR may continue to be necessary, Vietnam cannot prosper under a state of siege. Moreover, recognition of the vulnerability ensuing from undue dependence on the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries at a time of rapid changes in East-West and Sino-Soviet relations should induce Vietnam to improve relations with China. In fact, it appears to have

recognised this and has made overtures to China. These include deleting an "enmity" reference to China in the Vietnam Constitution, withdrawing troops from Laos and Cambodia, reducing the force level along the Sino-Vietnamese border, and praising the Chinese model of development. Hanoi was one of the very few to support the Chinese crack-down on pro-democracy students in June. China responded to the early overtures of Vietnam by agreeing to bilateral talks, which began in January 1989 between Vietnam's Deputy Foreign Minister Dinh Nho Liem and Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Shuqing. Despite Vietnam's interest, the bilateral talks have not resulted in a major breakthrough. There are many obstacles standing in the way of normalisation.

The principal one is the Cambodian problem, manifested in the form of the role of the Khmer Rouge in an interim government, euphemistically referred to as power-sharing. It is also the key issue on which the Paris Conference foundered. Vietnam perceives any arrangement that may allow for the return of the Khmer Rouge as being incompatible with its security, while China views any arrangement that excludes the Khmer Rouge as unacceptable. Deep suspicion and distrust of each other and the belief that the other party is seeking full victory for its protege make for a zero-sum situation. For the present, both countries appear not to be in the mood to compromise.

With Sino-Soviet normalisation out of the way, the benefits of a non-hostile government in Bangkok and political conservatism gaining ground in Vietnam, Hanoi may be disinclined to make concessions, at least not in the short term. It is pertinent to note here that the decision to withdraw from Cambodia was intensely contested by the conservatives. The moderates' argument that withdrawal was necessary to end Vietnam's international isolation and to gain access to Western aid and assistance so vital to the restructuring of Vietnam's ailing economy, and the army's frustration and desire to extricate itself from the Cambodian quagmire won out. However, continued international isolation of Vietnam may strengthen the conservatives. The dire state of its economy and the desire to benefit from economic relations with the free market economies may yet force Vietnam to soften its position. This expectation, however, must be counterbalanced by what Hanoi is being asked to concede: acceptance of almost total defeat in the contest of wills and abandonment of the strategic purpose that has governed its international conduct over the last decade and a half. Further concessions may be regarded by Hanoi as providing an opening for the

restoration of a hostile Khmer Government and the renewal of the Khmer-Vietnamese conflict, which precipitated the present Cambodian conflict in the first place. Hanoi may also view its withdrawal from Cambodia as a significant enougn gesture to bring about termination of external military aid to the Khmer Rouge and also to appease the international community and gradually to bring about an end to its international isolation. It would attempt to extract maximum benefit from its withdrawal before beginning to contemplate further concessions.

Similarly, Beijing is in no hurry to terminate its support for the Khmer Rouge. So long as the Khmer Rouge is part of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, Beijing does not have to suffer the political cost of supporting this faction on its own. To present a more favourable international image but also to exert influence through an internationally acceptable figure, Beijing will continue to support Norodom Sihanouk. Comprehensive settlement, that is settlement of the internal dimension of the conflict in Cambodia, has become the pre-condition for normalisation of SinoVietnamese relations. Notwithstanding this pre-condition, the incentive for, and the legitimacy of, direct Chinese military pressure or action against Vietnam would be considerably reduced (except perhaps in the Spratlys) and also be subject to international condemnation. Chinese military pressure and influence will have to be applied principally through the Khmer Rouge. Thus China is unlikely to terminate its support for that faction except in the context of an overall settlement.

The crux of the problem in Sino-Vietnamese relations is how to subordinate and overcome short-term conflicting demands in the interest of long-term considerations that are beneficial to both countries. This relationship is likely to work itself out only gradually.

Thus Sino-Soviet normalisation, while making for an important change in the structure of the conflict, thus decoupling it from the calculus of major-Power relations and preventing an escalation of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict, has not ameliorated the Sino-Vietnamese dimension of the Cambodian conflict. Sino-Soviet normalisation does not appear to have had an effect for the better on the intra-Khmer dimension. In fact, it may have intensified this dimension. As it has in Afghanistan, the USSR has armed, and can be expected to continue to arm, its local client, with China continuing to arm the Khmer Rouge and the non-Communist factions. There is the possibility that one or two ASEAN countries, Singapore and possibly Malaysia, may step up their supply of arms to the non-Communist factions or that Washington

will begin to supply military aid in addition to the non-lethal aid it is already providing.

Vietnamese Withdrawal from Cambodia

The withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, in effect, removes the Vietnamese threat to Thai national security, minimising the Thai-Vietnamese dimension of the conflict. In fact, it rewards and reinforces the Chatichai vision of "turning the Indochina battlefield into a market place", making for greater confidence and flexibility on the part of an economically and politically dynamic Thailand. Vietnamese withdrawal has also transformed the nature of the military contest in Cambodia. The ongoing fighting is not between Vietnamese troops and Khmer resistance forces but among Khmer factions supplied by external forces. This is much more reflective of a civil war for power and a war by proxy than of a war of national liberation against occupation forces.

This accounts for the refusal of the CGDK, China, ASEAN and their supporters to verify or accept that the withdrawal had taken place. Although Vietnam claims to have withdrawn all of its remaining 26,000 troops, the CGDK and China claim that substantial military (30,000) and civilian elements remain in Cambodia. In the absence of recognised international verification, it would be difficult to judge these claims and counter-claims. It is possible and quite likely that Vietnam would have left behind some military and civilian elements. There are, however, strong *a priori* grounds to believe that the bulk of the Vietnamese troops have left Cambodia. First, China would not have agreed to normalise relations without a Soviet guarantee to this effect, unless of course it completely sold out on its chief obstacle to normalisation. Secondly, if in fact Vietnamese troops remain in substantial numbers, they cannot be hidden for long. Their exposure will completely undermine Vietnamese and Soviet credibility, wiping out the little international support and sympathy they have gained. Thus far there has been no hard evidence of substantial Vietnamese troop presence in Cambodia, except for reports from the CGDK factions. The British Foreign Secretary's written reply to a parliamentary question supports the view that Vietnam has withdrawn its combat units from Cambodia.

Vietnamese withdrawal and the shift in focus from the diplomatic arena to the battlefield also highlight the intra-Khmer dimension and the enormous problems of national reconciliation. In particular it draws attention to the key role of the Khmer Rouge, making it more difficult

for it to hide under the cloak of the CGDK. The goal of preventing the return of the Khmer Rouge to power has assumed greater importance in Western countries and is being elevated to the same level as denying legitimacy to the PRK Government.

Change in Thai Policy

Soon after assuming office, Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan articulated a new approach to resolution of the Cambodian conflict, an approach which departed quite significantly from the formal Thai and ASEAN positions. Chatichai's approach is grounded in his vision of "turning the Indochina battlefield into a market place", which in turn rests on the belief that for Thailand to maximise its current political and economic dynamism, it requires a peaceful environment and co-operative relations with all its neighbours. His policy accepts a certain measure of Vietnamese political influence in Cambodia in the short term, but the hope is that over the long term the opening up of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam to market forces will reduce Hanoi's influence in Vientiane and Phnom Penh, increase that of Bangkok, and also pave the way for more amicable relations among all States in the region. The policy also relies to some extent on traditional Khmer-Vietnamese antagonism and Theravada Buddhist cultural affinities that Thailand shares with Laos and Cambodia. On the basis of this "philosophy", Thailand has since August 1988 begun to improve relations with all three countries of Indochina, notwithstanding the continuing conflict in Cambodia.

Thai policy towards Laos shifted early in 1988. The immediate concern was to terminate the Ban Rom Klao border conflict but other considerations, including general border security, trade, cultural affinities and Bangkok's hope of weaning Vientiane away from Hanoi, were also important. Under Chatichai this shift assumed greater significance inasmuch as it was viewed as a forerunner to improving relations with the other two countries of Indochina. Chatichai visited Vientiane in November 1988 and concluded an agreement to set up a joint border committee to delineate the common boundary in 40-odd disputed locations, using the 1907 Franco-Siamese Treaty and accompanying documents as the framework. Economic and cultural co-operation is also proceeding apace. Bilateral trade and Thai investment in Laos have increased, but only slowly because of the many structural problems in the Lao economy.

Thai relations with Vietnam have also been on the upswing. Under pressure from the foreign policy exploits of Chatichai and General

Chavalit Yongchaiyuth, Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila visited Hanoi in January 1989—the first senior-level visit in 13 years. Since then numerous senior officials, including Deputy Prime Minister Bichai Rattakul, and a House Foreign Affairs Committee delegation have visited Hanoi. A number of bilateral accords including a fishing agreement are under discussion. Friendship associations have been established in both countries to promote bilateral co-operation. There has been considerable interest in upgrading bilateral economic relations. Several high-level seminars have been held and many Thai business delegations have visited Vietnam. During Bichai's visit it was agreed to set up a joint commission for co-operation to strengthen bilateral trade and economic co-operation. Thai investment is on the rise and bilateral trade has surged from baht 20 million in 1988 to baht 200 million in the first quarter of 1989. A number of joint ventures are now operational.

However, progress has fallen short of initial expectations, the main limitations being shortage of foreign exchange and the underdeveloped physical, economic and financial infrastructure in Vietnam. Thai investment has also been held up because of the lack of investment guarantee arrangements and profit repatriation and bureaucratic problems. Hanoi, while eager to secure capital and technology, is also cautious to avoid exploitation by Thai businessmen. Notwithstanding these limitations, Bangkok's relations with Hanoi have come a long way since August 1988. Bangkok's relations with Phnom Penh are also on the mend. Chatichai's three meetings with Hun Sen have helped the diplomatically isolated PRK Government, and border trade between the two countries is flourishing despite the ongoing military conflict.

There has been considerable acrimony between Thai Foreign Ministry officials and Chatichai's advisers over Thailand's Cambodia policy. This, in turn, is linked to the rivalry in Thai domestic politics among Foreign Minister and leader of the Socialist Action Party (SAP), Air Vice Marshal Siddhi Savetsila; Prime Minister and leader of the Chart Thai Party, General Chatichai Choonhavan; and Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army (RTA), General Chavalit Yongchaiyuth. However, recent developments in Thai politics suggest that Chatichai's Indochina policy is on the ascendant. The National Security Council and the Royal Thai Army have been ordered to follow his line. The Foreign Minister has stated that henceforth his ministry will adopt a low profile, allowing the Prime Minister a free hand in Thailand's Cambodia policy. Thus, barring changes in Thai domestic politics, the Chatichai approach is likely to become effective Thai policy.

This change in Thai policy has several implications. First, as pointed out earlier, in conjunction with Vietnamese withdrawal it minimises, if not eliminates, the Thai-Vietnamese dimension of the Cambodian conflict. Secondly, it quite significantly undercuts the premise of the policy positions of ASEAN and the United States, shifting the burden almost exclusively to the illegality of the Government in Phnom Penh. Concern for the security of Thailand was a key issue in galvanising United States and ASEAN support and in formulating the common policy. Thus it would be ironic for Thailand, the front-line State and the one whose security was supposedly in jeopardy, to adopt a conciliatory policy while its ally and fellow association members adopt a confrontational policy towards the countries of Indochina.

The continuation of Chatichai's policy creates a dilemma for ASEAN. It may become infectious for some other ASEAN countries. In fact, Indonesia has been pursuing a dual-track policy of its own for a number of years but in the interest of ASEAN solidarity it has been subdued. Malaysia is exploring opportunities for expanding trade with Vietnam. Thus a situation could emerge in which the ASEAN collective would decide to continue its current policy but with some member Governments or even elements within them seeking to improve bilateral relations with Hanoi, Vientiane and Phnom Penh. Such a situation, however, cannot be sustained for long without undermining the credibility of the Association. ASEAN may have to forge a new consensus and policy more in accord with the prevailing interests of its member States or reshape the latter to conform to the current policy.

Change in Thai policy also poses problems for the United States, which allegedly following ASEAN's lead, supports Norodom Sihanouk as the central figure in a process of national reconciliation. Although the United States does not have direct leverage over any Khmer faction, it is not without influence if it chooses to act. International political and economic isolation of Vietnam would be very difficult to sustain without the United States lead. Recently, for example, in concert with Japan, the United States successfully exerted pressure on the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to withhold lending to Vietnam even though the latter had satisfactorily carried out the economic reforms recommended by the World Bank. Relaxing its opposition to international aid and lending to both Vietnam and Cambodia, lifting its own trade embargo against these two countries, and "delegitimising" the Khmer Rouge are levers the United States can use to affect the situation. It has, however, chosen not to do so,

citing Norodom Sihanouk's preference for co-operation with the Khmer Rouge, and ASEAN and Chinese interests as justification for not lifting its trade embargo. Current strains in Sino-American relations and Washington's concern to prevent further deterioration may also counsel against a change in policy at this juncture. The United States continues to insist on a comprehensive settlement in Cambodia.

However, change in Thai policy, Vietnamese withdrawal, and increasing apprehension that the Khmer Rouge may regain power are beginning to undermine the intellectual premise of the present United States position, resulting in growing pressure for change in its policy. A bipartisan group of 203 House and Senate members wrote to Secretary of State James Baker opposing United States support for the Khmer Rouge to share power as part of a Cambodian peace settlement. The United States Congress, which had sanctioned military aid to the non-Communist factions just before the Paris Conference, apparently to strengthen Sihanouk's hand at the Conference, has since become more reluctant because of the concern that these arms may end up with the Khmer Rouge. It has now attached a restriction to the United States military appropriations bill to prevent the Bush Administration from using the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) contingency fund to supply military aid to the non-Communist factions without its authorisation. These concerns and pressure also underscore, in part, peace proposals initiated by the United States, which are discussed later.

Considerations similar to those in the United States are also precipitating a re-evaluation of the Cambodia policies of several Western countries. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, for example, recently restated its position that the British stand in the United Nations Credentials Committee did not mean that it was ready to deal with the CGDK as a government, much less with the Khmer Rouge. The United Kingdom has offered $US 394,000 worth of aid to UNICEF for disbursement in Cambodia and a British diplomat based in Bangkok would, for the first time since 1978, visit Phnom Penh in connection with this aid. Sweden and Finland for the first time abstained in the United Nations vote on Cambodia. They are reported to be considering opening embassies in Hanoi. Australia, while supporting the ASEAN position, may also be close to developing some form of relations with Cambodia. Under growing domestic pressure Canberra is exploring other possibilities that would exclude the khmer Rouge from an interim coalition government. Australia has a relatively large contingent of aid workers in Cambodia and recently

announced that it would open a trade office in Vietnam. Canada is also reportedly evaluating its Cambodia policy. A delegation of three Canadian diplomats headed by Allan Sullivan, the Canadian Ambassador to Rome and Co-Chairman of one of the sub-committees at the Paris Conference, visited Cambodia late in October. These actions and offers of humanitarian assistance are, however, still rather tentative and minuscule. Whether the preliminary efforts cited above will gather momentum resulting in a substantial change in international orientation remains unclear. For substantial change to occur and for release of the massive assistance required in the reconstruction of the war-ravaged economy of Cambodia, there has to be a change in the position of the United States and Japan.

Two conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing discussion of the major developments and their impact on the structure of the conflict. First, while these developments have ameliorated the Sino-Soviet and Vietnamese-Thai dimensions, they have not had a similar impact on the remaining three dimensions—Sino-Vietnamese, Vietnamese-Khmer and intra-Khmer. The role of the Khmer Rouge is the key interconnecting issue between all three dimensions. In many ways improvement in Sino-Vietnamese relations holds the key to the resumption of the peace process although it is not adequate to fully resolve the problem. The prospects for a breakthrough in Sino-Vietnamese relations through direct bilateral negotiations do not appear bright in the short term, although not impossible. Consequently, developments in the battlefield which may have the potential to alter the standing of their respective client factions is assuming greater significance and attention. The second conclusion is that changes in Thai policy in conjunction with Vietnamese withdrawal have undermined the foundations of the policy of the international coalition led by ASEAN and the United States, precipitating a re-evaluation of policy in a number of Western countries and also posing a dilemma for the ASEAN collective.

The Military Conflict: Possible Outcomes and Consequences

All the Khmer factions, with the support of their foreign backers, have been preparing for, and have intensified, their efforts in the battlefield to consolidate and enhance their bargaining position. The political, military and administrative prowess of the PRK, of which so little is known, is critical in estimating possible outcomes of the military contest. Assessments of PRK capabilities vary from quite positive to very negative. For certain, the PRK would not be able to wipe out the

resistance forces. There is no reason to expect Phnom Penh to succeed where the Vietnamese with all their military might and experience have failed, although the Vietnamese withdrawal removes a political liability for the PRK. The PRK has lost some ground to the CGDK forces. The Khmer Rouge captured the gem-mining town of Pailin on 22 October 1989 and is reported to be preparing to attack the major city of Battambang. The Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) is reported to have captured some villages and outposts in the Banteay Meanchey province but the Sihanouk faction has not yet engaged in combat. Whether the CGDK forces will be able to make substantial progress in capturing and holding important towns and large tracts of territory for a prolonged period and to establish some kind of political and administrative framework remains uncertain. This will also be a function of the political and military unity and capability of the three Khmer factions. The political unity of the CGDK is tenuous at best. Inter-and intra-factional strife is common. The ability of the coalition to conduct a well co-ordinated military campaign against the PRK has yet to be proven.

The Khmer Rouge, best organised and equipped of the three factions, will continue to be the dominant military force in the CGDK but whether it is sufficiently strong to inflict telling damage on the PRK remains unclear. The non-Communist resistance forces, even with substantially increased military supplies, are unlikely to become a significant military force in the foreseeable future. Thus the PRK and the Khmer Rouge are the protagonists in the military contest. It is estimated that the Khmer Rouge has stockpiled supplies to enable it to continue fighting for at least a year even if external assistance is terminated and the PRK has been well supplied by the Soviet Union and Vietnam.

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, three possible outcomes may be envisaged.

Scenario 1: The PRK would collapse before the end of the first dry season in May 1990.

Scenario 2: The PRK would survive continued harassment from the Khmer Rouge but with massive assistance from Vietnam and the USSR, that is, there would be protracted conflict, not unlike the situation in Afghanistan. External assistance and the intensity of the fighting in Cambodia are, however, likely to be on a much smaller scale when compared to Afghanistan.

Scenario 3: The PRK would gain the upper hand in containing the resistance forces, enhancing its domestic and international credibility.

Scenarios 1 and 3 would provide little incentive for a negotiated settlement. The CGDK will form a new government under scenario 1, and in scenario 3, the PRK will see no need to accommodate even Norodom Sihanouk, except as a political gesture without the substance of power. Scenario 2 could possibly facilitate a negotiated political settlement but only after a considerable period of time has elapsed and even then only under very specific circumstances, namely that the cost would become unbearable (for Vietnam or the USSR) or the PRK's military standing would weaken considerably, or certain external actors (ASEAN, the United States) would see it as no longer in their interest to support the Khmer Rouge or the continuation of the conflict. More likely in this scenario is the possibility of prolonged conflict with no decisive shift in favour of any faction.

As scenarios 1 and 2 are much more probable in the short term than scenario 3, their possible consequences for Cambodia and the region merit attention. Should scenario 1 come to pass, Sihanouk may assume command in Phnom Penh but effective and quite legitimate power would lie with the Khmer Rouge, with little to prevent it from seizing political control at some future date. Under these conditions the potential for Khmer-Vietnamese and even Khmer-Thai hostilities would be quite substantial. Vietnam can be expected to support PRK resistance against the Government in Phnom Penh. Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge would become even more beholden to Beijing, not only to counter perceived external threats, but also to enhance their domestic position in the manoeuvring for power which must be anticipated. Through this, Beijing may increase its leverage in the mainland South-East Asian security complex.

Should scenario 2—protracted conflict—transpire, the region must brace itself for another long period of strife in Cambodia with every possibility for greater engagement by its immediate neighbours (Vietnam, Thailand) and also external Powers (China, less so the USSR). Both these scenarios will certainly increase the cost for ASEAN, especially Thailand. A pro-China Cambodia, which is likely to be the consequence of scenario 1, would increase the Chinese influence and role in South-East Asia and may not be in the interest of ASEAN. Similarly, intensified fighting, as envisioned in scenario 2, is also not in the interest of the ASEAN countries. It could spill over into Thailand; the flow of arms and supplies through Thai territory would increase; refugee outflow may increase; and it would be a personal setback for

Thai Premier Chatichai Choonhavan. Thailand would also have to address the difficult problem relating to the scope and level of support it should allow for the CGDK forces, especially the Khmer Rouge. Premier Chatichai would be confronted with the dilemma of having to reconcile the conflicting imperatives of maintaining good relations with China and the desire and need to stop the fighting in Cambodia.

As of mid-December 1989 the PRK has lost some ground, principally to the Khmer Rouge but also to the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF). These losses do not as yet appear to have had a significant impact on the stand of the PRK in relation to the role of the Khmer Rouge in an interim government. However, if there are further losses and the PRK begins to lose confidence, then its position may become more flexible. Khmer Rouge advances in the battlefield are also likely to increase apprehension in Western countries and introduce greater urgency into the peace process. A stalemate in the battlefield on the other hand is unlikely to create the necessary conditions for negotiations.

Continuing and New Diplomatic Efforts

The ASEAN-authored yearly resolution on Cambodia in the United Nations was adopted on 16 November 1989 with the support of 124 countries, 2 more than in the previous year. For this diplomatic approach to yield results a decisive shift has to occur on the battlefield against the PRK, otherwise protracted conflict and continued stalemate would be the outcome.

Meanwhile the Thai Prime Minister, the United States and Australia have separately initiated proposals in an attempt to reintroduce momentum into the peace process.

The initiative of Thai Premier Chatichai Choonhavan is in many ways a continuation of his earlier efforts, temporarily brought to a halt by the Paris Conference. Soon after the failure in Paris, Chatichai and his advisers engaged in consultations with all four Khmer factions, Vietnam, China, the United States, France and other countries. Chatichai held extensive discussions with Chinese leaders in Beijing to seek their endorsement of a proposed meeting and to ensure Khmer Rouge participation. Recognising the intractable nature of the problem of power-sharing in an interim government, Chatichai's initiative seeks to decouple it from the issues of verifying Vietnamese withdrawal, cease-fire, and cessation of external assistance. The emphasis is on a step-by-step approach, leading eventually to a comprehensive settlement. The immediate goals are to break the current impasse, to

stop the fighting, and to foster economic relations. The issue of power-sharing, if it cannot be resolved through negotiations, should be resolved through elections, which would be supervised by the international control mechanism (ICM). That body also has the responsibility of verifying the withdrawal, supervising the cease-fire and conducting a population census.

This proposal has several merits: it does not attempt to find a diplomatic compromise on the intractable issue of the Khmer Rouge; it seeks neither to apportion blame nor to punish any country or faction; it accepts the situation on the ground as reality while at the same time not conferring *de jure* status on it; it can stop the fighting and the suffering of the Khmer people; it accepts elections as the means for deciding who shall exercise political power in Cambodia; and provides for a strong international role. It can, however, be criticised for some of these very same reasons: that by concentrating on the intra-Khmer dimension and accepting the *de facto* situation, it defines the conflict as an internal one and excludes the crucial Sino-Vietnamese dimension; by internalising the conflict, Vietnam is let off the hook; that by accepting the PRK, the Vietnamese action is condoned; and that it can result in a partial settlement.

Thus far, Chatichai's proposal for a limited meeting of the four Khmer factions, the ASEAN countries, Vietnam, France and Laos, has received international support, in some cases grudgingly and with scepticism. All parties have agreed to attend the meeting. Jakarta has agreed to host the meeting if all parties come with a will to resolve the conflict. In other words, concessions and compromises must be worked out before the meeting. The auspices for the talks is likely to be that of the Paris Conference rather than the earlier Jakarta meetings. The dates and agenda have yet to be decided.

While expressing support for the proposed meeting, the key actors have advanced different interpretations of it and different expectations. Vietnam hopes that the meeting will focus on verifying its withdrawal, cessation of external assistance, and the establishment and supervision of a ceasefire. While declaring itself not opposed to discussion of the issue of power-sharing, Hanoi states that the demand of the CGDK factions for a four-party coalition government is unreasonable and that this is an internal affair that should be decided by the Kampucheans. Similarly, China, while agreeing with Chatichai that international verification of the Vietnamese withdrawal is important, states that a quadripartite coalition government is the only solution

and that a situation like that in Afghanistan should be prevented in Cambodia. The United States has rejected the step-by-step approach. The Soviet Union appears to have adopted a relatively low-key posture in responding to the various proposals. In discussions with the United States, while endorsing the need for a comprehensive settlement, it has called for the vacation of the United Nations seat in order to clear the air and for safeguards to prevent the return of the Khmer Rouge. Singapore is not supportive of phased settlement. Sihanouk, who is to be represented by his son Norodom Ranaridh at the proposed Jakarta meeting, states that the conflict is not among Cambodians but continues to be between Cambodia and Vietnam. Consequently he would only agree to a cease-fire in the context of an overall settlement. The Khmer Rouge, not favourably disposed towards the proposed meeting, states that it can only agree to a cease-fire if Vietnam and the PRK agree to verification under United Nations auspices and formation of a quadripartite interim government. The PRK, on the other hand, is against such an interim government and wants to exclude the Khmer Rouge from any power-sharing. The positions of the key actors have not shifted and there is no consensus as yet in favour of the Chatichai approach. Only the Khmer People's National Liberation Front has recently stated that it is not opposed to a phased settlement if it will eventually lead to a comprehensive settlement.

In the light of the inflexible positions of the various key parties, the probability of forging a consensus for the Chatichai approach appears rather slim. In the absence of such a consensus the proposed Jakarta meeting is unlikely to yield any substantive progress in the resolution of the conflict.

The United States proposals are motivated in part by growing apprehension that the Khmer Rouge may regain power in Cambodia. There are, in fact, two United States proposals, one advanced by Secretary of State James Baker, dubbed the "Baker formula", and the second advanced by Congressman Stephen Solarz.

The Baker formula, advanced within the context of a comprehensive settlement, seeks a compromise on the issue of the Khmer Rouge by suggesting "marginal participation" by this faction. Also, because of the deep mistrust and animosity that divide the four factions, the proposal is that a settlement should be worked out in the context of the United Nations framework and that the four factions should be "persuaded" to accept it. This proposal has been discussed with China, the USSR and the ASEAN countries but there does not appear to be

any urgency in underscoring it because of the perception that conditions are not yet propitious.

The Solarz initiative seeks to side-step altogether the issue of Khmer Rouge participation in an interim government. It proposes a United Nations-administered interim administration on the Namibia model that would prepare for and supervise elections. The assumption that the proposal will be acceptable to all parties as they have pledged to accept elections as the mechanism for deciding the future political authority in Cambodia appears rather unrealistic. Declarations of support for elections by the Khmer Rouge and the PRK should be viewed as more rhetoric than genuine. Otherwise their firm stance regarding the interim coalition government does not make sense. This is especially so with respect to the Khmer Rouge, which is not expected to do well in "fair and free" elections. The Solarz initiative is still at the conceptual level, with current efforts directed primarily towards developing a consensus in Washington to get it accepted as a United States proposal.

The proposal outlined by Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans in November 1989 builds on the Baker formula and the Solarz proposal. It calls for the dismantling of the PRK Government, vacation of the United Nations seat held by the CGDK, and the creation of a United Nations interim administration, which would administer Cambodia for an appreciable period of time before organising general elections. This proposal seeks to achieve the dual purpose of excluding the Khmer Rouge from an interim government and of denying legitimacy to the PRK. The Australian plan envisages a requirement for 200 United Nations officials to form the civilian administration and 5,000 to 7,000 troops to monitor the cease-fire.

Sihanouk, while still preferring a four-party interim administration, has endorsed this proposal because of the deadlocked situation. He has however qualified his support by stating that he would agree to vacate the United Nations seat only after the formation of the United Nations interim administration and international verification of Vietnamese withdrawal. It should be noted that under this proposal Sihanouk would lose his guaranteed privileged position as head of State before elections. The rationale for continued cooperation with the Khmer Rouge would wear thin and the difficulties of holding the CGDK coalition together in the run up to delayed general elections may become quite formidable. Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi, while endorsing the proposal, has stated that the "problem has reached the

stage where the Cambodian parties ought to make their own decision". The Khmer Rouge has rejected the proposal, while China "took note" of it, reiterating its position that a provisional power-sharing government should be set up.

The PRK may be supportive of the proposal because it would exclude the Khmer Rouge from the interim administration, the Khmer Rouge would have to contest the elections on its own political standing and in the process become more exposed, the PRK bureaucracy is likely to continue in place, and it makes good diplomatic sense to appear favourably disposed to a not-too-unfavourable international initiative at this time. However, Hun Sen and his close political aides would have to relinquish political power. Vietnam may also be supportive for the reasons cited above although it may continue to insist that a United Nations role is possible only after the Cambodia seat in the United Nations is vacated. This, however, may only be tactical and also a technicality which need not be a major obstacle. The Soviet Union, currently an advocate of a larger United Nations role in such conflicts, can also be expected to be supportive.

The Australian proposal, while attractive on several counts, has to overcome three problems. First, it must be accepted by the PRC and the Khmer Rouge. Although the latter has rejected the proposal, Beijing can still persuade the Khmer Rouge to change its mind. But for this to happen Beijing must view the proposal as not detrimental to its interests. It should also not view the proposal as collusion between Washington and Moscow to minimize, if not eliminate, the Khmer Rouge as a viable political force in the runup to general elections. Thus, while not rejecting the proposal outright and wanting to convey the impression that it is for a settlement in Cambodia, Beijing would seek to preserve and enhance the position of the CGDK and by extension that of the Khmer Rouge. It would also seek to modify the package in such a way that Vietnam would not emerge "victorious".

Secondly, an underlying premise of this proposal is that because the local and regional forces are unable to arrive at a compromise settlement, the major Powers, in the interest of international peace and security, should take it upon themselves to agree on a settlement and use the leverage at their disposal to "persuade" the local parties to accept it. This essentially top-down approach assumes that the difficulties that cannot be resolved at the local level can be resolved at the level of the major Powers because of their broader interests. The consequence of this approach could be that in the mid-to-long term,

the local dynamics of the conflict could re-exert themselves and undermine the settlement. Thus a major challenge is to devise a settlement that does not deviate significantly from the realities on the ground and which takes due account of the aspirations of the contending parties. This highlights the great need for national reconciliation among the four parties, which is still not in sight.

Thirdly, and related to the second problem, there is a need for consensus and commitment on the part of the major Powers, not only to devise a settlement, but also to make it stick at least for a number of years. Moreover, the United Nations must be prepared for a peace-keeping role and a force that far exceed its undertakings hitherto, including that in Namibia.

Conclusion

While the principal developments discussed in this study have helped to improve the Sino-Soviet and Vietnamese-Thai dimensions of the conflict, they have not had a similar impact on the other three dimensions—Sino-Vietnamese, Vietnamese-Khmer and intra-Khmer. The intra-Khmer dimension may, in fact, have been exacerbated. All three of the remaining dimensions are deeply intertwined, with the issue of power-sharing, that is, the role of the Khmer Rouge, as the interconnecting link. To break the current impasse and move the peace process forward there has to be a mutually acceptable compromise on the question of the Khmer Rouge. However, as pointed out earlier, left to themselves the contending parties do not appear ready for such a compromise.

There are, however, a number of possible developments that may issue from the battlefield and/or the rapidly changing international circumstances, which may, because of their potential to affect the relative military and diplomatic positions of the PRK and the Khmer Rouge, induce some changes in the inflexible positions of the contending parties. As of now, four such developments may be identified.

First, a further loss of confidence on the part of the PRK may make Phnom Penh and Hanoi more amenable to accommodating a role for the Khmer Rouge or to finding a way out of the impasse that does not exclude the Khmer Rouge.

The second is Soviet and Eastern European pressure on Vietnam and the PRK to accept minimal participation of the Khmer Rouge in an interim coalition government. Such pressure could possibly have its origins in the context of the dramatic developments taking place in

Eastern European countries and in East-West relations. However, Soviet pressure is likely to be tied to improvement in Sino-Vietnamese relations and a safeguard against the Khmer Rouge regaining exclusive power in Cambodia. In the light of the new developments, a number of the Eastern European countries may choose to act quite independently of the USSR and withdraw their support from the PRK. Such action will further isolate Vietnam and Hanoi, and Phnom Penh will find it exceedingly difficult to resist Soviet pressure under these conditions.

A third and related development may issue from domestic political changes in Vietnam. The ascendance of moderates in Hanoi, if it does come about, may make further concessions possible in the interest of economic reform. It is pertinent to observe here that for the moderates a non-threatening Cambodia has become acceptable on the basis of the view that Vietnam's future security lies in economic development and that an end to the conflict is necessary in order to secure the necessary international assistance.

The fourth development would be a move by Thailand, some other ASEAN countries and members of the larger international community to recognise the government in Phnom Penh or to "de-recognize" the CGDK because of their growing apprehension that the Khmer Rouge may regain exclusive power in Cambodia. This would be a boost to Hanoi and to the PRK and it might also induce the PRC to be more flexible. It is pertinent to recall here that there is little sympathy for the Pol Potists from Beijing. Pol Pot and his radical policies are more in line with Mao Ze Dong than with Deng Xiao Ping although the ascendance of hardliners in Beijing raises some doubts on this score. Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge is based essentially on *realpolitik* considerations. Consequently the PRC may be inclined to respond to this international swing by reducing its support for the Khmer Rouge and be content to exercise its influence more through Sihanouk. However, international recognition of the PRK, if it does materialize, would be gradual, with the key countries such as Japan and the United States holding out as long as possible.

Should the above-mentioned developments or a number of them transpire, then the prospects for a negotiated settlement would improve. In this context the Australian proposal would appear to have the greatest potential for developing a package acceptable to all parties, at least in the short term.

It should, however, be observed that even if an international settlement is reached, its viability would be in doubt. The past histories

of the competing Khmer factions, their radically different philosophical orientations, possession of military capabilities and access to external support suggest that manoeuvring for political power, including resort to violent struggle in the medium if not the short term, cannot be excluded altogether. "Fair and free" elections are unlikely to resolve the question who is to govern Cambodia. Elections may not be without legitimising value, but then such legitimacy counts for little in a country lacking a tradition of peaceful transfer of political power.

6

Aspects of the Central American Peace Process

In considering the Central American peace process it is imperative to refer to the various interrelated internal and external factors involved in the regional situation. One cannot forget that the world in which we live grows increasingly more interdependent with every passing day.

It would thus be misleading to suggest that Central America can achieve a stable and lasting peace by tackling any one of its problems on an individual basis. This might lead to the erroneous impression that the problems faced by Central America as a whole, or by any country in the region individually, are temporary. Or, it might suggest that there is a set of problems which, though permanent, have nevertheless become exacerbated or have taken a turn for the worse. That is, they are passing through a critical phase. This too is far from the actual facts.

In reality, there are two crises that have converged in Central America, one structural and the other related to current economic conditions. The structural crisis is one of poverty and injustice; it is a long-standing crisis. We might say that it is an everyday affair, a crisis that we have grown accustomed to seeing and accepting even though it touches our deepest feelings in an almost familiar way. It is a permanent crisis for a number of economies that, for the most part, have been based on single-crop agriculture and are, as a result, affected by dependency and external vulnerability—economies that are, moreover, profoundly marked by the realities of depressed and inadequate domestic markets, by little capacity to save, by open or disguised unemployment, and by a low level of innovation.

It is the crisis of a society built on manifestly unjust foundations and characterised by an extremely unequal and arbitrary distribution of wealth that dooms the great bulk of the population to backwardness. It is a crisis that is reflected in the growing pauperisation of the rural masses who live in squalor and in the frightening and uncontrollable swelling of the ranks of the have-nots in urban areas. This so-called "critical poverty" is evidenced by such inhuman rigours as poor nutrition, chronic or endemic diseases, high infant mortality, illiteracy and an extreme measure of institutionalised social injustice that is virtually legitimised.

The other crisis is linked to current economic conditions. It has of late been superimposed upon the earlier crisis, heightening some of the effects of the latter and making them more unbearable and more painful. It involves the burden of the external debt, the loss of the international purchasing power of exports, the contraction of external financial earnings, the chronic balance-of-payments deficit, the shortage of capital and consequent decline in economic output and rising unemployment. Above all, the current crisis is characterised by the inevitable adverse impact of the war situation with which the peoples of the region have had to cope, together with the usual phenomena of wartime economies: the disappearance or reduction of the active members of the workforce, the tidal wave of refugees spilling over the borders into other countries and the migration of agricultural workers to urban centres. In point of fact what has happened in Central America is the result of a most unfortunate combination of the worst possible consequences of the two crises.

It is therefore essential to distinguish the current economic crisis from the structural crisis. The reason for that lies in the fact that solutions which may address the current economic crisis do not entail by any means solutions to the permanent problems. Difficulties may be alleviated or may even disappear without there being even the slightest change in either the causes or symptoms of the structural crisis. Proposed solutions to the current economic crisis may do nothing to improve the prospects for self-reliant, integrated and sustained growth, which is the only realistic and genuine solution to the worse and more serious of the two crises, the long-term crisis.

To think that Central America's problem or crisis began some two or three decades ago with the emergence of liberation fronts in Nicaragua or El Salvador or with the armed conflict between Honduras and El Salvador (the inappropriately named "Football War") is to set

out from a false premise. Considering the history of the region or, more precisely, the historical context within which its economic structure was shaped is helpful in understanding the Central American reality.

The region has traditionally been a source of raw materials for the major outside centres of power. The former colonies, identified as they were with the exploitation and production of the traditional basic commodities, have built their industrial capacity on foundations that were bound to erode their wealth. The problem is further aggravated by the existence of political systems based either on dictatorships or military Governments in disguise, or on democracies imposed in the context of economic dependency. An outmoded and decaying structure is the distinctive feature of the economic and political model which has been imposed upon the peoples of Central America and which, with the connivance of part of the political class and economic power centres, represents the pattern of subjection common to the whole of Latin America.

Thus, in considering the requirements and the objective of a peace process in Central America, I take exception to the theory that democracy, in and of itself, is the means for furthering equitable development and promoting peace.

Though since the days of Plato, Socrates and Aristotle, no better alternative to democracy as a political system has been discovered, democracy must not be limited to a mere change in government every now and then, which can at times be pointless. For democracy to flourish, it must be a political system that empowers the people to rid themselves of all the injustices to which they have been subjected. If democracy is to survive, it must take root, and in order for it to take root, the people must feel that they are part of the democratic process. To be able to exercise their legitimate rights people must have a certain educational and economic level—the higher the development level, the more solid democracy will be.

Without wishing to review the familiar chronology of the peace process in Central America, I would like to recall that the first serious attempt at peace-making in Central America began with the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela on Contadora Island, Panama, in 1983. Their aim was to join forces to seek Latin American solutions to a Latin American problem, namely, the establishment of peace in Central America. The "Contadora Group" was subsequently joined by representatives of

Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay, called the "Contadora Support Group". As a result of problems affecting democratic stability in Panama, that country's membership has been in abeyance.

Recently, as a result of the return of the South American countries to the democratic fold and their increased interest in working together to seek Latin American solutions to the region's problems, the Group's membership was expanded with the entry of the Governments of Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador and representatives of one Central American and one Caribbean country. The Group has acquired the new name of "Group of 13" or "Rio Group" since the new members joined it in Rio de Janeiro.

The "Contadora Group" was the basis, a historical milestone we might say, for a new stage in the history of the Central American region. It represents a real step forward towards the affirmation of specific fundamental values and principles on the basis of which the region could, and should, foster its ability to innovate and devise unprecedented responses that are in keeping with actual conditions, and develop to the fullest its capacity to grow.

The importance of the "Contadora Group" lies in the fact that it recognises that the roots and deep-seated causes of the instability and the permanent state of conflict in the region can be traced primarily to underdevelopment, backwardness, injustice and economic vulnerability. The "philosophy" of the Group is based on the assumption that, if security and peace are to be lasting and stable, they must be placed in a context that is closely linked to the social and economic development of the peoples of the region. The Contadora process culminated in the Declarations of Esquipulas I and II, adopted respectively in May 1986 and August 1987.

Without minimising the value of any such initiatives, at both the bilateral and multilateral levels, it is nevertheless relevant to single out the objectives embodied in the Security Commission Agreement under Esquipulas II, which were defined as follows:

"To ensure that the armed forces of the countries of the region are of such a nature as to defend sovereignty... and internal order rather than of an offensive nature;"

"To establish a reasonable balance... or a proportional and overall equivalence between their weapons, equipment and human strengths, in such a way that they do not represent any threat to neighbouring countries;"

"To define a new model for security relations between the Central American countries, based on co-operation, co-ordination, communication and prevention;"

"To secure commitments with respect to the foreign military presence in the region" and the declaration issued by the meeting of Central American Presidents in Guatemala in June 1990, to the effect that:

"...Violence is beginning to be a part of a past which we shall not forget but which we must not repeat, and we are now embarking upon other paths."

"Accordingly, we have understood the people's cry and we have affirmed that we do not want any more war and violence; instead we wish to see the same kind of energy devoted to the best interests of the development of the Central American people."

Both documents reflect in a clear and explicit manner the desires of the region both to reduce the existing military establishment and to utilise the resources that are squandered on unnecessary armies to meet the urgent development needs of the Central American people.

It would be dishonest today to talk about development without taking into account the question of military spending. The developing countries spend nearly four times as much on arms as they do on health, while 20 per cent of the children in developing countries die before they reach the age of five years. Arms-purchasing abroad by the underdeveloped countries increased during the 1970s, rising to the highest levels in the 1980s. During the second half of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, when the external debt in the third world countries was growing uncontrollably, arms imports accounted for about 40 per cent of new debt incurred during that period.

In Latin America too, the problem of the external debt, which is the chief obstacle to the development of the peoples of the third world, is closely linked to excessive military spending. A surplus international liquidity, particularly in the 1970s, gave rise to an irresponsible lending policy which propelled the underdeveloped countries, caught in their own economic development crisis, into borrowing.

Similarly, in the most advanced countries, the upward spiral of military spending had much to do with the growth of debt as a result of rising interest rates. For instance, in the most highly industrialised country, excessive military spending was a major factor in the sudden increase in the budget deficit. The deficit led to an unprecedented rise in interest rates which, in turn, affected the debt. The country which traditionally was a source of capital for the rest of the world became one of the main importers of capital, pursuing a rigid monetary policy that kept interest rates at exceptionally high levels and turned financial institutions into active promoters of loans to other countries.

As the credit dried up without warning, payment of the debt was demanded. Today, international lending centres, in order to preserve their own financial system, continue to call for structural changes and sweeping domestic policy reforms in the debtor countries. This situation has become a time-bomb with potential unimaginable consequences for industrialised and third world countries alike, posing a constant and serious threat to democracy and peace.

The arms race in Central America was a phenomenon that defied reason. It is inconceivable that peoples with similar cultural roots, peoples who are equally poor and possess few resources, should consider themselves to be potential enemies and, for the sake of interests alien to their peoples, should embark upon an arms race that has been detrimental to their own social and economic well-being.

If one takes Nicaragua as an example from the region—a country whose wartime economy was imposed by external and internal factors—one finds that in 1985 its military expenditures represented more than 26 per cent of the central Government's total expenditure. In El Salvador, the smallest country in the region, owing to similar factors, military spending in 1987 accounted for more than 35 per cent of the national budget. In Costa Rica, on the other hand, a country that has been free of armed conflict, military spending has never exceeded three per cent of the national budget. It is no coincidence that the standard of living enjoyed by Costa Ricans is higher than that of any of the other peoples in the region.

Three decades ago, the United Nations endorsed the objective of general and complete disarmament. Because there are those who believe that international oversight by outside forces for the purpose of enforcing general and complete disarmament would mean abandoning national sovereignty, the objective has been generally viewed as Utopian. And yet the right course would be the maintenance of complete transparency and greater political will on the part of all Governments.

The Central American countries have recently demonstrated that they are committed, if not to immediate complete disarmament, at least to a drastic reduction in their military establishments. Nicaragua is a case in point. Nevertheless, although unilateral regional demilitarisation is a major factor for peace in Central America, it would be illusory to think that, by taking that step alone, the region would put the terrible memory of the past behind it.

In addition to substantial arms reductions, progress must be made in the international sphere towards ending the constant threat of intervention in the region—a threat that can no longer be artificially portrayed as a result of East-West confrontation now that the so-called cold war has supposedly ended. Furthermore, the unequal relations of the existing unjust international and domestic economic order must be eliminated. Otherwise, the peoples of Central America will continue to be plagued by illiteracy, poor health, poor sanitation and poverty, and they will continue to agitate violently for an order that will give them a more just existence.

The Central American people continue to face challenges on several fronts simultaneously: the subordination—whether open or disguised—of the civilian order to the military, with inappropriate and excessive expenditure on arms; the threatening trends of the world order; and the vulnerability of national economic systems. These are all obstacles to the consolidation of democracy, social justice and freedom as the highest expressions of their aspirations.

While it is clear that Central America is a region characterised by diversity as evidenced by different national realities, there are nevertheless more factors that unite the Central American countries than factors that set them apart in their economic and political relations with the rest of the world.

While each individual country of the region must, on the basis of its own national experience, generate the plans and carry out the pressing reforms that are needed to respond to these challenges, the coming together of this group of countries, united by similar problems and a common historical tradition, is a key factor in increasing the options open to each individual nation. The present generation in Central America is certainly facing challenges which cannot be met by thinking in national terms, but which call, rather, for thinking regionally. Policies which reflect an awareness of these realities and people capable of carrying them out must be found if this generation is not to fail its destiny.

What the entire region needs is change in every sphere, on every front and in every stratum of society.

There is a need for substantial change in the outlook of the leaders of the region, so that they may prepare themselves to manage social change with justice and without violence.

Change is needed among the business community, which must realise that it ought to pay for output in terms of productivity, greater efficiency and increased exports, and that the opportunity for change in the social sphere must be created.

There is a need for change in the armed forces, which must finally understand that their role as the vanguard of the most important values of the nation is to join, with their organisation and immense potential, in the national development effort.

Change is also needed among the working classes and the peasants, to whom fate has once again clearly assigned the role of the driving force for transformation—a change that allows them to realise that their interests, rather than being at odds with those of the military or the intellectuals, are in fact at the core of their nation's well-being.

Only in this way will we banish the spectre of war, of interventions, or of hunger and poverty which give rise to violence; and only in this way will we no longer have to see Central American children burying in trenches their toys and their dreams.

REGIONAL PEACEMAKING AND DISARMAMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Introduction

Since the nineteenth century, the history of Central America has been one of civil conflicts, local wars and foreign intervention. In the 1980s, global strategic interests transformed a local conflict into a stage for Super-Power confrontation, triggering a growing militarisation of the region that gradually closed off avenues for initiatives aimed at a negotiated settlement of the differences fuelling the conflict.

In this situation, regional Powers such as Mexico and Venezuela, whose geographical proximity gave them close ties to the Central American area, decided in 1983 to get together to form the Contadora Group to help work out a regional security agreement that would prevent all-out war in Central America or United States military intervention in El Salvador or Nicaragua. Later, in 1985, four Southern Cone countries joined this mechanism to form the Contadora Support Group.

From the start, the Contadora Group and the Support Group received wide support from the European Economic Community and Canada and from international organisations. However, by late 1987

the Central American region was totally debilitated and had reached a military and political stalemate. On the one hand, several years of "low intensity warfare" had not produced a decisive military outcome in any of the confrontations between Governments and insurgent groups, with the result that these conflicts threatened to continue indefinitely, at a growing cost to Central American societies. On the other, the Contadora Group and the Support Group had failed to persuade the countries involved in the conflict to sign the revised Contadora Act as a culmination of the negotiations begun in 1983, because the United States Government and some local allies of the United States were opposed to the involvement of the Contadora and Support Groups in the regional crisis. Contadora's achievements were thus limited to preventing the war from becoming regional in scope and to laying the groundwork for a new peace process, this time promoted by the Central American Governments themselves.

Esquipulas II

On 7 August 1987 at Guatemala City, the Presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua signed the "Procedures for the establishment of a firm and lasting peace in Central America", also known as the Esquipulas II peace plan. The negotiations which led to the conclusion of the Esquipulas agreements had really begun a year earlier, at a meeting in Guatemala of the Central American Presidents, known as Esquipulas I. Not much progress was made at that meeting because of major disagreements and also outside pressures on some of the Governments, but agreement was reached to set up and formalise a series of meetings of the Central American Presidents and to promote the creation of a regional parliament, indicating a renewed collective readiness to tackle outstanding problems in order to arrive at a comprehensive settlement of the Central American conflict.

During this period, an agenda for Esquipulas II was put together that emphasised the need to achieve consensus agreements, reflecting the different perceptions and national interests at stake in each situation. The unifying theme of this regional peace process was national reconciliation, namely, dialogue and negotiation between Governments, political parties and insurgent groups aimed at putting an end to the civil war situations in Central America. Thus, unlike the Contadora peace plan, which gave priority to the external dimensions of security, the Esquipulas process emphasised agreements on domestic policy as a determining factor for progress towards the resolution of

those conflicts and, thereafter, the gradual demilitarisation of the entire area.

Each of the presidential summits held since 1987 has helped perfect the mechanisms permitting progress in the policy of national reconciliation. At the Alajuela (Costa Rica, 15-16 January 1988), Costa del Sol (El Salvador, 13-14 February 1989), Tela (Honduras, 5-7 August 1989) and San Isidro de Coronado (Costa Rica, 10-12 December 1989) meetings, the conflicting parties softened or changed their positions in order to facilitate the decision-making process. For instance, it was agreed that all parties concerned would have veto power at each stage of the negotiations. This made the parties more equal, limiting the impact which disproportionate power can have on the negotiating process.

As indicated above, Esquipulas II changed the course of the Central American conflict by introducing a linkage between the peace process and the domestic political reform process. The Central American Presidents grappled with issues which would normally have been considered purely internal matters, such as: dialogues with the opposition, ceasefires, amnesty, international supervision of electoral processes, and respect for human rights. At the same time, numerous meetings were held to analyse the question of regional security, especially such matters as the capping of arms imports and the scaling-down of Central American armies.

Furthermore, the resolution of the conflict in Nicaragua through general elections in February 1990 created a perception that the main cause of the crisis had been removed and that the political dimension of the negotiations should now give way to the economic dimension. At the eighth summit meeting of the Central American Presidents, held at Montelimar (Nicaragua) in April 1990, tensions between the Nicaraguan Government and the Governments of Honduras and El Salvador were, for the first time, absent from the agenda. That meeting, in addition to adopting resolutions on disarming the contras, emphasised the need to pursue negotiations to resolve the domestic crisis in El Salvador.

The recent changes of government, particularly the election of President Violeta Chamorro in Nicaragua and the departure of President Oscar Arias Sanchez in Costa Rica, have resulted in even greater political homogeneity among the Central American Governments. One consequence of this development is that the most recent Central American summits, in a clear gesture of support for the

Government of El Salvador, have been increasingly categorical in their demands that the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberation Nacional (FMLN) agree to an unconditional ceasefire. This issue is an exception, however, to the fundamental concern of the Central American Presidents to focus almost exclusively on analysing economic problems, and in particular on reactivating economic integration, a focus which led to the announcement, at the Antigua meeting in June 1990, of the launching of the Central American Economic Plan of Action (PAECA). At the end of the meeting, the Presidents of the region met with the United States Secretary of State, who proposed the establishment of a special forum to consider programmes of economic assistance.

Disarmament and Reduction of Armies

The easing of regional tensions in 1990 allowed work to begin on one issue that had been postponed repeatedly since the Esquipulas II negotiations began, namely, security aspects. Thus, it was that one of the key issues in this conflict since the days of the Contadora negotiations returned to the agenda: regional demilitarisation on the basis of change (reduction) in the size and nature of armies, as part of efforts to achieve a reasonable balance of forces within the region.

The Esquipulas II process thus gave rise to the Central American Security Commission, made up of the Deputy Ministers of Defence and Deputy Foreign Ministers of the Central American countries, which has met regularly three times a year. Two positions emerged in the Commission's work: one favouring a sustained disarmament process that would leave armies with a strictly defensive capacity (advocated by the Government of Costa Rica, which has had no army since 1948, and Nicaragua, which in the final days of the Sandinist Government began a reduction of its Sandinist People's Army) and the other (advocated by the rest of the States in the region) opposing such a process. The High Commands of the Guatemalan and Salvadorian armies were particularly opposed to such a process and even claimed that the strength of their respective armed forces should be increased.

At the 31 July 1990 meeting of the Security Commission, held at San Jose, Costa Rica, Nicaragua insisted on an immediate freeze on arms levels, the suspension of international military manoeuvres in the Central American region, and the signing of regional and bilateral treaties of friendship and non-aggression. In the end, the Nicaraguan proposal went nowhere because of the opposition of countries like Honduras, which maintain that the Commission's objectives do not include regional demilitarisation and hold that it should instead pursue

more limited goals such as mutual confidence-building and the regulation of arms imports.

TABLE

Military Balance in Central America

(Troop Strength 1977-1990)

					Percentage growth	
	1977	*1980*	*1985*	*1990[d]*	*1977-1985*	*1985-1990*
Guatemala	14300	14900	31700	43300	122	37
Nicaragua	7100	_[c]	52800	63500	644	20
Honduras	14200	11300	16500	18200	17	10
El Salvador	7130	7250	41650	44600	484	7
Costa Rica[b]	5000	5000	8000	7800	60	−2.5

Source: The Military Balance, 1977-1990,IISS, London

a. For the period 1977-1990, no statistics are available on paramilitary or police forces (except in Costa Rica), whose numbers are considerable in the Central American countries. In the period 1977-1985, there was a marked acceleration in the growth of the armed forces in all five countries, coinciding with the increase in regional tensions.

b. Paramilitary forces, according to *The Military Balance* for various years. Costa Rica has only a Civil Guard and Rural Guard.

c. *The Military Balance, 1980-1981,* p. 86, mentions the dissolution of Somoza's National Guard but has no figures on the military strength of FSLN.

d. Figures up to the beginning of 1990.

Another important step taken by the new Government of Nicaragua was to propose, in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in 1990, that a process be initiated to make Central America a zone of peace and cooperation. It saw such a process as part of a general movement towards democracy, cooperation and demilitarisation in the subregion.

Meanwhile, negotiations on arms and the reduction of armies continued, and at the meeting of the Security Commission held at Puntarenas, Costa Rica, from 15 to 17 December 1990, a preliminary agreement was worked out that would permit El Salvador to maintain a proportionally greater number of troops and arms until such time as a political solution was found to the Salvadorian conflict. Together with this formula of relative symmetry, progress was also made on designing a factor chart setting out basic criteria for measuring the military capacity of the various countries, with a view to making

progress towards the goal of establishing a reasonable balance of forces in the region. Some proposals and concepts from the Contadora peace plan were taken up again in these negotiations on military aspects of security.

On the whole, no conclusive agreements were arrived at in 1990 in the area of disarmament, but negotiations continued and differences were steadily ironed out at each stage of the negotiations. If the process of national reconciliation moves ahead in Guatemala and El Salvador, that would offer new prospects for the Governments of the region to adopt specific agreements aimed at gradual regional demilitarisation.

National Reconciliation in Central America

Nicaragua

As part of the policy of national reconciliation, the new Government of Nicaragua immediately turned to the task of ensuring the final disarmament of the contras. President Chamorro promised the rebels security guarantees and land for their reintegration into the economic life of the country, in exchange for their demobilisation and the surrender of their weapons to United Nations military observers.

The first meeting on disarmament in Nicaragua, which resulted in the Tocontin Agreement, signed on 23 March 1990, brought together members of the newly elected Government, the Archbishop of Managua, Miguel Obando y Bravo, and the leaders of the Nicaraguan Resistance. At the meeting, agreement was reached on an "effective" ceasefire and on the delimitation of zones for disarmament. Despite this commitment, a large number of contras persisted in demanding that the Sandinist army be disarmed at the same time. A further disarmament agreement was signed on 5 May 1990, only two weeks after the inauguration of the new Government. Again, zones were specified for the surrender of weapons to United Nations forces. On 27 June 1990, the last commanders of the contra General Staff laid down their weapons.

The United Nations and the Organisation of American States (OAS) performed various functions in Nicaragua, for both the Sandinist Government and the Government of Violeta Chamorro attached importance to the role of multilateral organisations in ensuring a peaceful transition in Nicaragua, in both the electoral and the military spheres After the election, the new Government renewed and broadened the mandate of the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) and prolonged the presence of the International Support and Verification Commission (CIAV) set up by the United Nations

and OAS. These bodies played an important role in securing the signature and the implementation of the demobilisation agreements signed between the new Government and the insurgents.

El Salvador

At the beginning of the 1990s, El Salvador and Guatemala became the only countries in the region, with the exception of Panama, still experiencing serious problems of political and military instability. The FMLN of El Salvador, taking advantage of the ground gained by the left-wing opposition as a result of the Esquipulas agreements, had been reiterating its readiness to negotiate with the Salvadorian Government a peaceful solution to the national crisis. This position was welcomed even by the United States State Department. Both the Government and the FMLN formally accepted United Nations mediation of the talks and, at the outset, procedural agreements were reached. Between 1984 and the end of 1990, 11 rounds of talks were held, and the twelfth was scheduled for March of this year. However, by the end of April 1991, no definite agreements had been reached on ending the war, which after 10 years has taken a toll of more than 80,000 lives.

On 14 April 1990, under United Nations auspices, the parties to the Salvadorian conflict signed a short but important agreement emphasising that the initial objective of the negotiations was to reach political agreements and then to agree to a cessation of hostilities. At the time, President Alfredo Cristiani had no choice but to accept this order of priorities because of pressures from the United States Congress, which was threatening to cut aid to El Salvador by 50 per cent.

It should be noted that at the meeting held at Caracas from 16 to 21 May 1990 under United Nations auspices, the parties drew up an agenda for the talks which included the following points: (1) restructuring of the armed forces, (2) human rights, (3) administration of justice, (4) electoral process, (5) constitutional reform, (6) economic and social problems and (7) international verification of compliance with commitments. Once certain basic agreements had been reached on those topics, talks on the ceasefire would begin.

After a decade of war in El Salvador, the great majority of those involved have conceded that the causes of the violence in the country stem from the serious social inequalities which have always characterised Salvadorian society. The Government of Alfredo Cristiani, for its part, already weakened by the unsatisfactory investigation into

the deaths of the six Jesuits murdered in late 1989, suffered a number of additional set-backs in the early months of 1991. Some quarters outside the country that inclined to the view that the Government was unable to control the military and the security forces now began to suggest that factions within the Cristiani Government were colluding openly with those forces to cover up their excesses.

These circumstances notwithstanding, the negotiating process has continued in El Salvador. The Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Alvaro de Soto, mediator of the negotiations, submitted to the Government and the FMLN in October 1990 a working paper entitled "Agreement on the Salvadorian armed forces", aimed at addressing the main outstanding obstacle in the talks: demilitarisation and the future role of the Salvadorian army.

At the January 1991 meeting, progress was made concerning the disbanding of paramilitary groups, civil defence forces and security forces. None of the parties was opposed to the appointment of a civilian to head the Ministry of Defence and the idea of an *ad hoc* commission to review the records of the armed forces was accepted in principle. It should be noted that two important developments occurred while the meeting was going on but did not alter the course of the negotiations: members of the Sandinist People's Army supplied the FMLN with 28 surface-to-air missiles, and the missiles shot down an American military helicopter. These events, however, prompted the Bush Administration to lift the freeze on $42.5 million in military aid to the Cristiani Government by delivering six new planes and six helicopters, in addition to other military equipment, to replace aircraft recently shot down by the guerrillas.

The FMLN sought to mitigate the negative consequences of this situation, and on 3 February 1991, under Mexican supervision, it returned to the Nicaraguan Government 17 SAM missiles which it had received in secret from members of the Sandinist People's Army. These missiles, along with the 11 others which the Salvadorian guerrillas admitted having fired, completed the shipment of 28 missiles received from Nicaragua.

Finally, despite the secrecy of the Mexico talks, it became known that the two parties had narrowed their differences on the subject of the armed forces. In particular, the Salvadorian Government in early 1991 announced a thorough restructuring of the country's security forces, a crucial aspect of which would be the removal from military jurisdiction of the National Police, the Treasury Police and the National

Guard. These forces have played an important role in the counter-insurgency campaign, and have frequently been accused of participating in the activities of the death squads. Furthermore, the Minister of Defence announced the possible abolition of the paramilitary Civil Defence forces, another of the demands made by the FMLN.

This demonstrates that the greatest achievement of the January and February 1991 meetings, beyond the modest progress made, was to have built mutual trust, creating a positive climate for upcoming meetings at which the obstacles that have so far prevented a peace agreement in the Salvadorian war will have to be overcome. Within this framework, and in response to United States criticisms that the United Nations was not putting enough pressure on the FMLN, the insurgent group decided to withdraw its proposal for the disbanding of the Salvadorian army, which should make it easier to reach major agreements.

Guatemala

In Guatemala as well, internal negotiations have begun again, encouraged by the relaxation of tensions brought about by the political changes in Nicaragua. The National Reconciliation Commission (CNR), created within the framework of the Esquipulas agreements organised a meeting in March 1990 in Oslo, Norway, between the Guatemalan guerrilla movement, the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional de Guatemala (URNG), and members of the Government, with a representative of the United Nations Secretary-General present, in order to negotiate an end to the civil war.

A series of meetings was also held between the representatives of URNG and Guatemalan social sectors that in earlier years had opposed negotiations with the guerrillas (the first such meeting took place at Ottawa, Canada from 22 to 24 August 1990). One of the objectives of these meetings is to seek agreement on economic, political and social reforms within the current institutional framework, and to consider a possible reform of the Guatemalan Constitution.

Although the first round of talks between the Government and representatives of URNG had taken place in Madrid as early as 1987, no further meetings were held between then and March 1990, even though the rebels, on more than 22 occasions, appealed publicly for efforts to reach a negotiated political solution to the war. On 1 June 1990, at a third meeting held in Madrid, representatives of URNG and the Guatemalan Government reached a preliminary peace agreement, which, however, has yet to be finalised.

None the less, Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano, who took office on 14 January 1991, announced that representatives of the Government and of URNG would meet in April to negotiate a "total peace" agreement to put an end to a war which has lasted more than 30 years and in which, according to international organisations, 100,000 people have died. In Mexico, URNG leaders gave CNR Chairman Bishop Rodolfo Quezada an affirmative response to President Serrano's initiative and also made a series of specific proposals for negotiation, foremost among which was the necessary reform of the Constitution.

It will therefore be the responsibility of the newly elected Government and the guerrillas to give new impetus to this negotiating process. Even though national reconciliation between the insurgent forces and the Government will not come about overnight, the level of military confrontation has fallen off considerably and the conflict has moved to the political arena.

Conclusions

The Esquipulas process set a new course for negotiations in the region by standardising procedures for resolving internal conflicts and by linking the issue of national reconciliation to regional disarmament and security.

None the less, the situation in the Central American isthmus in the near future is still likely to be complex, since the conflicts in Guatemala and El Salvador, through their own internal dynamic, could continue for a long time to come unless all the forces in society become part of the political process. The prolongation of the conflict in these countries is in turn adversely affecting the rest of the region in many ways: it is accelerating the arms race between armed forces, keeping war-related migration flows high and aggravating the economic crisis which has already lasted for a decade. Without a doubt, the persistence of these conflicts is constantly jeopardising the precarious geopolitical balance of the Central American region.

At the same time, the change of political regime in Nicaragua does not necessarily guarantee peace in a society where the poverty of the vast majority of the population and the difficulties of arriving at a political consensus among the main forces in society have been endemic problems.

The greatest challenge facing the Esquipulas process will therefore be to find mechanisms for solving the conflicts in Guatemala and El Salvador, and to consolidate the peace process in the Central American

isthmus on the basis of comprehensive economic development, growing democratic control of States' decision-making processes, and implementation of the recommendations made in the Contadora peace plan for mutual confidence-building among the countries of the area. In that regard, the basic premises for this regional peace process continue to be negotiation and political consultation as the only legitimate means of resolving internal conflicts, and a reasonable balance of forces in which the prevailing criterion is the defensive capacities of armies.

7

General Overview of African Contemporary Political, Military and Economic Affairs and their Relationship to Peace, Security, Disarmament and Confidence-Building among African States

The International system into which African States emerged in the late 1950 was characterised by uncertainties provoked by East-West ideological rivalries and the accompanying arms race. The Second World War had hardly ended before the united will for a stable world order based on the concept of collective security disintegrated. Instead, a system of alliances—the most notable of which are NATO and the Warsaw Pact—came into being, led by the United States and the Soviet Union, which had emerged as the two Super-Powers. The arms race on which the two Alliances relied for their security and for the expansion of their influence has since become the dominant factor in international relations. The United Nations, which ought to have provided an environment in which emergent African States could develop in peace, was itself caught up in an increasingly acrimonious world dominated by the conflicting interests of the Super-Powers. It was in no position to insulate new African States from the East/West ideological battle theatre in which the one sought to dislodge the dominant interest which the other, notwithstanding the granting of Independence, sought desperately to preserve.

An early signal of the East/West competition and the prevailing concept of security based on military power was the creation by the

new African States of a defence apparatus. The establishment of armed forces became as much a symbol of sovereignty as a national flag. The basic rationale for the military apparatus was the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the new States. Other factors, some inherent in the colonial system from which the continent was then emerging, provided added stimulus for the acquisition of arms. Lack of internal cohesion arising from the arbitrary grouping of hitherto distinct peoples within national boundaries provoked crises in several of the new countries. This phenomenon was complicated by the irredentist movement of those who campaigned to join their relatives across national boundaries. Boundary disputes between States arising from ill-defined territories developed into armed conflicts. In parallel with these intra-State or inter-State crises was the continued liberation struggle against those colonial Powers, such as Portugal, which insisted on perpetuating their rule, and against the minority regimes in Rhodesia and the *apartheid* regime in South Africa.

The contemporary political and military situation in Africa must therefore be seen against the background of the legacy of colonialism, as it concerns internal cohesion within States, inter-State territorial and boundary disputes, the leftover struggle for liberation in southern Africa and the threat by the *apartheid* regime, and the post-colonial ideological scramble for the continent. To these must be added the effects of arms acquisition, including the role of the military in politics and the unfulfilled economic expectations of the post-Independence era leading to the current critical economic crisis on the continent.

Internal Crisis and Border Problems

The legacy of the partition of Africa by the colonial Powers through the grouping together of diverse people into administratively convenient entities may be said to be perhaps the deepest root cause of the problems that earned Africa the reputation of a crisis-ridden continent. It manifested itself partly in inter-ethnic conflicts within almost every country, conflicts in which each group sought control of power and the accompanying access to the national wealth. Added to this was the arbitrary and the imprecise manner of the partition, which meant that, on the attainment of Independence, most countries were uncertain of their boundaries. Lack of expertise on the part of the new countries in border demarcation and in conflict resolution was combined with a jealously guarded concept of territorial integrity which admitted of no concession, for whatever reason, to yield any part of the national territory. It was further compounded by rival ideological tendencies

and the irredentist quest of peoples who sought, or were instigated to seek, to join members of their ethnic group across borders.

The debate as to whether to preserve the colonial boundaries in the interest of the integrity of the newly emerging States or to make adjustments in the interest of uniting people had raged in Africa even before the formal granting of Independence. Fear of the chaos likely to follow claims for border adjustments must have been the determining factor in the decision of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to maintain the *status quo.* In article 3, paragraph 3, of the OAU Charter, adopted in May 1963, member States solemnly declared their adherence to the principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each member State and for its inalienable right to independent existence. The implied adherence to the doctrine of *uti possidetis juris* (as you hold possession by right) was explicitly clarified the following year in a resolution adopted at the OAU summit meeting held in Cairo in July 1964, associating territorial integrity with maintenance of the *status quo* of colonial boundaries. In the resolution, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government solemnly declared that all member States pledged themselves to respect the frontiers existing on their achievement of national Independence.

Notwithstanding this ground rule, the early years of African Independence witnessed a flurry of territorial disputes and border conflicts which the conflict management provisions of the OAU Charter were inadequate to deal with. It should be borne in mind that no provision whatsoever was made for military action of any kind in the form either of peace-keeping or of peace enforcement. Rather, the OAU Charter envisaged, in its article 3, paragraph 4, the peaceful settlement of disputes through third-party assistance of a quasi-juridical nature, involving mediation, conciliation and arbitration. However, the Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration which was set up was hardly used. Rather, African States preferred the improvised use of good offices of *ad hoc* committees of heads of State set up for specific border cases. The situation today is that although internal tensions have not totally ceased nor have borders been clearly demarcated, all countries still maintain the borders inherited at the time of Independence. The question, therefore, is whether all countries and peoples should not fully accept that situation and direct greater efforts towards forging nation States out of the state of nations.

Politically this would require two steps. First, a greater effort will have to be made to achieve internal cohesion. Thirty years is a long

enough period to turn the mistakes of the partitioners of Africa into a source of strength. Otherwise, the security of the State will always be in jeopardy, leading to a large diversion of resources into the acquisition of arms and a tendency to use these for internal security. Large-scale human rights violations, known to have bedevilled relations between Governments and their internal opponents, can only exacerbate tensions, particularly in the present period of universal awareness of the need to protect fundamental human rights. A second step required is the development of a credible system of crisis management and conflict resolution at both the continental and the subregional levels. This will ensure that inter-State disputes can be tackled before they degenerate into armed conflict and that, if need be, a continental peace-keeping group can be interposed.

Southern Africa and the Left-Over War of Liberation

The left-over struggle for liberation at present concentrated in southern Africa is epitomised by the *apartheid* regime of South Africa. The policy of that regime challenges the whole course of development in post-Second World War Africa by its determination to perpetuate a racialist and colonialist policy. Happily, its imperialist hold on Namibia is already at an end with the triumph of the liberation struggle and the unrelenting pressure of Africa and the international community.

However, the legacy of the militarisation of southern Africa resulting from the *apartheid* policy of South Africa still remains. Indeed *apartheid poses* the greatest obstacle to an African search for a non-military system of security.

The record of the South African regime has been one that encourages violence and militarism. Its system of internal repression has provoked equally violent resistance from the oppressed black people of South Africa generally and from the liberation movements that have been compelled to take up arms. Since the apparatus for the suppression of the black majority has not yet been touched by the current De Klerk Government, it is too early to expect the oppressed to let down their guard. In its bid to reverse the course of the wind of change that swept colonial regimes out of the continent, and to install a *cordon sanitaire* round itself, South Africa gave support to internal subversion and openly committed aggression against its neighbours. To support its abhorrent system and its aggressive policies, it has built a military capability far superior to that of any other country in Africa south of the Sahara.

South Africa's possession of a nuclear-weapon capability has further compounded the dilemma of Africa, whose clear preference is for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and a nuclear-weapon-free African continent. It should be recalled that as early as 1964, in reaction to French nuclear tests in the Sahara, African Heads of State and Government adopted in Cairo the Declaration on the Denuclearisation of Africa. However, the development of South Africa's nuclear-weapon capability has impeded the elaboration of a legally binding instrument along the lines of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America. Rather, the fear of South African nuclear blackmail generated an African debate on the question of developing a nuclear-weapon capability in some other African countries. Many African intellectuals and some politicians made spirited pleas in support of this idea. The present position is of course that no member State of the Organisation of African Unity has a nuclear-weapon capability. That is a situation I do not regret since I have always believed that a regional nuclear arms race cannot be in the overall interest of African security. What is regrettable, however, is that Africa has made no headway in the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Africa and Armaments

In the area of conventional weapons, the evolution of events in Africa and the universal importance attached to militarisation in inter-State relations have resulted in an African share of the arms race which, while small in global terms, is nevertheless substantial in terms of the share of available resources which it consumes. The intensification of the arms race of the Super-Powers and their Alliances, coupled with their ideological rivalries and the need to spread their influence globally, have made arms supply a crucial instrument of their foreign policy. Mwalimu Nyerere put it succinctly when he wrote:

> "The selling of arms is something which a country does when it wants to support and strengthen the regime or group to whom the sale is made. Whatever restrictions are placed on that sale, the sale of any arms is a declaration of support—an implied alliance of a kind."

The pattern of arms supply in countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and the Sudan shows the ideological political preferences of the suppliers and the recipients.

The internal factors that stimulated the acquisition of arms by African countries are varied. With Independence, the installation of a proper army was considered one of the essential attributes of

sovereignty. It was to be more than just symbolic as various factors led to their rapid expansion. The fragility of the concept of the nation-State was soon apparent in many parts of Africa and thus an awareness emerged of the practical utility of an army to quell internal rebellion and in several cases to prosecute the civil wars which dogged several African countries. At the same time, border conflicts and territorial claims necessitated arms acquisition, as did the fear of aggression or subversion based on ideological differences. For countries in southern Africa in particular, the requirements of the liberation struggle and the dangerous threat arising from the aggression and destabilisation of the *apartheid* regime of South Africa made arms acquisition imperative. Beyond the compelling reasons of national security, however, African arms acquisition was also influenced by the modernisation campaign, which enabled many arms-producing countries to benefit from the recycling of petro-dollars.

Far beyond the insignificant military expenditure of Africa in the early 1960s, the amount doubled every five years from the middle 1960s until it levelled off in the closing years of the 1970s. It was to decline sharply with the beginning of the economic crisis. In terms of percentage of total world military expenditure, Africa's share does not represent a large amount—only 1.5 per cent globally and 6.5 per cent of the expenditure of the third world in 1978, the median year. However, these statistics do not convey the whole picture. The percentage of Africa's share of foreign arms purchases was particularly high since the continent produced hardly any weapons. Whereas in 1969 Africa accounted for less than 3 per cent of third world arms purchases, by 1978 the continent accounted for 25 per cent. Arms import as a percentage of total African imports rose from 1.3 per cent in 1969 to 9.3 per cent in 1978.

The weakness of African economies makes the burden of military expenditure particularly heavy. Very little of such expenditure feedsback to stimulate the undeveloped African economy. Even where, as is often the case, the personnel costs of the armed forces are substantial, these tend to promote a demand for foreign goods and thus constitute a further drain on foreign exchange. There has been a decline in military expenditure since 1980—a decline averaging 9 per cent a year even in the oil-rich African countries, including Algeria, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Nigeria. This decline has been mainly due to the drop in revenue from oil and the general economic crisis. When it is also observed that the peak period of military expenditures coincided with the boom years, conclusions can be drawn as to the

military necessity as distinct from the political or the modernisation syndrome which provoked the heavy outlay of those years. While military expenditure cannot be held wholly responsible for current African indebtedness—estimated at $250 billion—it is noteworthy that the arms purchase component is in some cases about 15 to 20 per cent.

In view of the unproductive nature of arms purchase, the continent has derived no returns from this vast outlay. Unlike the situation in other developing parts of the world, in Asia and Latin America, not even the fall-out of the acquisition of arms technology has rubbed off on Africa. Apart from *apartheid* South Africa, no African country south of the Sahara has managed to develop an arms industry. Africa has not been able to profit from the indigenous production of arms, which would not only have saved foreign exchange and obviated the present total dependence but, in a period of falling commodity prices, might have been exported for foreign exchange. Let us not forget that those developing countries that have become exporters of arms to Africa began the process of developing their capacity only within the past twenty-five years.

The real effect of high military spending on the economies of the developed countries is now being seen with the evolution of events in Europe. Even the Super-Powers, it is now clear, have supported their ever-escalating military expenditure at tremendous economic and social costs. The widespread shortages of consumer goods and housing in the Soviet Union, the huge budget deficit and the pauperisation of the lower classes in the United States are clear examples of the opportunity costs of unrestrained military expenditure. It is now clear that economic considerations play an important part in the evolution of the policies of *glasnost,* which has brought Super-Power relations to the highest point of detente since the cold war began. The hope generated by the expected peace dividend is a justification of the long-standing proposition of a close interrelationship between disarmament and development.

The economic and social consequences of arms acquisition are even more dramatically demonstrated in the developing countries. Very often, arms acquisitions by third world countries in the interest of security are made at the apparent cost of primary or basic needs in the area of social and economic well-being. Given the fragile economic base, which cannot sustain the expenditure on arms, and the equally fragile political base, which requires arms acquisition, self-preservation often dictated a choice for defence over development. The non-military

threats to security are thus neglected, creating further cause for instability.

Economic Problems in Africa

The present economic situation in Africa is in part the result of this dilemma. The critical economic situation has the potential of destabilising the socio-economic and political development of individual countries as well as relegating the continent as a whole to the mercy of a new colonial status, this time not by metropolitan imperial Powers but by multilateral financial institutions and the banks of developed countries. Africa's colonial status was itself a handicap in the race for development.

It should be noted that Africa shares with other developing regions the burden of an unjust and inequitable international economic order. Being almost totally dependent on the export of primary products, whether agricultural or mineral, Africa more than other parts of the third world suffers most from the effect of the constant decline in the prices of these products. Earning less and less foreign exchange at a time of increasing import requirements, Africa has over the years lived beyond its means, with a consequent accumulation of debt.

Besides this factor, however, it is now generally acknowledged that instability, bad management and faulty planning have compounded the economic outlook. With the de-emphasis of agriculture and rapid urban migration many African countries which had been self-sufficient as regards food became major importers. Efforts at industrialisation created assembly plants which, being dependent on massive importation of completely knocked down parts, could be productive only when there was an abundance of foreign exchange for the raw materials. Insufficient allocation of resources to education, health and other social welfare programmes has resulted in a continuing shortage of trained manpower in many relevant disciplines and in generally low productivity.

Mention should again be made of the expenditure of African countries on armaments, estimated at over 20 per cent of the continent's foreign debt. Besides the known outlay for acquiring weapons and its opportunity costs, the instability and violence created by the use of the acquired weapons to achieve military solutions to national or inter-State problems have had serious economic consequences. The large refugee population on the continent is a sad reminder of the mass displacement of peoples, whose potential productivity is lost to their countries of origin.

Effects of East-West Detente

The present evolution of East-West relations in Europe has become a major factor in the likely course of events in Africa, inasmuch as it has created propitious conditions for a new concept of security de-linked from the accumulation of arms, and in favour of disarmament and greater East-West economic co-operation. The consequences for Africa will be both problematic and beneficial. East-West economic cooperation may portend some additional problems for Africa in the unequal competition which Eastern Europe may pose for Western capital. East-West disarmament, however, can be exploited to Africa's advantage. It should provide Africa with an example of security based on the lowest level of armament, on openness and mutual confidence and cooperation. An Africa that requires all its resources to bring itself into the mainstream of global development must learn a lesson from the European example. In addition, disarmament agreements between the Super-Powers and their Alliances will offer tremendous savings in military expenditure. Such savings will be particularly significant as a result of a conventional weapons disarmament agreement in Europe, since 80 per cent of annual military expenditure, estimated at $US 1 trillion, is spent on conventional armaments.

Of Africa's $US 250 billion debt, it is estimated that about 20 per cent is related to arms credit. An immediate benefit to Africa of the peace dividend arising out of disarmament could be a proposal for the immediate cancellation of the arms-related debt of African countries. Besides, part of the new money to be released by disarmament should be made available for financing a comprehensive debt reduction plan, the goal of which should be the elimination of all the debts. For such proposals to be credible, there should be a clear indication of the choice on the part of African countries to eschew further arms acquisition and to avoid intra-African armed conflicts.

It should also be noted that East-West disarmament will greatly reduce international tensions still further and promote confidence, whereby the peaceful solution of problems will take priority. A shift in the global concept of security may reduce the interest engendered in African issues by ideological one-upmanship. For that reason the fear has been expressed that African issues may be neglected in the aftermath of detente. In my view, there is as yet some uncertainty as to the strategic consequences of current events in Europe. While the Warsaw Pact is on the way to disintegration, the NATO alliance is as yet unmoved. What Africa should fear is a unipolar substitute for a bipolar post-1945 situation. What Africa should work for, in its own

strategic and security interest, is a multipolar evolution in which Africa will be an effective player in global affairs.

Political Liberalisation in Africa and Confidence-Building Measures

Africa's response therefore will have to proceed from a quick effort to set its house in order. The era of self-perpetuation in power and of the all-seeing and all-knowing monolithic political structure is fast disappearing. The effects of the events in Europe are not likely to be felt selectively by the people in Africa. Political liberalism and multiple choice are essential ingredients for mass participation in the development process. Nation State stability, like the stability of the family unit in each State, is essential for continental power. The disposition for peaceful resolution of intra-African problems should have the highest priority so as to avoid the inflaming of such problems by the dumping of arms that will become superfluous as a result of the evolution of events in Europe. Obviously this will mean that greater attention must be paid to the development of crisis management, conflict resolution and confidence-building measures in Africa. For Africa, crisis management and conflict resolution can truly be seen as an art of survival, especially in the light of the very marginal room the continent has for the use of its resources. This poses a great challenge to leaders on the continent. Peace-making and peace-keeping capacities must be developed through imaginative measures. This may include an informal coalition of a small representative group of African countries to assume leadership in the early consideration of potential areas of conflict as well as in the training and designation of troops from countries that can afford to do so in OAU peace-keeping operations.

Confidence-building measures which will reduce the necessity for military rivalry with the attendant financial implications should be given priority. Among such measures could be a declaration of acceptance of present borders and the renunciation of cross-border claims. Such reciprocal renunciation of claims would promote good-neighbourliness and reduce the necessity for massive arms acquisition. Resources could then be devoted largely to national economic and social programmes as well as to joint economic programmes.

Economic Integration in Africa

Africa's greatest challenge in the 1990s is likely to be in the area of economic integration. While lip-service has been paid to the value of

such integration, no progress has been made in its achievement. Africa's pattern of trade is still oriented mainly towards Europe, the United States and Japan. This fragmentation of the African market has compounded the external dependence of the continent. If Africa, which constitutes only 10 per cent of the global population, has one-third of the world's States, it follows that African States are, on the average, small and economically fragile. In the words of Professor Adebayo Adedeji during a lecture on the subject "Africa in the Nineteen-Nineties: A Decade for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation or Another Lost Decade",

> "To ensure that we embark on a process of recovery, development and transformation in the 1990s, Africa needs urgently to pursue vigorously and relentlessly the path of regional and subregional economic integration."

In the face of European economic integration in 1992, the North American free trade area already in place between the United States and Canada and the development of co-operation in the Asian and Pacific Basin, Africa has once again, observed Professor Adedeji, fallen behind the other continents in achieving a breakthrough in the establishment of a regional market and economic integration. "Regionalism", he concluded, "and the inevitable concomitant development of the intensification of protectionism will make Africa a major loser in world trade." Can Africa afford to lose the race again in the 1990s?

PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AMONG AFRICAN STATES

At a time when the rest of the world, especially Europe, is taking measures to ensure a future full of promise, a future not dependent on armaments but on co-operation, we in Africa also ought to be asking ourselves serious questions. Will Africa continue on its fractious path or shall we put a halt to it and set forth on the long road to peace, stability and co-operation on our continent? We may wish to imagine the Africa of the future—one in which, we hope, we shall not be talking about conflict resolution but rather about the consolidation of co-operation and the ensuring of lasting peace.

Both the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations have a high stake in the stability of Africa: the countries of Africa constitute one-third of the membership of the United Nations. It is this shared mission that has made the two organisations partners in the pursuit of peace. Together, they have promoted African unity, tackled the continent's economic problems, and in an effective way,

through quiet diplomacy, contributed positively in efforts to resolve conflicts. I hope this partnership will be strengthened even more in the years ahead as we approach the twenty-first century.

Conflict resolution is, indeed, a complex subject. Both OAU and the United Nations have been involved in matters of conflict resolution for years. But OAU and the United Nations have tended to work more closely on preventive diplomacy than on conflict resolution. Indeed, the notion of crisis prevention derives logically from the concept of preventive diplomacy. The development of the concept has been linked to the development of the broader concept of collective security. This was envisaged as a system for the maintenance of international peace and security and as an alternative to the system of the balance of power in international politics. The new system of collective security was envisaged as involving the establishment and operation of a complex scheme of national commitments and international mechanisms designed to prevent the use of force in international relations. The system was envisaged also as having the potential for credible threat and reliable promise of effective collective measures against aggressors, ranging from diplomatic boycott through economic pressure to military sanctions, in order to ensure and maintain the peace. This task of preventive diplomacy was assigned to both the United Nations and regional organisations such as the Organisation of African Unity.

The conduct of peace-keeping operations has been the primary instrument by which the United Nations system has undertaken to exercise the function of preventive diplomacy. Considerable discussion has taken place on whether peacekeeping or peace-observation operations are authorised by the Charter of the United Nations. In the conceptual framework, however, peace-keeping and peace observations seem to have been legitimised by general principles of moral obligation within the concept of collective security.

While the maintenance of peace and security is intrinsic in the United Nations Charter, the Charter of OAU makes no specific reference to peace-keeping operations or security arrangements. At the same time, the OAU Charter mentions co-operation for defence and security as one of the purposes of the organisation. It also talks of the promotion of international co-operation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations, and the universal declaration of human rights. The OAU Charter is, however, emphatic on the peaceful settlement of conflicts.

The OAU accepts the United Nations as a valuable instrument for peace and as a mechanism in which the world can establish some common norms and rules pertaining to the conduct of relations among States. Equally, the United Nations recognises OAU as a regional arrangement, within the meaning of the United Nations Charter, for dealing with matters related to conflict resolution, crisis prevention and management and, certainly, confidence-building among African States.

The major role of OAU and that of the United Nations in conflict resolution have been, by and large, complementary. Over the past years, OAU has tended to assume the primary responsibility for political and diplomatic aspects of conflicts in Africa while the United Nations has been inclined to limit itself to humanitarian aspects. This partnership presents a classic pattern for permanent co-operation in the fulfilment of the principles and purposes underlying a policy of continental peace based on preventive diplomacy. Outside the framework of the United Nations, OAU also has its own methodology and mechanisms for conflict resolution, prevention and management as well as confidence-building among African States.

My focus today is not, however, on such matters but rather on ordinary issues that often get glossed over or that are taken for granted when our experts propound and analyse strategic military doctrines and try, often without success, to fit the African context into tight theoretical frameworks. I proceed, of course, from the premise that Africa has problems that are unique to it, at least in magnitude. It should therefore have different concerns and priorities and should therefore approach its problems in a different way.

African countries have neither the capability nor a reason to pit themselves against other parts of the world in a fight for military supremacy. No amount of military procurement or deployment within an individual African country or in all of them collectively could possibly countervail against American or Soviet military Power, or even that of France. If we cannot arm ourselves enough to represent a credible deterrent to the outside Powers, why do we stockpile arms? The tragic character of the arms race in Africa is its inherent motivation to arm against neighbours, against sister countries!

This has been possible for a number of reasons, but it is due not least to our lack of political awareness of the indivisibility of the security of Africa. The security and stability of each African country is linked to that of its neighbours. Insecurity and instability are contagious.

One country cannot enjoy peace by itself like an island in a sea of insecurity and conflict. Instability along the borders precipitates tensions and military deployments with the risk of armed confrontation, and gives rise to refugees.

Why then do African countries arm themselves despite the realisation of the futility of pursuing security on an individual basis?

Since Independence, there has been a steady increase in the level of armaments and arms expenditures. Admittedly, there were initial justifications for such increases but their rate of increase and their political contexts have gradually degenerated into factors of instability and insecurity. It was argued in most countries—perhaps logically so—that the security void left by the departing colonialists had to be filled. It was also argued that the function of government made military buildup necessary so that the government could assume the role of defender and protector of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the newly independent countries. Wars of liberation in southern Africa also justified the increase, despite the heavy burden it constituted for the weak economies of the nascent front-line States, but by far the most regrettable increase and the one that constitutes the largest part has been the buildup arising out of inter-State conflicts, especially over borders. Whether in Ethiopia, Somalia, the Sudan, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Kenya, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Chad or in other countries, increases in military expenditures are or were directly linked to the prevalence of conflict situations. The cost of these increases has had serious consequences as regards the ability of those countries to pursue development objectives and, despite minor decreases, Africa still spends more today on arms than on education, health or social development, at a time when there is a general decline in military acquisition world-wide.

Border and boundary problems are not new to Africa. They are inherent in the arbitrary demarcation of boundaries by the colonial administrations, but with the exception of a relatively few open hostilities, most border areas have remained calm or, at worst, the hostilities have been only latent. In the period following Independence, hostilities were eclipsed by the euphoria of newly won national freedom and the fervent hope for continental unity. This was certainly not the only reason. The more self-serving reason was the reluctance to open up an endless chain reaction of boundary claims across the continent. Realism constrained the countries to adopt the principle of the inviolability of the boundaries inherited from the colonial period.

In more recent years, however, with the euphoria long gone and the tasks of government more exacting, States have tended to be less mindful of African solidarity and OAU Charter provisions. Population pressures, desertification coupled, in some cases, with the discovery of resources in bordering areas, have become catalysts for conflicts. The acute economic problems facing most African countries have subordinated the ideals of the African consensus over boundaries and have almost created a justification for sustaining some of these border conflicts. At times nationalism has been invoked.

Religion has had also its own contribution to conflicts though to a much less extent. But the resurgence of fundamentalism, Christian and Islamic, threatens to throw the continent into new forms of conflicts. With the exception of Mauritania, Comoros and in some ways the Sudan, all the other African countries have secular governments. Admittedly, there has been a continent-wide effort on the part of all Governments not to precipitate or to stir up the latent religious differences. But this does not mean that Africa has, on that account, immunised itself from religious strife. To the contrary, there have been riots and sometimes wars fought over religious differences. The war in the Sudan has religious overtones as did the confrontations in northern Nigeria.

Differences based on religion do in a very real way threaten the security and stability of African countries. It is, therefore, necessary that as an insurance against violence motivated by religious convictions and competition, African Governments should elaborate mechanisms of governance that do not accentuate these differences but should rather seek national harmony based, in part, on unfettered freedom of worship and secure foundations of secular government.

Problems of tribalism and regionalism led to the bitter civil war in Nigeria and they continue to be sources of tension in many African countries. Now, inter-clan wars are threatening to tear Somalia apart and add to the already complicated and delicate situation in the Horn of Africa. In the Sudan, a war is raging on. A combination of factors, not least those of ethnicity, have thrown the country into a destructive war.

Quite apart from these factors with military implications which put Africa's security in jeopardy, there are various non-military threats as well, threats which cannot be contained through the traditional mechanisms for the maintenance of peace. No third party or any innovative mechanism can replace the process of national consensus

within countries. Only through continuous debate and consultation can agreement be found on means to remove these threats. In African countries, as elsewhere, there are considerable economic disparities, despite many genuine national experiments to reduce income ratios and provide essential social services. There are many countries which are grappling with demands for democracy and human rights despite constitutions that guarantee such fundamental rights. In all of these, we need national means of conciliation and conflict resolution.

Poverty has had a debilitating effect on our continent and our ability to recover is seriously constrained by the weak base of our economies. Africa's income has plummeted with the collapse of commodity prices and a corresponding increase in the cost of manufactured products. Despite many structural adjustment arrangements with the world monetary and financial institutions, most countries are far from recovery. We spend about 50 per cent of our total external earnings on servicing external debt. Our per capita incomes continue to fall and about half of the entire population of our continent now live below the poverty level, despite the fact that they are working harder than before. Africa now works more and more for less and less.

A combination of drought and, in some cases, unsuitable agricultural policies has wrought havoc with the agricultural base for food production. The child mortality rate for Africa is more than 100 per cent above the average for the whole of the developing world, and a staggering 165 million Africans still languish in illiteracy.

All these are factors inimical to the stability and security of Africa. They need to be tackled first by Africans themselves. Africa has to look to itself for answers to her economic problems. We need to co-ordinate our efforts on the basis of the Lagos plan of action, on the basis of collective self-reliance to work towards self-sustaining economic development. Collective action within Africa to deliver the continent from its economic doldrums is the most important aspect of African security. A starving child in Sudan or Ethiopia or Tanzania is not threatened by nuclear weapons or machine-guns so much as by a lack of food and the prospect of death from starvation.

In my view, perhaps the most serious threat to Africa comes from a sometimes poor relationship between the people and their governments. Many countries are still grappling with the problem of working out an ideal model for such a relationship—a *modus operandi* in politics. The tensions which have resulted from an inability of

governments to respond in a satisfactory way to the need of the people to participate democratically in governance has led to a *de facto* freeze on popular participation in the political process and agitation by the people for such participation.

Whatever has been the form of the relationship between the people and the government, the African masses have not, by and large, been given adequate opportunities to find an outlet for their creative energies and apply them to development. In the process of containing dissent and ensuring self-preservation, certain elements within the ruling establishments have committed excesses and violated human rights. A resulting vicious circle of agitation and containment has literally applied brakes to development. In more ways than one, the peoples' despair has given rise to an almost fatal sense of cynicism with regard to the future of the continent and to pessimism regarding the policies of governments. This apathy has killed the initiative of the people and instilled in them a deep sense of self-doubt which poses a significant long-term threat to Africa's security.

Those less charitable about Africa have sought to apply different standards to Africa and justify such situations because it suits their interests. They argue that African societies are more amenable to military rule and that participatory democracy on the Western model is alien to Africa. Those even less charitable have argued that people in Africa should be more concerned about hunger and poverty and less about academic issues such as democracy. In other words, democracy is the pastime of the rich and the affluent. Such arguments are advanced to support the forces against democracy and development in Africa. How is it possible to talk about the liberating qualities of democracy and its positive impact on development in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and at the same time deny democracy to Africa?

There is now a steadily growing realisation in Africa that its future lies in democracy based on popular participation both in government and economic development. This realisation is best illustrated by the growing trend towards civilian rule. Most military governments are realising that constitutional rule provides a more stable basis for political legitimacy and for the long-term prospects for national security.

Questions of political participation are internal issues and there is therefore little room in such matters for innovation in conflict resolution nor is there an explicit role for OAU. None the less, society comes to terms with its own needs and abilities. A national process develops

which influences the way that society views conflicts with others. More peace internally contributes to peace-building externally.

Conflict resolution and management presuppose the political determination on the part of the parties in a conflictive situation to abandon war as a means of settlement and to embark instead on a peaceful course. The essential ingredient of this peaceful process is negotiation. Negotiation is both a process and a means towards pacific settlement.

Negotiations as an objective must entail shared perceptions by the parties on the general form of the settlement towards which they work. They may have divergent views as to the mechanism, priorities and areas to be stressed but they need to have a common concept of the final outcome of those negotiations. It is the element of common denominators that is instrumental in successful negotiations. Negotiation as a process involves a political determination by the parties that a fair settlement is possible through negotiation. It is a belief on the part of the parties in the ability or potential of that process to bring about equitable settlement. Negotiation as a political phenomenon must involve a realisation by those concerned that ultimately an equitable and lasting solution lies, not in the continuation of conflict, but in pacific settlement. It implies a certain balance of forces. Whatever the military statistics or equations, negotiation is possible only if the parties have confidence in both the process itself and in those who act as mediators. Credibility is the essence of any mediation effort. This credibility is not acquired all at once. To be credible, individuals or countries must, over a period of time, have demonstrated the necessary political skills in their involvement in other conflict situations. They must also have an impeccable record of impartiality and be able to inspire the confidence of parties to a conflict.

Some conflicts are so complicated, sometimes by extraregional power involvement, that they do not lend themselves to an easy solution regardless of the credentials and the efforts of the mediators. Sometimes, they involve personalities who see resolution of a given conflict linked to their political future. Sometimes, they are conflicts invoking such deep emotional and nationalistic feelings that it is an exercise in futility to try to advance logically reasoned arguments, especially at the peak of the conflict. Experience has demonstrated that such conflicts are resolved by time with changing political circumstances and personalities. It is with these considerations and on these premises that OAU has approached its role in the field of conflict resolution.

Among the principles of the OAU Charter is the solemn affirmation by the African States of the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration. Consistent with this affirmation, the founder members created a commission of mediation, conciliation and arbitration. A protocol to the agreement sets out the guidelines for its composition, activities, operation and areas of competence.

Over the years, there has been little recourse to the commission. Differences largely over its mandate as well as reluctance on the part of member States to submit themselves to mediation have not enabled the commission to function as envisaged. The absence of mediation by the commission does not, however, imply that there have been no mediation efforts at the level of OAU. Over time, and depending on the nature of the conflicts, the member States have dared to be innovative and in the process have contributed positively to conflict resolution and management.

Admittedly, owing to the sensitivity of the issue, in particular as it touches on matters of national sovereignty, the OAU bodies have been rather apprehensive when dealing with mediation. The limitations placed by the Charter on the extent of involvement in mediation make any would-be mediators sceptical about the possibilities of securing the consent of parties to the mediation. This scepticism has, in my view, been the greatest hindrance rather than the actual refusal of the member States involved in a conflict.

All this notwithstanding, there have been some commendable efforts and even if success in solving the conflicts has not always been forthcoming, the measures taken had clear advantages. They underlined the concern of the mediators and demonstrated their willingness to put themselves at the service of the African States concerned.

This has been done through a variety of techniques quite outside the purview of the Charter. There have been third-party efforts at mediation, conflict resolution and prevention. Individual countries or a group of them have undertaken such missions. While these were not under the auspices of OAU as such, it was the ideals of brotherhood and unity embodied in OAU that were invariably the guiding spirit. The efforts by Kenya and Zimbabwe to mediate the internal conflict in Mozambique or the Gbadolite summit in Zaire on the Angolan war are cases in point.

At times, individual countries or heads of State have taken initiatives to resolve conflicts. Examples include the efforts of President Eyadema of Togo to find a solution to the differences between Cote D'Ivoire and Liberia and the involvement of President Moussa Traore of Mali in the mediation efforts of the Senegal/Mauritania conflict. Non-governmental organisations such as the Church in Mozambique have also been involved in mediation exercises.

Apart from these third-party approaches, the Secretary-General of OAU and its current Chairman have used their good offices to intervene positively in conflicts. This has essentially been intervention with a view to urging restraint and containment of a potentially explosive situation and avoiding its degeneration. The usual temporary abatement in the intensity of conflicts resulting from such appeals has provided time for reflection and sober judgement. Again, even when no solution is reached immediately, this lull has provided an invaluable breathing-space both to the mediators and to those involved in the conflict. The Secretary-General has at times made concrete proposals on how to arrive at a pacific settlement and so has the OAU Chairman. This has, however, been done with the understanding that these good offices can be put at the disposal of the parties when they themselves are prepared to use them in a positive way. The role of OAU is to help provide the necessary atmosphere for negotiation. It is in this spirit that I am currently following the situation between Senegal and Mauritania as well as that between Chad and Libya.

Most important, however, is not the fact that OAU or its officials can offer their services but that the parties do demonstrate confidence in its ability to contribute positively to the resolution of the conflicts. It is this deep-seated confidence in OAU—even though few will readily acknowledge it—which in my view needs to be nurtured and developed in the minds of the African people. We need to build a grassroots constituency for OAU in all the African countries so that recourse to the OAU mediation mechanism becomes a reflex action, in-built in the national political conscience. We should be able to build a new peace culture among the people of our countries—a culture which is not pacifist but which recognises the virtues of the peaceful process. In the long run, this will prove a more credible assurance for conflict management and resolution than constitutional provisions in the OAU Charter or any other legal document.

Among the various methods of conflict resolution, management or prevention, it is the confidence-building approach that holds the greatest promise. Through the building of a system of political

accommodation by means of greater transparency in military procurement and deployment, neighbouring countries can gradually retreat from confrontational relationships. For example, the exchange of information on military establishments, the initiation of joint-training programmes, joint manoeuvres, establishing joint research and development projects will promote peace at a much lower cost and will yield more political dividends.

Weaving these confidence-building measures into the fabric of African defence doctrines and the perceptions of our defence establishments will create a more stable environment in which activities that open the way for greater peace can be initiated. I have in mind the importance of mutual confidence leading to economic co-operation and regional integration with shared security concerned and a minimal reliance on armaments.

Regional co-operation as a confidence-building measure can sustain co-operation, friendly relations and peace. The Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference is a case in point. On the one hand, the opportunities for cooperation and contact which they offer promote human understanding and create an economic motivation to promote security and prevent conflict. The more the countries have jointly at stake, the more the motivation for peaceful relations. Quite apart from this economic incentive of avoiding conflict, the summits of these organs can assume a political role of mediation.

As a confidence-building measure, I see for example no reason why, in the case of disputed border areas, the bordering countries cannot come together and exploit the area jointly as a shared enterprise. This implicit recognition of comiuon ownership of both or more parties in the disputed area will transform it from a centre of conflict into a theatre of co-operative endeavour. If the concept of common heritage were to be applied to disputed border areas, this would have gone a long way towards strengthening the basis for co-operation and reducing the incidence of conflict.

The Organisation of African Unity has had one real experience of a peace-keeping operation. The Chad Initiative failed to enlist the financial and political support necessary for its success, but what is politically important is that it was an African initiative undertaken by Africans. It showed that such an operation was possible and the lessons learned are important. I am sure that in future we shall have a more organised and well-funded operation but I hope that the need for such an operation will never arise again.

Europe is going through a phase of basic transformation. The era of military confrontation, threats of nuclear war and of ideological incompatibility are giving way to political accommodation and economic co-operation. Europe is no longer talking of war. The traditional concepts of security and defence doctrines are being replaced by new concepts of co-operation. Military alliances are rapidly losing their relevance in the changing political and security environment. All this is not the result of a miracle: it is a result of a realisation in both Eastern and Western Europe that, ultimately, genuine security lies, not in walls separating families and communities, not in tanks or soldiers, but in cooperation and mutual trust.

This move towards European integration will have far-reaching economic, political and security implications for Africa. If Europe, with a relatively less urgent need to unite, with less economic incentive to integrate, finds it necessary to do so, why should Africa not be thinking along the same lines? We need to harness all our resources and target them to development.

It is my firm belief that in the final analysis, Africa's security does not lie in arms. It does not lie in the number of anti-ballistic missiles, fighter aeroplanes, frigates and submarines, tanks and anti-personnel vehicles, rocket launchers and machine-guns or ammunition. It does not lie in the development of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, our real security lies in our ability to harness our resources and manpower and to direct them positively to economic development. It lies in our ability to fight desertification, to eradicate hunger, poverty and disease, to end feuds and conflicts, and in our preparedness to usher in democratic government, in which human rights are sacrosanct and the rule of law is taken for granted as an intrinsic right of citizens and an essential attribute of constitutional rule. Africa is too poor, too backward and too wanting in many technological and economic respects to scuttle its energies or to devote its resources to wars and conflicts. All this cannot be possible unless Africa is ready and willing to rise above the narrow thinking of isolationism and misplaced notions of an inflexible approach to sovereignty and come together in co-operative unity.

No country can by itself find solutions to all its security problems. The countries of Europe have come to that conclusion and are pulling together. Africa's enduring security ultimately lies in its unity of purpose and of action.

8

Conflict Resolution, Crisis Prevention and Management and Confidence-Building in West Africa

Introduction

The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa organised a training programme on Conflict Resolution, Crisis Prevention and Management, and Confidence-building among member States of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Lome, Togo, from 22 August to 2 September 1988. Senior military and civilian officials of the 16 member States of ECOWAS considered issues relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes and the non-use of force in inter-State relations within the West African sub-region. Simulation exercises and lectures were held on arbitration, negotiation, crisis management, international law and border disputes, the role of the Organisation of African Unity, the United Nations and peace-keeping, etc.

African and International Legal Provisions in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

If the Chinese legend surrounding the figure 8 is to be believed, then 1988 is an especially auspicious year for the forces of peace-making and conflict resolution, and August is especially so.

For this month an incredulous and war-weary world has been treated to news that portends well for peace-making and settlement of disputes: the acceptance of United Nations Security Council resolution 598 (1987) calling for a ceasefire and an end to the bloody, seemingly interminable Iran/Iraq war and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from

Afghanistan. In addition, a kind of peaceful *modus vivendi* is being negotiated between Angola, Cuba and South Africa which, it is hoped, will improve the chances of South Africa relinquishing its illegal hold on Namibia and permit the accession of that territory to its long-delayed Independence in conformity with Security Council resolution 435 (1978).

These are only random examples of what has transpired in 1988, and there are many more, but they have all involved United Nations action to counter the massive and destructive use of force.

The issue of the use of force or its threat generally, whether between individuals, communities or States, is an age-old problem. But insofar as individuals and communities or groups within a State are concerned, it is now largely one of law and order, with the authorities of the State having the exclusive monopoly regardless of the wishes of the individuals or groups concerned. In fact, this monopoly on the use of force by the authorities could be said to be the basis of the cohesion and integrity of the State in most instances.

On the other hand, the prohibition of the threat or use of force by States in their international relations is a relatively recent development in the international legal order. This no doubt reflects on the level of development, integration and cohesion of an international system that is composed of nation-States.

The fact of the matter is that the control of the use of force in inter-State relations is pre-eminently a problem of international organisation, whether at the global level, the regional level or the subregional level.

Between States, force will never be controlled by mere legal prescriptions making illegal certain kinds of conduct, though such prescriptions have their place. The control of force can only come through the parallel development of several aspects of international organisation. These include procedures for dealing with disputes, for the development of law and for political decisions implying a collectivisation of the use of force through international decision within a constitutional framework.

The prohibition of the threat or use offer by States in their international relations today is the result of a painful and costly process from the days when *jus ad bellum* (the right to wage war) was one of the attributes of the sovereign State. Indeed, before the League of Nations, there was a presumption of the legality of war as an instrument of self-interest and as a form of self-help.

On the global level, the establishment of the League of Nations in 1920, and the signing in Paris on 27 August 1928 of the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (popularly known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact) were high-water marks along the route which culminated in 1945 in article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations.

The basic norms concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes and the recourse to force in general international law today under the United Nations regime are contained in article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4 of its Charter:

> "3.   All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered."

> "4.   All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political Independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

The Charter of the United Nations is of course a multilateral treaty, and it is one to which nearly all the States in the international community are parties. But it is submitted that the provisions of the Charter in article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes and the non-use of force, incorporate principles of general international law which would be applicable to all States irrespective of the specific treaty obligations of the Charter.

Both in the practice of the political organs of the United Nations, where claims are made concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes and the use of force, and in juristic writings, the view is that the obligations of peaceful settlement of disputes and the non-use of force are universal, regardless of the Charter distinction between Members and non-members.

Indeed, on the formal side, there is a tendency in the practice of the United Nations to ignore the distinction between Members and non-members in establishing its competence to act whenever world peace is at issue: in such circumstances it often directs its resolutions to "all States" or "every State", thereby underlining the universality of the obligations incorporated in those principles.

Moreover, article 2, paragraph 6, of the Charter enjoins the United Nations to ensure that non-member States act according to the principles that hold for Member States when necessary for international peace and security.

With membership that is approaching complete universality, this aspect may not be of much significance anyway.

Whether derived from the Charter of the United Nations or from customary international law binding *erga omnes,* there is a requirement that inter-State disputes must be settled only by peaceful means and that in their international relations States should not use force or the threat of it.

In the sphere of the peaceful settlement of disputes, in addition to article 2, paragraph 3, the Charter of the United Nations contains other provisions that underscore one of the principle purposes of the United Nations, stated in article 1 as the maintenance of international peace and security.

The Charter, entitled "Pacific Settlement of Disputes" contains six articles providing for negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of the parties' own choice.

Indeed, in order to underline the obligation to settle disputes peacefully rather than by imposition, article 36 says the Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of disputes which the parties themselves might have already adopted.

Additionally, in article 7 of the Charter, the International Court of Justice is established as a principal organ of the United Nations and the Statute of the Court is attached to the Charter itself. The Statute provides for a wide range of possibilities for the judicial settlement of disputes. And advisory opinions have been given on disputes between international organisations and their member States.

Although the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice covers all cases which the parties may refer to it, and therefore could conceivably cover all types of dispute situations that may arise between States, the one serious drawback is that in the absence of a declaration of acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction, a State need not accept it.

At the same time, States have concluded a large number of bilateral and multilateral treaties and arrangements which often amplify and strengthen the legal norms established in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

Therefore, at the global level, the main legal provisions governing the peaceful settlement of disputes and the non-use of force are based on these two instruments.

Like the covenant of the League of Nations, the Charter of the United Nations recognises the role and importance of regional arrangements or agencies as partners in the maintenance of international peace and security.

Indeed, the Charter (articles 52-54) expressly recognises the existence, position and role of regional organisations and arrangements, especially in the field of the maintenance of international peace and security. The Charter specifically enjoins the States setting up regional organisations to make every effort to achieve peaceful settlement of their local disputes through such regional organisations before referring them to the Security Council of the United Nations.

Founded in 1963, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) is the most important and largest intergovernmental organisation in Africa. Although it is not expressly stated in its Charter that it is a regional organisation within the meaning of the United Nations Charter, in practice the relationship between the two indicates that the OAU is such an organisation. Also, the OAU Charter states as one of its principal purposes the promotion of international co-operation, having due regard for the Charter of the United Nations.

In terms of the obligations of its member States, the OAU Charter is somewhat brief: it simply states in article 6 that its members "... pledge themselves to observe scrupulously the principles enumerated in article 3", which consists of the following:

(a) sovereign equality of member States; *(b)* non-interference in the internal affairs of member States; *(c)* respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State; *(d)* peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration; *(e)* unreserved condemnation of political assassination as well as subversive activities on the part of neighbouring or any other State; (f) absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the dependent African territories; and *(g)* affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.

The OAU Charter should be seen as a product of its times. It is not surprising, therefore, that there was no explicit prohibition or undertaking by its members not to have recourse to force.

In 1963, most of the African States were just gaining their Independence. As newly emergent States, they had relatively small armed forces with limited and unsophisticated arsenals. Thus, the preoccupation was not with the use of force as such but with non-interference in each other's affairs by subversive activities and the

need to settle disputes peacefully. More specific obligations were undertaken by its members in article 19, where they pledged to settle all disputes by peaceful means, and decided to establish a commission of mediation, conciliation and arbitration. This was established by the Cairo Protocol in 1964. However, most OAU disputes that have arisen have been handled by *ad hoc* bodies.

It is submitted that, although not explicitly set out in its Charter, the prohibition on the use of force by OAU members can be derived from the principles of the Charter, especially those relating to non-interference in the internal affairs of other States, respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity and the obligation of peaceful settlement of disputes. The interplay of these principles clearly makes the use of force by a member State of the OAU against another impermissible under the Charter.

At the regional and subregional levels, with increasing emphasis on social, political and economic co-operation, the African States have seen a necessity to restate the legal norm of the non-use of force and the obligation to settle disputes peacefully.

In 1978, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) concluded in Lagos, Nigeria, a Protocol on Non-Aggression. A rather short protocol (only six articles), it states in its preamble that the objectives of ECOWAS cannot be attained "save in an atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding among" its members; it recalls article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter, of the OAU Charter. It then goes on to state the obligations incumbent on its members.

Article 1 literally restates the provision of article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations on the non-use or threat of force, with the addition of the word "aggression".

Article 2 enjoins each member State to refrain from committing, encouraging or condoning acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against the territorial integrity or political Independence of the other member States.

Article 3 enjoins a State to prevent foreigners resident on its territory from committing the acts referred to in article 2.

Article 4 is the same as article 3 except that it is aimed at non-resident foreigners using a member State's territory to commit the acts mentioned in article 2.

Article 5 pledges member States to resort to all peaceful means in the settlement of their disputes.

The means or method of settlement is evidently left to the parties' choice. A dispute which cannot be settled peacefully among the members shall be referred to a committee of the Authority. The latter is the highest organ in ECOWAS and is composed of heads of State of member countries. If the Committee of the Authority fails to settle the dispute then it shall finally go to the Authority itself.

It is not stated who refers the dispute to the Authority. It could be one or both parties, a third-party member State, or the executive secretary of ECOWAS. This is an area of the Protocol that needs clarification.

The Non-Aggression Protocol itself has been annexed to and forms an integral part of the ECOWAS Treaty of 1975.

The three countries of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, in the context of the subregional organisation, the Mano River Union, concluded on 20 November 1986 in Monrovia a specific subregional Non-Aggression and Security Co-operation Treaty.

The provisions of this Treaty again amplify and strengthen the general international legal norms expressed in the Charter of the United Nations concerning the non-use of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Indeed, the preamble of the Treaty expressly takes cognizance of article 33, of the United Nations Charter and article 19 of the OAU Charter, the provisions of which renounce the use of force as a means of settling disputes, and call upon all member States to settle their differences by peaceful means.

Members do not undertake to come to the defence of each other, as they would in a mutual-defence pact. Instead, the parties agree to consult each other if the security of one of their members is threatened; and they undertake to inform each other of any relevant information which may affect their security.

The parties also agree to establish a joint security committee with the responsibility of liaising on fugitive criminals, dissidents and citizens of their respective countries who have undertaken subversive activities in the territory of another. They also agree to exchange information and investigate reports affecting their security.

In conclusion, there are adequate legal provisions concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes and the non-use of force both in general

international agreements and in specific African treaties to provide a basis for strengthening international peace, security and co-operation. Wider dissemination of information on these provisions is needed for politicians, soldiers, diplomats and the public at large. The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa is "educating for peace" through its training programmes to provide invaluable yeoman's service for the social, political and economic development of Africa.

African Political, Military and Economic Affairs in their Relationship to Security, Disarmament and Confidence-Building

The international environment which saw the emergence of Africa from colonial status into independent States was one fraught with the uncertainties posed by post-Second World War developments, particularly as these concerned the system of international relations, collective security, and the safety and development of young and weak nations.

The Second World War had hardly ended before the consensus for a stable world order based on the concept of collective security collapsed. The Charter of the United Nations, which was adopted before the war formally ended, envisaged that the Organisation would maintain international peace and security by taking effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace; and through peaceful settlement of disputes that might arise between States. The instrument for carrying out this task was the Security Council, particularly its core of five permanent members, who were expected to be able to agree on steps necessary for enforcement action in each case. However, once the war ended with the defeat of Germany and Japan, the perception of the course of international relations among the wartime allies quickly manifested itself. American strategists, even during the course of the war, had predicted the emergence at its end of a bipolar world to replace the Euro-centric multipolar pre-war situation. These strategists had postulated that the successful termination of the war would lead to a world radically changed in terms of relative military strengths. They had even stated categorically that the United States and the USSR would be the only military Powers of the first magnitude.

The situation at the end of the war was to prove them right. There was a dramatic decline not only in the military strength but, more

importantly, in the economic power of the previous major Powers. The only exception was the United States, which emerged from the war so greatly strengthened that it overshadowed both militarily and economically all the other Powers. The war which weakened the others had actually stimulated the economy of the United States. Its GNP rose from $88.6 billion in 1939 to $135 billion in 1945; it was responsible for more than half the total world manufacturing production and owned more than $20 billion out of total world gold reserves of $33 billion. The Soviet Union, while not as strong economically as the United States, nevertheless emerged from the war with its territorial boundary expanded and with the largest armed forces in the world. The relegation of Western Europe to a position far behind the USSR and the United States was evident in military personnel and expenditures, which in 1950 stood at $15.5 billion and 4.3 million men for the USSR, $14.5 billion and 1.38 million men for the United States, $2.3 billion and 680,000 men for Britain, $1.4 billion and 590,000 men for France.

Ideological differences soon consolidated the power of the United States and the USSR into two armed camps, with lesser European States ranged behind the leader of each camp. A year after Winston Churchill's Iron Curtain Speech of March 1946, President Truman of the United States expounded the Truman Doctrine, in which he portrayed a world of two ideological principles: the one democratic and the other totalitarian. He said that the United States would adopt a policy that would help free people to maintain their institutions and integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. The United States launched the Marshall Plan, which poured billions of aid dollars into Europe for its economic recovery and thus checked the spread of communism. For their part, Soviet leaders equally expressed their suspicion of the policies of the United States and other Western countries by accusing them of trying to sabotage the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, surrounding the Soviet Union with new foes on all sides, supporting reactionary regimes and packing the United Nations. Little wonder that they rejected the Marshall Plan, both for themselves and for Eastern Europe.

The two sides established their defence Alliances—NATO in 1949 and the Warsaw Pact in 1955—and embarked on an arms race and a world-wide ideological rivalry. This was the new strategic reality in which the people of a divided Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and Africa found themselves. Rather than provide an environment in which the newly emergent States of Africa could develop

in peace, the United Nations witnessed and was caught up in an increasingly acrimonious world in which it was virtually powerless.

The arms race on which the two Alliances relied for their security and for the expansion of their influence became the dominant factor in international relations. The early efforts of the United Nations, starting from its first resolution setting up the Atomic Energy Commission in 1946, were based on a perception of the probable course of international relations arising from the discovery of the atomic bomb. The use of the weapon on the Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, barely three months after the Charter of the United Nations was drafted, ended the Second World War. However, the devastation introduced a new dimension into warfare and persuaded the first General Assembly of the United Nations to assume a level of urgency not envisaged in the Charter in dealing with disarmament. If the United Nations failed to confine the nuclear genie in a bottle before it grew wings, it was because the dictates of ideological rivalry carried more weight with the Super-Powers than the requirements of international peace and security.

Thus, the international system into which modern African States emerged was one of increasing militarism. In Africa itself, several factors—many inherent in the colonial system—provided an additional stimulus for arms acquisition. Lack of internal cohesion arising from the arbitrary grouping of previously distinct peoples within national boundaries provoked crises in several of the new countries. This phenomenon was complicated by the irredentist movement of those peoples who campaigned to join their kith and kin across national boundaries. Boundary disputes between States, arising from ill-defined territories, developed into armed conflicts. There were also liberation struggles against those colonial Powers, such as Portugal, that insisted on perpetuating their rule, and against the minority regimes in Rhodesia and the *apartheid* regime in South Africa. Emergent Africa also experienced the ideological struggle between the Eastern (socialist) and Western (capitalist) blocs, the former seeking to disrupt the monopoly interest in Africa which the latter, notwithstanding the granting of Independence, sought desperately to preserve.

Almost thirty years after the political map of Africa was changed, many of the early causes of endemic instability are still present. While some of the teething problems have become manageable, others have become extremely dangerous in the light of an increased military capability of the adversaries and the willingness of interested third

parties to provide unlimited assistance. In the first years of Independence, States that were not clear of their own border claims and did not have the military capacity to press their case, have in the second and third decades of Independence acquired greater capabilities and thus the confidence to use their armed forces to press their claims, particularly where they perceive their neighbours to be weaker.

The political and military history of post-colonial Africa has thus been greatly influenced by the legacy of colonialism as it concerns internal cohesion within States, inter-State boundary disputes, the unfinished struggle for liberation in southern Africa and the threat by the *apartheid* regime, and the ideological scramble for the continent. To these must be added the effects of arms acquisition, including the role of the military in politics, and the unfulfilled economic expectations of the post-Independence era leading to the current critical economic crisis on the continent.

Border Problem

The debate over whether to preserve the colonial boundaries in the interest of the integrity of the State or to make adjustments in the interest of uniting people had raged in Africa even before any formal granting of Independence. Fear of the possible chaos likely to follow claims for border adjustments must have been decisive in the decision of the OAU to maintain the *status quo.* In article 3(iii) of the Charter of the Organisation adopted in May 1963, member States solemnly pledged to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and its inalienable right to independent existence. The implied adherence to the doctrine of *uti possidetis juris* (the right to control what you possess) was explicitly clarified the following year in a resolution adopted at the OAU summit meeting held in Cairo in July 1964, associating territorial integrity with maintenance of the *status quo* of colonial boundaries. In the resolution, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government solemnly declared "that all member States pledge themselves to respect the frontiers existing on their achievement of national Independence".

Notwithstanding the legal ground rules, the early years of the OAU witnessed a flurry of border conflicts for which the conflict management provisions of its Charter proved inadequate. It should be borne in mind that no provision had been made for military action of any kind, either in the form of peace-keeping or peace enforcement. Rather, the Charter envisaged in article 3(iv) the peaceful settlement

of disputes through third party assistance of a juridical nature involving mediation, conciliation and arbitration.

The lack of personal contacts between leaders and officials of the new countries further complicated the situation in the early years of Independence. The legacy of colonialism was such that neighbouring countries that were colonies of different colonial Powers had little contact with each other. The barrier of language, especially between Anglophone and Francophone, created a deep gulf. Several confidence-building measures which could have arisen out of knowledge of and familiarity among leaders were not possible.

With time, the threat to peace arising out of the desire of some to redefine borders has subsided. After the multiple border wars of the 60s and 70s there are today few difficult cases, and only one—Chad/Libya—that is capable of exploding again into a serious war involving outside Powers. The *ad hoc* arrangements by the OAU have succeeded in either resolving or rendering manageable most territorial disputes so that no border has been changed since attainment of Independence by African countries, thus justifying the wisdom of the OAU Charter insistence on the maintenance of inherited borders. In addition, the leaders of most African countries have become willing to talk and negotiate with their counterparts rather than resort to the use of force. Confidence has increased with greater interaction not only at the OAU level, but also at the subregional level, as in ECOWAS.

However, the problem of internal cohesion within African countries persists. Though there are fewer civil wars, those that persist, notably in Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia, have defied all efforts of African solution. The same may be said of Western Sahara, which almost destroyed the OAU in its efforts to resolve this issue.

Southern Africa and the Unresolved War of Liberation

The unfinished struggle for liberation is concentrated in southern Africa and is epitomised by the *apartheid* regime of South Africa. The policy of that regime challenges the whole course of development in post-Second World War Africa by its determination to perpetuate a racial and colonial policy. By the subversion and destabilisation of neighbouring African States, the *apartheid* regime sought to institute a Pax *Afrikaaner* first in southern Africa, and, through nuclear blackmail, in the whole continent. By pretending to represent Western capitalist values, *apartheid* not only debases those values, but exacerbates an ideological confrontation in the continent. *Apartheid*

poses the greatest challenge to an African search for a non-military system of security.

The record of the South African regime has been one that encourages violence and militarism. Its system of internal repression and fascist measures has provoked equally violent resistance from the oppressed black people generally and the liberation movements that have been compelled to take up arms. In its bid to reverse the course of change that swept colonial regimes out of the continent, South Africa supported the unholy war waged by the Salazar regime against the people of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. It encouraged the white minority in Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) to rebel against the administering Power, and to declare Independence unilaterally. It assisted the rebel regime to beat the international sanctions imposed on it. It also aided the rebel regime in its campaign to suppress the liberation struggle of the Zimbabwe nationalists. When the liberation struggle of the people of Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe succeeded and they achieved Independence. South Africa was determined to sabotage them.

The *apartheid* regime's policy of destabilisation has found expression in outright military attacks against the front-line States, destruction of their infrastructure and the instigation and sustenance of internal rebellion. Mozambique and Angola have borne the brunt of these policies. Both countries have been forced to spend a very high proportion of their annual revenues (as much as 40 per cent in the case of Angola) on defence. However, all of the South African subregion has been in a state of perpetual turmoil. Apart from the distraction from nation-building and economic construction, South Africa's policy of destabilisation has imposed on the African neighbours the necessity of importing arms and a search for extra-African assistance to preserve their sovereignty.

The threat posed by South Africa, however, goes beyond the southern African subregion and extends to the entire continent south of the Sahara. In the bid to build a *cordon sanitaire* around itself for the perpetuation of *apartheid,* South Africa has continued to occupy Namibia illegally and thus deny the people of that territory their inalienable right to self-determination. Since South Africa's reason for its aggression against its neighbours is to punish them for their support of the freedom fighters of South Africa and Namibia, it considers, *a fortiori,* all African countries that support the liberation movements as targets. This is a security threat that no African country can

underestimate, because South Africa has by far the strongest conventional armed forces on the continent. In stark contrast to African countries which are totally dependent on imported arms, South Africa is in the unique position of being able to produce locally many categories of weapons and some aircraft.

The military superiority of South Africa has been further consolidated by its possession of a nuclear weapon capability long recognised by Africa and recently confirmed by the South African Foreign Minister in a press conference in Vienna, the seat of the International Atomic Energy Agency. This has further compounded the dilemma of Africa, whose clear preference is for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and a nuclear-weapon-free African continent. Of the more than 135 parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 40 are African countries. Africa vigorously protested against French nuclear tests in the Sahara in 1960 and, in 1964, the African Heads of State and Government adopted in Cairo the Declaration on the Denuclearisation of Africa. However, the development of South Africa's nuclear weapon capability has created a spoke in the wheel of African efforts to elaborate a legally binding instrument following the model of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America.

The ideological dimension of the problem created for Africa by the *apartheid* regime is seen in the open assistance given to the rebels in Angola and Mozambique by the United States, which has also impeded Namibian Independence. It has taken a sustained and very costly effort on the part of the Angolan armed forces, strongly assisted by Cuban forces, to break the myth of South African invincibility arising from its military and economic strength *vis-a-vis* the countries in the subregion. According to all accounts, at the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, in June 1987, Angolan/Cuban forces turned back South African aggression in southern Angola. This marked the turning point. South African losses since then have become unacceptable to the racist regime, thus forcing it to seek a solution. How serious the *apartheid* regime is in its agreement to pull out of Angola and to co-operate in implementing United Nations resolution 435, leading to Namibian Independence, is yet to be seen. The Director-General of the South African Institute for International Affairs said on a BBC programme on 12 August that the South African Government was definitely committed to withdrawal from Angola. However, he was not sure if a definite decision had been taken with respect to Namibian Independence. President Botha was quoted as saying *inter alia:* "It would be ironical if Resolution 435

should reach the point of implementation only to be obstructed or made impossible as a result of the provisions in American legislation which impose extensive restrictions."

Ideological Struggle and Africa's Strategic Relevance

The convergence of the Independence movement of colonial territories with the ideological division of the major Powers into two blocs highlighted the strategic importance of Africa. South Africa is only one area of manifestation. Hitherto considered the dark continent whose destiny was decided by the colonial Powers, and whose resources were available for free exploitation in the interest of the metropolitan Power, Africa played hardly any active role in international relations. It was virtually unknown and of no interest to the Soviet Union. The United States was satisfied for Africa to be a sphere of influence of its Western allies, who were the colonial Powers. With the beginning of Independence in African countries, and the commencement of African freedom of action, the continent began to feature in the strategic consideration of the East and West as a possible active partner in their struggle for world domination. While the West was determined to preserve its influence, the East sought to establish new bonds of friendship which would enable it to break its old exclusion. The tentative contacts made by the Soviet Union in Ghana, Guinea and Egypt alerted the West. The crisis that engulfed the Congo (Zaire) immediately after its Independence provided the first venue for the East/West rivalry in open confrontation.

In an effort to preserve its influence, the West concluded defence agreements such as the ill-fated Anglo-Nigeria Pact and the more lasting Pacts signed between France and its former colonies. Both the East and the West cast around for military bases to improve their strategic positions. The vital assistance of the East in the liberation struggle and in the resistance of southern African countries to the *apartheid* regime and its role in support of Ethiopia has improved its influence.

Africa's importance in the geopolitical consideration of the Alliances derives from several factors. Geographically, the northern part of the continent is considered vital by the West to secure its southern flank. The Horn of Africa is vital to securing access to the Gulf, so strategic to the West's energy supply. The eastern part, bordering on the Indian Ocean, is vital for the control of the Persian Gulf. The southern part controls the Cape route, which is used for transporting 60 per cent of supplies, essential to the preservation of white Western civilisation.

Western Africa, bordering the South Atlantic, provides a vital link between Europe and the Americas.

Africa's resources are vital to the West. In a report on Africa's role in a European Security Policy, the Assembly of the Western European Union plainly stated:

"Europe, a small but very densely populated continent with a highly developed industry, can find only a very small proportion of its requirements domestically, be it for its own consumption or to supply its industry with energy and raw materials. Conversely Africa, because of its size, relatively small population, rich mineral resources and low level of industrialisation, is in a position to supply Europe with what it lacks."

Equally plainly stated is the American view of the importance of African resources to the West. The Kissinger study on southern Africa said that the region contains 7 out of 16 strategic materials considered vital to the future survival of Western industry. This was a reference to a sizeable percentage of strategic minerals such as chromium, industrial diamonds, platinum, gold, cobalt, manganese, uranium, copper.

Thus the nature of its mineral wealth, the size of Western investment, and its strategic location in relation to the Cape route, the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean made South Africa crucial to NATO's security concept. The fact that *apartheid* makes South Africa a liability to Western interests is just being recognised, and has not yet led to an unequivocal commitment by the Western Powers to remove it. Notwithstanding its strategic importance, both geographically and in terms of resources, the continued weakness of Africa as a whole makes it impossible for her to assert herself. It therefore continues to rank low in the foreign policy scale of priorities of the two major Powers. This was highlighted in the 1985 Gorbachev/Reagan summit, where regional issues such as Afghanistan and Central America featured, but African issues were totally omitted. The last summit in Moscow was reported to have dealt with southern Africa, on the initiative of the United States, since South Africa had by then suffered the defeat at Cuito Cuanavale.

Africa and Armaments

The evolution of events in Africa, as well as the universal importance of militarisation in inter-State relations, have resulted in Africa assuming a share of the arms race. While small in global terms, it is nevertheless substantial in terms of the share of available resources which it consumes. The intensification of the arms race of the major

Powers and their Alliances, coupled with their ideological rivalries and the need to spread their influence globally, have made arms supply a crucial instrument of their foreign policy. Indeed, arms transfers by producers is recognised as a means of exerting political influence. "Arms sales", wrote Andrew Pierre, "are far more than an economic occurrence, a military relationship or an arms control challenge; arms sales are foreign policy writ large." Former President Nyerere agreed with Pierre's assertion. "The selling of arms", he wrote, "is something which a country does when it wants to support and strengthen the regime or group to whom the sale is made;. Whatever restrictions are placed on that sale, the sale of any arms is a declaration of support—an implied alliance of a kind".

Apart from deriving political influence, however, arms transfers also became for the producers a thriving source of commercial business which helped their armament industry. Early post-Independence restructuring and expansion of African armies were based largely on the military asistance provided by the former colonial Power (where Independence was amicably granted), or by the Eastern bloc in its effort to gain influence. However, as arms acquisition by African countries became a vital instrument of policy, the costs rose and the burden on the economy grew. Competition between suppliers became intense, and credit facilities were offered as an attractive incentive. This stimulated purchases beyond what might be needed. The maturity of these credits will add to the debt burden which is a prominent feature of the African economic crisis.

The internal factors which stimulated the acquisition of arms by African countries are varied. At the time of Independence, most African countries had armies that were no more than constabulary forces, effectively controlled by an officer corps from the army of the metropolitan power. Their function was to preserve internal order. With Independence, however, the installation of a proper army was considered one of the essential attributes of sovereignty. It was to be more than just symbolic. The fragility of the concept of the nation-State soon proved that the practical utility of an army was either to quell internal secession or to resist the interference of an outside Power or a budding regional Power or even a bunch of mercenaries. National security—the defence of territory and people, as well as protection of the broad economic base of the country—was seen as a compelling reason for an effective defence apparatus.

Reasons other than this basic requirement, however, increased the tempo of arms acquisition in Africa. Among these were the fear of

one's neighbour, especially in areas of border conflict or territorial claims, the requirements of the liberation struggle, the effect of the Arab/Israeli conflict for North African States, and the dangerous threat arising from the aggression and destabilisation of the *apartheid* regime of South Africa. In contrast to the insignificant military expenditure of Africa in the early 1960s, the amount doubled every five years from the middle 1960s until it met up with the beginning of the economic crisis. In terms of percentage of total world military expenditure, Africa's share represented only 1.5 per cent and 6.5 per cent of the expenditure of the third world in 1978. However, these statistics do not convey the entire picture. The percentage of Africa's share of foreign arms purchased was particularly high since the continent hardly produces weapons. Whereas in 1969 Africa accounted for less than 3 per cent of third world arms purchased, by 1978 the continent accounted for 25 per cent. Arms imports as a percentage of total African imports rose from 1.3 per cent in 1969 to 9.3 per cent in 1978.

In addition, it must be pointed out that the weakness of African economies makes the burden of military expenditure particularly heavy. Very little of such expenditure feedsback to stimulate the undeveloped economy. Even where, as is often the case, personnel costs of the armed forces are substantial, these tend to promote a propensity for purchasing foreign goods, and thus constitute a further drain on foreign exchange. There has been a decline in military expenditure since 1960—a decline averaging 9 per cent a year, even in the richer African countries, including Algeria, Libya, Nigeria and Tunisia. This decline has been due mainly to the drop in revenue from oil and the general economic crisis. Considering that the peak period of military expenditures coincided with the boom years, one can draw conclusions about military necessity as distinct from the political or modernisation syndrome which provoked the heavy outlay of those years. While military expenditure cannot be held wholly responsible for current African in debtedness estimated at $218 billion for 1988, it is noteworthy that arms purchases comprised about 20 to 25 per cent. The unproductive nature of arms purchases translates into no returns to the continent from this vast outlay. Unlike other developing parts of the world in Asia and Latin America, not even the fall-out of acquisition of arms technology has rubbed off on Africa. Apart from *apartheid* South Africa no African country south of the Sahara has managed to develop an arms industry. Africa has not been able to profit by the indigenous production of arms which would have not only saved foreign exchange but also obviated total dependence.

Development

The economic and social consequences of arms acquisition is nowhere more clearly demonstrated than in the developing countries. Third world leaders face the dilemma of the need for arms in the interest of security, but very often at the cost of basic needs in the area of social and economic well-being. Given the fragile economic base which cannot sustain the arms spending on the one hand, and the need for political stability as a prerequisite for economic development, self-preservation in such a political environment often dictates that defence be chosen over development.

The critical economic situation has the potential of destabilising the socio-economic and political development of individual countries as well as relegating the continent to the mercy of a new colonial status— this time not by metropolitan imperial Powers, but by multilateral financial institutions and banks of developed countries. Africa's late emergence into self-determination was considered the main reason why it is the least developed of the continents. Almost thirty years of self-determination has not resulted in great improvement. In geographical terms, Africa is the second largest continent, with an area of 30.3 million square kilometres, amounting to one-fifth of the earth's land mass. Its population of 553 million accounts for 11.1 per cent of total world population. Its 52 independent States constitute the single largest group in the United Nations and almost one-third of the entire membership. The continent is endowed with resources of a wide variety, including gold, diamonds, copper, zinc, iron ore and uranium, and it is responsible for a substantial proportion of the world's production of these resources. Its soil is fertile for the production of food and other agricultural products, and in some categories it is the leading continental producer. Notwithstanding these impressive statistics, Africa remains the least developed continent, with the lowest share of world industrial production (2 per cent), the lowest share of world trade (3 per cent), the lowest per capita income and the largest number of least developed countries.

It is alarming that rather than improving upon this position in order to catch up with the others, Africa's economic situation over the past five years has deteriorated. The gap between Africa and other continents seems to be widening. While the total third world share of global manufacturing has increased to 14 per cent, Africa's share has not improved beyond 2 per cent. No country in Africa has progressed enough to join the ranks of the newly industrialising countries in Asia

and Latin America. There has been no economic miracle in Africa akin to those of Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea, not to mention Japan, whose economy has grown from the ashes of the Second World War to become the world's second largest. On the contrary, the record has been a catalogue of economic disasters. The hope for emergence out of this predicament is made more difficult by the crushing debt burden of $218 billion, whose annual servicing obligation alone consumes up to half the annual income in some cases.

How has Africa found itself in this predicament?

A number of causes, some general, others specific, can be adduced. Just as the international political order in which modern African States emerged created security problems, the world economic system was not to their advantage either. The Bretton Woods arrangements which created the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 1944 did not anticipate having to deal with "underdeveloped countries" or else the bogey image which the institutions have today in the third world would not exist. This world monetary system which has remained, *mutatis mutandis,* is coupled with a trading system that is supposedly based on the free interplay of market forces. In practice, however, there is a constant decline in commodity prices of developing countries and a constant rise in the prices of products of developed countries. Those developing countries that seek to join the ranks of the industrialised are hampered by protectionist measures from access to the markets of the developed countries. Africa therefore shares with other developing countries the burden of an unjust and inequitable international economic order. Being almost totally dependent on the export of primary products—whether agricultural or mineral—Africa, more than other parts of the third world, suffers most from the effects of the constant decline in prices. Earning less and less foreign exchange while import requirements increase, Africa has lived beyond its means over the years with the consequent accumulation of debt now valued at $218 billion.

However, the African economic crisis has also been provoked by specific causes. The vicissitudes of climate, and particularly the prolonged drought, have caused immense damage to African agriculture and livestock.

Instability, bad management and faulty planning have compounded the economic outlook. The lack of emphasis on agriculture and rapid urban migration resulted in "food self-sufficient" Africa becoming a big importer. Efforts at industrialisation created assembly plants which

were dependent on massive importation of completely knocked down parts and which could only be productive when there was an abundance of foreign exchange for the "raw materials". The insufficient allocation of resources to education, health and other social welfare programmes has resulted in a continuing shortage of trained manpower in many relevant disciplines and generally low productivity. Another important factor is the lack of public accountability, which has enabled public officials to amass fabulous wealth at the expense of their countries.

The Organisation of African Unity made a realistic analysis of these issues in the document which it presented to the United Nations General Assembly at its special session on the critical economic situation in Africa, in 1986. The OAU Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery and the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development 1986-1990 were predicated on rigorous internal adjustments to create conditions for recovery and sustained growth on the one hand, and external support of $46 billion in the five-year period on the other. Two years after the adoption of the Programme of Action, the outlook for Africa's recovery has not improved. In 1987, a total of 28 countries were reported to have embarked upon structural adjustment measures. While these measures are in the right direction, the hardships they impose on the people are potential causes of civil revolts. Moreover, the expected inflow of resources in support of reform has not materialised, while export earnings were generally low. This situation has further compounded the debt problem, which in 1987 was estimated at $218.1 billion, with a scheduled debt service ratio at 47.3 per cent of export earnings in the same year. In 1988, a number of countries faced scheduled servicing costs higher than 50 per cent of export earnings. Given the uncertainties of the world market for Africa's export products, it is becoming increasingly unrealistic to expect that most countries would be able to meet their debt obligations and, at the same time, have the resources for investment to stimulate growth in their economies. Therefore, it has become urgent to find a solution to the debt burden and to channel additional resources into the continent. Otherwise, even the most optimistic are bound to doubt the short-term survival of many countries.

Recently, some unscrupulous companies and individuals in the industrialised countries have taken advantage of Africa's economic conditions to convert the continent into a waste disposal area. Offering financial rewards, these companies and individuals have entered into agreements which would unload thousands of tons of toxic and

radioactive wastes in African countries. In other cases, the wastes have been clandestinely smuggled in and deposited with scarcely any precautions. Although waste disposal is a business involving $12 billion a year and 300 million tons of waste from 24 industrial countries, it is unattractive to developed countries because of the environmental hazards and the high cost of proper management in designated sites. African countries, desperate for money, it is presumed, can be used as sites for toxic waste disposal at very little expense.

Africa's sharp reaction (spearheaded by Nigeria) to this "toxic terrorism" has sensitized international opinion. Africa cannot expose its environment and its people to long-term hazards for temporary paltry financial gain. The OAU resolution, initiated by Nigeria at the last summit, is a timely warning both to African countries and to the foreign vendors of such wastes. The waste disposal scandal is a further indication of Africa's declining fortune and global image.

The consequences of this decline for peace and security in each country, and the continent as a whole, are most disturbing. The International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, held in New York in August 1987, emphasised that non-military threats to security have moved to the forefront of global concern. "Underdevelopment and declining prospects for development, as well as mismanagement and waste of resources, constitute challenges to security.... The world can hardly be regarded as secure so long as there is polarisation of wealth and poverty at the national and international levels."

Africa's situation calls for great imagination in the pursuit of continental self-reliance. While abiding by its Charter provision of non-interference in the internal affairs of States, the OAU can at least launch a solemn appeal to all its members to put their internal political situations in order so as to help the process of development. The Committees of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government dealing with crisis situations on the continent should intensify their efforts to resolve them.

Greater attention must be paid to the development of crisis management, conflict resolution and confidence-building measures in Africa. This poses a great challenge to leaders on the continent. Peacemaking and peace-keeping capacities must be developed through imaginative measures. For example, an informal representative group of African countries might assume leadership in early consideration of

potential areas of conflict, as well as in the training and earmarking of troops from countries that can afford it in OAU peace-keeping operation.

Consideration should be given to confidence-building measures which would reduce the necessity for military rivalry, such as a declaration of acceptance of present borders and a renunciation of cross border claims. Such reciprocal renunciation of claims would promote good neighbourliness and reduce the necessity for excessive arms acquisition. Resources could therefore be devoted largely to national economic and social programmes as well as to joint economic programme.

Subregional and regional steps for economic integration should be hastened. The examples of ECOWAS and SADCC are encouraging in this connection.

While Africa cannot unilaterally disarm, the fragility of its economic base demands that it explore a system of security less expensive to individual countries. The strategy should aim at eliminating inter-African arms competition and promoting a united approach to the causes of threats to continental peace and security. In this connection, Africa must seriously consider collaborative efforts to produce its own defence. Dependence entirely on foreign supply is dangerous and represents a great drain on foreign exchange. At least 20 per cent of Africa's huge external debt is related to the acquisition of arms. A part of this sum would have been saved if arms had been produced indigenously. Now individual countries can hardly afford the large-scale investment required for the establishment of arms industries which, in any case, would require external markets to be viable. Subregional joint production facilities would not only be more cost effective, but would promote the standardisation of equipment for African armed forces, and thus facilitate joint operations.

Before concluding, I return briefly to the problem of South Africa. Even if the *apartheid* regime were to honour its pledge on Namibia, Africa would still have to confront South Africa on its policy *of apartheid.* The racists could make a last ditch stand which would challenge all the strength that Africa could muster. The hope for being able to meet such resistance lies in an Africa at peace with itself, emphasising peaceful settlement of inter-African disputes, recognising the futility of an arms race, the importance of mutual confidence, and the advantages of internal political stability and economic progress as indispensable preconditions for effective Subregional co-operation.

THE ROLE OF ECOWAS IN THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

The Treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was signed in Lagos on 28 May 1975, by 15 heads of State and Government of West African countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Since the signing, the Republic of Cape Verde has joined as the sixteenth member State.

In accordance with the provisions of article 62 of the Treaty, the Community was born on 10 June 1975, when seven signatory States ratified the Treaty.

The aim of ECOWAS is to promote co-operation and development in all fields of economic activity for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its peoples, increasing and maintaining economic stability, fostering closer relations and contributing to the progress and development of the African continent.

But these grand objectives cannot be attained unless there is an atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding among the member States of the Community, where security and political stability are guaranteed. The recognition of this link between development on the one hand and security and stability on the other led to the adoption by ECOWAS of collective measures which are geared towards securing a peaceful and politically stable environment in the subregion.

The first of these measures can be found in the ECOWAS Treaty under articles 11 and 56.

Article 56 of the Treaty provides that:

"Any dispute that may arise among the Member States regarding the interpretation or application of this Treaty shall be amicably settled by direct agreement. In the event of failure to settle such disputes, the matter may be referred to the Tribunal of the Community by a party to such disputes and the decision of the Tribunal shall be final."

Article 11 established the Tribunal as an institution of the Community, but the composition, competence, statutes and other matters relating to the Tribunal are yet to be prescribed by the Authority as stipulated in paragraph 2 of this article.

Let us now examine the objectives of this Tribunal in the light of the provisions of articles 11 and 56 of the Treaty.

Article 11 provided that the Tribunal of the Community shall ensure the observance of law and justice in the interpretation of the provisions of the ECOWAS Treaty. Furthermore, it shall be charged with the responsibility of settling such disputes as may be referred to it in accordance with article 56 of the Treaty.

Article 56, as quoted above, provides for disputes arising among the member States regarding the interpretation or application of the Treaty to be amicably settled by direct agreement. If such disputes can not be settled, they then may be referred to the Tribunal of the Community by a party to such disputes.

The Tribunal, therefore, is no more than the judicial organ of the Community established for settling only disputes arising from disagreements over legal interpretation or application of the Community laws. Even then there must first be an attempt to effect amicable settlement by direct agreement before it can be referred to the Tribunal. Its jurisdiction does not cover the settling of disputes such as political and border conflicts, which are outside the provisions of the Treaty.

The realisation of the existence of these gaps and the need to bridge them led the founding of ECOWAS to take further measures for the peaceful settlement of disputes. These measures include the signing of the Protocol on Non-Aggression in 1978 and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence Matters in 1981.

Protocol on Non-Aggression

The Protocol on Non-Aggression was signed by the heads of State and Government of ECOWAS at their third summit conference in Lagos on 22 April 1978. It has since been ratified by 13 member States.

The Protocol recalls the provisions of article 3(3) of the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity in its preamble, and proceeds to provide in article 1 that member States of ECOWAS shall refrain from the threat or use of force or aggression in their relations with one another. They shall also refrain from employing any other means inconsistent with the Charters of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity against the territorial integrity or political Independence of other member States.

This Protocol was aimed at arresting the political instability often generated by border claims and other activities of political dissidents and refugees moving from one country to another in ECOWAS territory.

Therefore, articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Protocol provide that each member State shall refrain from committing, encouraging or condoning acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against the territorial integrity or political Independence of the other member States. Also, each member State shall undertake to prevent foreigners resident on its territory, or non-resident foreigners using its territory as a base, from committing such acts.

Settlement of Dispute

By virtue of article 5 of the Protocol, member States pledge to resort to all peaceful means in the settlement of disputes among themselves. Any dispute which cannot be settled peacefully among member States shall be referred to a Committee of the Authority. In the event of failure of settlement by this Committee, the dispute shall finally go to the Authority.

A recent example of the application of the provisions of article 5 of this Protocol occurred in 1986, at a meeting of the Authority held in Abuja from 30 June to 1 July. The Authority mandated the chairman, Major-General Ibrahim Babangida, and the head of the Guinean delegation to mediate in the dispute between two member States of the Community, i.e. Liberia and Sierra Leone, with a view to resolving the issues involved. As evidenced in the final communique that was issued at the end of the following year's summit conference in 1987, "the Authority noted with satisfaction efforts made by member Countries normalising relations between them". The Authority expressed its firm commitment to fostering good neighbourliness and a spirit of solidarity, and urged member States once again to translate into reality the Community Protocol on Non-Aggression so as to ensure peace and stability in the subregion.

Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence Matters

The founding fathers of ECOWAS, still convinced that economic progress could not be achieved unless the conditions for the necessary security were ensured in all member States of the Community, realised that, while the Protocol on Non-Aggression forbids the use of force as a means of settling disputes among themselves, there was still the serious risk of external aggression.

In order to safeguard and consolidate the Independence and the sovereignty of member States against foreign intervention, and realising that external defence of their States would be more effective with the co-ordination and pooling together of the means of mutual

assistance provided by respective member States of ECOWAS, a Defence Pact was deemed necessary. Consequently, the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence matters was signed at Freetown on 29 May 1981.

In accordance with the provisions of article 24(1) of the Protocol, it came into force on 23 October 1987, the date the seventh member State ratified it. As of April this year, eight member States have ratified the Protocol.

By virtue of article 21(1) of the Protocol, any member State which accedes to the Treaty automatically accedes to this Protocol and to the Protocol on Non-Aggression signed on 22 April 1978.

The most important point about the Protocol is that it is a collective defence system. Article 2 of the Protocol provides:

"Member States declare and accept that any armed threat or aggression directed against any member State shall constitute a threat or aggression against the entire Community."

This provision means that if a member State is a victim of aggression by a non-member, it automatically will benefit from the collective defence aid of the other ECOWAS member States.

If it is a case of armed conflict between the member States of ECOWAS, the procedure for settlement by peaceful means as provided under article 5 of the Non-Aggression Protocol shall be adopted (article 4(a)). In the event of failure of settlement, the Authority shall meet urgently and take appropriate action for mediation (article 17).

But in the case of internal armed conflict within any member State which is *engineered and supported actively from outside* and likely to endanger the security and peace of the entire Community, the Authority shall *appreciate and decide* on this situation in full collaboration with the head of State and Government of the State concerned (article 4(6)).

Implementation of the Protocol

For the implementation of this Protocol, the Authority of heads of State and Government has the supreme responsibility to establish:

(i)   a Defence Council and

(ii) a Defence Commission

The Defence Council shall consist of ministers of defence and foreign affairs of member States, while the Defence Commission shall consist of a chief of staff from each member State.

The Defence Council shall appoint a deputy executive secretary (military) at the executive secretariat. He shall update plans for the movement of troops and logistics and initiate joint exercises as provided for under article 13(3) (on modalities of intervention).

Modalities of Intervention and Assistance

As provided under article 13, all member States agree to place at the disposal of the Community certain units from their existing national armed forces in case of any armed intervention. The units shall be referred to as the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC).

The AAFC shall be under the command of the force commander appointed by the Authority on the proposal of the Defence Council. He shall be entrusted with powers that are conferred upon him by the Authority. The force commander, with the chief of Defence Staff of the assisted country, shall be the joint chief of Defence Staff of the Allied Armed Forces and shall be responsible for the implementation of armed intervention and assistance as decided by the Authority. He shall have at this disposal all necessary means of defence (article 14).

Intervention by the Allied Armed Forces of the Community shall in all cases be justified by the legitimate defence of the territories of the Community (article 15).

Procedure for Determining and Justifying the Legitimate Intervention

Article 16 provides that when an external armed threat or aggression is directed against a member State of the Community, the heads of State of that country shall send a written request for assistance to the current chairman of the Authority of ECOWAS, with copies to other members. This request shall mean that the Authority is duly notified and that the Allied Armed Forces of the Community are placed under a state of emergency.

The Defence Council, assisted by the Defence Commission, shall supervise, with the authority of the State concerned, all measures to be taken by the force commander and ensure that all necessary means for the intervention are made available to him. The actions of the force commander shall be subject to competent political authority of the member State concerned (article 9). At the end of the operation, the Defence Council shall write a factual report to be addressed to the Authority (article 10). The Community Forces shall not intervene if the conflict remains purely internal (article 18(2)).

This ECOWAS Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence matters is a comprehensive collective pact which will require adequate funding and logistic facilities. The Protocol has already come into force and the Authority may set up the institutions at any time for its implementation.

In conclusion, the systems provided by ECOWAS for the settlement of disputes and the maintenance of peace and security in the west African subregion can be summarised as:

(i)   The provisions of article 56 (on interpretation of the Treaty);

(ii)   The Tribunal of the Community;

(iii)   The Protocol on Non-Aggression; and

(iv)   The Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence Matters.

If these systems are fully implemented by member States collectively and individually, the prospects for peace and security will be enhanced and the climate will be right for achieving economic progress in the subregion.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY TRAINING IN AFRICA AS A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING FACTOR

Confidence-Building Measures

The final objective of confidence-building measures is to "strengthen international peace and security and to contribute to the development of confidence, better understanding and more stable relations between nations, thus creating and improving the conditions for fruitful international co-operation". Its first objective is to prevent the use or threat of use of military force.

After the Second World War, and, in particular, after the advent of East-West ideological blocs in continuous military competition and with the frenzied accumulation of arms in every part of the world, humanity became more aware that it was living in an era in which any irresponsible or desperate act might assume the dimensions of a planetary catastrophe and that it was therefore necessary to do everything possible to improve the climate of international relations. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the treaties and agreements for bilateral or multilateral defence and even political organisations such as the OAU shared, at least in part, this concern.

The text of the Warsaw Treaty does not differ in essentials from that establishing the Atlantic Alliance. The two blocs face each other in the search, first, for peace and internal cohesion, then for collective regional security, and lastly for international peace and security. Have those objectives been obtained since then? In any case, the guns have been silent for a very long time in the respective zones covered by NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This suggests that we look a little more closely at the modern world.

The Main Characteristics of the Modern World

On the level of international peace and security, observers are generally agreed in maintaining that arms are not the primary cause of international tensions; they are much more the result of them. And, without denying the interrelation between causes and effects, they maintain that the tensions are the result of the political, ideological and economic disputes and rivalries, which are the very stuff of international life. Thus, they consider that the modern world is characterised in particular by:

- The antagonism, or, as it is more usually put, the struggle for hegemony between East and West in the theatres of the third world;
- A division of the surface of the globe by the major Powers and their allies;
- The opening of national frontiers and the economic interdependence of nations;
- Rapid and continually renewed advances in science and technology:
- The predominance of economics over ideology;
- The predominance of national interest over international law;
- The increasing influence of the media and international public opinion and the instant circulation of information;
- The increasingly decisive weight of the Super-Powers on the scales of world peace.

The perceived consequences of this situation are many but we may note in particular:

- The military bipolarisation of the world and the subordination of security to the balance of forces;
- An enormous accumulation of more and more sophisticated and deadly weapons in the northern hemisphere and a frenzied

accumulation of more or less obsolete weapons from the north throughout the third world;

- The promotion throughout the third world of regional "powers" by the major Powers and their allies;
- The development of the defence strategies of States towards peripheral and sometimes distant complementarity;
- The multiplication of so-called low-intensity conflicts outside the zones covered by nuclear deterrence;
- The development of rapid deployment and intervention forces for external use;
- The increasing indebtedness of the countries of the third world;
- The gradual rise of terrorism.

Nevertheless, in spite of these observations, each State, particularly in the industrialised world, aspires quite naturally to power, which is understood here as being the capacity of a State to act on the complex machinery of the international system in order to promote its national interests. And it is for the defence of these interests that the State defines its areas of interest.

The Means of Defence of the Industrialised Countries

The defence strategy of the industrialised countries, including those possessing nuclear weapons, rests essentially on the national capacity for deterrence and combat conferred on each of them by the existence of both nuclear and conventional forces. We shall deal here, however, with the economic and industrial means they employ for their defence.

Arms industries are developed by most of the industrialised countries and are under the control of the States, which, in most cases, supervise the design and production of arms. This is done in order to supply their own armies, i.e., to carry out as large a part as possible of their own national arms programmes, and to extend themselves abroad. This latter objective is particularly important.

However, strong a country's desire for Independence in defence policy may be, it must have available to it the technical and industrial means to achieve it. However, since development costs are escalating for latest technology equipment, national needs are not always adequate to amortize them. Moreover, it is becoming more and more difficult for States—other than the major Powers—to develop complete systems of highly sophisticated weapons. It therefore becomes essential for them to look abroad in order to export and co-operate.

Co-operation with allies naturally becomes more and more necessary for national arms industries as well as for national defence itself.

Exports, which are not directed solely to allies, offer several advantages:

- A military advantage, by maintaining an independent national arms industry in full activity;
- A scientific and technical advantage, by making it possible to maintain high-level teams and by continuously developing research and know-how;
- An economic advantage, by helping to balance the country's foreign trade and ensuring employment for nationals;
- A diplomatic and even political advantage, by helping to solidify the role the country concerned assigns itself in the regional or international concert.

The economic means of defence are established through economic mobilisation, which is manifested in the industrial field by the establishment of production and stockpiling plans as well as the creation of security stocks (energy, oil products, electricity, strategic raw materials). This economic mobilisation also extends to transport, public works and food supplies.

Africa in the Strategic Thinking of East and West

At Berlin, as we all know, during the famous conference which lasted from November 1884 to February 1885, the European Powers (Germany, France, Great Britain, Belgium, Portugal and Spain) divided Africa into zones of influence and parcelled them out (the division was not completed until 1913).

In the face of the economic crisis raging in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century, it was necessary to find other markets and new sources of raw materials. As Bismarck said at the close of the conference, this was an attempt to offer the trade and industry of all nations the most favourable conditions for their development and security. At Yalta, in February 1945, it was a matter of dividing another cake, this time among the three big Powers. This cake did not specifically include the African ingredient, except to the extent that the interests of the beneficiaries of the Berlin conference were involved.

In both cases, Africa was not yet the Africa of Independent States.

The question then arises whether the Independence of Africa has in any way modified the geopolitical vision of Europe and the Soviet

Union with regard to the African continent. In other words, how has Europe's perception of Africa changed since the emergence of independent States? And what does it represent for the Eastern bloc?

At the geopolitical level it is considered that:

(a) The sea, beyond the immense riches of all kinds it contains, is the most highly utilised means of communication and trade, and the new world order will be built in large part on maritime space;

(b) The Soviet Union, which has a polar north and little access to the open sea, has a vital need for maritime bases for its expanding fleet along the peninsular and insular girdle of Asia;

(c) The petroleum routes to the Western countries are largely situated along the coasts of Africa;

(d) Because of the flow of petroleum from the Persian Gulf and the political fragility of some of its coastal States, the Indian Ocean is potentially a major conflict zone;

(e) One of the great vulnerabilities of the great industrial regions of North America and Western Europe is that they remain highly dependent on raw materials brought across the Atlantic, by far the most heavily used ocean;

(f) One of the great vulnerabilities of Western Europe is that it is ill-endowed with minerals; most of the mines and known reserves are situated in the great industrial States of the northern hemisphere and in Australia and Africa.

The low- and high-intensity conflicts which have shaken Africa more or less severely since the search for Independence, as well as the visible actions and reactions of the industrialised countries in and around Africa, provide clear evidence that in the open East-West competition in the third world, Africa occupies a place.

In his book, *The Struggle for Africa,* Gerard Chaliand states flatly:

"Since 1975, sub-Saharan Africa has become one of the are nas of (these) crises. Having remained on the fringes of East-West confrontation, sub-Saharan Africa has, since the withdrawal of Portugal (1975) and the radicalisation of Ethiopia (1977), ceased to be a Western preserve....In fact, with very few exceptions (the right only expressing its views in private and the left side-stepping this type of problem from a sense of decency, from abstract universalism or from a dogmatic voluntarism), what is thought about African societies is rarely expressed in public or in writing."

I am persuaded that Africa is more often presented or perceived by non-African specialists on African problems primarily from the point

of view of the interests of one bloc or another. I am therefore convinced that only Africa itself can see itself correctly—from the point of view, to be sure, of its own interests.

Main Characteristics of Modern Africa

A mosaic of relatively young States suffering the effects of contradictory ideological attractions, Africa, in terms of international peace and security is characterised by the following:

- Its particular geopolitical position between the Atlantic Ocean, the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean;
- The abundant, sometimes strategic, mineral riches of its subsoil and the large market prospects offered by its poor but steadily growing population;
- The fragility of its frontiers, carved out by the accident of discoveries and partitions during the colonial period;
- Its privileged links with certain outside Powers involved in the East-West competition;
- The weak hold of the media on inter-African public opinion, which is in any case ineffective;
- The absence of a system of fundamental internal values unanimously recognised, accepted and firmly defended.

The consequences of this situation which places our continent in the geopolitical ambit of both the Western and Eastern countries, may be easily observed:

- The presence on the continent of military bases and areas of influence of extra-African Powers which are sometimes ideologically opposed;
- A steady increase in the military expenditures of States and the establishment of arms industries;
- The persistence of social conflicts within States and of border conflicts between States;
- The existence of defence or military assistance treaties and agreements with countries of the northern hemisphere;
- Foreign military intervention on African territory;
- The fruitful expansion of the policy of regional military alliances.

The Concept of Defence in Africa

Lenin, in his "Reflections on War", wrote that:

> "....politics is the pursuit of war by other means; the war front is only one of the four fields of action on which an implacable struggle takes place: the economic, the political, the psychological and the military. They constitute the four aspects of a war without truce and without mercy, a stubborn struggle conducted sometimes with and sometimes without bloodshed, sometimes violently and sometimes peacefully against the forces and traditions of the old society."

This definition demonstrates that defence policy is inseparable from the general policy and the foreign policy of a given country. Defence policy is the specific manifestation of a country's understanding of the relationship between strength and politics. As regards foreign policy, it depends on the goals pursued by a Government in its relations with other States, either collectively, through membership in international institutions, or through bilateral contacts. Although, it does not always appear in books, the defence policies laid down by the OAU countries fit this concept admirably. It will suffice to glance rapidly at the preambles of constitutions or fundamental laws. For example, the preamble to the constitution of the Togolese Republic states:

> "The Togolese State unreservedly supports all policies aimed at the strengthening of African unity and the safeguarding and consolidation of peace in the world....It also expresses its desire to establish ties of friendship and co-operation with all peoples on the basis of the principles of equality, reciprocal interest and mutual respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity."

The preamble to the constitution of the Republic of Cameroon states:

> "The Cameroonian people, convinced that the salvation of Africa lies in the realisation of greater and greater solidarity among African States, affirms its desire to achieve, in Independence for Cameroon, a united and free Africa, while maintaining peaceful and fraternal relations with the other peoples of the world in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter."

The letter and the spirit of the constitutions and fundamental laws of the independent States of Africa are the same. At the bilateral level, all the States of independent Africa have accepted and respect the principle of the large mixed commission, which President Paul Biya of the Central African Republic emphasised:

> "...constitutes the appropriate framework for the organisation of our co-operation and the effective instrument for carrying out the joint projects planned within its framework, just as it constitutes the ideal framework for the normalisation of conflict situations arising out of different interpretations of our respective rights, for there is no problem which

cannot be resolved by peaceful means...".

In May 1963, at Addis Ababa, the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity gave additional proof of Africa's clear vision of the relationship which should always exist between general policy, defence policy and foreign policy. The preamble and articles I, II, III and VI deserve to be recalled:

"We, the Heads of African States and Governments assembled in the City of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia;

"Convinced that it is the inalienable right of all people to control their own destiny ;Conscious of the fact that freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples;

"Conscious of our responsibility to harness the natural and human resources of our continent for the total advancement of our peoples in spheres of human endeavour;

"Inspired by a common determination to promote understanding among our peoples and co-operation among our states in response to the aspirations of our peoples for brotherhood and solidarity, in a larger unity transcending ethnic and national differences;

"Convinced that, in order to translate this determination into a dynamic force in the cause of human progress, conditions for peace and security must be established and maintained;

"Determined to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won Independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our states, and to fight against neo-colonialism in all its forms;

"Dedicated to the general progress of Africa;

"Persuaded that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to the principles of which we reaffirm our adherence, provide a solid foundation for peaceful and positive co-operation among states;

"Desirous that all African States should henceforth unite so that the welfare and well-being of their peoples can be assured;

"Resolved to reinforce the links between our states by establishing and strengthening common institutions; "Have agreed to the present Charter."

Article I

1. The High Contracting Parties do by the present Charter establish an Organisation to be known as the Organisation of African Unity.

2. The Organisation shall include the Continental African States, Madagascar and other Islands surrounding Africa.

Article II

1. The Organisation shall have the following purposes:

   (a) to promote the unity and solidarity of the African States;

   (b) to co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;

   (c) to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and Independence;

   (d) to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and

   (e) to promote international co-operation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

2. To these ends, the Member States shall co-ordinate and harmonise their general policies especially in the following fields:

   (a) political and diplomatic co-operation;

   (b) economic co-operation, including transport and communications;

   (c) educational and cultural co-operation;

   (d) health, sanitation, and nutritional co-operation;

   (e) scientific and technical co-operation; and

   (f) co-operation for defense and security.

Article III

The Member States, in pursuit of the purposes stated in Article II, solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles:

1. the sovereign equality of all Member States;

2. non-interference in the internal affairs of states;

3. respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence;

4. peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration;

5. unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring states or any other state;

6. absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent;

7. affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.

Article VI

The Member States pledge themselves to observe scrupulously the principles enumerated in Article III of the present Charter.

But do the words and the practice correspond?

From Words to Practice

The weekly magazine *Jeune Afrique* published an "OAU Special" issue, dated 8 June 1988, which reviewed the 25 years of the Organisation of African Unity. In this issue, Sennen Andriamirado, referring to economic problems in particular, wrote that:

"On this 25th of May 1988, the 25th anniversary of the Organisation of African Unity, the concerns of Africans remain almost the same as they were 25 years ago. The price of raw materials is low. Crickets are ravishing the plantations in North Africa and the Sahel. The States are as naked and ruined—if not more!—as they were on the day of their Independence. Namibia is still occupied by South Africa. And *apartheid* endures."

Another writer, Siradiou Diallo, after making a detailed list of the ills afflicting Africa, and emphasising the setbacks as well as the successes of the OAU, concluded his report as follows:

"It remains for us to bring our actions into conformity with theory. That is not easy, especially when we remember that most of our States have been in existence for less than 30 years. That is not much in the life of nations, but it is a long time in the life of individuals. Considering the prerogatives and limitations of an international organisation, the OAU could not do everything. But it has carried out many of the missions it was entrusted with. Missions of study, orientation and the heightening of awareness. It was the responsibility of the States to translate its options and recommendations into specific actions."

A global reply to a global problem, as we see. If we limit ourselves to the specific field of defence policy, how can we reply to this agonizing question of the gap between theory and facts?

In the matter of defence, the theory is that Africa as a whole does not fear a specific threat but, in the eyes of each of its constituent elements, it feels exposed to very specific weaknesses which it would like to overcome through respect for a certain number of principles which can promote and strengthen confidence between States. These principles include:

(a)   Refusal to resort to the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political Independence of any State, or in any other manner incompatible with the goals of the Charter of the United Nations;

(b)   Settlement of disputes by peaceful means;

(c)   Non-interference in internal affairs;

(d)   Co-operation between States to resolve international problems and encourage respect for human rights;

(e)   Equality of the rights of peoples and their right to self-determination;

(f)   The sovereign equality of States and respect for the rights deriving therefrom;

(g)   Fulfillment in good faith of the obligations of States under international law.

When we look at the arms transfers to Africa and the co-operation and defence agreements entered into by some African States with extra-African countries, it seems that they are a result of the desire of leaders to employ a strategy of classic military deterrence and certainly not one of persuasion. And yet persuasion seems to represent the aspirations of the OAU States more adequately. This hypothesis is the more plausible in the light of the fact that, except in the case of the countries linked under the Non-Aggression and Defence Assistance Agreement (ANAD) and particularly in the case of neighbouring countries, African armies seem to ignore that the defence of a State can no longer be ensured only along the frontiers which delimit it. Moreover the OAU itself, on the level of the defence objectives it has assumed, is unanimous only on the question of *apartheid* in South Africa, and its various attempts to establish a defence force have so far failed. Similarly, the harmonisation of military training programmes entrusted to its Defence Committee years ago is still marking time.

We will not attempt to answer the question why the defence problems of the African continent do not seem to enjoy the same overall attention as the political and economic problems. We will simply raise the question because, as Buddha emphasised ages ago, "Questions are more important than answers".

In his book *The Fifth Republic and the Defense of Africa*, John Chipman analyses this question from a number of angles, as follows:

> "How much longer will France have to guarantee—if necessary militarily— the sovereignty of its African partners, leaving to them the tasks of managing only frontier incidents? Can the States of the former French Community rely only on foreign help to ensure their security?

> "Have the decolonisation of the sixties, a quarter of a century of Independence, and the strengthening of the African States and their armies failed to produce the expected results? France's military undertakings

and withdrawals mark the closeness of the ties between its defense and that of Africa and associate its international prestige with African struggles. These ebbs and flows also herald a difficult birth: that of the military personality of Africa."

But, in spite of this point of view, which, for that matter, is worth no more than any other point of view, is it possible to sketch an outline of Africa's zones of interest for the purposes of a possible defence policy matching its policy of solidarity?

Africa's Possible Interest Zones

Africa as a whole, i.e., the Africa of the OAU, is not an ideological entity—far from it—and neither internal nor international public opinion assign any sworn enemy or adversary to it. Discussing the concerns of the francophone African States, John Chipman emphasises that:

> "In reality the causes of instability have very different origins which can be classified as follows: ethnic rivalries and separatist problems; border conflicts; disturbances caused by migratory flows or by 'agitation'; dissidence induced by over-austere economic policies or natural catastrophes. The French-speaking African States are less fearful of a direct military attack by one of their neighbours than of the activity of foreign agents or of national groups which have fallen under the influence of a hostile State....The leaders of all the States of the region will have to strengthen their co-operation in order to avoid the export of potentially subversive problems."

Since Africa's security problems do not seem to take the form, at the continental level, of a common adversary to be watched, contained or possibly fought by the classic methods in the East and the West, it seems appropriate for Africa to draw its inspiration from the political and diplomatic signposts set up in the Addis Ababa Charter and in the constitutions of the States in delineating its chief zones of common interest.

Unlike the East or the West, where the problem of hunger arises in terms of quality rather than quantity but where that of supplies of strategic minerals is at the origin of global strategies, Africa above all faces elementary problems of development which require peace inside the frontiers of States. This internal peace is largely conditioned by peace along the frontiers, i.e., with the neighbours with whom each State shares its land and sea frontiers.

Outside Africa and under the control of the great industrial Powers in particular, there are zones of optional economic interest and zones

of priority economic interest. The zones of priority economic interest comprise the extra-African countries which import the main exports of the continent or exploit its mineral wealth. Each zone of optional economic interest is made up of all the countries with which a State maintains bilateral trade relations in its strategic search for a diversification of partners.

Towards a Military Education Adapted to the Needs of Peace and the Realities of Modern Times

In order to be ready to assume properly their defence missions as conceived by the political authorities, military men of all ranks are subject throughout their careers to the constraints of continual professional training. This training consists of:

(a)   Individual training in accordance with the principle of preparing the officers to exercise authority and the subordinates to carry out orders, without forgetting that each of them is both the commander and the subordinate of someone else and that he is destined to move through the various ranks of the hierachy;

(b)   Collective training which follows the individual and advanced training of officers and soldiers, the goal of which is to ensure that these individuals or groups of individuals together constitute effective, coordinated units, capable, at any time and under any combat conditions foreseen in the defence strategy of the countries or groupings concerned, of making co-ordinated use of their arms and equipment in order to carry out successfully a specific mission;

(c)   Higher military education, intended in principle for highranking officers, to train those officers who may be called on eventually to fill the most prestigious posts in the national defence commands or general staffs;

(d)   Defence studies, in which the military elite is brought into contact with the civilian intelligentsia.

The first three levels of professional military training are generally provided at instruction centres, military or defence schools or academies, or war colleges. The last level is carried out in universities and entails earning university degrees.

In France, for example, high-level institutions are intended to coordinate the administrations responsible for defence and the administrations supervising the public or private institutions of higher education and research. Thus, in France, there are: 11 universities in

the Paris area, 24 in the other regions, and 24 higher schools, political studies institutes or major scientific institutes (of which 12 are outside Paris) which provide seminars, courses and lecture series which are outside the regular curricula of these institutions. In addition, two specialised higher studies diplomas and seven advanced study diplomas are given for defence studies, and defence study options exist for 19 other such diplomas and 16 advanced university degrees. Needless to say, professional military training is not organised on this basis on our continent.

Military Training and Education in Africa

From the Maghreb to southern Africa, from west Africa to the Horn of Africa, there are 1,899,915 career soldiers like myself. All African countries provide basic training of soldiers of their armies and part of the training for their non-commissioned officers in specific centres and schools. The individual training of officers is carried out in part in countries which have military or defence schools or academies. Officers obtain higher military education, at the war school level, abroad, usually in the industrialised countries of the northern hemisphere. University-level defence studies involving diplomas are rather rare.

In other words, the professional training of officers in particular, as well as the university training of elites in general, in defence studies would benefit greatly from greater interest on the part of the authorities and especially the Organisation of African Unity, or the United Nations, if the fundamental goal of Africa remains development in peace and the absence of distrust and fear between States.

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) listed in its Newsletter of June 88, a total of 21 African research institutes, located in the following countries: Algeria 1, Cameroon 1, Egypt 2, Gabon 1, Kenya 1, Morocco 1, Nigeria 7, Senegal 2, Tanzania 1, Togo 1 (the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa), Tunisia 2, Zaire 2, and Geneva 1 (the Pan African Institute of International Relations). Listed on the basis of the traditional regional division of Africa, as presented by *l'Annee Strategique 1987,* they are distributed as follows: the Maghreb 6, West Africa 10, Equatorial Africa 4, and East Africa 2.

What, therefore, remains to be done in Africa with regard to military training and education if not to spread these institutes more equitably among its regions, co-ordinate their activities, harmonise the instruction

provided and disseminate it at every level of professional military training?

Conclusion

The well-known American historian, Barbara Tuchman, has said that "nations do not distrust each other because they are armed; they arm because they mistrust each other".

Nations usually spring to life armed because of their concern for their security and Independence and their ambition to assume the role they believe they must play on the international scene, where distrust is a more or less subterranean but constant factor and the geopolitics of States is affected by economics and the interdependence of national economies. Therefore, in the countries of the third world, security poses an indefinite and contradictory problem, because for a State to be secure it believes it must be superior in capability to all its possible rivals and this itself constitutes a threat to the security of the other countries.

Faced with the unforeseeable consequences of this escalation of armaments, it has become obvious to the international public that the peace of the world—indeed the survival of the world—is largely dependent on the application of measures which will increase confidence in international relations based on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Declaration of Human Rights and international law.

The Africa of the OAU, which was born in a burst of enthusiasm in the midst of the ideological competition between East and West and after the geopolitical division of the world, has joined the rest of the international community in the effort to safeguard international peace and security. But it has done so without complete awareness of the place it has been assigned, or that it should assign itself, and above all without devising any overall strategic policy of solidarity to promote the military confidence it so sadly lacks. This works to the great detriment of peace, which is a major condition for development.

Can we then raise the question of whether interregional military training in Africa can be a confidence-building factor?

Given the military strategic void in which Africa exists and its national defence strategies which are ill-adapted to the diplomatic policies of the African States, it is timely and perhaps even late to raise this question. For there is no doubt that a military training and education adapted to the singular situation of Africa, to the needs of

peace as well as the realities of modern times, would greatly contribute not to the building but rather to the strengthening of confidence between the States of the continent.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF PEACE TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF TOGO

Mankind was deeply affected by the two great wars which shook the world and caused great loss of human life. The 1914 war was devastating, but the 1939 war was even deadlier. The First World War lasted four years and resulted in over 9 million casualties; in the Second World War 50 million people died. There is no doubt that a third war would cause incomparably greater losses.

The search for peace has accordingly become the concern of all States and of many institutions in an effort to save human society from further horrors. The basic goal of the League of Nations, which was established at the end of the First World War, was to maintain peace and security with a view to preventing the outbreak of another war. When the United Nations was established, this noble ideal was revived and included in the preamble of its Charter. There are many specialise institutions and committees of the United Nations which work for universal peace.

Clearly issues of peace and disarmament should not be the sole prerogative of nuclear-weapon or industrialised countries; they are of concern to the international community as a whole. All countries, particularly the developing countries, need to mobilise their energies and resources for the welfare of their peoples.

The frantic arms race in the industrialised countries, as well as in the countries of the third world, necessitates huge expenditures which could ease the suffering of hundreds of millions of human beings who live in conditions of abject poverty, surrounded by famine, sickness and illiteracy. In a statement made at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in June 1982, Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar pointed out that annual expenditures on armaments had reached $600 billion, while 40,000 children were dying every day of hunger and neglect. Whereas one strategic bomber of the latest type costs $100 million, the World Health Organisation has spent only about $90 million to eradicate smallpox.

Clearly, the resources devoted to military expenditures could have satisfied the basic and fundamental needs of millions of human beings

and could have contributed to the socio-economic development of the entire world. In reality war profits only the arms merchants who are the true winners in all armed conflicts. As for the belligerents, whatever the outcome, they are always the great losers.

In the light of such considerations, it is the duty of all States and of all of us who are concerned about the future of our beautiful planet and of human civilisation to take practical steps, individually and collectively, to safeguard the fundamental right of man to live in peace.

That assumes that peoples, statesmen and all others who have political or moral influence must act in accordance with the noble ideals enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations: to save future generations from the scourge of war; to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human being, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small; to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained; to promote social progress and better standards of life with greater freedom; and for these ends to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours; and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security.

Throughout the African continent, those long-shared ideals find their expression in the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and in the Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted in 1963 and 1981, respectively. The member States of OAU have undertaken to eliminate from the continent all causes of tension and to cherish all human values for the purpose of bringing the peoples together.

We can confirm without hesitation that the search for peace is a universal concern, for peace is a pre-condition for any economic and social development in any nation, large or small.

In Togo, following our political Independence, the Army found it necessary to intervene in national political life on two occasions in order to prevent the outbreak of civil war.

In fact, the leaders of the First Republic, once in power, brought the nation to its knees and turned their backs on it. This oligarchy seized power and its sole goal was to protect the interests of one social group. Regionalism was the order of the day. Such discrimination carried within it the seeds of civil war. The prisons were full, many Togolese were in exile.

The Second Republic was no better and became a two-headed monster. The settlement of accounts resumed. The manhunt started again. Togo reverted to the politics of politicians. During this period, the development of the country was pushed into the background.

In such an unacceptable situation, economic and social development was impossible. Hunger, misery, disease and illiteracy were prevalent. The Togolese people felt that their very existence was threatened. In this dilemma, the Army decided to heed the voice of the people who were appealing for help, and intervened a second time to avoid an unnecessary civil war. The Army quickly put an end to the activities of the politicians and ensured freedom and peace for the population.

In order for peace to last, it was necessary to create a single party, a true national melting pot where all essential forces would blend together regardless of the party to which they belonged previously.

The President and founder of the Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT) (Togolese People's Assembly), General Grassingbe Eyadema, has defined the single party as the most effective organisation and instrument available to the Togolese people. It reflects our situation in that there is, as yet, no differentiation between classes in our society. President Eyadema also said that the victory of the people must be affirmed in the face of exploiters, who are often foreigners. He said that the people held all the power in their hands, and he governed the nation in accordance with the slogan: "Everything for the people and everything by the people."

In speaking of the single party in Africa, Cyrille Champagne, a French professor, said that African societies are still homogeneous, as they do not yet know what the class struggle is. Consequently, a multi-party system is not regarded as an absolute necessity. The single party is the party of all social strata of the nation.

Following the creation of the RPT, President Eyadema developed a new political position based on the principles of permanent dialogue, peace and the search for political stability, integration of the army into the nation, national unity and solidarity. The battle for peace and stability having been won, action must now be directed to the tasks of development.

As General Eyadema said in his message to the nation on 12 January 1981:

> "No country can make progress amid disorder and anarchy. I our country, Togo, has been able to register the positive achievements that it has, and

that today are the pride and joy of our towns and villages, it is thanks to peace and stability which have freed the minds and energies of people for the benefit of development."

National Unity and Economic Development

National unity and solidarity imply that members of a single community share rights and duties and the wealth of the country's soil and sub-soil. When there is solidarity among the citizens, national conscience and national unity are easily moulded.

In the space of 20 years, the Party of Togo has gathered the threads of this formerly divided country around a single programme in order to attain the noblest of all possible goals: union, peace, solidarity and full development.

The new Togo has established the essential roads and air transport to open up all regions of the country, thus facilitating the movement of goods and people and the mixing of ethnic groups. Also, the infrastructure has been established to deal with health problems of people in every region and town, however remote. There is piped water and electricity in the capitals of the prefectures. This encourages the establishment of small-scale industries in these towns.

Accommodation facilities for tourists and business travellers are now nearing completion. Each prefecture has its own hotel or camp site to accommodate visitors from Togo and abroad.

Regarding schools and universities, all children in Togo are given equal opportunities to pursue their training or education to a level compatible with their intellectual abilities and the country's needs.

Particular attention is being given to industrialisation; the large-scale industries in the country have been established because of the raw materials and market needs which are growing rapidly.

For the first time in our country's history, agricultural development is being treated as a national priority and specific targets have been set for food self-sufficiency and increased industrial production.

By way of comparison, we have far exceeded anything that the previous regimes were able to do. Through appropriate legislation, the party has seen to it that workers in the same category have the same income and the same advantages throughout the territory. Men and women are on an equal footing. Through programmed efforts, everyone will gradually attain the same purchasing power.

The appeal launched by President Eyadema on 30 August 1969 is designed to secure justice and equality for all in a peaceful country. To achieve a new approach to Togo's political and economic problems, it is necessary to break with traditional methods and practices. Citizens must forget their old quarrels based on clan, region, race or ethnic group. Although there are several ethnic groups in Togo, history has included them, by force of circumstances, in a single national territory.

If they are to survive, these ethnic groups must co-exist in order to avoid destruction. One does not choose one's ethnic group or one's race, still less one's country; chance and fate decree what and where one is born. It is imperative to make all citizens understand the concept of a nation so that they may transcend ethnic and regional particularities.

Co-operation with Other States

The President has also succeeded in establishing friendly relations with all the countries in the subregion. We consider the policy of good-neighbourliness an absolute necessity, and regional groupings are a priority. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to transcend the artificial barriers imposed on us by the colonizers. These barriers, languages and ideologies must not prevent us from building up viable economic units, capable of promoting the industrial and commercial efforts of our States.

For that reason, the Heads of State of the West African States signed at Lagos, on 28 May 1975, a treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to which Togo is a party. The member States of ECOWAS undertake to: promote subregional economic co-operation; ensure stability and economic progress; raise the standard of living of more than 200 million souls; and thus contribute to progress and development in the African continent.

Such an undertaking is viable only if it is based on a joint defence of the global interests of the nations concerned. Convinced that the goals of development could not be achieved unless there was peace and political stability, in 1978 the member States of ECOWAS adopted at Lagos the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence Matters. The Protocol has its roots in article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, the guarantor of world peace and security. These goals are also based on the concerns of the OAU, which condemns any action that might threaten peace and security in Africa.

Under the Protocol, the member States of ECOWAS promise to resort neither to threats nor to aggression against the territorial integrity and Independence of another member State or of any other State. Furthermore, the Protocol urges all to contribute to detente by establishing a climate of mutual trust with a view to fruitful and mutually advantageous co-operation. Above all, the Protocol seeks to settle all differences by peaceful means.

The ECOWAS Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence Matters, like the Agreement on Non-Aggression and Assistance in Matters of Defence (ANAD), is an expression of common determination to promote peace in our subregion.

People are often inclined to consider defence and security as purely military matters which are the preserve of the military alone, and to deliberately ignore the global and multifaceted nature of defence. Defence calls for participation by all—workers, farmers, civil servants, tradesmen, students and others—for defence involves protection not only of territorial integrity, but also of individuals, property, economic activities, culture, religion and civilisation. The goal is therefore to protect our States from the forces of evil which come from abroad and to shelter them from destabilising tactics.

In conclusion, the ECOWAS Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence Matters and ANAD are fighting for peace and security. Peace is a pre-requisite for the development and progress of our States. Togo, for its part, is happy to belong to all the subregional, continental and worldwide institutions which are working for peace and progress. Togo trusts in its creative genius and in its human values.

BORDER REGIONS IN AFRICA: COLLABORATION OR CONFLICT

The significance of the border problem to the inter-related subjects of conflict resolution, crisis prevention and management and confidence-building among African States is too obvious to warrant any elaborate justification; and the urgency the problem poses has not been lost on peace researchers and men of affairs with a concern for peace and orderly development of Africa and its subregions. Last October here in Lome, under the auspices of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament, an informal meeting of scholars, researchers and representatives of non-governmental organisations from Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo was held under the

chairmanship of the Centre's Director. The focus of the meeting was the discussion of how best to promote peace, security and development in Africa, with particular reference to the five contiguous West African countries as the experimental field.

The meeting took a number of decisions, the foremost of which was the establishment of a Commission on Border Issues in the Subregion. The decision was premised in part on the universal and age-old awareness of borders as "the razor's edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war or peace, of life or death to nations". Border disputes, conflicts and wars are among the most important obstacles in the path of peace, security and orderly development of the continent and its subregions.

The number of tension areas is legion. We can only illustrate with a few of the most dramatic scenes, such as: the Horn, destabilised for a long time by the irredentist claims of the Somali Republic *vis-a-vis* her neighbours (Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya); the Maghreb, where Moroccan expansionism has occasioned a series of armed confrontations with Algeria, Mauritania, the Polisario and the Saharawi Arab Republic; and Central Africa, where the Chadian crisis has been complicated by border wars not only with Libya over the Aouzou Strip, but also with Nigeria over the disputed location of the boundary in Lake Chad. *Apartheid* South Africa is in a class of its own: in addition to its illegal occupation of Namibia, the Republic has also engaged in systematic aggression and violation of the territorial integrity of all the States in the southern African sub-continent.

Since our concentration is on the international level, we should ignore the several cases of secessionist movements: the Chadian crisis; the autonomous wars in southern Sudan; the Eritrean question in Ethiopia and the defeated Biafran insurrection in Nigeria, to mention just a few. All of these also touched on the question of the territorial frameworks of the affected nation-States.

West Africa has not been an exception to this endemic problem. Indeed, the area must be considered as typical of the African border question. This point is especially easy to see with regard to the area of the subregion made up of Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo, which the October 1987 Working Group chose for its experiment. In spite of common membership of such intergovernmental organisations as the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the several bilateral and multilateral co-operative

agreements and institutions among the States (e.g. the 1984 Quadripartite Protocols in Collective Security among Benin, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo), peaceful relations among the five have often been marred by border incidents and irritations.

These incidents range from disputes to actual wars. Witness, for example, the border closures between Togo and Ghana; between Nigeria and all her neighbours from 1984 to 1986; the killing of Nigerian soldiers on routine border patrol by Camerounian gendarmes at the border village of Ikang in 1982; as well as the incursions into the Nigerian territory by Beninese gendarmes, especially in the Kwara and Sokoto State sectors of the Benino-Nigerian border in 1981 and 1984; actual exchange of artillery fire in 1983 between Nigerian and Chadian troops over the border in Lake Chad; and more recently between Burkina Faso and Mali over the allegedly mineral-rich Agacher strip along their shared boundary. The West African locality is the only one in the entire subregion which features a border demarcation in the form of wire fences, on a section of the Togo-Ghana border.

Not only have border disputes and conflicts tended to compromise the issues of peace and security in several parts of the continent, they have also seriously obstructed realisation of subregional integration efforts and, ultimately, the much-talked-about African common market. Africa's international boundaries artificially serve natural economic planning areas, vitiate markets, obstruct the free flow of labour and capital, and perpetuate distortions in the exchange system. They play crucial roles in the creation and sustenance of parallel economies which, in turn, have posed inherently intractable challenges to the various economic recovery programmes of the States of the region.

Since the intention in this lecture is to explore the peace potential of the subject, we have chosen to concentrate not so much on the perspective of nation-State or sovereignty as on border regions or borderlands, i.e. the special areas along the borders which have been created as a consequence of the international boundaries. A border region should be seen not only from the limited viewpoint of a nation-State, but as a barrier and a bridge at the same time; a political line of demarcation, of socio-cultural juxtapositions, and yet a line of socio-economic and cultural interface; a point of confrontation and yet one of mutual exchange and communications. The borderlands perspective is a product of the search for a more scientific, rational and realistic alternative capable of providing a more reliable basis not only for the resolution and management of existing conflicts and crises but for

preventing future ones for building confidence among States in Africa, so that the ramparts that have been made of the borders between the distinct areas of jurisdiction may be turned into bridges.

What, then, is a border region? What is its structure and content? How is it to be measured? How does it operate? What are its manifestations in the African continent?

These simple questions do not beget simple answers. The controversy surrounding the concept of border regions or any of its familiar synonyms (e.g. borderlands and frontier regions) derives as much from the disagreement among regional science experts regarding what constitutes region as from the lack of consensus among borderlands scholars regarding the precise meaning and limits of a border region.

Regarding the definition of a border region, the controversies centre on issues of structure and dimension; the questions of mode of operation and African manifestations are relatively easy to answer. With regard to structure, two opposing schools of thought have emerged. First, the scholars and policy analysts are committed to the idea of the nation-State as a basic unit of analysis. Since, for adherents of this school, there can be no negotiation over the doctrine of national sovereignty and the sanctity of the nation-State boundaries, border regions can have meaning only when set in the context of their own particular nations. When so defined, a borderland corresponds to the classical interpretation of the area as one which "stretches inward from the boundary and merges imperceptibly with the State". It is in this sense that we can legitimately think, talk, and write in such an exclusive and one-sided term as "Nigerian" borderlands and limit our considerations to the Nigerian sides of the borders shared with adjacent sovereign States such as Benin (formerly Dahomey), Niger, Chad and Cameroon.

However, this contrasts sharply with a rival definition of structure, based on what has been appropriately referred to as the "periphery to periphery interchanges", which have created far stronger ties between borderlands of adjacent sovereign States than between borderlands, on one side of a boundary and other sub-national areas within the same nation-State. Thus, for example, the links would appear stronger and more intimate between the Nigerian and Beninese "Borgu" or between Ghanaian and Ivorian "Assinie" than between each "Borgu" or each "Assinie" and the rest of either Nigeria or Benin in the one example; and Ghana or Cote d'Ivoire in the other instance.

No doubt the transnational approach to the definition of the structure of border regions is far less known and far less influential than the nationalist or sovereignty-biased perspective, which has continued to dominate policy formulation and implementation. Nevertheless, the transnational model is our preference because it has been far more responsive to the realities of borders and border regions. The model correctly points to border regions less as points where two differentiated national structures lie in juxtaposition than as zones of interpenetration between the peoples, economies and institutions of the adjacent national entities where a new and distinct culture area exists, different from either of the two national cultures separated by the border. In recent years, particularly since the end of the Second World War, the transnational model has won an increasing number of supporters among peace-researchers and policy analysts. This is especially the case in Western Europe and North America, where the effect has been an increasing commitment to regional integration and transboundary co-operation, planning and development.

An international boundary influences socio-economic relations and activities far beyond the immediate vicinity of the border itself, and *vice versa*. In our continent, where transborder cultural relations are strongly influenced by the ethnic factor, the behaviour of "partitioned Africans" as "extended communities" further reinforces the picture of the border region as an area of cultural interfacing.

Just how extensive and complex the social impact of an African border can be has often been illustrated by the case of the western Yoruba subgroups which straddle the Nigeria-Benin border. Not only do these form part of a larger world of the Yoruba, who number several million and whose cultural area covers virtually all of the Nigerian territory south and west of the Niger River basin and the adjacent parts of eastern Benin and central Togo; they are historically and culturally related to the Aja-speaking peoples (the Gun, the Fon and the Evhe, concentrated in southern Benin, Togo and Ghana) and the Bariba (mostly the Baatonu) of Borgu, both cultural areas also partitioned by the Nigeria-Benin border. Within the context of these indigenous culture areas, which straddle several West African borders, there are what some have poetically described as Nigerians who "have relations in Benin, who have relations in Togo, who have relations in Ghana, who have relatives in Liberia, who have relatives in Sierra Leone...". The same observation can be made of the other subregions of Africa where culture areas in their hundreds (if not thousands) straddle the 103 international boundaries on the continent.

The resultant status of these borderlands as economically disadvantaged—if not militarily threatened—areas is compounded by their typical peripheral locations. Their neglect by State authorities is proverbial. The socio-economic impact of borders can be so strong that whole national territories, especially those of small countries like Benin, Togo and the Gambia, can be absorbed into border regions of their larger geographically contiguous neighbours. The clandestine movement of Nigerian cocoa into Benin from 1968 to 1987 exemplified the economic category of the contraband across this border. While the main activities were concentrated in border locations, the entire network of the operations covered much wider areas of Nigeria and Benin: purchases of the produce extended over the entire Nigerian "cocoa belt", stretching eastward as far as the Ondo State of Nigeria in eastern Yorubaland.

Similarly extensive is the network of operations involved in the prosecution of criminals regarding automobiles stolen from Nigeria. Police records and media reports show that a good number of the vehicles snatched from their owners in different parts of Nigeria, often by armed robbers, were driven across the border into Benin, which served mostly as a "stage" for distribution farther afield, mostly to ECOWAS member countries such as Togo, Burkina Faso, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire and Mauritania.

Border regions for us are areas where both human and material resources characteristically extend across sovereign boundaries, where local communities and a whole range of essential natural resources—water (surface and underground), air, energy, flora and fauna (particularly the migratory species), energy (especially oil) and other mineral deposits—straddle the border. Border regions are areas where the environmental impacts of human activities in one national territory necessarily affect human life in the adjacent foreign jurisdiction.

The modern history of Europe, the homeland of the nation-State and its border problems, illustrates the capacity of border regions for war and peace. That history confronts Africa with two choices: the path of war and human tragedy, prevalent from the Treaty of Westphalia, in 1648, until the end of the Second World War, or the option of peaceful co-operation, characterised by the regional integration and transborder co-operation since 1945. In one era, the basic concern was for boundary maintenance; the other period has been characterised by a dedication to the simplification of the border and international good-neighbourliness.

My recommendation, then, is peace at all costs, not war. Africa does not need to wait until it has had an experience equivalent to Europe during the Second World War before choosing peace and international collaborative efforts. If it must take a continental-scale disaster for nation-States to realise the value of transborder co-operation, then the people of Africa need only think about events such as the drought and famine across the borders of the entire Sahelian region, or the floods in the Sudanic States of West Africa. We should not wait until there is a continental conflagration, such as that which is being provoked by *apartheid* South Africa, before-embracing international collaboration, and replacing rhetoric with concrete programmes of transborder planning and development.

Here then is the special attraction held by border regions: their potential for international co-operation and preventive diplomacy. Their transnational structure and orientation dictate the imperative of transborder co-operation and a systematic use of regional planning techniques for development. This means a call for a radical re-interpretation of the traditionally cherished doctrine of national self-interest, basic to conventional diplomacy.

It is impossible for a local or regional community or authority in such border areas to undertake coherent local development programmes and law-enforcement without adequate input from counterparts on the other side of the given border. A few years ago, the Nigerian Government was embittered by the syphoning into neighbouring countries of essential commodities which the authorities had to provide at great cost to their citizenry. A similar situation has generated complaints by the Zambian Government about Mozambican, Malawian Chewa and Ngoni kinsmen who overburden the medical, agricultural and educational facilities provided under the State's Rural Integrated Scheme for kinship groups residing on the Zambian side of the boundaries with these neighbouring States.

Our advice is for a supplementary policy that will allow for cooperation between sovereign nation-States through the specific localities directly impacted by their shared boundaries. The new practice will be based on the genuine needs and aspirations of the local populations, organised into responsible local Governments with appropriate powers and mandates of the national authorities. Such authorisation would enable regional and local authorities in border regions to function as agencies for international relations strictly at this local level. In other words, rather than continue in the practice of

placing control directly in the hands of the distant and inadequately informed national Governments, the peoples, through local administrations in the adjoining sides of shared borders, could be directly charged. The regional and local authorities should be enabled to liaise with counterparts across the border for the control and the development of shared resources.

The policy suggestion being made here is not entirely new: trans-border co-operation is the vogue today in the border regions of Western Europe and North America, particularly in the twin cities (e.g. Detroit, Michigan and Windsor, Ontario), and the municipalities astride the United States-Mexico border. Also there is the lesson from our colonial era. Under French and British regimes in West Africa, rival territorial administrations had to seek co-operation at the level of local authorities in adjoining border regions in order to cope with problems such as cross-border protest migrations, smuggling, and the transit needs of landlocked territories. From the 1930s until the end of formal colonial rule in West Africa, the need to provide local solutions to these essentially local problems led to regular periodic meetings of representatives of the French and British authorities in adjacent border regions. In the West African subregion, centralism is embedded in the administration of all the ex-French colonies around us. But even in Anglophone countries, such as Nigeria, where the constitutions provide for a considerable measure of autonomy for local authorities, a centralist practice has been imposed by military interventions and prolonged martial rule.

Yet there are important opportunities in the generally good diplomatic relations among the States of the subregion and the common membership in several intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), most of which support the type of regional understanding necessary for transborder local government and development plans. Indeed, transfrontier co-operation at the local level must be regarded as the most appropriate test of the sincerity of the IGOs. As in Europe, frontier regions in Africa ought to have been the starting point for the realisation of continental and subcontinental integration schemes.

That actual development has been the other way around may well explain the agonisingly limited success and snail-like progress of regional integration endeavours in the continent. Rather than being founded on the realities of African history and geography, so strongly manifested in the border regions, African regional integration schemes have been pursued within the framework of the State. Whether at the

level of subregions, such as ECOWAS and the defunct East African Common Market Organisation, or at the level of the entire continent, such as the OAU-ECA (Economic Commission for Africa) Lagos Plan of Action, African regional integration schemes have been defined and structured as typical international organisations with little or no operational capabilities for levels below the member nations. In these circumstances, border regions were given no attention whatsoever, in spite of their objective conditions.

The refocussing on border regions has unrivalled advantages for the cause of peace and development in our continent and its subregions. The endeavour is to develop a new policy vision that offers African States the opportunity for manageable, co-operative interaction, capable of providing a more secure foundation on which to rest the sub-continental and continental structures and institutions.

This position is supported by the argument in a study of African river systems and shared water resources. It is explained that "the ultimate goal of continental economic cooperation is most likely to be attained in stages, through initially limited cooperative ventures between countries with close historical ties or convergent economic interests".

Transborder co-operation, though related to wider issues of regional integration, is a distinct genre of international collaborative effort. The argument generally is that the international category of regional integration is the central issue, and that once it is achieved border problems and irritations will automatically disappear. But the case of Europe illustrates that this is a wrong assumption. It took much effort for regional integration and for transborder co-operation (the one in the context of the European Economic Community and the other within the framework of the Council of Europe) to attain the present level of achievements.

Founded in 1949, the Council of Europe has campaigned for peoples and regions. It has contained such institutions as the European Conference of Ministers responsible for Regional Planning and, more significantly, the Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe. Made up of representatives of districts, *cantons, Lander,* countries, *departements,* provinces and regions, the Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe is particularly useful as a unique body which officially represents local and regional authorities across several international boundaries in their relations with international institutions.

The OAU or ECOWAS equivalents may be used to bring about an achievement similar to the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities, which was open to the signatures of members of the Council of Europe at Madrid in 1980 and has since been ratified by all, including centralist France. The Convention covers a wide range of local issues which, in border regions, require collaboration of local authorities of foreign jurisdictions for effective management. This new outlook in Europe changes the traditional use of diplomacy as instrument for the management of relations between sovereign nations. The developments in Europe have been inspired by the need to make use of the informal relations within and between ethnic groups and geographic regions that have straddled the European nation-State boundaries. Not surprisingly, organisations of the partitioned peoples and regions have constituted the dynamic element in the new movement. These organisations include the Conference of Upper Rhine Valley Planners, the Regio Basiliansi and the Euregio in the middle and lower Rhine Valleys, the Committee for the Promotion of Alpine Region Co-operation and the Association of European Border Regions, to mention only a few examples. Thus, active involvement of the people is essential for the success of formalised transfrontier co-operation.

The subnational areas inhabited by Africa's "gateway" communities have been among the most depressed socially and economically. In the colonial period, when border regions were traditionally viewed as disadvantaged areas, our borderlands were left out of whatever was done towards development of infrastructure for social and economic development. The neglect of the colonial era has been continued in the era of Independence, thanks to the adoption of a socio-economic development strategy which, in spite of rhetoric about even development, has continued to emphasise centres at the expense of the periphery.

To achieve accelerated development of the border regions and reverse a disadvantage imposed on us by history, we suggest a policy of "compensatory action" which will enable African Governments to single out those areas for accelerated development. African border regions must be treated as negatively impacted areas deserving the sympathetic treatment of nations. Every national Government is encouraged to set up a special development fund to be used for these disadvantaged areas. The need to adjust established policy, which is based on the notion of sovereignty and the use of classical diplomacy, must extend to formal education and scholarly research. If we are to

convert nation-State boundaries from barriers to junctions, legal educators everywhere in the continent must appreciate the need to research and teach a new branch of the law of nations, the international law of good neighbourhood. Similarly, cartographers should delineate human and geographical extensions across sovereign boundaries. Henceforth, teachers of social studies must insist that while children in our schools should hear the anthems of their own nation, they should also know something of the national anthems and flags of geographically contiguous neighbouring sovereign States. There should be more interest in teaching languages, especially in Anglophone countries. In Nigerian border regions, our secondary schools must be improved to provide for a compulsory course in French, which is the official language of the adjacent foreign jurisdictions. Likewise, Francophone West African countries should teach English.

The Commission on Boundary Issues in the West African subregion, set up by the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa in October 1986, has been charged with studying the possibility of setting up a specialised documentation centre that would serve as the data bank for the subregion.

All these efforts are aimed at maximising the potential of border regions for the cause of peace and development in Africa. This potential is best developed by the popularisation of transborder co-operation policy for all adjacent States of the continent and its subregions. Encouragement must come from all directions and at all levels. In particular, the OAU should resolve to promote borders in conformity with the principle of *Uti possidetis,* as it has in the past. Like the resolution in 1964 for the retention of colonial territories, the same concern for continental unity, peace and overall development is today all the more compelling for another decision to devalue the divisive functions of the retained boundaries.

ECOWAS, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

Introduction

Our presentation of this research demonstrates our abiding belief that the Economic Community of West African States is a veritable forum for the promotion and maintenance of peace and security among its member States. The task of proving the validity of this assertion is both an honour and challenge to all of us here as representatives of our countries.

There is hardly anybody in this hall who would not accept the proposition that the signing of the Treaty of ECOWAS in Lagos on 28 May 1975 signalled not just an agreement to promote co-operation and development in all areas of economic activity—particularly in industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions—but also a determination to co-operate in social and cultural matters which, by extension, could touch on all aspects of diplomatic relations among the West African States.

Obviously, one of the implications of such collective relationships should be the promotion and maintenance of peace and security within the subregion. This conclusion is supported by the ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression which was signed in Lagos on 12 April 1978 and which has been discussed by my colleague in his presentation to this assembly.

Furthermore, the concept of collective promotion of peace and security, as well as the peaceful settlement of disputes through regional arrangements, derives from the provisions of chapter VIII (articles 52 through 54) of the Charter of the United Nations. The OAU Charter incorporates the same idea within its provisions under article XIX.

While the OAU represents the rallying point for the promotion of pan-Africanism, ECOWAS is expected to provide the framework for the achievement of self-reliance in West Africa. We hold the view, therefore, that there is a positive correlation between the role of ECOWAS and the need for it to offer its good offices for the peaceful settlement of disputes among its member States.

Causes of Disputes between States

Before the role of ECOWAS as a promoter of peace and security can be placed in proper perspective, it would be pertinent to attempt a cursory identification of the causes (potential and actual) of conflicts between any neighbouring States. While the focus of this research is on west Africa, it should be emphasised that the arguments could be equally valid for any part of the world where similar circumstances of history, geography, politics and economics exist. The causes are summarised under four broad categories as follows:

Historical Causes

The history of West Africa, or any part of Africa for that matter, cannot be fully told without reference to colonialism. While the

intertribal wars and conquests that preceded the European colonisation of West Africa left the subregion with too many non-viable micro-States, the European colonisation left a semblance of order and larger national entities.

However, one of the sad legacies of this colonial experience was the arbitrarily drawn boundaries of the States. These artificial boundaries were simply a reflection of the rivalries among the colonising Powers themselves. The irrationally determined borders have remained potential sources of disputes since Independence.

Regional economic co-operation such as that of ECOWAS, which aims at evolving into a common market, is bound to lead to a de-emphasis of national boundaries.

Socio-Psychological Causes

As emergent nations, the States of West Africa have occasionally witnessed outbursts by their nationals or officials towards the resident nationals of other neighbouring countries, ostensibly because the non-nationals are "illegal aliens" and thought of as being responsible for rising rates of crime. In extreme cases, such passions could be interpreted by analysts as manifestations of xenophobia, irridentism, jingoism or chauvinism. Perhaps such tendencies are the symptoms of new States trying to safeguard their newly won Independence.

Within the States themselves, there could be religious and ethnic tensions which have the tendency to spill over to the neighbouring States.

These are all human problems which are inevitable problems of society. The point here is that the "neighbours' quarrel" may be an inevitable fact of life and is probably intractable, but it should be contained and prevented from exploding into dangerous proportions.

The invocation of the provisions and benefits of the ECOWAS Treaty could turn these passions into mutual respect, acceptance, accommodation and appreciation of communal inter-independence.

Political/Ideological Causes

Differences in ideology and political systems, mutual dislike of political leaders and petty jealousies can sometimes erupt into serious disputes between neighbouring States. In fact, there have been cases elsewhere in Africa in which the territorial claims of ambitious politicians led to armed conflicts.

Empirical evidence also seems to support the assertion that a *coup* that results in the overthrow of a civilian administration in one State tends to provoke hostile reaction by the neighbouring States' civilian administrations.

Non-interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign State is a cardinal principle of both the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity. However, the collective voice of ECOWAS, as a much closer "family" grouping, can be brought to bear on its quarrelling member States by means of moral suasion whenever the need arises.

Economic Causes

States are not equally or evenly endowed with economic resources. Consequently, pockets of affluence within a vast area of economic adversity and under-development could spark off envy and hostilities among neighbouring States. It has been postulated that an overwhelming majority of conflicts in history has stemmed either from economic deprivation or from religious persecution. Students of Marxism recognise economics and religion as the most frequent causes of conflicts between neighbouring communities. The primary goal of ECOWAS is to promote even development among its member States.

Role of ECOWAS in Promotion and Maintenance of Peace and Security in West Africa

In the light of the foregoing, we can conjecture what possibilities a subregional economic arrangement such as ECOWAS can have in promoting and maintaining peace and security in West Africa. Consequently, our perception of the role of the Community as an instrument of peace and security in West Africa can be articulated on the following philosophical propositions:

Political Commitment and Solidarity

The member States' accession to the Treaty of ECOWAS presupposes a lasting commitment to solidarity in action and political *rapprochement* by these States. ECOWAS can therefore be perceived as a partnership in which the collective commitment of its contracting parties is to ensure that its objectives are achieved within a stable political milieu.

ECOWAS provides an appropriate forum for the containment or settlement of disputes arising from the possible causes identified above. The experience of the Community in recent years has amply demonstrated the effectiveness of ECOWAS as a ready negotiator,

mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in disputes between its member States.

The annual meeting of its heads of State can be seen as an annual reaffirmation of the member States' commitment and solidarity and as a regular opportunity to resolve any simmering conflicts in the most amicable and brotherly fashion.

Regional Economic Integration and Development

ECOWAS is essentially an instrument of regional economic integration, designed to promote accelerated and well-balanced development of its member States. It is hoped that mutual distrust and animosities among neighbouring States arising from uneven distribution of wealth will be removed, since the ultimate goal is to set up a fully integrated common market of goods and services in which there is complete mobility of labour and capital, to ensure an equitable distribution of the benefits of integration.

To achieve this anticipated economic millenium for the subregion, ECOWAS has formulated some programmes of action. They include the following:

(a) Liberalisation of trade in order to boost intra-Community trade in volume and value;

(b) Creation of a single-currency monetary union;

(c) Rationalisation and diversification of the patterns and locations of production with a view to promoting complementary economies among the member States;

(d) Harmonisation of sectoral policies to achieve an optimum allocation of resources and minimise waste;

(e) Establishment of a customs union in the medium term and the evolution of a common market in the long term.

These programmes have the combined effect of redressing disparities in economic development among the member States. Their achievement can only succeed if the economic climate in the subregion is not plagued by unnecessary inter-State disputes.

We strongly believe that economic self-reliance throughout the subregion is bound to minimise the possibilities of conflicts among the States. It may be instructive to mention here that the European Economic Community (EEC), from which ECOWAS drew great inspiration, owes its origins to this philosophy. Jean Monnet conceived of the idea of a united Europe, and his compatriot, Robert Schuman, later proposed the establishment of a European Community for Coal

and Steel. President Charles de Gaulle of France and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of the Federal Republic of Germany enthusiastically supported the enduring Franco-German Friendship Treaty. It was widely known that these statesmen were genuinely motivated by one belief: that an economic co-operation effort would remove the rivalries among European nations which had often led to devastating internecine conflicts, such as the Franco-Prussian War and the First and Second World Wars.

We believe that the EEC, as constituted today, has put an end to any possible armed conflict among the 12 member States of the Community. We firmly believe that ECOWAS has such prospects and possibilities in relation to the West African subregion.

Socio-Cultural Benefits

The ECOWAS Treaty provides for free movement of persons and other mobile factors of production. The first phase of this process defined in chapter IV provides for the elimination of entry visa requirements for the nationals of the member States travelling to States other than their own.

The second phase accords the nationals of member States the right to an indefinite period of residence and the right to set up business enterprises in any member State of the Community. Under the aegis of ECOWAS, many associations of professionals from the member States have been established.

Similarly, sporting activities involving football clubs and athletic organisations of member States are held regularly by the member States. This very training Programme, which has assembled a distinguished audience also has the Community's seal of approval.

Sectoral Development Projects

The ECOWAS Fund's financing activities are concentrated in the key sectors of telecommunications, infrastructure and agriculture. It is believed that such integrated sectoral development activities by the Community will have far-reaching positive effects on the attitudes and bilateral relations of the member States.

Concluding Remarks

In this discourse we have attempted to analyse how economic cooperation in general and ECOWAS in particular can serve as an instrument of peace and security. All of the member States of ECOWAS

have an equal stake in its success and continued survival, which can only be achieved if these States accept that ECOWAS would always form the centrepiece in the formulation and conduct of their west African policy. This is the role we see for ECOWAS in the context of the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in the west African subregion. It is eminently fit for that role.

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